F.

SPEECH, COURTS AND CONTEMPT

U.S. v Bustos
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of
the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary
servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were
proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution
and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him
for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it
wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced
them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made
by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the
defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable
doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were
true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in
evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition
forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in
advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence
of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this
case arose.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900.
There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The
Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the
tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine
Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public
opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. It
also said the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary
would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in
the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any
person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine
of privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications may
in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is
the unfettered administration of justice.

Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima

facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in
complaints made in good faith against a public officials conduct
having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be
false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it
was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a selfseeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has
a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without
this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then
lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and
the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel
of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge
or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of
direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution.
Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of
the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office
of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them
of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a
judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. VS. JUDGE

MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION
FACTS: Published under the by-line of one Marichu Villanueva and
titled Judiciary worse than PNP, an item in the June 17, 1993 issue
of the Manila Standard, a metropolitan daily, reported that the results
of the latest opinion polls conducted by the Ateneo Social Weather
Station, as Social Weather Stations, Inc. (or SWS) is also known,
showed the Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating that the
Philippine National Police. The item went on to state that the
President and his Cabinet had been briefed on the results of the
survey by Professors Mahar Mangahas and Felipe Miranda of the
SWS, and that Malacanang had expressed concern over the
Judiciarys law standing. Press Secretary Jesus Sison was also
quoted as saying that this was most puzzling, although he could not,
recall the exact rating, noting only that the PNP had a better image
that the judiciary. Said report appears to have prompted Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch 104 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, motu proprio to initiate on the
same date of June 17, 1993 proceedingsordering the President of the
SWS to: explain why you should not be held in contempt for
distributing to the general public without prior permission from any
court your findings that the people have more confidence with the
police than with judges thereby tending directly or indirectly to
degrade the administration of justice. On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar
Mangahas through Atty. Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted his comment
and explanation that it was not true that the Social Weather Stations,
Inc. distributed to the general public the allegedsurvey. Said survey
was privately given to Pres. Ramos and the cabinet and was not
intended for publication nor for public consumption and that if ever it
reaches the media, he had not authorized anyone to do so. The
hearing was had a scheduled on June 23, 1993, after which Judge
Asuncion promulgated an Order dated July 2, 1993, finding Professor
Mangahas explanation satisfactory and dismissing the contempt
charge against him. After three weeks or so, or more precisely on July
26, 1993, Professor Mangahas addressed a letter to the Chief Justice
intended as a formal complaint against Honorable Maximiano C.
Asuncion for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law,
in connection with his issuance of an Order dated 17 June 1993.

ISSUE: Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is violative of the

constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom from
prior restraint.
HELD: No. What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about
the results of the SWS poll - in the words of Judge Asuncion, that the
people have more confidence with the police than with the judges
in light of the fact, of which judicial notice is taken, that said report
came out at a time when there already was widespread publicity
adverse to the judiciary, there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to
degrade the administration of justice.Thus, Judge Asuncion can hardly
be faulted for what, at a minimum, he must have felt duty-bound to do
in the circumstances. No question of prior restraint or violation of the
guarantee of free speech arises here, what he did being, in essence,
merely to initiate an inquiry into the source and basis of the
derogatory news report. And he forthwith abated the proceedings
upon receiving an explanation he deemed satisfactory. Upon the
facts, and under applicable law and principle, the complaint fails to
make a prima facie showing of the charges made therein, and must
perforce be as it is hereby, DISMISSED.

public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency
patronized by this public utility firm.
This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court
decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been
authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. The seed of the
proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this
Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called controversial case of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court
was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner
PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the
majority.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad
hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption in the
judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility,
denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then
issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and
affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as
an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the
allegations made by Jurado are true.

In Re Emil P. Jurado
FACTS:

ISSUE #1:

Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a

newspaper of general circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about
alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several
months (from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other journalists
had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At
the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively
circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts.

WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the
published writings.

What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was

his column entitled Who will judge the Justices? referring to a report
that six justices, their spouses and children and grandchildren (a total
of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious
hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a

HELD:
NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further
the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that
the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official,
should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the
false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper
exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19.

Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the

performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The provision is reflective of the
universally accepted precept of abuse of rights, one of the most
dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any
system of law.
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of
the statements when publishing statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials.Judges, by
becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent
standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly
required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or
accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded
as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so
rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain
their self-respect from becoming judges.
The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the
individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public
officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to
be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or
accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely
found in the norm, which requires those, who, invoking freedom of
speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does
not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private
reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without
any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.

WON the court has the power to cite him for contempt.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for
contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of
ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons
connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The power to
punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against
improper interference with the due administration of justice."
Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a
pending case.
Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative
supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a
journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being
required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated
differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to
explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary
to the Ad Hoc Committee.
The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court
may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity,
honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the
administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its
business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner.
Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened is that there
have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course,
sworn statements branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon
him the alternatives of substantiating those reports or assuming
responsibility for their publication.

Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw

intelligence or reports he received surrounding the corruption in the
Judiciary. Moreover, some of his reports were completely untrue
because he did not bother to make any further verification.

Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity whether a

journalist, or as a member of the bar he has been cited in these
proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a
similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a
lawyer for his statements as ajournalist.

ISSUE #2:

This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles
already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist

who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in
clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and
opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice.
That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do
with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate
liability.
Jurados actuations, in the context in which they were done,
demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual
accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and
reputation of those of whom he wrote.
They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to
degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges
engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself
beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who
live by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all times to
maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution

En Banc.
Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control
their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial
administration of justice and the constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and complementing further the
Per Curiam Resolution of the Court in the case of Nestle Philippines,
Inc. v. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, et al., dated September 30, 1987,
the Court resolves to adopt formally the following policy and
procedural guidelines, regarding the conduct of demonstrations,
pickets, rallies and other similar gatherings in the vicinity of the
grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme Court and all other
courts:
1. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights, especially their
freedom of expression and assembly. Free speech and peaceable
assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.
These freedoms, however, are not absolute. The right of a citizen to
use the streets for communication of views on national questions must

be balanced with the need of our courts for an atmosphere that will
enable them to dispense justice free from bias and unnecessary
pressure. The courts would not exist and survive to protect the
people's most revered rights if they were unable to preserve the
integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the institution from
all forms of distracting, degrading and prejudicial influences that
threaten the fair and orderly administration of justice.
2. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are
enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets
adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters
from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of
Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala.
Such activities unquestionably interrupt and hamper the working
condition in the salas, offices and chambers of the courts.
3. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers must
keep all public thoroughfares free and unimpeded to allow the smooth
flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. At no time should ingress to
and egress from the premises of the courts and the offices of the
courts and the offices of the justices, judges, and court officials and
employees be obstructed.
4. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers are
prohibited from camping out on the streets, sidewalks or pavement
adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters
from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of
Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala.
No provisional shelters and kitchens, pickets' quarters, and other
similar makeshift structures shall be established in said areas.
5. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to
properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper
attitude toward courts of justice when engaged in demonstrations,
pickets, rallies and similar activities. As officers of the court, they
must help to preserve the dignity of the courts and to insulate the
courts from all forms of influence that may adversely affect judicial
impartiality and violate a party's right to due process.
6. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of
court. Members of the Bar violating this resolution may, in addition,

be subject to the administrative sanctions of fine, imprisonment,

suspension from the practice of law or disbarment as circumstances
may warrant.

complaint against him exposed this Court and its investigators to

outside influence and public interference.

The Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith cause publication of these

Guidelines in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The
Guidelines shall take effect upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days
after such publication.

In their comments, respondents, among others, contended

that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was
already the subject of widespread news and already of public
knowledge, and that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a
legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and character.

The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all lower courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the PNP, and all agencies of local
governments in charge of issuing permits to hold demonstrations,
rallies, pickets and similar activities, around the vicinity of courts of
justice with copies of this Resolution.cralaw

Issue: Whether or not respondents violated the confidentiality rule in

disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect
contempt of court.

Fortun v. Quinsayas, et.al.

(Confidentiality Rule in Disbarment Proceedings; Exception)
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun, the lead defense counsel
of Ampatuan, Jr. in the prominent "Maguindanao Massacre Case,"
filed this present petition for contempt against Atty. Prima Jesusa
Quinsayas, et.al., including media men and broadcasting companies.
Quinsayas, et.al. filed a disbarment case against Fortun for
dishonest and deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. They alleged that Fortun is "engaging in activities
misleading the prosecution and the trial court." Pending the
disbarment case, Quinsayas was invited to a show "ANC Presents:
Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," where he discussed
the disbarment case against Fortun, including its principal points. This
tempted Fortun to file this present petition against him and various
media men and companies.
Fortun alleged that Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the
details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent
media groups and personalities conspired with Quinsayas, et al. by
publishing the confidential materials on their respective media
platforms. He said that the public circulation of the disbarment

Held: Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule, but the media men
and companies are not liable thereto.
The Court recognizes that publications which are privileged for
reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech. As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are
confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of
this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint
against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that
it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and
participation as defense counsel in the case. Indeed, the allegations in
the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions
involving the Maguindanao Massacre case. Since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a public figure because he is
representing a matter of public concern, and because the event
itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against
petitioner is a matter of public concern, the media has the right
to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It
would have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner
was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to
respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the
freedom of the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is

not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in
a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
As to Quinsayas, he is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B both
as a complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a
lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Quinsayas is familiar
with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However,
instead of preserving its confidentiality, he disseminated copies of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media
which act constitutes contempt of court. The premature disclosure
by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment
proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule.
The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to
make its investigations free from any extraneous influence or
interference, but also to protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants. It is also
to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions
thereto without authority.
In view thereof, the court found Quinsayas liable for indirect
contempt of court, with a fine of P20,000.

G. ELECTIONS AND EXPRESSIONS

he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner

Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter
in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There
was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the
fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political
expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate
or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of
these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of
clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional
rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo
M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that
Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association.
He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present
danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether
for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in
government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the
Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents
contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

GONZALES v COMELEC
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the
too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional
grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked
to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the
Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that
may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on
freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and
the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can
be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive
evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing
according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It

provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established.

The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness.
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.

ADIONG v COMELEC

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and
present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel
of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive
evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country.

ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is

constitutional.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on

the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case
of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or
the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation
of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

(Constitutional Law Right to Free Press)

FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the
posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private,
and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas
that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said
resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his
last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate,
due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.

HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on

mobileplaces whether public or private except in the authorized
areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which is
unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the prohibition.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The
plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of
the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito
V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio
Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19
(Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said
resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on
the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio
or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their

opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite
periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to
the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has
also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders
nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no
statutory basis.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC

FACTS: Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of
exit polls during elections for the reason that exit polls have the
tendency to cause confusion.
HELD: Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid
exercises of freedom of speech and of the press. A limitation on them
may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that
the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec cannot
be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in
voting centers.

SWS vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media
the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners
argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and
exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media,
valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes
a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PONENTE: Reyes
TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of
campaign materials on PUV and public terminals, captive-audience
doctrine

DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and
fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to
vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular
candidate. The right to express ones preference for a candidate is
likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any
governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a
candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in
connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the
prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. During the
campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places,
or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any
of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs,
ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus
terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause

for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the
owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006
as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the
application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis--vis privately owned public
utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then
requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and
transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214,
which denied the petitioners request to reconsider the implementation
of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No.
9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the
people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom
of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election

campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with

them.

is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of

the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting

an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and
transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the
public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an
election offense.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also,
there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of
the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free

expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result
of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are
forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation
of their franchise or permit to operate.

The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate

and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.

The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an

invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time,
place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally
permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that
the following requisites concur:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The government regulation is within the constitutional power of

the Government;
It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and
The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where
election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition

In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional

grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during
an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
powers over the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation, inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities.
The COMELECs constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the
same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities.
The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public
transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political
expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing to do with
the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified
under the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a
practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be
restricted. The captive-audience doctrine recognizes that a listener
has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.

A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of

censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than
others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity
makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed captive audience may
avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is
not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are
not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive.
Lehmans case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting
of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which
prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum,
pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses,
although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part
of commercial venture. In the same way that other commercial
ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general
public, the citys transit system has the discretion on the type of
advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned
by the city government; the city government, as owner of the buses,
had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed
on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility
vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of

advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark

contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail
the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the
advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to
refuse political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what
were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant
case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains private;
there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their
properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run
afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection
clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and
applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not
based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of
the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals
and private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be
considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a
franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier,
the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and
transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the
franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the
public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other

properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by

posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no
cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of
private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use
by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart
from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election
campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport
terminals would be seen by many people. However, election
campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also
be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out
owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against
posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral
regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the
COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of
ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They
are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial
distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise ones
political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of
expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a
violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.

Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC 2015

FACTS:
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution
conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on

the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper

of general circulation and features items of information including
election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the
validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially
section 5.4 which provides that surveys affecting national candidates
shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before the
election.
SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of
the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish election survey results up to
the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint
RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to
ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well
as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for
public information and forms among candidates.
Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial.
Nor does this section pass the Obrient test for content related
regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while
allowing other types such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is
greater than what is needed to protect government interest because
the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as
subsequent punishment.
Note: Justice Kapunans dissenting opinion basically says that the test
of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the
validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of
balancing by weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine
whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free

enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the

balance, the other considerations (for example, prevention of last
minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of
expression.

H. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND TIME,

PLACE OR MANNER REGULATIONS
UNITED STATES V OBRIEN
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, OBrien (Defendant), was
convicted for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal
statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. His conviction was
upheld after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
found the law constitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. First, a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government.
Second, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest.
Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
FACTS: The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948,
amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that made it an
offense to alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate a Selective
Service registration certification. Defendant knowingly burned his draft
card on the front steps of the local courthouse. The Court of Appeals
held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging the
freedom of speech.
ISSUE: Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied
to Defendant because his act of burning the draft card was protected
symbolic speech within the First Amendment?
Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to
notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or

tossed into the waste basket according to the convenience of the

registrant?
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because
it was intended to suppress freedom of speech?
HELD: No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be
accepted that there is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that
constitutes speech whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends to express an idea. However, even if the alleged
communicative element of Defendants conduct is sufficient to bring
into play the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution), it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a
draft card is constitutionally protected activity. First, a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The 1965
Amendment meets all these requirements. Therefore, the 1965
Amendment is constitutional as applied to Defendant.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the initial
purpose of the draft card is to notify, it serves many other purposes as
well. These purposes would be defeated if the card were to be
mutilated or destroyed.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of
Congress is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.
Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted.
Discussion. This case creates a symbolic speech test that was used
here to uphold the 1965 Amendment to the UMTSA.

CLARK v COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE

NONVIOLENCE
Brief Fact Summary. A National Park Service regulation banning
camping in certain parks was held by the Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) not to violate the First Amendment when
applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and
the Mall.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A message may be delivered by conduct that

is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would
reasonably be understood by the viewer as communicative. Symbolic
expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if the conduct
itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly
drawn to further a substantial governmental interest and if the interest
is unrelated to the suppression of speech.
FACT: In 1982, the Park Service issued a renewable permit to the
Respondent, Community for Creative Non-Violence (Respondent), to
conduct a wintertime demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall for
the purpose of demonstrating about the plight of the homeless. The
permit authorized the erection of symbolic tent cities. The Park
Service, however, denied Respondents request that the
demonstrators be permitted to sleep in the tents. Respondent filed this
action to prevent the application of the anti-camping regulations to the
proposed demonstration.
ISSUE: Whether a National Park Service regulation banning camping
in certain parks violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution) when applied to prohibit demonstrators
from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall?
Held. No. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The regulation
forbidding sleeping is defensible as both a time, place or manner
restriction and as a regulation of symbolic conduct. The requirement
that the regulation be content neutral is clearly met. The Park
Services decision to permit non-sleeping demonstrations does not
impugn the camping prohibition as a valuable, but perhaps imperfect
protection to the parks. The Park Service regulation is necessary.
Further the Park Service has the authority to judge how to protect the
park lands. Therefore, the National Park Service regulation banning
camping in certain parks does not violate the First Amendment of the
Constitution when applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in
Lafayette Park and the Mall.
Dissent. The proper starting point for analysis in this case is the
recognition that the Respondents speech is symbolic speech and
therefore protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The

regulations as applied to Respondent, fails to satisfy the time, place or

manner standards. The Supreme Court should have subjected the
Governments restrictive policy to something more than minimal
scrutiny.
Discussion. This case illustrates that symbolic speech can be
regulated by the government as long as the regulation is narrowly
drawn to further a substantial governmental interest and if the interest
is unrelated to the suppression of speech.

I.COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council
Brief Fact Summary. A statute banning pharmacists from advertising
the prices of prescription drug prices was found to be in violation of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)
by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. If there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising and it may be asserted by
the consumers here.
Facts. Prescription drug consumers challenged a statute banning
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drug prices on
behalf of the pharmacists. They claimed that the statute was
unconstitutional and that the First Amendment of the Constitution
entitled the consumers to receive the drug price information. The
lower court invalidated the law on First Amendment constitutional
grounds.
Issue. Whether the prescription drug consumers have standing to
challenge the law?
Whether the advertisement of prescription drug prices is outside the
protection of the First Amendment of the Constitution because it is
commercial speech?

Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. Where exists, as

here, the protection afforded by the First Amendment of the
Constitution is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both. If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising and it may be asserted by the consumers
here. Therefore, the prescription drug consumers do have standing to
challenge the law.
No. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. The idea that the
pharmacist wishes to communicate is merely, I will sell you the X
prescription at the Y price. Speech does not lose its First Amendment
protection because money is spent to project it as an advertisement.
When drug prices vary as much as they do, information as to who is
charging what becomes more than a convenience. This information
(drug prices) is not harmful. The people will know their own best
interests only if they are well informed. The best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication by making such information
available to the consumers rather than closing the modes of
communication by not prohibiting such advertising. Therefore, the ban
on advertising prices of prescription drugs is constitutional.
Dissent. In a democracy, the economic is subordinate to the political.
The First Amendment of the Constitution does not mandate the
Courts open door policy toward such commercial advertising.
Discussion. Here the majority holds that speech is not taken out of the
First Amendments protection merely because it is commercial in
nature.

BATES v STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

FACTS: In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona
restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm
which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate
income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm
would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve
litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low
financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal
services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise
its availability and low fees.

ISSUE: Did the Arizona rule, which restricted legal advertising, violate
the freedom of speech of Bates and his firm as guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments?
HELD: The Court found that the rule violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Justice Blackmun argued that commercial speech does
merit First Amendment protection given the important functions it
serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about
services and products, and helping to allocate resources in the
American system of free-enterprise. The Court held that allowing
attorneys to advertise would not harm the legal profession or the
administration of justice, and, in fact, would supply consumers with
valuable information about the availability and cost of legal services.

CENTRAL HUDSON GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP v

PUNLIC SERVICE COMMISION
Brief Fact Summary. In the winter of 1973-74 there existed an
electricity shortage in the State of New York. Accordingly the Appellee,
the Public Service Commission (Appellee), imposed a ban on all
advertising that promotes the use of electricity. By 1976 the electricity
shortage subsided, causing the Appellee to determine whether or not
to continue the ban. Upon further inquiry, the Appellee decided to
continue the ban, causing the Appellant, Central Hudson Gas and
Electric Corp. (Appellant), to file suit claiming that the regulation of the
Appellee was infringing on their First and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional rights involving commercial speech.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case established a four-part analysis for
commercial speech cases. (1) Whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
To be protected, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
(2) Whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
part one and part two are satisfied then (3) A court must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted. (4)Whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
FACTS: In December 1973, the Appellee ordered electric utilities in

New York State to cease all advertising that promotes the use of
electricity. The Appellee based this regulation on a finding that the
interconnected utility system in New York State does not have
sufficient fuel stocks to continue furnishing all customer demands for
the 1973-74 winter. In 1976, the fuel shortage ended, causing the
Appellee to request public comment on its proposal to continue the
ban on advertising. The Appellant opposes the ban on First
Amendment constitutional grounds and filed this suit after the
Appellee decided to continue the ban. The 1976 order from the
Appellee was that information advertising, used to encourage shifts of
consumption of electricity from peak use times to periods of low
electricity demand would be allowed because it does not increase
aggregate consumption, but would promote the leveling of demand
throughout the day. The Appellee also offered to review specific
proposals by companies to determine if their advertisement meets this
criterion. The Appellant challenged this order in state court, arguing
that the Appellee restrained commercial speech in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The Appellees order
was upheld in the trial court, by the appellate level and by the New
York Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether a regulation of the Appellee of the State of New York
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical
utility?
HELD: Yes. The Appellees ban is unconstitutional even though the
United States Constitution (Constitution) accords a lesser protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression. The protection available for particular commercial
expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the
governmental interests served by the regulation. There is a four-part
analysis for commercial speech cases. (1) Whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. To determine if
it is protected, the speech must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. (2) Whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both parts one and part two are satisfied then (3) A court
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted. (4)Whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.

Under this four-part analysis the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) found that the advertising is commercial speech
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court found that the state interest in suppressing the use of energy is
substantial. The Supreme Court also found a direct link between the
state interest in conservation and the Appellees order as there is a
connection between advertising and demand for electricity. This lead
the Supreme Court to consider whether the complete suppression is
more extensive than what is necessary. The Supreme Court in this
case determined that the Apellee has not shown that it could not
protect its interest in energy conservation through a less restrictive
means. For example, providing information in its advertisement about
the relative efficiency and expense of its offered service. Therefore
since there is a less restrictive means available, the restriction by the
Appellant is an unconstitutional restri
ction of free speech.
Dissent. The Supreme Courts decision fails to give due deference to
the subordinate position of commercial speech. The dissenting judge
feels the court has gone back to the days of Lochner, feeling that it
can strike down regulations of a State through its own notions of what
is the most appropriate means of regulation.
Concurrence.
Doubts whether suppression of information concerning the availability
and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the
State to dampen demand for or use of the product. But, agrees with
the majority that even though commercial speech is involved, it is
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. In fact, the
Appellees ban is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the
choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by
depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choices.
Another concurring judge argued that this is not a commercial speech
case. Therefore, they see no need to decide whether the four-part
analysis, adequately protects commercial speech as properly
defined in the face of a blanket ban of speech of the sort involved in
this case.
Discussion. This case is most significant because it clearly provides a
four-part test to be used in cases involving commercial speech. The

Supreme Court in this case also provides a clear use of this test
through its analysis. This case builds on the definition of commercial
speech provided in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. That case
defined commercial speech as expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience, which is to be
used to determine whether or not part one of the test in this case is
satisfied. Part two of the test, looks at whether the States interest is
substantial and is similar to all other First Amendment analysis, except
as stated in this case and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the state
possess an elevated standard of interest in regulating commercial
speech, as does part three determining whether the regulation
furthers the interest. This leads to part four of the test, where it seems
most commercial speech cases will be decided. In part four once
again, as is with most First Amendment expression cases, e.g.
obscenity cases, the Supreme Court will on a case-by-case basis
determine if there was a less restrictive means of regulation. If a less
restrictive means is available to achieve the same goal, the answer
will always necessarily strike down the regulation as unconstitutional.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the

Philippines v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner
claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk
Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom
Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code
of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also
adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil
are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH
through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with intl
agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of
jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the
RIRR.

Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law
by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e
treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they
have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been
transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the
Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of
ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish
that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law
that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an intl rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to
comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although
signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by
at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby
legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk
Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and

absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been

adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well.
The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as
they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW nonbinding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Soft law is not part of intl law.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit
held that the park was in fact a "public" forum, not a non-public forum
as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated
that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be
denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential
harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the
public interest.
ISSUE:

Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk
Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are
prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended
for infants and young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and
respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions.

J. GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE

PLEASANT GROVE CITY v SUMMUM
FACTS:
Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of
Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's
parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten
Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the
monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove."
Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other
things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a
preliminary injunction.

Does a city's refusal to place a religious organization's monument in a

public park violate that organization's First Amendment free speech
rights when the park already contains a monument from a different
religious group?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the
placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government
speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing
for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and
Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy,
Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the
Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final
authority over which monuments were displayed, the monuments
represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus
government speech.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a separate
concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's reasoning.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Agreeing with the Court's reasoning, he also noted
that there were likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. He argued that
displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed by the Court
as "having an undeniable historical meaning" and thus did not attempt
to establish a religion. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which he noted that "government speech" should be
considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid category. He stated that

sometimes the Court should ask "whether a government's actions

burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to
further a legitimate government objective." Justice Souter also wrote
separately, concurring in the judgment, but warning that public
monuments should not be considered government speech
categorically.

Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and

Southern heritage."
ISSUES:
1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech that is
immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality?
2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on license
plates constitute viewpoint discrimination?

WALKER v TEXAS DIVISION, SONS OF

CONFEDERATE VETERANS
FACTS:
In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate
Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to
preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the
confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license
plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The
proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the
organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the
plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a
new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any
member of the public." The board in charge of approving new
specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public
regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's
application.
Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that
the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license
plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within
their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to
express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the
plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's
denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a nonpublic forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint
discrimination that "discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the

HELD:
Yes, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4
majority. The Court held that the government choosing the content of
its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because
that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process.
Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texass
specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as
opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and
other states have long used license plates to convey messages.
Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally,
Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty
plates from design to final approval.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he argued that,
with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an observer would think
that the plates were the expression of the individual drivers, not
Texas. Because the specialty license plates are a limited public forum
for private expression, Texas rejecting the confederate flag design
because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin
Scalia, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.

K. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
BAYAN v ERMITA
FACTS: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens
and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations
and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on

October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing

Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a
permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by
the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the
law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered
to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or
CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5
and 6, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas
Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a)
violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a
disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
HELD: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides
that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a
right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection.

For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic

polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is
not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise
of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds
of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is
independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents,
more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments,
are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate
compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30)
days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to

peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every

city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the
law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as
it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is
NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from
using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

IBP v ATIENZA
FACTS:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an
application for a rally permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose Lito
Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola
Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is
only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the
day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of
Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a
partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional
right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda
but at the Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila Police District
(MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the
Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place
different from what was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what
Atienza did was within his power; that freedom of expression is not
absolute.

Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the
suspension of the criminal case against him on the ground that the
certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas power to modify the
rally permit without consulting with the IBP.
HELD:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question
at this stage and in this certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a
prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding.
However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal
proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the
pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first
instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in
an appeal from the civil action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which
contains a time and place different from that applied for, the mayor
must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is
in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is
favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial
remedies) Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the
matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza
capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason
therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the
freedom of expression.