003 DEMETRIA vs ALBA

GR 71977 February 27, 1987

TOPIC: The Constitution and the Three Branches of
Government
PONENTE: FERNAN, J

AUTHOR: Aiyu
NOTES:
This case was decided under the 1973 Consti
Do not skip the commentary of Thomas Cooley

FACTS:

[PETITION] Petitioners, concerned citizens, and members of National Assembly/Batas Pambansa,

questioned the constitutionality of Section 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977, PD1177, for illegal
transfer of public money
[ANSWER] OSG, for public respondent, Budget Minister Alba, questioned legal standing of petitioners; also,
OSG contended that theres no justiciable controversy
[COMMENT] respondents Comment: due to change in administration (from Marcos to Cory), the resolution of
the case must be held in abeyance until development arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective
stands
Court ordered OSG to file Rejoinder
[REJOINDER w/ MTD] SolGen filed a rejoinder with MTD stating that the case is already moot and academic by
abolition of the Batas Pambansa.

ISSUE(S): constitutionality of par 1, section 4 of PD 1177?

HELD: NO
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
RATIO:
conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution
Par. 1, section 44, PD 1177
Section 16(5) of Article VIII of 1973 Consti
The President shall have the authority to transfer Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any
any fund, appropriated for the different transfer of appropriations, however, the President,
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice
Executive Department, which are included in the of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
General Appropriations Act, to any program, constitutional commis ions may by law be
project or activity of any department, bureau, or authorized to augment any item in the general
office included in the General Appropriations Act appropriations law for their respective offices from
or approved after its enactment.
savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
o The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the
1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of
the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited.
o Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section
16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made.

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, explained:

... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike
supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of
its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that
other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of
government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the
trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what
the law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law,
whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative
action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within
its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every
private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render
judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial
supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not
because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their
representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5;
Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
o Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary
cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):