Torts 3

CUSTODIO vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed
for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
Damnum absque injuria There is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
Article 21 Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of
abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must
concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to
the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going
into their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties
which thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they
built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property from their
intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be
created.
Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of
the trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages
(p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages
were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property due
to the adobe wall restricting access.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The
mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the
plaintiff resulting therefrom.Damages are merely a part of the remedy allowed
for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting
from the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe
wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the owner
of their respective propertiesi.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in
Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1)
defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)
The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None
of these requisites was present in this case.
The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the
damage was not a result of an injury is calleddamnum absque injuria and the
plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
***********************************
FEBTC v. Pacilan Digest
Far East Bank vs. Pacilan
G.R. 157314 July 29, 2005
Callejo Sr, J.:
Facts:
1. Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank (now BPI). He issued
several postdated checks, the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to
P680. The said check was presented to petitioner bank for payment on April 4,
1988 but was dishonored. It appeared that the account of Pacilan has been closed
on the evening of April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly handled'.
2. It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988
amounting in total to P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to
P6,981.43, thus an overdraft of P 428.57 resulted therefrom. Consequently, the last
check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff deposited the amount the
following day.
3. Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed
an action for damages against it and the employee (Villadelgado) who closed the
account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his account was
malicious and intended to embarrass him.
4. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages
(P100,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000). The bank appealed, but the CA
affirmed the lower court's decision with modifications and held that the closure of
the bank of plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation allowing a reclearing of a check returned for insufficiency of funds, is patently malicious and
unjustifiable. Hence, this appeal.
5. The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and
in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the
operations of a regular demand deposit, allowing it to close an account if the
depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds or uncollected
deposits.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages
NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. The
petitioner has the right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and
regulations on regular demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner
abused its rights in the exercise of its duties. The evidence negates the existence of
bad faith and malice on the part of the petitioner bank, which are the second and
third elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation of Art. 19.
The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by
issuing checks previously against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a
hundred times.
Moreover, the acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of the
account cannot be considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple
negligence of its personnel.
As a result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the subsequent
dishonor of the other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as these was
the result of his own act in irregularly handling his account.
**********************************
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: It was the 8
th
of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between
Angeles City and SanFernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter,
Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, andKim, as well
as Kims babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction
of Angeles City (northward) in aFord Escort.Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in
theopposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to
Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as itwas carrying 200 hundred
cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.As the Escort approached one PulongPulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side
ofthe road into the Escorts lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of
whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced
to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights
on, appliedhis brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get
back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck.The collision occurred on
the bridge.The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old,
Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap shewas sitting. Loida was seated in
the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back
of the Escort,received physical injuries from the collision.An information was filed
against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond re
asonable doubt of the charges in the information. Theconviction was affirmed by
the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by
the SC of hisPetition for Review.Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife
and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and herhusband for the
death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were
impleaded against as theemployers of Ruben Galang Galang was not included.
The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were
eventuallyconsolidated.The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the
respondents damages and attorneys fees.On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it
wasGalangs inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.
However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, theIAC set aside its original
decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Kohs car invaded
the lane of the truck andthe collision occurred while still in Galangs lane gave rise
to the presumption that Koh was negligent.ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing
their original decision?HELD: NO. The petition has merit.
Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil
and criminal) should have been consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the
evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses
in the criminalcase but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation
resulted in two confl icting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict
ofGalang was deemed by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar.
On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately

concluded that it was Jose Kohs negligencethat was the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the
petitionersconvincingly shows that the car swerved into the trucks lane because as
it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boysdarted across the road from
the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.Aracelis testimony was pretty much what
was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the
truckwas immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on to warn
the trucks driver to slow down and let the Escortreturn to its lane. When asked as
to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck
just kept oncoming, indicating that it didnt reduce its speed. She posited that if it
did, there wouldnt have been a collision. Her testimonyremained intact, even upon
cross-examination that Joses entry into Galangs lane was necessary to avoid
what was, in his mindat the time, a greater peril death or injury to the two idiots.
This is hardly negligent behavior.Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio
Tanhueco
1
, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck,moving at 50 to 60kph,
only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the
collision, they foundskidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated
that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision.While Galang
claimed that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck
but this only served to substantiateTanhuecos statement that he stopped only
upon collision, considering the speed at which he was going
***************
Valenzuela vs CA
Lessons Applicable:
Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)

Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue
towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a
flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her
emergency lights and seeked help
She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the
tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li
who was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the
ground
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.
Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27,

000 (aritificial leg)]
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer,
jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840
actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of
plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24,
1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant,
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for
unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000,
as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but
absolved Li's employer
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located

just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very
near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a
drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery
road, he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or
applying his brakes at the proper time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for
both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
3.
4.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
emergency rule
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search
for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find
no one to help her
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed
she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind
a Toyota Corona Car
YES.
Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure
to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by
large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that
it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting
its company car to Li
YES.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we
are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court
is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent

driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting,
it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive
physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been
documented, are painful.
********************
Ilocos Norte Electric vs. CA
Facts: Nana Belen ventured out in flood waters to check on the status of her
grocery store after the storm. On her way to her grocery she was electrocuted.
Issue: WON Ilocos Norte Electric Corporation was liable
Held: yes
Ratio: The finding of the lower court, was based on what the defendant's employees
were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on.
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE
JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA
JUAN, respondents.
Herman D. Coloma for petitioner.
Glicerio S. Ferrer for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the Decision * of the respondent Court of
Appeals' First Division, setting aside the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and

another rendered in its stead whereby defendant is hereby
sentenced to pay plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45;
compensatory damages of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of
P10,000.00; attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in
both instances. (p. 27 Rollo)
Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both patties strive for the
recognition of their respective versions of the scenario from which the disputed
claims originate. The respondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the evidence of
the parties as follows:
From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of
June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon
by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between
5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had
abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the
deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out
of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero
Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction
of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and
proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have
been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the
deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five
Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo
Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned
by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance
of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the
deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two
girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so
because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric
wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the
water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of
the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased,
but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help
from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or
five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in

law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife
Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the
City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of
defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the
electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero
Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house
were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an
electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29,
1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National
Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00
and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an
inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines.
Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he
could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the
INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of
Guerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and
Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across
the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the current
of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the
INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to
the NPC Compound.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again
on another inspection trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel
Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been
taken. Using the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in
his jeep and employing the skill he acquired from an in service
training on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of
the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to
the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them
about the grounded lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the
same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the

restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in
the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H.
del Pilar after learning that the deceased had been electrocuted.
Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal
Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the
relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about
8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical
parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the
left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh.
C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the
base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The certificate of death prepared by Dr.
Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock
electrocution" (Exh. I; p. 103, Ibid.).
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of
its officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric engineer;
Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and
Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO Through the
testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought to prove that on
and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the
INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area No. 9 which
covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero Street,
did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life
and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO
equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date
in question. As a public service operator and in line with its
business of supplying electric current to the public, defendant had
installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons
and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as
floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12 linesmen
charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the
areas respectively assigned to them.
Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the
province of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets of
Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were
reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the

southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed away
and where the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern
part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in
the far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of
Segundo and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the far northwest
side, near the premises of the Ilocos Norte National High School.
Fabico Abijero, testified that in the early morning before 6 o'clock
on June 29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and
Guerrero Streets to switch off the street lights in Area No. 9. He did
not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he
saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by
the defense to show that the deceased could not have died of
electrocution Substantially, the testimony of the doctor is as
follows: Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor,
not even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of
death. Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the
deceased three hours after her death, because cyanosis which
means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the
color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live person. The
presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased
(Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to establish her death by
electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are more or less
round in shape and with points of entry and exit. Had the
deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her
palm would have been bigger and the injury more massive. (CA
Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the
heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide,
Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as a special
defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In
this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main
house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with
electric current whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then conjectures that the
switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the
deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of
June 29, 1967. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and
dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and
attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the
controverted decision.
In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed by
the respondent CA:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion and error in considering
the purely hearsay alleged declarations of Ernesto
de la Cruz as part of theres gestae.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion and error in holding that
the strong typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag
City and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967 and the
flood and deluge it brought in its wake were not
fortuitous events and did not exonerate petitionercompany from liability for the death of Isabel Lao
Juan.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion and erred in not applying the legal
principle of "assumption of risk" in the present
case to bar private respondents from collecting
damages from petitioner company.
4. That the respondent Court of Appeals gravely
erred and abused its discretion in completely
reversing the findings of fact of the trial court.
5. The findings of fact of the respondent Court of
Appeals are reversible under the recognized
exceptions.
6. The trial court did not err in awarding moral
damages and attorney's fees to defendant
corporation, now petitioner company.
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner company

may be held liable from the death of the late Isabel
Lao Juan, the damages granted by respondent
Court of Appeals are improper and exhorbitant.
(Petitioners Memorandum, p. 133, Rollo)
Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the deceased died of
electrocution; (2) whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's
death; and (3) whether or not the respondent CA's substitution of the trial court's
factual findings for its own was proper.
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that the same be resolved in the
affirmative. By a preponderance of evidence, private respondents were able to show
that the deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily
derived from the photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left
palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased
had clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body of the deceased a few hours
after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree burn" (p.
144, TSN, December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically charged" (p. 102,
TSN, November 28, 1972). Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida
Bulong added that after the deceased screamed "Ay" and sank into the water, they
tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in a snake-like fashion
(supra). The foregoing therefore justifies the respondent CA in concluding that "(t)he
nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no
other conclusion than that they were "burns," and there was nothing else in the
street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the
dangling live wire of defendant company" (CA Decision, p. 22, Rollo).
But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the
deceased was electrocuted, if such was really the case when she tried to open her
steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to
install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said
burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with
evidence. As required by the Rules, "each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations." (Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless, the CA significantly noted that
"during the trial, this theory was abandoned" by the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23,
Rollo).
Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. The CA said:
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl,
were with the deceased during that fateful morning of June 29,
1967. This Court has not been offered any sufficient reason to
discredit the testimonies of these two young ladies. They were one
in the affirmation that the deceased, while wading in the waistdeep flood on Guerrero Street five or six meters ahead of them,
suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. When
they approached the deceased to help, they were stopped by the
sight of an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snakelike fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz also tried to approach
the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the water was
grounded. These bits of evidence carry much weight. For the
subject of the testimonies was a startling occurrence, and the
declarations may be considered part of the res gestae. (CA
Decision, p. 21, Rollo)
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be
present: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that
the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3)
that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances (People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151; People vs.
Balbas, 122 SCRA 959). We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA' part in
view of the satisfaction of said requisites in the case at bar.
The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are admitted in evidence
precisely as an exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness
and necessity. "Trustworthiness" because the statements are made instinctively
(Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity" because such natural and
spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the same
person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore, the fact that the
declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to testify does not make the
testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong hearsay since the said
declaration is part of the res gestae. Similarly, We considered part of the res
gestae a conversation between two accused immediately after commission of the
crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).
deceased sank into the waist-deep water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida
Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after,
the sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling event had not yet ceased when
Ernesto de la Cruz entered the scene considering that the victim remained
submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of mind
characterized by nervous excitement had been triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's
being as anybody under the same contingency could have experienced. As such, We
cannot honestly exclude his shouts that the water was grounded from the res
gestae just because he did not actually see the sinking of the deceased nor hear her
scream "Ay."
Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere opinion of Ernesto de la
Cruz. While We concede to the submission that the statement must be one of facts
rather than opinion, We cannot agree to the proposition that the one made by him
was a mere opinion. On the contrary, his shout was a translation of an actuality as
perceived by him through his sense of touch.
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto de la Cruz' testimony was
suppressed by the private respondents, thus, is presumed to be adverse to them
pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 131. For the application of said Rule as against a
party to a case, it is necessary that the evidence alleged to be suppressed is
available only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18 May 1955, 97 Phil. 953).
The presumption does not operate if the evidence in question is equally available to
both parties (StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is
clear from the records that petitioner could have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the
witness stand. This, precisely, was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to
petitioner's counsel when she testified on cross examination:
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did he reach from
the gate of the house?
A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir because he
is here. (TSN, p. 30, 26 Sept. 1972)
The foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify the declarations of
Ernesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse to private respondent, would have helped
its case. However, due to reasons known only to petitioner, the opportunity was not
taken.
While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's Memorandum, p.

135, Rollo), Ernesto de la Cruz was not an actual witness to the instant when the
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor.
The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be
exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may
be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's
death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took
place. We subscribe to the conclusions of the respondent CA when it found:
On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the
electrocution and consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan,
defendant called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief
lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence
and to negate the charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a
general way about their duties and the measures which
defendant usually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. From
these testimonies, the lower court found "that the electric lines and
other equipment of defendant corporation were properly
maintained by a well-trained team of lineman, technicians and
engineers working around the clock to insure that these
equipments were in excellent condition at all times." (P. 40, Record
on Appeal) The finding of the lower court, however, was based on
what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what
they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on
the occasion of theemergency situation brought about by the
typhoon.
The lower court made a mistake in assuming that defendant's
employees worked around the clock during the occurrence of the
typhoon on the night of June 28 and until the early morning of
June 29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National Power
Corporation affirmed that when he first set out on an inspection
trip between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. on June 29, 1967, he saw
grounded and disconnected electric lines of the defendant but he
saw no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on
Rizal Street was still closed. (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Even
the witnesses of defendant contradict the finding of the lower
court. Conrado Asis, defendant's electrical engineer, testified that
he conducted a general inspection of the franchise area of the
INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day following the typhoon. The
reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were
submerged. (p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he

arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. onJune 30 and after briefing his
men on what to do they started out. (p. 338, lbid) One or two days
after the typhoon, the INELCO people heard "rumors that someone
was electrocuted" so he sent one of his men to the place but his
man reported back that there was no damaged wire. (p. 385, Id.)
Loreto Abijero, chief lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr.
Juan. He testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr.
Juan came to the INELCO plant and asked the INELCO people to
inspect their lines. He went with Engr. Juan and their inspection
lasted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28,
1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of defendant, testified that at about
6:00 on June 29, 1967 the typhoon ceased. At that time, he was at
the main building of the Divine Word College of Laoag where he
had taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511, Ibid.)
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag
City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29,
1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be
inconstant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that
defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there
were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even
manning its office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it
that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must
be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this
high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right
to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner
having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the
victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines
or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant
is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no
application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and
brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5,
26 Sept. 1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to
see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her
the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the
rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another
is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co.,
1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property,
a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the
deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a
right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect
her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid.,
p. 1165, 1166).
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in completely
reversing the trial court's findings of fact, pointing to the testimonies of three of its
employees its electrical engineer, collector-inspector, lineman, and presidentmanager to the effect that it had exercised the degree of diligence required of it in
keeping its electric lines free from defects that may imperil life and limb. Likewise,
the said employees of petitioner categorically disowned the fatal wires as they
appear in two photographs taken on the afternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and
"E"), suggesting that said wires were just hooked to the electric post (petitioner's
Memorandum, p. 170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held, "(t)he finding of the
lower court ... was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do,
not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the
occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon" (CA Decision, p.
25, Rollo). And as found by the CA, which We have already reiterated above,
petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of
the several wires cannot stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it
held that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them
can lead to no other conclusion than that they were 'burns', and there was nothing
else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn
except the dangling live wire of defendant company" (supra).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt
efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474).
The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set
out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded
and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any
INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office (vide, CA
Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the
negligence of petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:
. . .even before June 28 the people in Laoag were already alerted
about the impending typhoon, through radio announcements.
Even the fire department of the city announced the coming of the
big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN, March 13, 1975) At the INELCO
irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because
"amperes of the switch volts were moving". And yet, despite these
danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that
defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done. Asked why
the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine
tender of the electric plant to switch off the current." (pp. 467468, Ibid.) How very characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA
Decision, p. 26, Rollo)
From the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its discretion in reversing
the trial court's findings but tediously considered the factual circumstances at
hand pursuant to its power to review questions of fact raised from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).
In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in
private respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the
victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory
damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit
case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the
deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit.
Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We affirm
the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent
jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA
381), We increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total
actual damages to P48,229.45.
10
The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was
properly made by the respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad faith on the
- versus part of respondents in instituting his case being a mere product of wishful thinking
and speculation. Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the
action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate
(Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results from a person's exercising his
Spouses
EDILBERTO
EXALTACION
legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).
ADELAIDA EXALTACION,
and
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight
Respondents,
modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED.
x-------------------------x
************************
EODORICO MANZANARES,
G.R. Nos. 153760-61
Petitioner,
MANHATTAN
ENTERPRISES,
CO.,
and
TEODORICO MANZANARES,
Petitioners,
- versus -
- versus THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Present:
Respondent.
x-------------------------x
EDUARDO YANG, doing business under the

name and style of MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES,
INC., and TEODORICO MANZANARES,
LYDIA, CONSEJO, MIGUEL, JR., WILFREDO,

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
BELINDA,
JOHNA,
DANIEL,
DESPOSORIO,
Chairperson,
MA. MILLIE ANAS-SACLOTE,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Respondents,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
x-------------------------x
VICTOR, ANTONIETTE [all surnamed ANAS] and
CALLEJO, SR., and

Petitioners,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
TEODORICO
MANZANARES,
and
EDUARDO
YANG,
11
Petitioners,
October 12, 2006

TEODORICO
MANZANARES,
and
EDUARDO
YANG,
- versus -
Petitioners,
FELICIDAD TOMAQUIN,
- versus Respondent,
x-------------------------x
CITA VICENTE,
Respondent.
MANHATTAN
ENTERPRISES
CO.,
and
x--------------------------------------------------x
TEODORICO MANZANARES,
Petitioners,
DECISION
- versus CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
EDUARDA DAPLINAN VDA. DE PASCO, ROSA
PASCO
ALONZO,
JESUSA
PASCO
BUSLON,
FRANCISCO PASCO, MIRAVER PASCO & MA.

TERESA PASCO,
Respondents,
x-------------------------x
Promulgated:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
April 2002[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 19600 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53834 affirming the
joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal
Case No. 5782-M and Civil Cases No. 6734-M, 6769-M, 6935-M, 6894-M, and
8478-M.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
12
At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular collision

took place along MacArthur Highway, Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, involving
an Isuzu six-wheeler truck bearing plate no. CBG 283 Pilipinas 82 and a
passenger jeepney with plate no. DDC 430 UV Pilipinas 82. The Isuzu truck was
owned by petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and was then driven by
petitioner TeodoricoManzanares. The passenger jeepney, on the other hand, was
registered in the name of Teodoro Basallo. It was established during the trial that
the passenger jeepney was heading southwards in the direction ofManila while the
Isuzu truck was heading the opposite way.
her salary for the two-month period that she was unable to perform her job as a
secretary in a law firm in Bulacan.[7]
Except for the personal circumstances of the parties and the amount of
damages claimed, the civil cases filed against petitioner Manzanares alleged that he
drove the Isuzu truck in a grossly negligent, reckless, careless, and imprudent
manner without due regard to traffic rules and ordinances.
As for petitioners Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and Eduardo Yang, the

complainants alleged that they failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of petitioner Manzanares who was their
employee when the mishap occurred.
The
incident
resulted
in
the
deaths
of
the
driver
of
the
passenger jeepney Jesus Basallo, Miguel Anas, Ferdinand Exaltacion, and Antonio
Pasco. It also inflicted serious physical injuries to some of the passengers of
the jeepney,
namely: Angela
Enriquez,
Teodoro Basallo was sued on the basis of breach of contract of carriage as
Romeo Espelimbergo, Teresita dela Cruz, Cita Vicente, Jesus Bartolome, Rolando
he was the registered owner of the passenger jeepney.
Peralta, and Felicidad Raymundo.
In their joint answers,[8] petitioners denied the material allegations of the

complaints and claimed, by way of special and affirmative defense, that
petitioner Manzanares was faultless in the accident in question; that petitioner
Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. had always exercised the diligence required in the
[2]
[3]
The families of the deceased Ferdinand Exaltacion and Miguel Anas instituted selection and supervision of all its employees; and that it had always acted in good
separate civil cases for damages against petitioners Manzanares, Manhattan faith in dealing with others.
Enterprises, Inc., the latters managing partner, Eduardo Yang, and the operator of
the passenger jeepney, Teodoro Basallo. The heirs of Antonio Pasco opted to file a
his
answers,[9] Teodoro Basallo alleged
that
while
he
owned
the
complaint
against
petitioners
Manhattan
Enterprises
Co. In
[4]
passenger jeepney involved in the collision, the same was on lease to his brother
and Teodorico Manzanares.
and the jeepneys driver, Jesus Basallo for P100.00 a day thus, he did not have a
contract of carriage with anyone.
As expected, the incident spawned the filing of civil suits by those harmed by the
collision.
The heirs of Jesus Basallo also filed a complaint for his death but their complaint
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. [5]
Two of those who sustained injuries also filed their respective complaints against
petitioners and Teodoro Basallo. In her complaint,[6] Felicidad Tomaquin claimed
that because of the incident, she would not be able to report to her work in a
factory for more than twelve months while Cita Vicente demanded that she be paid
Aside from the civil cases, an Information was also filed against
petitioner Manzanares before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The accusatory portion
of the information reads:
That on or about the 13 th day of January, 1983, in the municipality

of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
13
jurisdiction
of
this
Honorable
Court,
the
said
accused Teodorico Manzanares y Domingo, being then the
chauffeur and person in charge of a truck bearing plate no. CBG
283 Pilipinas 82, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive and operate the same while passing along the
Mac-Arthur Highway in the said municipality in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to the traffic
laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent accident to persons and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence, the said truck bearing plate no. CBG 283
T. Pilipinas 82, to bump a passenger jeep bearing plate no. DDC
430 UV Pilipinas 82 owned by Teodoro Basallo and driven by
JesusBasallo, thereby causing serious physical injuries which
directly caused the death of the said Jesus Basallo, Atty.
Miguel Anas y Alli, Ferdinand Exaltacion y de Guzman and Antonio
Pasco y Geronimo; serious physical injuries to the passenger(s)
thereof;
namely:
Angela
Enriquez
y
Nicolas,
Romeo Espelimbergo and Teresita dela Cruz, Cita Vicente,
Jesus Bartolome,
Rolando
Peralta
and Felicidad Raymundo y Tomaquin which
required
medical
attendance for a period of two (2) to three (3) months barring
complications and which incapacitated them from performing their
customary labor for the same period of time; and damage to the
said jeep in the amount ofP65,000.00, to the damage and prejudice
of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P65,000.00.[10]
These cases were later on consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
During the hearing of the cases, Dr. Eufemia B. Arellano, rural physician
of Malolos, Bulacan, testified that she issued the death certificates of
Jesus Basallo, Atty. Anas, and Antonio Pasco[11] and she was the one who signed
their autopsy reports. For Jesus Basallo, she identified the cause of death to be
cerebral hemorrhage due to fracture of the base of the skull and hemorrhage of the
lung due to multiple fractures of the ribs [12] while Atty. Anas died because of
cerebral hemorrhage due to fracture of the skull and hemorrhage of the lungs due
to multiple fractures of the ribs. [13] As for Pasco, his death was brought about by
cerebral hemorrhage due to multiple fractures of cranium and hemorrhage of the
lungs brought about by multiple fractures of his ribs. [14]
The prosecution likewise introduced in evidence the radiological report

on Exaltacion stating that he suffered from complete fracture of the distal end of
the left clavicle and complete fracture of the scapula. [15]
The following temporary medico-legal certificates with respect to the injuries to the
passengers of the jeepney were also admitted during the trial:
Angela Enriquez:
1.
Lacerated wound on the left eyeball 4-5 cm. in size.
2.
Hematoma, periorbital area left.
3.
Abrasion, 3-4 cm. left lateral neck.
4.
Complete, over-riding fracture middle third of the

clavicle, right.[16]
Cita Vicente
1.
Lacerated wound, 6 cm. right parietal area.
2.
Lacerated wound, 3 cm. left occipital area.
3.
bone.
Contusion hematoma, right and left side of nasal
4.
Abrasion, right arm.
5.
Abrasion, right and left knee.[17]
Jesus Bartolome
1.
4-5 cms. Lacerated wound, deep right frontal.
14
2.
3-4 cms. Lacerated wound, on the right eyebrow.
3.
5x1 cm. lacerated wound, right face.
4.
Lacerated wound, 4-5 cm. medial aspect right hand.
5.
Multiple abrasions, right hand.[18]
4.
Complete over-riding fracture 3rd rib anteriorly, left

and 2nd rib, right.
5.
Complete, [over]-riding fracture middle third of the

tibia and fibula.[21]
Felicidad Tomaquin
Rolando Peralta
1.
Swelling of the right arm.
[19]
1.
Abrasion, left side of the mouth.
2.
4 cm. lacerated wound, at the right occipital area.
3.
Romeo Espelimbergo
4.
1.
Punctured wound, left arm, measuring 0.5 cm in

circumference, 1 cm. in depth.
2.
Lacerated wound superficial face left side 1 cm. in

length.
3.
Skin Abrasion, multiple, both lower extremities, and

left hand.
4.
Skin burns 2nd degree multiple left eye inner cantus

and around the left leg.
5.
Contusion with abrasion, left superior iliac spine

measuring 7 cms. x 7 cms.
6.
X-ray of the hip shows an incomplete fracture of the

left acetabulum.[20]
Teresita Dela Cruz
1.
Wound lacerated, 4-5 cm. temporo-perietal left.
2.
Wound lacerated, mouth, left angle, 5 cm.
3.
Complete fracture distal end of the clavicle, left.
5.
Hematoma, chest left side at the level of the angle of

lower.
Tenderness at the epigastric area.
Tenderness at the left lateral side of abdomen and
inguinal area.[22]
Subsequently, Patrolman Liberato Macapagal was presented as a witness and he

testified that at about 2:35 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, he received
a report about an accident which happened atBarangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
[23]
When he arrived at the said place, he saw that the reported mishap involved a
passenger jeepney with plate number DDC 430 and an Isuzu delivery truck bearing
plate number CBG 283.[24] The two vehicles were resting on the right side of
the MacArthur Highway going towards Guiguinto, Bulacan. The Isuzu truck was
still on the asphalted highway while the passengerjeepney rested on the ramp.[25] In
the course of his investigation, he prepared a sketch showing the relative conditions
of the Isuzu truck and of the passenger jeepney as well as the other physical
evidence around these vehicles. [26] In addition, he also caused the taking of pictures
of the incident before the body of Jesus Basallo was extracted from the
passenger jeepney.[27]
Patrolman Macapagal also stated that he noticed skid marks along the highway
which were allegedly caused by the Isuzu truck when its driver stepped on its brake
pedal.[28] When asked as to the length of the skid marks, he replied that they
measured about fifteen to twenty meters.[29] While he was not certain as to the point
15
of impact, Patrolman Macapagal stated that there were more pieces of broken glass
on the shoulder of the highway than there were on the asphalted portion thereof. [30]
After Patrolman Macapagal, Angela Enriquez, a passenger of the jeepney which
figured in the collision testified that the vehicle she was riding in was on the
inclined pavement of the cemented portion [31] of the highway when it was bumped
by the Isuzu truck which was then in the process of overtaking another vehicle.
[32]
Substantially, this was also how Tomaquin and Vicente recalled the
incident. Tomaquinstated during her turn at the witness stand that the jeep (they)
were riding was already ascending in the cemented portion of the highway [33] while
Vicente
alleged
that
the
passenger jeepney was umaakyat palang sa kalsada[34] when the incident took
place.
Q- How about the 6 wheeler truck, where was it before the collision
took place?
A- The 6-wheeler truck came from the direction of Manila, sir.
Q- Where was it facing before the collision?
A- It was facing Malolos, sir.

Another witness presented by the prosecution was Paterno Dimapilis who claimed
that he was resting near the entrance of the vulcanizing shop he was working
located along Barangay Tikay, Malolos,Bulacan.[35] He declared that the smash up
occurred in the following manner:
Q- Immediately
before
passenger jeepney?
the
collision,
where
was
the
A- It was at the shoulder of the road, sir.
Q- What shoulder if coming from Malolos (going) towards the

direction of Manila?
A- At the right shoulder of the road, sir.
Q- If the truck was coming from Manila while according to you the
jeep was facing towards Manila coming from Malolos, please tell
the Honorable Court how the collision took place?
A- That truck was following a Philippine Rabbit Bus, sir.
Q- Yes, please continue.
A- This Philippine Rabbit Bus wanted to overtake while the 6

wheeler truck also wanted to overtake but was in a dilemma
because there was an on-coming tamaraw jeep, sir.
Q- You said that the truck was placed in a dilemma

or naalangan, what do you want to tell the court by naalangan?
16
A- Because of the dilemma of the driver of the 6 wheeler truck due

to the oncoming tamaraw jeep, the 6-wheeler truck (swerved) to
the left, sir.
Q- Left of what?
A- At the left side of the road coming from Manila going to Malolos,
sir.
Q- At that precise moment, when you saw the 6-wheeler truck

swerved
to
the
left,
did
you
notice
where
the
passenger jeepney was?
A- The passenger jeepney was at the right shoulder of the road

facing Manila, sir.
Q- Alright, what happened when the truck swerved to the left?
A- When the 6-wheeler truck was swerving to the left to avoid

the tamaraw, the passenger jeepney was about to stop on the
cemented portion of the road, sir, and that was the time when it
was bumped by the 6-wheeler truck, sir.[36]
For his part, petitioner Manzanares testified that he, together with a truck helper,
was on his way back to petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. premises after
delivering cement in Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacanwhen he got involved in an
accident with a passenger jeepney. According to him, he was following a passenger
bus which overtook another passenger jeepney unloading its passengers. After the
passenger bus successfully went back to its proper lane he tried to see if there was
any oncoming vehicle so that he too can overtake the passenger jeepney which was
then still occupying a portion of his side of the road.Seeing no oncoming vehicle
except for another passenger jeepney on the shoulder at the opposite side of
the MacArthur Highway,
he
proceeded
to
overtake. However,
the
[37]
passenger jeepney he was trying to pass immediately took its motion forcing him
to apply the brakes of the Isuzu truck which skidded as a result. It was then that
the Isuzu truck bumped the passenger jeepney on the other side of the highway
then driven by Jesus Basallo.
When
asked
by
the
prosecutor
on
cross-examination,
petitioner Manzanares admitted that the two passenger jeepneys were obliquely
situated from one another and were about five to ten meters apart. [38] He also
claimed that while he was overtaking, Jesus Basallo suddenly climbed[39] onto the
asphalted portion of the highway forcing him to step on his brakes but despite his
effort, the Isuzu truck still skidded to the left without him even turning the
steering wheel to that side.[40]
After the trial, petitioner Manzanares was found guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries and damage to
property. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. Criminal
Case
No.
5782-M
entitled
People
the Philippines vs. Teodorico Manzanares. This Court finds
of
the
17
said accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. Accordingly, the said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of a minimum of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of prisoncorreccional, medium to a maximum of seven (7)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor, medium and to pay the
costs.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay: 1) ANGELA ENRIQUEZ a)

actual damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250.00)
PESOS; b) moral damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
(P500.00) PESOS; c) exemplary damages in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; and d) attorneys fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;
and 2) TERESITA DELA CRUZ a) actual damages in the amount of
ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; b) moral damages in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; c) exemplary
damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; and
d) attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.
II. In the Civil Cases
1) In Civil Case No. 6734-M, entitled Sps. Edilberto Exaltacion, et

al. vs. Eduardo Yang, et al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay
the former as follows:
a.
actual damages in the
amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY (P26,630.00) PESOS;
b.
moral damages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS;
c.
exemplary damages in
the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS;
d.
attorneys fees in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS plus five (5%) per cent of the total amount
recoverable;
e.
litigation expenses in the
amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00)
PESOS.
2) In Civil Case No. 6769-M entitled Lydia Anas, et al. vs.

Manhattan Enterprises Co., et al., judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the
latter to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount of THIRTY

THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS;
b)
damages in
THOUSAND
PESOS;
c)
amount
PESOS;
of
compensatory
the amount of NINETY FOUR
NINE
HUNDRED
(P94,900.00)
SIXTY

THOUSAND (P60,000.00)
d)
exemplary damages
in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS; and
18
e)
attorneys fees and
litigation expenses in the amount of TWENTY
3) In Civil Case No. 6935-M entitled Eduarda Daplinan Vda. De

Pasco, et al. vs. Manhattan Enterprises Co., et al., judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:
a.
actual damages in the
amount
of
TWENTY
FIVE
THOUSAND
(P25,000.00) PESOS;
b.
compensatory damages
in
the
amount
of
THIRTY
THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS;
c.
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS;
d.
exemplary damages in
the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS; and
e.
attorneys
fees
and
litigation expenses in the amount of TWENTY
4) In
Civil
Case
No.
6894-M
entitled Felicidad Tomaquin vs. Teodorico Manzanares,
et
al.,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS:
of
ONE
b. moral damages in the

HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;
of
FIVE
amount
c. exemplary damages in the amount of TWO

HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; and
d. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the

amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.
5) In
Civil
Case
No.
8478-M
entitled Cita Vicente
vs. Teodorico Manzanares, et al., judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the latter
to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the

HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;
amount
of
FIVE
b. moral damages in the amount

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;
of
ONE
c. exemplary damages in the amount of FIVE

HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS; and
d. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the

amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P2,500.00) PESOS.
19
COSTS against the defendants in all of the instant 5 civil cases. [41]
In its assailed Decision of 30 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with
modification, the Decision of the trial court. The decretal portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, except for these MODIFICATIONS:
In Crim. Case No. 5782-M, the awards for exemplary damages,

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are DELETED;
In Civil Case No. 6734-M, the awards for exemplary damages,

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity for
death of P50,000.00 is additionally awarded; and the award for
moral damages is reduced toP50,000.00;

moral damages is reduced toP50,000.00;

moral damages is increased toP50,000.00;

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted; and

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted.
but in all other respects

otherwise AFFIRMED.[42]
the
appealed
Decision
is
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court impugning the judgment of the
appellate court for the following reason:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION ONLY AS TO
DAMAGES THE APRIL 30, 2002 DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
BY
OVERLOOKING
CERTAIN
FACTS
WHICH
MAY
SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE. [43]
Petitioners insist that the prosecution failed to discharge its duty of establishing
petitioner Manzanares guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the decisions both
of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals were based only on mere
assumptions. They
pointed
out
that
if
it
were
true
that
petitioner Manzanares swerved farther to the left of the highway while he was
overtaking, as found by the trial court, then, there was no reason why it still ended
up on the asphalted portion of the highway. Moreover, they claim that
petitioner Manzanares exercised caution before he proceeded to overtake the
passenger jeepney on his side of the road by making sure that there was no
oncoming vehicle on the opposite side of the highway. It was only after
petitioner Manzanares was certain that he could successfully overtake that he did
so
but
Jesus Basallo suddenly
and
unexpectedly
maneuvered
his
passenger jeepney into the highway forcing petitioner Manzanares to apply the
brakes of his truck. Unfortunately, the Isuzu truck skidded and rammed into the
passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo. Petitioners also impugn the reliance by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the testimony of Dimapilis by claiming
that the latter was a biased witness supplied by the parents of
Ferdinand Exaltacion, one of the passengers who died because of the incident.
20
Petitioners also maintain that at the time of the incident, the

passenger jeepney owned by Teodoro Basallo was not covered by any franchise to
operate and that Jesus Basallo was driving with an expired license. Thus, under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code,[44] Jesus Basallo is presumed negligent.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment [45] and essentially maintained
that this petition does not present any special and important reason that may
justify the exercised of this Courts power of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Q- Will you tell this Honorable Court how that accident where you
were involved happened?
A- I was following a truck, sir, and that truck I was following

overtook a jeep which was unloading a passenger, sir.
Q- What happened next after that truck you have mentioned

overtook a passenger jeep which was unloading a passenger?
A- I was also coming, sir.

The petition is unmeritorious.
Q- Coming from where?
It is quite evident that the question as to who between petitioner Manzanares and
Jesus Basallo was negligent in the operation of his vehicle is factual in nature
justifying the outright rejection of this petition.As this court has repeatedly
stressed in the majority of appeals in criminal cases, an appellate court gives great
weight to the factual findings of trial courts and accords them respect if not finality
unless the accused-appellant is able to show that the trial court overlooked or
disregarded matters of substance which if considered would very likely change the
results.[46]
Petitioners plead with us to absolve them of any liability arising from the incident
which occurred in the afternoon of 13 January 1983 by shifting the blame to the
Jesus Basallo, the driver of the passengerjeepney involved in the incident. We have
carefully reviewed the entire records of this case and failed to find any reason to
rule in their favor.
We particularly take note of the inconsistency in petitioner Manzanares stance as to

what really caused him to abruptly step on his brakes while he was trying to pass
the passenger jeepney then unloading its passengers in his side of the road. While
he insists that he was compelled to apply his brakes when he saw
Jesus Basallos passenger jeepney move into the MacArthur Highway away from the
shoulder to allow its passengers to disembark, he stated a different recollection of
the incident in his direct testimony on 5 March 1986, thus:
A- From Tabang going to Malolos, sir.
Q- How about that truck which according to you overtook a jeep

which was unloading a passenger, where did it come from?
A- From Tabang, sir.
Q- What happened when that truck you were following overtook

that jeep which was unloading passenger?
A- He was able to overtook (sic), sir.

Q- And after by the way, what kind of truck was it which you said
overtook that passenger jeepney which you said was unloading a
passenger, if you still recall?
A- It was a passenger bus, sir, colored red.
21
xxxx
A- No, sir.
Q- After that passenger bus according to you had overtaken the

jeep which was unloading a passenger, what happened next to you,
if anything had happened?
Q- Why, please tell the Court?
A- I was also going to overtake because the jeep was still there but
I tried to see whether there was an oncoming vehicle so that I
would be able to overtake, also, sir.
Q- Was that the only thing you did before overtaking the said
passenger jeep?
A- When I was already aligned with the jeep, I was to overtake

the jeep which was on a stop on the shoulder, it immediately
took its motion, sir.
Q- And what did you do when you saw that the jeep on the
shoulder immediately entering the pavement?
A- I applied my brakes, sir.

A- I did not see any oncoming vehicle, sir.
Q- How many times did you apply your brakes?
Q- When you said you did not see oncoming vehicle, you mean you
did not see vehicle coming from the direction of Malolos going
towards Guiguinto?
A- Only once, sir.
A- No one, sir, was coming except a jeep which was on the shoulder
of the road, sir.
Q- Did the truck you were driving stopped as a result of the

application of that brake?
Q- What did you do upon seeing that there was no oncoming

vehicle from the direction of Malolos?
A- It still continued to move (umusad), sir.
xxxx
A- I overtook, sir.
Q- You said your truck skidded, what happened after it skidded?
Q- Were
you
able
to
successfully
overtook
passenger jeepney which was unloading passenger?
that
A- It bumped the jeep, sir.
22
Q- What kind of jeep?
A- A passenger jeep, sir.[47] (Emphases supplied.)
On cross-examination, he reiterated that the passenger jeepney he was supposed to

pass commenced moving while he was in the process of overtaking
ATTY. ARCEO:
Q- And when you were abreast to the jeep you testified, did you
not, that the jeep started its motion?
ATTY. PASAMBA:
Which jeep now?
ATTY. ARCEO:
The jeep at the right side.
running at such a fast pace, the momentum of the Isuzu truck overpowered his
brakes such that the truck still continued with its motion until it bumped the
passenger jeepneydriven by Jesus Basallo right at the edge of the asphalted portion
of the highway. The location of the debris, as illustrated by the sketch prepared by
Patrolman Macapagal, and his testimony confirm that there were more pieces of
broken glass on the shoulder of the road than there were on the highway
itself. Evidence tending to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles
immediately after the accident tends to throw light on the issue of speed and
direction of the vehicles movements prior to, and at the same time of, the accident.
[49]
This confirms that only a small portion of the passenger jeepney was positioned
on the asphalted portion of the highway itself while the remainder of its body was
still on the shoulder of the road. Given petitioners testimony that the two
passenger jeepneys were far from one another, there was more than ample road
space within which petitioner Manzanares could have maneuvered the Isuzu truck
instead of bumping into the passenger jeepney and pinning Jesus Basallo to his
death. The fact that he was unable to do so and in the end lost control of the Isuzu
truck indicate that petitioner Manzanares was unreasonably fast in traversing that
portion of the road despite his insistence that he was driving slowly because his
speedometer was not functioning.[50]
Equally damning for petitioner Manzanares are the photographs of the two
vehicles which were presented before the court for they easily contradict his claim
with respect to the speed of the Isuzu truck. [51] In the case of Macalinao v. Ong,
[52]
we had the occasion to discuss the evidentiary value of photographs
According to American courts, photographs are admissible in

evidence in motor vehicle accident cases when they appear to have
been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and clear
representation of the subject, which cannot itself be produced, and
are of such nature as to throw light upon a disputed point. [53]
A- Still little by little, sir.[48]
By his own admission, it is crystal clear that petitioner Manzanares was caught by
surprise when the passenger jeepney he intended to overtake started moving
alongside him causing him to hesitate and to step on his brakepedal. But as he was
The severe damage to the front left portion of the passenger jeepney as
shown by said pictures gives rise to the inevitable conclusion that the Isuzu truck
was running fast before it smashed into thejeepney. Such destruction could not
have resulted had petitioner Manzanares been driving his truck slowly for then the
impact would not have been as severe. As we have previously declared, the very fact
of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
23
conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway. [54]
Nor are we convinced that the Isuzu truck voluntarily swerved to the left of the
highway. Such bare claim on the part of petitioner Manzanares part amounts to
nothing but an unsubstantiated and self-serving allegation.
Finally, as to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo should be presumed

negligent because he was driving with an expired license and the
passenger jeepney owned by his brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to
operate, we hold that the same fails to convince. The defense of contributory
negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects
of his own negligence.[55]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated 30 April 2002 affirming, with modification, the Decision
dated 16 December 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Corporation. Ford filed a third party complaint against Rivera and PBC. The case
against PBC was dismissed. The case against Rivera was likewise dismissed
because summons could not be served. The trial court held Citibank and PCIB
jointly and severally liable to Ford, but the Court of Appeals only held PCIB liable.
II. G. R. No. 128604
Ford drew two checks in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting
to P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are crossed checks payable to payees
account only. The checks never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make
second payments. Plaintiff instituted an action for recovery against PCIB and
Citibank.
On investigation of NBI, the modus operandi was discovered. Gorofredo Rivera
made the checks but instead of delivering them to BIR, passed it to Castro, who
was the manager of PCIB San Andres. Castro opened a checking account in the
name of a fictitious person Reynaldo Reyes. Castro deposited a worthless Bank of
America check with the same amount as that issued by Ford. While being routed to
the Central Bank for clearing, the worthless check was replaced by the genuine one
from Ford.
The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank liable, which decision was affirmed
in toto by the Court of Appeals.
*************************
Issues:
PCIB v. CA
Facts:
(1) Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of Ford
This case is composed of three consolidated petitions involving several checks,

payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an
organized syndicate.
I. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On October 19, 1977, plaintiff Ford issued a Citibank check amounting to
P4,746,114.41 in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of
manufacturers taxes. The check was deposited with defendant IBAA (now PCIB),
subsequently cleared the the Central Bank, and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The
proceeds never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment.
Defendant refused to reimburse plaintiff, and so the latter filed a complaint. An
investigation revealed that the check was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the general
ledger accountant of Ford, and was replaced by a managers check. Alleged
members of a syndicate deposited the two managers checks with Pacific Banking
(2) Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and
the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue?
Held:
(2) The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third
person and by the concuring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent,
the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's
action against the third person, asuming, of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. As
defined, proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces the injury and without the
result would not have occurred. It appears that although the employees of Ford
initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their
actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR.
24
The degree of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate
cause of the injury to the parties. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by
a drawer-payor's confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had
unusual facilities for perpertrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon
the bank, does notentitle the bank toshift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the
absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule
likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the
confidential employees who hold them in their possession.
(2) We have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBank's share of negligence when the
syndicate achieved its ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks.
a. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the
checks. The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter requesting for
the replacement of the Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed
lack of care and prudence required in the circumstances. Furthermore, it was
admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf
of the BIR. As an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal
regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent. It is a wellsettled rule that the relationship between the payee or holder of commercial paper
and the bank to which it is sent for collection is, in the absence of an argreement to
the contrary, that of principal and agent. A bank which receives such paper for
collection is the agent of the payee or holder.
Indeed, the crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a
warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it
is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited
in payee's account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is
bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the
clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement
guaranteed".
Lastly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the
check must take some precautions to learn whether or not it is genuine. And if the
one cashing the check through indifference or other circumstance assists the forger
in committing the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds of the
check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it did not discover the forgery or
the defect in the title of the person negotiating the instrument before paying the
check. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check drawn upon another bank,
without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it, or making
inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee when
the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party.
In such cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or the
collecting bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the
authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one who encashed a check
which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment thereon from the
drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the success of the
fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may recover from the holder the
money paid on the check.
b. G. R. No. 128604
In this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious
participation of PCIBank in the embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a
banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of
its officers or agents within the course and scope of their employment. A bank will
be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the
course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its
officers even as regards that species of tort of which malice is an essential element.
In this case, we find a situation where the PCIBank appears also to be the victim of
the scheme hatched by a syndicate in which its own management employees had
participated. But in this case, responsibility for negligence does not lie on
PCIBank's shoulders alone.
Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. For this
reason, Citibank had indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which
is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated
payee. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of
their relationship. Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of
the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and
both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in
the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are
constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks
issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
25

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CUSTODIO vs.

On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately

Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)

Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27,

Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated

Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent

THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in

same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the

reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the

7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner company

While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's Memorandum, p.

submerged. (p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he

- versus THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

EDUARDO YANG, doing business under the

LYDIA, CONSEJO, MIGUEL, JR., WILFREDO,

MA. MILLIE ANAS-SACLOTE,

VICTOR, ANTONIETTE [all surnamed ANAS] and

CALLEJO, SR., and

October 12, 2006

FRANCISCO PASCO, MIRAVER PASCO & MA.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular collision

As for petitioners Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and Eduardo Yang, the

In their joint answers,[8] petitioners denied the material allegations of the

That on or about the 13 th day of January, 1983, in the municipality

These cases were later on consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

The prosecution likewise introduced in evidence the radiological report

Lacerated wound on the left eyeball 4-5 cm. in size.

Hematoma, periorbital area left.

Abrasion, 3-4 cm. left lateral neck.

Complete, over-riding fracture middle third of the

Lacerated wound, 6 cm. right parietal area.

Lacerated wound, 3 cm. left occipital area.

Contusion hematoma, right and left side of nasal

Abrasion, right arm.

Abrasion, right and left knee.[17]

4-5 cms. Lacerated wound, deep right frontal.

3-4 cms. Lacerated wound, on the right eyebrow.

5x1 cm. lacerated wound, right face.

Lacerated wound, 4-5 cm. medial aspect right hand.

Multiple abrasions, right hand.[18]

Complete over-riding fracture 3rd rib anteriorly, left

Complete, [over]-riding fracture middle third of the

Swelling of the right arm.

Abrasion, left side of the mouth.

4 cm. lacerated wound, at the right occipital area.

Punctured wound, left arm, measuring 0.5 cm in

Lacerated wound superficial face left side 1 cm. in

Skin Abrasion, multiple, both lower extremities, and

Skin burns 2nd degree multiple left eye inner cantus

Contusion with abrasion, left superior iliac spine

X-ray of the hip shows an incomplete fracture of the

Teresita Dela Cruz

Wound lacerated, 4-5 cm. temporo-perietal left.

Wound lacerated, mouth, left angle, 5 cm.

Complete fracture distal end of the clavicle, left.

Hematoma, chest left side at the level of the angle of