G.R. No.

175602

February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the
RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of
each victim P93,000.00 _as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the
modification that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007,
Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on
October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.1
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of
PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead
of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporalas maximum,2 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18,
2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each
count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective
heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a selfexplanatory
letter3 dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of
the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. The letter reads as
follows:
HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ
Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila
SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.
Your honor,
The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office,
assistance on the subject mentioned above.
I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720, which convicted us to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3) offense.
Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the
Court of Appeals with CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006
the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED
the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.
Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed
(sic) the Affirmatory Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the
Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my part, I decided to withdraw
my appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me, but I was
wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court,
dated January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C.
Corona and finally I found hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and
assistance that the Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V.
Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the undersigned through Section 11 (a) ,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate
Court is favorable and applicable to the latter: x x x"
Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter.
Thank you very much and more power, God Bless.
Respectfully yours
EDWIN V. VALDEZ
Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General
interposed no opposition to the plea for the reduction of Edwins sentences
for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.
We grant the plea for reduction of Edwins sentences.
The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes
committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of
homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of
indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for parole in
due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering
the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Court rationalized the result as follows:
x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary
to the established facts and circumstances showing that he and
Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai
alaibetting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller
of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the
booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out
of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them

threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately

after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at
Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued
firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to
aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head,
spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third
victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and
that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three
victims were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the
physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that
Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselitos back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest.
Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence
was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial
recollections and the physical evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2
Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.
Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both
lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode
and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their
deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal
responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and
Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not
only from their going together to the betting station on board a
single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez
commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately
followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the

other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the
same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common
purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of
the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed
by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez
and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that
were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2
Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on
account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance
of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of
any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure
its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of
actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular
to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on
each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the
state to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that
constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for
the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend
himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. In People v.
Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the

title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information
for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference
to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is
to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two
accused "with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and
there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of
their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their
deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not
be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the
execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without
risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make.
Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were
missing from the informations.

x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to

inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against
him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement
accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which
he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly
accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice, x x x.
xxxx
x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty
is applied in its medium period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the
maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each
count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18,
2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him
to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years ofreclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson,
Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of
the downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter
penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder
due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes
committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to

deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be

highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have
acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their
equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwins plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (a) An appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that
the benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of
whether they appealed or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the
event of Guingguings acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted,
based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to
petitioner inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision
states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to those who did
not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private
respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as
to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal
of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact,

several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without
regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so long as
the judgment was favorable to him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguezs coaccused to him despite the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122,
Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence against both are
inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the wellestablished rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to
financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter." As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and
Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which is
favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of
homicide.1wphi1 Such verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso,
who was previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide,
despite the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellants brief.
The Court also modified Preciosos civil liability although the additional
monetary award imposed on Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it
was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the Court.
In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were
found by the trial court guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the
review before the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction
became final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas co-accused
guilty only of grave coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court
also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is
beneficial to him.
In People v. Escao, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen
Escao, praying that the Courts Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting
his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,

be applied to him. Escao originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial
court but later withdrew the same.
In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of
conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable
judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision
dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt
with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment
should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him
and considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject
advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have
been done with actual malice."7
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012
finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10
years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson,
the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts
ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 200030

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

NELSON BAYOT y SATINA,

Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:
April 18, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision [1] dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan
City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No.
98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed against AAA,
[3]
thus, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
appellate court increased the award of indemnity from P40,000.00
to P50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the
amount ofP50,000.00.
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape
Information[4] dated 29 December 1997, which reads as follows:

in

an

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality

of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or
sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old, against her will.
[5]

On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on

the merits ensued thereafter.
In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
AAA the amount ofP40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting
appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that AAAs testimony as regards her ordeal
was
simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid crossexamination. There
appeared
to
be
no
inconsistency
in
her
testimony. Further, AAAs declaration that she was raped by appellant was
corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina
at 6:00 oclock quadrant of the crevice, which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo
Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates the
sweet heart defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellants claim of
being AAAs lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the

consequence of his dastardly lust. AAAs immediate response of reporting the

rape incident carries the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such
relationship between appellant and AAA, the latter would not have pursued
this case. It bears stressing that despite appellants repeated plea for the
dismissal of the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for the
violation of her womanhood.[6]
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by
filing a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.[7] In light, however, of this
Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[8] the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution [9] dated 4 October
2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants
conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity
from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor
of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed
that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA. It further held that other
than the self-serving declaration of appellant that he and AAA were
sweethearts; no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate such
claim. Even the testimony of appellants daughter, who claimed that her
father and AAA are maintaining an illicit relationship, could not be given any
considerable weight. Aside from the fact that appellants daughter could not
point to any other circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident
when she allegedly saw her father and AAA holding hands during a dance at
their barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped of bias and
partiality considering that she is the daughter of appellant. In the same way,
her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual
intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the time
of the commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in a
position to state with certainty that there was no struggle on the part of
AAA. Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of
fact.[10]

However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006,[11] Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal

Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals
that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December
2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellants Certificate of
Death.[12]
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of
appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice
of Appeal[13] dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of
Appeals per Resolution[14] dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals also
directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire
records of the case to this Court.
Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now determine its
effect to this present appeal.
Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his
appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal
liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil
liability solely arising from or based on said crime.[15]
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically
provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil,
liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis
supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,
which was cited in a catena of cases, [17] had laid down the following
guidelines:
[16]

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of [the] accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e)

Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2

above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with [the]
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.[18]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.[19]
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People
v. Paniterce,[20] it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants
appeal. Appellants appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been
rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant
was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even
assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex
delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions
of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling in People
v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding appellant guilty of
the crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages had
become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina,
the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CRH.C. No. 00269 isSET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC
of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 186529

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,

August 3, 2010

Appellant.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] dated May 22, 2008 in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court [2] (RTC) Joint
Decision[3] datedJuly 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through

cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later
reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a
team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police
force to apprehend the appellant.[4] The agent gave the police appellants
name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that
appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and
informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler,
Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed
to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the
bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would
bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion
of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he
pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug.[5]

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De
Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test
and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. [6]

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of

Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of

Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory
portions of which read:

That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003
in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one
(5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as Shabu, a regulated drug without any permit
or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20,

2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and there,
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering
dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the
same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler,
Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He
maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was

taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the
police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced
him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and
underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.[9]

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment [10] convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted
him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision.[11]

Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the
specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant
assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case.[13]

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and
seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the
sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were
briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the
admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by
the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case

for review. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just
disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be
considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every
accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[14]

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of
his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless
search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises
the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the
trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that
appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is
deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. [15]

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary

for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.[16]

The 1987 Constitution states that

must be carried out with a judicial
unreasonable and any evidence obtained
any purpose in any proceeding.[17] Said
exceptions, namely:

a search and consequent seizure

warrant; otherwise, it becomes
therefrom shall be inadmissible for
proscription, however, admits of

1.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2.

Search of evidence in plain view;

3.

Search of a moving vehicle;

4.

Consented warrantless search;

5.

Customs search;

6.

Stop and Frisk; and

7.

Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or

seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.[19]

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring
that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to

commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in

Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the
warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the
lawful arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest,

the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search. [21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the
case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause
to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete
definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.[22]

The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause

necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a
confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to
the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the
appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent
with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in
Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The
team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed
to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police
station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands
from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when
opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. [23] The team

then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the
confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test
and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a

warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora carrying shabu.This circumstance gives rise to another
question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to
effect a valid warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information

alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.[24] We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established
doctrine.

[26]

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v. Tudtud,

and People v. Nuevas.[27]

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a
certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with
a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team
and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front
of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then
pointed to the team members the woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying
a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced
themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the

apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried
marijuana leaves.[28]

The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril
Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the
neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter
was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the
report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.
On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had
headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of
marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers
posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police
officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of
the box which yielded marijuana leaves.[29]
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain
male person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo
mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong
pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting
stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw
the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police
accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon
inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to
escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would
make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons,
later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police
approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected
the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned
out to be marijuana leaves.[30]

In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely

because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of
some overt act indicative of the criminal design.

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of
the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting
for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the
sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable

information sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v. Lising,
[34]
People v. Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that
would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except
in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the
rule against warrantless searches.[38]
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow
them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1
Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
tipped information on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the
informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name.

Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May
19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May
20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.[39]

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree,

hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained

based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite
the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by
entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.[40]

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41]

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice

would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding
if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an
illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones lawbreaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only
fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law

and to preserve the peace and security of society, we

nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly,
the end never justifies the means.[42]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision

dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the

immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the
reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GILBERT ZALAMEDA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 183656

Present:

versus -

QUISUMBING, J.,Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 4, 2009
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision[1] and

resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30061 that
affirmed the February 8, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, Makati City.[3] This RTC decision found petitioner Gilbert Zalameda
(petitioner) guilty of violating Section 11[4]of Republic Act (R.A.) No.

9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), and sentenced

him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
The trial court likewise found the petitioner and his co-accused Albert Villaflor
(Villaflor) guilty of violating Section 12[5] of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced
them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four (4) months
and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years and seven (7) months, as
maximum.
The prosecution charged the petitioner before the RTC with violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under the following Information:
Criminal Case No. 03-3559
That on or about the 14th day of September, 2003, in the
City of Makati, Philippines, and a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without
the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess one (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero three (0.03)
gram of Methylampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The petitioner and Villaflor were likewise charged before the same
court with violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Information
for this charge reads:
Criminal Case No. 03-3560
That on or about the 14th day of September 2003, in the
City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, not
being lawfully authorized to carry dangerous paraphernalia, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession two (2) aluminum foil strips and three (3) unsealed
transparent sachets with traces of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, three (3) other pieces of aluminum foils strips,
one (1) stainless scissor and one (1) disposable lighter which are

instruments, apparatuses or paraphernalia fit or intended for

ingesting or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The petitioner and Villaflor pleaded not guilty to the charges. [8] During pretrial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following:
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
xxx
1.

That these cases were investigated by PO1 Alex Inopia;

2.

That after the investigation of PO1 Alex Inopia, he prepared

the Final Investigation Report;

3.

That the Drug Enforcement Unit through SPO4 Arsenio

Mangulabnan made a Request for Laboratory Examination;

4.

That the PNP Crime Laboratory through Police Inspector

Karen Palacios conducted an examination on the specimen
submitted;

5.

That Physical Science Report was issued by PNP Crime

Laboratory Office detailing the findings of the Forensic
Chemist; and

6.

The qualification of the Forensic Chemist.

The prosecution marked the following exhibits:

A Final Investigation Report
A-1 Signature of PO1 Alex Inopia
A-2 Signature of SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan
B Request for Laboratory Examination
B-1 Signature of SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan
C Duplicate Copy of Physical Science Report
C-1 Signature of Karen Palacios

D Original Copy of Physical Science Report

D-1 Signature of Karen Palacios
D-2 Signature of Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip
D-3 Signature of Juanita A. Ramos
The prosecution reserved its right to present and mark additional
exhibits in the course of the trial.
The defense did not mark any exhibit but reserved the right to
present and mark them in the course of the trial.
With the stipulation entered into by the prosecution and
the defense, the testimony of Forensic Chemist Karen S.
Palacios is dispensed with.
Pre-trial is terminated.[9]
Joint trial on the merits followed. The essential facts, based on the
records, are summarized below.
At around 5:15 a.m. of September 14, 2003, SPO4 Mignelito Orbeta
(SPO4 Orbeta), the desk officer of Precinct 1, Makati City, received a phone
call from a concerned citizen regarding an on-going pot session at 2725 D.
Gomez
St., Barangay Tejeros, Makati City.[10] The
house
number
was
[11]
specified.
Acting on this information, SPO4 Orbeta dispatched PO2 Faustino De
Guia (PO2 De Guia), PO2 Renato De Guzman, (PO2 De Guzman), PO2
Gonzalo Acnam, PO1 Donie Tidang (PO1 Tidang), and one Major Ancheta to
D. Gomez St., Barangay Tejeros to verify the report. They were in uniform.
[12]
They reached their intended destination at 5:25 a.m. which they found to
be a house three by six (3 x 6) meters located along D. Gomez St. They
found the door of the house slightly open. [13] PO2 De Guzman peeped inside
and saw the petitioner and Villaflor sniffing smoke [14] may sinisinghot sila na
usok[15] while sitting on a bed.[16] PO2 De Guzman gave a thumbs-up sign to
his companions who joined him in immediately rushing inside the house.
Villaflor was holding a tooter at that point, which he threw away.[17] The
petitioner initially showed resistance when the police introduced themselves

as law enforcers.[18] They frisked the petitioner and Villafor in accordance

with police procedure,[19] and recovered from the petitioners right pocket a
rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances. [20] The
police likewise found on top of the bed aluminum foils (later confirmed to
have traces of shabu), three (3) plastic sachets containing traces of white
crystalline substance, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a
plastic zipper, and an improvised tooter.[21] The police handcuffed the
petitioner and Villaflor, informed them of their rights and their violation of
R.A. No. 9165, and brought them to the police station.[22]
At the police station, PO2 De Guzman marked the confiscated items,
and turned them and the suspects to SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan (SPO4
Mangulabnan). The latter prepared a request for laboratory examination;
[24]
immediately after, the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for analysis and examination. Police Inspector Karen S. Palacios
(Police Inspector Palacios), Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimens submitted, [25]and
found them to be positive for the presence of shabu.[26] Urine tests conducted
on the petitioner and Villaflor also yielded a positive result.[27]
[23]

The petitioner presented a different version of the events and narrated

that he and Villaflor were talking at around 11:47 p.m. of September 13,
2003 when four men in civilian clothes barged into his house on D. Gomez
Street.[28] The door at that time was closed but not locked. These men
ordered them to stand, and then handcuffed them. [29]PO2 De Guzman frisked
him and found P100.00 in his pocket. PO1 Tidang then conducted a search on
the room.[30] Afterwards, the police brought them to Precinct 1 where they
were detained. At the police station, the police asked them whether they had
money to give in exchange for their liberty (i.e. pang-areglo). The police
initially demandedP20,000.00, but the petitioner and Villaflor answered that
they did not have this amount.[31] The petitioner likewise denied that he and
Villaflor were using drugs when the police entered his house.[32]
On cross examination, he testified that Villaflor was a friend of his
sister, Julie; and that the latter requested Villaflor to borrow money from their
(his sisters and his) mother, whose house was located in a nearby street.
[33]
The money was for the baptism of Julies daughter scheduled for the next
day.[34] He did not anymore accompany Villaflor to his mothers house
because her mother was already asleep.[35] He declared that he did not

personally know the persons who arrested them prior to their arrest. [36] He
also added that PO2 De Guzman demanded P20,000.00 from him in
exchange for his liberty.
The RTC, in its decision of February 8, 2006, convicted the petitioner
and Villaflor of the crimes charged, and sentenced them, as follows: [37]
1.

In Criminal Case No. 03-3559, the accused GILBERT

ZALAMEDA y SUMILE is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II,
R.A. No. 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS,
ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as
maximum pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
R.A. No. 4103, as amended, and to pay a fine
of P300,00.00.

2.

In Criminal Case No. 03-3560, the accused GILBERT

ZALAMEDA y SUMILE and accused ALBERT VILLAFLOR y
HUERTE are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II, R.A. No.
9165 and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, SEVEN (7) MONTHS, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00.
In both cases, the period during which the accused were
held under detention shall be considered in their favor
pursuant to existing rules.
The dangerous drug subject matter of Criminal Case No.
03-3559 consisting of 0.03 gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu and the pieces of drug
paraphernalia recovered from the accused and subject
of Criminal Case No. 03-3560 are hereby transmitted to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its
appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner appealed to the CA and this appeal was docketed as CAG.R. CR No. 30061. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in its decision of March
18, 2008.[38] The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA
denied his motion in its resolution of July 15, 2008.[39]

In the present petition,[40] petitioner alleges that the items confiscated

from him were inadmissible, and that the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of the illegal drug.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with
the argument that the testimonies of PO2 De Guzman and PO2 De Guia were
straightforward and consistent on material points. [41] In addition, the
warrantless arrest conducted by the police was valid as the petitioner and
Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu. Since the arrest was lawful, the search
made incidental to the arrest of the two accused was also lawful. [42]
The OSG further argues that the prosecution was able to show all the
elements of the crimes charged.[43] The police also complied with the
procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs under Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules.[44]
Finally, the OSG contends that the petitioners bare denial constitutes
self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and
positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses.[45]
We DENY the petition for lack of merit. The records of the case
records support the conclusion that a lawful arrest, search and seizure took
place, and that the prosecution fully discharged its burden of
establishing all the elements necessary for conviction for the crimes charged
beyond reasonable doubt.[46]
The prosecution duly established
the elements of the crimes charged

Illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of R.A. No.

9165 carries the following elements: (1) possession by the accused of an
item or object identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) the possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the free and conscious possession of the drug by
the accused.[47] On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs under Section 12 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,

consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous

drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements.
PO2 De Guzman, in his testimony of January 28, 2004, narrated the
circumstances that led them to go to the house of the petitioner; [48] how he
saw the petitioner and Villaflor in the act of sniffing smoke; [49] and how they
arrested and searched the petitioner and seized evidence they discovered in
plain view.[50]
PO2 De Guzman duly and positively identified the petitioner as the
person he saw sniffing shabu with Villaflor, and as the same person from
whose right pocket he recovered a rectangular plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substances. He also narrated how the police inadvertently
found various drug apparatus and paraphernalia scattered on top of the
petitioners bed. Per Report No. D-1142-03S of Police Inspector Palacios, the
plastic sachet recovered from the petitioner was examined and found to
contain 0.03 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug.
The two aluminum foil strips and three unsealed transparent plastic sachets
recovered on top of the petitioners bed also tested positive for the presence
of shabu. Thus, the petitioner knowingly possessed shabu a prohibited drug
and had under his control various drug paraphernalia without legal authority
to do so, all in violation of Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165.
PO2 De Guzmans testimony also presented a complete picture of the
police operation from the time the desk officer received a tip regarding an
ongoing pot session at the petitioners house on D. Gomez Street; to the time
the police went there and arrested the petitioner and Villaflor; until they
returned to the police station and marked the confiscated items. PO2 De
Guia corroborated PO2 De Guzmans testimony on all material points. The
defense did not contest the admissibility of the seized items as evidence
during trial. Significantly, the petitioner failed to produce convincing proof
that the prosecution witnesses had any malicious or ulterior motive when
they testified, or that the evidence submitted by the prosecution had been
tampered with.[51]
PO2 De Guzman testified in a spontaneous, straightforward and
categorical manner, proving all the elements of the crimes charged; he never
wavered despite the grueling cross-examination by the defense counsel.

The Petitioners Defenses

a.

The Legality of the Petitioners Arrest

The petitioner alleges that since the warrantless arrest conducted by

the police was illegal, the items seized from him as a result of said arrest
were inadmissible.
This argument totally lacks merit.
We stress at the outset that the petitioner failed to question the
legality of his warrantless arrest. The established rule is that an accused may
be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for
the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[52]
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the
warrantless arrest conducted on the petitioner was valid. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the situations when a person may be
arrested without a warrant, thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante

delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante

delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[53]
After carefully evaluating the evidence in its totality, we hold that the
prosecution successfully established that the petitioner was arrested in
flagrante delicto.
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the
petitioners house and to his arrest were triggered by a tip from a concerned
citizen that a pot session was in progress at the petitioners house located
on D. Gomez Street. Under the circumstances, the police did not have
enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time element
involved in the process (i.e., a pot session may not be for an extended period
of time and it was then 5:15 a.m.). In view of the urgency, SPO4 Orbeta
immediately dispatched his men to proceed to the identified place 2725 D.
Gomez Street to verify the report. At the place, the responding police officers
verified from a slightly opened door and saw the petitioner and Villaflor
sniffing smoke to use the words of PO2 De Guzman, or sumisinghot ng
shabu as PO2 De Guia put it. There was therefore sufficient probable
cause for the police officers to believe that the petitioner and Villaflor were
then and there committing a crime. As it turned out, the petitioner indeed
possessed a prohibited drug and, together with Villaflor, was even using a
prohibited drug and likewise illegally possessed drug paraphernalia, contrary
to law. When an accused is caught inflagrante delicto, the police officers are
not only authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures,
the petitioner and Villaflor were frisked, which search yielded the prohibited
drug in the petitioners possession. The police, aside from seeing Villaflor
throw away a tooter, also saw various drug paraphernalia scattered on top of
the petitioners bed. These circumstances were sufficient to justify the
warrantless search and seizure that yielded one (1) heat-sealed plastic
sachet of shabu. In this regard, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states:
Section 13. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or

anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the

commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The seizure of the various drug paraphernalia is likewise beyond
question. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view" of
an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence. This doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.[54]
All the foregoing requirements for a lawful search and seizure are
present in this case. The police officers had prior justification to be at the
petitioners place as they were dispatched by their desk officer; they arrested
the petitioner and Villaflor as they had reason to believe that they were
illegally using and possessing a prohibited drug and drug paraphernalia. The
search of the petitioner incident to his arrest yielded the confiscated
crystalline substance which later proved to be shabu. In the course of their
lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia
scattered on the bed. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them.
The petitioner also harps on the fact that the police did not conduct a
prior surveillance to verify the tipped information. We emphasize that the tip
has reference to an ongoing pot session an activity that does not usually last
for an extended period. We have held that when time is of the essence, the
police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. [55] Simply stated, a
prior surveillance is not necessary where the police operatives are pressed
for time to capture a suspected offender, as in this case. Thus, the absence
of a surveillance did not undermine the validity of the petitioners arrest.
b.

Denial and Extortion

The petitioner denied that he and Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu,
and maintained that they were just talking to each other when the police

arrived at his house at 11:47 p.m. of September 13, 2003. According to the
petitioner, Villaflor was in his house because he (Villafor) had been requested
by Julie (the petitioners own sister) to borrow money from their mother,
Milagros, who lives in a nearby street. The money was for the baptism of
Julies daughter, scheduled for the next day.[56] The petitioner maintained that
he did not bring Villaflor to Milagros house as soon as he (Villaflor) arrived in
the evening of September 13, 2003 because it was already late and Milagros
was already asleep.[57] He maintained that he and Villaflor were arrested and
detained on September 13, 2003 and not on September 14, 2003.[58]
As the lower courts did, we find the petitioners story unworthy of belief.
We find the petitioners claim that he was arrested and detained in the
evening of September 13, 2003 to be self-serving and uncorroborated by any
separate competent evidence. The petitioner, in fact, admitted that he has
no proof of such detention in his testimony of March 31, 2004.[59] The
justification that the petitioner offered for Villaflors presence at his place, in
the
absence
of
any
corroborating
evidence,
is
likewise
questionable. Allegedly, Villaflor was asked by Julie to borrow from Milagros
money to be used in a baptism to be held on the following day. No reason
exists in the records explaining why Villaflor would proceed to the petitioners
house and stay there, given the urgency of his task and given that, by the
petitioners own admission, Milagros was expecting Villaflor that night. The
questionable status of this basic component of the denial, to our mind,
renders the whole denial itself questionable. The latin maxim falsus in unus,
falsus in omnibus[60] best explains our reason.
The petitioners denial must likewise fail in light of the positive
identification and declarations made by the prosecution witnesses. As we
stated earlier, these witnesses testified in a straightforward and categorical
manner regarding the identities of the malefactors. They did not waver
despite the defense counsels rigid questioning.
Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility
with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence
that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly,
providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime
committed. One such positive evidence is the result of the laboratory
examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the various drug and

drug paraphernalia recovered from the petitioner and Villaflor which revealed
that the following confiscated items tested positive for the presence
of shabu: (a) one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking GSZ
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance; (b) two aluminum foil
strips both with markings AHV, each containing white crystalline substance;
and (c) three unsealed transparent plastic sachets all with markings RSG
each containing white crystalline substance. In addition, the drug tests
conducted on the petitioner and Villaflor both yielded positive results.
Petitioners claim of extortion is similarly untenable. An allegation of frame-up
and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most
dangerous drug cases. It is viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be
easily concocted. To substantiate such a defense, the evidence must be clear
and convincing.[61] In the present case, thepetitioner was unable to support
his allegation of extortion with any other evidence. The petitioner also
admitted that he did not know the policemen previous to the arrest, hence
negating any improper motive on the part of the police. Such lack of dubious
motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
prosecution witnesses, should prevail over the petitioners self-serving and
uncorroborated extortion claim. It is also worth noting that the petitioner has
not filed a single complaint against the police officers who allegedly
attempted to extort money from him.
c.

Non-presentation of the Informant

The petitioner argues that the informant was never presented in court
to corroborate the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
We do not find this argument convincing.
The settled rule is that the presentation of an informant in an illegal
drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative
and cumulative.[62] Moreover, informants are usually not presented in court
because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable
service to the police.[63] Thus, we held in People v. Boco:[64]

Under the circumstances, we do not find any necessity for

additional corroborating testimony, particularly that of the
confidential informant. Intelligence agents, due to the nature of
their work, are often not called to testify in court so as not to
reveal their identities publicly. Once known, they could no longer
be used again and, worse, may be the object of revenge by the
criminals they implicate. The prevailing doctrine is that their
testimonies are not essential for conviction, nor are they
indispensable to a successful prosecution. With the testimonies
of the arresting officers, they would be, after all, merely
corroborative and cumulative.

d.

The Integrity and Evidentiary Value of the

Examined and Presented Seized Items

The petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the

evidences chain of custody because the police operatives failed to strictly
comply with Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165. He adds that the police did not
immediately mark, photograph and inventory the drugs and drug
paraphernalia at the place where they were seized.
We disagree.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.[65]
Contrary to what the petitioner wants to portray, the chain of
custody of the seized prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken.
After the seizure of the rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance from the petitioners possession and of the various drug
paraphernalia on top of the petitioners bed, the police immediately brought
the petitioner and Villaflor to the police station, together with the seized
items. PO2 De Guzman himself brought these items to the police station and
marked them. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was
marked GSZ[66] (Exh. F); the improvised tooter aluminum foil strips and
aluminum foil with traces of methylamphetamine hydrochloride were marked
AHV[67] (Exh. G and H); the three pieces of unsealed transparent plastic
sachet were marked RSG[68] (Exh. I, I-1, and I-2); the disposable lighter was
marked RSG (Exh. J); the stainless pair of scissors was marked RSG (Exh. K);

the transparent plastic sachet containing three aluminum foil strips was
marked RSG (Exh. L); and the Monsieur bag was marked RSG (Exh. M). These
confiscated items were immediately turned over to SPO4 Mangulabnan, who
in turn, forwarded them to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Southern Police District
for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a
qualitative examination conducted on the specimens, Forensic Chemist
Palacios concluded that Exhibits F, G, H, I, I-1, and I-2 tested positive for the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. [69] When the prosecution
presented these marked specimens in court, PO2 De Guzman positively
identified them to be the same items he seized from the petitioner and
which he later marked at the police station, from where the seized items
were turned over to the laboratory for examination based on a duly prepared
request.[70] We quote the pertinent portions of the records:
xxx
PROSECUTOR ALEX BAGAOISAN:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you mentioned earlier that when you
frisked accused Zalameda, you were able to recover
from his possession a sachet containing white
crystalline substance?
PO2 RENATO DE GUZMAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If that sachet containing white crystalline substance will be
shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you, Mr. Witness, a sachet, which
contains white crystalline substance. Will you please
go over the same and tell us what relation does this
have to the sachet containing white crystalline
substance, which you said was recovered from
accused Zalameda?
A: This is the plastic sachet that I have recovered from
the possession of accused Zalameda, sir.
Q: Why are you certain that this is the same sachet
containing white crystalline substance, which you
recovered from accused Zalameda?

A: I put markings, sir.

Q: What markings?
A: I placed GSZ.
Q: Where did you place this marking?
A: Inside the headquarters, sir.
Q: Could you tell us what does this marking GSZ stand for?
A: Gilbert Sumile Zalameda, sir.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that this white crystalline
substance contained in a plastic sachet with markings GSZ
be marked as Exhibit F, Your Honor. Now, you mentioned
also that you were able to recover drug paraphernalia from
the bed.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned of an improvised tooter aluminum foil?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I have here several pieces of evidence. Will you please
step down and identify the improvised tooter
aluminum foil you have mentioned?
A: This one, sir.
Q: And why are you certain that this is the same
improvised tooter aluminum foil that you recovered
from the accused?
A: I placed markings sir.
Q: What is the markings that you placed?
A: AHV, sir.
Q: What does AHV stand for?
A: Albert Huerte Villaflor, sir.

Q: May I request, Your Honor that this improvised tooter

aluminum foil identified by the witnesses be marked as
exhibit G with markings AHV. Now, you also mentioned
of one aluminum foil, which was made as a tray,
could you identify that particular object evidence
that you have mentioned?
A: Yes, sir, this is the one.
Q: And why are you certain that this is the same
aluminum foil, which was used as a tray?
A: I also placed markings, sir.
Q: What markings did you place in this particular object
evidence?
A: AHV, sir.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that this aluminum foil identified by
the witness with markings AHV be marked as exhibit
H. You mentioned of three pieces plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. Now could
you point to us these sachets that you have
mentioned?
A: Yes, sir. These are the plastic sachets.
Q: And why are you certain that these are the same
sachets which you said contained traces of shabu?
A: I placed the markings, sir.
Q: What markings did you place?
A: My initial, sir, RSG.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that these three pieces of plastic
sachets containing traces of shabu be marked as exhibit I,
I-1, and I-2. Now, you also mentioned of disposable
lighter. Will you please identify the disposable
lighter that you have mentioned?
A: Yes, sir, this is the one.

Q: May I request, Your Honor, that the disposable lighter

identified by the witness with markings RSG be marked as
Exhibit J. How about the scissors, could you identify
the scissors that you have recovered?
A: Yes, sir. This is the one.
Q: The witness identified stainless scissors, which we
request to be marked as Exhibit K. Aside from these
object evidence, what other object evidence did you
find on the bed?
A: I also found three rolled aluminum foil, sir.
Q: Will you be able to identify those three aluminum foils
that you have mentioned?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point them out to us.
A: Here, sir.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that these three rolled
aluminum foils with markings RS be marked as
Exhibit L. Now, why are the markings different, there is
the marking RSG, there is a marking AHV? [sic]
A: For identification, sir.
Q: You also mentioned a bag. Will you please identify that
bag?
A: Here, sir.
Q: We request, Your Honor, that the bag identified by the witness
be marked as Exhibit M. Now, you also mentioned that you
brought Zalameda to the headquarters.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about accused Albert Villaflor?
A: We also brought him to the headquarter[s].
Q: What did you do at the precinct?

A: Our desk officer prepared the necessary paper to turn over the
two suspects to the investigator.
Q: So, did you come to know what happened after that?
A: The investigator prepared a request addressed to the crime
lab. for laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence, sir.
Q: How about the accused, what did you do with them after the
investigation?
A: The investigator also made a request for drug
examination addressed to the Crime Laboratory.

test

Q: And did you come to know what was the result of the
examination conducted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was the result?
A: The result is positive, sir.
Q: What do you mean positive?
A: Positive, sir, for
or shabu, sir.

methylamphetamine

hydrochloride

Q: How about the drug test?

A: The accused also gave positive result.
x x x[71] [Emphasis ours]
Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized items from the time they were first discovered until
they were brought for examination. Besides, as earlier stated, the petitioner
did not contest the admissibility of the seized items during trial. The
integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from the
petitioner were therefore duly proven not to have been
compromised.

We also reject the petitioners claim that the non-presentation of the

forensic chemist was fatal to the prosecutions case. The petitioner never
raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Police Inspector
Palacios. In fact, the defense during the pre-trial agreed to dispense
with her testimony.[72] It must also be stressed that Police Inspector
Palacios is a public officer, and her report carries the presumption of
regularity. Besides, Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.[73] Police Inspector Palacios findings that Exhibits F, G, H, I, I-1,
and I-2 were found positive for the presence of shabu are, therefore,
conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly
comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 [74] does not necessarily
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. [75] In
the present case, we see substantial compliance by the police with the
required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items, thus
showing that the integrity of the seized evidence was not compromised. We
refer particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to the
overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals, to the test
results obtained, under a situation where no objection to admissibility was
ever raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind, show that
the evidence seized were the same evidence tested and subsequently
identified and testified to in court. In People v. Del Monte,[76] we explained:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21
of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not
render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or
rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary
weight that will accorded it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in

any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there
is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of
weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence
depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.

The Proper Penalties

The petitioner was caught in possession of 0.03 gram of shabu or

methamphetamine hydrochloride. The illegal possession of dangerous drugs
is punished under Section 11, paragraph 2(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
which provides:
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less
than five (5) grams of x x x methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu x x x

We sustain the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA in

Criminal Case No. 03-3559, as it is within the range provided for by law.
Meanwhile, Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who unless
authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
The courts a quo sentenced the petitioner to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four months and one day, as minimum, to two years and seven
months, as maximum in Criminal Case No. 03-3560. Pursuant to Section 12

of R.A. No. 9165, we increase the minimum to six (6) months and one (1) day
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision and
resolution dated March 18, 2008 and July 15, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30061 areAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case
No. 03-3560, petitioner Gilbert Zalameda is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two
(2) years and seven (7) months, as maximum.
The CA decision finding the petitioner guilty of violation of Section 11
of R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal Case No. 03-3559 is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

CHUA, accused-appellant.

vs.

BINAD

SY

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal
Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations which read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507[1]

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less two (2)
kilos and one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated
drug, without any authority whatsoever.
Criminal Case No. 96-513[2]
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal.
ammunitions, without first having obtained a license or permit to possess or
carry the same.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. The two cases
were then jointly tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police
force of Angeles City. Their testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario
Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential
informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported
that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in
Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col.
Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of
Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo
Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud,
as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian
informer positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back
up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by
accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the

Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him
and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled
out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to
a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm
bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents
of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2
Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O
juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car
used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the
office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
[3]

When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big
plastic bags containing crystalline substances. The initial field test conducted
by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the siezed items
contained shabu.[4] Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant
brought these items for further laboratory examination to the Crime
Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing,
forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline
substances yielded positive results for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed
13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms
of shabu.[5]
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and
narrated a different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving
the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he
decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of
a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy
cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and
examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker,
the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car
with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During
the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him
to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and
proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions

arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene,
pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his
car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held
inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who
ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col.
Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box
while pictures were being taken.[6]
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its
material points. He testified that he witnessed the incident while he was
conducting a routine security check around the premises of the Guess
Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.[7]
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
59, rendered a decision,[8] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the
accused is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of
shabu, accused Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charge and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following
errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;

B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF

SHABU ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND
VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS
SUFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND
REAONABLE DOUBT.[10]
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made
by the police operatives was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of
SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two
years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which
the arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that
the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have easily
arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null
an void, the drugs that were seized should likewise be inadmissible in
evidence since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellants argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to
the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for
the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their
testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case.[11]
In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and
substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the
trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of
the penalty and indemnity imposed by the trial court. [12] We are clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we
find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of
the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered.

[13]

This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused

shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and
seizure made upon accused-appellant, the court a quo made the following
findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs
(shabu). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. x x x x
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal affects (sic) of the accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present case, the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its
vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to
secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and frisk.[14]
A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and
conclusion of the trial court. It confused the two different concepts of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a stop-andfrisk.
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[15] we distinguished the concepts of a stopand-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a stopand-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the

arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an

arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search
can be madethe process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and
the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used
as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping
or committing violence.
xxxxxxxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-andfrisk as a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons, as
laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-

preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
[16]
(Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk
principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent
search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on
the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.
Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings.[17] Accordingly, for this exception to apply two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.[18]
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The
record reveals that when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder
Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway, alighted
from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a
sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious
manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly
manifesting a violation of the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud hurriedly
accosted[19] accused-appellant and later on introduced themselves as police
officers.[20] Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of
shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was more imagined than
real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the
search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accusedappellant that he had committed a crime, was committing a crime or was
going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has
been held that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting

officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in

flagrante delicto arrest.[21] Hence, in People v. Aminudin,[22] we ruled that
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension (Emphasis
supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben[23] to justify the
polices actions is misplaced. In the said case, based on the information
supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who
may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the
traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a
person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag
were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers
only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior
knowledge from the very same informant of accused-appellants activities. No
less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of
accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on September 21,
1996. An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality
of the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of
this chinese drug pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
Q. And he had been mentioning
before September 21, 1996?
A. Yes, sir.

these

names

to

you

even

Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about
the activities of this chinese drug pusher reckoning in relation to
September 21, 1996?
A. That was about two years already.
Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you
gained from the civilian informant that this chinese drug pusher
have been engaged pushing drugs here in Angeles City, you did
not think of applying for a search warrant for this chinese drug
pusher?
A. No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking
along the road near the Thunder Inn Hotel, is that right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese
drug pusher that will deliver to him also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the
accused in this case he alighted with a Corolla car with plate
number 999, I think, he just alighted when you saw him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near
the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was
pinpointed already by the civilian informer.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn
Hotel?
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
xxxxxxxxx

Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as
you used pounced on him in your affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small
plastic bag, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is
shabu?
A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been
tailing the accused that he is really a drug pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that
you are very sure that what was brought by him was shabu?
A. Yes, sir.[24]
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal
activities of accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and
activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous
to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could
not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and
searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to
them hours before accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an on-thespot tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of
arrest. Accordingly, the arresting teams contention that their arrest of
accused-appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this case. A
stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on

the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) [25] or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons.[26] The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him.[27] It should therefore be emphasized that
a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.[28]
This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court
in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.[29] In said case, the policemen chanced upon
the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who
appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as
akin to a stop-and-frisk. In People v. Solayao,[30] we also found justifiable
reason to stop-and-frisk the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions,
the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact
that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify
reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was
no valid stop-and-frisk in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the
alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police
operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business
in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already
had custody of accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accusedappellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence
and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the
information given to them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before
and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime.

At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually
occurred, accused-appellants warrantless arrest and consequent search
would still not be deemed a valid stop-and frisk. For a valid stop-and-frisk the
search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case.
Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the information about the illegal
activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the apprehending
officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be
deemed as a valid stop-and-frisk.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized
items found in accused-appellants possession. First, there was no valid
intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O
juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber
ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first
arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked
into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on
ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was no clear
showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried
contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which
allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber
ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in plain view of
the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the
poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even
fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is
bereft of any such showing.
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot
simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent
warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of
regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution.[31] In People v. Nubla,[32] we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be
used as basis for affirming accused-appellants conviction because, first, the
presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption. Once challenged by

evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth.

Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized
from accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of
this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized
were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of
Angeles City.[33] The items were therefore not marked at the place where they
were taken. In People v. Casimiro,[34] we struck down with disbelief the
reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked
at the place where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as
marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at
the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana
marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the
crime laboratory.
The governments drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every
citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen
as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so
carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to
do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such
simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but
it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.[35]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513,
convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section 16, Article
III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of

reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from

custody, unless he is being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.

HO WAI PANG,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 176229

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the
so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.[2]
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16,
2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459
affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118
of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused,
namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,[5] Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin San
Ho[7] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III [8] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion
for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates
Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to
the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah
(Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda
L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco
examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From
the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing,
shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was
examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as
those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate
boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was
white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus

immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo
and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes
earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger
manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first
found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains
nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the
chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing
Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of
Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar
chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages
of the six accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco
pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted
a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the
NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.[10] The result of his examination[11] of the
white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape,
placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated
stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined
them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the
representative samples were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[12] Out
of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as
against petitioner and his five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed
against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97.Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation[13] which the trial court granted. The reinvestigation conducted

gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to the
filing of a single Amended Information[14] under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to
the withdrawal of the other Informations.[15] The Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and
transport into the country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms,
more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also
popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost
identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no
knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all the accused guilty of
violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the
accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG, WU HING
SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of
Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended for having conspired to transport into the Philippines
31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally
known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is being imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its
applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a less
stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic
Act No. 6425. The fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed
pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused
[than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION

AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be

imposed since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG
KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND
INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.[19]

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case
records were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995. [20] Later, all
the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective
withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after being satisfied that the withdrawing
appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the
withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997.
[22]
Per Entry of Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final and executory on July 7,
1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief[25] for the respondent
People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this Court
referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and determination pursuant to
this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the
RTC. While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the
custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that
there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also
rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory
right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] which the CA denied in

its Resolution[29] dated January 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI
INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION.[30]

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
prohibits as evidence only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against
himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not
assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial
investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA
in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits
as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against
himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically ruled that the
infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are]
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken
in the course of custodial investigation.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during
his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement
was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused,
the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v.
Buluran,[33][a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not excluding
evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen
Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance
in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The
disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each

case relied on in rendering their respective decisions.Apparently in Ming, the trial

court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they
affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed
the accuseds act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the
crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights
when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared
inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional
rights. In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole
testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have performed his
duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the
Court noted that said examiners testimony was not corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the
strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the
country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the
testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court,
hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus
providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime. As the Court held in People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a
testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive
and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to
produce a conviction.
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another
case when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be
decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to
confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing
for the right to confrontation,viz:

Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what
the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence
being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to
confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel
cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the
proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it
before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless
able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination
suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco
despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the
lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is
that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the
other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. InPeople v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights

guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and
must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The
chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity
for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination
has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also
been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic
preliminary to cross-examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the

witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was duly
established.

Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of
conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision,
and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence
to conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where
conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but by
circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough
circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently prove
conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have
known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila.
Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior
to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the
one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the
extent of directly dealing with the travel agency and [that] Law Ka
Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang
allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel
agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin
San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a
restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is
know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San.
These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they
have the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal
substances confiscated from the six accused were contained in
chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all

contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the
trial prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense
charged [c]ould have been perpetrated only through an elaborate
and methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused assiduously
cooperating and mutually helping each other in order to ensure its
success.[37]

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.[38] [C]onspiracy
which determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association
or at least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.[39] It
need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design.[40] The assent of the minds may
be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some
complete whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced from
petitioner and his co-accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there
was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in
bringing about the crime committed.
Petitioners guilt
reasonable doubt.

was

proved

beyond

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes
were found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that
it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him the
possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she
declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in
petitioners bag.[42]Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she
recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were still at

the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes
from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU.[43] To us, this slight clash in Cincos
statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence in its Order[44] of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that
the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and
definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang,
because she even testified that she found nothing inside the handcarried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But
that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting
Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from
the express lane in going to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she
was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which]
taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from
the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco
admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was
already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless
recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof, pointing to Ho
Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts
from the personal perception of the witness and out of her personal
knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.[45]

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony

must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a
conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must
be calibrated and considered.[46] Also, where there is nothing in the records which
would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate
the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented
no evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution,
Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court
is convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing
else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he
was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his coaccused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his
luggage considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it
bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is
a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As
such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished
and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare
denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the
evidence for the prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who
are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative
testimony.[47]
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging
petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into
the country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the
appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should
be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No.
1683.[48] The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall
be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced new
amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00
to reclusion
perpetua to death and a
fine
ranging

from P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659
amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided
by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty
of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment
ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being
more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court
ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable
to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x.

And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused,
have, as to him, a retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed
by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June
16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

WILLIAM C. YAO, SR.,

LUISA C. YAO, RICHARD C.
YAO, WILLIAM C. YAO JR.,
and ROGER C. YAO,
Petitioners,
-versus
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
PETRON
CORPORATION
and
PILIPINAS
SHELL
PETROLEUM CORP., and

G.R. No. 168306

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

its Principal, SHELL INTL

Promulgated:
PETROLEUM CO. LTD.,
Respondents.
June 19, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr.,
and Roger C. Yao pray for the reversal of the Decision dated 30 September
2004,[2] and Resolution dated 1 June 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP No. 79256,[3] affirming the two Orders, both dated 5 June 2003, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City, relative to Search Warrants
No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. [4] In the said Orders, the RTC denied the
petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant [5] and Motion for the Return of
the Motor Compressor and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Refilling Machine.[6]
The following are the facts:
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS
CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and
distribution of LPG products. Private respondents Petron Corporation (Petron)
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the
largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Their LPG
products
are
sold
under
the
marks
GASUL
and
SHELLANE,
respectively. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines of the
trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LPG products. It is the
sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to
refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its
trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in
the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols, or designs of its
principal,
Shell
International
Petroleum
Company
Limited
(Shell

International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in

connection with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is
the only corporation in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and
distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and
products.[7]
On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant
with the RTC, Branch 17, CaviteCity, against petitioners and other occupants
of
the
MASAGANA
compound
located
at
Governors
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City, for alleged violation of
Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. [8] The two
applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief,
and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing,
selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders
owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of
the said entities.
In his two separate affidavits[9] attached to the two applications for
search warrant, Oblanca alleged:
1.
[That] on 11 February 2003, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received a letter-complaint from
Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr.
of Villaraza and Angangco,
on
behalf of among others, [Petron Corporation (PETRON)]
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the authorized
representative of Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
(Shell International), requesting assistance in the investigation
and, if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain
persons and/or establishments suspected of violating the
intellectual property rights [of PETRON] and of PSPC and Shell
International.
2.
[That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I,
together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was assigned as the NBI
agent on the case.
3.
[That] prior to conducting the investigation
on the reported illegal activities, he reviewed the certificates of

trademark registrations issued in favor of [PETRON], PSPC and

Shell International as well as other documents and other
evidence obtained by the investigative agency authorized by
[PETRON], PSPC and Shell International to investigate and
cause the investigation of persons and establishments violating
the rights of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International,
represented by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. Certified copies of the
foregoing trademark registrations are attached hereto as
Annexes A to :E.
4.
[That] among the establishments alleged to
be unlawfully refilling and unlawfully selling and distributing
[Gasul LPG
and] Shellane products
is Masagana Gas
Corporation (MASAGANA). Based on Securities and Exchange
Commission Records, MASAGANA has its principal office
address
at 9775 Kamagong Street, San
Antonio Village, Makati, MetroManila. The incorporators and
directors of MASAGANA are William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao,
Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger C. Yao. x x x.
5.
I confirmed that MASAGANA is not
authorized to use [PETRON and] Shellane LPG cylinders and its
trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or distributors of
[PETRON and] Shellane LPGs.
6.
I
went
to MASAGANAs refilling
station
located
at
Governors
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires City (sic), Cavite to
investigate its activities. I confirmed that MASAGANA is indeed
engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or distribution of
[Gasul and] Shellane LPG cylinders. I found out that MASAGANA
delivery trucks with Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612, WTE-527,
XAM-970 and WFC-603 coming in and out of the refilling plant
located at the aforementioned address contained multi-brand
LPG cylinders including [Gasul and] Shellane. x x x.
7.
[That] on 13 February 2003, I conducted a
test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. After asking the
purpose of our visit, MASAGANAs guard allowed us to enter the
MASAGANA
refilling
plant
to
purchase
GASUL
and
SHELLANE LPGs. x x x. We were issued an order slip which we
presented to the cashiers office located near the refilling
station. After paying the amount x x x covering the cost of the
cylinders and their contents, they were issued Cash Invoice No.
56210 dated February 13, 2003. We were, thereafter, assisted
by the plant attendant in choosing empty GASUL

and SHELLANE 11 kg. cylinders, x x x were brought to the

refilling station [and filled in their presence.] I noticed that no
valve seals were placed on the cylinders.
[That] while inside the refilling plant doing the test-buy, I
noticed that stockpiles of multi-branded cylinders including
GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders were stored near the refilling
station. I also noticed that the total land area of the refilling
plant is about 7,000 to 10,000 square meters. At the corner
right side of the compound immediately upon entering the gate
is a covered area where the maintenance of the cylinders is
taking place. Located at the back right corner of the compound
are two storage tanks while at the left side also at the corner
portion is another storage tank. Several meters and fronting
the said storage tank is where the refilling station and the office
are located. It is also in this storage tank where the elevated
blue water tank depicting MASAGANA CORP. is located. About
eleven (11) refilling pumps and stock piles of multi-branded
cylinders including Shellane and GASUL are stored in the
refilling station. At the left side of the entrance gate is the
guard house with small door for the pedestrians and at the
right is a blue steel gate used for incoming and outgoing
vehicles.
8.
[That] on 27 February 2003, I conducted
another
test-buy
accompanied
by
Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. x x x After choosing the cylinders, we
were issued an order slip which we presented to the
cashier. Upon payment, Cash Invoice No. 56398 was issued
covering the cost of both GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders
and their contents. x x x Both cylinders were refilled in our
presence and no valve seals were placed on the cylinders.
Copies of the photographs of the delivery trucks, LPG cylinders and
registration papers were also attached to the aforementioned affidavits.[10]
Bernabe C. Alajar (Alajar), owner of Able Research and Consulting
Services Inc., was hired by Petron and Pilipinas Shell to assist them in
carrying
out
their
Brand
Protection
Program. Alajar accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance of and testbuys at the refilling plant of MASAGANA. He also executed two separate
affidavits corroborating the statements of Oblanca. These were annexed to
the two applications for search warrant.[11]

After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar,

and upon reviewing their sworn affidavits and other attached documents,
Judge Melchor Q.C.Sadang (Judge Sadang), Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 17, Cavite City, found probable cause and correspondingly issued
Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. [12]The search warrants
commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search of the
MASAGANA compound and to seize the following items:
Under Search Warrant No. 2-2003:
a.

Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing

the tradename SHELLANE, SHELL (Device) of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other
devices owned by Shell International Petroleum Company,
Ltd.;

b.

Machinery and/or equipment being used or

intended to be used for the purpose of illegally refilling LPG
cylinders belonging to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
bearing the latterstradename as well as the marks
belonging to Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd.,
enumerated hereunder:
1.
2.
3.
4.

c.

d.

Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

Compressor/s (for pneumatic refilling system);
LPG hydraulic pump/s;
LPG refilling heads/hoses and appurtenances
or LPG filling assembly;
5.
LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and
handles and levers;
6.
LPG weighing scales; and
7.
Seals simulating the shell trademark.
Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts,
purchase orders, and all other books of accounts,
inventories and documents pertaining to the production,
sale and/or distribution of the aforesaid goods/products.
Delivery truck bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery
trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended
to be used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing the
above-mentioned counterfeit products.

Under Search Warrant No. 3-2003:

a.

Empty/filled
LPG
cylinder
tanks/containers,
bearing Petron Corporations
(Petron) tradename and
its tradename GASUL and other devices owned and/or used
exclusively by Petron;

b.

Machinery and/or equipment being used or

intended to be used for the purpose of illegally refilling LPG
cylinders belonging to Petron enumerated hereunder;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

Compressor/s (for pneumatic filling system);
LPG hydraulic pump/s;
LPG filling heads/hoses and appurtenances or
LPG filling assembly;
LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and
handles levers;
LPG weighing scales; and
Seals bearing the Petron mark;

c.

Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts,

purchase orders, and all other books of accounts,
inventories and documents pertaining to the production,
sale and/or distribution of the aforesaid goods/products;
and

d.

Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ612 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery
trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used for the
purpose of selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned
counterfeit products.

Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and several
NBI operatives immediately proceeded to the MASAGANA compound and
served the search warrants on petitioners.[13] After searching the premises
of MASAGANA, the following articles described in Search Warrant No. 22003 were seized:
a.

Thirty-eight (38) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing

the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and
the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

b.

Thirty-nine (39) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing

the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and
the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

c.

Eight (8) filled 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing

the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and
the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

d.

Three (3) empty 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing

the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and
the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

e.

One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system.

Pursuant to Search Warrant No. 3-2003, the following articles were

also seized:
a.

Six (6) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders without seal,

bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL and
other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;

b.

Sixty-three (63) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders,

bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL and
other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;

c.

Seven (7) tampered 11 kg. LPG cylinders,

bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL and
other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;

d.

Five (5) tampered 50 kg. LPG cylinders,

bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL and
other
devices
owned
and/or
used
exclusively
by Petron with tampered GASUL logo;

e.

One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system;

and

f.

One (1) set of LPG refilling machine.

On 22 April 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash

Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003[14] on the following grounds:
1.

There is no probable cause for the issuance

of the search warrant and the conditions for the
issuance of a search warrant were not complied
with;

2.

Applicant NBI Agent Ritchie N. Oblanca and

his witness Bernabe C. Alajar do not have any
authority to apply for a search warrant.
Furthermore, they committed perjury when they
alleged in their sworn statements that they
conducted a test-buy on two occasions;

3.

The place to be searched was not specified

in the Search Warrant as the place has an area of
10,000 square meters (one hectare) more or less,
for which reason the place to be searched must be
indicated with particularity;

4.

The search warrant is characterized as a

general warrant as the items to be seized as
mentioned in the search warrant are being used in
the conduct of the lawful business of respondents
and
the same
are not
being
used
in
refilling Shellane and Gasul LPGs.

On 30 April 2003, MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the

RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling
Machine.[15] It claimed that it is the owner of the said motor compressor and
LPG refilling machine; that these items were used in the operation of its
legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business
interests.
On 5 June 2003, the RTC issued two Orders, one of which denied the
petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003,
and the other one also denied the Motion for the Return of Motor
Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine of MASAGANA, for lack of merit. [16]

With respect to the Order denying the petitioners motion to quash

Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, the RTC held that based on
the testimonies of Oblancaand Alajar, as well as the documentary evidence
consisting of receipts, photographs, intellectual property and corporate
registration papers, there is probable cause to believe that petitioners are
engaged in the business of refilling or using cylinders which bear the
trademarks or devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell in the place sought to
be searchedand that such activity is probably in violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293.
It also ruled that Oblanca and Alajar had personal knowledge of the
acts complained of since they were the ones who monitored the activities
of and conducted test-buys on MASAGANA; that the search warrants in
question are not general warrants because the compound searched are
solely used and occupied by MASAGANA, and as such, there was no need to
particularize the areas within the compound that would be searched; and
that the items to be seized in the subject search warrants were sufficiently
described with particularity as the same was limited to cylinder tanks
bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE.
As regards the Order denying the motion of MASAGANA for the return
of its motor compressor and LPG refilling machine, the RTC resolved that
MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party claimant whose rights were
violated as a result of the seizure since the evidence disclosed that
petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they conduct their
business through the same juridical entity. It maintained that to rule
otherwise would result in the misapplication and debasement of the veil of
corporate fiction. It also stated that the veil of corporate fiction cannot be
used as a refuge from liability.
Further, the RTC ratiocinated that ownership by another person or
entity of the seized items is not a ground to order its return; that in seizures
pursuant to a search warrant, what is important is that the seized items
were used or intended to be used as means of committing the offense
complained of; that by its very nature, the properties sought to be returned
in the instant case appear to be related to and intended for the illegal

activity for which the search warrants were applied for; and that the items
seized are instruments of an offense.
Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration of the assailed Orders,
but these were denied by the RTC in its Order dated 21 July 2003 for lack
of compelling reasons.[18]
[17]

Subsequently, petitioners appealed the two Orders of the RTC to the

Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.[19] On30 September 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Decision affirming the Orders of the RTC. [20] It adopted in essence the
bases and reasons of the RTC in its two Orders. The decretal portion thereof
reads:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to
disturb the assailed Orders of the respondent judge. Grave abuse
of discretion has not been proven to exist in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed orders both dated June 5, 2003 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration [21] of the Decision of the

Court of Appeals, but this was denied in its Resolution dated 1 June
2005 for lack of merit.[22]
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC CAVITE CITY HAD SUFFICIENT
BASIS IN DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NBI
AGENT (RITCHIE OBLANCA) CAN APPLY FOR THE SEARCH
WARRANTS NOTHWITHSTANDING HIS LACK OF AUTHORITY;

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED WAS COMPLIED WITH;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE APPLICATIONS AND THE SEARCH WARRANTS THEMSELVES
SHOW NO AMBIGUITY OF THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE COMPLAINT IS DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA GAS
CORPORATION,
ACTING
THROUGH
ITS
OFFICERS
AND
DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION MAY NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT WHOSE RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE.[23]

Apropos the first issue, petitioners allege that Oblanca and Alajar had
no personal knowledge of the matters on which they testified;
that Oblanca and Alajar lied to JudgeSadang when they stated under oath
that they were the ones who conducted the test-buys on two different
occasions; that the truth of the matter is that Oblanca and Alajar never made
the purchases personally; that the transactions were undertaken by other
persons namely, Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva as shown in the Entry/Exit
Slips
of
MASAGANA;
and
that
even
if
it
were
true
that Oblanca and Alajar asked Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva to conduct the
test-buys, the information relayed by the latter two to the former was mere
hearsay.[24]
Petitioners also contend that if Oblanca and Alajar had indeed used
different names in purchasing the LPG cylinders, they should have
mentioned it in their applications for search warrants and in their testimonies
during the preliminary examination; that it was only after the petitioners had

submitted to the RTC the entry/exit slips showing different personalities who
made the purchases that Oblanca and Alajar explained that they had to use
different names in order to avoid detection; that Alajar is not connected with
either of the private respondents; that Alajar was not in a position to inform
the RTC as to the distinguishing trademarks of SHELLANE and GASUL;
that Oblanca was not also competent to testify on the marks allegedly
infringed by petitioners; that Judge Sadang failed to ask probing questions on
the distinguishing marks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that the findings of the
Brand Protection Committee of Pilipinas Shell were not submitted nor
presented
to
the
RTC;
that
although
Judge Sadang examined Oblanca and Alajar, the former did not ask
exhaustive questions; and that the questions Judge Sadang asked were
merely rehash of the contents of the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar.[25]
These contentions are devoid of merit.
Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states
requirements before a search warrant may be validly issued, to wit:

the

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (emphasis supplied).

Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

provides with more particularity the requisites in issuing a search
warrant, viz:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued
only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant
means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched.[26]
The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts,
data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he
may present.[27] The applicant or his witnesses must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
being complained of. Reliable information is insufficient. Mere affidavits are
not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his
witnesses.[28]
Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting
trademark infringement, thus:
SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall,
without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the same
container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or
services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out
the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a
registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or

services on or in connection with which such use is likely to

cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be
liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement
takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection
155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether
there is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing
material.

As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a

container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale,
distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be
considered as trademark infringement.
In his sworn affidavits,[29] Oblanca stated that before conducting an
investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the
certificates of trademark registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual
Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell; that he confirmed
from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is not authorized to sell, use,
refill or distribute GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinder containers; that he
and Alajar monitored the activities of MASAGANA in its refilling plant station
located
within
its
compound
at
Governors
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City; that, using different
names, they conducted two test-buys therein where they purchased LPG
cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; that the said GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refilled in their presence by the
MASAGANA employees; that while they were inside the MASAGANA
compound, he noticed stock piles of multi-branded cylinders including GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that they observed delivery trucks loaded
with GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out of the
MASAGANA compound and making deliveries to various retail outlets. These
allegations were corroborated by Alajar in his separate affidavits.
In support of the foregoing statements, Oblanca also submitted the
following documentary and object evidence:

1.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. 44046 for SHELL (DEVICE) in the name of Shell
International;

2.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. 41789 for SHELL (DEVICE) in the name of Shell
International;

3.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. 37525 for SHELL (DEVICE) in the name of Shell
International;

4.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. R-2813 for SHELL in the name of Shell International;

5.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. 31443 for SHELLANE in the name of Shell International;

6.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. 57945 for the mark GASUL in the name of Petron;

7.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. C-147 for GASUL CYLINDER CONTAINING LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM GAS in the name of Petron;

8.

Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration

No. 61920 for the mark GASUL AND DEVICE in the name
of Petron;

9.

Certified true copy of the Articles of Incorporation

of Masagana;

10.

Certified true copy of the By-laws of Masagana;

11.

Certified true copy of the latest General Information

Sheet of Masagana on file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;

12.

Pictures of delivery trucks coming in and out

of Masagana while it delivered Gasul and Shellane LPG;

13.

Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated 13 February

2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul and Shellane LPG
purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;

14.

Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by

Cash Invoice No. 56210 purchased from Masagana by
Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;

15.

Cash Invoice No. 56398 dated 27 February 2003

issued
by Masagana for
the Gasul and Shellane LPG
purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; and

16.

Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by

Cash Invoice No. 56398 purchased from Masagana by
Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar.[30]

Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object

evidence is that Oblanca and Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact that
petitioners, through MASAGANA, have been using the LPG cylinders bearing
the
marks
GASUL
and
SHELLANE
without
permission
from Petron and Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for trademark infringement.
Both Oblanca and Alajar were clear and insistent that they were the very
same persons who monitored the activities of MASAGANA; that they
conducted test-buys thereon; and that in order to avoid suspicion, they used
different names during the test-buys. They also personally witnessed the
refilling of LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE inside the
MASAGANA refilling plant station and the deliveries of these refilled
containers to some outlets using mini-trucks.
Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to
establish probable cause. It should be borne in mind that the determination
of probable cause does not call for the application of the rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute
or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial.
[31]

The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the purchase
receipts do not negate personal knowledge on their part. It is a common
practice of the law enforcers such as NBI agents during covert investigations

to use different names in order to conceal their true identities. This is

reasonable and understandable so as not to endanger the life of the
undercover agents and to facilitate the lawful arrest or apprehension of
suspected violators of the law.
Petitioners contention that Oblanca and Alajar should have mentioned
the fact that they used different names in their respective affidavits and
during the preliminary examination is puerile. The argument is too vacuous
to merit serious consideration. There is nothing in the provisions of law
concerning the issuance of a search warrant which directly or indirectly
mandates that the applicant of the search warrant or his witnesses should
state in their affidavits the fact that they used different names while
conducting undercover investigations, or to divulge such fact during the
preliminary examination. In the light of other more material facts which
needed to be established for a finding of probable cause, it is not difficult to
believe that Oblanca and Alajar failed to mention that they used aliases in
entering the MASAGANA compound due to mere oversight.
It cannot be gainfully said that Oblanca and Alajar are not competent
to testify on the trademarks infringed by the petitioners. As earlier
discussed, Oblanca declared under oath that before conducting an
investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the
certificates of trademark registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual
Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. These certifications of
trademark registrations were attached by Oblanca in his applications for the
search warrants. Alajar, on the other hand, works as a private investigator
and, in fact, owns a private investigation and research/consultation firm. His
firm was hired and authorized, pursuant to the Brand Protection Program
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, to verify reports that MASAGANA is involved in
the illegal sale and refill of GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders. [32] As part of
the job, he studied and familiarized himself with the registered trademarks of
GASUL and SHELLANE, and the distinct features of the LPG cylinders bearing
the same trademarks before conducting surveillance and test-buys on
MASAGANA.[33] He also submitted to Oblanca several copies of the same
registered trademark registrations and accompanied Oblanca during the
surveillance and test-buys.

As to whether the form and manner of questioning made by

Judge Sadang complies with the requirements of law, Section 5 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules on CriminalProcedure, prescribes the rules in the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses when applying for search
warrant, to wit:
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.- The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no
hard-andfast rule governing how a judge should conduct his investigation, it
is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma.The judge
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.[34]
After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the preliminary
examination, we found the questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently
probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. [35] The testimonies
of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and their narration of
facts was credible. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:
This Court is likewise not convinced that respondent Judge
failed to ask probing questions in his determination of the
existence of probable cause. This Court has thoroughly examined
the Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken during the
investigation conducted by the respondent Judge and found that
respondent Judge lengthily inquired into the circumstances of the
case. For instance, he required the NBI agent to confirm the
contents of his affidavit, inquired as to where the test-buys were
conducted and by whom, verified whether PSPC and PETRON
have registered trademarks or tradenames, required the NBI
witness to explain how the test-buys were conducted and to
describe the LPG cylinders purchased from Masagana Gas

Corporation, inquired why the applications for Search Warrant

were
filed
in Cavite City
considering
that Masagana Gas
Corporation was located in Trece Martires, Cavite, inquired
whether the NBI Agent has a sketch of the place and if there was
any distinguishing sign to identify the place to be searched, and
inquired about their alleged tailing and monitoring of the delivery
trucks. x x x.[36]

Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings

of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to
question the applicant and his witnesses, the findings of the judge deserves
great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof
that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates
of reason.[37] We find no compelling reason to disturb Judge Sadangs findings
herein.
Anent the second issue, petitioners argue that Judge Sadang failed to
require Oblanca to show his authority to apply for search warrants;
that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime and not that of the
Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that all complaints for infringement
should be investigated by the Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that it
is highly irregular that an agent not assigned to the Intellectual Property
Division would apply for a search warrant and without authority from the NBI
Director; that the alleged letter-complaint of Atty. Bienvenido Somera, Jr.
of Villaraza and Angangco Law Office was not produced in court; that
Judge Sadang did not requireOblanca to produce the alleged letter-complaint
which is material and relevant to the determination of the existence of
probable cause; and that Petron and Pilipinas Shell, being two different
corporations, should have issued a board resolution authorizing
the Villaraza and Angangco Law Office to apply for search warrant in their
behalf.[38]
We reject these protestations.
The authority of Oblanca to apply for the search warrants in question is
clearly discussed and explained in his affidavit, viz:

[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) received a letter-complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera,
Jr.
of Villaraza and Angangco,
on
behalf
of
among
others,Petron Corporation
(PETRON)
[and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the authorized representative of
Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (SHELL
INTERNATIONAL)] requesting assistance in the investigation and,
if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain persons
and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual
property rights of PETRON [and of PSPC and Shell International.]
11. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with
Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was assigned as the NBI agent on the
case.[39]

The fact that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime

Division and not that of the Intellectual Property Division does not abrogate
his authority to apply for search warrant. As aptly stated by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the provisions on search warrant under
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which specifically
commands that the applicant law enforcer must be a member of a division
that is assigned or related to the subject crime or offense before the
application for search warrant may be acted upon. The petitioners did not
also cite any law, rule or regulation mandating such requirement. At most,
petitioners may only be referring to the administrative organization and/or
internal rule or practice of the NBI. However, not only did petitioners failed to
establish the existence thereof, but they also did not prove that such
administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice are inviolable.
Neither is the presentation of the letter-complaint of Atty. Somera and
board resolutions from Petron and Pilipinas Shell required or necessary in
determining probable cause. As heretofore discussed, the affidavits
of Oblanca and Alajar, coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish probable cause. It can also be
presumed that Oblanca, as an NBI agent, is a public officer who had regularly
performed his official duty.[40] He would not have initiated an investigation on

MASAGANA without a proper complaint. Furthermore, Atty. Somera did not

step up to deny his letter-complaint.
Regarding the third issue, petitioners posit that the applications for
search warrants of Oblanca did not specify the particular area to be
searched, hence, giving the raiding team wide latitude in determining what
areas they can search. They aver that the search warrants were general
warrants, and are therefore violative of the Constitution. Petitioners also
assert that since the MASAGANA compound is about 10,000.00 square
meters with several structures erected on the lot, the search warrants should
have defined the areas to be searched.
The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places
in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that
points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the
officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.[41]
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes
the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held
that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place intended in the
warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been
issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended
the compound described in the affidavit.[42]
The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to
make an immediate search on MASAGANA compound located at Governors
Drive, Barangay Lapidario,Trece Martires, Cavite City. It appears that the
raiding team had ascertained and reached MASAGANA compound without
difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other offices/plants
in Trece Martires, Cavite City. Moreover, Oblanca, who was with the raiding
team, was already familiar with the MASAGANA compound as he
and Alajar had monitored and conducted test-buys thereat.

Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound,

there was no need to particularize the areas to be searched because, as
correctly stated by Petronand Pilipinas Shell, these structures constitute the
essential and necessary components of the petitioners business and cannot
be treated separately as they form part of one entire compound. The
compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA. What the case law
merely requires is that, the place to be searched can be distinguished in
relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this requisite was
complied with in the instant case.
As to the fourth issue, petitioners asseverate that the search warrants
did not indicate with particularity the items to be seized since the search
warrants merely described the items to be seized as LPG cylinders bearing
the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying their sizes.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of
law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.[43]
While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be
taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once
described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not
be so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between
those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of
those articles described as a class or specie would suffice.[44]

Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized

under the search warrants in question were sufficiently described with
particularity. The articles to be confiscated were restricted to the
following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE;
(2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be used in the illegal
refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also
specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3) Documents
which pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE527, XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or
vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be used for the purpose
of selling and/or distributing GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders.[45]
Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to those
which bear direct relation to the offense, i.e., violation of section 155 of
Republic Act No. 8293, for which the warrant was issued, the requirement of
particularity of description is satisfied.
Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
Finally, petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to intervene and
to move for the return of the seized items; that the items seized by the
raiding team were being used in the legitimate business of MASAGANA; that
the raiding team had no right to seize them under the guise that the same
were being used in refilling GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that
there being no action for infringement filed against them and/or MASAGANA
from the seizure of the items up to the present, it is only fair that the seized
articles be returned to the lawful owner in accordance with Section 20 of A.M.
No. 02-1-06-SC.
It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors
or officers. However, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons,or in the case of two

corporations merge them into one. [46] In other words, the law will not
recognize the separate corporate existence if the corporation is being used
pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-recognition is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity
or disregarding the fiction of corporate entity. Where the separate corporate
entity is disregarded, the corporation will be treated merely as an association
of persons and the stockholders or members will be considered as the
corporation, that is, liability will attach personally or directly to the officers
and stockholders.[47]
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are
utilizing the latter in violating the intellectual property rights
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, petitioners collectively and MASAGANA
should be considered as one and the same person for liability purposes.
Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no refuge for petitioners.
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from
that of the petitioners, the effect will be the same. The law does not require
that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence,
and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized. [48] Hence, even if,
as petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a
separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still valid.
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine
and the GASUL and SHELL LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the
body or substance of the crime, or the evidence of the commission of
trademark infringement. These were the very instruments used or intended
to be used by the petitioners in trademark infringement. It is possible that, if
returned to MASAGANA, these items will be used again in violating the
intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell.[49] Thus, the RTC was
justified in denying the petitioners motion for their return so as to prevent
the petitioners and/or MASAGANA from using them again in trademark
infringement.

Petitioners reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, [50] is not

tenable. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is
not applicable in the present case because it governs only searches and
seizures in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property rights. [51] The
offense complained of herein is for criminal violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170[52] of Republic Act No. 8293.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79256, dated 30 September
2004 and 1 June 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.