[G.R. No. 134340.

November 25, 1999]

LININDING
PANGANDAMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL
SUR,
MAHED
MUTILAN,
ALEEM,
AMERRODIN
SARANGANI
and
NARRA
ABDUL JABBAR JIALIL, respondents.

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc dated

July 14, 1998,[3] the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, special
elections for the municipalities, namely
Butig Lumbayabague

DECISION

Kapatagan Sultan Dumalondong

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

Maguing Sultan Gumander

Recently, this Court emphatically stated that

[U]pholding the sovereignty of the people is what
democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the
people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not
enough for this Court to make a statement but it
should do everything to have that sovereignty obeyed
by all. Well done is always better than well said.
[1]
Corollarily, laws and statutes governing election
contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. [2] These standards
will be the legal matrix within which this controversy
will be adjudged.

Masiu Marawi City

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and

prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction is the Omnibus Order of the

There shall be machine counting and consolidation of

votes for all municipalities except Maguing and those
precincts where ballots for manual count will be used.

Lumbabayabao
shall be held on 18 July 1998.
Special elections shall also be held on July 25,
1998 for the municipalities of
Ganassi Lumbatan
Malabang Pagayawan
Marantao Tubaran

The Education and Information Department, the Acting

PES of Lanao del Sur and the Election Officers in these
municipalities are hereby directed to cause the
immediate publication of this Omnibus Order in their
respective municipality (sic).

1. Butig 7. Maguing

Schedule for special elections in the municipalities of

Madalum
and
Tugaya
is temporarily
withheld pending unresolved issues before the
Commission.

4. Lumba Bayabao 10. Sultan Gumander

Let the Executive Director for Operation[s] of the

Commission execute this order with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
The COMELECs challenged Omnibus Order
summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy thus:
The instant cases were filed by petitioners praying that
the Commission declare [a] failure of elections in their
respective municipalities and to hold special elections
thereafter. The petitions were reinforced by reports
received by the Commission from its field officers and
deputies. A pre-trial for all cases in Lanao del Sur
involving failure of elections was set and parties, their
counsels, and the election officers of concerned
municipalities appeared.
During the pre-trial of the above cases, it was shown
and admitted by the parties that total failure of
election[s] took place in the following municipalities:

2. Kapatagan 8. Masiu
3. Lumbatan 9. Sultan Dumalondong

5. Lumbayanague 11. Tubaran

6. Madalum 12. Tugaya
No precinct in the above towns was able to function on
election day.
It was also shown and admitted by the parties that in
the following municipalities, partial failure of
election[s] took place as follows:
1. Ganassi
2. Malabang
3. Marantao
4. Pagayawan
5. Marawi City
TOTAL FAILURE OF ELECTIONS

It was found that the cause of failure of election[s] in

the twelve municipalities where there was total failure
of election[s] as follows :
1. BUTIG armed confrontation of opposing political
groups and vehement disagreement on the clustering
of precincts.
+ Acting election officer reported that all election
paraphernalia are available except for 200 ballots for
precinct 5A.
2. KAPATAGAN allegedly, Camad Benito, husband of
mayoralty candidate Bailo Benito, terrorized the Acting
Municipal Treasurer Okuo Macaumbas thus preventing
the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia to the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEIs for brevity). Similarly, there were only
twenty two (22) public school teachers who were
available as BEIs and eighteen (18) of them were
disqualified to act due to relationship to candidates
within the prohibited degree.

December 1997. A copy of said order was received on

10 May 1998 by the Election Officer. The court having
found
by
implication
that
said
VRRs
were
irregularly/unlawfully issued, and its order having
become final, this Commission in compliance with said
court order hereby orders the Election Officer of
Kapatagan to delete from the records said VRRs with
serial nos. from 36767001 to 3676500.
Pursuant to said order, the Law Department is directed
to conduct a joint investigation administrative and
preliminary investigation for election offenses against
Camal Calandada and Muslemin Tahir to determine
their criminal and administrative liability and to submit
to the Commission its findings and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Order.
The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in
Region XII is similarly directed to initiate an
investigation on the conduct of Camad Benito in
contributing to the failure of election[s] in Kapatagan.
+ All election paraphernalia are available.

In Election Case No. 571, the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur issued an order
dated April 30, 1998 ordering the Election Officer of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur to delete, erase, and cancel
all Voters Registration Records with serial numbers
3676001 to 3676500 after finding that said VRRs were
received only on December 15, 1998 by EA Camal
Calandada from Atty. Muslemin Tahir. And yet, said
VRRs appeared to be filled up, used and dated 14

3. LUMBATAN all the members of the different Board

of Inspectors are disqualified to act as such by reason
of relationship either by consanguinity or affinity,
within the prohibited degree.
+ All election paraphernalia for 39 precincts are intact
and available.

4. LUMBABAYABAO candidates could not agree on

the venue of the distribution of the election supplies
and there was vehement disagreement on the
clustering of precincts.

+ All election paraphernalia are available.

+ All election paraphernalia for fifty nine (59) precincts

are available.

+ There is a need to print new ballots for all forty-nine

(49) precincts and other election forms due to the
inadvertent non inclusion of a candidates name in the
original ballots.

5. LUMBAYANAGUE there was non-completion of the

composition of the BEIs in all precincts because almost
all appointed members of [the] BEI are disqualified by
reason of relationship either by affinity or
consanguinity, within the prohibitive degree.
+ All election paraphernalia for the 35 precincts are
available.
6 MADALUM the twenty (20) appointed teachers to
act as members of the different BEIs did not arrive on
election day.
The issue on the existence of alleged ghost
barangays/precincts is not yet resolved by the
Commission considering that the alleged ghost
precincts are being investigated and an ocular
inspection is being made by an investigating
team. The issue being factual and the findings
determinative of a clean, honest and credible
elections, it is the desire of the Commission that the
issue on ghost precincts be resolved first before a
special election in Madalum shall be scheduled.

7. MAGUING no members of the different Boards of

Election Inspectors arrived in all precincts.

8. MASIU the Municipal Treasurer did not get the

election
paraphernalia
from
the
Provincial
Treasurer. Neither could the Municipal Treasurer be
located on election day. Hence, there was nothing to
distribute to the BEIs on election day. Similarly, the
Acting Election Officer, EA Cayansalam Benaning, on
her admission during the pre-trial hearing on June 25,
1998, arrived only at 7:00 A.M. of election day thus
preventing the distribution of election paraphernalia
from her office. Some parties claim in fact that she was
only seen at noontime of election day while she was in
the house of the incumbent mayor of Masiu.
+ All election paraphernalia for eighty (80) precincts
are available.
9. SULTAN DUMALONDONG Municipal Treasurer did
not appear on May 10 & 11, 1998 at the office of the
Provincial Treasurer to receive the ballots and other
election paraphernalia for distribution to the BEIs so
there was no election supplies for distribution on
election day.

+ All election paraphernalia for 16 precincts are

available.
10. SULTAN GUMANDER no BEIs appeared on
election day because most of them are disqualified by
law to act as such; the remaining 12 who are not
disqualified also did not appear; there was also
disagreement on the venue of distribution of election
supplies.

In the following municipalities and City of Marawi,

there was partial failure of election in the specified
precincts due to the following reasons:
1. GANASSI members of the BEIs for nine precincts as
herein below enumerated did not appear thus election
supplies were not distributed on election day for the
following precincts:
Barangay Name Precinct No.

+ All election paraphernalia for 51 precincts are

available.

1. Poblacion 1A2

11. TUBARAN non-appearance of all the members of

the different BEIs due to intense rivalry among the
opposing candidates.

1A3/1A4

+ All election supplies are intact and available.

3. Linuk 14A

12.
TUGAYA widespread
terrorism
causing
intimidation of the electorate to cast their vote. The
order of inclusion by the Municipal Court of Tugaya,
covering 4,075 voters, will be the subject of a petition
to declare its nullity to be filed by the Law Department
of the Commission before the Regional Trial Court in
Marawi City. It is the desire of the Commission to put to
rest the issue on the controversy surrounding the
4,075 voters to allow honest election in this
municipality. After the controversy is put to rest, then
the special election shall be scheduled.

14A1

PARTIAL FAILURE OF ELECTION

2. Baya 8A

14A2
4. Macaguiling 18A
18A1
18A2
There was also failure of election in precinct 1A1 and
17A1 due to ballot box snatching. The ballot box
containing official ballots and other election

paraphernalia for precinct 17A1, Brgy. Macabao whose

polling place was at Ganassi Central Elementary
School was snatched allegedly by the incumbent
mayor of Ganassi, Maning Diangka and his armed
escorts.

During the special election, the members

Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ganassi are
directed to suspend the proclamation of
Macapodi for vice mayor, if winning, until
orders from this Commission.

In precinct 2A in Brgy. Bagoingud, failure of election is

declared and special election shall be held considering
that the ballot box, official ballots and other election
paraphernalia were illegally brought to a private
dwelling in said barangay and voting irregularly took
place therein despite the fact that the designated
polling place was Gadungan Elementary School at
Gadungan. This could not take place unless the BEIs
assigned in Precinct 2A cooperated in these acts.

+ All election paraphernalia for the nine (9) precincts

where there was non-appearance of BEIs are
available. The Commission shall cause the printing of
ballots and other election forms for precincts 1A1
(Poblacion), 17A1 (Brgy. Macabao), and 2A (Brgy.
Bagoingud) for use in the special election since the
snatched ballot box were not recovered.

The acts complained of against Ex-Mayor Maning

Diangka shall be referred to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Lanao del Sur for possible prosecution. Similarly, the
Election Officer of Ganassi is directed to inform the
Commission of the identity of the BEIs for precinct 2A
for possible prosecution.

2. MALABANG twenty three (23) precincts failed to

function due to shooting incidents. Ballot boxes
containing election paraphernalia for five precincts out
of these 23 precincts were snatched and never
recovered. The following are the precincts that failed
to function on election day or whose ballot boxes were
snatched:
Barangay Name Precinct No.

Considering the charge of Maimona Diangka in SPA 98404 that Baguio Macapodi, candidate for Vice Mayor of
the Ompia Party and his cohort Bai Sa Ganassi
terrorized registered voters in Precincts 32, 32A, 32A1,
and 32A2 in Barangay Taliogan, Ganassi and that they
were allegedly aided by the Barangay Chairman
therein, said acts shall be referred immediately to the
office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur for
investigation.

of the
hereby
Baguio
further

1. Banday 4A2
2. Betayan 5A/5A1
3. BPS Billage 7A2/7A3
4. Bunkhouse < 8A1

5. Calumbog 11A/11A1

21. Tubok 37A2

6. Campo Muslim < 12A2

22. - do - 37A5

7. Chinatown 13A

23. - do - 37A6

8. - do - 13A4

< ballot box snatched

9. Curahab 14A

+ All election paraphernalia for eighteen precincts are

intact and available. The Commission will cause the
printing of 1,000 ballots and other election forms for
five precincts (8A1, 12A2, 26A, 34A).

10. Diamaru 15A

11. - do - 15A1
12. Matampay < 26A
13. Pasir < 29A
14. - do - 29A1
15. - do - 29A2
16. Sumbagarogong 33A
17. - do - 33A1
18. Tacub < 34A
19. Tiongcop 36A
20. - do - 36A1/36A2

3. MARANTAO thirty-five (35) precincts failed to

function due to terrorism in the area. Out of these 35,
eight (8) precincts lost to armed groups their ballot
boxes, ballots and other election paraphernalia. These
eight are:
Name of Barangay Precinct No.
1. Daana Ingud Proper 3A
2. - do - 3A1/3A2
3. Tuca Kialdan 7A
4. - do - 7A1
5. Banga Pantar 22A/22A-1
6. Inudaran Campong 29A

7. - do - 29A-2

1. Brgy. Banggolo 6A2

8. Mapantao Goo 34A-2

2. - do - 6A3

Ballots are to be printed for these precincts by the

Commission. Canvassing
forms
and
other
paraphernalia shall also be provided. In Precincts No.
12A, 24A and 24A-1, ballots were cast but were not yet
counted due to complaints that their integrity had
been violated. There being no proof that the integrity
of the ballots had been violated in these precincts, the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Marantao are directed to include the same in the
canvass.

3. Brgy. Lilod Madaya 42A-4

4. PAGAYAWAN casting of votes was aborted due to

widespread terrorism. Fifteen (15) precincts failed to
function.
+ All election paraphernalia are available. However, in
precinct 5A/5A1, some commotion took place. Eleven
voters out of two hundred and sixty-eight (268) have
already cast their votes at the time but only one ballot
was found inside the ballot box after the
commotion. The Commission deems it proper that the
casting of votes by the eleven voters be annulled and
a special election shall be conducted therein.
5. Marawi City there was partial failure of election in
sixteen precincts (16), namely -Name of Barangay Precinct No.

4. Brgy. South Madaya 85A

5. Brgy. Sangkai Dansalan 83A-3
6. Brgy. Raya Madaya I 74A-6
7. Brgy. Bacolod Chico 3A
8. - do - 3A-1
9. - do - 3A-2
10. Brgy. Raya Saduc 76A
11. Brgy. Guimba 38A
12. - do - 38A-1/38A-2
13. Brgy. Lolod Saduc 73A-5
14. Brgy. Bangco 5A-5A-1
15. Brgy. Timbangalan 88A
16. - do - 88A-1/88A-2

due to non-appearance of the BEIs. All election

paraphernalia are in order and available except for one
ballot box intended for Precinct 5A/5A-1 in Brgy. Banco
which is missing or undelivered or without ballots
contained therein.
The petition for declaration of failure of election in the
municipality of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur will be
covered by a different resolution.
To avoid the risk of another failure of elections and to
encourage public trust in the process and results of the
special elections, the following changes shall be
undertaken:
a. Only elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are
assigned to the affected areas shall serve as members
of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs). The Acting
Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Lanao del Sur,
Atty. Suharto Ambolodto, shall ensure that said BEIs
are given adequate briefing for this task;
Considering that under-aged persons succeeded in
registering voters, a complaint that is common in
many areas in Lanao del Sur, the BEIs are given
explicit authority to prevent from voting all those
registered voters who are visibly under-aged and shall
reflect their names and VRR numbers in the Minutes of
Voting for future prosecution.

For this purpose, all poll watchers are encouraged to

provide themselves with camera and provide
indubitable proof of under-aged voters.
b. Election officers from areas outside of Lanao del Sur
shall be tapped to act as Election Officers, while the
regular election officers in Lanao del Sur shall perform
such duties as directed by the Acting PES;
c. The special election in the municipality of Madalum
shall be scheduled only after the Investigating Team
aforementioned has finished its investigation of
alleged ghost precincts therein and the Commission
has acted on their findings of facts and
recommendation(s);
d. The special election in the municipality of Tugaya
shall be scheduled after the controversy on the four
thousand and seventy-five (4,075) voters shall have
been settled;
e. Considering the complaints received by the
Commission against certain actuations of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers, the same shall be
replaced with a new Provincial Board of Canvassers
whose members shall be designated by the
Commission;
f. The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in
Region XII and the Prosecution Offices in Lanao del Sur
shall actively help in the filing of criminal complaint for

election
period.

offenses

committed

during

the

election

Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC acted with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Omnibus Order
1.] By insisting on holding special elections on July 18
and 25, 1998 more than thirty (30) days after the
failure to elect, in certain municipalities, in
contravention of the clear and explicit provisions of
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.] By failing to declare a total failure of elections in
the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the
same to the President of the Philippines and Congress
so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for
the holding of a special election;
3.] By ordering only elements of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who
are not assigned to the affected areas as members of
the Board of Election Inspectors, in contravention of
Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
4.] By insisting on machine counting despite the
proven unreliability and undependability of the
counting of votes with use of computer machines.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists on a strict
compliance with the holding of special elections not

later than thirty (30) days after failure to elect

pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides that:
SEC. 6. Failure of elections. If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty
days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure
to elect.
Petitioner argues that the above-quoted provision is
mandatory because of the word shall. He further
asserts that the prescribed time frame actually
delimits COMELECs authority to call for a special
election and that instead, the power to call for a
special election after the 30thday now resides in
Congress.

The provision invoked can not be construed in the

manner as argued by petitioner for it would defeat the
purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted.
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter
of the law determines its construction; for that reason,
a statute must be read according to its spirit and
intent.[4]Thus, a too literal interpretation of the law that
would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to
[a]dmonish against a tooliteral reading of the law as
this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth xxx[5]
Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution
gives the COMELEC the broad power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct
of
an
election,
plebiscite,
initiative,
referendum and recall. There can hardly be any doubt
that the text and intent of this constitutional provision
is
to
give
COMELEC
all
the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal
in defining the parameters of the COMELECs powers in
conducting elections. As stated in the old but

nevertheless still very much

of Sumulong v. COMELEC:[6]

applicable

case

Politics is a practical matter, and political questions

must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint
of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because
of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in
a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex
political questions xxx. There are no ready made
formulas for solving public problems. Time and
experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will
serve the ends of good government. In the matter of
the administration of laws relative to the conduct of
election xxx we must not by any excessive zeal take
away from the Commission on Elections that initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it.
More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay
Loong v. COMELEC, et al.,[7] that [O]ur elections are not
conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for
public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of
Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap
judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that
threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the
process, the actions of COMELEC may not be
impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We
cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of
these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.

The purpose of the governing statutes on the

conduct of elections
[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all
evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of
the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the
most
fundamental
requisites
of
popular
government. The Commission on Elections, by
constitutional mandate, must do everything in its
power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes
cast in the elections. In the performance of its
duties, the Commission must be given a considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created to promote free, orderly, and
honest elections. The choice of means taken by
the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of
discretion, should not be interfered with.[8]
Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal
compass from which the COMELEC should take its
bearings in acting upon election controversies is the
principle
that clean
elections
control
the
[9]
appropriateness of the remedy.
In fixing the date for special elections the
COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be
later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the
cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held,

suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The

first involves a question of fact. The second must be
determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances
of a case.[10] Thus, the holding of elections within the
next few months from the cessation of the cause of the
postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still
be considered reasonably close to the date of the
election not held.[11]
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for
tardiness. The dates set for the special elections were
actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial
failure of elections was determined, which date fell on
July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the
challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18
and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the
holding of special elections were only a few days away
from the time a total/partial failure of elections was
declared and, thus, these were dates reasonably close
thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore,
it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude
of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, the
COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to
resolve election disputes.[12]
Petitioners argument that respondent COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion by failing to declare a
total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao
del Sur and to certify the same to the President and
Congress so that the necessary legislation may be

enacted for the holding of a special election, likewise

fails to persuade.
No less than petitioner himself concedes that there
was total failure of elections in twelve (12)
municipalities and partial failure in eleven (11). Yet he
now insists a total failure of elections should have
been declared in the entire province of Lanao del
Sur. Suffice it to state that the propriety of declaring
whether or not there has been a total failure of
elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur is a
factual issue which this Court will not delve into
considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized
officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the
actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of
fact of the COMELEC or any administrative agency
exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor,
are binding on the Court.[13] There is no cogent reason
to depart from the general rule in this case.
The insistence of petitioner that the COMELEC
violated Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the
Omnibus Election Code when it ordered elements of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) who are not assigned
to the affected areas as members of the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEIs) is likewise unconvincing vis-vis the underlying reason of the public respondent to
have an effective and impartial military presence to
avoid the risk of another failure of elections.

So too must fall the argument that machine

counting being allegedly undependable and unreliable
should not be resorted to as the reasoning of
petitioner, by itself, invokes the answer. If the
COMELEC saw it fit to order a machine counting of
votes in the municipalities enumerated, it could only
mean that the decree of R.A. No. 8436 could be
implemented without the interference of the claimed
unreliability, inaccuracy and undependability of the
computer sets. The absence of any satisfactory proof
to support petitioners allegations to the contrary
reduces them to mere self-serving claims.
Be that as it may, we agree with the Solicitor
General that the petition has been rendered moot by
supervening events. For one, it seeks to enjoin the
holding of special elections scheduled for July 18 and
25, 1998. However, petitioner himself admits that
special elections were conducted on a staggered basis
on July 4, 18 and 25, 1998.[14] For another, the petition
questions the membership of the Board of Election
Inspectors for being composed of elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police as well as the machine counting of the
votes when these events have been superseded by the
recent issuance of the Certificates Of Canvass Of Votes
And Proclamation Of The Winning Candidates For
Provincial Offices dated August 7, 1998. [15] In face of
these supervening events, the arguments proffered by
the petitioner to seek the annulment of the challenged
Omnibus Order rings hollow. Verily

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice

of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and
apply laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the
letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate
purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in
isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly
against or gently in favor of the voters obvious
choice. In applying election laws, it would be far
better to err in favor of popular sovereignty
than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms.[16]
Indeed, to embark upon the costly electoral
exercise insisted upon by petitioner in terms of time
and taxpayers money is an unwarranted imposition on
the people of the affected areas and is an
unacceptable option to the judicial conscience.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza,Quisumbing Purisima, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
[G.R. No. 160130. April 14, 2004]

ISIDRO
IDULZA
and
GODOFREDO
CABANA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and TERESITA A. BOLLOZOS,
REY L. MORTIZ, MIGUEL P. PADERANGA,
JOJAC Q. ASUNCION and CIFERINO L.
GARCIA, JR. respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
An election protest was filed by three unsuccessful
candidates
for
seats
in
the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Gingoog City, directed at three
proclaimed candidates. The COMELEC found merit in
the protest and ordered the protestees to vacate their
posts. In reviewing the COMELECs actions, the Court is
guided by two principles particular to election cases:
the recognition of the COMELECs specialized role in the
supervision of elections, and the liberal construction of
election laws to the end that the will of the people may
not be defeated by mere technical objections.
On 17 May 2001, petitioners Isidro Idulza (Idulza)
and Godofredo Cabana (Cabana) were proclaimed as
the seventh (7th) and eighth (8th) winning candidates
for the office of members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Gingoog City. Private respondents
Miguel Paderanga (Paderanga), Jojac Asuncion
(Asuncion), and Ciferino L. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia), all losing
candidates for the same office, filed an election protest
with the COMELEC on 25 May 2001, against the two

petitioners therein and Besben Maquiso (Maquiso),

who had placed ninth (9th) in the canvass results. The
election protest was docketed as COMELEC Case No.
EPC 2001-3. After conducting the revision of ballots,
the COMELEC Second Division (Second Division) on 16
January 2003 promulgated a Resolution that settled
the election protest at that point. It determined that
the parties garnered the following number of votes:
PROTESTANTS:

the protest as he was a party-mate of the protestants.

[2]

Consequently, the Second Division disposed of the

election protest in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant protest is hereby GRANTED.
Protestants Paderanga, Asuncion and Garcia are
hereby declared winners and councilors-elect of
Gingoog City, in the following order:

Paderanga - 17,260
1. 8th place Miguel P. Paderanga
Asuncion - 16,567
2. 9th place Jojac Q. Asuncion
Garcia - 16,502
3. 10th place Ceferino (sic) L. Garcia, Jr.
PROTESTEES:
Idulsa - 16,013
Maquiso - 16,266
Cabana - 16,266[1]
At the same time, the Second Division determined that
one Rey Y. Mortiz (Mortiz), who was not a party to the
election protest, had garnered more votes than the
three protestants. Apparently, per the Certificate of
Canvass, Mortiz had placed tenth (10th) in the city
council election, though he had not been impleaded in

As a consequence of the final numerical results of the

votes obtained by the winning candidates vis--vis the
number of those authorized to be elected, Rey Y.
Mortiz, who garnered more votes than the three
Protestants herein, wins the seventh (7th) rank in the
City Council.
Protestees Isidro Idulsa, Besben Maquiso, and
Godofredo Cabana are hereby ordered to vacate their
positions as Councilors No. 7, 8 and 9 in the City
Council, Gingoog City.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Obviously aggrieved, the protestees, filed a Motion

for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc on
21 January 2003. Aside from contesting the Second
Divisions appreciation of the contested ballots, the
petitioners
also
specifically
questioned
the
proclamation of Mortiz, who was not a party to the
election protest. Petitioners also noted therein that
Asuncion and Garcia had filed certificates of candidacy
for Punong
Barangay and Barangay
Kagawad respectively
in
the
15
July
2002 barangay elections, and Asuncion was elected.
As a result, it was argued, Asuncion and Garcia should
be deemed to have abandoned their election protest. [4]
On 17 February 2003, before the COMELEC En
Banc had
resolved
the Motion
for
Reconsideration, private
respondent
Teresita
A.
Bollozos (Bollozos), who was not a party to the election
protest, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in
`COMELEC Case No. EPC 2001-3, with her Motion for
Intervention appended thereto. She alleged therein
that she too was a losing candidate for the Gingoog
City Sanggunian, yet her vote total according to the
records had surpassed the number of votes ascribed to
Asuncion and Garcia.[5] She therefore asserted that she
should have been proclaimed as the ninth (9th)
winning candidate in lieu of Asuncion, who should have
placed tenth (10th) instead.
On 18 September 2003, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution partially affirming the Second
Divisions Resolution. It held that the Second Division

committed no reversible error as to the appreciation of

the contested ballots, and in declaring Mortiz as the
seventh (7th) place councilor. However, the COMELEC
also considered Bollozos claim as meritorious, as
according to it, [r]ecords reveal that Bollozos garnered
a total of seventeen thousand twenty-three (17,023)
votes, clearly outnumbering [Asuncions] 16,567 votes
and [Garcias] 16,502 votes.[6] Bollozos Motion for
Intervention was thus granted, and Bollozos was
proclaimed as the ninth (9 th) place candidate. At the
same time, the COMELEC En Banc also ruled that
Asuncion should not be proclaimed, as he has been
deemed to have abandoned his protest due to his
successful candidacy for Punong Barangay in the 15
July 2002 elections. Accordingly, the tenth (10th) place
was declared vacant.
Petitioners now come before this Court on
a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Resolutions of the
COMELEC. They assert that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Mortiz and
Bollozos, the former having no participation in the
election protest, while the latter having filed her
motion for intervention beyond the period provided by
law.[7] They also question the manner of appreciation
by the COMELEC of the contested ballots. [8] Finally,
they applied for aTemporary Restraining Order, which
the Court has not granted.
The appreciation of contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency

tasked with the supervision of elections all over the

country.[9] The findings of fact of the COMELEC when
supported by substantial evidence are final and nonreviewable.[10] Petitioners want this Court to review the
specific appreciation by the Second Division of ballots
cast in forty-eight (48) precincts in Gingoog City. The
bar for this manner of review is quite high, considering
that the Court is not a trier of facts. Yet before this
Court, petitioners merely direct us to examine the
contrary
conclusions
made
by
Commissioner
Florentino Tuason in his dissenting opinion, without
particularly explaining why we should substitute the
findings of one commissioner in lieu of those of the
COMELEC speaking as a collegial body.
An examination of the Tuason dissent reveals that
it is predicated not on any broad question of law, but
on the specific application of principles of election
law vis--vis particular ballots. His disagreement with
the majority is purely factual in basis, too detailed to
the point of being pernickety. On the other hand, the
thirty (30)-page majority opinion is just as detailed in
providing for the general principles applicable in
appreciating the ballots, and in explaining why each
particular contested ballot was interpreted in the
particular way that it was. Petitioners are unable to
point out why the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the
contested
ballots.
Notwithstanding
the
dissenting opinion, the Second Divisions factual
findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc,

are supported by substantial evidence and thus

beyond the ken of review by the Court.
Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the
COMELEC as to how many votes the parties had
obtained in the city council election. The COMELEC had
also noted that Mortiz, who had originally placed tenth
(10th), has become the seventh (7th) placer,
considering that his original vote total still surpassed
that of the protestants. We are unable to see how such
declaration by the COMELEC could constitute grave
abuse of discretion, even if Mortiz had not been a
party to the election protest. He was not a losing
candidate elevated into victory, as he apparently was
already proclaimed a duly elected city councilor in May
of 2001.[11] The petitioners were dislodged from their
respective seats because the private respondents
garnered more votes than them. Mortizs vote total
remained unchanged despite the protest. His elevation
to seventh (7th) place is but a necessary consequence
of the finding of the COMELEC that the petitioners had
actually obtained less number of votes than as
reflected in the first canvass results. It would be
patently ridiculous for the Court or the COMELEC to
hold that he should still be deemed as the tenth (10th)
placer when the amended vote totals reveal that he
had garnered more votes than the new eighth (8th)
placer. Presumptively, the vote totals as amended
after the revision more accurately reflect the true will
of the voters of Gingoog City, and the elevation of
councilor Mortiz from tenth (10th) to seventh (7th)
place is in consonance with the electoral mandate.

Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary

rule of interpretation that statutes providing for
election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.[12] For that reason, the Court sustains the
allowance by the COMELEC of Bollozos Intervention. It
would have been explicitly anomalous had Bollozos not
been seated in the City Council, considering that her
uncontested vote total had exceeded that of Asuncion,
the ninth (9th) placer according to the Second Division.
The people of Gingoog City had chosen Bollozos to
serve as their councilor, and it was but proper for the
COMELEC to recognize that electoral will and
accordingly amend the Second Divisions Resolution.
Besides, in allowing the Bollozos Intervention, the
COMELEC did not stretch itself by applying an
overarching equitable principle that would have
disturbed the judicially sedate. Statutory prescription
on the right to intervene in an election protest is
provided only by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
particularly Rule 8, Section 1. The aforementioned rule
does state that the motion for intervention be filed
before or during the trial of an action or proceeding.
[13]
At the same time, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
are to be construed liberally in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives
of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding before the

COMELEC.[14] The allowance of the motion for

intervention was clearly geared towards fostering
honest, credible elections and a just outcome centered
around the proper proclamation of a candidate whom
the voters have chosen to serve as their councilor.
Admittedly, the Rules of Court provides that a
motion to intervene be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment of the trial court. [15] However,
the suppletory role of the Rules of Court in this case
must be dispensed with if its application would
frustrate the electoral will. Further, as the Solicitor
General points out in his Comment filed in behalf of
the COMELEC, the Court has, in exceptional cases,
allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
judgment by the trial court [16], or even after the case
had become final and executory.[17] The Court is not
ordinarily predisposed, on account of broad claims of
equity, to disregard infractions of procedural rules. Yet
election cases are of such an exceptional character
that the supervening State interest is to ensure that
the true results of its elections are given efficacy. We
find
that
the
COMELECs
grant
of
the
Bollozos Intervention is in accord with this superior
principle which is grounded on the imperative to seek
and make the sovereign will of the people prevail.
Finally, none of the parties question the
COMELEC En Bancs declaration of vacancy of the tenth
(10th) seat in the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Gingoog City on the premise that the tenth (10th)
placer Asuncions subsequent active candidacy and

election as Punong Barangay should be deemed an

abandonment of his protest. In so holding, the
COMELEC En Banc cited the Courts majority opinion in
the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos.[18] The parties
adduced no compelling reason for the Court to disturb
this conclusion of the COMELEC. At the same time, the
eleventh (11th) placer Garcia cannot be elevated to
the tenth (10th) spot, for the simple reason that the
electorate of Gingoog City did not elect him as one of
the ten (10) city councilors.[19]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

LYNETTE
G.
GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER
DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR
NOLI PIPO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set
aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC) en
banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan

(SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on
May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for
registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied
her application on the ground that petitioner, who was
then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for
Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter"
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, BanguiPagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision
dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner
qualified and ordered her registration as member and
voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from
acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner. 3
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April
23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios,
per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy

again due to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed

to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who
set aside the order of respondents and allowed
petitioner to run. 6
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a
memorandum to petitioner informing her of her
ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her
certificate
of
candidacy
should
not
be
7
disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of
the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G.
Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en
banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for
falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued
the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en
banc issued an order directing the Board of Election
Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San
Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in
the event she won in the election. The order reads as
follows:
Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial
And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy" by petitioner Florencio G.
Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida,

received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent

allegations of which reads:

votes for the position of Sangguniang

Kabataan [sic].

xxx xxx xxx

Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to

submit immediately ten (10) copies of his
petition and to pay the filing and legal
research fees in the amount of P510.00.

5. That the said respondent is disqualified

to become a voter and a candidate for the
SK for the reason that she will be more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on May
6, 1996; that she was born on June 11,
1974 as can be gleaned from her birth
certificate, copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex "A";
6. That in filing her certificate of
candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she made
material representation which is false and
as such, she is disqualified; that her
certificate of candidacy should not be
given due course and that said candidacy
must be cancelled;
xxx xxx xxx
the Commission, it appearing that the
petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS
the Board of Election Tellers/Board of
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the
proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the
event she garners the highest number of

SO ORDERED.

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78

votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. 10 In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not
proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK
chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. 11 The proclamation was "without prejudice to
any further action by the Commission on Elections or
any other interested party." 12 On July 5, 1996,
petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga
Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed
one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 13
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first
concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of
candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her

certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has

exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective
official of the SK.
I
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under
the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed
by the Omnibus Election Code. 14 The Omnibus
Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the
procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy, viz:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before election.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy for an elective office may be filed

with the Law Department of the COMELEC on
the ground that the candidate has made a false
material representation in his certificate. The
petition may be heard and evidence received by
any official designated by the COMELEC after
which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself. 15
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a
petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with
the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases
before a Division may only be entertained by the
COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes
to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not
obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of
the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELECen banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC
sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election
cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules
thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in
Divisions. The Commission shall sit in
two (2) Divisions to hear and decide
protests or petitions in ordinary actions,
special actions, special cases, provisional
remedies,
contempt
and
special
proceedings except in accreditation of
citizens' arms of the Commission. 17

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer

the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the
petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the
petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18
II

Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. (a)

pleadings allowed by these Rules shall
printed, mimeographed or typewritten
legal size bond paper and shall be
English or Filipino.

All
be
on
in

xxx xxx xxx

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note

that the petition itself did not comply with the formal
requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. These requirements are:
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. Every
pleading, motion and other papers must
be filed in ten (10) legible copies.
However, when there is more than one
respondent or protestee, the petitioner or
protestant must file additional number of
copies of the petition or protest as there
are additional respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. The documents
referred to in the immediately preceding
section must be filed directly with the
proper Clerk of Court of the Commission
personally, or, unless otherwise provided
in these Rules, by registered mail. In the
latter case, the date of mailing is the date
of filing and the requirement as to the
number of copies must be complied with.

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be

printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal
size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10)
legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly
with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in
proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were
filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en
banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition
transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving
the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade
or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. 20 The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or

other device that produces a printed record on paper

referred to as a facsimile. 22
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not
sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much
less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine
and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and
his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The
uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading
should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from
acting on the petition and issuing the questioned
order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until
it received the petition filed by registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve
the issue of petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by
Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of
all residents of the barangay who were at least 15
years but less than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang
Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to
express their views and opinions and participate in
issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its affairs were
administered by a barangay youth chairman together

with six barangay youth leaders who were actual

residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years
but less than 18 years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code,
raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay
members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not
more than 21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the
Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid
down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years
old. 27 The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are
administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who
are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The
chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of the SK
holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner
removed for cause, or becomes permanently
incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to
specific qualifications laid down by the Local
Government Code of 1991, viz:
Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. The
katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed
of all citizens of the Philippines actually
residing in the barangay for at least six
(6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not
more than twenty-one (21) years of age,

and who are duly registered in the list of

the sangguniang kabataan or in the
official barangay list in the custody of the
barangay secretary.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may
become a candidate for the Sangguniang
Kabataan if he possesses the following
qualifications:
Sec. 428. Qualifications. An elective
official of the sangguniang kabataan must
be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified
voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a
resident of the barangay for at least one
(1) year immediately prior to election, at
least fifteen (15) years but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on the day
of his election, able to read and write
Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and
must not have been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay
for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21
years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.
Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective
official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan

ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least

one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at
least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on
the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and
(f) must not have been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC
interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and
defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
becomes a qualified voter and an elective official.
Thus:
Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. To be
qualified to register as a voter in the SK
elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twentyone (21) years of age on election day that
is, he must have been born between May
6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least
one (1) year and actually residing in the
barangay wherein he proposes to vote for
at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6.
Qualifications
of
elective
members. An elective official of the SK
must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least
one (1) year immediately prior to the
elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any
Philippine language or dialect or English.
Cases
involving
the
eligibility
or
qualification of candidates shall be
decided by the city/municipal Election
Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may
be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK
elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but
not more than 21 years of age on election
day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6,
1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and an actual resident of the barangay at
least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a)
possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter;
(b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the elections; and
(c) able to read and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the

qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan
ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang
Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is admittedly beyond the
limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of
Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond
the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. She contends that the
Code itself does not provide that the voter must be
exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that
so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old,
she was still twenty-one years of age on election day
and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK
elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal
a distinction between the maximum age of a member
in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age
of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets
a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is
no further provision as to when the member shall have
turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section
428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK
official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The
addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an
additional qualification. The member may be more
than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he
registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
The elective official, however, must not be more than
21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is

understandable considering that the Code itself

provides more qualifications for an elective SK official
than for a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan.Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. 31 The courts
may distinguish when there are facts and
circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or qualification. 32
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must
not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the
election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified
voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an
elective official, then it may be assumed that a
"qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide
that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election.
Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is
therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a
voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the
day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should
not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election is very clear. The Local Government Code
speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law
speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365
days each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is
consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th
day after his birth the last day of the year. 35 In

computing years, the first year is reached after

completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day,
the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On
the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns
two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime.
A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his
21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday,
he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day
cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his
22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the
first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22
years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not
over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or
some days or a fraction of a year because that would
be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21
years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old,"
contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state
that the candidate be less than 22 years on election
day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang
Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth
official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen
years of age or over but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This
provision clearly states that the youth official must be
at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a
fraction of a year but should not reach the age of
eighteen years. When the Local Government Code
increased the age limit of members of the youth

organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the

provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least
15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the
Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22
years old, they should have stated so expressly
instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and
doubt. 37
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991
declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng
Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay
discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang
Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age
by the time President Aquino assumed power. 38 They
were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government
Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more
than 21 years 39 and the only exception is in the
second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:
Sec. 423. Creation and Election.
a) . . . ;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who,
during his term of office, shall have
passed the age of twenty-one (21) years
shall be allowed to serve the remaining
portion of the term for which he was
elected.

The general rule is that an elective official of the

Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than
21 years of age on the day of his election. The
only exception is when the official reaches the
age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section
423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the
remaining portion of the term for which he was
elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the
youth leader must have "been elected prior to
his 21st birthday." 40 Conversely, the SK official
must not have turned 21 years old before his
election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with
Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at
which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is
on the day of his election. The maximum age of
a youth official must therefore be exactly 21
years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to
Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is
not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum
age of an elective SK official on the day of his
election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11,
1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as
voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was
twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the
day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and
5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996,
she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old.
Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was

over the age limit for elective SK officials set by

Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.
She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6,
1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age
qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks
the age on the day of the election, he can be declared
ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over
the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he
is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected
will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it
validate his election. 42 The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. 43
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private
respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be
declared elected. 44 A defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office. 45Moreover, despite his
claims, 46 private respondent has failed to prove that
the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's
ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with
the intention of misapplying their franchises and
throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival
candidate. 47
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section
435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should
be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member

who obtained the next highest number of votes in the

May 6, 1996 elections. 48Section 435 applies when a
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, 49 is convicted of a felony,
voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated,
is removed from office, or has been absent without
leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of
eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means being "legally
qualified;
capable
of
being
legally
chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the
lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution
or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility
is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435
for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the
Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be
filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK
members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The
member chosen shall assume the office of SK
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and
shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the
rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and
petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for candidacy in the
May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan,
and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of

the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo,

Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan
member voted by simple majority by and from among
the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall
assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman
of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the
unexpired portion of the term.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.

DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners,
vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.)
and
VICTORINO
X.
FORNIER,respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD

ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.

of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders

for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face
with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds
us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly
Filipino.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

Antecedent Case Settings
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD
ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on
those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as
an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who
enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all
of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the
land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the
Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan

Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in
the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824,
entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA
No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a naturalborn Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,

his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley

Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being
an
illegitimate
child
of
an
alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions
- first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the
COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of
his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1)
a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English
translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records
Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact
that there was no record in the National Archives that
a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two

documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a
certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate
of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a
copy of the purported marriage contract between
Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA
No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26
January
2004,
Fornier
filed
his
motion
for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R.

No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier,"
and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of
FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or
cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was
a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC

expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission
on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code which would authorize "any interested party" to
file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule
64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX,
of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same

Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law which power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up
in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could
well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary
view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and
Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003
and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the
petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973

Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole

judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns
and qualifications of the President or VicePresident. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress,
on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting
the Election of the President-Elect and the VicePresident-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic
Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would
now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18
April 1992, would support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,

and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of

the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated
by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include
an election protest.
Rule
14. Election
Protest. Only
the
registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may
be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for
President
or
Vice-President. Aquo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second
or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of

the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly

brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections
et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first
give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship
was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to
322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who
shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if
only to determine the constituency of the "State,"
which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve
a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to
include one who would both govern and be governed,
for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal
with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and
with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its
ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to
the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes
over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept
was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which

established the rights necessary for individual

freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th
century
to
include political
citizenship,
which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage
of the development ofsocial citizenship, which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic wellbeing and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking
global
village,
might
well
be
[12]
the internationalization of citizenship.

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens"
during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives
were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago.Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
century but their sheer number made it difficult to
point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply
to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to
the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing
views among experts;[15]however, three royal decrees

were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the

Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,[16] the Royal
Decree of
23
August
1868
specifically defining the political status of children born
in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley
Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never
extended to the Philippine Islands because of the
express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramar among which this
country was included, would be governed by special
laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective
in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came
out with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother,
even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners
who
have
naturalization papers,

obtained

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have

become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in
Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole

colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the

United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in
force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would
remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10
December 1898 between Spain and the United States.
[21]
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories ceded to the United States would be
determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in
the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of
which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of
the territory in which they reside.

"The civil rights and political status of the native

inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress." [22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not
become American citizens, they, however, also ceased
to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands"
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of
1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islandsand as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]

Thus
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a

Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term

inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born
in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in
the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,
articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that
the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period. [25] More
about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United
States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of
the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of
the United States, under the laws of the United States,
if residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H.
Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine

Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated

virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except
such others as have since become citizens of some
other
country;
Provided,
That
the
Philippine
Legislature,
herein
provided
for,
is
hereby
authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of
the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of
Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines
on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views
on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring

citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to

any such link with common law, by adopting, once and
for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship -

well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of

Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following

are citizens of the Philippines -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following

are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at

the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the

time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign

parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens

of the Philippines.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the

Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to

the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines

and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution,
taken together with existing civil law provisions at the
time, which provided that women would automatically
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article

also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an
alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular
situation
generated
by
the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section
provides:

I,

Article

IV,

1987

Constitution

now

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared
to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of

acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res

judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa
vs.
Collector
of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong
vs.
Secretary
of
Labor[30] (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner
would tend to indicate that the earliest established
direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of
Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou
had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at
the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on
05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage
to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate,
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly,
an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties

on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married
to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe;
and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient
to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public
record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A"
for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was
submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by

respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two

documents were submitted in evidence for respondent,
the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to
the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the
marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage
of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima
facie proof
of
their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of

a duty specially enjoined by law,

facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

are prima

The trustworthiness of public documents and the

value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty
which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might
have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate
that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be
assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the
year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not
in the Philippines during the crucial period of from
1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management
and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed
to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines
from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing
filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the
father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate
child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according
to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in
the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the
day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required
to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was
either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth,
a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate
shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents
of the infant or only by the mother if the father
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to
state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give
therein any information by which such father could be
identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized
to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or

sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement

rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,
[34]
the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law
was enacted, the question here really is whether or not
his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized.No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in
Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may
also be made, according to the same Article 131. True
enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented
by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other
proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some
other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this
Court defined what could constitute such a document
as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of

public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document
pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by
which recognition may be made belongs to the first
class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The
1950
Civil
Code
categorized
the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into
voluntary,
legal
or
compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record
or
in
any
authentic
writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood
brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized
or
judicially
declared
as
natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment
could
be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his
favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime
of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs
of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,
however, could only be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the
oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules;

Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate
established by any of the following:

children

is

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or

a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

evidence,

the

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status

of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall
survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
[36]

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,

the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily

recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article
2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according
to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30,
1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from
the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate
and non-legitimate relationships within the family in

favor of the greater interest and welfare of the

child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is
little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also
affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship
to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship"
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must
be taken in the context of private relations, the domain
of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as
the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience
among members of a family, and those which exist
among members of a society for the protection of
private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has
held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain,
x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or
nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the
husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing
property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects

of marriage and divorce upon the persons and

properties of the spouses, are questions that are
governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to
Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil
relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,
[39]
such as on successional rights and family relations.
[40]
In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be
considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but
such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may
be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional
rights of members of the family, provided distinctions
in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In
the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according
to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and

illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code,
and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our
own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political
law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well
and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary

that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue,
(c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted
as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted
to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent
FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound
mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A.,
after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the
name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August
20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.

xxxxxxxxx

Ruby

Kelley

Mangahas
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met
and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the
Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that
same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had
their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their
first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo
St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila
in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie,
were blessed with four (4) more children
after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to
the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he
is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this
12th day of January 2004.

Declaran
t

DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult
to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being
a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was

said, that courts should apply the results of science

when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe
were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted
his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself,
consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was
born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child,
FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie
Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the
ruling
of
this
Court
in Morano
vs.
Vivo,
[43]
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs.
Republic.[45]

On the above score, the disquisition made

by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis
mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the
Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting
doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a
mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was
whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather.Nothing
about jus
sanguinis there. The
stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not
about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was
about a legitimate son of a father who had become
Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the
1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be

naturalized.There is nothing there about invidious jus

sanguinis.

a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino

mother.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated

case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate
son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin
therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the
son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded
that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not
Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not
even a Filipino.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions

was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I
would grant that the distinction between legitimate
children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it

followed
with
an obiter
dictum. The
Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin
was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based
on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum,
pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would
also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and
an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or

illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible
state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was
not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political
rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an
illegitimate child from holding an important public
office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that.
And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal
protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente
Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor
Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom,
have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately
hinging
solely
on
pureobiter
dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child
as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so
for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino

nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in

line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child,
not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and
year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions
where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition
in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R.
No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for
lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the 10 th May
2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction
and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and

No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this

Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to
resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election
contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father.Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence
before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand

still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold

that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in RomualdezMarcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson
and
Felix
B.
Desiderio,
Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634,
entitled
"Zoilo
Antonio
Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald
Allan
Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 150477. February 28, 2005]

LAZARO C. GAYO, petitioner,
VERCELES, respondent.

vs.

VIOLETA

G.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Agoo,
La Union, Branch 32, in EPC A-07, dismissing a petition
for quo warranto filed by petitioner Lazaro C. Gayo to
declare as null and void the proclamation of
respondent Violeta G. Verceles as Mayor of the
Municipality of Tubao, La Union, during the May 14,
2001 elections.
This
case
antecedents:

proceeded

from

the

following

Sometime in 1977, the respondent migrated to the

United States of America (U.S.A.) with her family to
look for greener pastures. Although her husband was
granted American citizenship, she retained her
citizenship as a Filipino.[2] In 1993, she returned to the
Philippines for good. The following year, she was
appointed as Treasurer of the B.P. Verceles
Foundation[3] and regularly attended the meetings of
its Board of Directors.[4]

In 1995, the respondent registered herself as a

voter of Precinct No. 16 in Tubao, La Union. [5] As
certified by the Assistant Revenue District Officer,
Revenue District No. 3 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) in San Fernando City, the respondent
also filed her income tax returns for the taxable years
1996 and 1997.[6] Between the years 1993 to 1997, the
respondent would travel to the U.S.A. to visit her
children.[7]
The respondent abandoned her status as lawful
permanent resident of the U.S.A. effective November
5, 1997 for the purpose of filing her candidacy for
Mayor of Tubao, La Union in the May 11, 1998
elections. On January 28, 1998, she surrendered her
alien registration receipt card before the Immigration
and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in
Manila.[8]
The respondent ran in the May 11, 1998 elections
and was elected Mayor of Tubao, La Union.
Thereafter, during the May 14, 2001 elections, the
petitioner ran for re-election and won. She was
proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor on May 16,
2001.[9]
On May 26, 2001, the petitioner, also a candidate
for Mayor during the May 2001 elections, filed a
petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La
Union. He prayed that (a) the respondent be declared
disqualified to hold the position of Mayor of Tubao, La

Union; (b) the respondents proclamation as winner be

declared null and void; and (c) the petitioner be
proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor.
In her Answer, the respondent argued that she had
clearly and unequivocally shown, through direct and
positive acts, that she already renounced and waived
her right to permanently reside in the U.S.A. even
before she surrendered her green card in 1998. As a
counterclaim, she prayed for the payment of attorneys
fees and litigation expenses, moral damages, and
exemplary damages.
On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Decision[10] dismissing the petition for quo warranto.
The RTC ruled that the respondent was qualified to
occupy the position as Municipal Mayor.
The RTC held that the respondents act of
registration as a voter, or of filing an income tax
return, does not constitute an abandonment or waiver
of her status as a permanent resident of the U.S.A.
[11]
Nonetheless, it declared that the respondent was no
longer such permanent resident during the May 2001
elections because she had already waived her green
card even prior to the filing of her certificate of
candidacy when she first ran for mayor in the 1998
elections.[12] The RTC held that the waiver of the status
as a permanent resident under Sec. 68(e) [13] of the
Omnibus Election Code is still effective. It ruled that
Sec. 40(f)[14] of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991 did not repeal Sec. 68(e). For one, there is

nothing in the repealing clause of the LGC that

indicates an intention to repeal or modify the Omnibus
Election Code.[15] Moreover, the two provisions are not
inconsistent with each other. In fact, Section 68(e) of
the Omnibus Election Code complements Section 40(f)
of the LGC, in the sense that the former may supply
the condition when permanent residents may be
qualified to run for public office.[16]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed this petition for
review based on the following ground:
THE TRIAL COURT HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AND CONTRAVENED APPLICABLE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
DESPITE PRESENCE OF LEGAL GROUND FOR ITS
GRANT.[17]
The fundamental issue in this case is whether or
not the respondent was able to meet the residency
requirement for the position of municipal mayor during
the May 2001 elections.
Before ruling on the substantive issues of the case,
we note that the petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. While a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 may be filed with this Court to assail the
decision of the RTC on questions of law, the rule is that
the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate

courts, or where exceptional and compelling

circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
[18]
The Court notes that the petitioner has not relied on
any such exceptional circumstances.
The remedy of the petitioner was to appeal the
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a writ of error
under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 2(a) of Rule 41 provides for the appeal to the
CA of cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. The petition for quo warranto in
this case was filed with and decided by the RTC in its
original jurisdiction; hence, the remedy of the
petitioner was to appeal by writ of error to the CA.
We also note that the contested term of office,
which commenced on June 30, 2001, lasted only until
June 30, 2004. This petition, thus, has become moot
and academic insofar as it concerns the petitioners
right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality. [19] For
this reason, we resolve to accept the appeal and
consider the case on the merits. Further, as we have
previously ruled, Courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review and if it will aid in
fostering free, orderly, and peaceful elections. [20]
The issue in this case involves one of the essential
qualifications for running for public office, that is, the
one-year residency requirement prescribed under
Section 39 of the LGC, thus:

SECTION 39. Qualifications.

(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member
of
the sangguniang
panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any local language or dialect.
In interpreting this requirement, our ruling
in Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[21] is
instructive, thus:
The term residence, as used in the election law,
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. [22]

constructively has his permanent home, where he, no

matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs
parents reside and continues (sic) until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).[24]
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held that a
Filipino citizens immigration to a foreign country
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. In other words, the
acquisition of a permanent residency status in a
foreign country constitutes a renunciation of the status
as a resident of the Philippines. On the other hand, the
Court explained in another case [26] that a new domicile
is reacquired if the following conditions concur:

More recently in Coquilla v. Commission on

Elections,[23] we further clarified the meaning of the
term, and held as follows:

(1) [R]residence or bodily presence in the new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. [27]

The term residence is to be understood not in its

common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence,
that is, the place where a party actually or

Applying case law to the present case, it can be

said that the respondent effectively abandoned her
residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the
status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we

find that the respondent reacquired her residency in

the Philippines even before the holding of the May
2001 elections. The records show that she surrendered
her green card to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service of the American Embassy way back in 1998.
By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S.
residency could not have been made clearer.
Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the
Philippines for good in 1993, she continued living here
and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic visits to her
children who were residing there. Moreover, she was
elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as
such for the duration of her term. We find such acts
sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to
stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that
she has once again made the Philippines her
permanent residence. As we ruled in Perez v.
Commission on Elections:[28]
When the evidence on the alleged lack of residence
qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the
law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to
the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected. In this case, considering the purpose of the
residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person
elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his
constituency, there can be no doubt that private
respondent is qualified, having been governor of the
entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately
before his election as Representative of that provinces
Third District.[29]

The petitioner posits that, under existing law, the

waiver of the status as a permanent resident of a
foreign country is no longer allowed to cure the
disqualification, in case of permanent residents
abroad. He argues that the prevailing law is the LGC of
1991 which impliedly repealed Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code for being inconsistent. He asserts that
the inconsistency lies in the fact that Section 40(f) of
the LGC does not provide for the waiver of the status
as permanent residents in a foreign country which, on
the other hand, is provided under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. He contends that under
Section 40(f) of the LGC, permanent residents or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right even after the
effectivity of the law on January 1, 1992, are
disqualified from running for any local elective
position. Hence, the petitioner argues, since the
respondent continued to avail of the right to reside
permanently in the U.S.A. until 1997, the respondent
was disqualified from running for mayor during the
May 2001 elections.
The respondent counters that the petitioners
interpretation of Sec. 40(f) of the LGC of 1991 is
patently illogical, absurd, and myopic, if not totally
outrageous. Such interpretation would, in effect,
forever ban Filipinos from running for local elective
positions, that is, those who are permanent residents
abroad and who have failed to abandon their status as
such after the effectivity of the LGC. [30] The respondent
avers that the provision simply means that after the

effectivity of the LGC, permanent residents in a foreign

country or those who have acquired the right to reside
there and continue to avail of the said right are
disqualified from running for any elective local
position. She argues therefore that she is no longer
disqualified because, at the time she ran for office, she
already ceased to avail of her right as a permanent
U.S. resident or immigrant.[31]
We agree with the respondent. Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code was not repealed by the LGC of
1991. The repealing clause of the LGC, Section 534,
[32]
does not specifically mention a repeal of any
provision of the Omnibus Election Code. The
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws, such
that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or
specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly
mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that
the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the
matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and the old
laws.[33]
In this case, we discern no irreconcilable
inconsistency between Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 40(f) of the LGC. Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code provides in part:
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said

person has waived his status as a permanent resident

or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
On the other hand, Sec. 40(f) of the LGC provides
that permanent residents in a foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity
of this Code are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
The two provisions are basically the same in that
they both provide that permanent residents or
immigrants to a foreign country are disqualified from
running for any local elective position. The difference
lies only in the fact that Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code specifically provides for an exception to
the disqualification. This does not make the two
provisions inconsistent with each other.
Moreover, the two provisions are in pari
materia they relate to the same subject matter.
Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict,
are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in
harmony with each other.[34] Thus, the RTC correctly
made the following observations:
The deletion is based on the premise that once a
person waives or abandons his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country he has,
therefore, ceased to be such from the time of the

waiver or abandonment. The phrase as used in Section

68 of the Omnibus Election Code is a catchphrase or a
conditional clause on how a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country could fall outside the
coverage of the prohibition. The legislature found the
inclusion of the phrase unnecessary or, with no offense
meant to the framers of Batas Pambansa [Blg.] 881, a
surplusage, so to speak. Hence, the deletion.
So that, the absence of that conditional clause in
Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code may be
supplied by Section 68(e) of the Omnibus Election
Code as both provisions relate to the same subject
matter and purpose; hence, in pari materia. And, when
statutes are in pari materia, they are to be construed
together; each legislative intent is to be interpreted
with reference to other acts relating to the same
matter
or
subject.
(Black,
Construction
and
[35]
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 331)
Finally, the respondent avers that in the event of
her disqualification from holding office, the petitioner
cannot assume the mayoralty post because he did not
obtain a plurality of votes for the position.
The rule is well settled. The ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number
of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. As
we held in Reyes v. Commission on Elections:[36]

To simplistically assume that the second placer would

have received the other votes would be to substitute
our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances. [37]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in EPC No. A-07 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman),
Austria-Martinez,
Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004]

ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor represented
by her father ROLANDO CIPRIANO, (AND
OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND AFFECTED
AND SIMILARLY SITUATED), petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Election Officer LOPE GAYO,
JR., 1st District, Pasay City, SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY thru its Chairman JOHNNY
SANTIAGO of Barangay 38, Pasay City,
GREG PAOLO ALCERA in his capacity as SK
Federation President of Pasay City, EDNA
TIBAR a minor assisted by parents,
KRISTAL GALE BONGGO a minor assisted
by parents, SK Chairman RUEL TAYAM
DECENA of Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE
PRESIDENT
OF
THE
PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN
NG
MGA
SANGGUNIANG
ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS AND
YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED
and
THEIR
AGENTS
AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on

the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed
by law? This is the issue that needs to be resolved in
this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P.
Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay
38, Pasay City, whose certificate of candidacy was
cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio on the ground
that
she
was
not
a
registered
voter
in
the barangay where she intended to run.
On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC
her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections
held on July 15, 2002.[1]
On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the
recommendation of the Commissions Law Department
to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of
candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections,
including petitioners. The ruling was based on the
findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all
the other candidates affected by said resolution were
not registered voters in the barangay where they
intended to run.[2]

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on
its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and
administer election laws, look into the qualifications of

Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the

July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted
from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing
of
votes,
petitioner
was
proclaimed
by
the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK

Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City.[3] She took her

oath of office on August 14, 2002.[4]
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of
Resolution No. 5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion
for reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that
a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due
course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by
any registered candidate for the same position under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646.
According to petitioner, the report of the Election
Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or
cancel ones certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also
claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the
Commission without notice and hearing. Petitioner
further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have
jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of her certificate
of candidacy on the first instance because it is the
Division of the Commission that has authority to
decide
election-related
cases,
including
preproclamation controversies. Finally, she contended
that she may only be removed by a petition for quo
warranto after her proclamation as duly-elected SK
Chairman.[5]
On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5781,[6] resolving petitioners motion for
reconsideration. It cited its previous resolution,

Resolution No. 5584, in relation to Resolution No. 4801.

The Commission stated in Resolution No. 5584 its
policy on proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible
for not being registered voters in the place where they
were elected. It explained:
A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the
procedure adopted by the Commission in denying due
course the certificate of candidacy of a candidate. It
reads:
Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Election Officers
were given the duty to: (1) verify whether all
candidates
for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan positions
are
registered
voters
of
the barangay where they filed their certificates of
candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the
certificates of candidacy and determine on the basis of
said entries whether the candidate concerned
possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.
Further, Election Officers are mandated to report by
registered mail and by rush telegram to the Law
Department of this Commission the names of
candidates who are not registered voters in the place
where they seek to run for public office within three (3)
days from the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy. The names of these candidates, however,
shall still be included in the certified lists of candidates
until the Commission directs otherwise.

By virtue of the said report, the Law Department

makes a recommendation to the Commission En Banc,
and the latter, by virtue of an En Banc Resolution
either gives due course to or denies/cancels the
certificates of candidacy of the said candidates.
Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on
the eligibility of candidates starts from the time they
filed their certificates of candidacy. The candidates, by
virtue of the publication of COMELEC Resolution No.
4801 on May 25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and
Manila Bulletin are deemed to have constructive notice
of the said administrative inquiry. Thus, the
Commission, by virtue of its administrative powers,
may motu proprio deny/cancel the certificates of
candidacy of candidates who are found to be not
registered voters in the place where they seek to run
for public office.
Any registered candidate for the same office may also
file a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy pursuant to Section 69
(nuisance
candidate)
or
Sec.
78
(material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy) of
the Omnibus Election Code either personally or
through a duly authorized representative within five
(5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of
candidacy directly with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor or with the Office of the Election
Officer concerned.

Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the

alleged ineligibility in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801, or the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy was filed
within the reglementary period, the fact that the
Resolution of this Commission, denying due course to
or canceling the certificate of candidacy of an
ineligible candidate, was not promulgated or did not
arrive prior to or on the day of the elections is
therefore of no moment. The proclamation of an
ineligible candidate is not a bar to the exercise of this
Commissions power to implement the said Resolution
of the Commission En Banc because it already
acquired the jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility
of the candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy even before elections by virtue of either the
report of the Election Officer or the petition to deny
due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy
filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the
provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 are
likewise clear: (1) A verified petition to disqualify a
candidate on the ground of ineligibility or under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed
at anytime before proclamation of the winning
candidate by any registered voter or any candidate for
the same office, (2) All disqualification cases filed on
the ground of ineligibility shall survive, although the
candidate has already been proclaimed.

Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted provisions, the

proclamation of a candidate who is found to be
disqualified is also not a bar to the Commissions power
to order a proclaimed candidate to cease and desist
from taking his oath of office or from assuming the
position to which he was elected.
By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed candidates
who were found to be ineligible only after they were
elected and proclaimed, the provisions of Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code are clear: The remedy of
losing candidates is to file a petition for quo
warranto before the metropolitan or municipal trial
court. This is logical The Commission did not acquire
jurisdiction over these proclaimed candidates prior to
election (i.e., There was no report from the Election
Officer regarding their ineligibility and no petition to
deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy
and/or petition for disqualification was filed against
them.) Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction to
annul their proclamation on the ground of ineligibility,
except in cases wherein the proclamation is null and
void for being based on incomplete canvass.

(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of

candidacy was denied due course to or cancelled by
virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc
albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to
implement the resolution of the Commission deleting
the name of the candidate whose certificate of
candidacy was denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered
deleted to cease and desist from taking his oath of
office or from assuming the position to which he was
elected, unless a temporary restraining order was
issued by the Supreme Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the
purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates
and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of
Proclamation.[7]
The Commission further stated:

Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES, to establish a policy as follows:

Considering that there are queries as to the status of

the proclamation of disqualified candidates as an
offshoot of Resolution No. 5584, the same was
amended by virtue of Resolution No. 5666, the
dispositive portion of which now reads:

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE

INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN
THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.

Considering
the
above-quoted
provision,
the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner

Thus, the Commission ruled:

Sadain to amend Resolution No. 5584 promulgated on

10 August 2002 with modification.
Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall now read as
follows:
I
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE
INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN
THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX

candidate is hereby
declared void from the
beginning, even if the
dispositive portion of
the
resolution
disqualifying him or
canceling his certificate
of candidacy does not
provide for such an
annulment.[8]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:

(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in
the event that the
disqualified candidate
is
proclaimed
the
winner
despite
his
disqualification
or
despite the pending
disqualification
case
filed
before
his
proclamation,
but
which is subsequently
resolved against him,
the proclamation of
said
disqualified

a) To declare illegal and unconstitutional the

COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on
15 July 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No.
5781 promulgated on October 7, 2002 and any
other COMELEC actions and resolutions which
are intended to summarily oust and remove
petitioner as SK Chairman of Barangay 38,
Pasay City without any notice, inquiry, election
protest, petition for quo warranto, investigation
and hearing, and therefore a clear violation of
due process of law.
b) To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC
Resolutions sitting en banc which does not
have authority to decide election related case,
including pre-proclamation controversies, in
the first instance, in consonance to this
Honorable Courts ruling in the cases of
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308,

August 29, 1989 and Garvida vs. Sales, G.R.

No. 124893, April 18, 1997.
c) To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7 of
R.A. 9164 and also to declare the age of
membership and its officers of the KK or SK
organization from 15 to 21 years old in
accordance with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b)
and other provisions of R.A. 7160 otherwise
known as Local Government Code of 1991.
d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as
constitutional to direct all SK Officers and
Members who are now more than 18 years old
to cease and desist from continuously
functioning as such SK Officers and Members
and to vacate their respective SK Officers
position, as they are no longer members of the
Sangguniang
Kabataan
organization
or
Katipunan ng Kabataan organization for being
over age upon attaining the age of 18 years
old.
e) To direct respondents to pay the salary,
allowance and other benefits of the petitioner
as SK Chairperson of Barangay 38, Pasay City.[9]
Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in
this case is the validity of Resolution No. 5363 of the
COMELEC.

Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due

process when the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
5363 canceling her certificate of candidacy. She claims
that the resolution was intended to oust her from her
position as SK Chairman without any appropriate
action and proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its
resolution by invoking its administrative power to
enforce and administer election laws. Thus, in the
exercise of such power, it may motu proprio deny or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who
are found to be unqualified for the position they are
seeking. The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing
the conduct of the Barangay and SK elections in two
newspapers of general circulation is sufficient notice to
the
candidates
regarding
the
Commissions
administrative inquiry into their certificates of
candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the
Constitution to govern the conduct of elections and to
ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest,
orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct
of
an
election,
plebiscite,
initiative,
[10]
referendum
and
recall.
As
an
independent
Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three
powers of government - executive or administrative,

legislative,
and
quasi-judicial
powers.
The
administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example,
include the power to determine the number and
location of polling places, appoint election officials and
inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law
enforcement
agencies
and
government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections; register political
parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens
arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses,
and recommend to the President the removal or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any
officer or employee it has deputized for violation or
disregard of its directive, order or decision. It also has
direct control and supervision over all personnel
involved in the conduct of election.[11] Its legislative
authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer.
[12]
The Constitution has also vested it with quasijudicial powers when it was granted exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.[13]
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution,
the Commission also exercises other powers expressly

provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is

the authority to deny due course to or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority,
however, must be in accordance with the conditions
set by law.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu
proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy based on its broad administrative power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections.
We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself,
without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of
the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec.
76. Ministerial
duty
of
receiving
and
acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
the certificate of candidacy.
The Court
discretion
petitioners
COMELEC

has ruled that the Commission has no

to give or not to give due course to
certificate of candidacy. [14] The duty of the
to give due course to certificates of

candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character.

While the Commission may look into patent defects in
the certificates, it may not go into matters not
appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of said body. [15]
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy on the ground that any material
representation therein is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the
candidate must be notified of the petition against him
and he should be given the opportunity to present
evidence in his behalf. This is the essence of due
process. Due process demands prior notice and

hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary

that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support
its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a
party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence
to support his side of the case and that the evidence
should be considered in the adjudication of the case.
[16]
In a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, since the proceedings are
required to be summary, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position papers
together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other
documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When
there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at
the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division,
the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the
affiants.[17]
Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the
denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate
of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of
the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing
orders
as
determined
by
proper
[18]
governmental organs.
We have earlier enumerated
the scope of the Commissions administrative
functions. On the other hand, where a power rests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer
other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.
[19]

The
determination
whether
a
material
representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or
not, or the determination whether a candidate is
eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may
result to a deprivation of ones right to run for public
office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public
office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate
concerned be notified of the proceedings against him
and that he be given the opportunity to refute the
allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is
not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the
candidate be notified of the Commissions inquiry into
the veracity of the contents of his certificate of
candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his
own evidence to prove that he possesses the
qualifications for the office he seeks.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that
Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No. 5781,
canceling petitioners certificate of candidacy without
proper proceedings, are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and therefore void.
We need not rule on the question raised by
petitioner as regards the constitutionality of Sections 6
and 7 of Republic Act No. 9164 lowering the age of
membership in the SK as it is not the lis mota of this
case.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No.

5363 promulgated on July 15, 2002 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 5781 issued on October 7, 2002 are
hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca,

Jr. by herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca. 1
The records disclose that in the 11 May 1998 elections,
the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKASNUCD-UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate
candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality
of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by
Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter "BARBERS Wing")
nominated Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter CANOY), while
the other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS
(hereafter "MATUGAS Wing") endorsed the candidacy
of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (hereafter TEODORO).
G.R. No. 135691 September 27, 1999
EMMANUEL
vs.
MIGUEL
MULA
and
ELECTIONS, respondents.

SINACA, petitioner,
COMMISSION

ON

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before
us
is
a
special
civil
action
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer
for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order assailing the Resolution of 6 October 1998, of
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter
COMELEC) in SPA No. 98-292, declaring as invalid the

Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vicemayor and belonging to the "BARBERS Wing," filed
before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against TEODORO which was docketed as SPA 98-021.
On 8 May 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC
issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as
candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono,
Surigao del Norte and ordering the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy because of prior conviction of
bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude. 2
On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. On even
date, herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter
EMMANUEL), an independent candidate, withdrew his
certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan
Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS
party and was nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS

Wing" as the substitute mayoralty candidate for the

Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the
basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed his
certificate of candidacy 3 attached thereto is his
certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty
candidate signed by Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS
(hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman
together with EMMANUEL's written acceptance of the
party's nomination. 4
On 11 May 1998, MULA filed through mail
another petition for disqualification, this time
against EMMANUEL, which was received by the
COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was docketed as
SPA No. 98-292. In his petition MULA contended
that the nomination of EMMANUEL as substitute
candidate is illegal on the following grounds:
a)
The
substitute,
before he filed
his
Certificate
of Candidacy as
LAKAS
candidate, was
an independent
candidate.
Being so, he
cannot
rightfully
substitute
the

disqualified
one;
b)
The
nomination
of
respondent
substitute bears
only
the
approval
of
Provincial
Chairman
Matugas
and
without
consultation
and consent of
the
higher
political
hierarchy
especially
Mr.
Robert
Ace
Barbers
who
has also a say
on nomination
of
candidates
within
his
jurisdiction, as
evidenced
by
an
authority
hereto attached
as Annex "E";

c) Substitution
generally takes
place when by
reason
of
a
candidate's
disqualification
the party to
which
he
belongs
loses
such
representation.
In the instant
case,
the
disqualification
did not at all
prejudice LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP
because
Mr.
Garchil
G.
Canoy is still
there
representing
the party after
the
disqualification.
The substitution
is a redundancy
and
not
necessary
under
the
circumstances,

more so that it
was done with
malice
and
without
the
required
consensus
of
the
political
hierarchy. 5
In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of
the petition for the following reasons:
a) The petition
does not state a
cause of action
as it is not
based on any of
the grounds for
disqualification
as
provided
under Sec. 68
of the Omnibus
Election
Code
and Sec. 40(A)
of the Local
Government
Code of 1991;
b) The issue of
who in LAKAS
has
the
authority
to

nominate
candidates for
local officials, is
an
intra-party
matter
hence
beyond
the
jurisdiction
of
the Comelec;
c) Gov. Matugas
was
duly
authorized
by
LAKAS as its
Provincial
Chairman and
official
candidate
for
Provincial
Governor
to
nominate
the
party's
local
candidates; and
d) The petition
is already moot
and academic
because of the
proclamation of
EMMANUEL as
mayor of the
Municipality of
Malimono,

Surigao
Norte. 6

del

On 28 May 1998, the COMELEC Second Division

dismissed the petition for disqualification and upheld
the candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL. 7 The pertinent
part of the resolution reads:
It is therefore clear, that candidate for
governor Matugas was clothed with the
authority to nominate the respondent as
substitute candidate for the position of
mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte,
vice the disqualified candidate, Apropos
thereto, Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code states:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that on May 10, 1998 the
proper nomination was issued by the
official of the party authorized therefor, it
stands to reason that the substitution was
valid, respondent having accepted the
nomination
and
his
certificate
of
candidacy
dated
May
10,
1998,
correspondingly filed.
Respondent is correct in stating that the
question of nomination is a party concern
which is beyond the ambit of the
Commission. What matters is, the

candidate has been certified as a party

member and the nomination duly issued
in his favor.
Be that as it may, the petition is rendered
moot and academic by the proclamation
of respondent on May 12, 1998, as
evidenced by the certificate of canvass
and proclamation of winning candidates
for municipal offices with SN 16671298
and his oath of office dated May 13, 1998,
which forms part of the record of this
case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES
to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of
merit.
MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the
main that the signature alone of MATUGAS in the
nomination was not sufficient because the party's
authority to nominate was given to both MATUGAS and
Senator Robert S. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS), in
their joint capacity, and that the nomination of
EMMANUEL is void since he was an independent
candidate prior to his nomination. 8
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution 9 which set aside the resolution dated 28
May 1998 of the Second Division and disqualified
EMMANUEL, for the following reasons:

In the motion for reconsideration,

petitioner argues that the signature only
of Governor Matugas in the nomination
was not sufficient because the party's
authority to nominate was given to both
Governor Matugas and Senator Robert
Barbers, in their joint capacity.
We do not have to resolve this issue
because the more important issue is
whether respondent is disqualified as a
substitute
candidate.
He
was
an
independent candidate for councilor at
the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor as a substitute of a
disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not
belong to the same political party as the
substituted candidate.
We sustain petitioner's position. We
declare
that
the
substitution
of
disqualified mayoralty candidate Teodoro
F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D.
Sinaca was not valid because the latter
was an independent candidate for
councilor prior to his nomination as
substitute candidate in place of the
withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas
party member.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Commission en
banc hereby resolves to SET ASIDE the

Commission (Second Division)'s resolution

dated May 28, 1998. We declare
Emmanuel D. Sinaca DISQUALIFIED to be
a substitute candidate for mayor of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and ANNUL
his proclamation as such being void ab
initio. Upon finality of this resolution, he is
ordered to vacate the position of mayor of
the municipality of Malimono, Surigao del
Norte, to which the vice-mayor elected in
the May 11, 1998 elections shall succeed
by operation of law.
Not satisfied therewith, EMMANUEL is now before us
alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution.
EMMANUEL principally contends that his nomination as
a substitute candidate was regular and valid hence, his
proclamation as mayor of the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte must be upheld.
In the assailed resolution, the COMELEC disqualified
EMMANUEL solely on the basis that he was an
independent candidate prior to his nomination as a
substitute candidate.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party who dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy is
governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides:

If after the last day for the filing of

certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of the day
of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the
day before the election and mid-day of
election day, said certificate maybe filed
with any board of election inspectors in
the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to
be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary, among
others, that the substitute candidate must be of the
same political party as the original candidate and must
be duly nominated as such by the political party.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance
with the above said requirements. EMMANUEL was
properly nominated as substitute candidate by the

LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing" to which TEODORO, the

disqualified candidate, belongs, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance signed by
MATUGAS, the Party's provincial chairman. 10 That
EMMANUEL is a bona fide member of the LAKAS party
is
shown
not
only
by
the
certificate
of
11
membership, which is being controverted for having
been presented as new evidence for the first time
before this court, but more importantly by his
certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC
stating therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party. 12
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal
manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's
political creed or lack of political creed. 13 It is a
statement of a person seeking to run for a public office
certifying that he announces his candidacy for the
office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office,
the name of the political party to which he belongs, if
he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all
election purposes being as well stated. 14
The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted
the placing of his name before the electorate. It
constituted an authorized badge, which the voter
could scrutinize before casting his ballot. Thus, with
the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of
candidacy that he is affiliated with the LAKAS party, he
was effectively voted by the electorate not as an
independent candidate, but as a member of the LAKAS
party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as
to political party to which he belongs is sufficient to

make the electorate conscious of the platform of the

said political party. 15
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent
candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What
is more significant is that he had previously withdrawn
his certificate of candidacy as independent candidate
for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate
of candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO at which
time he was, for all intents and purposes, already
deemed a member of the LAKAS party "MATUGAS
wing." As such, EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and
carry out the party's ideology, political ideas and
platforms of government. As the official candidate of
an organized political party, he is bound by the party's
rule. He owes loyalty to the party, its tenet and its
policies, its platforms and programs of government. To
the electorate he represents the party, its principles,
ideals and objectives. 16
Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member
of the LAKAS party after the disqualification of
TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the
substitution. There is nothing in the Constitution or the
statute which requires as a condition precedent that a
substitute candidate must have been a member of the
party concerned for a certain period of time before he
can be nominated as such. Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code only mandates that a substitute
candidate should be a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party as the candidate
to be replaced. We cannot provide for an additional

requirement or condition not provided under the said

provision without encroaching into the domain of the
legislative department.

that, in this country, politicians switch

party affiliations more frequently than the
ebb and flow of the tides.17

As aptly observed by Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco

Flores in her dissenting opinion, to wit:

The argument advanced by private respondent MULA

that MATUGAS has no authority to nominate a
candidate without the concurrence of BARBERS is
devoid or merit.

. . . . With due respect to the majority

opinion, I find that at the time the
substitute candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor and at the time of
his election as such, he was an
independent candidate no more. He was,
at that time, a nominee of the LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP Political Party. This fact is
evidenced
by
the
Certificate
of
Nomination and Acceptance dated 10
May 1998 executed by the Provincial
Chairman of the said party of Surigao del
Norte and by herein respondent. This
certificate bonafide member of the said
party. To rule that respondent was still an
independent candidate and not a member
of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP political party
at the time of filing his certificate of
candidacy as a substitute candidate for
mayor
is
to
arrogate
upon
this
Commission what would have been the
sole and exclusive prerogative of any
political organization to determine
party membership and its nominees to
elective positions. It is an accepted fact

Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS

National Headquarters through its Deputy Secretary
General and National Secretariat Executive Director
Reynaldo L. Maclang, as the party officer authorized to
nominate, sign, attest under oath, and issue
Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance for the
Party's official candidates for the positions of Board
Members, City Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vicemayors and councilors for the Province of Surigao del
Norte. 18
This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998
replaced and/or modified the former authorization
given by the party of both BARBERS and
MATUGAS. 19 Both BARBERS and MATUGAS were given
separate and distinct authorizations when the mother
of BARBERS ran for governor against MATUGAS.
Secondly, there are only two official candidates for
mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, namely
TEODORO and CANOY, 20 both of whom are members
of the LAKAS party but from different factions.
TEODORO was indorsed by the "MATUGAS wing" and

CANOY by the "BARBERS Wing." The certificates of

candidacy of these candidates were never questioned
despite the fact that they belong to the same political
party and were separately and independently
endorsed by either BARBERS or MATUGAS. Therefore,
if the absence of a joint nomination is to be considered
fatal to the validity of the certificate of candidacy of
TEODORO or CANOY, then there would in effect no
candidates running for mayor in the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification
of TEODORO, who is a member of the LAKAS
"MATUGAS wing," the substitute must come from the
same faction as the candidate to be substituted and
since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of
TEODORO, then MATUGAS' nomination of EMMANUEL
in substitution of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.
There is also no irregularity in the act of EMMANUEL in
joining a political party. The right of individuals to form
an association as guaranteed by the fundamental law
includes the freedom to associate or refrain from
association. 21No man is compelled by law to become a
member of a political party; or after having become
such, to remain a member. He may join such a party
for whatever reason reasons seems good to him, and
may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or
indifferent, or without cause. 22 The decision of a
candidate on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or
aggrupation is left entirely to his discretion. 23

We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL that

the decision as to which member a party shall
nominate as its candidate is a party concern which is
not cognizable by the courts.
A political party has the right to identify the people
who constitute the association and to select a standard
bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and
preference. 24 Political parties are generally free to
conduct their internal affairs free from judicial
supervision; this common-law principle of judicial
restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right
of free association, serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without
undue interference. 25 Thus, the rule is that the
determination of disputes as to party nominations
rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving
the court's jurisdiction. 26
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute
or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume
jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within
a political party, but will leave the matter for
determination by the proper tribunals of the party
itself or by the electors at the polls. 27 Similarly, in the
absence of specific constitutional or legislative
regulations defining how nominations are to be made,
or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain
ways, political parties may handle party affairs,
including nominations, in such manner as party rules
may establish. 28

An election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and

honestly expressed their will is not invalid even though
an improper method is followed in the nomination of
candidates. 29 This is because in determining the effect
of a particular irregularity in a party nomination for
office on the result of the general election, the pivotal
issue is whether the irregularity complained of has
prevented a full, fair, and free expression of the public
will. Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision to
the contrary, an election may not even be invalidated
by the fact that the nomination of the successful
candidate was brought about by fraud, and not in the
manner prescribed by the statute, provided it appears
that noncompliance with the law did not prevent a fair
and free vote. 30
None of the situations adverted to above are obtaining
in the case at bar as to warrant this Court's
intervention
in ascertaining the propriety of
EMMANUEL's nomination as a substitute candidate by
the LAKAS "MATUGAS wing."
Finally, the issue as to the validity of EMMANUEL's
nomination as substitute candidate has been rendered
moot and academic by his proclamation on May 12,
1998, by the Board of Canvassers of Malimono as the
duly elected municipal mayor and after he has
assumed into office. The fact that the nomination of a
substitute lacks the signature of one of the authorized
signatory is but a technicality which cannot be used to
frustrate the will of the electorate.

It has been held that the provisions of the election law

regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing
and swearing on the same, as well as the information
required to be stated therein, are considered
mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are
regarded as merely directory. With respect to election
laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that
mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
election will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate.
Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly
signed or if it does not contain the required data, the
proclamation of the candidate as winner may not be
nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate
should have been questioned before the election; they
may not be questioned after the election without
invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not
be done. 30 In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 32 the
Court held that the "will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal
provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the electorate, but after the people
have expressed their will, the result of the election
cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has
not sworn to his certificate of candidacy."
Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate,
overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible
doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's
eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of

the people. 33Above and beyond all, the determination

of the true will of the electorate should be paramount.
It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must
prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue
to hold sacred. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en
banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having
been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, GonzagaReyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 134293 June 21, 1999

KAISER
B.
RECABO,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO
R. REYES, JR., respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the
resolution dated May 8, 1998 of the First Division of
the Commission on Elections 1 ("the Commission"),
cancelling the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., and the resolution dated July 1,
1998 of the Commission en banc, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Pardo, J., no part. Was Comelec chair.

The antecedents as found by the Commission in the
resolution dated May 8, 1998 are:
It appears that on March 27, 1998,
petitioner Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his
certificate of candidacy (Annex A,
Petition) as the official candidate (for vicemayor of the municipality of Mainit,
Surigao Del Norte) of the political party
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. His nomination by
said political party is evidence by the
certificate of nomination and acceptance

dated March 27, 1998 signed by Fidel V.

Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National
Chairman
and
Secretary
General,
respectively, of said political party. This
certificate of nomination and acceptance
is petitioner's Annex A-1.
However, on April 2, 1998, another
person, respondent Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr.,
claiming to be the official candidate of
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP as vice-mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, Surigao del Norte
also filed his certificate of candidacy
(Annex E, Petition). Petitioner submitted
to this Commission a copy of the
certificate of nomination and acceptance
in favor of Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., dated
March 30, 1998 (Annex F) signed only by
one representative of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP.
Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the
other representative (Robert Z. Barbers)
is blank.
Petitioner in par. II-2 of the petition
alleges:
II-2. The respondent KAISER
B.
RECABO,
JR.,
is
a
SUBSTITUTE candidate for
the office of VICE-MAYOR of
the Municipality of Mainit,
Surigao del Norte. He filed

his Certificate of Candidacy

on April 02, 1998. He claims
to be a substitute of MRS.
CANDELARIA B. RECABO who
filed
her
Certificate
of
Candidacy for the position of
VICE-MAYOR
of
Mainit,
Surigao del Norte on March
25, 1998.
The allegations in this paragraph are
admitted by respondent as he has not
specifically denied the same. Further,
respondent emphasizes that he admits
this in par. 1 of his Answer where he
states:
1.
Ex
ce
pt
th
os
e
th
at
ma
y
be
sp
eci
fic

all
y
de
nie
d
in
th
e
foll
ow
ing
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
of
thi
s
an
sw
er,
he
ad
mi
ts
th
e
ma
ter
ial

all
eg
ati
on
s
of
th
e
pe
titi
on.
Petitioner submits the theory that since
the
certificate
of
nomination
and
acceptance (Annex C) in favor of
Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed by
Robert Barbers, there is no valid
nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP in
favor of Candelaria Recabo. Therefore,
Candelaria B. Recabo not having been
validly nominated, should be deemed an
independent candidate only. And since
Candelaria B. Recabo is an independent
candidate,
she
cannot
be
validly
substituted because under Sec. 11 of
Comelec Res. No. 2977 promulgated on
January 15, 1998, "no substitution shall
be
allowed
for
an
independent
candidate."
On the other hand, respondent argues
that the certificate of nomination and

acceptance signed only by representative

Matugas (and without the joint signature
of representative Barbers) substantially
complied with the party requirements and
are, therefore, valid as far as the party is
concerned. Respondent maintains that his
nomination is valid. Respondent further
argues that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to rule on who between
petitioner and respondent has a valid
certificate of candidacy.1wphi1.nt
Respondent likewise claims that the
certificate
of
nomination
in
favor
petitioner (Annex A-1) is falsified because
it was notarized in Mainit, Surigao del
Norte at a time when the signatories
therein (Fidel Ramos and Jose de Venecia,
Jr.,) were not in said place. Respondent
however has not presented any evidence
to this effect. 2
Based on the foregoing, the respondent Commission
cancelled the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr. On May 14, 1998, petitioner
Recabo, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration and a
supplement thereto on May 22, 1998. Francisco R.
Reyes, Jr. filed his opposition. On July 1, 1998, the
Commission en banc issued a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:

1. The certificate of candidacy of

petitioner and that of his mother whom
he substituted as candidate for Vice
Mayor substantially complied with the
requirements of being official candidate
of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP party.
2. The people of Mainit, Surigao del Norte
have spoken loud and clear in favor of
petitioner by giving him a resounding
majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the
votes cast for both of them.
3. By canceling the certificate of
candidacy of petitioner, public respondent
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to petitioner,
except this present petition. 3
The
respondent
Commission
rationalized
the
cancellation petitioner's certificate of candidacy thus:
It appears from the very wording of the
certificate of nomination and acceptance
of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP that joint signing of
the certificate is required for validity. The
body of the certificate begins by . . . "WE,
GOV. FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS and
ROBERTO Z. BARBERS . . . as its Provincial

Chairman
and
District
Chairman,
respectively, hereby nominate.
The certificate continues . . ." WITNESS
OUR HANDS this 18th day of March 1998"
etc.
From the way the document is worded,
the intent is that there should be two
complete signatures on the certificate for
the certificate to be valid.
The mischief in respondent's assertion to
the effect that this Commission has no
jurisdiction to rule on whose certificate of
candidacy should be given due course is
that if such a position is taken, it would
give rise to scenario whereby one single
political party may make multiple
nominations for a single elective position.
Such is not a situation the intent of the
rules and regulations issued by this
Commission.
We, therefore, rule that petitioner's
certificate of candidacy be given due
course and that respondent's certificate
of candidacy be denied due course. First,
because petitioner filed it much earlier
than respondent and second, because the
certificate of nomination and acceptance
upon which respondent's certificate of

candidacy is premised appears to be

invalid. We find the theory of petitioner,
that at best Candelaria Recabo is only an
independent candidate, logical and valid.
Consequently, she cannot be substitute
by respondent. (Sec. 11, Comelec Res.
2977).
Furthermore, under Sec. 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the Commission
may motu proprio, or upon valid petition,
refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that
said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute
or by other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate
has no bona fide intention to run for office
for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the
electorate. To allow respondent to run
under the circumstances adverted to
herein would put the election process in
mockery or disrepute for we would in
effect be allowing an anomalous situation
where a single political party may field-in
multiple candidates for a single elective
position. 4
To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall
resolve the second issue first that the "electorate has

spoken loud and clear in favor of petitioner by giving

him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of
the votes cast for both of them". Petitioner, in effect,
argues that the "popular will as clearly expressed in
votes cast and counted should prevail, such that the
election of a candidate cannot be annulled because of
formula defects in his certificate." 5 Petitioner cites a
number of cases to advance this position. 6
According to petitioner, on May 11, 1998, election day,
he garnered 4,835 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 3,733. As proof, petitioner
Recabo, Jr. submitted a "Certified List of Candidates
with their Votes Obtained dated May 14, 1998 and an
undated "Certified List of Winning Candidates" both
signed by a certain Lydia P. Mahinay as Acting Election
Officer, and Election Officer-OIC, respectively. 7
In Garay vs. Commission
occasion to rule that:

on

Elections 8 we

had

. . . According to Section 17, 9 a certificate

of votes can only be "evidence to prove
tampering, alteration, falsification or any
other anomaly committed in the election
returns
concerned,
when
duly
authenticated . . ." A certificate of votes
does not constitutes sufficient evidence of
the true and genuine results of the
election; only election returns are,
pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236, and
238 of B.P. Blg. 881. 10

In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning

candidates signed by the said Election Officer II and
OIC sufficient evidence of the real results of the
election. Moreover, we final that the certificate of
votes does not conform with Section 16 of R.A. 6646
which reads:
Sec. 16. Certificate of Votes. After the
counting of the votes cast in the precinct
and announcement of the results of the
election, and before leaving the polling
place, the board of election inspectors
shall issue a certificate of votes upon
request of the duly accredited watchers.
The certificate shall contain the number
of votes obtained by each candidates
written in words and figures, the number
of the precinct, the name of the city of
municipality, province, the total number
of voters who voted in the precinct and
the date and time issued, and shall be
signed and thumbmarked by each
member of the board.
The certificate of votes submitted by petitioner does
not state the number of votes obtained in words; it
does not state the number of the precinct, the total
number of votes who voted in the precinct and the
time issued. Most importantly, it was merely certified
true and correct by a certain Lydia P. Mahinay as acting
election officer. As aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A.
6646 requires that the certificate of votes be signed

and thumbmarked by each member of the board of

election inspectors.

respondent
Commission
documentary evidence.

Thus, the doctrine that a mere technicality cannot be

used to frustrate the people's will find no application in
the case at bar considering that the results of the
election have not been duly established.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 which prescribed the

rules and regulations governing the filing of
certificates of candidacy in connection with the May
11, 1998 election provides under Section 5 thereof:

This brings us to the first issue of whether "the

certificate of candidacy of petitioner and that of his
mother who he substituted as candidate for Vice
Mayor substantially complied with the requirements of
being official candidates of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Party."
The issue boils down to the validly of the certificate of
nomination of petitioner by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP which
is required to be attached and filed with the certificate
of candidacy, for apparently, petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law and the contents of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy are otherwise in order.

Sec. 5. Certificate of nomination of official

candidates by political party. . . . The
certificate of nomination by registered
political
parties,
organizations
or
coalitions of their official candidates shall
be filed with the certificates of candidacy
not lather than the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy as specified in
Section 4 hereof, duly signed and
attested under oath by the party
president, chairman, secretary-general or
any other party officer duly authorized in
writing to do so.

Preliminary, it must be stated that in special civil

actions for certiorari, the main issue is one of
jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 11 In the
case at bar, we find that the findings and conclusions
reached by the respondent Commission were not
whimsical nor capricious. The respondent Commission
acted within its powers and jurisdiction in canceling
the certificate of candidacy of petitioner and there is
no justification for this Court to interfere with the
actions taken by the Comelec. The findings of the

are

supported

by

xxx xxx xxx

Pursuant to said resolution, the political party of LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP issued an "Authorization designating two
(2) Party officers to nominate, sign, attest under oath
and issue the Official Certificates of Nomination,
namely, Francisco T. Matugas and Robert Ace S.
Barbers. Consistent with the foregoing, the certificate
of nomination and acceptance, as pointed out by the
respondent Commission, requires the joint signing of

the two party officers. The fact that only Francisco T.

Matugas signed the certificate of nomination of
petitioner Recabo, Jr. leaves the same open to
question. On the other hand, the certificate of
nomination of private respondent Reyes, Jr. was signed
by no less than Fidel V. Ramos and Jose De Venecia, Jr.
as the National Chairman and Secretary General,
respectively of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP party. By and
large, the best authority to interpret a rule is the
source itself of the rule, in this case the COMELEC. 12
Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for
the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy
to curb the evil that the respondent Commission
sought to abate pursuant to its mandate to hold free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. 13 As
the respondent Commission stated, "to allow
respondent to run under the circumstances adverted
to herein would put the election process in mockery
and disrepute for we would in effect be allowing an
anomalous situation where a single political party may
field-in multiple candidates for a single position."
It will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner
filed her certificate of candidacy on March 25, 1998
and later withdrew the same on March 31, 1998. In the
meantime, private respondent Reyes, Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998. Thereafter,
herein petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of
candidacy of April 2, 1998, in substitution of his
mother who had withdrawn earlier.

Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the

same political party, at the petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed
his certificate of candidacy there was no more void to
fill in as respondent Reyes, Jr. has already filed his
certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP. Verily, there was no more vacancy to be
substituted for. Disunity and discord amongst
members of a political party should not be allowed to
create a mockery of our electoral process, which
envisions one candidate from a political party for each
position.
This issue was not raised in this petition, nevertheless,
we deem it necessary to clarify respondent
Commissioner's declaration that petitioner's mother is
an independent candidate on account of the invalidity
of her certificate of nomination and acceptance to
forestall any confusion that may arise on account of
the said declaration. For the same reason, that his
certificate of nomination was invalid because it was
signed only by one authorized party officer, may
petitioner be likewise deemed an independent
candidate and pave the way for his candidacy in the
said elections? The answer still be in the negative.
Were we to treat him as an independent candidate, his
certificate of candidacy would still be cancelled and
denied due course on the ground that it was filed out
of time. It is well-settled that a certified filed beyond
the deadline is not valid. 14
Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy on April 2,
1998, well within the prescriptive period for filing a

substitute certificate of candidacy, but way beyond the

period for filing an independent certificate of
candidacy. Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2977
requires that "the certificate of candidacy for municipal
positions in areas other than the ARMM should be filed
starting January 11, 1998 to midnight of March 27,
1998. 15 On the other hand, Section 11 thereof
provides that "the substitute candidate nominated by
the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy as herein provided for the office affected
not lather than mid-day of the day of the election. 16
Finally, private respondent Reyes, Jr. has filed a motion
in this Court to the effect that in the event this Court
affirms the non-qualification of petitioner Recabo Jr., he
should be proclaimed the winner and assume the
position of vice mayor of the municipality of Mainit,
Surigao del Norte. Apparently, respondent Reyes, Jr. is
counting on the certificate of votes to establish that he
is the second highest winning candidate. As we have
pointed out earlier, a certificate of votes is not
sufficient to establish the true and genuine results of
the election. A certificate of canvass issued on the
basis of the election returns is required to proclaim the
elected candidate. 17 Moreover, it is settled that the
disqualification or non-qualification of the winner in a
vice mayoralty race does not justify the proclamation
of the defeated candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes. Thus, in the recent case
of Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 18 it was stated:

That the candidate who obtains the

second highest number of votes may not
be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified is now settled.
The doctrinal instability caused by seesawing rulings has since been removed.
In the latest ruling on the question, this
Court said:
To simplistically assume that
the second would have
received the other votes
would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is
just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of
voters. He could not be
considered the first among
qualified candidates because
in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the
conditions
would
have
substantially changed. We
are
not
prepared
to
extrapolate the result under
the circumstances. (at p.
529.)

Hence, in the event that herein petitioner Kaiser

Recabo, Jr. obtained the plurality of votes in the May
11, 1998 elections for Vice Mayor of the Municipality of
Mainit, Surigao del Norte, the vacancy due to the
ineligibility of herein petitioner should be filled up in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 19 which provides that the highest
ranking sanggunian member shall become the vicemayor.
In the sum, we find that the respondent Commission
did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in cancelling and denying due course to
petitioner Recabo, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
resolutions respondent Commission dated May 8, 1998
and July 1, 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD
OF
CANVASSERS
OF
DOLORES,
QUEZON,
VIVENCIO G. LIRIO respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1 (which
dismissed his petition to set aside respondent
Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July
31, 1980 denying his petition for annulment of the
proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the
elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and for his
proclamation instead as such elected vice-mayor for
having received the clear majority of the votes cast),
the comments of public and private respondents and
petitioner's consolidated reply and manifestation and
motion of June 25, 1985 (stating that respondent
abandoned his claim to the office and accepted and
assumed on June 10, 1985, the position of municipal
trial judge of Lucban and Sampaloc, Quezon, as
verified from the records of the Office of the Court
Administrator), the Court Resolved to RECONSIDER and
SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to GRANT the
petition at bar.
The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza,
Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local
elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as
independent for the office of vice-mayor of the
municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very

same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own

handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of
candidacy "for personal reasons." Later on January 25,
1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of
his companion Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own
sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of
Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a oneman independent ticket. ... The results showed
petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with
a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his
opponent respondent Lirio's 2,660 votes). But the
Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes
cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of
the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that
since petitioner's name does not appear in the
Comelec's certified list of candidates for that
municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy
was not duly approved by the Comelec so that his
votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The
canvassers
accordingly
proclaimed
respondent
Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and
as the duly elected vice mayor of the municipality of
Dolores.
Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution
on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two
grounds after citing the pertinent legal provisions, as
follows:
The 1978 Election Code provides:

SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy

duly filed shall be considered withdraw ...
unless the candidate files with the office
which received the certificate ... or with
the Commission a sworn statement of
withdrawal ...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing
certificates of candidacy, a candidate with
a certificate of candidacy duly filed should
... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the
office may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office for which ... the candidate
who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on
or before midday of election ...
Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not
have substituted for Candidate Mendoza
on the strength of Section 28 of the 1978
Election Code which he invokes, For one
thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his
certificate
is
not
under
oath,
as required under Section 27 of the Code;
hence it produces no legal effect. For
another, said withdrawal was made not
after the last day (January 4, 1980) for
filing
certificates
of
candidacy,
ascontemplated under Sec. 28 of the
Code,
but
on that
very
same
day. (Emphasis copies)

Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the

reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the
will of the electorate instead of defeating the same
through the invocation of formal or technical defects.
(De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211
[1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208
(1918) Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969]; Yra vs.
Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107
Phil. 607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522
[1963], Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [19721;
and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72 SCRA 170 [19761).

The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for

denying due course to petitioner's substitute
certificate of candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's withdrawal
of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath,"
should be rejected. It is not seriously contended by
respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's
withdrawal was not an actual fact and a reality, so
much so that no votes were cast for him at all, In fact,
Mendoza's name, even though his candidacy was filed
on the last day within the deadline, was not in the
Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn
withdrawal filed later on the same day had
been accepted by the election registrar without protest
nor objection, On the other hand, since there was no
time to include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of
registered candidates, because the election was only
four days away, petitioner as substitute candidate
circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all
chairmen and members of the citizens election
committees in compliance with the suggestion of the
Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.
The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is
but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate
the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute
candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil.
211, clearly applicable,mutatis mutandis this Court
held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated
by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had
not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the
election would be fatal to the status of the candidate

before the electorate, but after the people have

expressed their will, the result of the election cannot
be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not
sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See also
Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As
likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec,
107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal
be under oath will be held to be merely directory and
Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should
be "considered a harmless irregularity."
As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his
certificate of candidacy right on the very same day
that he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4,
1980 which was the very last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy shows that he was not serious
about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not be
done to would be bonafide candidates, like petitioner
who had not filed his candidacy in deference to
Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his " co-planners
" with "some concerned citizens ... (who) held causes
to put up a slate that will run against the erstwhile
unopposed KBL slate."
The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's
substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in
consonance with the substance and spirit of the law.
Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such
substitute candidates in case of death. withdrawal or
disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the
elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last
hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on

January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same

day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal
should therefore be considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the last day, even going
by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.
Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of
petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a
substitute candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be
successfully assailed. It follows that the votes cast in
his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there
is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation
as Vice Mayor...
ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned
Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the
proclamation of respondent Lirio as elected
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares
petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said
office, take the oath of office and discharge its
functions. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez,
Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., on leave.

MELO, J.:
Petitioner assails the order of the Commission on
Elections dated May 28, 1998 which dismissed the
petition he filed seeking to declare illegal the
proceeding of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Navotas for failing to include in the canvass the
Bautista stray votes contained in a separate tally
sheet.
Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private
respondent were duly registered candidates for the
position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the
elections of May 11, 1998. Aside from said candidates,
a certain Edwin "Efren" Bautista, hereinafter referred
to as Edwin Bautista, also filed a certificate of
candidacy for the same position of mayor. His
certificate of candidacy was filed at midnight on March
27, 1997, the last day for such filing. In fact, the filing
was done at the very last minute.
G.R. No. 133840 November 13, 1998
CIPRIANO
"EFREN"
BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NAVOTAS, METRO
MANILA
and
MIGUELITA
DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.

On April 1, 1998, petitioner filed a petition praying that

Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. The
COMELEC saw merit in the petition and in a resolution
dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate and consequently ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the
position of mayor.

Accordingly, the name of Edwin Bautista was not

included in the list of candidates for the position of
mayor for Navotas. Copies of said list were distributed
by the Office of the Election Officer of Navotas to the
boards of election inspectors (BEI).
On May 8, 1998, Edwin Bautista filed a motion for
reconsideration. As a result, on May 10, 1998, the
Election Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the BEI
to include the name of Edwin Bautista in the certified
list of candidates. Conversely, on the afternoon of the
same day, the Election Officer issued another directive
to the BEI recalling his earlier directive for the
inclusion of Edwin Bautista pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration.
In view of the conflicting directives, the Regional
Election Director of the National Capital Region,
responding to a request made by Atty. Gauttier T.
Dupaya, counsel for petitioner, gave instructions to the
BEI to tally separately either in some other portion of
the same election return not intended for the tallying
of votes for the candidates for mayor, or in a separate
sheet of paper, the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA",
"EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA". Said
instructions were affirmed in a Memorandum of the
then COMELEC Chairman, directing the BEI to "proceed
with the counting of the votes for local officials
excluding the votes cast for 'Bautista', 'Efren' and
'Efren Bautista' as stray but to segregate such stray
votes into a separate improvised tally sheet in order to
count the total stray votes."

On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin

Bautista's motion praying for the reconsideration of
the April 30, 1998 resolution declaring him a nuisance
candidate.
When the canvass of the election returns was
commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Navotas refused to canvass as part of the valid votes
of petitioner the separate tallies of ballots on which
were written "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E.
BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA". Said ballots were tallied
by the BEI separately either on some portion of the
election return not intended for votes for mayoralty
candidates or in separate sheets of paper. In view of
this refusal, objections to the inclusion of the election
returns were raised during the canvass. Consequently,
on May 20, 1998, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers which was docketed as
SPC No. 98-10. The assailed order resolving said
petition reads in relevant part as follows:
The
issue
before
this
Commission En
Banc is
whether or not of the Board
of Canvassers not to include
in the canvass the "Bautista
stray votes" contained in the
separate
tally
sheet
constitutes
an
illegal
proceeding thereof?

We rule in the negative.

The duty of the Board of
Canvassers
is
only
to
canvass what is on the face
of the election returns and
not
to
go
beyond
it.
Obviously, the stray votes in
the separate tally sheet
cannot be said to be entries
in the election returns. Thus,
the ruling of respondent
Board not to Include in the
canvass the Bautista stay
votes is correct.
Further, under the Omnibus
Election Code, Section 211
(4) which provides:
4. When two or
more words are
written on the
same line on
the ballot all of
which are the
surnames
of
two or more
candidates, the
same shall not
be counted for
any of them,

unless one is a
surname of an
incumbent who
has served for
at least one
year in which
case it shall be
counted
in
favor of the
latter.
Thus,
under
the
circumstances stray votes
cannot be considered a vote
for either party.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
instant
petition of Cipriano "Efren"
Bautista
is
hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

(p. 24-25, Rol

Meanwhile, on May 18, 1998, the disqualified nuisance
candidate, Edwin "Efren" Bautista, filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court, docketed as G.R No.
133607, where he assailed the actions of the COMELEC
Second Division and of respondent COMELEC En Banc,
declaring him a nuisance candidate and ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The Court
dismissed said petition on May 21, 1998, ruling that

there is no showing that the COMELEC committed

grave abuse of discretion in declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate. Edwin Bautista's motion for
reconsideration of our resolution was denied with
finality on July 7, 1998.
The instant petition posits the following grounds for
nullification of the assailed COMELEC order:
UTTER
LACK
AND
DISREGARD
OF
DUE
PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE
OF
THE
QUESTIONED
ORDER; and
RESPONDENT
COMELEC
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO EXCESS OR LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING
THE INCLUSION AS PART OF
PETITIONER'S VALID VOTES
THE VOTES THAT WERE
SEPARATELY TALLIED BY THE
BOARDS
OF
ELECTION
INSPECTORS
AND
THE
RESPONDENT BOARD.
Let us first examine the due process issue as regards
the issuance of the questioned order.

The petition resolved by COMELEC in the assailed

resolution was lodged to declare illegal the
proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Navotas due to non-inclusion of votes which herein
petitioner claims to be valid. On this score, we agree
with petitioner that the matter falls under the category
of special cases, particularly a pre-proclamation
controversy raising the issue of the illegality of the
proceedings of the board of canvassers (Sec. 3, Rule
27, Part V, Comelec Rules of Procedure).
Sec. 2 of the above-stated Rule provides that all preproclamation controversies shall be heard summarily
after due notice. Hence, the COMELEC only has to give
notice to the parties by issuing summons and by
serving a copy of the petition. The proceedings being
summary, the COMELEC may rely on whatever
pleading that may have been filed by the parties. A
hearing wherein the parties engage in oral argument is
not required.
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]),
we held that the right to be heard does not only refer
to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A
party may also be heard through his pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral
arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of
procedural due process. As reiterated in National
Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R.
No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity

to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs.

Damaso (246 SCRA 260 [1995]), we held that a formal
or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all
instances essential. Plainly, petitioner was not denied
due process.
We nevertheless find merit in petitioner's second
argument.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers denied the
inclusion, as part of petitioner's valid votes, of those
votes that were separately tallied by the BEI and the
Board of Canvassers.
When petitioner raised the matter to the COMELEC,
the commission upheld the act of the Board of
Canvassers, stating that the same cannot go beyond
the election returns. In its Comment, the Office of the
Solicitor General opines that the improvised sheets of
paper containing the tally of Bautista stray votes
cannot be legally considered in the canvass.
An examination of the foregoing incidents brings us to
the following legal queries: (1) Did the "EFREN
BAUTISTA" (or EFREN/E. BAUTISTA/BAUTISTA) votes
which were tallied in separate sheets of paper
categorically pertain to petitioner? Stated otherwise,
did said separate tally reflect the intention of the
voters?; (2) What is the legal effect of the final
declaration made by the COMELEC that Edwin Bautista
was a nuisance candidate? Further, what are the
implications of the final and conclusive ruling of this

Court on the issue? and (3) Will there be a

disenfranchisement of the voters' will if the "EFREN
BAUTISTA" votes separately tallied are not counted as
votes for petitioner?
At the outset and initially setting aside all the
ramifications of the substantive issue of the instant
petition, the primordial concern of the Court is to verify
whether or not on the day of the election, there was
only one "Efren Bautista" as a validly registered
candidate as far as the electorate was concerned.
We find significant reference in the resolution of the
COMELEC dated April 10, 1998 declaring Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate, the ratio decidendi of
which reads as follows:
While Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code does
not explicitly provide for
grounds
to
declare
a
nuisance candidate, it states
clearly some tests, viz:
Sec.
69.
Nuisance
candidates.
The
Commission
may motu
proprio or upon
a
verified

petition of an
interested
party, refuse to
give due course
to or cancel a
certificate
of
candidacy, if it
shown that said
certificate has
been filed to
put the election
process
in
mockery
or
disrepute; or to
cause confusion
among
the
voters by the
similarity of the
names of the
registered
candidates; or
by
other
circumstances
or acts which
clearly
demonstrate
that
the
candidate has
no bona
fide intention to
run
for
the

office for which

the certificate
of
candidacy
has been field
and
thus
prevent
a
faithful
determination
of the true will
of
the
electorate.
In the present case, it has
been
established
that
respondent's
known
appellation or nickname is
not "Efren" as stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy, but
"Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo".
Two "EFRENS" and two
"BAUTISTAS" will necessarily
confuse the voters and
render worthless a vote for
an "Efren" or "Bautista"
during the appreciation of
ballots, thus preventing the
determination of the choice
and
true
will
of
the
electorate.
Respondent's
lack of financial means to
support a campaign as an
independent candidate is

manifested by his inability to

file his Income Tax Returns
for calendar years 1995 and
1996. This only amplifies the
fact that he has no bona
fide intention to run for the
position of municipal mayor
of Navotas, a municipality
with
104,601
registered
voters.
Respondent
has
not
demonstrated
any
accomplishment/achievemen
t in his twenty-six (26) years
of existence as a person that
would surely attract the
electorate to choose him as
their
representative
in
government. Elective public
officials
are
respected
leaders in the community.
Respondent has not shown
any.
This Commission as the
vanguard of the people in
the determination of the
chosen representative of the
electorate in government will
not be an instrument to
subvert that choice. The

circumstances in the case at

bar warrant that respondent
be declared a nuisance
candidate.

(pp. 28-29, Ro
Edwin Bautista moved for reconsideration on May 8,
1998. Unfortunately said motion was not resolved as of
election day. Technically, the April 30, 1998 decision
was not yet final as of May 11, 1998, and this
technicality created serious problems on election day.
As mentioned earlier, the name of Edwin Bautista was
initially not included in the list of candidates for mayor
of Navotas. Then on election day itself May 11, 1998,
Edwin Bautista's name was included in the certified list
of candidates. Later that same day, however, Edwin
Bautista's name was again stricken off the list.
To remedy the situation which was bound to affect
petitioner's candidacy, his counsel requested the
COMELEC that a directive be issued to all members of
the BEI of Navotas for the preparation of a separate
tally for all votes in favor of: "Efren Bautista", "Edwin
Bautista", "Efren", "Edwin", "E. Bautista", and
"Bautista". The request for the separate tally was said
to have been necessitated by the pendency of the
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Edwin
Bautista for being a nuisance candidate. Since the final
resolution of said petition was delayed due to the filing
of a motion for reconsideration, counsel for petitioner

stated that the basis must be laid down "for the

ultimate appreciation of all Bautista votes in favor of
petitioner," and the requested separate tally sheet
would "protect his substantial rights" as well as the will
of the electorate.
Consequently, as mentioned above, the Regional
Election Director of the National Capital Region
instructed the various boards of election inspectors to
tally separately either in some other portion of the
same election return not intended for the tallying of
votes for the candidates for mayor, or in a separate
sheet of paper, the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA",
"EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA". The then
COMELEC Chairman affirmed said directive in a
Memorandum to the Board of Canvassers of Navotas
for the purpose of counting the total stray votes.
An analysis of the foregoing incidents shows that the
separate tallies were made to remedy any prejudice
that may be caused by the inclusion of a potential
nuisance candidate in the Navotas mayoralty race.
Such inclusion was brought about by technicality,
specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which prevented the April 30, 1998
resolution disqualifying him from becoming final at
that time.
Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved
prior to election day. Its pendency on election day
exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the
inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to

be nuisance candidate. We have ruled that a nuisance

candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is
presented and filed to cause confusion among the
electorate by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidate or by other names which
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fideintention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1
[1970]).
It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a
ground for disqualification which clearly affects the
voters' will and causes confusion that frustrates the
same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to
protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the
will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be
observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in
the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in
favor of their validity (Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521
[1967]).
Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code sets forth that
the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if the
following situations are extant: (1) if it is shown that
said certificate has been filed to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute; (2) or if said
certificate was filed to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered

candidate; (3) or if there are other circumstances or

acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.
As discussed in the COMELEC's April 30, 1998 decision,
in accordance with Section 69, Edwin Bautista was
found to be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost,
he was running under the name of Edwin "Efren"
Bautista, when it had been established that he was
really known as "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo". Second,
the following circumstances saliently demonstrate that
he had no bona fide intention of running for the office
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: He is
said to be engaged in a "buy and sell" business, but
has no license therefor. He declared that he had a
monthly income of P10,000.00, but with expenses
totalling P9,000.00. He does not own any real property.
He did not file his income tax return for the years 1995
and 1996 and when asked why, he said he did not
have any net income and that he was only earning
enough to defray household expenses. He even
violated COMELEC rules since he failed to submit the
names of individuals who paid for his campaign
materials as well as the printing press he dealt with.
He did not have a political line-up and had no funds to
support his campaign expenses. He merely depended
on friends whose names he did not submit to the
COMELEC. And as straightforwardly found by the
COMELEC,
he
"has
not
demonstrated
any

accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26)

years of existence as a person that would surely
attract the electorate to choose him as their
representative in government."
In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had previously
held under his name Cipriano and appellation, "Efren"
Bautista, various elective positions, namely: Barangay
Captain of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor of
Navotas in 1970, and Vice-Mayor of Navotas in 1980.
He is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine
Engineer, and a member of various civic organizations
such as the Rotary Club of Navotas and the Philippine
Jaycees.
It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied
are not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman
Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected member of
the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed
the segregation of the votes for "Bautista", "Efren",
and "Efren Bautista", and "E. Bautista" into a separate
improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the
votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself validated the
separate tallies since they were meant to be used in
the canvassing later on to the actual number of votes
cast. These separate tallies actually made the will of
the electorate determinable despite the apparent
confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
What remained unsaid by the COMELEC Chairman was
the fact that as early as May 13, 1998, the COMELEC
had already spoken and stated its final position on the
issue of whether or not Edwin Bautista is a nuisance

candidate. It had already denied Edwin's motion for

reconsideration in its May 13, 1998 Order which reads:
Deliberating on the motion
for
reconsideration
of
respondent Edwin "Efren"
Bautista on the grounds
therein
stated,
the
Commission,
Second
Division,
maintains
its
resolution.
Commissioners
Manolo B. Gorospe, Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores and Evalyn
I. Fetalino concur with the
Second Division's resolution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED. This denial
is final.
SO ORDERED.

finally ruled as disqualified from the 1998 Navotas

mayoralty race? That is like saying one thing and doing
another. These are two incompatible acts the
contrariety and inconsistency of which are all too
obvious.
In this light, we now refer to the dispositive portion of
COMELEC's April 30, 1998 resolution, which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing,
respondent
EDWIN "EFREN" BAUTISTA is
hereby declared a NUISANCE
CANDIDATE,
and
consequently,
his
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
for the position of Municipal
Mayor of Navotas, Metro
Manila is hereby ordered
CANCELLED.

(pp. 29-30, Ro

(p. 54, Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give

rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
This important detail only shows that as of May 14,
However, since the aforestated ruling was not yet final
1998, when Chairman Pardo issued the aforestated
on election day, how then do we determine the will of
Memorandum, Edwin Bautista had already been finally
the electorate? Factual circumstances and logic dictate
declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC.
that the "Bautista" and "Efren" votes which were
And when Edwin Bautista elevated the matter to this
mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only one
Court, we upheld such declaration. How then can we
candidate, herein petitioner. Such votes, which
consider valid the votes for Edwin Bautista whom we
represent the voice of approximately 21,000 electors,

could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista,

allegedly known in Navotas as a mere tricycle driver
and worse, a drug addict, and satisfactorily and finally
shown as a candidate with no political line-up, no
personal funds that could have supported this own
campaign, and no accomplishments which may be
noted and considered by the public, as against a
known former public officer who had served the people
of Navotas as barangay official, councilor, and as vicemayor. To rule other wise will definitely result in the
disenfranchisement of the will of the electorate, which
is, as we mentioned, the situation that our election
laws are enacted to prevent.
Verily, Edwin Bautista got only 29 votes, while
petitioner under the very restrictive name Cipriano
"Efren" Bautista got 17,981 votes. To be sure, however,
there are 12,034 Bautista votes which have been
tallied but not credited to petitioner, and there are
8,982 Bautista votes which were not tallied and
credited to petitioner. These Bautista votes which total
21,016 could only have been meant for petitioner and
which added to the 17,981 votes he got as Cipriano
"Efren" Bautista would give him a grand aggregate of
38,997 votes.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of
determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar.
Significantly, it has also been established that by
virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of
notification, the voters were informed of the

COMELEC's decision to declare Edwin Bautista a

nuisance candidate.
From another angle, it is likewise improper and
strained to limit petitioner's votes to the ballots which
only indicate the name "Cipriano" when it is of public
knowledge that petitioner is also known by the
appellation and nickname "Efren" which he in fact
registered as his nickname.
As we said earlier, the instant petition is laden with an
issue which involves several ramifications. Matters
tend to get complicated when technical rules are
strictly applied. True it is, the disqualification of Edwin
Bautista was not yet final on election day. However, it
is also true that the electorate of Navotas was
informed of such disqualification. The voters had
constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action
of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a
candidate for mayor. Technicalities should not be
permitted to defeat the intention of the voter,
especially so if that intention is discoverable from the
ballot itself as in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed order of respondent
COMELEC dated May 28, 1998 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is likewise
directed to order the inclusion, as part of the valid
votes of petitioner, the following votes that were
separately tallied by the boards of election inspectors:

"EFREN BAUTISTA",
"BAUTISTA".

"EFREN",

"E.

BAUTISTA"

and

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pangnaniban, Quisumbing
and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under

the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
secretary-general,MOHAMMAD
OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO!

GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE
LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER
OF
REAL
ESTATE
BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION
and
others
under
"Organizations/Coalitions"
of
Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST
PEOPLE'S
COALITION;
LABAN
NG
DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO;
AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties"
of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.respondents.

PLANTERS;
JEEP;
and
ORGANIZATION, respondents.

BAGONG

BAYANI

PANGANIBAN, J.:

x---------------------------------------------------------x

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed

not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered
to participate directly in the enactment of laws
designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those which now dominate district elections,
to have the same opportunity to participate in partylist elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

The Case

BAYAN
MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS;
NATIONALIST
PEOPLE'S
COALITION
(NPC);
LABAN
NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;
LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA;
CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification
of private respondents, arguing mainly that the partylist system was intended to benefit the marginalized

and underrepresented; not the mainstream political

parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed

their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Factual Antecedents

The Comelec gave due course or approved the

Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which we quote:

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec

received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made
as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and
night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number
of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as
well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to
arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)
divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution
and individual resolution on political parties. These
numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release
of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were
promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations,
stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also
filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters,

having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate
in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system'
is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at
bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to
keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and
coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only
those who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed

before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names
of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the
'Certified
List
of
Political
Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and
that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the
said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and
that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April
11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed

before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the
Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions
before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before
noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral
Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec
may proceed with the counting and canvassing of
votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders
of the Court.

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the

respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 8

Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were

received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to
submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously
within a non-extendible period of five days. 15

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec,

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice. 11

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court

directed the parties to address the following issues:

Issues:

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is

proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties

participate in the party-list elections.

may

19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is

exclusive
to
'marginalized
and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity

of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it
allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge
may be brought before this Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed

grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases
should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated
in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as
specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both
petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there
are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor
General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification
or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was

promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule
13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had
filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on
that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time.
Subsequent events have proven the urgency of
petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not
yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a
resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the

rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has
been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding
the presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." 24Indeed, the instant
case is indubitably imbued with public interest and
with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the
composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover,
this
case
raises
transcendental
constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its
duty
to
"formulate
guiding
and
controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules."25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:

party-list system is the most objectionable portion of

the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow
political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact,
open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations."29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and
RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that
they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political
party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or

coalitions registered under the party-list system,
shall not be represented in the voters'

registration
boards,
boards
of
election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out
that the participants in the party-list system may "be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka,
or
a
regional
party
in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas
Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay
pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list
system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose
of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections
to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups
or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide,
have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they
were always third or fourth place in each of the

districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But

this way, they would have five or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list
system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a
party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x
x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." More to the point, the law defines "political
party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as
to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five
(5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the
major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute

twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision,
a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in
Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed,
he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to
our national history, by giving genuine power to our
people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not
self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases
like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided
by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite
the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941
was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall

promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become
Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of
promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,

1.
who
belong
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepresented,"
and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to
the number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed
group.
Rather,
it
refers
to
the
representation
of
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration
in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk,
urban
poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in

Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by

the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens
belonging
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to
the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that
only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress
under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine
power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x
x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be

represented
under the
party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of
persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president
or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral
party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
While
the
enumeration
of
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be

limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate

association. 38
The Party-List
Contentions

System

Desecrated

by

the

OSG

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the

Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No.
7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list
system to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party
or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of
RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park
or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list
elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We
stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the
party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory
policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit
of the party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar

disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast,
and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna PatajoKapunan42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a
group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters
could not join the party-list system as representatives
of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark
reality is that their economic clout engenders political
power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it
is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give
them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and
in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense,
the party-list system truly empowers the masses and

ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it

invites those marginalized and underrepresented in
the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban
poor, even those in the underground movement to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them
by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had
not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians
and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the
House of Representatives were set aside for the partylist system. In arguing that even those sectors who
normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for
the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec
disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the
chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives
through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows
that the system has been opened to those who have
never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore
need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so.
Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to

those who have long been within it -- those privileged

sectors that have long dominated the congressional
district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows
outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the
open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily,
allowing
the
non-marginalized
and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under
the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the
intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list
system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot
let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state
policy must permeate every discussion of the

qualification of political parties and other organizations

under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,
Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The
fundamental
principle
in
constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is
the language of the provision itself. The presumption is
that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails.
Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
true intent or purpose of the provision being
construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive
Secretary 48 that
"the
debates
and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary

the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is

clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of
value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument
the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the
party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding
and
implementing
party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law
first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous
should the use of extraneous aids of construction be
resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is
obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2
thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system
of electing congressional representatives was designed
to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The

criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is

no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations,
not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event,
the framers' deliberations merely express their
individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in
construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity
of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here.
Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be
applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest
that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary,
it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list
system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group, even the
non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the
Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down
by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and

quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as

they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In
its
Memorandum,
Petitioner
Bayan
Muna
passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of
the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD,
LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under
Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major
political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the "advantage
of
getting official
Comelec Election
Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x."
We note, however, that this accreditation does not
refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the
election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances,
however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154
previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a
trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence
and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that

respondents should first be given an opportunity to
show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the
case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are

expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens
belonging
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives." In other words, while they
are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko
and other similarly situated political parties admitted
as much during the Oral Argument, as the following
quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my
question. All I am saying is, the political party must
claim
to
represent
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x

In the event that a certain religious sect with

nationwide and even international networks of
members and supporters, in order to circumvent this
prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from wellestablished religious faiths, will that also not fall within
this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention
is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the
Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction." 54

prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect

as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;

The following discussion is also pertinent:

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed
"EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody
who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The
prohibition was explained by a member57 of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he
prohibition is on any religious organization registering
as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign

government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)

preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure
to comply with election laws and regulations. These
laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives." A party or
an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct
of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a
group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated
by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in
the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only
illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious
to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the

requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under
Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens
"who
belong
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the
urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To

allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give

genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a welldefined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district x x x."61

is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and

seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents
that the party-list system is, without any qualification,
open to all. Such position does not only weaken the
electoral
chances
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut
the substance of the party-list system. Instead of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.

Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of
the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the
fundamental social justice principle that those who
have less in life should have more in law. The party-list
system is one such tool intended to benefit those who
have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a
message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even
to those in the underground, that change is possible. It

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the

party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941
are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on
the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could
not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec,
which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of
the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last partylist elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its
hearings for the parties and organizations that appear
to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify
for seats in the House of Representatives. The

Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its

compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001,
directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain
in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the
Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. No. 166229. June 29, 2005]

MS.

BAIRANSALAM LAUT LUCMAN, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
MOSAMA M. PANDI, respondents.

DECISION

SO ORDERED.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and

Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J., in
the
result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

Petitioner Bairansalam Laut Lucman and private

respondent Mosama M. Pandi were mayoralty
candidates in Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, during
the May 10, 2004 elections.
During the canvassing of votes, private respondent
objected to the inclusion of ten election returns,
although only six of these are subjects of the present
controversy, to wit:[1]
Precinct Number

1A

Election
Number
01201094

Returns

Objection/s

1) The election ret

obviously manufa
and/or falsified
2) It is not authent

1B/C

01201091

3A

01201095

8A

01201093

force, threat and intimidation were employed on the

3) It contains
alterations
voters,
double voting, substitution of voters, snatching
of
ballots,
padding of ballots and existence of flying
1) Obviously manufactured
[4]
voters. Private respondent also contended that the
contested election returns should have been excluded
from the canvass, and that the Board was precipitate
in proclaiming
1)
Obviously petitioner as the winning candidate, as
private
respondent has manifested on record that he is
manufactured
intending to appeal the Boards ruling. [5] Private
2) Incomplete
respondent admits that the exclusion of the contested
1)
Obviously
returns
is a ground for election protest, but he also
manufactured
and/or
argues that
the COMELEC may go beyond the face of
falsified
the returns to determine whether the elections in the
precincts involved are a sham.
2) Incomplete

also filed a motion to annul

1) The electionPrivate
returnsrespondent
is
proclamation
and/or
to
suspend the effects of
obviously manufactured
proclamation pendente lite.[6]
2) It is incomplete, it
filed his Comment and/or Answer to the
lacks statistical Petitioner
data
appeal, arguing that the grounds relied upon by
private
respondent are not proper in a pre1)
Obviously
14A/14B
01201096
proclamation controversy but in an election protest.
manufactured
Petitioner also argues that her proclamation is valid;
the petition is defective for failure to include
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (Board)
indispensable parties; and that private respondent
overruled private respondents objections on the
[2]
failed to inform the Board that he is appealing its
disputed returns, and proclaimed petitioner as the
ruling, as required by Section 20 of Republic Act No.
winning candidate, as shown in the Certificate of
7166, or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1991.[7]
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
8B/8C

01201106

Candidates for Municipal Offices, signed on May 19,

2004.[3] Petitioner won over private respondent by a
margin of 16 votes.
Private respondent filed with Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) an appeal from the ruling of the
Board, docketed as SPC 04-184, alleging massive fraud
and irregularities in the conduct of the elections, e.g.,

On June 16, 2004, a hearing on the appeal was

held, wherein counsel for petitioner and private
respondent, and several Board of Election Inspectors of
Poona-Bayabao appeared, and Ms. Monera P.
Macadato, Poll Clerk of Precinct 3A was called to the
witness stand.[8] Presiding Commissioner Resurreccion
Z. Borra, for the First Division, then issued an order on

the same date, requiring the parties to submit their

simultaneous memoranda.[9]
On September 30, 2004, the COMELECs First
Division issued the assailed order, with the following
dispositive portion:
In order therefore to resolve the issues raised in this
Appeal the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) hereby
ORDERS the document examiners of the Commission
on Elections to conduct an examination of the List of
Voters with Voting Record of the precincts involved in
this case as well as the VRRs pertaining to the
contested
precincts
in
the
Municipality
of
Poonabayabao to determine whether or not actual
voting by the duly registered voters of said precincts
were conducted during the elections of May 10, 2004;
Considering that we have annulled the proclamation of
BAIRAMSALAM (sic) LAUT LUCMAN as duly elected
mayor of Poonabayabao, Lanao del Sur, it is hereby
ordered that the Vice-Mayor of said Municipality
assumed (sic) the position pursuant to the provisions
of the Local Government Code, until the final
resolution of this petition.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano dissented to
the majority opinion on the ground that the petition
involves issues proper to an election protest and not a
pre-proclamation controversy.[11]
Petitioner moved to reconsider the assailed Order,
and in an Order dated October 13, 2004,
Commissioner Borra ordered and certified the motion
for reconsideration to the Commission en banc.

[12]

Thereafter, the Commission en banc, in an Order

dated October 14, 2004, issued a temporary
restraining order and a status quo ante order, directing
the parties to maintain the status prevailing before the
issuance of the September 30, 2004 Resolution.
On December 14, 2004, the COMELEC en banc
issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioners
motion for lack of merit.[13] The dispositive portion of
said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission
(en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY
the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The
Order of the Commission (First Division) dated 30
September 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, in
implementation of the directive therein, the document
examiners of the Commission on Elections are hereby
ordered to conduct an examination of the List of Voters
with Voting Record of the precincts involved in this
case as well as the VRRs pertaining to the contested
precincts in the Municipality of Poonabayabao to
determine whether or not actual voting by the duly
registered voters of said precincts were conducted
during the elections of May 10, 2004, and thereafter
submit a report thereon.
The
Temporary
Restraining
Order/Status
Quo
Ante Order dated 14 October 2004 is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On December 17, 2004, Commissioner Mehol
Sadain issued a Constancia protesting his lack of
participation in the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner
Sadain stated that although he was out on official

business at the time the Resolution was routed to his

office, he should have been allowed to vote thereon, or
at least, informed of the urgency of its promulgation so
that he may cast his vote or allow its promulgation
without his signature.[15]
Petitioner then filed the present special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order/preliminary
injunction, based on the following grounds:

Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines

a pre-proclamation controversy as any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board
of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT, IN EXCESS OR

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ANNULLING
THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER.

Under Section 243 of the same Code, the issues

that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy,
are as follows:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OR WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
DOCUMENT EXAMINERS TO EXAMINE THE LIST OF
VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS AND THE VRRs.

SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy. - The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT, IN EXCESS OR

WITH GRAVE OF DISCRETION (sic) IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL WITHOUT THE
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IMPLEADED AND WITHOUT
THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 20, RA
7166 COMPLIED.

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of

canvassers;

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION

IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE CHALLENGED INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2004.[16]
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the appeal
from the Board of Canvassers to the COMELEC (First
Division) interjected by private respondent makes a
case for a pre-proclamation controversy.

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete,

contain material defects, appear to be tampered with
or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies thereof as
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this
Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the

results of which materially affected the standing of the

aggrieved candidate or candidates.
The foregoing
exclusive.[17]

enumeration

is

restrictive

and

In the present case, the objections initially raised

by private respondent before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation
controversy, i.e., the election returns is obviously
manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it
contains alterations. However, in his appeal to the
COMELEC, he further alleged that the elections held in
the precincts clustered in the Pooni Lomabao Central
Elementary were tainted with massive election
irregularities. According to private respondent, there
were massive substitution of voters, snatching of
ballots from the voters by people identified with the
Lucman who filled them up against the will of the
voters, force or coercion, threats, intimidation, casting
of votes by double registrants in the same precincts
(double entry), and flying voters [18] Private respondent
also alleged that the counting of votes on May 11,
2004, were not prepared simultaneously with the
appreciation of the ballots/counting of votes, in
violation of Section 44 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6667 (March 16, 2004). Also, private respondents
watchers were threatened by petitioners watchers,
forcing them to leave the counting room, and that the
Board of Election Inspectors merely copied the entries
on the tally boards and records of votes made by
petitioners watchers. Finally, private respondent
alleged that the denial to his objections to the
contested election returns were not made by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers in the prescribed form,
and that despite his manifestation that he will appeal

the Boards ruling on the returns, it proceeded with

petitioners proclamation.[19]
Obviously, the foregoing allegations pertain not
only to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of the election returns, but to the
conduct of the elections as well.
Pre-proclamation controversies are limited to
challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers
and proceedings before said Board relating to
particular election returns to which private respondent
should have made specific verbal objections
subsequently reduced to writing. A pre-proclamation
controversy is limited to an examination of the election
returns on their face. As a rule, the COMELEC is limited
to an examination of the election returns on their face.
[20]
It is beyond the COMELECs jurisdiction to go beyond
the face of the returns or investigate election
irregularities.[21]
The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy
are
summary
in
nature.[22] Reception
of
evidence aliunde, such as the List of Voters with Voting
Record and the VRRs, is proscribed. [23] Issues such as
fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process,
the resolution of which would compel or necessitate
the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns
which appear to be prima facie regular, on their face,
are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. Such
issues should be posed and resolved in a regular
election protest, which is within the original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). [24] In a regular
election protest, the parties may litigate all the legal
and factual issues raised by them inasmuch detail as
they may deem necessary or appropriate.[25]
In Macabago vs. COMELEC,[26] the Court reiterated:

That the padding of the List of Voters may constitute

fraud, or that the Board of Election Inspectors may
have fraudulently conspired in its preparation, would
not be a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy
either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are
asserted, the proper course of action is an election
protest.
Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism
are proper grounds in an election contest but may not
as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and
to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate
through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a relative few.
Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the
resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters,
for the losers will always cry fraud and terrorism (GAD
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA
665).
Hence, as correctly argued by petitioner, private
respondents cause of action before the COMELEC is
proper for an election protest and not a preproclamation
controversy,
and
the
COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
private respondents petition/appeal. Consequently, all
subsequent actions by the COMELEC in relation to
private respondents appeal are null and void, and
correctible by the present special civil action
for certiorari.

Following the disposition of the Court in Macabago

vs. COMELEC,[27] the dismissal of private respondents
petition/appeal before the COMELEC is without
prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest
before the proper RTC, the period for the filing of which
is deemed suspended by the filing of private
respondents petition/appeal.
In light of the foregoing ruling, the Court need not
delve on the other issues posed by petitioner as these
necessarily
have
been
rendered
moot
and
academic[28] thereby.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Order dated September 30, 2004 of the First
Division and Resolution En Banc dated December 14,
2004 are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Private respondents appeal to the First Division and
the appeal to the COMELEC En Banc are DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the filing of a regular election
protest, the period for the filing of which is deemed
suspended by the filing of the petition before the
COMELEC until the finality of herein decision.
The proclamation of petitioner by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers is maintained and petitioner
should be allowed to assume her office as mayor of
Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

banc. Petitioner primarily contends that the COMELEC

en banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering
the exclusion from canvass of the election returns from
nine
precincts
in
the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Province of Maguindan
ao, in connection with the May 14, 2001 elections.

The Antecedents

[G.R. Nos. 154442-47. December 10, 2003]

SALIPONGAN L.
DAGLOC, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
BAI
SUSAN A. SAMAD and KENNEDY P.
DILANGALEN, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification
of the resolution[1] dated July 18, 2002 of the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
en

During the May 14, 2001 elections, Bai Susan A.

Samad (Samad), Salipongan I. Dagloc (Dagloc) and
Kennedy Dilangalen (Dilangalen) were among the
mayoralty
candidates
in
the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Province of Maguindan
ao.[2]
During the canvassing of the election returns for
the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Samad, Dagloc and
Dilangalen filed their respective objections and
oppositions to the inclusion or exclusion from the
canvass of certain election returns from several
precincts.[3]
Samad contested the inclusion of the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A and
33B, all of Brgy. Bagumbayan, on the grounds that: (a)
the returns were tampered and falsified, and (b) the
returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion
and intimidation.[4]
In its rulings dated May 23 and May 26, 2001, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kabuntalan (the
Board) dismissed Samads petitions to exclude the said
election returns because she failed to submit evidence

within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of her

objection. On June 1 and 5, 2001, Samad appealed
from said rulings of the Board before the
COMELEC, and her appeal was docketed as SPC 01341 and SPC 01-342, respectively. [5]
On the other hand, Dagloc questioned the
inclusion of the election returns from Precinct Nos.
78A/79A, 80A/81A and 82A on the ground that the
returns were manufactured or spurious because the
counting of the votes and the preparation of the said
election returns were conducted in a privately-owned
house which was under the control of a barangay
chairman, who was an alleged ally and political
supporter of Samad. Dagloc also opposed the
exclusion of the election returns from Precinct Nos.
58A/59A, 70A, 71A, 83A and 84A[6] on the ground
that said returns appeared regular on their face and
the alleged irregularities were done during the voting.
Dagloc further stated that the COMELEC authorized
the voting in Precinct Nos. 78A/79A, 80A/81A, 82A,
58A/59A, 70A, 71A, 83A and 84A to be conducted in
the gymnasium of the 6th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army, Awang, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao. [7]
The Board, in resolving the objections and
oppositions filed by Dagloc, ruled to include in the
canvassing the election returns from Precinct Nos.
78A/79A, 80A/81A and 82A, and granted Samads
petitions to exclude the returns from Precinct Nos.
58A/59A, 70A, 71A, 83A and 84A. On June 7, 2001,
Dagloc appealed from the said rulings of the Board
with the COMELEC, and his appeal was docketed as
SPC 01-282.[8]
Dilangalen also filed several petitions to exclude
from the canvassing the election returns from Precinct

Nos. 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B/3B, 3A, 5A/6A, 17A, 31A, 31B,
32A/32B, 33A/33B, 34A/35A, 36A/37A, 38A, 45B/46A,
70A, 71A, 78A/79B, 80A/81A and 82A based on any of
the following grounds:
(a) The returns were prepared under duress,
threats and intimidation;
(b) The returns were manufactured and
falsified and they contained erasures,
mistakes,
manifest
errors
and
superimpositions in figures and in words;
(c) The election returns lacked material data;
(d) Terrorism
and
election
irregularities
transpired during the casting of votes;
and
(e) Statistical improbability of the results of the
elections.[9]
Dilangalen alleged that the Board dismissed his
petitions and included the contested returns in the
canvassing. Hence, on June 12, 2001, he filed a preproclamation case before the COMELEC, docketed as
SPC No. 01-285.[10]
On June 13, 2001, Dagloc filed a Petition to Annul
Falsified Proclamation and to Suspend the Effects of
Falsified Proclamation, docketed as SPC 01-291. Dagloc
alleged that on June 7, 2001, while the tabulation of
the election returns was still in progress, the Board,
consisting of Chairman Dionisio Linaban and MemberSecretary Andaman Samud proclaimed Bai Susan A.
Samad as mayor, Datu Nasser H. Ali as vice-mayor,

and Monambai (sic) Diocalano, Brahim Mokamad, H.

Sittie Tula, Lincoln Radzak, Zainadun Kabulan, H. Faisal
Pendi, Almada Pidzakal and H. Rouf Adbulrakman as
members of the Sangguniang Bayan (Samad, et al.).[11]
Further, Dagloc maintained that the Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for
Municipal Offices (CEF No. 25) with Serial No. 8692104,
used by the Board, was not valid because: (1) the
signature of Samud was allegedly obtained by force by
two men who blocked his way on June 6, 2001 at
around 10:10 p.m.; and (2) Linaban was absent during
the purported proclamation. Dagloc thus prayed for
the annulment of the proclamation of Samad, et al.[12]
On June 18, 2001, Samad, et al. filed a petition
before the COMELEC, docketed as SPC 01-310, alleging
that on June 8, 2001, members of the Board, namely,
Vice-Chairman Usman D. Zailon and Member-Secretary
Andaman K. Samud proclaimed Datu Salipongan L.
Dagloc as mayor, Datu Mohidin S. Lauban as vicemayor, and Amnambai Diocolano, H. Sittie Tula,
Fhamie Dumaba, H. Brahim Mokamad and Lincoln M.
Radzak
as
members
of
the Sangguniang
Bayan (Dagloc, et
al.). Said
proclamation
was
evidenced by CEF No. 25 with Serial No.
8692109. Samad, et al. contended that the second
proclamation was a nullity based on the following
grounds:
(a) The second proclamation was made without
notice and hearing;
(b) The second proclamation cannot annul the
first proclamation;

(c) The signature of Andamen K. Samud in the

second
proclamation
was
obtained
through intimidation by the armed men of
Dagloc; and
(d) The second proclamation is void for there
were only five (5) councilors who were
proclaimed.[13]
The COMELEC consolidated the aforementioned six
cases filed by Dagloc, Samad, Samad, et al., and
Dilangalen.
In
its
resolution
dated May
29,
2002,
the COMELEC, Second Division (Second Division),
clarified that the contested returns refer to the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B/3B, 3A,
5A/6A, 17A, 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 34A/35A,
36A/37A, 38A, e45A/46B, 45B/46A, 58A/59A, 70A, 71A,
72A, 78A/79B, 80A/81A, 82A, 83A and 84A. [14]
The Second Division found that some of the
grounds relied upon by the petitioners, i.e, tampered,
falsified, manufactured or spurious returns, returns
prepared under duress, threats, coercion, etc., were
proper issues for a pre-proclamation controversy under
subsections (b) and (c) of Section 243 [15] of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Second Division, however,
stated that objections to the inclusion of the election
returns should not be immediately accorded weight
absent any showing that on the face thereof, there are
patent irregularities. It took into consideration the
doctrine that as long as the returns appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the
Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind
them to verify allegations of irregularities in the
casting or counting of votes.[16]

The Second Division noted that based on the

written rulings of the Linaban Board, the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B and
33A/33B and 45A (should have been Precinct Nos. 70A,
71A, 83A and 84A) were excluded because of alleged
election irregularities perpetrated by some members
of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and the
disqualification of some members thereof as
evidenced by purported affidavits executed by Usman.
[17]

The Second Division, however, resolved to include

the returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B and
33A/33B (should have been Precinct Nos. 70A, 71A,
83A and 84A) in the canvass on the following grounds:
a) The contested election returns contained no
sign of any tampering or alteration,
affecting the standing of the candidates;
they are prima facie regular on their face;
b) The alleged irregularities occurred in the BEI
level. Pre-proclamation controversies are
limited to challenges directed against the
Board of Canvassers and the proceedings
thereof and not challenges with respect to
proceedings before the Board of Election
Inspectors or its composition.
c) The grounds raised compel the COMELEC to
pierce the veil of election returns, which,
as adverted to, are not proper issues for
pre-proclamation controversies. A party
seeking to raise issues the resolution of
which would necessitate the COMELEC to
pierce the veil of election returns that

are prima facie regular on their face has

his proper remedy in an election protest
case.[18]
With respect to the other grounds raised to support
the exclusion of the contested returns, the Second
Division made the following findings:
1. Election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A,
32A/32B,
36A/37A,
45A/46B,
70A,
80A/81A and 82A There is no entry on the
space provided for Data on Voters and
Ballots. Such omission, however, does not
invalidate the election returns. The defect
does not, in any way, affect the results of
the elections.
2. Election Returns from Precinct Nos. 5A/6A,
38A and 71AThere were erasures in the
votes of some candidates in figures and in
words. Nevertheless, the said election
returns must be included applying the
aforecited Section 30 of COMELEC
Resolution 3848.
3. Election Returns from Precinct Nos. 2B/3B,
31B, 34A/35A, 45B/46A, 78A/79A and 83A
-- There are superimpositions or erasures
but they were countersigned and were
just obviously made to correct clerical
errors.
We also resolve to include election returns from
Precinct Nos. 1A/1B, 2A, 3A, 17A, 58A/59A, 72A and
84A on the ground that they are perfectly regular on
their face.[19]

Moreover, the Second Division declared the first

proclamation of Samad, et al. and the subsequent
proclamation of Dagloc, et al. to be illegal.
The COMELEC,
judgment, thus:

Second

Division,

pronounced

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

COMMISSION RESOLVE, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to INVALIDATE (1) the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Local Positions
(CEF No. 25) with Serial No. 8692104 certifying to the
proclamation of Samad, et al. and (2) the Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for
Local Positions (CEF NO. 25) with Serial No. 8692109
certifying to the proclamation of Dagloc, et al.
ACCORDINGLY, We:
(1) ORDER
the
CONSTITUTION of
a SPECIAL
BOARD
OF
CANVASSERS composed of COMELEC
lawyers to be appointed by the
Commission;
(2) DIRECT THE
Municipal
Board
of
Canvassers
of
Kabuntalan
to DELIVER to Election Records and
Statistics
Department
(ERSD),
COMELEC, Manila, all the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 17A,
45B/46A, 58A/59A, 70A, 71A, 72A,
78A/79A, 80A/81A, 82A, 83A, 84A,
45A/46B, 31A, 31B, 32A/32B and
33A/33B, as well as the election records
and documents pertaining to these
cases; and

(3) ORDER the Special Board of Canvassers

to:
(i) immediately RECONVENE upon
receipt of said election returns and
after serving proper notice to all
the parties concerned;
(ii) COMPLETE the CANVASS by
including the results in Precinct
Nos. 17A, 45B/46A, 58A/59A, 70A,
71A, 72A, 78A/79A, 80A/81A, 82A,
83A, 84A, 45A/46B, 31A, 31B,
32A/32B and 33A/33B; and
(iii) Thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning
candidates
for
the
position
of MAYOR, VICE-MAYOR and ME
MBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN of
the Municipality of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao.
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao and
the
Election
Officer
of
Kabuntalan
are
hereby DIRECTED to COORDINATE with
the
local
police or members of the Armed forces of
the Philippines to ensure that the integrity of the ballot
boxes containing the contested election returns and
other election records is not violated.
The Urgent Motion for Handwriting Examination filed
by petitioner DAGLOC is hereby DENIED.
The Law Department is
immediately INVESTIGATE

hereby

directed

to
EO

DIONISIO LINABANs questionable act of leaving the

canvassing venue without notice and authority from
this Commission during the canvassing on June 7-8,
2001 and to PROSECUTE him upon finding of
probable cause.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
for implementation and for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Presiding
Commissioner
Ralph
C.
Lantion
[21]
dissented
from the resolution of the Second Division
and voted to exclude from the canvass the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B,
33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A.
On June 3, 2002, Samad seasonably filed a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC,
Second Division, relying mainly on the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Lantion. It appears that
Dilangalen filed, out of time, [22] his motion for
reconsideration on July 2, 2002.
On July 18, 2002, the COMELEC en banc resolved
Samads motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en
banc agreed with the resolution of the Second Division
that the consolidated cases were pre-proclamation
controversies since some of the grounds (i.e.,
tampered, falsified, manufactured or spurious returns,
returns prepared under duress, threats, coercion, etc.)
were proper issues for a pre-proclamation controversy
under subsections (b) and (c) of Section 243 [23] of the
Omnibus Election Code. It ruled that the Second
Division correctly annulled the proclamation of Samad
and Dagloc as the duly elected mayor of

the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao pursuant

to Section 20 (i)[24] of Republic Act No. 7166.[25]
The COMELEC en banc held that the only issue to
be resolved was the propriety of the inclusion or
exclusion of the contested returns, taking into account
the contradicting conclusions of the two members of
the Second Division and its Presiding Commissioner. It
noted that if all the election returns were canvassed,
Dagloc would win by a plurality of votes. But if the
election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B,
33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A were excluded
from the canvass, as ruled in the dissenting opinion,
Samad would win.[26]
The COMELEC en banc held that after a careful
study of the evidence on record, it found that only the
election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B,
33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A remain to be
proper subjects for review as the grounds relied upon
to exclude the other contested returns were
appropriate in a regular election protest.[27]
The COMELEC en banc sustained the findings in
the dissenting opinion of the Presiding Commissioner
of the Second Division, and excluded from the canvass
the election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B,
32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A
(hereinafter,
the
nine
election
returns). The
COMELEC en banc anchored the exclusion of the nine
election returns on the manner of their preparation,
which it found to be sham. The COMELEC en banc held
that the votes reported in the nine election returns do
not reflect the true will of the electorate. It added
that this conclusion was strengthened by the fact that
in the supposed affidavit of the BEI members
of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, which was attached by

Dagloc in his appeal in SPC 01-282 to prove the

regularity of the exercise of the BEIs assigned task,
only one member of the BEI from Precinct No. 70A,
Sandatu Kamson, signed said affidavit, while
no member of the BEI from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B,
32A/32B, 33A/33B, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A signed it.[28]
The
thus:

COMELEC

en

banc pronounced

judgment,

WHEREFORE, the proclamation of both Datu

Salipongan Dagloc and Bai Susan Samad as municipal
mayor
of
Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao
is
hereby ANNULLED. Furthermore, a New Municipal
Board of Canvassers is hereby constituted, to be
composed of Comelec lawyers, mandated to canvass
the valid election returns in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao,
taking into consideration the above observations in
Election Returns No. 69090014, 69090021, 69090036,
69090044,
69090045,
69090046,
69090056,
69090061, 69090062, 69090067, and 69090069, from
Precinct Nos. 17A, 25A/26A, 45A, 56A/57A, 58A/59A,
60A, 73A/74A, 80A/81A, 82A, 89A, and 91A,
respectively, in the proper appreciation of votes of the
contending
mayoralty
candidates,
and EXCLUDING therefrom the election returns from
Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A,
72A, 83A, and 84A, in accordance with the foregoing
disquisition, and on the basis thereof proclaim the
winning local candidates in the May 14, 2001 National
and Local Elections.
Furthermore, the Law Department is hereby directed to
investigate, and if necessary, prosecute upon finding
of probable cause: (1) the Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
and Member-Secretary of the Municipal Board of

Canvassers
of
Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao
for
apparently being partisan by favoring certain local
candidates; and (2) the members of the BEIs in
Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A,
72A, 83A, and 84A, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.[29]
On August 15, 2002, Dagloc filed this instant
petition for certiorari, raising the following issues:
1. The respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the
questioned PER
CURIAM Resolution
ordering the EXCLUSION of the nine (9)
election returns based on objections
which are not proper for pre-proclamation
controversies.
2. The respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the
questioned PER
CURIAM Resolution
ordering the EXCLUSION of the nine (9)
election returns without clear and
convincing evidence of fraud and other
election irregularities.
3. The respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing
SPC No. 01-342 for failure to comply with
the mandatory procedure provided in

Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 38 of

Comelec Resolution No. 3848.[30]
On August 26, 2002, petitioner filed a Most Urgent
Motion and Plea Reiterating the Previous Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, [31] which
was denied by the Court for lack of merit. [32]
On September 3, 2002, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Kabuntalan proclaimed Bai Susan A.
Samad
as
the
duly
elected
mayor
of
the Municipality of Kabuntalan,[33] having obtained the
highest number of votes. On the same date, Samad
took her oath of office,[34] and thereafter assumed
office.[35]
On September 16, 2002, respondent Dilangalen
filed a Motion to Issue a Status Quo Order as of the
Filing of the Petition and/or Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the Respondent
Samad from Assuming and/or Performing the Functions
of Mayor[36], which was also denied by the Court for
lack of merit.[37]

On September 16, 2002, Mohidin S. Lauban, a

party mate of petitioner Dagloc and a candidate for
vice-mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections in
the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, filed a
motion for leave to intervene and a petition-inintervention. Lauban alleged that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction for: (1) failing to notify
him about the proceedings in the consolidated cases
including SPC No. 01-310, and thereafter annulling his
proclamation in violation of his right to due process;
and (2) ordering the exclusion of the nine election
returns grounded on objections which were improper
for a pre-proclamation controversy.
On October 1, 2002, the Court resolved to grant
Laubans motion and required respondents to comment
on Laubans petition-in-intervention.[38]
Finally, in her Comment [39] to Daglocs petition
for certiorari,
respondent
Samad
averred
that
on September 13, 2002, Dagloc filed an Election
Protest Ad
Cautelam before
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, which is still
pending with the said court.

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: The existence of grounds for a preproclamation controversy

Petitioner
avers
that
the
COMELEC
en
banc excluded the election returns from Precinct Nos.
70A, 71A, 83A and 84A for being spurious due to the

following reasons (as quoted from the dissenting

opinion of Commissioner Lantion): (1) the alleged
disqualification of some members of the BEI in said
precincts; and (2) the Board found that the same
members of the BEI were the ones who committed
illegal acts, such that the votes reported in the subject
returns do not reflect the true will of the electorate.
Petitioner states that the COMELEC also excluded
the election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B,
32A/32B and 33A/33B for the same reasons advanced
in excluding the election returns from Precinct Nos.
70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A.According to petitioner,
the COMELEC made said conclusion by relying solely
on the averments of respondent Samad in SPC No. 01341 and SPC No. 01-3342, thus:
In SPC No. 01-341 and SPC No. 01-342, Bai Susan
Samad questions the inclusion of the election returns
in Precincts No. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B. [She]
avers that they are tampered or falsified and
prepared under duress, threats, coercion and
intimidation. An eyewitness and official watcher in
Precinct No. 31A, Deduzman Lakim, stated in his
affidavit dated May 19, 2001 that on May 14, 2001,
Salipongan Dagloc approached him and said that he
(Lakim) will be killed after the election. Consequently,
Lakim and his co-watchers, namely: Amera Lakim, Asis
Abdulla, and Tuansi Sandiale, who were assigned at
Precincts No. 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, respectively,
failed to report because they were afraid they will be
killed by Dagloc. Lakim narrated that the ballots in
said contested precincts were openly tampered
and falsified by Daglocs supporters. So that the
counting of votes were based on tampered and
falsified ballots which, in turn, were the bases

reflected on the election return.[40] x x x (Emphasis

supplied by petitioner Dagloc.)
Petitioner contends that the aforementioned
reasons advanced by the COMELEC for the exclusion of
the nine election returns are not proper issues in a preproclamation controversy. Citing Patoray v. Comelec,
[41]
petitioner contends that under the Omnibus
Election Code, pre-proclamation controversies are
limited to: (1) challenges directed against the
composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers
(not
the
board
of
election
inspectors), or (2) challenges related to election
returns to which a party must have made specific
objections. (Emphasis supplied by petitioner Dagloc.)
Following
the
arguments
of
Commissioner
Resurreccion Z. Borra in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
petitioner contends that the Second Division in its
Resolution found that the contested returns contained
no tampering or alteration affecting the standing of
the candidates and that they were prima facie regular
on their face; hence, the Second Division included said
returns in the canvass. Petitioner asserts that this is in
accordance with the Courts ruling in Matalam v.
COMELEC, [42] that [i]n the absence of a strong
evidence establishing spuriousness of the returns, the
basic rule that election returns shall be accorded prima
facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the
counts of votes for canvassing and proclamation
purposes must perforce prevail. Petitioner also
cited Loong v. COMELEC,[43] where the Court held:
The policy consideration underlying the delimitation of
both substantive ground and legal procedure is the

policy to determine as quickly as possible the result of

the election on the basis of the canvass. x x x The
prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction, therefore, is that
as long as the returns appear to be authentic, and duly
accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers
cannot look beyond or behind them to verify
allegations of irregularities in the casting and counting
of the votes.
Petitioner thus contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding the nine
election returns because of alleged disqualification of
some members of the BEI and alleged irregularities
perpetrated by said members, which are not proper
issues in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Section
provides:

243

of

the

Omnibus

Election

Code

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy.-- the following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the
board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are
incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified,
or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies
thereof as mentioned in Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under

duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation,
or they are obviously manufactured or not
authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted
polling
places
were
canvassed, the results of which materially
affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive.[44]
Admittedly, the COMELEC en banc ordered the
exclusion of the nine election returns from the canvass
considering partly the reasons aforecited by
petitioner. Petitioner, however, omitted to mention the
fact that the COMELEC en banc also gave great weight
to the affidavit of the BEI members assigned in
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, which was attached by
Dagloc in his appeal in SPC 01-282 to prove the
supposed regularity of the exercise of the BEIs
assigned task. The COMELEC en banc held:
We cannot just close our eyes and include in the
canvass the subject returns, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that the votes reported in the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B,
33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A, and 84A do not reflect
the true will of the electorate. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that in the supposed affidavit
of the BEI members, who were assigned in the
different precincts in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao,
attached by Dagloc in his appeal in SPC 01-282 to
prove the supposed regularity of the exercise of the
BEIs assigned task, there were no affiants in

Precincts Nos. 83A and 84A; whereas only one member

of the BEI in Precinct Nos. 71A and 72A was named, to
wit: Rosalinda Kimbuan and 1Lt. Juan Gullem,
respectively, but both did not sign said affidavit; and
only one member of the BEI in Precinct No. 70A,
Sandatu Kamson, signed said affidavit. Moreover, no
member of the BEIs in Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B,
32A/32B, and 33A/33B signed said affidavit. Neither
[were] their [names] even mentioned in it. [45]
All the circumstances, taken as a whole, made the
COMELEC en banc conclude that the election returns
from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A,
71A, 72A, 83A and 84A were spurious.
The case of Patoray v. Comelec, as cited by
petitioner, is not in point. To reiterate, in said case, the
Court stated that under the Omnibus Election Code,
pre-proclamation controversies are limited to: (1)
challenges directed against thecomposition
or
proceedings of the board of canvassers (not the
board of election inspectors), or (2) challenges
related to election returns to which a party must
have made specific objections. The private respondent
therein objected to two returns on the ground that the
election returns are manufactured, fabricated or not
authentic, considering that the election returns
includes votes on ballots which are spurious, marked
and invalid ballots. In said case, the Court held that
the municipal board of canvassers correctly ruled that
private respondents objections were not proper in a
proclamation controversy since the objection, as
worded, did not challenge the returns, but was
directed primarily at the ballots reflected in the returns
(emphasis supplied). Hence, the Court ruled, [i]t is
settled that issues relative to the appreciation of

ballots cannot be raised in a proclamation

controversy. Appreciation of ballots is the task of the
board of election inspectors, not the board of
canvassers, and questions related thereto are proper
only in election protests.
In this case, what Samad contested was the
inclusion of the election returns from Precinct Nos.
31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A and 33B on the ground that
these were tampered or falsified and were prepared
under duress, threats, coercion and intimidation, which
are proper issues for a pre-proclamation controversy
under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Board dismissed Samads
petitions; hence, Samad appealed to the COMELEC.
The resolution of the Second Division shows that
Samad also sought the exclusion of the election
returns from Precinct Nos. 70A, 71A, 83A and 84A, but
the ground for her objection does not appear on
record. The Board granted the petition of Samad to
exclude said returns; hence, Dagloc appealed from the
Boards ruling before the COMELEC. Evidently, the preproclamation cases filed by Samad fall under the
second category adverted to in Patoray v. Comelec,
that is, (2) challenges related to election returns to
which a party must have made specific objections.
Moreover, the COMELEC en bancs findings on the
nine election returns are anchored on the manner of
their preparation, which it found to be a sham. The
COMELEC correctly held that said ground is a preproclamation issue, citing Sections 241 and 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 235 of
the same Code, thus:
Sec. 241. Definition.-- A pre-proclamation controversy
refers to any question pertaining to x x x any matter

raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in

relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns.
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy. -- The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) When
substitute
or fraudulent
returns in controverted polling
places were canvassed, the results
of which materially affected the
standing
of
the
aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
Sec. 235. When election returns appear to be
tampered with or falsified.If the election returns
submitted to the board of canvassers appear to be x x
x x prepared by persons other than the member of the
board of election inspectors, the board of canvassers
shall use the other copies of said election returns and,
if necessary, the copy inside the ballot box which upon
previous authority given by the Commission may be
retrieved in accordance with Section 220 hereof. If the
other copies of the returns are likewise x x x x
prepared by persons other than the members of the
board of election inspectors, the board of canvassers
or any candidate affected shall bring the matter to the
attention of the Commission. The Commission shall
then, after giving notice to all candidates concerned
and after satisfying itself that nothing in the ballot box
indicate that its identity and integrity have been
violated, order the opening of the ballot box and,

likewise after satisfying itself that the integrity of the

ballots therein has been duly preserved shall order the
board of election inspectors to recount the votes of the
candidates affected and prepare a new return which
shall then be used by the board of canvassers as basis
of the canvass.
Although the COMELEC en banc noted that
Deduzman Lakim, an eyewitness and official watcher
in Precinct No. 31A, stated in his affidavit that the
ballots in Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B
were openly tampered and falsified by Daglocs
supporters, it must be clarified that the appreciation of
ballots is not the ground raised by Samad for the
exclusion of the nine election returns, and it is also not
the basis of the COMELEC en banc for excluding said
returns.
Further, the aforecited doctrine that as long as the
returns appear to be authentic, and duly accomplished
on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look
beyond or behind them to verify allegations of
irregularities in the casting and counting of the votes,
is not applicable in this case due to the following
reasons:
(1) The COMELEC has the authority to review the
rulings of the Board of Canvassers in a preproclamation controversy under paragraphs (e) to (f)
of section 20 (Procedure in Disposition of Contested
election Returns) of Republic Act No. 7166;[46]
(2) The COMELEC en banc found that the nine
election returns are fraudulent in the manner of their
preparation which is a pre-proclamation issue under
Sections 241 and 243 of the Omnibus Election Code;

(3) The allegations of irregularity is not in the casting

and counting of votes, but in the preparation of the
election returns (i.e., the election returns from Precinct
Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A and 33B were tampered
or falsified and were prepared under duress, threats,
coercion and intimidation).
Given the factual finding of the COMELEC en
banc that the nine election returns are spurious in the
manner of their preparation, doubt is cast on the
authentic appearance of said returns. Hence, the
subject election returns cannot be accordedprima
facie status as genuine reports of the results of the
counts of votes. Nevertheless, under Section 235 of
the Omnibus Election Code, a recount of votes may be
resorted to, if the integrity of the affected ballot boxes
and their contents has been preserved. Thereafter,
new returns shall be prepared which shall be used by
the Board of Canvassers as basis of the canvass. This
procedure protects the will of the electorate.

Ralph C. Lantion in the Resolution of the Second

Division. What exactly these documents and evidence
are upon which the COMELEC en banc based its
resolution, and how they have been appreciated in
respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this Courts
scrutiny.[47] The
rule
that
factual
findings
of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of
justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or
no substantial evidence in support of such findings
should be applied with greater force when it concerns
the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC--created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. [48] The
factual finding of the COMELEC en banc is therefore
binding on the Court.

Third Issue: The proper remedy in case of spurious

election returns

Second Issue: Sufficiency of evidence in finding that

the
nine election returns were spurious

Petitioner contends that even assuming that the

subject election returns are spurious, the remedy is not
exclusion, but that provided in Section 235 of the
Omnibus Election Code, thus:

Appellant contends that the COMELEC abused its

discretion in finding the nine election returns spurious
without clear and convincing evidence of fraud and
other election irregularities.

Sec. 235. When election returns appear to be

tampered with or falsified.If the election returns
submitted to the board of canvassers appear to be
tampered with, altered or falsified after they have left
the hands of the board of election inspectors, or
otherwise not authentic, or were prepared by the
board of election inspectors under duress, force,
intimidation, or prepared by persons other than the
member of the board of election inspectors, the board

The Court is not persuaded.

The COMELEC en banc, after a judicious evaluation
of the documents on record, upheld the findings stated
in the dissenting opinion of Presiding Commissioner

of canvassers shall use the other copies of said

election returns and, if necessary, the copy inside the
ballot box which upon previous authority given by the
Commission may be retrieved in accordance with
Section 220 hereof. If the other copies of the returns
are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, not
authentic, prepared under duress, force, intimidation,
or prepared by persons other than the members of the
board of election inspectors, the board of canvassers
or any candidate affected shall bring the matter to the
attention of the Commission. The Commission shall
then, after giving notice to all candidates concerned
and after satisfying itself that nothing in the ballot box
indicate that its identity and integrity have been
violated, order the opening of the ballot box and,
likewise after satisfying itself that the integrity of the
ballots therein has been duly preserved shall order the
board of election inspectors to recount the votes of the
candidates affected and prepare a new return which
shall then be used by the board of canvassers as basis
of the canvass.
According to petitioner, while it may be true that
the board of canvassers will not be compelled to
canvass election returns which are falsified or
spurious, this does not, however, mean that the board
should right away disregard and exclude the election
returns and ultimately the votes cast in the precinct.
Hence, petitioner contends that the exclusion from
canvass of the nine election returns by the COMELEC is
a clear exercise of grave abuse of discretion.
The contention is meritorious.
Outright exclusion of election returns on the
ground that they were fraudulently prepared by some
members or non-members of the BEI disenfranchises

the voters. Hence, when election returns are found to

be spurious or falsified, Section 235 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides the procedure which enables
the COMELEC to ascertain the will of the electorate.
The COMELEC, therefore, gravely abused its
discretion when it excluded outright the subject
election returns after finding that they were fraudulent
returns. Instead, the COMELEC should have followed
the procedure laid down in Section 235 of the Omnibus
Election Code: x x x The Commission shall then, after
giving notice to all candidates concerned and after
satisfying itself that nothing in the ballot box indicate
that its identity and integrity have been violated, order
the opening of the ballot box and, likewise after
satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein
has been duly preserved shall order the board of
election inspectors to recount the votes of the
candidates affected and prepare a new return which
shall then be used by the board of canvassers as basis
of the canvass.
Nevertheless, if the integrity of the ballots has
been violated, the COMELEC need not recount the
ballots but should seal the ballot box and order its
safekeeping in accordance with Section 237 of the
Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 237. When integrity of ballots is violated.-- If upon
the opening of the ballot box as ordered by the
Commission under Sections 234, 235 and 236, hereof,
it should appear that there are evidence or signs of
replacement, tampering or violation of the integrity of
the ballots, The Commission shall not recount the
ballots but shall forthwith seal the ballot box and order
its safekeeping.

Therefore, subject to the finding of whether or not

the integrity of the affected ballot boxes and of their
ballots has been preserved, the new returns from
Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A,
72A, 83A and 84A shall be included in the canvass.
Consequently, not only the votes of the mayoralty
candidates, but also those of the candidates for vicemayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan will be
recounted and reflected in the new returns as basis of
the canvass. On the basis of said canvass, the winning
local candidates of the Municipality of Kabuntalan in
the May 14, 2001 elections shall be proclaimed.

xxx xxx xxx

Fourth Issue: Whether SPC No. 01-342 should have

been dismissed

Petitioner claims that Samad failed to submit her

evidence in support of her objections within 24 hours
from the time such objections were made, which is
evidenced by the ruling of the Board issued on May 26,
2001.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC should have

dismissed SPC No. 01-342 since Samad failed to
comply with the mandatory procedure provided in
Section 20 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166 and Section
38 of Comelec Resolution No. 3848.
Section 20 of RA No. 7166 provides:
Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election
Returns. (a) Any candidate x x x x contesting the
inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election
returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article
XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the
Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral
objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers
at the time the questioned return is presented for
inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be
recorded in the minutes of the canvass.

(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the

objecting party shall also enter his
objection in the form for written
objections to be prescribed by the
Commission. Within
twenty-four
(24) hours from and after the
presentation of such an objection,
the objecting party shall submit
the evidence in support of the
objection x x x (Emphasis supplied by
petitioner Dagloc.)

Further, petitioner asserts that Paragraph 8,

Section 38 of Comelec Resolution No. 3848 mandates
that [a]ny appeal brought before the Comelec on the
ruling of the Board, without the accomplished forms
and the evidence thereto, shall be summarily
dismissed.
Petitioner thus contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss
SPC No. 01-342 for failure to comply with the
mandatory procedure under Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 7166 and Section 38 of Comelec Resolution No.
3848.
The Court disagrees.

Petitioner is referring to Samads appeal before the

COMELEC of the Boards ruling to include in the
canvass the election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A,
31B, 32A/32B, 33A and 33B. It appears that Samad
submitted her evidence belatedly. It may be presumed
that when Samad appealed from the Boards ruling
before the COMELEC, the Board elevated its report and
the complete records and evidence submitted in the
canvass in accordance with Section 20, paragraphs (g)
and (h) of Republic Act No. 7166, thus:
(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of
appeal, the board shall make an appropriate
report
to
the
Commission,
elevating
therewith the complete records and evidence
submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the
parties with copies of the report.
(h) On the basis of the records and evidence
elevated to it by the board, the Commission
shall decide summarily the appeal within
seven (7) days from receipt of said records
and evidence. Any appeal brought before the
Commission on the ruling of the board,
without the accomplished forms and the
evidence appended thereto, shall be
summarily dismissed.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed. Moreover, in their respective resolutions,
the COMELEC en banc and the Second Division
evidently decided on the pre-proclamation cases filed
before them based on the records and evidence
elevated to them by the Board.

Further, the COMELEC has broad powers to

ascertain the true results of the election by means
available to it.[49] It is not strictly bound by procedural
rules in the attainment of this end. In fact, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, wherein the aforecited
Section 20 of RA No. 7166 is reiterated, [50] provides
that said rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote the effective and efficient implementation of
the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.

Fifth Issue: Whether intervenor was denied due

process
In regard to the petition-in-intervention filed by
intervenor Mohidin Lauban, a co-respondent in SPC No.
01-310, it is contended that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction for: (1) failing to notify him about the
proceedings in the consolidated cases including SPC
No. 01-310, and thereafter annulling his proclamation
in violation of his right to due process; and (2) ordering
the exclusion of the nine election returns grounded on
objections which were improper for a pre-proclamation
controversy.
The Court has already ruled on the incorrectness of
the order of the COMELEC to exclude outright the nine
election returns from the canvass; hence, the
remaining issue to be resolved is whether or not the
intervenor was denied due process by the COMELEC.

Lauban contends that the COMELEC deprived him

of his right to notice and hearing in all the proceedings
conducted in SPC No. 01-310, wherein he was a corespondent, as he was neither notified nor furnished a
copy of the petition. Thereafter, Lauban asserts that
the two resolutions of the COMELEC annulled and set
aside
his
proclamation
as
vice-mayor
of
the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, despite
prior knowledge by both the Second Division and the
Commission en banc that he was not duly notified and
heard.
The contention is without merit.
The COMELEC, represented by the Solicitor
General, countered that Lauban was not denied due
process before the COMELEC. It observed that
petitioner Dagloc and Lauban were party mates; the
former was a candidate for mayor and the latter for
vice-mayor during the May 14, 2001 elections. In SPC
No. 01-310, Dagloc and Lauban and their candidates
for
Sangguniang
Bayan
were
impleaded
as
respondents and their proclamations were sought to
be annulled.
According to the COMELEC, Dagloc, Lauban and
another private respondent in SPC-310, Fhamie
Dumaba, were all represented by Abdul & Maningas
Law Offices as shown by the pleading, Answer to
Petition.[51] A notice of hearing[52] was sent to Atty.
Kamid Abdul as counsel of private respondents. In the
minutes of the session held at the COMELEC Session
Hall on July 24, 2001 at 2:00 p.m., Atty. Kamid Abdul
entered his appearance as counsel for Dagloc, et al.
[53]
The
COMELEC,
therefore,
correctly
stated
that Lauban, who was represented by a counsel who
filed an answer, was notified of the hearing and had

attended the hearing, cannot claim to have been

denied due process by the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition-in-intervention is
denied for lack of merit, insofar as intervenor Mohidin
S. Lauban claims that the COMELEC denied him due
process. However, said petition-in-intervention and the
petition for certiorari of Salipongan L. Dagloc are given
due course insofar as they pray for the inclusion of the
nine election returns in the canvass. The COMELEC is
directed to determine within twenty (20) days from
receipt of this Decision whether the integrity of the
ballot boxes and the ballots from Precinct Nos. 31A,
31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A
has been preserved. If the integrity of the
affected ballot boxes and of their ballots is found to be
intact, the COMELEC is directed to order the Board of
Election Inspectors to recount the votes cast in the
precinct involved and to prepare a new return as basis
of the canvass. The new return shall be included in the
canvass, in the proper appreciation of the votes of the
candidates for mayor, vice-mayor and members of
the Sangguniang
Bayan of
the
Municipality
of
Kabuntalan, Province of Maguindanao, and on the
basis of said canvass, the winning local candidates in
the
May
14,
2001
elections
shall
be
proclaimed. However, if the integrity of any ballot box
or of its ballots has been violated, the COMELEC shall
not recount the affected ballots, but shall seal the
affected ballot box and order its safekeeping.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales,

GEORGIDI
B.
AGGABAO, petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
the
PROVINCIAL BOARD of CANVASSERS of
ISABELA,
and
ANTHONY
MIRANDA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari[1] seeks to annul and set
aside as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion Resolution No. 7233 of the COMELEC
En Banc and the proclamation of private respondent
Anthony Miranda as Congressman for the 4 th District of
Isabela.[2]
Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private
respondent Anthony Miranda were rival congressional
candidates for the 4th District of Isabela during the May
10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of the
certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the
municipalities of Cordon and San Agustin, Miranda
moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on
grounds that it was tampered with; prepared under
duress; differed from other authentic copies and
contained manifest errors.[3]

[G.R. No. 163756. January 26, 2005]

Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised

by Miranda are proper only for a pre-proclamation
controversy which is not allowed in elections for
Members of the House of Representatives.[4]

On May 22, 2004, the reconstituted Provincial

Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the
contested COCVs and used instead the 4 th and
7th copies of the COCVs.[5] Based on the results,
Miranda garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Congressman.
On appeal with the COMELEC,[6] petitioner asserted
that the PBC acted without jurisdiction[7] when it heard
Mirandas Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that
the PBC had jurisdiction over the petition, it still erred
in excluding the contested COCVs as they appeared
regular and properly authenticated.[8]
On June 6, 2004, private respondent filed a Very
Urgent
Motion
for
Proclamation[9] which
was
[10]
opposed
by petitioner who contended that the
pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC Second
Division is a bar to Mirandas proclamation.
In a Memorandum dated June 8, 2004,
Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, commissioner incharge for Regions II and III, approved the
proclamation of the remaining winning candidates for
the province of Isabela.[11]

On June 9, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued

Resolution
No.
7233
likewise
directing
the
proclamation of the remaining winning candidates in
Isabela.[12] On the same day, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Notice of
Proclamation with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.[13]
On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the
duly elected Congressman for the 4th District of
Isabela.[14]
Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this
petition assailing Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that
the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when
it ordered Mirandas proclamation considering that the
Second Division has not yet resolved the appeal.
In his Comment,[15] Miranda moved for the
dismissal of the petition considering that the issue
raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).[16]
On August 27, 2004, the petitioner filed
a Consolidated
Motion
for
Early
Resolution;
Manifestation that the COMELEC Second Division
Issued a Resolution Sustaining the Appeal of the
Petitioner; and Reply to the Comment.[17] He
manifested that on August 16, 2004, the COMELEC
Second Division gave due course to his pending
appeal.[18] At the same time, he bewailed the failure of

the COMELEC
proclamation.[19]

Second

Division

to

annul

the

The basic issue for resolution is whether we can

take cognizance of this petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of
only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites,
to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling
or modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to
prosper.[20]
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the

parties or organization registered under the party-list

system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections [21] we
ruled that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now
have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members,
thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its
jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election
cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the
COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and
decide
pre-proclamation
controversies
against
members of the House of Representatives as well as of
the Senate.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.[22]
It is undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June

14, 2004. As such, petitioners recourse would have

been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His
remedy is not this petition for certiorari. Thus:
Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.
has already been proclaimed as the winner in the
congressional elections in the fourth district of Quezon
City. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his
duties as representative; hence, the remedy open to
the petitioner was to have filed an electoral protest
with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives.[23]
The allegation that Mirandas proclamation is null
and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its
jurisdiction. Thus:
(I)n an electoral contest where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids
duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
peoples mandate.[24]
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections[25] we ruled
that, upon proclamation of the winning candidate and
despite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is divested
of its jurisdiction to hear the protest. Thus:

The petition is impressed with merit because the

petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and
assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to
take cognizance of the electoral protest against him
would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral
Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation
(which has been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of
the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of
the Electoral Tribunal.
In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that
there is an available and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. After
the proclamation, petitioners remedy was an electoral
protest before the HRET. The resolution of the issues
presented in this petition is best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the electoral
tribunal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
ChicoNazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on official leave.

MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
and
ATTY.
AURORA
S.
DE
ALBAN, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to
annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951 [1] dated
October 15, 1996 issued by public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which (1)
approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by
only one registered voter - herein private respondent
Ma. Aurora Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the
further signing of said petition by the rest of the
registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on November 9,
1996; and (3) in case the said petition is signed by at
least 25% of the total number of registered votes in
Tumauni, Isabela, scheduled the recall election on
December 2, 1996.
On October 25, 1996, this court issued a
Temporary
Restraining Order[2] enjoining
public
respondent
COMELEC
from
implementing
and
enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.
The facts of this case are not disputed.

[G.R. No. 126576. March 5, 1997]

Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the

Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections
of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private
respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said
elections.
Sometime in early September, 1996, private
respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar in
Tumauni, Isabela, a Petition for Recall [3] against
petitioner. On September 12, 1996, petitioner received
a copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was
forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in
Manila, for approval.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director
for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the
COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum[4] dated October 8,
1996 recommending approval of the petition for recall
filed by private respondent and its signing by other
qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters as required by
Section 69(d) of the Local Government code of 1991.
In
turn
acting
on
the
abovementioned
Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the
COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed
Resolution No. 96-2951.
Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned
resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore
invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution

approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was

signed by just one person in violation of the statutory
25% minimum requirement as to the number of
signatures supporting and petition for recall; and (2)
that the resolution scheduled the recall election within
one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections.
In at least three (3) urgent motions, private
respondent has sought the lifting of the Temporary
Retraining Order issued last October 25, 1996 on the
twin grounds (1) that the issue of the one-year bar on
recall elections has been resolved in the case of Paras
v. COMELEC[5] promulgated on November 4, 1996; and
(2) that the procedure prescribed by Resolution No. 962951 involving petition signing upon initiation of even
just one person, is no different from that provided for
in COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 which was upheld as
constitutional in the 1991 cases of Sanches, et al. v.
COMELEC[6] and Evardone v. COMELEC[7]
Private respondent is correct in saying that in the
light of our pronouncement in Paras v. COMELEC[8], the
recall election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the
instant case cannot be said to be barred by the May
12, 1997 Barangay Elections.In construing the
meaning of the term, regular local election in Section
74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that no recall shall take place within one (1)
year x x x immediately preceding a regular local
election, we ruled that for the time bar to apply, the
approaching regular local election must be one where

the position of the official to be recalled, is to be

actually contested and filled by the electorate. Thus, in
the instant case where the time bar is being invoked
by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching
Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no
application of the one year bar, hence no invalidity
may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this
ground.

The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the

local Election Registrar if the recall involves a city
or municipal official, or with the Provincial Election
Supervisor if it involves a provincial official, one
copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof
on the bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.
If the recall involves a provincial official, two
additional copies of the notice shall also be
furnished by the voter filing the notice to the
Election Registrar of each city and municipality in
the province, one copy of which shall be posted
upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the
city/municipal hall.

We, however, find petitioners second ground to be

impressed with merit.
Before the enactment of the 1991 Local
Government Code, the recall of public officials voted
for in popular elections, was governed by Sections 54
to 59 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1983.Pursuant to
Section 59 thereof, which states that the Commission
on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of
and election on recall x x x and, in pursuance thereof,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2272 Sections 4
and 5 of which provide as follows:
Sec. 4. How instituted. - The recall of an elective
provincial, city or municipal official shall be
commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice
of recall containing the address and precinct
number of the voter filing the notice, and the
name of the official sought to be recalled, his
position, and the ground(s) for the recall. Each
notice shall refer to only one official.lex

In every case, the voter filing the notice of

recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the official
sought to be recalled, the Commission on Elections
in Manila and the Election Records and Statistics
Department of the Commission.
Section 5. Schedule and place of signing of the
petition. - The Election Registrar shall submit to the
Commission on Elections, not later than ten days from
filing of the notice of recall, the schedule of the signing
of the petition to recall for approval and funding x x x.
[9]

In the case of Sanchez v. COMELEC[10], petitioners

therein contended that the aforegoing Resolution No.
2272 is unconstitutional there being no legislative
enactment yet on [the] mechanism of recall as

mandated under Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution [11] It

is true, as private respondent asseverates, that we
upheld the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272, but
not because we found nothing constitutionally infirm
about the procedure of allowing the initiatory recall
petition to be filed by only one person. The issue
in Sanchez was not this questioned procedure but the
legal basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rulemaking power in the alleged absence of a grant of
such power by an enabling statute on recall. Thus we
ruled:
While it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the
Constitution mandates the Congress to enact a
local government code providing among others for
an effective mechanism of recall, nothing in said
provision could be inferred the repeal of BP 337,
the local government code existing prior to the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 3, Art. X of
the Constitution merely provides that the local
government code to be enacted by Congress shall
be more responsive than the one existing at
present. Until such time that a more responsive
and effective local government code is enacted,
the present code shall remain in full force and
effect. Thus, under Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, (a)ll existing
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.
lex

Considering
that
the
present
local
government code (BP 337) is still in effect,
respondent COMELECs promulgation of Resolution
No. 2272 is therefore valid and constitutional, the
same having been issued pursuant to Sec. 59 of
BP 337. It reads:
Sec. 59. Supervision by the
Commission on Elections. - The
Commission
on
Elections
shall
conduct and supervise the process of
and election on recall x x x and, in
pursuance thereof, promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations.[12]
We reiterated the foregoing ruling in the case
of Evardone v. COMELEC[13] in this wise:
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall
remain operative, until amended, repealed or
revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the
Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals
B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of
said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991
will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and
therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337) is still the law applicable to the present case.
xxx

Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337

provides for the mechanism for recall of local
elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes
the
respondent
COMELEC to
conduct
and
supervise the process of and election on recall and
in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations. x x x Thus,
pursuant to the rule-making power vested in
respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution
No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272
promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently,
the
respondent
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition
for recall and set the date for the signing of said
petition.[14]
In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC prescribed
procedure of (1) allowing the recall petition to be filed
by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total
number of registered voters and then (2) inviting
voters to sign said petition on a date set for that
purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the crux of
the present constitutional challenge, the proper time
has come for this court to issue a definitive ruling on
the matter.
Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of
the evolution of the mechanism of recall as a mode of
removing a public officer by direction action of the
people, essayed in the case of Garcia v. COMELEC:[15]

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer

by the people before the end of his term of
office. The peoples prerogative to remove a public
officer is an incident of their sovereign power and
in the absence of constitutional restraint, the
power
is
implied
in
all
governmental
operations. Such power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of
public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in a
representative democracy.
Recall as a mode of removal of elective
local officials made its maiden appearance in
section 2 of Article XI entitled Local
Government, viz:
SEC.
2. The
Batasang
Pambansa shall enact a local
government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a
majority vote of all its Members,
defining a more responsive and
accountable
local
government
structure with an effective system
of recall x x x
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337
entitled, The Local Government Code of 1983
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one
mode of initiating the recall elections of local
election officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-

five percent (25%) of the total number of

registered voters in the local government unit
concerned x x x.
Our legal history does not reveal any instance
when this power of recall as provided by BP 337
was exercised by our people.
In February , 1986, however, our people more
than exercised their right of recall for they resorted
to revolution and they booted out of office the
highest elective officials of the land. The
successful use of people power to remove public
officials who have forfeited the trust of the
electorate led to its firm institutionalization of the
1987 Constitution. Its Articles XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of Peoples
Organizations x x x.
Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the
mandate for Congress to enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum x x x. In response to this constitutional
call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took
effect on January 1, 1992.[16]
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 expressly provides that recall of any elective x x

x municipal x x x official may also be validly initiated

upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of
the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in
which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what
initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters, may
validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note
of the phrase, petition of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) and point out that the law does not state that
the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the
registered voters; rather, the petition must be of or by,
at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition
must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least
25% of the total number of registered voters. This is
understandable, since the signing of the petition is
statutorily required to be undertaken before the
election registrar or his representative, and in the
presence of a represetantive of the official sought to
be recalled, and in public place in the x x x
municipality x x x.[17] Hence, while the initiatory recall
petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters, the
petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters in whose behalf only
one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of
the recall petition by a number of people less
than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much
less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the

instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear

and categorical provisions of subsisting law.
Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement
at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that
this is the requirement under a majority of the
constitution and recall statutes in various American
states to the same extent that they were aware of the
rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an
effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who
is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of
whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the
best of his ability and as his conscience dictates, [18] it is
a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire
to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a
collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be
pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled
loser in the elections or a small percentage of
disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a
direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill
motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to
recall would destabilize the community and seriously
disrupt the running of government.
A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar
provisions and the percentage of minimum voter
requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably
reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse
of the power of recall. For instance, the Supreme Court
of Illinois held in the case of In Re Bower[19] that:

[t]the only logical reasons which we can

ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one
year before petitioning for a recall election is
to prevent premature action on their parting
voting to remove a newly elected official
before having had sufficient time to evaluate
the soundness of his political policies and
decisions. We view the statutory provision
requiring the number of petition signers to
equal at least 45% of the total votes case in
the last general election for mayor as a
further attempt to insure that an official will
not have to defend his policies against
frivolous attacks launched by a small
percentage of disenchanted electors.[20]
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of
Colorado held in the case of Bernzen v. City of
Boulder[21] that:
[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall
petition contain the signatures of at least 25% of
all votes cast in the last election for all candidates
for the position which the person sought to be
recalled occupies, assured that a recall election
will not be held in response to the wishes of a
small and unrepresentative minority. However,
once at least 25% of the electorate have
expressed their dissatisfaction, the constitution
reserves the recall power to the will of the
electorate.[22]

And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp[23], the Supreme

Court of Michigan, echoed the foregoing posturings in
this wise:
Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon
recall clearly not provided or contemplated by the
Constitution has revealed fears about an irresponsible
electorate xxx. A much cited Nebraska case pertaining
to
a Nebraska recall statute provides some answers whic
h areequally applicable to the Michigan constitutional
right of recall:
xxx Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of
the electors to sign the petition before the council [is]
compelled to act was designed to avoid such a
contingency. The legislature apparently assumed that
nearly one-third of the electorate would not entail
upon the taxpayers the cost of an election unless the
charges made approved themselves to their
understanding
and
they
were
seriously
dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent of the
office.[24]
In the instant case, this Court is confronted with a
procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the
applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying
that law. Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows
that Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code
plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a
petition of 25% of the total number of registered
voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private

respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with

only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her
petition that she has, together with many others in
Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership
of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names
of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have
reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from
the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private
respondent is truly earnest in her cause, and the very
fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows
that she claims responsibility for the seeming affront
to petitioners continuance in office. But the same
cannot be said of all the other people whom private
respondent claims to have sentiments similar to
hers. While the people are vested with the power to
recall their elected officials, the same power is
accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see
through all the consequences of the exercise of such
power, including rising above anonymity, confronting
the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends,
and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its
ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one
person to file the initiatory recall petition and then
setting a date for the signing of the petition, which
amounts to inviting and courting the public which may
have not, in the first place, even entertained any
displeasure in the performance of the official sought to
be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but
also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We
can not and must not, under any and all
circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the

explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the

initiation of the recall process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI is
hereby
GRANTED. COMELEC
Resolution No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and
VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE.
The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is
hereby made permanent.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
lex

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM
DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO,
ALEXANDER
PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN,
ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR
RAUL
S.
ROCO,
DEMOKRASYAIPAGTANGGOL
ANG
KONSTITUSYON
(DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN
NG
DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to
the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution.
The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the
original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the
proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution,
characterized
this
system
as
"innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of threefourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter
discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.
Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on

Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend

the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials,
by
People's
Initiative"
(hereafter,
Delfin
5
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of
said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers
of
general
and
local
circulation;
3.
Instructing
Municipal
Election
Registrars
in
all
Regions
of
the
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers,
in
establishing
signing
stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding
member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system
intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers
intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, signature stations shall be established all over
the country, with the assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by

individual signatories; that before the Movement and

other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary
that the time and dates to be designated for the
purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the
COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of
the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary
that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the
signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers
of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions
sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, 7 Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article
X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a
copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM
LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION
8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will
first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
by at least twelve per cent of the total number of
registered voters in the country it will be formally filed
with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was

forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an
Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of
the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the
signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3)
daily newspapers of general circulation at his own
expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b)
setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at
10:00 a.m.

(1) The constitutional provision on

people's initiative to
amend
the
Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such
law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill
No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by
People's
Initiative,
which
petitioner
Senator Santiago filed on 24 November
1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee
on
Constitutional
Amendments.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December

1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q.
Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for
Reforms,
Modernization
and
Action
(PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together
with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or
counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK),
Public
Interest
Law
Center,
and
Laban
ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on
that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides

for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes,
and on local legislation. However, it failed
to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided
for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.
Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed
this deficiency in the law in his privilege
speech delivered before the Senate in
1994: "There is not a single word in that
law which can be considered as
implementing
[the
provision
on
constitutional
initiative].
Such
implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed

Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action
for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the

effectivity of the law after publication in

print media. This indicates that the Act

covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern
"the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution
and
initiative
and
referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra
vires insofar
as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to
amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.
(6) Finally,
appropriated
neither the
government
office has
purpose.

Congress has not yet

funds for people's initiative;
COMELEC nor any other
department, agency, or
realigned funds for the

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action

for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event

the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's

initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses
to the national treasury for general re-registration of
voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to
mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses
which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative
itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the
public and the nation of the issues raised demands
that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of
procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's
and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the
respondents to comment on the petition within a nonextendible period of ten days from notice; and (b)
issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty
Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They
argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD
ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL
TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION
OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC

GRANTS
THE
PETITION
FILED
BY
RESPONDENT
DELFIN
BEFORE
THE
COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE
SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF
THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR
THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM
OF
ACTIVITIES
AND
EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE
DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE
PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE
COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS
DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT
TO
ITS
"INITIATORY
JURISDICTION"
UPHELD
BY
THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON
AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO

THE
CONSTITUTION.
SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.
1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO.
6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416
WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID:
"THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN
DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE
LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A
PROVISION
DELEGATING
TO
THE
COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY
BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B.
NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E,
PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON
THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF

THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN

AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES
AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION.
REVISION
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF
THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE
HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD
BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED.
1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed
in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an
assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk
reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What
he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally
necessary to start the signature campaign to amend
the Constitution or to put the movement to gather
signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the
substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the
petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735,
which governs the conduct ofinitiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence
therein of a subtitle for such initiative is
not fatal, since subtitles are not
requirements
for
the
validity
or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735
specifically provides that the proposition

in an initiative to amend the Constitution

approved by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by
(a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC
the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the
conduct
of
an
election,
plebiscite, initiative,
referendum,
and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735,
which empowers the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not
involve
a revision of,
but
mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few
specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay
term limits. It does not seek to reexamine
or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters,
Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million
as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact
figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any
event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise
of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC,

filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia,
people's initiative to
amend
the
Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement
of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and
guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems
of initiative, includes initiative on the
Constitution and defines the same as the
power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly
mentions initiative on
the
Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No.
6735 because, being national in scope,
that
system
of initiative is
deemed
included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed
that nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a
competent nor a material proof that R.A.
No. 6735 does not deal withinitiative on
the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected
officials constitutes a mere amendment to
the Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was

validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 and under the Omnibus Election
Code. The rule-making power of the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro
tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only
and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and
(c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6
January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to
file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23
January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI),
filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion
was their Petition in Intervention, which was later
replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention
wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a
mere amendment to, but a revision of,
the Constitution because, in the words of
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve
a change from a political philosophy that

rejects unlimited tenure to one that

accepts unlimited tenure; and although
the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing
equal
access
to
opportunities for public service and
prohibiting
political
dynasties. 19 A revisioncannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision
of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of
the President and the limits provided for
all other national and local elective
officials are based on the philosophy of
governance, "to open up the political
arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the
hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the
term limits is to negate and nullify the
noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to
the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest
situation.Initiative is
intended as a fallback position that may
be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of

their elective officials, but not as a

premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and
inadequate in itself to be called the
enabling law that implements the
people'sinitiative on amendments to the
Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper
parties who may file the petition, (b) the
appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of
the petition, (d) the publication of the
same, (e) the ways and means of
gathering the signatures of the voters
nationwide and 3% per legislative district,
(f) the proper parties who may oppose or
question the veracity of the signatures,
(g) the role of the COMELEC in the
verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such people's
initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot
be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC
is without authority to legislate the
procedure for a people's initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis

for the Resolution, as the former does not

set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for

Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his

Petition
in
21
Intervention. He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the
enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that
the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory
pleading
contemplated
under
the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the
filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the
required number of registered voters. He also submits
that the proponents of a constitutional amendment
cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an
initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative
petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if
warranted.

(1) Congress has failed to enact an

enabling law mandated under Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to

Intervene.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot

substitute for the required implementing
law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from
a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision
of the Constitution, which can be
proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a)
granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK
and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the
Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI,
and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and
of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a
nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention;
and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in
Intervention within a nonextendible period of three
days from notice, and the respondents to comment
thereon within a nonextendible period of five days
from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the

parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and
arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act,
as
worded,
adequately
covers
such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and
Local Laws) regarding the conduct of
initiative
on
amendments
to
the
Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions
on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of
elective national and local officials, as
proposed in the draft "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would
constitute a revision of, or an amendment
to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take
cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature

gathering; (b) instructing municipal

election
officers
to
assist
Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme
Court to take cognizance of the petition
when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested
intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in
Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that
the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action
and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of
portions of both the Journal and the Record of the
House of Representatives relating to the deliberations
of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes on the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on
House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed

their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and
IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due
course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues,
we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to
pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the
parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of
this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition filed by
private respondent Delfin. This being so,
it becomes imperative to stop the
Comelec from proceeding any further,
and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65,
Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the
proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an

extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a
court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p.
84). In this case the writ is an urgent
necessity, in view of the highly divisive
and adverse environmental consequences
on the body politic of the questioned
Comelec order. The consequent climate of
legal confusion and political instability
begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system
of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the
Supreme
Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the
paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the
COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or
authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC
made no ruling thereon evidently because after having
heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at
the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6
December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.

The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to

dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition
rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under
Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor

Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities
of
procedure
in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where

the
proceedings
of
any
tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial,
are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant
to
desist
from
further
proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein.

A party's standing before this Court is a

procedural technicality which it may, in
the exercise of its discretion, set aside in
view of the importance of issues raised. In
the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,
this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance
to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities
of procedure.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that

the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by
the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the
required number of signatures. In light of these claims,
the instant case may likewise be treated as a special
civil action forcertiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE
SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION,
BUT
IS,
UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which
every
legislative
district
must
be
represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall

be authorized within five years following

the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote
of three-fourths of all its members; or

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of

the exercise of this right.

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

This
provision
is
not
self-executory.
In
his
book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:

(c) directly by the people themselves thru

initiative as provided for in Article___
Section ___of the Constitution. 31

Without implementing legislation Section

2 cannot operate. Thus, although this
mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis
it still is dependent on congressional
action.

After several interpellations, but before the

period
of
amendments,
the
Committee
submitted a new formulation of the concept of
initiative which it denominated as Section 2;
thus:

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly

propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in
Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments
and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed
Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you,

Madam President. May we
respectfully call attention of
the
Members
of
the
Commission that pursuant to
the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this
afternoon
a
complete
Committee Report No. 7
which
embodies
the
proposed
provision
governing the matter of
initiative.
This
is
now
covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report.
With the permission of the
Members, may I quote
Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the

date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution
thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in
the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the
details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR.
BERNAS.
Madam
President, just two simple,
clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the
matter of initiative upon
petition of at least 10
percent, there are no details
in the provision on how to
carry
this
out. Do
we
understand, therefore, that
we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right,
Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also
understand,
therefore,
that for as long as the
legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law
on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter

was also taken up during the
committee
hearing,
especially with respect to
the budget appropriations
which would have to be
legislated
so
that
the
plebiscite could be called.
We deemed it best that this
matter be left to the
legislature. The Gentleman is
right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment
through
the
power
of
initiative can be called until
after five years from the
date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the
first amendment that could
be proposed through the
exercise of this initiative
power would be after five
years.
It
is
reasonably
expected that within that
five-year
period, the
National Assembly can come
up with the appropriate rules
governing the exercise of
this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the
matter
is left
to
the
legislature the details on
how this is to be carried
out is it possible that, in
effect,
what
will
be

presented to the people for

ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not
exclude
that
possibility
because even the legislature
itself as a body could
propose that amendment,
maybe
individually
or
collectively, if it fails to
muster the three-fourths
vote in order to constitute
itself
as
a
constituent
assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for
ratification
through
the
process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS.
AQUINO.
Do
I
understand from the sponsor
that the intention in the
proposal
is
to
vest
constituent power in the
people
to
amend
the
Constitution?
MR.
SUAREZ.
That
is
absolutely correct, Madam
President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur

with the underlying precept
of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing
popular
participation in the drafting
of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I
would
have
a
lot
of
difficulties
in
terms
of
accepting
the
draft
of
Section 2, as written. Would
the sponsor agree with me
that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power
has primacy over all other
legal mandates?
MR.
SUAREZ.
Commissioner
is
Madam President.

The
right,

MS. AQUINO. And would the

sponsor agree with me that
in the hierarchy of legal
values, the Constitution is
source of all legal mandates
and
that
therefore
we
require a great deal of
circumspection
in
the
drafting
and
in
the
amendments
of
the
Constitution?
MR.
SUAREZ.
That
proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in

order to underscore the
primacy of constituent power
we have a separate article in
the constitution that would
specifically
cover
the
process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This

proposal was suggested on
the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has
to be separated from the
traditional
modes
of
amending the Constitution
as embodied in Section 1.
The committee members felt
that this system of initiative
should not extend to the
revision
of
the
entire
Constitution, so we removed
it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or
Revision. 34

MR. SUAREZ. That is right,

Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is
the sponsor inclined, as the
provisions
are
drafted
now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or
the
requirement
of
determining the mechanics
of
amending
the
Constitution
by
people's
initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of
implementing
this
could
very well be placed in the
hands
of
the
National
Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate
into
this
provision the mechanics that
would adequately cover all
the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I
am seriously bothered by
providing this process of
initiative as a separate
section in the Article on
Amendment.
Would
the
sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2
as another subparagraph (c)
of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another
separate section as if it were
a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be

amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this
process
of
initiative
is
limited to the matter of
amendment and should not
expand into a revision which
contemplates
a
total
overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words,
the
Committee
was
attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and
(b) in Section 1 to include
the process of revision;
whereas
the process
of
initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would
only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right.
Those
were
the
terms
envisioned
in
the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were
thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you
Madam President. I propose
to substitute the entire
Section 2 with the following:

MR.
DAVIDE.
Madam
President, I have modified
the proposed amendment
after taking into account the
modifications submitted by
the sponsor himself and the
honorable
Commissioners
Guingona, Monsod, Rama,
Ople, de los Reyes and
Romulo.
The
modified
amendment in substitution
of the proposed Section 2
will now read as follows:
"SECTION
2.

AMENDMENTS
TO
THIS
CONSTITUTION
MAY
LIKEWISE
BE
DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL
NUMBER
Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT
MUST
BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED
VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE
AUTHORIZED
WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION
OF
THIS
CONSTITUTION
NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT.
MR.
SUAREZ.
Madam
President, considering that
the proposed amendment is
reflective
of
the
sense
contained in Section 2 of our
completed
Committee
Report No. 7, we accept the
proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed
modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that
it was a legislative act which must implement the
exercise of the right. Thus:
MR.
ROMULO.
Under
Commissioner
Davide's
amendment, is it possible for
the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry
out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx

MR.
ROMULO.
But
the
Commissioner's amendment
does
not
prevent
the
legislature
from
asking
another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR.
DAVIDE.
The
Commissioner is correct. In
other
words,
the
implementation
of
this
particular right would be
subject
to
legislation,
provided
the
legislature
cannot determine anymore
the
percentage
of
the
requirement.
MR.
ROMULO.
But
the
procedures, including the
determination of the proper
form for submission to the
people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it
will
not
destroy
the
substantive right to initiate.
In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed
by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right
conceded here.
MR.
ROMULO.
In
provision
of

that
the

Constitution can
the
procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified

amendment
strictly
confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the
Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure,
Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first
question:
Commissioner
Davide's
proposed
amendment on line 1 refers
to "amendment." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the
distinction
between
the
words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not,
because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can
only relate to "amendments"
not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the
process
of
proposing
amendments

through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult

than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction
has to be made that under
this
proposal,
what
is
involved is an amendment to
the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the
National Assembly by a vote
of three-fourths; and to call a
constitutional
convention
would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a
constitutional convention, a
majority of the National
Assembly is required, the
import
being
that
the
process of amendment must
be made more rigorous and
difficult
than
probably
initiating
an
ordinary
legislation or putting an end
to a law proposed by the
National Assembly by way of
a referendum. I cannot agree
to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee
on the Legislative because it
would require another voting
by the Committee, and the
voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present

such a proposal, by way of

an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up
the Article on the Legislative
or on the National Assembly
on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were
subjected to amendments, and the final version, which
the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and
3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you

Madam President. Section 2,
as
amended,
reads
as
follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE
BE
DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT
MUST
BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED
VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE
AUTHORIZED
WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION
OF
THIS
CONSTITUTION
NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or
Revisions was approved on second reading on 9
July 1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was

allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2

which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view
thereof, the Article was again approved on
Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that
the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein"
and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads:The
Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was
approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the
system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the
exercise of this right? Those who answer the question
in the affirmative, like the private respondents and
intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the
essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by
the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for
the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
with

The Congress shall provide for the

implementation of the exercise of this
right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture
on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The
"rules" means "the details on how [the right] is
to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House
Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was
prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis
of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No.
497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum
mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution;
and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X
(Local Government) and initiative provided for in
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum
concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government
units.
The
Bicameral
Conference
Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the
House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now
R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power

and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said
section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The
power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein
was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum
on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions.
That
section
is
silent
as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the

fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement
of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact,"
"approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of
the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems
of initiative,
and
that
Section
5
(Requirements)
restates
the
constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered
voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the
case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on
the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include,
as among the contents of the petition, the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case
of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c)
reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions

provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the
registered voters; and

petitioners

or

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is

not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
(Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that
the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A.
No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum

because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle

II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for
doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of
the
initiative
involved,
but
on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted
or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only
the legislative bodies of the governments of the
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into nationaland local is actually based on Section 3 of
the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which
refers
to
a
petition
proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which
refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles

there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the
subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are
placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by the majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
(c)
A
national
or local
initiative proposition
approved
by
majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become
effective
fifteen
(15)
days
after
certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative)
referring to indirect initiative with the legislative
bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly
accredited people's organization, as
defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. . . .

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to

decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and local initiativeand
referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of
Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,54 since the provision therein
applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in
this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void
any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost
diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so
on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to
sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition

and the required number of votes for its approval;

concerned as to whether the required number of

signatures have been obtained;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of

the proposition;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the

submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period
specified therein;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the

Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the
proposition. 55

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the

following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of
signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local
legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to
favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be
signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC
through its official in the local government unit

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.

56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments

to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twentythree sections, merely (a) mentions, the word
"Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on
the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of
the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks
of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition
in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional
requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the
more important or the paramount system of initiative.
RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No.

6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

which are sufficiently determinate and determinable

to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is
one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be
effected. 62

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be

delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized
exceptions to the rule are as follows:

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President
under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body

exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that
the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of

III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient
standard" tests.

IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a
full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative
on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of
the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters.
Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is
primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before
the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form
of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election
Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total

number of registered voters in each legislative

district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars,
in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits,
and voters' identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition
under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of
by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must
have known that the petition does not fall under any of
the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the
issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
elective
national
and
local
officials
is
an amendment to,
and
not
a revision of,
the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC

should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and
blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry
any longer in complying with the constitutional
mandate to provide for the implementation of the right
of the people under that system.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18

December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against
private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby
reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

G.R. No. L-29177

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation;

ERNESTO
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z.
SERIA, respondents.

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300

of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments
to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

September 30, 1969

VILLALON, petitioner,
ARRIETA

and

ARTURO

---------------------------------G.R. No. L-29394

September 30, 1969

ERNESTO
VILLALON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARTURO
SERIA, respondents.

Nemesio G. Beltran and Jose W. Diokno Law Office for

petitioner.
Benjamin N. Tabios, William M. Duhaylungsod and
Manuel R. Valdez for respondent Arturo Seria.
Jose
W.
Diokno
for
petitioner.
Benjamin N. Tabios and Angel Baula for respondent
Arturo Seria.

BARREDO, J.:
These two cases arose from related circumstances
connected with the election for Mayor in the
Municipality of Kibawe, Bukidnon held on November
14, 1967. The first (G.R. No. L-29177) is a petition
for certiorari seeking the annulment of the order of the
respondent judge dated April 1, 1968 declaring null
and void the proclamation of petitioner as the duly
elected Mayor made by the municipal board of
canvassers on March 14, 1968 on the ground that the
same was made in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
The second (G.R. No. L-29394) is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition purporting to enjoin the
respondent Commission on Elections from requiring
delivery to it and investigating and determining the
genuineness of the election returns from Precinct 20 of
said municipality with a view to their being used in the
canvass of the votes for mayor, based upon the theory
that the Comelec is without authority to review the
finding of a court in a judicial recount regarding the
condition of the envelop containing one of the copies

of the election returns. We sustain the petitioner in the

first, We overrule him in the second.
On November 17, 1967, respondent Seria filed with
respondent judge a petition for recount of the votes in
Precinct 20. He stated as grounds therefor, alleged
tampering of the returns and discrepancy between the
total number of votes cast in said precinct, as
appearing in C. E. Form 40, Minutes of Voting, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the total of the votes cast
for all the candidates for mayor, as appearing in the
election returns, the former being 419 and the latter
642, 525 of which were credited to petitioner. This
petition was amended on December 7, 1967 to make
more detailed the particulars of the grounds already
alleged in the original petition. Subsequently, on
January 12, 1868, a second amendment of the petition
was attempted but this was denied by the court.
Meanwhile, on December 17, 1967, petitioner filed his
answer challenging the jurisdiction of the court and
alleging insufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute
a "cause of action" under Section 163 of the Revised
Election Law, since the petition, even as amended,
does not allege any discrepancy in the numbers of the
votes for the different candidates for mayor in all the
extant genuine copies of the returns and, on the other
hand, any discrepancy thereof with that appears in the
minutes of voting is not a ground for judicial recount.
After proceedings considerably less summary than
they should be, on February 7, 1968, the respondent
judge, at first, granted the petition; but, later, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner on

February 14, 1967, he reconsidered his previous order

and denied the petition on March 13, 1968 ruling thus:
The pivotal question in this case has definitely
been resolved by the Supreme Court in its
decision in the most recent case of Ong vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G. R. No. L28415, promulgated on January 29, 1968, fixing
a dividing line between the powers of the board
of canvassers and the Commission on Elections
on the one hand and the court of first instance
on the other. The highest tribunal ruled that
"where before or during canvass or before
proclamation representations are made that
returns are falsified, it becomes the primary
duty, first of the board of canvassers and then
the Commission on Elections, to ascertain this
fact;" that the latter is clothed with broad
constitutional powers to have the returns
corrected in order to secure that only genuine
returns are presented to the board of
canvassers for the purpose of canvass and thus
prevent any dastardly attempt to subvert the
people's choice with the use of patently
doctored returns, while the court of first
instance is delimited by Section 163 of the
Revised Election Code in the exercise of its
authority to order a recount to situations where
an authentic copy of the election returns gives a
different number of votes to a candidate from
those appearing in another authentic copy and
the difference would affect the result of the

election. It is evident that the remedy available

to the petitioner in the present instance lies with
the Commission on Elections and not with this
court because no differences in the number of
votes of the respondent Ernesto Villalon that
would affect the result of the election were
found in the available copies of the election
returns. The absence of the corresponding entry
in words as to the number of votes received by
said respondent for the Office of Mayor in the
municipal treasurer's copy of the election
statement may not be considered a discrepancy
within the context of the law sufficient enough
to warrant the application of Section 163 of the
Code.
On March 14, 1968, alleged even before respondent
Seria had received copy of the order of denial, the
municipal board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner
Ernesto Villalon as the duly elected mayor. This caused
the filing of omnibus motion for contempt against the
members of the municipal board of canvassers and for
annulment of said proclamation by respondent Seria
and the subsequent issuance by respondent judge of
the disputed order of April 1, 1968, denying the said
prayer for contempt but granting that for annulment of
the proclamation. A motion for the reconsideration of
this order was filed on April 8, 1967, but the same was
denied on June 4, 1968. On June 29, 1968, the present
first petition was filed.

Petitioner assails the order of April 1, 1968 insofar as

the annulment declared by it is concerned as having
been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner is right.1awphl.nt
The only reason given by respondent judge in support
of his order is that the proclamation "was premature
because (the order of March 13) had not yet become
final as the petitioner had not yet even been notified
thereof on March 14, 1968." Such reason is erroneous.
It is in the very nature of a proceeding for judicial
recount of votes in an election that orders disposing of
the petition by either granting the petition and
accordingly proceeding to the actual recount or
denying the same, as well as the order certifying the
result of the recount, should not be appealable. This
Court has already held that there is no appeal
therefrom (Sanidad vs. Saquing, 23 SCRA 878, 880). If
at all, only questions of jurisdiction and of law may be
brought to the Supreme Court in appropriate instances
by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus with a request
for the issuance of the corresponding writ of
preliminary injunction, if necessary. The procedure has
been made summary precisely to accomplish its
purpose of aiding the electoral authorities in
ascertaining the apparent results of an election
exclusively for purposes of proclamation without
unnecessary loss of time and without prejudice to the
final outcome of a full-dressed determination of the
true result of the election thru an election contest. As
this Court indicated in Ong vs. Comelec, 22 SCRA 241,
judicial recounts must be speedily terminated in order

not "to prolong the periods during which the contested

positions will remain without an occupant, thereby
provoking suspicion, conjecture and unrest." This Court
emphasized this to these same parties now before Us
in Seria vs. Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, a
previous case involving practically the same facts as
here:
... It is not amiss to state, however, that
respondent court, in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction under either Section 163 or 168 of
the Revised Election Code as the case may be,
should dispose of the matter with promptness
and dispatch. That would assure that the
proclamation would not be unduly delayed. It is
equally relevant to state that under such
circumstances there should not be on the part of
the judiciary timidity and hesitancy in lending its
approval to pleas form any party before it, if
thereby the true and honest result of the
elections could be elicited. That would enable
the provincial or municipal board of canvassers
to discharge its function in the shortest possible
time and with the utmost degree of accuracy.
(24 SCRA 715, 719.)
Indeed, this aspect of the electoral process could as
well be performed by Comelec officials or other public
officials designated by that body or by law, and the
only reason why it has been given to the courts seems
to be just to impress solemnity and dignity to its result
which may serve as the basis of a temporary color of

title to an elective office, without implying that the

courts should follow the usual cumbersome and
complicated procedure of a judicial proceeding, since,
after all, what is contemplated is more of a mechanical
process rather than one requiring the exercise of
judgment and discretion. In Albano vs. Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Isabela, 5 SCRA 13, 18-19, this
Court said:

technicalities should be used to help in arriving

at a clear intention of the law and not to defeat
said intention." (Board of Election Inspectors vs.
Piccio, 81 Phil. 577. See also Cawa, et al. vs.
Hon. Vicente del Rosario, et al., supra.)
(Emphasis supplied) Verily, in this instance, legal
technicalities were applied to defeat the
purpose of the law.

It is well to emphasize once again that the

authority given to a court of first instance to
allow the recount of votes under Section 163 of
the Revised Election Code is restrictive in
nature. The law is explicit that the proceeding is
summary in character and merely consists in
the mathematical counting of the votes received
by each candidate. It does not involve any
appreciation of the ballots or determination of
their validity as is required in an election
contest. Its only purpose is to count the number
of votes as they appear on the face of the
ballots. (Cawa, et al. v. Hon. Vicente del Rosario,
et al., G.R. Nos. L-16837-40, May 30, 1960.)
Thus, as this Court has aptly said: "The purpose
of the law is to offer a prompt relief to a simple
controversy, that can immediately be settled
through a summary judicial proceeding that may
dispense with the long drawn and complicated
proceeding of a full-dressed election contest
and, at the same time, ... to restore public
tranquility by dispelling all doubts as to the true
number of votes cast in a given precinct. Legal

The case at bar is not the first one where the matter of
a judicial recount has remained pending without final
resolution by the courts far beyond the beginning of
the term of office being contested. It must be admitted
that such a situation is not only undesirable; it is
inconsistent with the intent and spirit of the law. Truth
to tell, even a full blown electoral contest could have
been terminated within a shorter period since the
elections of 1967; which is absurd, to say the least.
A judicial recount is not an action. It is not, strictly
speaking, even a special proceeding. It is a part of the
electoral administrative process preparatory to the
canvass and proclamation of the results of an election.
The fact that it is performed by the Court of First
Instance does not make of it a purely judicial
proceeding. Only that aspect of it wherein the court
determines whether or not the requirements of the law
for a recount are present is judicial. (Binging Ho vs.
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongao, Sulu, et al.,
G.R. No. L-29051, July 28, 1969.) The exact procedure
to be followed after the proper motion is filed is
prescribed neither in the election law nor in the rules

of court. The law merely lays down three requisites for

the exercise of jurisdiction by the court, namely, (1)
there must be a discrepancy between authentic copies
of the election returns from a precinct in the number of
votes given to a candidate and the difference affects
the results of the election; (2) a motion must be filed
by the board of canvassers or by any candidate
affected; and (3) notice of the proceeding shall be
given to all the candidates affected. These three
requisites complied with, the law evidently leaves it to
the court to devise the means for the exercise of its
powers and the performance of its assigned role in the
manner which may appear to it to be most consistent
with the fundamental purpose of the proceeding. The
practice of some judges of requiring pleadings to be
filed within specified periods and holding pre-trials is
definitely outside of the contemplation of the law. It is
not conformable to its spirit. (See. 6, Rule 135).
Barring unusual and inevitable circumstances, this kind
of proceedings should consume but a number of days,
if not hours. All that the judge has to determine is
whether the copies of the genuine election returns
submitted to it, tally with each other or not, as to the
votes of the candidates concerned, and if they don't,
he should promptly proceed to have the corresponding
ballot box brought to the court and opened and then
count the votes of the candidates for the office in
question as they appear on the face of the ballots
found therein without in any manner applying the rules
on appreciation of ballots and without passing on their
validity, which are matters that should be reserved for

an election contest. (Cawa, et al. vs. Del Rosario, G.R.

No. L-16837, May 30, 1960; Samson vs. Estenzo, 106
Phil. 1140.) It is obvious that such a simple function
can be performed and finished in a very short time.
These considerations are equally persuasive against
allowing any appeal from the court's orders in the
premises. As already stated, the purpose of the
proceeding is the prompt if not immediate solution to a
problem related to the proclamation of the apparent
winner in an election which as a rule must be made
before the term of the contested office begins, and the
matter placed before the judge for action is so simple
that from the very nature of the action the court is
required to take, the principal ingredient of review
thereof by a higher court is wanting, namely, the
element of finality in the consequences of the
pronouncements the judge is called upon to make,
considering that whatever be the outcome of the
recount and the resolutions of the court in the course
thereof as well as the subsequent canvass based
thereon may still be reopened and passed upon in the
ensuing electoral contest should there be any. In other
words, whatever resolution the court may make
therein can at best have only provisional legal
consequences, not in any way controlling in the
eventual electoral protest case that may follow.
For all the foregoing considerations, We hold that
respondent judge erred in holding albeit impliedly that
his order of April 1, 1968, denying the petition for
recount of herein respondent had any period of finality

before it could be executed. We further hold that such

kind of order is immediately executory and the only
way to stop its implementation or compliance is thru
an order of a higher court in an appropriate special
remedy as above indicated. Otherwise stated, it is the
holding of this Court that immediately after a recount
of votes has been made and certified by the Court of
First Instance pursuant to Section 163 and 168 of the
Revised Election Code, or after it has issued an order
of denial of the petition for such a recount, the court
becomes functus officio and is henceforth powerless to
issue any order in connection therewith except,
perhaps, such as will insure the expedient effectuation
of its basic order.
It is, therefore, sufficient answer to respondent
Seria's contention to the effect that respondent
judge's annulment order is merely a consequence of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the latter
upon the filing of the petition for recount to say that
said writ lost its force and effect upon the issuance of
the order denying the petition, not only because
respondent judge did, in fact, declare in the same
order that the said "writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the (this) Court shall be automatically
dissolved," which dissolution is it itself immediately
executory, but also because being a mere auxiliary
remedy to the main petition, it could not have survived
beyond the life of such principal remedy.
With regard to the same respondent's contention in his
answer that the proclamation in question was null and

void because it was made in violation of a Comelec

resolution of December 20, 1967 ordering the
suspension of said proclamation until further orders of
the Commission, and none such has come, it must be
clarified that the two proceedings, the one before the
respondent judge and that before the Comelec are
distinct and separate ones. As a matter of fact the
respondent judge did not base his order of annulment
on the Comelec resolution but on the theory alone that
his order of denial of March 13, 1968 had not yet
become final. Indeed, this could have been due to the
fact that this point was not raised in the court below,
and it is doubtful if it can be raised for the first time in
this certiorari. In any event, the Comelec has broad
powers to enforce its own injunctions by its own fiat
and it would be less productive of confusion and
conflict of authority for the courts to keep off where
the Comelec has already assumed its jurisdiction. After
all, it bears repeating here, the authority of the courts
under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code is
strictly limited only to the recount of the votes, if the
requisites therefor appear to it to be existent, and
whether or not its certification of the results of the
recount will be utilized properly by the election officials
is entirely another matter which, if necessary, has to
be the subject of another entirely distinct proceeding.
Coming now to the second petition before Us, We do
not find any plausible legal basis therefor. Petitioner
seeks to enjoin the Comelec from investigating the
election returns for Precinct 20, the same one subject
of the first petition disposed of above, allegedly

because the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon had

already made an adverse finding as to its integrity. To
start with, it is to be noted that petitioner's pose is
quite inconsistent. The order of the Court of First
Instance of Bukidnon, which according to petitioner,
found "that the Provincial Treasurer's copy of the
election returns for Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe,
Bukidnon, was spurious and of doubtful origin the
reason that it was found only inside the mail box of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, on December 9, 1968, long
after the canvassing of votes for and the proclamation
of the Provincial Officials of Bukidnon in the last
elections" was made in the court's order of January 17,
1968. Said order was issued only as a preliminary step
to the recount sought by respondent Seria. Petitioner
knows very well, however, that precisely upon his own
motion, the order of February 7th which granted the
petition for recount, was reconsidered and set aside in
the order of March 13, 1968, which upheld petitioner's
contention that the court had no authority to make the
recount requested. It is not clear to Us, how petitioner
can base his challenge against the Comelec's
actuation on a proceeding he has successfully
challenged to have been conducted without
jurisdiction. The order of January 17th was a denial of a
motion to reconsider a previous order of the court
denying, in turn, an earlier motion of respondent
Seria asking for production of the envelope
containing the copy of the return intended for the
Provincial Treasurer in order to be used in the
determination of discrepancy among the genuine

copies of the returns, and as the recount was

ultimately denied by the court, for want of jurisdiction,
it logically follows that whatever finding the court had
made in the process should lose any legal significance.
We hold that inasmuch as the finding relied upon by
petitioner was made in an order which was merely
preparatory to a judicial recount which could not be
held because the court was without jurisdiction or
would have acted in excess of its jurisdiction, the same
cannot serve any legal purpose, since in law, it is
devoid of any existence whatsoever. Incidentally, the
point raised by petitioner regarding the effect of the
failure of the parties to take any appeal from the order
of January 17th deserves scant consideration, for the
simple reason that the said order was at best
interlocutory and whatever legal significance it might
have had was completely absorbed in the final result
of the proceedings. Accordingly, the main basis of the
present petition against the Comelec must fall.
Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that
proceedings under Section 163 of the Revised Election
Code are exclusively for purposes of the recount
therein requested only, hence any ruling of the Court
made in the course thereof cannot have the effect
of res adjudicata upon proceedings for any other
purpose whether in court or in the Comelec. This is
perhaps even more true with respect to the Comelec,
in so far as the genuineness of the returns are
concerned, because in Ong vs. Comelec, supra, it was
held that the investigation of this matter pertains

peculiarly to the province of the Comelec. We reiterate

that:
3. Appropriately to be drawn then is the line that
divide the powers of the boards of canvassers
and the Comelec on the one hand, and the
Court of First Instance, on the other. We are
unprepared to say that the election law
intended that where, in a given precinct, some
of the returns are authentic and others are
falsified, both the Comelec and the Court of First
Instance will have concurrent jurisdiction prior
to proclamation. Such procedure breeds
confusion. It detracts so much from the powers
granted the boards of canvassers and Comelec
to proceed with dispatch with the work of
canvassing and proclamation.
Where before or during canvassing or before
proclamation representations are made that
returns are falsified, it becomes the primary
duty, first of the board of canvassers, and then
of the Comelec to ascertain this fact.

If, on the other hand, the discrepancy in the

returns was the result of honest mistakes of the
board of inspectors, two courses of action are
open in the court of first instance: (1) a petition
for correction of returns with the consent of all
the members of the board of inspectors under
Section 154 of the Revised Election Code
[Section 154, Revised Election Code, reads:
"Alterations in the statement. After the
announcement of the result of the election in
the polling place, the board of inspectors shall
not make any alteration or amendment in any of
its statements, unless it be so ordered by a
competent court." Unanimity of the board of
inspectors has long been considered to be a
requisite
to
correction
under
this
provision. Estrada vs. Navarro, L-28340 & L28374, December 29, 1967, and cases cited
therein and (2) a petition by the said board or
any candidate affected for summary judicial
recount under Sections 163 and 168 of the
same Code.
Earlier, in Cauton vs. Comelec, We ruled:

If finally the Comelec summarily finds that there

was falsification of the copies to be used for
canvassing purposes, then canvassing must be
made upon the basis of authentic copies.
Because a falsified return or spurious return
amounts to no return at all.

Where the election returns produced by the

provincial treasurer have been shown to have
been tampered, and all the other copies outside
the ballot box have also been shown to have
been tampered or falsified, it is certainly within
the power of the Commission on Elections to
issue such order as would ascertain the

existence of the genuine, authentic and

untampered election returns, and thus open the
way for the summary recount of the votes, in
accordance with law, for the purposes only of
the canvass of the votes and the proclamation
of the candidate found to have obtained the
highest number of votes.
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to
protect the integrity of elections and to suppress
all evils that may violate its purity and defeat
the will of the voters. ... The Commission on
Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and
honest canvass of the votes cast in the
elections. In the performance of its duties, the
Commission must be given a considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created to promote
free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of
means taken by the Commission on Elections,
unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave
abuse of discretion should not be interferred
with ...
The present case comes squarely within the scope of
the powers of the Comelec thus defined and explained.
To be clearer, should it happen that the Comelec
discovers a discrepancy between the returns already
examined by the court, on the one hand, and any
other genuine copy thereof not yet brought to the

court, on the other, the Comelec may require the

parties concerned to request for a judicial recount in
spite of a previous order of denial thereof on the basis
only of the formerly extant copies.
Finally, in the case of Chiongbian vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
L-19202, February 20, 1962 (decided by resolution),
this Court did hold that when there is evidence that
the ballot box and the ballots therein have been
tampered prior to a judicial recount, the recount even
if conducted already may be disregarded in favor of
the contents of genuine copies of the return before the
court. We make it clear, however, that the finding of
tampering by the court therein served no other end
than to make the recount prayed for pointless, but
such finding could not have any binding effect or any
legal significance in the ensuing electoral protest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L29177 is granted and the order of respondent judge of
March 14, 1968 declaring null and void the
proclamation of petitioner Villalon as the elected
mayor of Kibawe, Bukidnon, is hereby annulled and set
aside, without prejudice to whatever action may be
taken by the Comelec or any steps the interested
parties may wish to initiate in regard to the Comelec
resolution ordering the suspension of the canvass of
the votes for mayor of said municipality, but the
petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. L29394 is hereby dismissed, with costs against
respondent Seria in the first case and against
petitioner Villalon in the second case.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

Fernando, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Sanchez, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 107854 July 16, 1993

DATU
SUKARNO
S.
SAMAD, petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC AND BAI UNGGIE ABDULA, respondents.
G.R. No. 108642 July 16, 1993

DATU
SUKARNO
S.
SAMAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ANTONIO
CARPIO AND BAI UNGGIE ABDULA, respondents.
Kamid D. Abdul for petitioner.
Pedro Q. Quadra for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions
involving the position of Mayor in the Municipality of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Petitioner Sukarno S.
Samad and private respondent Bai Unggie Abdula
were among the contenders for this office in the
synchronized elections of May 11, 1992. Both were
proclaimed mayor-elect by two different canvassing
boards the private respondent, by the board headed
by Abas A. Saga, on May 28, 1992, and the petitioner,
by the board headed by Mucado M. Pagayao, on May
29, 1992. Both went to the Commission on Elections in
separate petitions against each other.
In SPA 92-314, which was filed on June 1, 1992, Samad
sought the nullification of the proclamation made in
favor of Abdula and the calling of a special election in
three precincts. In SPC 92-421, which was filed on
August 14, 1992, Abdula prayed that the proclamation
of Samad be nullified and that he be enjoined from

assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan. The two petitions

were consolidated and raffled to the First Division of
the COMELEC.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC issued a resolution in
SPA 92-314 directing its Law Department to: 1)
summon both election registrars Saga and Pagayao to
appear before the Commission; 2) conduct an
investigation of the matter with a view to the
prosecution of any one found responsible for
falsification of the election documents; and 3) require
Election Supervisor Carmencita Cabacungan to
comment on the petition.
On that same date, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2489 declaring the termination of all preproclamation cases except the 86 cases named in the
list annexed thereto. SPA 92-314 was not included in
the list. (SPC-92-421 had not yet been filed at that
time.)
On July 2, 1992, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City an action against the private
respondent forquo warranto and prohibition with
preliminary injunction. This was docketed as SPL Civil
Case 2938 in Branch 13.
Judge Emmanuel D. Badoy initially opined that he had
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition but he later
changed his mind and issued a temporary restraining
order, converted into a writ of preliminary injunction
on August 14, 1992, directing private respondent

Abdula to cease and desist from exercising the powers

and functions of the mayor of Kabuntalan and
enjoining all officials and entities to respect the
proclamation of petitioner Samad. 1
On that same day, Abdula filed a petition with the
Court of Appeals, later docketed as CA-GR SP No.
28683, questioning the validity of the order. On August
20,1992, the court issued a resolution enjoining its
implementation. 2
On November 4, 1992, after finding that both the
conflicting certificates of canvass and proclamation
prepared by the Saga and Pagayao boards of
canvassers were defective, the First Division of the
COMELEC denied the consolidated petitions and
directed the Office of the Executive Director to
constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the
purpose of verifying which of the two sets of
statements of votes upon which the two different
proclamation documents were based was genuine,
without prejudice to the resolution of the prayer for
special elections in Kabuntalan. 3
On November 27, 1992, acting on Samad's motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc sustained its
First Division. It also declared that pending
implementation of the challenged resolution, it was the
responsibility of the Department of Interior and Local
Government to designate an OIC-Mayor in the
Municipality of Kabuntalan. 4

This declaration prompted Samad to file with this Court

a petition for certiorari with restraining order and
injunction. On December 3, 1992, we issued a
temporary
restraining
order
commanding
the
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
questioned resolutions. 5
On December 9, 1992, the DILG issued a letterdirective recognizing the petitioner as mayor of
Kabuntalan, but on December 14, 1992, it allegedly
issued another letter, this time authorizing the private
respondent to continue serving as a hold-over mayor.
Samad then came again to this Court in a petition
for certiorari. This was referred to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-GR SP No. 29942, and consolidated
with CA-GR SP No. 28683.
On January 5, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos
designated respondent Abdula as officer-in-charge of
the Office of the Mayor of Kabuntalan. 6 Samad's
reaction was to file with this Court on February 8,
1993, a petition questioning this designation. This was
docketed as G.R. No. 108642. On February 18, 1993,
we issued a restraining order: 1) directing respondents
Executive Secretary Edelmiro Amante and Presidential
Legal Counsel Antonio Carpio to cease and desist from
implementing the questioned designation; and
2) restraining respondent Abdula from assuming the
position
and
functions
as
OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan. 7 G.R. No. 108642 and G.R.
No. 107854 were also consolidated.

Samad later filed with the Court of Appeals a

Manifestation that he had no objection to the dismissal
of CA-GR 29942, the same having no more basis
because the December 14, 1992 letter recognizing
Abdula as hold-over mayor was a forgery, as
evidenced by the affidavit of Secretary Rafael Alunan.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said
case on March 12, 1993. It further suspended the
resolution of CA-G.R. 28683 to avoid the possibility of
conflicting decisions on these closely-related cases and
in deference to the two restraining orders issued by
this Court in GR Nos. 107854 and 108642. At the same
time, it issued a preliminary injunction restraining the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City from conducting
further proceedings in SPL Civil Case No. 2938 (330). 8
The issues raised by petitioner Samad in these
consolidated petitions are as follows:
G.R. No. 107854: Whether or not the
COMELEC acted arbitrarily and in
derogation
of
existing
laws
and
jurisprudence
in:
a)
directing
the
Executive Director to constitute a Special
Board of Canvassers to determine the
winner in the mayoralty election, without
prejudice to the resolution of the other
issue of whether or not to call a special
election, despite the fact that this case
was deemed terminated in view of the
COMELEC Resolution No. 2489; and b)

denying his motion for reconsideration

instead of dismissing both petitions and
paving
the
way
for
a
judicial
determination of the instant controversy
by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato
City, subject to the review of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 108642: Whether or not, the
President
of
the
Philippines
had
jurisdiction and/or authority to appoint
the private respondent as OIC in the
office of the Mayor of Kabuntalan in spite
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato
City which ordered the latter to cease and
desist from performing the functions of
mayor of Kabuntalan, and enjoined
officials and entities to respect herein
petitioner's proclamation as the duly
elected mayor of the said municipality.
It is necessary first to determine whether jurisdiction
over the present controversy remained with the
COMELEC or was vested in the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City upon the filing of the petition for quo
warranto.
The petitioner contends that SPA 92-314 was
terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 2489, as
authorized by R.A. 7166, because it was not among

the 86 cases enumerated in the list annexed to the

said resolution that as exceptions thereto, could
continue to be heard by the COMELEC.
This contention is not well taken.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 reads in part as follows:
WHEREAS, the second paragraph of Sec.
16, Republic Act No. 7166, provides:
All pre-proclamation cases pending before
the Commission shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term
of office involved and the rulings of the
boards of canvassers concerned shall "be
deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest by the
aggrieved party. However, proceedings
may continue when on the basis of the
evidence
thus
far
presented,
the
Commission determines that the petition
appears meritorious and accordingly
issues an order for the proceeding to
continue or when an appropriate order
has been issued by the Supreme Court
petition for certiorari.
xxx xxx xxx
3) All other pre-proclamation cases which
do not fall within the class of cases

specified under paragraphs (1) and (2)

immediately preceding are deemed
terminated by operation of law. Hence, all
the rulings of boards of canvassers
concerned are affirmed. Such affected
boards of canvassers are directed to
reconvene forthwith, continue their
respective
canvass
and
proclaim
accordingly, if the proceedings were
suspended by virtue of pending preproclamation cases;
4)
All
pending
petitions
for
disqualification, failure of elections or
analogous
cases,
not
being
preproclamation
controversies
and,
therefore, not governed by Sections 17,
18, 19, 20, 21 and particularly, by the
second paragraph of Sec. 16, Republic Act
No. 7166, shall remain active cases, the
proceedings to continue beyond June 30,
1992, until the issues therein are finally
resolved by the Commission; and
5) The remaining pre-proclamation cases,
which on the basis of the evidence thus
far presented, appear meritorious and/or
are subject of orders by the Supreme
Court or this Commission in petitions
brought respectively to them thereby
requiring the proceedings therein to

continue beyond 30 June 1992 until they

are finally, resolved.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered that
the proceedings in the eighty six (86)
cases appearing on the list annexed and
made an integral part hereof, be
continued to be heard and disposed of by
the Commission. (Rollo, p.143-144).
SPA 92-314 was not only for the annulment of Abdula's
proclamation but also for the holding of special
elections in three precincts. It therefore fell under
Section 4 of the afore-quoted resolution.
Moreover, although not included in the list of cases
that could continue to be heard by the COMELEC, SPA
92-314 remained active because on June 29, 1992, the
same day Resolution No. 2489 was issued, the
COMELEC en banc, after finding that there were two
Certificates of Canvass and Proclamation and two
proclaimed mayors, issued another resolution requiring
both Election Registrars Saga and Pagayao to appear
before it, and the Election Supervisor Cabacungan to
comment on the petition.
Even assuming that SPA 92-314 was a purely preproclamation case, it could nevertheless continue
beyond June 30, 1992, pursuant to Section 5 of
Resolution No. 2489, because it was the subject of the
said order.

It should also be noted that upon Abdula's motion, the

COMELEC on September 11, 1992, ordered the said
case, then pending in the First Division, to be
consolidated with SPC 92-421 in the Second Division.
What was the effect upon the cases pending in the
COMELEC of the filing by Samad of the petition for quo
warranto in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City?
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent
filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, 9 or amounts
to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving
the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass
upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. 10 The reason is that once the competent
tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative
thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and
not in another proceeding. 11 This procedure will
prevent
confusion
and
conflict
of
authority.
Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that
after a proclamation has been made, a preproclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer
viable. 12
The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: 1)
the board of canvassers was improperly constituted;
2) quo warrantowas not the proper remedy; 14 3) what
was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; 15 4) the filing of a quo warranto petition

or an election protest was expressly made without

prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was
made ad cautelam; 16 and 5) the proclamation was null
and void. 17
All the exceptions except the fourth apply here.
The Saga board which proclaimed the private
respondent had been illegally constituted. As held by
the COMELEC, the letter of request dated May 27,
1992, of the Municipal Treasurer of Kabuntalan did not
serve as an official designation of Abbas Saga to take
over the canvassing allegedly abandoned by Mucado
Pagayao, because Bernardita Cabacungan, the Election
Supervisor of Maguindanao, denied having signed her
name after the word "Approved." She declared that it
was Mucado Pagayao whom she had instructed to
continue the canvassing after the former chairman had
been relieved by her.
Moreover, quo warranto was not the proper remedy
because both the petitioner and the private
respondent claimed to have assumed the office of the
mayor of Kabuntalan. 18 In a quo warranto proceeding,
the petitioner is not occupying the position in dispute.
Moreover, under the Omnibus Election Code, quo
warranto is proper only for the purpose of questioning
the election of a candidate on the ground of disloyalty
or ineligibility. Neither of these grounds was invoked by
Samad in SPL Civil Case 2938.

No less importantly, the case before the Regional Trial

Court of Cotabato City was not really one for quo
warranto nor was it an election protest.
A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus
Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding
to unseat the respondent from office but not
necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. 19
An election protest is a contest between the defeated
and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or
irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots,
or in the preparation of the returns. 20 It raises the
question of who actually obtained the plurality of the
legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.
Both petitions in the COMELEC and in the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato were directed at the illegality of the
composition of the Saga board and of the proclamation
of the private respondent. This matter is within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Sections 241, 242,
and 243 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as
follows:
Sec. 241. Definition A pre-proclamation
controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings
of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party before the board
or directly with the Commission.

Sec.
242.
Commission's
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
all
proclamation
controversies The Commission shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all preproclamation controversies.
It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after
due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate
elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if
one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in
accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in
pre-proclamation controversy The
following shall be proper issues that may
be
raised
in
a
pre-proclamation
controversy.
a) Illegal composition or proceeding of the
board of canvassers;
xxx xxx xxx

has not been held on the date fixed, . . .

and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice
and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held on
the date of the election but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the
cause
of
such
postponement
or
suspension of the election or failure to
elect. (Omnibus Election Code)
Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election
and
Special
Elections.
The
postponement, declaration of failure of
elections and the calling of special
elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and
7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
decided by the Commission sitting en
banc by a majority of its members
(Republic Act 7166).

The question of whether or not special elections should

be called in the three precincts is also cognizable by
the COMELEC under the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

We hold therefore that the COMELEC retained

jurisdiction over SPA 92-314 and SPC 92-421.

Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on

account of force
majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes, the election in any polling place

Turning now to the merits of the assailed resolutions,

this Court finds that the COMELEC should not have
denied the consolidated petitions for the annulment of
the questioned proclamations. Having ascertained that
the proclamation in favor of Abdula had been made by

a board constituted without proper authority, the

COMELEC should have declared such proclamation null
and void, along with the certificate of canvass and
proclamation and the statements of votes prepared by
that board.
But ironically enough, this ruling can only give cold
comfort to Samad. We find that his proclamation does
not fare any better because it is also null and void.
In its Report on the Status of Canvassing dated May
29, 1992 the Pagayao board declared:
Please be informed that the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao had terminated the canvass
of the 66 election returns as of May 26,
1992 at around 3:00 P.M. out of 69
precincts.
As reported, 2 precincts did not function
on election day and for 1 precinct, the
election returns were all missing as
follows:
BARANGAY
REMARKS

PRECINCT

REG.

VOTERS

1.
xxxxx
3-A
214
No
election
2.
xxxxx
4-A
196
No
election
3. xxxxx 13 224 Election returns
missing

It may be stated that the canvass of the

returns for the National Office was
finished by the previous Chairman of the
Board, Election Registrar Abdul Dimalen.
We took over on May 23, 1992 upon the
directive
of
Atty.
Bernardita
P.
Cabacungan, OIC Provincial Election
Officer of Maguindanao and Chairmandesignate of the board.
The new Board, canvassed the election
returns for local officials. Right after the
tabulation of votes but before we
prepared the certificate of votes obtained
by the local candidates for the Municipal
Offices there was a pressure exerted,
upon the individual members of the Board
to proclaim Bai Unggie Abdula who
appear to be winning by a margin of 153
votes over her closest rival Sukarno
Samad.
The board held that it cannot proclaim
because the result will be affected by the
two (2) precincts that did not function and
one (1) precinct the election returns of
which were missing.
xxx xxx xxx
In view whereof, we are submitting this
report without any tabulation of votes

showing the standing of each candidate

and to inform the Commission that the
duly constituted Board of Canvassers has
not proclaimed any winner until ordered
by the Commission on Elections.
In fact, no less than Samad himself averred in his
petition with the COMELEC:
4. That the proclamation was premature
as there were still three precincts which
were not accounted for with a total
number of 660 registered voters (2
precincts failed to function while the
ballot box of the other one was declared
missing by the Chairman and members of
the Board of Election Inspectors) . . . .
That the lead of respondent Bai Unggie D.
Abdula over that of petitioner is only
about 153 votes which can be overcome
by the numbers of votes involved in the
above-stated precincts.
It is settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is
illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid
proclamation. 21 All the votes cast in the election must
be counted and all the returns presented to the board
must be considered as the disregard of some returns
would in effect disenfranchise the voters affected. 22 A
canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless all the returns are considered. 23

The canvass of the mayoralty election was incomplete

because there were still three precincts with a total of
660 registered voters that had not sent in their
returns. Precincts 3-A and 4-A reportedly did not
function on election day, and the election returns in
Precinct No. 13 were missing.
In this situation, the COMELEC should determine
whether there was indeed a failure of election that
would necessitate the calling of a special election in
the said precincts. Regarding the missing election
returns in Precinct No. 13, Section 233 of the Omnibus
Election Code mandates the board of canvassers to
obtain them from the corresponding boards of election
inspectors. If these returns have been lost or
destroyed, the board may, upon prior authority of the
Commission, resort to any of the authentic copies of
said election returns or a certified copy of said election
returns issued by the Commission. Any proclamation in
violation of this provision is null and void under Section
238 of the Code.
It is only when authorized by the COMELEC or when
the missing election returns will not affect the results
of the election that the board can terminate the
canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the
basis of the available returns. Precinct No. 13 had 224
registered voters and the margin between the
petitioner and the private respondent is allegedly 153
votes only. As the missing election returns of that
precinct will affect the outcome of the election, no
proclamation can as yet be made.

The Pagayao board was aware of this and in fact

declared in its report that "it cannot proclaim because
the result will be affected by the two (2) precincts that
did not function and the one (1) precinct, the election
returns of which were missing." Yet, on May 29, 1992,
the same day the report was made, the Pagayao board
proceeded to proclaim petitioner Samad as mayorelect over Abdula and the other candidates.
Undoubtedly, the said proclamation produced no legal
effect whatsoever.
It is noteworthy that, the COMELEC found the
Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation dated May 29,
1992 to be not credible because it was inconsistent
with the board's "Report on the Status of Canvassing,"
also dated May 29, 1992, that it had not yet
proclaimed the winner. Also, while Pagayao declared in
his sworn statement that the proclamation was held at
the Regional Office of Cotabato City, the certificate
stated that the venue was PC Hill, Cotabato City.
It was these uncertainties about the validity of the
certificate of canvass that prompted the COMELEC to
constitute a, Special Board of Canvassers to ascertain
the winner in the mayoralty race. This action is in our
view not whimsical or arbitrary and so cannot be
interfered with by this Court.
We must also reject the contention that the private
respondent is now estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City
over SPL Civil Case No. 2938. We find that in her

Answer with Motion to Dismiss dated July 7, 1992,

Abdula did in fact argue that the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Inasmuch as it is the COMELEC that has exclusive
jurisdiction over the present controversy, the
restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City are
void ab initio. Consequently, President Ramos did not
act improperly when he designated the private
respondent as OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan pending final
resolution of the dispute. The designation was in
accordance with the case of Sanchez v. Commission
on Elections, 24where this Court recognized the
authority of the President of the Philippines to appoint
an officer-in-charge of the office of mayor of San
Fernando, Pampanga, pending settlement of the
controversy over the position.
The private respondent accuses the petitioner of
forum-shopping for having filed a quo warranto case
with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City although
the COMELEC continued to have jurisdiction over the
controversy. It is also asserted that the petitions filed
by Samad with this Court in G.R. Nos. L-108642 and L107854 and with the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP.
Nos. 28683 and 29942 involve the very same issue of
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Samad contends that it is the
private respondent who is guilty of forum-shopping
because she filed a petition praying for the affirmance

of her proclamation and the nullification of the

petitioner's when that same prayer, which was
contained in her comment in SPA 92-314, was not
granted in that case.
This Court has held in a long line of decisions that
"there is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to
suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, in order to
defeat administrative processes and in anticipation, of
an unfavorable court ruling." 25
We find that the petitioner filed with the lower court a
petition for quo warranto because he believed that SPC
92-314 had been terminated under COMELEC
Resolution 2489. He therefore cannot be faulted for
going to the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City to
continue his challenge to Abdula's proclamation.
Samad was obviously acting pursuant to Section 16 of
RA 7166, providing that the termination of the preproclamation cases is without prejudice to the filing by
the aggrieved party of a regular election protest.
The second ground raised by the private respondent is
also untenable.
In CA-GR. SP No. 28683, the petitioner impugned the
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by

the lower court on August 14, 1992, whereas in CA-GR.

SP No. 29942, he questioned the alleged appointment
dated December 14, 1992 of the private respondent as
hold-over mayor of Kabuntalan. On the other hand,
G.R. Nos. 107854 and 108642 were petitions assailing
the resolutions of the COMELEC dated November 4,
1992 and November 27, 1992, and the appointment
made by the President on January 5, 1993 in favor of
the private respondent as OIC-Mayor of the said
municipality.
The causes of action, subject matter, and issues raised
in these four petitions are not identical. There is forumshopping only where the actions involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances. 26
Neither is the private respondent guilty of the same
charge. The fact that she prayed for the affirmance of
her proclamation and the nullification of that of
petitioner Samad does not make Abdula guilty of
forum-shopping. The reason is that she sought this
relief from one and the same forum, to wit, the
COMELEC. Moreover, at the time she filed her petition
in SPC 92-421, no adverse ruling or opinion had as yet
been rendered by the COMELEC on these issues in SPA
92-314.
We defer ruling on the motion to cite the respondent in
contempt pending receipt of her comment thereon. In
the meantime, so as not to unduly delay resolution of
this controversy and ascertainment of the winner in

the election for mayor of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao,

we hereby promulgate this decision on the merits of
the two petitions.
WHEREFORE,
rendered:

judgment

is

hereby

1) allowing the private respondent to

continue discharging the duties and
functions as OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan;
2) ordering the Commission on Elections
to:
a) declare the proclamation
of both the petitioner and
the private respondent null
and void;
b) resolve with dispatch the
question of whether or not a
special election should be
called
in
the
precincts
affected;
c) proceed with the creation
of a Special Board of
Canvassers to proclaim, after
proper canvass, the mayorelect
of
Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao; and

3) ordering the Regional Trial Court,

Cotabato City, Branch 13, to dismiss SPL
Civil Case 2938.
The temporary restraining orders dated December 3,
1992, and February 18, 1993, are LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.

as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her

assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.

P.E.T. Case No. 001

February 13, 1996

MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,
vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.
RESOLUTION
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her
Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in
the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed
with and the revision process in the pilot areas be
deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the
Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective
memoranda on the issue of whether this case had
been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant

The Protestant answers this issue in the negative.

Relying
on Sibulo
vda. de
De
Mesa
vs. Mencias,1 Lomugdang vs.Javier,2 and De Castro
vs. Ginete,3 she asserts that an election contest
involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the
private interests of the rival candidates, but more
importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and
for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of
the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public interest
and should be pursued to its final conclusion to
determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts
that an election case may be rendered moot only if the
term of the contested office has expired,4 thus her
election as Senator and assumption of office as such
cannot, under the rule laid down in Moraleja
vs. Relova,5 be construed as an abandonment of the
instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has
departed from the orthodox view that a case should be
dismissed if it has been mooted.6
For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong
legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the Protestant
is deemed to have abandoned the instant protest, in
light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra7 which
construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code).8 He submits, however, that
public interest requires that this protest be resolved on
the merits considering that: (a) it involves a matter of
paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was
filed merely to keep Protestant Santiago in the
limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign.
He likewise claims that a resolution on the merits
would confirm his victory in the 11 May 1992

presidential election and prove that the instant protest

is unfounded. Further more, it would establish guiding
and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to
presidential election protest cases, thereby educating
the bench and the bar and preventing the
indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that
by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator
Protestant Santiagoipso facto forfeited her claim to the
office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg.
881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to
an incumbent elective official who files a certificate of
candidacy for any office "other than the one he is
holding in a permanent capacity." Even more plain is
that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy for
Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding
in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.
Neither do we find any convincing logic to the
Protestee's proposition that this case should
nevertheless be resolved on the merits because its
filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep the
Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her
Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public
interest would be served if this case were put to an
abrupt end after the Protestant won a seat in the
Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent nor
compelling reason to proceed with this case, in the
event that we find it to be moot, simply to establish
guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with
respect to election protests involving the office of the
President or the Vice-President.
I.

The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue

is the consideration of public interest and public policy
and their encompassing effects on election cases
which have been unequivocally expressed in the cases
cited by the Protestant.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court
stated:
It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving
as it does not only the adjudication and
settlement of the private interests of the rival
candidates but also the paramount need of
dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that
beclouds the real choice of the electorate with
respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives
of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding
imbued with public interest which raises it onto
a plane over and above ordinary civil actions.
For this reason, broad perspectives of public
policy impose upon courts the imperative duty
to ascertain by all means within their command
who is the real candidate elected in as
expeditious a manner as possible, without being
fettered by technicalities and procedural
barriers to the end that the will of the people
may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al.,
G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs.
De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So
inextricably intertwined are the interests of the
contestants and those of the public that there
can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition
that even the voluntary cessation in office of the
protestee not only does not ipso factodivest him
or the character of an adversary in the contest
inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep

his political opponent out of the office and

maintain therein his successor, but also does
not in any manner impair or detract from the
jurisdiction of the court to pursue the
proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los
Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597;
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587;
Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
Upon the same principle, the death of the
protestee De Mesa did not abate the
proceedings in the election protest filed against
him, and it may be stated as a rule that an
election contest survives and must be
prosecuted to final judgment despite the death
of the protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA
520 [1967], where the trial court proceeded with
the trial of an election protest and decided it
even if the protestee had already died and his
Vice-Mayor had assumed office by succession,
this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal
brought on behalf of the deceased protestee,
required the Vice-Mayor to intervene on the side
of the appellant)
In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared:
Determination of what candidate has been in
fact elected is a matter clothed with public
interest, wherefore, public policy demands that
an election contest, duly commenced, be not
abated by the death of the contestant. We have
squarely so ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa
vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October
26, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court
to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is

not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57),

and that the protestee's cessation in office is not
a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor
detract the Court's jurisdiction to decide the
case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595;
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).
In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this
Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7,
Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor elect has the
status of a real party in interest in the
continuation of the proceedings and is entitled
to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds
and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor
succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes
vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the
post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled:
As to the contention that by accepting such
appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant
has abandoned his protest, all that need be said
is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction
over an election contest, the public interest
involved demands that the true winner be
known without regard to the wishes or acts of
the parties, so much so that there can be no
default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in
this kind of cases. (Francisco, How To Try
Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz,
62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the
acceptance by the protestee of an appointment
to another position is not a ground for dismissal
of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by
Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-259, citing Calvo v.

Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918)

like the resignation of the protestee from the
contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil.
595), simply because it is of public interest that
the real winner be known, neither can the
acceptance of a more or less temporary
employment, such as that of a technical
assistant of the Vice-Governor, which is a
primarily confidential position, be considered as
inconsistent with protestant's determination to
protect and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. In such instances, the plight of
protestant may be viewed in the same light as
that of an employee who has been illegally
dismissed and who, to find means to support
himself and family while he prosecutes his case
for
reinstatement,
accepts
a
temporary
employment elsewhere. Such employee is not
deemed to have abandoned the position he
seeks to recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No.
L-12525, February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot
v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82
Phil. 679). Of course, the case of protestant who
accepts a permanent appointment to a regular
office could be different, but We are not ruling
on it here.
In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated:
The purpose of an election protest is to
ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed
elected by the board of canvassers is really the
lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in
an election protest is the correction of the
canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the

proclamation of the winning candidate. An

election contest involves a public office in which
the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a
losing candidate of recognizing the one who is
proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing
candidate from questioning the validity of the
election of the winner in the manner provided
by law.
The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours
with the instant protest.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case
of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been
proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate and had
assumed office, and then died during the pendency of
the election protest. While inLomugdang, it was the
protestant who died during the pendency of the
protest.
In Moraleja, the election protest survived the
protestant's acceptance of temporary employment
during the pendency of his election protest. Likewise,
in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited in Sibulo
vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued
despite the resignation from office of the protestee.
Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was
whether the protest should be dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. In this proceeding, the protestant
congratulated the protestee after the latter was
proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers and
even exhorted those present during the inauguration
and installation into office of the protestee to support
the latter's administration.

May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant

Santiago who assumed the office of Senator after her
election as such in the 8 May 1995 election? This
question was impliedly raised but not resolved
in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by
the protestant therein of a temporary appointment
during the pendency of his protest did not amount to
an abandonment thereof, nor could it be considered
inconsistent with his determination to protect and
pursue the public interest involved in the election
protest, this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a
protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a
regular office could be different, but We are not ruling
on it here."15
Indeed, it would be entirely different where the
protestant pursued the new position through a popular
election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who
filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May
1995 election, campaigned for such office, and
submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the
term of office of the Senators who would then be
elected would be six years, to commence at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their
election16 and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing
her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most
unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to
serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the
outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any
qualification, condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with
the electorate that if elected, she would assume the
office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her
constituency as such for the term for which she was

elected. These are givens which are in full accord with

the principle enshrined in the Constitution that, public
office is a public trust, and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people and serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.17
Indeed, it has been aptly said:
It is impossible that government shall be carried
on, and the functions of civil society exercised,
without the aid and intervention of public
servants or officers, and every person,
therefore, who enters into civil society and
avails himself of the benefits and protection of
the government, must owe to this society, or, in
other words, to the public, at least a social duty
to bear his share of the public burdens, by
accepting and performing, under reasonable
circumstances, the duties of those public offices
to which he may be lawfully chosen.18
In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even
be held criminally liable should he refuse to discharge
an elective office.19
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May
1995 election is six years, the first three of which
coincides with the last three years of the term of the
President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's
term if she would succeed in proving in the instant
protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992
elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the
Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this
protest, or at the very least, in the language

of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect

and pursue the public interest involved in the matter
of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot
the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this
protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of
the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the
all too crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.

Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those

provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a
suppletory character, 21may likewise be pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the
Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary
hearing on such grounds. 22 In sum, if an election
protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it
must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has
become moot due to its abandonment by the
Protestant.

It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may
be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public
policy and public interest implications thereof, on the
following grounds:

II.

(1) The petition is insufficient in form and

substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods
provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods
provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00
thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing
of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the
annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not
clearly legible.20

There is yet another reason why this case should now

be dismissed.
This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the
Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the
remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out
of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot
areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original
stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18
October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal
declared in its resolution of 21 October 1993:
After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings
and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal
rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of
the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot areas
are concerned, and against the immediate
application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the
Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the
Counter-Protest.
At this stage of the proceedings in this case it
cannot be reasonably determined whether the

revised ballots are "considerable" enough to

establish a trend either in favor of or against the
Protestant as would justify an appropriate action
contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the
Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from
said areas would not, in the language of the
Protestant, "materially affect the result of the
representative sample of the ballot boxes so far
revised." As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from
Makati, the proper time to raise the objections
to the ballot boxes and its contents would be
during the revision stage.
Consequently, we resolved therein to:
A. ORDER the revision of the remaining
unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the
aforequoted paragraph A of the 5 October 1993
Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT the
Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect
said ballot boxes and other election documents
and paraphernalia from their respective
custodians in the event that their revisions in
connection with other election protests in which
they are involved have been terminated, and if
such revisions are not yet completed, to
coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or court
in which such other election protests are
pending and which have already obtained
custody of the ballot boxes and started revision
with the end in view of either seeking
expeditious revisions in such other election
protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot
boxes and related election documents and
paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to
the Tribunal; and

B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the

Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, if after the completion of the revision of
the ballots from her pilot areas she would
present evidence in connection therewith.
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not
informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of
the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still
intends to present evidence in connection therewith.
This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.
It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings
that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the course
of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of
the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and
have objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of
the Protestee. Revision is merely the first stage, and
not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no
uncertain terms then, this Tribunal declared in its
resolution of 18 March 1993 that:
Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer
and a former judge herself, that the revision
phase of her protest is but the first stage in the
resolution of her electoral protest and that the
function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12
February 1993 Comment on Protestee's 5
February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of
a resolution which,inter alia, would clarify that
revisors may observe the objections and/or
claims made by the revisors of the other party
as well as the ballots subject thereof, and record
such observations in a form to be provided for
that purpose, Protestant unequivocally stated:

8. Further, the principle and plan of the

RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal] is to subdivide the entire
election contest into various stages. Thus,
the first stage is the Revision Proper.
Second is the technical examination if so
desired by either party. Third is the
reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the
filing of parties' memoranda.
and described the function of the revisors as
"solely to examine and segregate the ballots
according to which ballots they would like to
contest or object (contested ballots) and those
which they admit or have no objections
(uncontested ballots)." Indeed, revisors do not
have any judicial discretion; their duties are
merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas,
24 Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or
decision on the more crucial or critical matter of
what ballots are to be contested or not does not
even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52
Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168
[1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be
given to the revision phase of an election
contest. It can never serve as a logical or an
acceptable basis for the conclusion that massive
fraud or irregularities were committed during an
election or that a Protestant had won in said
election. If that were so, a Protestant may
contest all ballot boxes and, in the course of the
revision thereof, object for any imagined ground
whatsoever, even if the same be totally
unfounded and ridiculous to all ballots credited
to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the
day, said Protestant may even announce to the

whole world that contrary to what is reflected in

the election returns, Protestee had actually lost
the elections.
All told, a dismissal of
inevitable.

this election

protest is

III.
However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly
disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence, a
reply to the important points they raise is in order.
Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would
dismiss this "election protest as moot and academic on
two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of irregularities
made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of
the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts
are entirely irrelevant; and second, she abandoned her
protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in
the 8 May 1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate.
The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no
room for any doubt or miscomprehension that the
dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has
been rendered moot and academic by its
abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a
consequence of her election and assumption of office
as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof." There is, therefore, ONLY ONE
reason or ground why the protest has been rendered
moot and academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or
withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the
parties were required, in the resolution of 26
September 1995, to submit their respective
memoranda.

The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even

suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently
understood, that this protest has become moot and
academic because the finding of irregularities by the
Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of the
ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in the pilot areas
are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has
abandoned this protest by filing a certificate of
candidacy for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995
elections. The majority's views on "irrelevancy" and
"on the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not
the grounds themselves, but parts only of the
arguments
to
strengthen
the
conclusion
reached, i.e., abandonment. Otherwise stated, in order
to make the point crystal clear, the majority never held
that the irrelevancy of the finding of irregularities is a
ground why this protest has become moot and
academic. It only declared that the Protestant's: (a)
waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the
remaining 4,017 contested precincts in the pilot areas;
and (b) failure to comply with the resolution of 21
October 1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal
within ten days from notice if she would still present
evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas rendered such "findings" of
irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the
Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18
March 1993 resolution.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely
irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under the
heading "II" of this Resolution. It must, however, be
stressed that the said paragraph is inexorably linked to
the preceding two paragraphs relating to the abovementioned waiver and non-compliance, which provide
the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more

concretely, the latter is nothing more than the logical

conclusion which the major premises support.
The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the
Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In any
event, the protestant's possible "belief . . . that the
contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly
appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral
victory," cannot stand against her previous insistence
to proceed with the revision of the remaining
unrevised ballots and the aforementioned finding of
the Tribunal in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The
Tribunal is not to blame for "the slow pace of the
protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of
things. Neither can the thought of cutting costs be a
valid reason. The Protestant knew from the outset that
the revision of the ballots in the pilot areas was a
crucial phase of this protest because, under Rule 61 of
the Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be
dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that she
would probably fail to make out a case but only after
examination of the ballots from the pilot areas and the
evaluation of the evidence offered in connection
therewith. It goes without saying that every ballot then
in the pilot areas counts.
Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the
Protestant's filing of the certificate of candidacy for a
seat in the Senate in the 8 May 1995 election was the
sole and exclusive operative act for what Mr. Justice
Puno perceives to be the majority's second ground why
this protest has become moot and academic. To the
majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series
of acts performed by the Protestant to convincingly
evince her abandonment of this protest, viz.,
campaigning for the office of Senator, assumption of

such office after her election and her discharge of the

duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the
resolution of 26 September 1995, this Court directed
the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their
respective memoranda on the issue

which shows a determination in the individual not to

have a benefit which is designed for him.

[o]f whether or not the protest has not been

rendered moot and academic by the election of
the Protestant as Senator and her subsequent
assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.
(emphasis supplied)

Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of

office. It is stated therein as follows:

As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno

and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law Dictionary
and the cases of Roebuck vs. Mecosta Country Road
Commission,23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv. Co., 24 and McCall
vs. Cull,25 cited therein. We have turned to the primary
sources of these cases, meticulously perused them,
and found none materially significant to this protest.
The first two cases above refer to abandonment of
property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether a
roadway had been abandoned by the Mecosta Road
Commission. The Court therein held that in order for
there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to
public use, two elements must concur, viz., (a)
intention to relinquish the right or property, but
without intending to transfer title to any particular
person; and (b) the external act which such intention is
carried into effect. WhileDober, on the issue of
whether the plaintiff therein abandoned a certain
property, quoted Corpus Juris that the intention to
abandon must be determined from the facts and
circumstances of the case. There must be a clear,
unequivocal and decisive act of the party to constitute
abandonment in respect of a right secured an act done

It is, of course, settled that a public office is not

deemed property.26

Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when

thought of in connection with an office, implies
that the occupant has quit the office and ceased
to perform its duties. As long as he continues to
discharge the duties of the office, even though
his source of title is two appointments, one valid
and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has
abandoned it. It was said in Steingruber v. City
of San Antonio, Tex. Com. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78:
"A
public
office
may
be
abandoned.
Abandonment is a species of resignation.
Resignation and abandonment are voluntary
acts. The former is a formal relinquishment; the
latter a relinquishment through non-user.
Abandonment implies non-user, but non-user
does not, of itself, constitute abandonment. The
failure to perform the duties pertaining to the
office must be with actual or imputed intention
on the part of the officer to abandon and
relinquish the office. The intention may be
inferred from the acts and conduct of the party,
and is a question of fact. Abandonment may
result from an acquiescence by the officer in his
wrongful removal or discharge, but, as in other
cases of abandonment, the question of intention
is involved.

Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest

for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice
Kapunan, the Protestant could not abandon the office
of President which she was not holding at the time she
filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator. But the
majority of the Tribunal never declared, nor even
implied, that she abandoned the office of President
because it knew that she had yet nothing to abandon.
Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the
winner for that office, to thereafter assume and
perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers
appertaining thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly
states is that the Protestant abandoned this Protest,
thereby rendering this protest moot.
Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a
question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot resolve it
"for lack of competent evidence"; moreover, he notes
that the Protestee "has not adduced evidence which
can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally
abandoned her protest; on the contrary, the Protestee
does not want the protest to be dismissed on a
technicality but prays that it be decided on the
merits." Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has
not denied nor questioned the following facts, which
by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the
intention to abandon the protest:
(a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator
for the 8 May 1995 elections;
(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such
election;
(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the
commencement of the term therefor;

(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and

(e) Discharge and performance of the duties
appertaining to the office of Senator.
These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to
negate any proposition that the Protestant has not
abandoned this protest.
Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in
the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced. This
must also be the verdict upon the following
pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:
A more fundamental reason prevents me from
joining the majority. With due respect, I submit
that the majority ruling on abandonment is
inconsistent with the doctrine that an election
contest is concerned less with the private
interest of the candidates but more with public
interest. Under a republican regime of
government, the overarching object of an
election contest is to seek and enforce the
judgment of the people on who should govern
them. It is not a happenstance that the first
declaration of policy of our Constitution
underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority
emanates from them." The first duty of a citizen
as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to
exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of
any reigning government is to uphold the
sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus,
in Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held
that ". . . once the court has acquired
jurisdiction over an election contest, the public

interest involved demands that the true winner

be known without regard to the wishes or acts of
the parties so much so that there can be no
default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in
this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has
consistently demurred from dismissing election
contests even on the ground of death of the
protestee or the protestant.
The majority appears to stray away from this
lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the
case at bar even while the protestee and the
protestant are yet alive, even while the term of
the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and
even while the protestee and the protestant
together plead, that the Tribunal should
determine the true will of the people by deciding
their dispute on the merit[s] and not on
technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit
that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to
decide this election contest on the merit[s] and
vindicate the political judgment of the people
which far surpasses in significance all other
considerations. Our duty to tell the people who
have the right to govern them cannot depend on
the uncertain oscillations of politics of the
litigants as often times they are directed by the
wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the
public.
For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms,
demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual settings
of the instant protest vis-a-vis the earlier cases that
enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr. Justice Puno.
Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further
miscomprehension, that the Moraleja ruling even

conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be

different" if the petitioner therein had accepted
"a permanent appointment to a regular office" during
the pendency of his protest. In short, Moraleja in fact
intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the
meantime, the Protestant accepts a permanent
appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then
would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a
protestant who voluntarily sought election to an office
whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of
the term of the contested office, and after winning the
said election, took her oath and assumed office and
thereafter continuously serves it.
In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in
excluding abandonment from the enumeration of
specific "acts or wishes" of the parties which must be
disregarded because of the public interest component
of an election protest. As reflected in the above
quotation
from
Mr.
Justice
Puno's
dissent,
only default, compromise, or stipulation of facts are
included.
Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement
of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly pointed
out in the early part of this Resolution, the Rules of the
Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests
even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the
petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes attached
thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and
cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in
the Rules,27 and the additional provision for dismissal
under Rule 61. All these provisions of the Rules would
then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified or
amended in a way not authorized by the Rules, if the
theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted. Such theory

would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to the technical

minutiae of trial on the merits to bring to their ultimate
end all protests or contests filed before it including
those filed by candidates who even forgot to vote for
themselves and obtained no votes in the final count,
but, unable to accept defeat, filed a protest claiming
massive fraud and irregularities, vote-buying, and
terrorism. Consequently, all the time and energy of the
Justices of the Supreme Court would be spent
appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice
of their regular judicial functions in the Court, as the
electoral protest of every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who
lost in the presidential elections would have to be
heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a
scenario and no public good stands to be thereby
served.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Hermosisima,
Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Melo,
J., concurs
in
the
result.
Panganiban, J., took no part.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to

(1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August
1995 to dispense with the revision of ballots and
other election documents in the remaining
precincts of the pilot areas;
(2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it
has been rendered moot and academic by its
abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant
as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her
discharge of the duties and functions thereof;
and
(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's
Counter-Protest.
No pronouncements as to costs.

[P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005]

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, protestee.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The moving finger writes, says Omar Khayyam in
the Rubayyat, and having writ, moves on. Nor all your
piety nor wit, adds the poet, could lure it back to
cancel half a line; nor all your tears wash out a word of
it.

Such is my view on the providential case for our

consideration.
Before this Electoral Tribunal, composed pursuant
to the Constitution, by all the fifteen members of the
Supreme Court, is a matter of first impression. We are
tasked not only to determine, as originally prayed for,
who between the Protestant and the Protestee was the
true winner in the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections,
but also to decide now whether the Protestants widow
(Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, popularly known as the
cinema star Susan Roces) could intervene and/or
substitute
for
the
deceased
party,
assuming arguendo that the protest could survive his
death.
If one were guided by folk wisdom expressed in the
adage that in a democracy, the voice of the people is
the voice of God, then it would appear our task had
been made easy by fateful events. Past midnight, in
the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as
the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous
roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines.
She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232
votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ).[1] She took her Oath of Office before the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in
the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election

protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004.

Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with
Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the
parties exchanged lively motions to rush the
presentation of their respective positions on the
controversy, an act of God intervened. On December
14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his
medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. The medical
certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of
Death of the Protestant, showed that he died of cardiopulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral infarction.
However, neither the Protestees proclamation by
Congress nor the death of her main rival as a
fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the
present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice
may
be
taken
of
periodic
mass
actions,
demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this
Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ
against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular
function of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be
fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who
is the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation. All
these, despite the fact that the submissions by the
parties on their respective sides in the protest and the
counter-protest are thus far, far from completed.
Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its
constitutional duty. Yet, neither could it go beyond its
mandate under the Constitution and the law. Further,
this Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules
of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the

transcendental importance of the electoral contest

involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply
out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must,
without further delay, to prevent popular unrest and
avoid further destabilization of government at the
highest level.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of
Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal,
dated January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with
URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by the
widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the
verification and certification therein.
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because
of the untimely demise of her husband and in
representation not only of her deceased husband but
more so because of the paramount interest of the
Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband in the
election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true
and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004
elections. In support of her assertion, she cites De
Castro v. Commission on Elections,[2] and Lomugdang
v. Javier,[3] to the effect that the death of the
protestant does not constitute a ground for the
dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the
jurisdiction to decide the election contest. She stresses
nevertheless that even if the instant protest case
succeeds, she is cognizant that as a mere substitute
she cannot succeed, assume or be entitled to said

elective office, and her utmost concern is not personal

but one that involves the publics interest. She prays,
however, that if subsequently determined that the
protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the
highest number of votes for president, for protestee to
be disallowed from remaining in office, and thus
prevented from exercising the powers, duties,
responsibilities and prerogatives reserved only to the
duly-elected president or her legitimate successor.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying
on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias [4] and subsequent
cases including analogous cases decided by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts
that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the
proper party to replace the deceased protestant since
a public office is personal and not a property that
passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow
has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an
election protest, since no such right survives the
husband, considering that the right to file an election
protest is personal and non-transmissible.
Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute
for her deceased husband because under the Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered
candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes
for the presidency may contest the election of the
president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the
2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a
candidate for the presidency in the election that is
being contested.

Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses

that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of
surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the
electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over
election protests and quo warrantocases.
According to protestee, movant/intervenor Mrs. FPJ
cannot use the public interest to justify her request to
be substituted for her husband. Public interest, i.e. the
need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the
electorate, is applicable only in election contests, not
in an action to merely ascertain the true and genuine
will of the people. She asserts that the only case
herein cognizable by this Tribunal is an election protest
involving a protestant and a protestee, not between
the electorate and the protestee. Citing analogous
HRET cases, protestee avers that in a case where the
protestant, the primary adversary in an election
protest case dies, the public interest in said protest
dies with him.
Protestee also contends that in the adversarial
nature of a protest case where one of the parties dies,
a correct ruling cannot be had because the dead
protestant could no longer refute his adversarys
allegations because death has rendered him hors de
combat.
Further
citing Defensor-Santiago
v.
Ramos,
protestee points out that this Tribunal, nonetheless,
confirmed its power to dismiss an electoral case on
technical grounds. She adds that if the Tribunal can do
[5]

so on a technicality, all the more it could for a stronger

reason, that of protestants death.
In her Reply, movant/intervenor argues that
reference of protestee to the HRET case of Abadilla v.
Ablan,[6] was erroneous inasmuch as said case was a
congressional protest and the controlling case is De
Castro. She likewise contends that protestant failed to
distinguish between a right to an office which
protestant concedes is personal and non-transmissible
vis--vis the right to pursue the process which is not
personal but imbued with public interest. She likewise
stresses that the death of the protestant abolished the
personal/private character of the protest, as
protestants right to assume if he prevails, necessarily
disappears, and the same cannot be transferred to
anyone else, protestants widow included. She insists,
however, that the public interest remains. Further,
movant/intervenor posits that the protest having been
commenced cannot be abated by the death of the
protestant and the only real issue is the determination
of the proper substitute. She avers that the Tribunals
rule is clear on who can commence and initiate a
protest compared to the persons who can initiate
a quo warranto. She admits that in the former, only the
second and third placers in the presidential election
are authorized to commence the contest, while in the
latter, any voter may initiate the petition. She
contends that with no personal interest involved, any
registered voter can continue the duly-commenced
protest as the real-party-in-interest which is analogous
to aquo warranto. She contradicts protestee and

insists that allowing any voter to substitute just like in

a quo warranto will not open the floodgate to
whimsical protests, and the imagined political
instability feared by protestee will even more be
pronounced
if
the
protest
is
dismissed.
Movant/intervenor reiterates that the issue at hand
involves just the continuation of proceedings by
allowing substitution and the taking over by the
substitute of the prosecution of the protest already
duly commenced.
Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow
substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during
the pendency of the latters protest case?
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential
election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines
who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation
of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2 nd and
3 placers, may contest the election. By this express
enumeration, the rule makers have in effect
determined the real parties in interest concerning an
on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario
rd

where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted

upon by the electorate, the candidate who received
that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be
the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election
contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on
substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the
analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of
Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the
decisions of the electoral tribunals. [7]
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the
Rules of Court.[8] This rule allows substitution by a legal
representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of
this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear
before
this
Tribunal
as
the
legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our
application of this rule to an election contest, we have
every time ruled that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the
heirs upon death.[9] Thus, we consistently rejected
substitution by the widow or the heirs in election
contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v.
Mencias,[10] we recognized substitution upon the death
of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow
or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest.
Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria v.
Commission on Elections,[11] we struck down the claim
of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee

to the contested office for the same reason. Even in

analogous cases before other electoral tribunals,
[12]
involving substitution by the widow of a deceased
protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real
party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or
heirs.
This is not to say that death of the protestant
necessarily abates the pending action. We have held
as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right
to a public office is personal and exclusive to the
public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee
such that the death of either would oust the court of
all authority to continue the protest proceedings.
[13]
Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real
party in interest is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled
to the avails of the suit.[14] In Vda. de De Mesa v.
Mencias[15] and Lomugdang v. Javier,[16] we permitted
substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is
a real party in interest considering that if the protest
succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vicemayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that
becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume
office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ,
herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case,
we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real
party in interest to this election protest.

We are not unaware that a contest before election

tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of ones
right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with
public interest.
Indeed the personal aspect of the case is
inextricably linked with the public interest. For an
election protest involves not merely conflicting private
aspirations but is imbued with public interest which
raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil
actions.[17] But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has
overly stressed that it is with the paramount public
interest in mind that she desires to pursue the process
commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is
pursuing the process to determine who truly won the
election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud
her noble intention and her interest to find out the true
will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is
not the point of reference in determining whether a
person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court[18] is the applicable rule
on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the
PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which
allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the
matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will
not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome
should it be determined that the declared president
did not truly get the highest number of votes. We fully
appreciate
counsels
manifestation
that
movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in

assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot

succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it.
Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the
vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have
come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the
deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real
parties in the action could be allowed to intervene,
proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable and this is not the policy
of the law.[19] It is far more prudent to abide by the
existing strict limitations on intervention and
substitution under the law and the rules.
Conformably then with the law, the rules and
prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no
justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for
intervention and substitution.
WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor
JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to intervene
and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED
for lack of merit.

Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of

the Death, submitted by counsel of protestant RONALD
ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve
that Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002,
entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. v.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby
DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in interest
has come forward within the period allowed by law, to
intervene in this case or be substituted for the
deceased protestant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, YnaresSantiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

D. C. Macaraeg, T. Guadiz, Jr., R. Hidalgo and N. F.

Calimlim
for
petitioner
and
appellee.
Santos D. Areola for respondent and appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Registered candidates for councilors, amongst others
in the eight-seat City Council of Dagupan City in the
1963 elections were petitioner Gregorio V. Gaerlan,
Jr. and respondent Luis C. Catubig. Having obtained the
third highest number of votes, the City Board of
Canvassers, on December 2, 1963, proclaimed
respondent Catubig one of the elected 8 councilors.
Petitioner Gaerlan, on the other hand, lost his bid.
Seasonably,1 petitioner
went
to
Court
on quo
warranto to challenge respondent's eligibility2 for the
office, on the averment of non-age. The judgment
below gave the nod to petitioner and held respondent
ineligible to hold the office of councilor of Dagupan
City, excluded him there from, and declared vacant the
seat he occupies in the City Board. Respondent
appealed.

G.R. No. L-23964

June 1, 1966

GREGORIO
V.
GAERLAN,
JR., petitioner
appellee,
vs.
LUIS C. CATUBIG, respondent and appellant.

and

There is no quarrel as to the facts. Respondent Catubig

was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the
time he presented his certificate of candidacy on
September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and
22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was
24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he
took his oath of office as councilor on January 1,
1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days.
Whether respondent's age be reckoned as of the date
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or the date
of election,4 or the date set by law for the assumption

of office the result is the same. Whichever date is

adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age.
With the foregoing backdrop, respondent calls upon us
to resolve two questions: First, has petitioner a cause
of action against respondent? Second, in the
affirmative, is respondent eligible to the office of
councilor of Dagupan City?
1. The thrust of respondent's argument is simply this:
Petitioner Gaerlan, Jr. placed 16th out of the 16
candidates; Gaerlan thus has no right to the office,
either by election or otherwise; and said petitioner
cannot validly question respondent's right to sit.
This case calls into question the applicability of Section
173 of the Revised Election Code 5 which, in part,
reads:
Procedure against an ineligible person. When
a person who is not eligible is elected to a
provincial or municipal office, his right to the
office may be contested by any registered
candidate for the same office before the Court
of First Instance of the province, within one
week after the proclamation of his election, by
filing a petition for quo warranto. ...
The language of this statute is very plain. The right of
a non-eligible person elected to a municipal office may
be contestedby any registered candidate for the same
office. Petitioner perfectly fits into this legal precept.
He was a registered candidate for the same office. It
matters not that he has no claim or right to the office
of councilor in the event respondent be ousted.
Because the clear-cut language "any registered

candidate for the same office" does not require that

said candidate, if his quo warranto case prospers,
himself occupy that office. Right here, we find a
forbidding obstacle to any other view of the statute. To
say otherwise would empty this legal provision of its
obvious contents. Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, supra, is to
be read as controlling in the present. There, as here,
the office involved was that of Councilor, the statute
under consideration the same Section 173, Revised
Election Code. And again, there as here, petitioner
would not sit if the action be successful. This Court
there expressly ruled:
That petitioner would not be entitled to the
elective office even if respondent is ordered to
vacate the same is likewise an invalid objection
against the institution of this suit, for otherwise,
Section 173 of the Revised Election Code would
clearly be rendered nugatory. Under said law,
the contestant's right to the office involved is
not contemplated, and thus this Court has
repeatedly ruled that respondent's declaration
of ineligibility does not entitle the petitioner to
said office (Luison vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-10981,
April 25, 1958; Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz.,
No. 2, 727; Calano vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-6404,
January 12, 1954). Yet, in said rulings, the
petitioners have never been considered to be
without any legal personality to file the
necessary quo warranto proceedings. We need
not conjecture into the philosophy of the law;
suffice it to say that the legislature expressed its
intentions very plainly.1wph1.t
But respondent would want us to apply Section 6 of
Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 6. When an individual may commence

such an action. A person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another bring an
action in his own name.

candidate elected. In such a posture it is beyond

debate that the applicable statute here is Section 173
of the Revised Election Code, the specific law on the
subject.
And, petitioner's standing in court is confirmed.

Section 6 just quoted is out of focus. Petitioner here

is not "claiming to be entitled" to the office of
councilor. Besides, we are unprepared to scuttle the
jurisprudence heretofore cited which is so well
buttressed upon law and reason. Moreover, distinction
should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an
office filled by election and quo warranto involving an
office held by appointment thus
... In quo warranto proceedings referring to
offices filled by election, what is to be
determined is the eligibility of the candidate
elect,
while
in quo
warranto proceedings
referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. In
the first case when the person elected is
ineligible, the court cannot declare that the
candidate occupying the second place has been
elected, even if he were eligible, since the law
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes, and has presented his certificate of
candidacy. In the second case, the court
determines who has been legally appointed and
can and ought to declare who is entitled to
occupy the office.6
The foregoing, once again, emphasizes the rule that
in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled
by election, the only issue is the eligibility of the

2. Respondent's presses the claim that the question of

age-eligibility should be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act 1707 and not by Republic Act 2259.8 For
ready reference, we present in parallel columns the
two conflicting legal provisions on the left side,
Section 12, Republic Act No. 170, as amended, and on
the right, Section 6, Republic Act 2259.

Sec. 12 x x x the
elective members of the
Municipality Board shall
be qualified electors of
the
city,
residents
therein for at least one
year, and not less than
twenty-three years of
age. x x x"

Sec. 6. No person
shall be a City Mayor,
Vice-Mayor,
or
Councilor unless he is
at least twenty-five
years of age, resident
of the city for one
year prior to his
election and is a
qualified voter.

Pertinent here it is to state that Republic Act No. 484

amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City
Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas,
Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959
nine years later.

The problem, cast in legal setting, is whether or not

Section 12 should give way to Section 6. On this point
the following reproduced in haec verba from Libarnes
vs. Executive Secretary, et al., L-21505, October 24,
1963, is an authoritative expositor of the law, viz:
Again, the question whether or not a special law
has been repealed or amended by one or more
subsequent general laws is dependent mainly
upon the intent of Congress in enacting the
latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress
show beyond doubt that its members intended
to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 2259, except those which are expressly
excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, the
explanatory note to Senate Bill No. 2, which
upon approval, became Republic Act No. 2259,
specifically mentions Zamboanga City, among
others that had been considered by the authors
of the bill in drafting the same. Similarly, Section
1 of Republic Act No. 2259 makes reference to
"all chartered cities in the Philippines", whereas
Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act
"the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and
Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso
exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing
clearly that all cities not particularly excepted
from the provisions of said Act including
therefor, the City of Zamboanga are subject
thereto.9
The only reference to Dagupan City in Republic Act
2259 is found in Section 2 thereof whereunder voters
in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly
precluded to vote for provincial officials. Therefore, by

the terms of the Libarnes decision, the age-limit

provision in the last-named statute (Republic Act 2259)
is controlling.
Indeed, we find no warrant in logic to go along with
respondent. Adverting to Libarnes, supra, Act 2259
(Section 8) excludes from the operation thereof a
number of cities. Dagupan City is not one of them. We
are not to enter into the impermissible field of injecting
into a statute a provision plainly omitted therefrom.
And until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to
tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we
should go by what the legislative body has expressly
ordained.
And, this position we take here is accentuated by the
fact that by Section 9 of Act 2259,
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act, are hereby repealed.
Given the fact that Dagupan City beyond peradventure
is removed from the exceptions, it stands to reason
itself that its charter provision on the age limit is
thereby repealed. And this, because "the last statute is
so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its
words so as to show that it was intended to cover the
whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior
statute." 10
Specifically with reference to the uniform age limit of
25 years set forth in Section 6 of Republic Act 2259,
we take stock of the phraseology employed. This
section starts with "No person shall be ... Councilor
unless he is at least twenty-five years of age". This

specific language gives us added reason to believe

that in reality and for the sake of uniformity the
23-year age limit in the Dagupan City Charter must
have to yield. Because in the legislative scheme,
councilors are conferred the right to succeed the City
Mayor
in
the
event
the
Vice-Mayor
is
Unavailable. 11 The City Mayor must at least be 25
years of age. 12 So it is, that in the event a councilor 23
years of age is elected and before 25 years catapulted
to the position of mayor, then we have the anomalous
situation where the person succeeding as mayor will
be less than 25 years. Such a situation, it seems to us,
is not contemplated by the law.
With the foregoing guideposts, we are unable to
subscribe to the view that respondent's age

qualification should be governed by the provisions of

the Dagupan City Charter.
We, accordingly, hold that respondent is disqualified
on the ground of non-age: Because at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election,
and at the time he took his oath of office, he was
below the age of 25 years.
Upon the law and the facts, we vote to affirm the
appealed judgment. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.