Manila Prince Hotel vs.

GSIS
267 SCRA 402
February 1997 En Banc
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award
during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent
Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of
Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who
offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the
winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the formers bid prize
also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a managers check worth Php 33 million
as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the
managers check.
One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the
instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
1987 Constitution
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and
instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive
command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in
question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the
equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of
national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of
foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be
interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it
does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to
foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is
estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew
the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:

The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of
the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After
election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE
TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of
the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial
elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently
approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the
Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
violative to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted
to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context,
where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case
for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the

Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The
petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and
the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed;
(2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is
outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for
Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision
or an amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing
legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or
granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of
the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions
of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional
guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the
Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a
revision or amendment has become academic.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO ,together with 6,327,952
registered voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.
174153,October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160
Facts:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Initiative and Referendum with the COMELEC to amend
the1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly Articles VI and VII to replace the
present Presidential-Bicameral system of government to Parliamentary-Unicameral
system using Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Petitioners claim that their

petition was signed by 6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same
constitutes over 12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more
than 3% of the registered voters in every legislative district signed the same in
accordance with Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. The petition to change the
Constitution involves sections 1-7 of Article VI; Sections 1-4 of Article VII and an
Article XVII entitled Transitory Provisions. The petitioners prayed with the
COMELEC that after due publication of their Petition, the COMELEC should submit
the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OFARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION,CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THEPRESIDENTIAL
BICAMERAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDINGARTICLE
XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
THE OTHER?
The COMELEC dismissed the petition citing MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS.
COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 [where it was held that:
RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the
Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system under Section 2,
Art. XVII of the Constitution. x x x .The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that
RA6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on
this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
the purposes of this act.2]
Considering the said dismissal, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme
Court on Certiorari and Mandamus alleging rave abuse of discretion and to set aside
the COMELEC Decision and to compel the latter to give due course to their initiative
petition.
THE ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE LAMBINO GROUPS PETITION COMPLIESWITH SECTION 2, ARTICLE
XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION ONAMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH
PEOPLESINITIATIVE;
2. WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS RULING INDEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS.
COMELEC, DECLARING THAT RA NO.6735 INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE OR WANTING
IN ESSENTIALTERMS AND CONDITIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVECLAUSE ON
PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION; and
3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN DENYING
DUE COURSE TO THE LAMBINOGROUPS PETITION.
HELD:

There is no merit to the petition. The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative. Thus,
there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal
based alone on the Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. As such, there is likewise no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is
the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. [This Section provides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLE through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention vividly explain the meaning of
the amendment directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.
Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. ISTHE DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED
CONSTITUTIONALAMENDMENT READY TO BE SHOWN TO THE PEOPLEWHEN THEY
ARE ASKED TO SIGN?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign? Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam PresidentAs it is envisioned, any
Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature. Clearly, the
framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must prepare the proposal and pass it
around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition IS THAT THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL ON ITS FACE IS A PETITION BYTHE
PEOPLE.
This means two (2) essential elements must be present:
1. The people must author and must sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign for and on their behalf;

2. As an initiative upon a petition, THE PROPOSAL MUST BE EMBODIED IN

APETITION.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who will express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLETHROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETIITON ONLY IF THE PEOPLE SIGN
ON APETITION THAT OCNTAINS THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.
The petitioners bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures---that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition a copy of the document
containing the proposed amendments and as such, the people signed initiative
petition without knowing the actual amendments proposed in the said initiative.
Instead, the alleged 6.3 million people who signed the petition had to rely the
representations of Atty. Lambino.Clearly, Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the
6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
2. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of
the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress and a Constitutional
Convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. This is
clear under Section 1of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution under Section 2 of Art. XVIII
clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution,
the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments. The two are distinguished as follows:
Revision is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document
[Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the
greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever
results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention
and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution
to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
Amendment of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a
few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend isnot to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The
intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to
it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.

(Note: On November 20, 2006, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration of Lambino, while it denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit insofar as they want the peoples initiative petition to be presented to the
people in a plebiscite, it held that ten (10) members voted to declare that RA No.
6735 IS COMPLETEAND ADEQUATE and therefore, peoples initiative may be availed
of by the people provided they shall comply with the strict requirements of Section
2, Art. XVII that the proposed amendments/s to the Constitution must be indicated
in the petition itself signed by the people.)]
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et.al v . HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN
HISCAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et.al G.R. No. 187167, 16 July
2011, EN BANC
The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast.
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers or
legislators assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments
contending that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into
archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including over flight. Petitioners have contended
that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into
archipelagic waters
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with the Philippines
national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the countrys
maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. The Court also
finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has
sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the
regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic

waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad
G.R. No. 9959
35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916
On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish
Dominions then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by
the Philippine Treasury. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then
invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in
jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said
amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that the
Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of
the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint
against the respondent bank?
HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de
Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government
being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to
enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the government has the
right to take back the money intended for the people.
CABANAS v. PILAPIL
58 SCRA 94
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil, the insured, had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman,
Melchora Cabanas. The complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant
Francisco Pilapil, the brother of the deceased is the one designated by the latter to
act as his daughters trustee during her minority. Thus, upon Florentinos death, the
proceeds were paid to his brother hence the complaint of the mother whom the
child lives with. Petitioner contends that she should be entitled to act as the trustee
of the insurance policy of her child.
ISSUE:
Does the State have the authority to interfere with the terms of the insurance policy
by virtue of parens patriae?
HELD:
The appealed decision adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an agent of the
State, acts as parens patriae. As such, the judiciary cannot remain insensible to the
validity of the petitioners plea. The State shall strengthen the family as a basic
social institution. The Constitution, moreover, dictates that it is the family as a unit
that has to be strengthened. As such, the decision of the lower courts, entitling the
mother as the trustee, is affirmed.

TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign
trading
intervention.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said
WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity,
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation
on
the
parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered
as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such
as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its
sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal
of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic selfdestruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their
free
choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SAAD versus Republic

FACTS: The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
which invalidated the sale of the Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an
area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu to petitioner.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City which
was ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer certificates of title
that may have been subsequently issued.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and
failure to consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government failed to show that the subject lot is part of
timberland or forest reserve it adverted to as the Regalian Doctrine says.
RULING: The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the
basic foundation of the State's property regime.Under the Regalian doctrine or jura
regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In instances where a
parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under
private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion,
which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the
action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
16 July 2001 and the Resolution dated 18 March 2002 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 15 May 1999 dismissing the
complaint for reversion and the complaint-in-intervention is REINSTATED.