- POLICE POWER -

thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

Binay Vs. Laguio
Facts:

Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has

been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council,

approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial
assistance to bereaved families whose gross family
income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds
are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds
in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission
approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission
on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement
of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged
public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the
equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the
police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection
clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,
"Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the
general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent
powers
of
the
State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under
the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are
clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and
such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace
and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity
and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and

has been said to be commensurate with, but not to
exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while
it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to
deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them
the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it
incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services,
the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well
as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care
for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise
of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection
clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the
hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is
the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the
soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, reenacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete.
The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience,
and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the
very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those
who have less in life, should have more in law." This

decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as

an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark
on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No.
92389, September 11, 1991)

GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005

MMDA vs. GARIN
FACTS:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation

receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated
for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his
license and expressed his preference for his case to
be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the
chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction
assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924
violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to
fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and
penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to
return his license and for the authority to desist from
confiscating drivers license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes
MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations
constitutional?
HELD:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was

concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit
of a public corporation endowed with legislative power
and it has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is

the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for good and welfare of the
commonwealth and for subjects of the same.

There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers

MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs
and private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of services. All its functions are administrative
in nature.
LAWS
GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
BALACUIT vs. CFI
FACTS:

Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal

Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which

penalizes any person group of persons, entity or
corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to
require children between seven (7) and twelve (12)
years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended
for adults but should charge only one-half of the said
ticket.
The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and
Sergio Yu Carcel are managers of the Maya and
Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the
Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the
effect of the said ordinance, they filed a complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the
subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and unenforceable.
Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its
decision declaring Ordinance No. 640 as
constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the respondent
court but was later on denied.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and

an invalid exercise of police power.
HELD:

(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a

valid exercise of police power, the same must be
resolved in the negative. While it is true that a
business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that
is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and
its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling
subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may
not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
police measure for the regulation of the conduct,
control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by
the citizens of their property rights. right of the owner
to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or
used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process
clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a
right to manage their property in their own way, to fix
what prices of admission they think most for their own
advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government

is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and

property rights of petitioners for even if We could
assume that, on its face, the interference was
reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has
been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and
unlawful curtailment of the property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of

exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in
Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately
executory.

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
FACTS:

Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and

proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines,
are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003. On February 26, 2004, R.A. No.
9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became
effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act
states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens.
The senior citizens shall be entitled to
the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%)
discount from all establishments relative to
the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial
services for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted

under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on
the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided,
further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall
be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No.
9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso
that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be
subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by
the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law,
the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted
a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The
DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the
tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from
Net Sales together with other deductions which are
considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due
was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On
the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the
amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was

deducted directly from the tax due amount.

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the
twenty percent discount shall include both prescription
and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or
generic. It stated that such discount would be
provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive
use of the senior citizens.
Drug store owners assail the law with the contention
that granting the discount would result to loss of profit
and capital especially that such law failed to provide a
scheme to justly compensate the discount.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior

Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3
Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3
Section 1.
HELD:

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a

forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but
the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify
the meaning of the word compensation, and to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.

The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior

citizens for medical and dental services, and
diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees
charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure
and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive
use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount
to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power

which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not
capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has
been described as the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in
the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the

commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES
20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA
FACTS:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc.,
and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the
second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the
City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such
charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the
execution and enforcement of such
ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of
the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and
motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly
paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting
City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the
alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in
detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in
the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other
law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the
City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and
after July 8, 1963.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
HELD:

A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a

fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in
both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is

the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by

enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that

the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance
is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in
the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme
Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it
void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.

120 SCRA 568 (1983)

VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose.
(1) To enable the City of Manila to collect a fee for
operating massage clinic separately from those operating
barber shops and (2) To prevent immorality which might
probably arise from the construction of separate rooms.
However, petitioner argues that such ordinance amounts
to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of
their means of livelihood without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is
clear that such law is a police power measure. This Court
has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on
the general welfare clause. WHEREFORE, the appealed
order of the lower court is affirmed.
234 SCRA 255 (1994)
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS:

On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in

Cagayan de Oro City and to this end leased a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties. Upon
announcement of the opening of the casino, several
organization in the said area objected, including
Cagayan de Oros sangguniang panglungsod who
later enacted Ordinance no. 3353. Such ordinance
was entitled, AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE

ISSUANCE
OF
BUSINESS
PERMIT
AND
CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND
ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR
PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF
CASINO. Less than a month from the passage of
such ordinance, the sangguniang panglusod of
Cagayan de Oro adopted a sterner ordinance no.
3375-93 which
was
an AN
ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND
PROVIDING
PENALTY
FOR
VIOLATION
THEREFORE.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of
Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervener and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court
of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued
the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.
Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July
13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now
before the court in this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang
panglusod of Cagayan de Oro are valid.
2. WON the Local Government Code should prevail over
and above an existing statute (in this case PD1869)
HELD:

First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling

is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all.
In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature
may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling
and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient.

Although it is true that local government units are

authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it
should be understood that, obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent flaw in
the ordinances in question is that they contravene
P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein
insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the
power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City.

On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869

and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the
case before us. The proper resolution of the problem
at hand is to hold that under the Local Government
Code, local government units may (and indeed must)
prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within
their territories except only those allowed by statutes
like P.D. 1869.

Lastly, The rationale of the requirement that the

ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of
the national government. Local councils exercise only

delegated legislative powers conferred on them by

Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners.

GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997

ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES
FACTS:

15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto

Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which
banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster
outside the city from 1993-1998.

22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office

Order No. 23. It authorized officers to inspect cargoes
containing live fish and lobster that are shipped out of
Puerto Princesa. The purpose of the inspection is to
check if the shipper had the required mayors permit
issued by their office.

19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited
the catching, gathering, possession, etc. of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period
of 5 yrs.

he respondents implemented the ordinances,

depriving all the fishermen, marine merchants, and
shippers of the entire province of their only means of
livelihood.

The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction

of the SC arguing as follows:
1. It deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, violating Section 2, Article
XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor
condition under which the Mayors permit could
be granted or denied; ie. Mayor had absolute
authority in issuing the permit.
3. The Ordinance took away the right of the
fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways.

The respondents contended that it was a valid

exercise of the Provincial Governments power under
the general welfare clause (Sec. 16 of the LGC). The
Ordinance, they argued, only covered live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms and excluded those
not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last
for 5 years. The court must also distinguish between
catching live fish and selling it live and those who
have no intention at all of selling it live.
ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the
exercise of powers under the LGC relative to the
protection and preservation of the environment are a valid
exercise of the police power of a municipal corporation.

HELD: Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of

constitutionality.

Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the

general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be
liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs
in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people of the community.

The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant

fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose
rentals, fees, or charges for their use.

The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for

the general welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants.

The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization.

Indispensable to this is devolution. One of these
powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves. The
term municipal waters includes not only streams,
lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but also
marine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from points
where the boundary lines of the municipality or city
touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with
the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r]
LGC).

Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:

1. Establish a closed season for the species of fish
covered therein for 5 years (This falls within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters);
2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city
and the province from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities (this falls within the
general welfare clause of the LGC and the
express mandate there to cities and provinces to
protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which harm the environment.
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR.
FACTS:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development

Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and
lodging houses.

On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the

lower court praying that the Ordinance of the City of
Manila be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and

improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's
Victoria Court considering that these were not
establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment"
and they were not "services or facilities for
entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for
entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community."

The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns,

massage parlors, beer houses, nightclubs in the
Ermita-Malate area.

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was

invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons:

1.

The City Council has no power to prohibit the

operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code)
grants to the City Council only the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments
2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which
specifically declared portions of the ErmitaMalate area as a commercial zone with certain
restrictions
3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power as the compulsory
closure of the motel business has no reasonable
relation to the legitimate municipal interests
sought to be protected
4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law
by punishing the operation of Victoria Court
which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment
5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional
rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes
an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the
City Council has no power to find as a fact that a
particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it
have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and
6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law as no reasonable basis
exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and
inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments, and for
prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate
area but not outside of this area.
Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the
City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms
of entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" as provided for in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was
enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the
social and moral welfare of the community in
conjunction with its police power.
Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private
respondents and declared the Ordinance null and
void.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court
alleging that the following errors were committed by
the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding
that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise,
unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of
police power; (2) It erred in holding that the
questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 49931 which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial
establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.
Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was
enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary
power of the State and the general welfare clause
exercised by local government units provided for in
Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila
and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid

exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D.

499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a
valid exercise of police power.
HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the
operation of motels and inns within the Ermita-Malate
area.

The exercise of police power by the local government

is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.

The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and

property rights and impairs personal privileges.

It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation;

it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses
may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not
to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had
no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore
ultra vires, null and void.

Police power legislation of such character deserves

the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our
support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the
enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative
bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit
the operation of the enumerated establishments
under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or
conversion without infringing the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
laws not even under the guise of police power.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI
BANK AND TRUST CO.
FACTS:

Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business,

developing and selling lots to the public, particularly
the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On
March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto
Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered
into separate agreements of sale on installments over
two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19,
1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and
interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase
price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds
of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the
agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of
sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1.

2.

The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for

residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled
to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or
any other lots belonging to the Seller.
All buildings and other improvements (except the
fence) which may be constructed at any time in
said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and
properly painted, (b) provided with modern
sanitary installations connected either to the
public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and

(c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2)

meters from its boundary lines.

Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5

directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour
Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions.
Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification
of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the
commercialization of western part of EDSA.
Defendant began constructing a commercial bank
building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him
to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding
police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the
appeal.

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of

police power
HELD: Yes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power.

EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through

several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the
residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality
are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that
while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power.
201 SCRA 13
PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
FACTS:

A complaint for specific performance was filed by

respondent against Teofilo & Rollo Almendras (both
deceased and substituted by petitioner) for violating a
Bel-Air Subdivision restriction that the subject house
and lot shall be used only for residential and not for
commercial purposes, and for non-payment of
association dues to BAVA (respondent)

Deceased petitioners were the registered owners of

the property while Presley, as lessee of the property,
is the owner and operator of Hot Pan de Sal Store
located in the same address.

The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent

which was affirmed by the CA

Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this

petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the ruling of respondent CA is in accordance
with a recent consolidated decision of the SC which
applies in the case at bar in favor of the petitioner
2. WON the ruling of the CA adjudging the petitioner
solidarily liable together with the Almendrases
(deceased) to pay the alleged unpaid association
dues is patently contrary to the evidence and facts
3. WON respondent court adjudging petitioner solidarily
liable to pay attorneys fees is without any legal or
factual basis
Note: During the pendency of the case with this Court,

petitioner Enedina Fox Presley died on January 4, 1991.

She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs,
namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson.
HELD:

The issues raised in the instant petition have already

been dealt with in the consolidated cases decided by
this Court promulgated on December 22, 1988
Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated
the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the
Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this
Court, etc.

Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated

the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the
Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this
Court.

The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all

entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions
annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the
provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the
nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by
the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be
enforced against the petitioner.

But they are, like all contracts, subject to the

overriding demands, needs, and interests of the
greater number as the State may determine in the
legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction
guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the
'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code,
supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot
contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot
be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and
enhance the common good, at the expense of
contractual rights, whenever necessary.

With respect to the demand for payment of

association dues in the sum of P3,803.55, the records
reveal that this issue is now moot and academic.

The demand for payment of attorney's fees is now

without legal or factual basis.

Petition granted.
119 SCRA 597, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT
FACTS:
On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT)
issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 phasing out old and
dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within
the National Capitol Region having year models over 6
years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the Director
of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and
other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital
Region (NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating
a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances. In
accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phasedout in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in
1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model
1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of

Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace

Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a
petition with the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify
Memorandum Circular 77-42 or to stop its implementation;
to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit
for operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed
before the BT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion,
praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was
heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981,
TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same Board a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide
Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or
decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them,
in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may
have under the law for the protection of their interests
before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1
January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its President,
allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was
later informed that the records of the case could not be
located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the implementation and enforcement of
Memorandum Circular 77-42 violates the petioners
constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2)
Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against
arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD:

Regarding the and Substantive Due Process,

Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of
Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable
standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility
motor vehicles. The overriding consideration in the
issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers
posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare
of society. It may also regulate property rights. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public
hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not
violative of procedural due process. Previous notice
and hearing are not essential to the validity of general
rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless
the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to
determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact
that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to
apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and
justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable

standard. The product of experience shows that by

that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost
recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained.
They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit
for safe and comfortable service to the public
specially considering that they are in continuous
operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts
of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the
requirement of due process has been met. alleged
that the Circular in question violates their right to
equal protection of the law because the same is being
enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely
towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be
pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila
is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 7742. In fact, the same is also implemented in Cebu
City. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular
initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city,
compared to those of other places, are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This
is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic
conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort
of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society may
also regulate property rights the language of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded".

- EMINENT DOMAIN WHO EXERCISES THE POWER?

GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919
CITY OF MANILA
VS.
CEMETERY

CHINESE COMMUNITY

FACTS:

The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent

Domain, presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of said City raying that certain lands
described therein, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein
respondents contend that there are other parcels of
land offered for such improvement proposed by the
City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel of
land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved
ones of the Chinese community were buried. Herien
respondents also averred that the City of Manila will
have to spend a great deal amount of money in the
relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres, tombstones
and monuments of those affected by the expropriation
should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery. The
trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was

no necessity for the expropriation of the particular

strip of land in question. The City of Manila appealed
contending that under the law, it has the authority to
expropriate any land it may desire and neither the
court not the land owners can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask
concerning the necessities therefore; and that the
courts are mere appraisers of the land involved.
ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon,
the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD:

Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that the govt. of

the Phil islands, or of any province or department
thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or
public or private corporation having, by law, the right
to condemn private property for public use, shall
exercise that right in the manner prescribed under
Sec. 242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding
shall be presented; that the complaint shall state with
certainty the right of condemnation, with a description
of the property sought to be condemned together with
the interest of each defendant separately.). Section
243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that
the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it
shall then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243
means that when the legislature conferred upon the
courts the right to ascertain upon trial whether the
right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it
intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear
proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is public; and 2.whether
the land is public or private. Supreme Court also
averred that the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is necessary in derogation of private rights,
and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest
necessity existing for an expropriation, it should not
be made for such purposes until it is fully established
that such necessity exist. In the present case, even
granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal
St. through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining
and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free
of charge which will answer every purpose of the City
of Manila. The cemetery, then, still being under care
and maintenance of the living should be spared from
such expropriation where there are other lands
offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to
serve the same purpose. The judgment of the lower
court is hereby affirmed.
268 SCRA 368 (1997)
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:

On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the

Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal
Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a
One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along
the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for
the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities."

In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by

then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and

transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its
approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and
returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available
lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center."
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public
respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent
Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the
RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality
filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession
of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had
already deposited with the municipal treasurer the
necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be
in the government's best interest for public
respondent to be allowed to take possession of the
property.
Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on
the merits, the RTC granted respondent municipality's
motion to take possession of the land. Petitioners'
motion for recon was denied by the trial court.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The
CA held that the public purpose for the expropriation
is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not
declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of
petitioners' property could proceed. Respondent
appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for
recon.
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected
three buildings on the subject property: 2 wooden
structures, and one made of concrete.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the

right to eminent domain, since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.

HELD:

On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary

restraining order enjoining and restraining public
respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing
her and respondent municipality from using and
occupying all the buildings constructed and from
further constructing any building on the land subject of
this petition.

Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for

Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt,
the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995,
citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo
for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to
demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in
violation of the restraining order.

Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and

manifested that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election.
The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a
Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for
Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining
Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the

Municipality of Bunawan.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the
legality of the condemnation proceedings initiated by
the municipality. According to petitioners, the
expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution
No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The
CA
declared
that
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the resolution
"could be baseless, because it failed to point out
which and where are those available lots.'"
Respondent court also concluded that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the
municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation
of petitioners' property could proceed. The Court finds
no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the
CA.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of
Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in
the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities.
For the taking of private property by the government
to be valid, the taking must be for public use and
there must be just compensation.
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the
right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
the local Government Code in force at the time
expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of
said law states:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. A local government
unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute condemnation
proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review.
(1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of
approved ordinances, resolutions and executive
orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the
documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal,
who shall examine them promptly and inform the
sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect
or impropriety which he may discover therein and
make such comments or recommendations as shall
appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any
municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order is
beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang
bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance,
resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in
part, entering its actions upon the minutes and
advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The
effect of such an action shall be to annul the
ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in
whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall be final. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis
supplied.)

10

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of

Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action
which does not render said resolution null and void.
The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337,
grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to
declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 4389 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No.
43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful
authority to petition for the condemnation of
petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is
alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of then
Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support
the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections.
Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C.
Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by
expropriating their land even if there were other
properties belonging to the municipality and available
for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the
municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property
adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch
plan.
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are
that the use must be public, compensation must be
made and due process of law must be observed. The
Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as
the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of
the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising
eminent domain must be genuine and of a public
character. Government may not capriciously choose
what private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case,
however, we find no evidentiary support for
petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of
the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the
municipality does own vacant land adjacent to
petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the
expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent
appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and
documents on record have not pointed out any of
respondent municipality's "other available properties
available for the same purpose." The accusations of
political reprisal are likewise unsupported by
competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds
that petitioners' demand that the former municipal
mayor be personally liable for damages is without
basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

Facts:

Under

a city

council resolution,

the

Municipality

of

Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for

expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square
meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994,
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on
its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160
(the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action,
if any, wasbarred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR
was denied. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal
council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and
will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of
action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for
dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is
primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation

case

the requirements of

substantially
the

law

complies

because

the

with
terms

ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the

purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government
unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36,
Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails

11

to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or

ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration

welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said

of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a

property

Sanggunian

specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and

authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation

permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in

proceedings.

nature.

Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent

legislative branch of government, which may delegate the

domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply

exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public

adopted the language of the previous Local Government

utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to

Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from

expropriate private property only when authorized by

the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA

Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints,

7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive

imposed through the law conferring the power or in other

act pursuant to an ordinance.

legislations.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily

Sec 19, RA 7160

involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of

A local government unit may, through its chief executive

the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the

and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power

legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to

of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare

ordinance

for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment

construction.

of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the

When the legislature interferes with that right and, for

Constitution and pertinent laws.

greater

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before

an individualwithout his consent, the plain meaning of the

an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU,

Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an

to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue

LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the

expropriation

clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot

through

resolution

proceedings

over

of

the

particular

private

under

public

RA 7160

purposes,

--

demands

appropriates

the

strict

land

of

property.

be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public

implementation.

use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and

Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated

the landless.

to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain,

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required

since it must conform to the limits imposed by the

under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other

delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent

pertinent laws.

domain.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to

2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial

the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but

court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata

said offer was not accepted.

are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to

on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving

exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a

identical interests, subject matter and cause of action,

resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no

which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction

compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be

over it.

authorized through an ordinance.

Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res

We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the

judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and

terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A

proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent

municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An

to expropriate private property.

12

Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which

the State might need for public use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the
right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does
apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power
of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not
diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment
over the property to be expropriated has become the law
of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized

agent may still subsequently exercise its right to

expropriate

the

same

property,

once

all

legal requirements are complied with.

OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION
G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY
FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA

Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement
whereby telephone messages, coming from the
United States and received by RCA's domestic
station, could automatically be transferred to the lines
of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the
PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the
United States.

The arrangement was later extended to radiotelephone messages to and from European and
Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a
stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT
gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2
February 1958.

Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of

Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation
and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT
to enable government offices to call private parties.
The Bureau has extended its services to the general
public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned
by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the
Bureau's) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk
lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS)
subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in
the same way that the latter could make a call to the
former.

On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of

Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with
RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas
telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey
radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's
station to and from local residents.

On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long

Distance Telephone Company, complained to the
Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was

violating the conditions under which their Private

Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the
PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for
the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public, in competition with the
business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said
violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April
1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone
connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the
Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was
the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services,
from the rest of the world, except the United States.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to
the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an
interconnecting agreement, with the government
paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through
the interconnecting facilities from the Government
Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT replied
that it was willing to enter into an agreement on
overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian
countries provided that the Bureau would submit to
the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service
Commission.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit
against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its
complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to
execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,
for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone
system throughout the Philippines under such terms
and conditions as the court might consider
reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant company to restrain the
severance of the existing telephone connections
and/or restore those severed.
PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its
part to execute a contrary of services with the Bureau
of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter into
interconnecting agreements, and averred that it was
justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore
leased to the Bureau of Telecommunications under
the existing agreement because its facilities were
being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed
that the Bureau was engaging in commercial
telephone operations in excess of authority, in
competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT,
using defendants own telephone poles, without proper
accounting of revenues.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it
could not compel the PLDT to enter into an
agreement with the Bureau because the parties were
not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94,
establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said
Bureau was not limited to servicing government
offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of
lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or
ought to have known, at the time that their use by the
Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands,
hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse,
or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of
serious public prejudice that would result from the
disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the

13

preliminary injunction permanent, although it

dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims.
Both parties appealed.

ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract

compulsory rendering the company to provide interconnectivity services, despite its objection.
HELD:

The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that

parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract
where no agreement is had between them as to the
principal terms and conditions of the contract.
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of
the essence of our contractual system, and by
express provision of the statute, a contract may be
annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue
influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the
Philippines).

But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that

while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system
and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.

While the defendant telephone company is a public

utility corporation whose franchise, equipment and
other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision
and control of the Public Service Commission (Sec.
13, Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's
telecommunications network is a public service
owned by the Republic and operated by an
instrumentality of the National Government, hence
exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act,
from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First

Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so
far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the
Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company to continue servicing the
Government telephone system upon such terms, and
for a compensation, that the trial court may determine
to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing
of the original complaint or petition. And for this
purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court
of origin for further hearings and other proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.
WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED
G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000
RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR
FACTS:

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)

of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1)
a Complaint to
expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order
dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that
"[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take
private property for public use after payment of just
compensation. In an action for eminent domain,
therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise

of such power or right. The fact that the action also

involves real property is merely incidental. An action
for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not
with this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed
before it, holding that an action for eminent domain
affected title to real property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would determine whether
the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.
Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject
property was less than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court,
raising a pure question of law.

ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over

cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the
assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
HELD:

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary

estimation thus RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over expropriation case as provided for by
Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which states that RTCs
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all
civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;.

If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of

money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his
part of the contract (specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or
to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not

involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take private property for public
useHence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation,
and the observance of due process. The subject
matter of an expropriation suit is the governments
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY
COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY vs.HON. JUDGE VICENTE
G. ERICTA
FACTS:
The city government of Quezon tried to enforce Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING
THE
ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE
AND
OPERATION
OF
PRIVATE
MEMORIAL
TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING

14

PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" through

the passing of a resolution wchich reads: RESOLVED by
the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does
hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots
in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
But Respondent Himlayang Pilipino questioned the validity
of the ordinance specifically its sec9 w/c provides that At
least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than six months from the date
of approval of the application. . respondent alleged that
this is contrary to law and further contended that contends
that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts
the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property and stressed that the general
welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. After the
examining the facts, respondent court ruled that The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit
and declared the ordinance null and void.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in declaring the
ordinance null and void?
HELD:

SC ruled that police power is usually exercised in the

form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation
of property with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare
as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally
possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No.

6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of
the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the
city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.
328 U.S. 256, May 27, 1946

UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY

FACTS:

Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil

Aeronautics Board. Respondents own 2.8 acres near
an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It
has on it a dwelling house, and also various
outbuildings which were mainly used for raising
chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast
runway is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and
2,275 feet from their house

United States began operations in May, 1942, its fourmotored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier
type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed
over respondents' land buildings in considerable
numbers and rather close together. They come close
enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of
the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees
as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling.
And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights
up the place. As a result of the noise, respondents
had to give up their chicken business. As many as six
to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying
into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that
manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The
result was the destruction of the use of the property
as a commercial chicken farm. Respondents are
frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has
become nervous and frightened. Although there have
been no airplane accidents on respondents' property,
there have been several accidents near the airport
and close to respondents' place

The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of

1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49
U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401
et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et seq. Under those statutes
the United States has 'complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the air space' over this country.
the planes never touched the surface would be as
irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal
livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate.

The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property'

shall not 'be taken for public use, without just
compensation.' The Court holds today that the
Government has 'taken' respondents' property by
repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above
respondents' land at a height of eighty-three feet
where the light and noise from these planes caused
respondents to lose sleep and their chickens to be
killed
ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and
regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents'
land at low altitudes.
HELD:

The Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to

control all navigable airspace. Congress has already
acted under that power. It has by statute, 44 Stat.
568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that 'the United States of
America is ... to possess and exercise complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256,
272] air space (over) the United States.' navigable

15

airspace which Congress has placed in the public

domain is 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes
of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
Airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above
the land, is part of the public domain.
The contribution of courts must be made through the
awarding of damages for injuries suffered from the
flying of planes, or by the granting of injunctions to
prohibit their flying
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded
to the Court of Claims so that it may make the
necessary findings in conformity with this opinion.

244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
FACTS:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No.

2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec
space of not less than one-half page for the common
use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec
space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates to enable them to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue
and their platforms of government. The Comelec
space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a nonprofit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and
void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. On behalf of the
respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed
that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard
and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional.
HELD:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as

unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate Comelec space amounts to
taking of private personal property without payment
of the just compensation required in expropriation
cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent
Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not
unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of
private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. FRANCISCO

FACTS:

The petitioner sought to expropriate the three (3)

adjoining land with and area of 1,847 sq. meter
registered under the name of the defendants namely
Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, Rodulfo, Antonio, and
Virginia wherein they constructed residential houses
several decades ago which they had leased out to
tenants until the present. In 1983, the lots were
classified by the Board of the Housing and Urban
Development Council as an Area of Priority
Development for Urban Land Reform under
Proclamation Number of then President Marcos. As a
result of this classification, the tenants and occupants
offered to purchase the lots but the respondents
refused to sell. On November 1996, upon petition of
the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and
occupants of the subject land adopted a resolution
authorizing Mayor Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong
to initiate action for expropriation of the subject lots
and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land. On January 1996,
Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a letter to the
respondents offering to purchase the said property at
P3, 000.00 per sq. meter; respondents did not answer
the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation
of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at
the fair market value of P3, 000.00 per sq. meter.

The respondents except Eusebio Aguilar who died in

1995, claimed that they did not received a copy of
Mayor Abalos letter to purchase their lots. They
alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary
and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the
subject lots are their only real property and are too
small for expropriation, while petitioner has several
properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair
market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is
arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square
meter. On 1997, Petitioner filed an amended
complaint and named as an additional defendant
Virginia Aguilar and at the same time, substituted
Eusebio Aguilar with his five (5) heirs. Petitioner also
reduced the area sought to be expropriated to 1, 636
square meters. The Trial Courts decision was in favor
of the respondents, dismiss the amended complaint
and declared respondents as small property owners
whose land are exempt from expropriation under RA
7279. Also found out that the expropriation was not for
public purpose for petitioners failure to present
evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are landless and homeless.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the respondents are qualified as small property
owners and are thus exempt from expropriation under
RA no. 7972.
2. W/N the subject property is the only real property of
respondents for them to comply with the second
requisite for small property owners.
HELD:

The acquisition of lands for socialized housing are

governed with several provisions of the law. Thus,
Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279 provides for the

16

priorities in the acquisition of lands and enumerates

the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy in
their acquisition, and the modes of land acquisition or
the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing,
respectively.
Under Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to
be acquired in the following order: (1) government
lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands
within the declared Areas for Priority Development
(APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which
have not yet been acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan
Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites
which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privatelyowned lands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are
privately-owned and therefore last in the order of
priority acquisition. However, the law also provides
that lands within the declared APD's which have not
yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the
order of priority. According to petitioner, since the
subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact
mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition.
Also, Lands for socialized housing under Section 10
are to be acquired in the following modes: (1)
community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land
assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5)
donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to
two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when
the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted;
(b) parcels of land owned by small property owners
are exempt from such acquisition.
These means that the types of lands that may be
acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be
acquired only in the modes authorized under Section
10.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the
different modes of land acquisition for socialized
housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the priorities
in the acquisition for socialized housing under said
law. It, however, did not state with particularity
whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition
in Section 10 of the law before it decided to
expropriate the subject lots. The law states
"expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes
of acquisition have been exhausted." Petitioner
alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by
negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through the City
Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents but
the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of
acquisition, no mention has been made. The
Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the
expropriation of the subject property did not even
state whether the city government tried to acquire the
same by community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
the government, or joint venture agreement under
Section 10 of the law. The law expressly exempted
"small property owners" from expropriation of their
land for urban land reform.
Under Section 3 of RA 7279, Small-property owners"

are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real

property whose property consists of residential lands
with an area of not more than 300 square meters in
highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in
other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real
property other than the same.
In the case at bar involves two (2) residential lots
Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized City. The lot
totalled 1, 636 square meters was issued in the
names of the herein five (5) respondents. The
respondents are co-owners of the said lot. Under
Article 493 of the Civil Code, every co-owner has the
absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the
common property. The co-owner is free to alienate,
assign or mortgage his interest, except as to purely
personal rights. He may also validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party independently of the
other co-owners. The effect of any such transfer is
limited to the portion which may be awarded to him
upon the partition of the property. The partition in
1998, six (6) months after the filing of the
expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by
converting into certain and definite parts the
respective undivided shares of the co-owners. The
rights of the co-owners to have the property
partitioned and their share in the same delivered to
them cannot be questioned for "no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership." The partition
was merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership;
and absent any evidence to the contrary, this partition
is presumed to have been done in good faith. Upon
partition, only Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347
square meters, which is 47 sq. meters more than the
maximum of 300 square meters allowed by law set by
RA 7279 for small property owners. However, after
Eusebio died, his five heirs became co-owners of his
347 square meter portion. Dividing the 347 square
meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4
square meters of the land subject of litigation. The
share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300
square meter limit set in R.A. 7279.
The second issue is whether the subject property is
the only real property of respondents for them to
comply with the second requisite for small property
owners which Antonio Aguilar testified that he and
most of the original co-owners do not reside on the
subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco,
Manila. Respondents therefore appear to own real
property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless,
the records do not show that the ancestral home in
Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are
owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner
did not present any title or proof of this fact despite
Antonio Aguilar's testimony. Respondents claim that
the subject lots are their only real property and that
they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio
Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore
do not own any other real property in Metro Manila.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in
the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar
testified that he and the other co-owners filed
ejectment cases against the occupants of the land
before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong.
Orders of eviction were issued and executed on
September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of

17

the tenants and other occupants from the land in

question.
PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION
284 SCRA 716 (1998)
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Filstream is the registered owner of the subject land which
filed an ejectment suit against the occupants of the parcels
of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract
and non-payment of rentals. The MTC rendered decision
in favor of the petitioner and ordered private respondents
to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to the
petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed this decision. It was
at this stage that respondent City of Manila approved an
Ordinance authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition
by negotiation, expropriation, purchased and other legal
means certain parcels of land which formed part of the
properties of the petitioner then occupied by private
respondents. The said properties were to be sold and to
be distributed to the qualified tenants of the area pursuant
to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. The Trial Court issued a writ of possession in favor
of the City of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila complies with the
conditions under RA No. 7279 when it expropriated
petitioner Filstream properties.
HELD:

The court found nothing that would indicate that

respondent City of Manila complied with Section 9
and 10 of RA No. 7279. Under Section 9, lands for
socialized housing are to be acquired in the following
order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the
public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle
lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority
Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5)
BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services
or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(6) privately-owned lands.

The provisions are the limitations with respect to the

order of priority in acquiring private lands and in
resorting to expropriation. Private lands rank the last
in the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. Expropriation proceedings are to be resorted
to only when the other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
must be deemed mandatory because these are the
only safeguards on securing the right of owners of
private property to due process when their property is
expropriated for public use.

Petitioner Filstreams properties were expropriated

and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila
sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of
other lands listed under Section 9 of R.A. no. 7279
have proved futile. There was a violation of Petitioner
Filstreams right to due process which must
accordingly be ratified. The state has the paramount
interest in exercising his power of eminent domain for

the general welfare considering that the right of the

State to expropriate private property as long as it is
for public use always takes precedence over the
interest of private property owners. But we must not
lost sight of the fact that the individual rights affected
by the exercise of such rights are also entitled for
protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this
right cannot override the guarantee of due process
extended by the law to owners of the property to be
expropriated.
PUBLIC USE
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 , October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary

injunction challenging the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of
the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation
No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed
Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and in the
municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province
of Cebu as tourist zones. The petitioners ask that we
restrain respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu
and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from
enforcing and implementing the writs of possession
issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA
against the petitioners.

The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4)

Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of
rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to
acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within
and without the tourist zones" for the purposes
indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised
Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of
selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value.

The defendants filed their respective Opposition with

Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The
defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation
in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with
public use under the Constitution. They further
alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purpose.
ISSUE: Whether expropriation of several barangays for
provocation of tourism and construction of sports and hotel
complexes constitutes expropriation for public use.
HELD: YES.

The petitioners' contention that the promotion of

tourism is not "public use" because private
concessioners would be allowed to maintain various
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.
inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less
merit. The expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public

18

purpose even if the developed area is later sold to

private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment
and service companies, and other private concerns.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants,
and other private businesses using public streets end
highways do not diminish in the least bit the public
character of expropriations for roads and streets. The
lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built
on expropriated land does not make the taking for a
private purpose. Airports and piers catering
exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies
are still for public use.
GR No. 137285, January 15, 2001
ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA
FACTS:

On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines

Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation
proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigated riceland
in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B)
of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an
approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is
registered in the name of Salud Jimenez under TCT
No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in
an Order dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of
private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among
others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the
said order was sought by petitioner contending that
said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would
not be utilized for a public purpose.

In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court

reconsidered the Order dated July 11, 1991 and
released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the
expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding
the said order unacceptable, private respondent
PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private

respondent offering two (2) proposals, namely:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with
respect to Lot 1406-A I consideration of the
waiver of claim for damages and lass of income
for the possession of said lot by private
respondent.

the expropriation proceedings. On the other

hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees
to waive, quit claim and forfeit its claim for
damages and loss of income which it sustained
by person of the possession of said lot by plaintiff
from 1981 up to the present.
2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of
Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an
area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of
the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the
plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and
exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167
square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to
the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3. That the swap arrangement recognized the
fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T113498 of the state of defendant Salud Jimenez
is considered expropriated in favor of the
government based on Order of the Honorable
Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of
being paid the just compensation for said lot, the
estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434
covered by TCT No. T-14772.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide by
the terms of the foregoing agreement in good
faith and the Decision to be rendered based on
this Compromise Agreement is immediately final
and executory.

2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered

by TCT No. T-14772 since private respondent
has no money yet to pay for the lot.

Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal"

and the compromise agreement was signed by
private respondent through its then administrator
Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted by Government
Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said compromise
agreement9 dated January 4, 1993 is quoted
hereunder:
1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal
from the Order of the Honorable Court dated
October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial

court for the approval of the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties,
consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the
Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993,
the trial court approved the compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title
of Lot 434 to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the
registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13,
1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to Partially
Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993."
In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court
annulled the said compromise agreement entered into
between the parties and directed private respondent
to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner.
Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court,
respondent PEZA moved13 for its reconsideration.
The same proved futile since the trial court denied
reconsideration in its Order14 dated November 3,
1997.
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance
of petitioner, corrected the Orders dated August 4,
1997 and November 3, 1997 by declaring that it is Lot
1406-B and Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered
and returned to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated

19

August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the court.

Petitioner filed its Comment17 on January 16, 1998.
ISSUE: The petition anchored on the following assignment
of errors:
1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals committed grave
and reversible error in giving due course to the special
Civil Action filed by respondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No.
46112 when it was made substitute for lost appeal in clear
contravention of the Honorable Courts ruling in Sempio v.
Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) and Ongsitco v. Court of
Appeals (255 SCRA 703) .
2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special Civil
Action of Certiorari is proper, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless wrongly interpreted the phrase Original
Demand contained in Article 2041 of petitioner estate is
the return of the subject lot (Lot 1406-B) which sought to
be expropriated and not the determination of just
compensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if the
interpretation of the court of appeals or the import of the
phrase in question is correct, it is Article 2039 of the Civil
Code and not Article 2041 which is applicable to
compromise agreements approved by the courts.
HELD:

This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did

not err in interpreting "original demand" to mean the
fixing of just compensation. The authority of
respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof
have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order
dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly
admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement.
The only issue for consideration is the manner and
amount of payment due to petitioner. In fact, aside
from the withdrawal of private respondent's appeal to
the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406-A, the
matter of payment of just compensation was the only
subject of the compromise agreement dated January
4, 1993. Under the compromise agreement, petitioner
was supposed to receive respondent's Lot No. 434 in
exchange for Lot 1406-B. When respondent failed to
fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can
again demand for the payment but not the return of
the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the
Court of Appeals is in according with Section 4 to 8,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

This court holds that respondent has the legal

authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and
that the same was for a valid public purpose. In
Sumulong v. Guerrero41 , this Court has ruled that,
the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions.

We have rules that the concept of just compensation

embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property
owner is made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving

the amount necessary to cope with his loss. We find

that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving
what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the
expropriation order was issued by the trial court in
1991. The compromise agreement between the
parties was approved by the trial court in 1993.
However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent
has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the
prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to
petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a
good title to the property to be swapped with Lot
1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been
reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the
said expropriated lot. However, it is high time that the
petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years
ago. It is high time that the petitioner be paid what
was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and
capricious for a government agency to initiate
expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property,
allow the judgment of the court to become final and
executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that
there are no appropriations for the property earlier
taken and profitably used. Though the respondent has
committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot,
however, grant the petitioner's prayer for the return of
the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of
expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become
final and executory.

In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate

that this case be remanded to the trial court for
hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B
and for its prompt payment to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied.

The Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
expropriation proceedings, docketed as Civil Case
No. N-4029, regarding the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described
in TCT No. T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same
with dispatch.
GENUINE NECESSITY
G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM
FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a

special civil action for expropriation with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case
No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad
Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose
of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of
Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square
meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of
13,164 square meters.

After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine

National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated
October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of
the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI
rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.

20

The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of

Appeals but it was dismissed
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the
Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca GaleosValdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with
the same CFI an action for recovery of possession
with damages against the Republic and officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the
property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
R-7208.
In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering
Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of
Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio,
respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase
subject to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932
and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable
market value.
The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the
owners and have retained their right as such over
Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics failure to
pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to
execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In
view of the differences in money value from 1940 up
to the present, the court adjusted the market value at
P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum
from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation
proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied,
Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI
Decision, in view of the amount in controversy,
directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No.
L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its
Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered
owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no
payment of just compensation by the Republic.
Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to
show that the Republic paid the owners or their
successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision.
While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said
deposit was allegedly disbursed,
however, the
payees could not be ascertained.
Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot
932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for
their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite
demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976.
Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.
Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu
City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore
Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of
the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo
Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners.
Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead
the Republic.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus
declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and
exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an

absolute owner including the right to possession. The

monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter
claims contained in the answer of defendants are
ordered Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its
Decision dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate
Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for
the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on
the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff
or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or
interest in the real property, which is the subject
matter of the action.
Also the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as
cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs.
Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the
foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of defendantappellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or
uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim
that can be removed by an action to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding
no reversible error in the appealed May 4, 2001
Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision
is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ISSUE: The basic issue is whether the Republic has

retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondents
predecessors-in-interest
the
just
compensation
HELD:

From the taking of private property by the government

under the power of eminent domain, there arises an
implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss

Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of

Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant
but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in
keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers
to the detriment of the individuals rights. Given this
function, the provision should therefore be strictly
interpreted against the expropriator, the government,
and liberally in favor of the property owner.

Title to property which is the subject of condemnation

proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the
judgment fixing just compensation is entered and
paid, but the condemnors title relates back to the
date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain
Act, or the commissioners report under the Local
Improvement Act, is filed.

Clearly, without full payment of just compensation,

there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to
the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republics
acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full
payment of just compensation within a reasonable
time

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED

21

G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988

MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the

resolution dated April 24,1985 by the former
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
setting aside its earlier decision dated January 10,
1985 and dismissing the special civil action for
expropriation filed by the petitioner.

Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising

Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a
permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8
meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879.
The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable
the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and
various finished products such as large diameter steel
pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors,
bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles,
large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost
housing.

The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by

then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No.
258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to
expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.

An opposition to the resolution was filed by the

respondent with the Office of the Provincial Governor,
which, in turn, created a special committee of four
members to investigate the matter.

The Special Committee recommended that the

Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the
resolution in question because there was no genuine
necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to
expropriate the respondent's property for use as a
public road.

On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of

Bulacan passed Resolution No. 238, Series of 1976,
disapproving and annulling Resolution No. 258,
Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to the
Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the
permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land.

However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now

headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed
Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of
expropriating anew the respondent's land. The
Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid
resolution on January 25, 1984.

Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.

Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is

the market value of the land, with the Philippine
National Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued
a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner.

The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of

the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial
Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall
hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation
for the property.

The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate

Court on petition for review. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon
motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the
decision was re-examined and reversed. The
appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity
to expropriate the land for use as a public road as
there were several other roads for the same purpose
and another more appropriate lot for the proposed
public road. The court, taking into consideration the
location and size of the land, also opined that the land
is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent's
heavy equipment and finished products.

ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right

to exercise its power of eminent domain to expropriate the
respondent's property for use as a public road?
HELD:

This Court held that the foundation of the right to

exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Condemnation of private property is
justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine
necessity
of
a
public
character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire
into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity thereof. There is absolutely no showing in
the petition why the more appropriate lot for the
proposed road which was offered for sale has not
been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to
expropriate assuming there is a real need for another
connecting road.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The questioned resolution of the
respondent court is AFFIRMED.

Facts:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road

from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near
the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas
Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly
made of light materials, were located. The road
had to be at least three meters in width, as
required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks
could pass through in case of conflagration.
[2]
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the
road for water and electrical outlets. [3] The
municipality then decided to acquire 51 square
meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and
Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,[4]which is
abutting E. R. Santos Street.

On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of

Pasig approved an Ordinance[5] authorizing the
municipal mayor to initiate expropriation
proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of

22

the municipalitys intent to purchase the property

for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer.

On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a

complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against
the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the
property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein
that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its
intention to construct an access road on a portion
of the property but they refused to sell the same
portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a
photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.[6]
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the
market value of the property based on the latest
tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiffs
motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over
the property sought to be expropriated. On
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of
the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation,
Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property.[7] Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed
therein a cemented road with a width of three
meters; the road was called Damayan Street.

In their answer,[8] the defendants claimed that, as

early as February 1993, they had sold the said
property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of
sale[9] bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto
Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.

JILCSFI averred, that the plaintiffs exercise of

eminent domain was only for a particular class
and not for the benefit of the poor and the
landless. It alleged that the property sought to be
expropriated is not the best portion for the road
and the least burdensome to it. JILCSFI also
averred that it has been denied the use and
enjoyment of its property because the road was
constructed in the middle portion and that the
plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest.

On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order

in favor of the plaintiff, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the Court Resolves to DECLARE the
plaintiff as having a lawful right to take the property in
question for purposes for which the same is
expropriated.
The plaintiff and intervenor are hereby directed to
submit at least two (2) names of their recommended
commissioners for the determination of just

compensation within ten (10) days from receipt

hereof.

SO ORDERED.[26]

The RTC held that, as gleaned from the

declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was
substantial compliance with the definite and valid
offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
and that the expropriated portion is the most
convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid.

Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the

CA.

The Court of Appeals Decision

In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA

affirmed the order of the RTC.[28] The CA agreed
with the trial court that the plaintiff substantially
complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
particularly the requirement that a valid and
definite offer must be made to the owner. The CA
declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to
discuss with him the road project and the price of
the lot, was a substantial compliance with the
valid and definite offer requirement under said
Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that there
was also constructive notice to the defendants of
the expropriation proceedings since a notice
of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on November 26,
1993.[29]

Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the

subject property based on the findings of the trial
court that the portion of the property sought to be
expropriated appears to be, not only the most
convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering
the area, particularly fire trucks.

Issues:

(1) whether the respondent complied with the

requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government
Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property
prior to the filing of the complaint;
(2) whether its property which is already intended
to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by
the respondent; and

(3) whether the requisites for an easement for

right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New
Civil Code may be dispensed with.

23

compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the

Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall
be determined by the proper court based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope

The right of eminent domain is usually

understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property
within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. The nature and scope of such power
has been comprehensively described as follows:

It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power

grounded in the primary duty of government to serve
the common need and advance the general welfare.
Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every
independent government without the necessity for
constitutional recognition. The provisions found in
modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to
the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government, but
limit the power which would, otherwise, be without
limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that
[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Furthermore, the due
process and equal protection clauses act as additional
safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this
governmental power.[41]

Strict Construction and Burden of Proof

The exercise of the right of eminent domain,

whether directly by the State or by its authorized
agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights.[42] It is one of the harshest proceedings
known to the law. Consequently, when the
sovereign delegates the power to a political unit
or agency, a strict construction will be given
against the agency asserting the power.[43] The
authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in
favor of the owner and against the condemnor.
[44]
When the power is granted, the extent to
which it may be exercised is limited to the
express terms or clear implication of the statute
in which the grant is contained.[45]

The Court declared that the following requisites

for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain by a local government unit must be
complied with:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative

council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for

public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required

under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made

to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was not accepted.[47]

Valid and Definite Offer

Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations

Implementing the Local Government Code
provides:

ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. (a)

The offer to buy private property for public use or
purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the
property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its
acquisition, and the price offered.

The grant of the power of eminent domain to

local government units is grounded on Section 19
of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:

(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its

entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and
payment forthwith made.

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit

may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just

(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their

property but at a price higher than that offered to
them, the local chief executive shall call them to a
conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement
on the selling price. The chairman of the appropriation

24

written definite and valid offer to acquire the

property for public use as an access road. The
only evidence adduced by the respondent to
prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local
Government Code is the photocopy of the letter
purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose
Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco.

or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his

absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen
as its representative, shall participate in the
conference. When an agreement is reached by the
parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.

(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the

following documents:

(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local

chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The
resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be
embodied in the contract;

(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in

the contract; and

(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability

of funds together with a statement that such fund shall
not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to
pay for the purchase of the property involved.

The respondent was burdened to prove the

mandatory requirement of a valid and definite
offer to the owner of the property before filing its
complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter.
[48]
It is incumbent upon the condemnor to
exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it
desires by agreement.[49] Failure to prove
compliance with the mandatory requirement will
result in the dismissal of the complaint.[50]

It bears stressing, however, that the respondent

offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent
to acquire the property for a right-of-way.[60] The
document was not offered to prove that the
respondent made a definite and valid offer to
acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected
the document because the respondent failed to
adduce in evidence the original copy thereof.
[61]
The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce
evidence that copies of the letter were sent to
and received by all the co-owners of the property,
namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching
Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.

Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the coowners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer
to purchase a specific portion of the property for
a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only
one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to
a conference to discuss the project and the price
that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.

There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs

ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioners TCT
No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with
the requisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a
notice to the whole world of the pendency of an
action involving the title to or possession of real
property and a warning that those who acquire an
interest in the property do so at their own risk and
that they gamble on the result of the litigation
over
it.[63] Moreover,
the lis
pendens was
annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on
November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had
been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.

Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas

clauses of the ordinance that the property owners
were already notified by the municipality of the
intent to purchase the same for public use as a
municipal road, a substantial compliance with the
requirement of a valid and definite offer under
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably,
theSangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous
premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached
the co-owners of the property. In the absence of
competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent
made a definite and valid offer to all the coowners of the property, aside from the letter of
Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is
not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160.

An offer is a unilateral proposition which one

party makes to the other for the celebration of a
contract.[51] Corollarily, the offer must be
complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the
kind of contract intended and definitely stating the
essential conditions of the proposed contract.
[53]
An offer would require, among other things, a
clear certainty on both the object and the cause
or consideration of the envisioned contract.[54]

The purpose of the requirement of a valid and

definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed
for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and
delay of a court action.[55]

The expropriating authority is burdened to make

known its definite and valid offer to all the owners
of the property. However, it has a right to rely on
what appears in the certificate of title covering the
land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to
make its offer only to the registered owners of the
property. After all, it is well-settled that persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond
what appears on its face.[58]

In the present case, the respondent failed to

prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a

25

Public Necessity

We reject the contention of the petitioner that its

property can no longer be expropriated by the
respondent because it is intended for the
construction of a place for religious worship and a
school for its members. As aptly explained by this
Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals,[65] thus:

It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila

Railroad Co., that:

A historical research discloses the meaning of the

term public use to be one of constant growth. As
society advances, its demands upon the individual
increases and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted.
for whatever is beneficially employed for the
community is a public use.

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There

was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy,
as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more.
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove
any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities
and other private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirements of public use.

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M.

Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has
viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one
that is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so
as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems
the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what,
in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public
use which is just as broad as public welfare.

Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called unusual

interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalos)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain when only members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the
principal objective of, not the casual consequences
that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix

Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to

commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such
a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a
few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
property, does not necessarily diminish the essence
and character of public use.

The subject property is expropriated for the

purpose of constructing a road. The respondent
is not mandated to comply with the essential
requisites for an easement of right-of-way under
the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the
absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of
the power of eminent domain may determine the
location and route of the land to be
taken[66] unless such determination is capricious
and wantonly injurious.[67] Expropriation is justified
so long as it is for the public good and there is
genuine
necessity
of
public
character.
[68]
Government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.[69]

The respondent has demonstrated the necessity

for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street
to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were
residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that
although there were other ways through which
one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however,
especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street.
This is more than sufficient to establish that there
is a genuine necessity for the construction of a
road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is
not required, only reasonable and practical
necessity will suffice.[70]

Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the

necessity for constructing the road particularly in
the petitioners property and not elsewhere. [71] We
note that the whereas clause of the ordinance
states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest
and most suitable access road to connect Sto.
Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The
respondents complaint also alleged that the said
portion of the petitioners lot has been surveyed
as the best possible ingress and egress.
However, the respondent failed to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.

However, as correctly pointed out by the

petitioner, there is no showing in the record that
an ocular inspection was conducted during the
trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject property during the trial,
the petitioner was not notified thereof. The
petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to
due process. It bears stressing that an ocular
inspection is part of the trial as evidence is
thereby received and the parties are entitled to

26

be

present at any stage of the trial.

Consequently, where, as in this case, the
petitioner was not notified of any ocular
inspection of the property, any factual finding of
the court based on the said inspection has no
probative weight.
[73]

REPUBLIC VS. LIM

Ruling:

Facts:

More than anything else, however, it is the

obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to
dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19,
1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the
Republic to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable
market value of the two lots in question.
Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed
several decades to pass without obeying this
Courts mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy
bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and
to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance.
It is tantamount to confiscation of private
property. While it is true that all private properties
are subject to the need of government, and the
government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion
demands, however, the Constitution guarantees
that when this governmental right of expropriation
is exercised, it shall be attended by
compensation.[10] From the taking of private
property by the government under the power of
eminent domain, there arises an implied promise
to compensate the owner for his loss.[11]

Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of

Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a
grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the
Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of
governmental powers to the detriment of the
individuals rights. Given this function, the
provision should therefore be strictly interpreted
against the expropriator, the government,
and liberally in favor of the property owner.[12]

Ironically, in opposing respondents claim, the

Republic is invoking this Courts Decision
in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How
could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot
932 when it has not paid its owner the just
compensation, required by law, for more than 50
years? The recognized rule is that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in
other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al.,
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[13] thus:

On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the

Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu, involving Lots 932 and
939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug,
Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a
military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot
932 was registered in the name of Gervasia
Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters,
while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon
and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of
13,164 square meters.

After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine

National Bank, Thereafter, the CFI rendered its
Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation.

The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court

of Appeals but it was dismissed on March 11,
1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5,
1948.

On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its

Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained their right as such
over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics failure to
pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings

In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the

Denzons, filed with the National Airports
Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots,
but it denied knowledge of the matter. Another
heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the
Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote
the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Secretary of National Defense to expedite action
on said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on
September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-ininterest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and
Josefina Galeos-Panerio,[2] filed with the same
CFI an action for recovery of possession with
damages against the Republic and officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of
the property. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. R-7208.

27

Title to property which is the subject of

condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnors title relates back to the date on which the
petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the
commissioners report under the Local Improvement
Act, is filed.

Clearly,
without
full
payment
of
just
compensation, there can be no transfer of title
from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise
stated, the Republics acquisition of ownership is
conditioned upon the full payment of just
compensation within a reasonable time.[14]

Significantly,
in Municipality
of
Bian
v.
Garcia[15] this Court ruled that the expropriation of
lands consists of two stages, to wit:

x x x The first is concerned with the determination of

the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is

concerned with the determination by the court of the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.

It is only upon the completion of these two stages

that expropriation is said to have been
completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment
Corporation,[16] we ruled that, the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation.
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a
period of 57 years rendered the expropriation
process incomplete.

The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza,

respondent is not entitled to recover possession
of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair
market value. Of course, we are aware of the
doctrine that non-payment of just compensation
(in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle
the private landowners to recover possession of
the expropriated lots. This is our ruling in the
recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] and Reyes vs.
National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts
of the present case do not justify its application. It
bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to
pay just compensation twice, the first was in the

expropriation proceedings and the second,

in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have
passed since then. We cannot but construe the
Republics failure to pay just compensation as
a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
circumstance, recovery of possession is in
order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that
recovery of possession may be had when
property has been wrongfully taken or is
wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under
the power of eminent domain[19] or where a
rightful entry is made and the party
condemning refuses to pay the compensation
which has been assessed or agreed upon;
[20]
or fails or refuses to have the compensation
assessed and paid.[21]

The Republic also contends that where there

have been constructions being used by the
military, as in this case, public interest demands
that the present suit should not be sustained.

It must be emphasized that an individual cannot

be deprived of his property for the public
convenience.[22]

The Republics assertion that the defense of the

State will be in grave danger if we shall order the
reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an
overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to
operate as an airport. What remains in the site is
just the National Historical Institutes marking
stating that Lot 932 is the former location of
Lahug Airport. And second, there are only
thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight
(8) of which are residence apartments of
military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are
actually used as training centers. Thus,
practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to
respondent will only affect a handful of military
personnel. It will not result to irreparable damage
or damage beyond pecuniary estimation, as what
the Republic vehemently claims.

We thus rule that the special circumstances

prevailing in this case entitle respondent to
recover possession of the expropriated lot from
the Republic. Unless this form of swift and
effective relief is granted to him, the grave
injustice committed against his predecessors-ininterest, though no fault or negligence on their
part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore,
serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in
the exercise of its power of eminent domain,
necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must
comply with the Constitutional limitations. This
Court, as the guardian of the peoples right, will
not stand still in the face of the Republics
oppressive and confiscatory taking of private
property, as in this case.

At this point, it may be argued that respondent

Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in entering into a

28

contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and

Panerio despite the clear annotation in TCT No.
23934 that Lot 932 is subject to the priority of
the National Airports Corporation [to acquire
said parcels of land] x x x upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value.

The issue of whether or not respondent acted in

bad faith is immaterial considering that the
Republic did not complete the expropriation
process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over
Lot 932 by its failure to pay just compensation.

The issue of bad faith would have assumed

relevance if the Republic actually acquired title
over Lot 932. In such a case, even if respondents
title was registered first, it would be the Republics
title or right of ownership that shall be
upheld. But now, assuming that respondent
was in bad faith, can such fact vest upon the
Republic a better title over Lot 932? We
believe not. This is because in the first place, the
Republic has no title to speak of.

29