Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's power of control
may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, 19 or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.20 The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary.21 In this case, it was argued that there is no law which empowers the President to
reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus:
"Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
We do not agree.
xxx xxx
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
'Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and
offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services
and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. X x x. Actual scaling down, phasing
out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.'
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of
offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62
which provides that:
'Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. - Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act.' (italics ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation
of offices in the department or agency concerned.
xxx xxx
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
'Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested
in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.' (italic ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to
reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution
clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees." (Emphasis supplied)
Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.
In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY
1999 General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin, thus;
"Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key
positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded
from appropriations provided by this Act."
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the
department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. 22 Under this law, the
heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review
of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which
are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will
result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. 23 Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the
actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for
the purpose by the Office of the President.24 The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to sustain.
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end
here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre,25 we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. 26 It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President's continuing authority to reorganize.
It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department,
what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.27 Pertinently, Republic Act No. 665628 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of
civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a
classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation. 29
Petitioners claim that the deactivation of EIIB was done in bad faith because four days after its deactivation, President Estrada created the Task
Force Aduana.
We are not convinced.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders30 shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good
faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task
Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides that the technical, administrative and
special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing
agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they belong is called upon to assist
the Task Force. Since their employment with the Task force is only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their employment with the
existing agencies. And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control and supervision of the President as base of the
government's anti-smuggling campaign. Such a smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or
office and to use their respective personnel, facilities and resources; and 2) "to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP for
assignment to the Task Force." Obviously, the idea is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already
existing departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole set of personnel and facilities.
The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the government because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.
And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially intended
to lessen EIIB's expenses. Tracing from the yearly General Appropriations Act, it appears that the allotted amount for the EIIB's general
administration, support, and operations for the year 1995, was P128,031,000;31 for 1996, P182,156,000;32 for 1998, P219,889,000;33 and, for 1999,
P238,743,000.34 These amounts were far above the P50,000,00035 allocation to the Task Force Aduana for the year 2000.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find the latter to have additional new powers. The Task
Force Aduana, being composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP),36 has the essential power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force Aduana has the power
to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the
additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly granted to the EIIB.1wphi1.nt
Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil Sevice Commission, 37 we ruled that a reorganization in
good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy and greater efficiency in its operation.
Lastly, we hold that petitioners' right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within
the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents.38 In the instructive words laid down by this Court in Dario v. Mison,39 through Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization
is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case
of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would
not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the 'abolition,' which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid 'abolition' takes and whatever 'abolition' is done, is void ab initio.
There is an invalid 'abolition' as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by
the existence of ample funds.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. 40
While we cast a commiserating look upon the plight of all the EIIB employees whose lives perhaps are now torn with uncertainties, we cannot ignore
the unfortunate reality that our government is also battling the impact of a plummeting economy. Unless the government is given the chance to
recuperate by instituting economy and efficiency in its system, the EIIB will not be the last agency to suffer the impact. We cannot frustrate valid
measures which are designed to rebuild the executive department.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
5. To enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office or agency or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations to carry out its functions, including the use of their respective personnel, facilities
and resources;
6. To conduct investigation of ill-gotten wealth of all persons including government officials involved in smuggling activities, in
coordination with other government agencies.
7. To conduct verification with the Bureau of Customs of all documents pertaining to payment of duties and taxes of all imported
articles.
8. To suppress and prevent all other economic frauds as may be directed by the President.
9. To perform such functions and carry out such activities as may be directed by the President."
10
"Supplementing Executive Order No. 191 on the Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and for Other
Matters."
11
Section 3 of E.O. No. 223.
12
176 SCRA 84 (1989)
13
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed. p. 579.
14
Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 5
15
Rivera, Law of Public Administration, First Edition, p. 634; Guerrero v. Arizabal, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)
16
In Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 243 SCRA 196 (1995), the Court ruled:
"Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of a public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so
far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may
decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to
create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or
whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is
wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
Mendoza v. Quisumbing 186 SCRA 108 (1990); Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998 (1968) De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1998 Ed., p. 24
17
Cruz, The Law of Public Officers, 1999 Ed., p. 4.
18
Ibid., p. 199
19
Martin, Philippine Political Law, p. 276
20
Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997)
21
ibid.
22
General Appropriation Act FY 2000, signed into law on February 16, 2000.
23
Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760.
Section 16, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 16. Career civil service employees from the separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivision, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line
with the existing policy, had been accepted."
24
Ibid.
25
323 SCRA 312 (2000).
26
Section 17, Title II, Book IV, E.O. No. 292.
27
Department of Trade and Industry v. Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission 227 SCRA 198 (1993); Dario v.
Mison, supra.; Mendoza v. Quisumbing, supra.
28
"An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization"Approved on June 10, 1988" (84 Official Gazette No. 24, p. S-1)
29
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656.
30
E.O. No. 196; Section 17, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV, E.O. No. 292, and Section 7 and Section 26, E.O. No. 127.
31
R.A. No. 7845, 1995 General Appropriation Act
32
R.A. No. 8174, 1996 General Appropriation Act
33
R.A. No. 8522, 1998 General Appropriation Act
34
R.A. No. 8745, 1999 General Appropriation Act
35
Section 10, E.O. No. 196.
36
Section 2 of E.O. No. 196.
37
226 SCRA 278 (1993).
38
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, supra. De la Llana v. Alba, supra.
39
supra.
40
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service Commission, supra.
2. Dominador L. Galura
3. Jaime D. Gonzales
4. Lilia C. Guillermo
5. Rizalina S. Magalona
6. Victorino C. Mamalateo
7. Jaime M. Maza
8. Antonio N. Pangilinan
9. Melchor S. Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-Torres
Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in
the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including
disqualification for reappointment in the government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13, 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from
office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the conviction of petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who
are Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He also averred
that the administrative investigation conducted under Memorandum Order No. 164 is void as it violated his right to due process. According to him,
the letter of the Committee dated September 17, 1993 and his position paper dated September 30, 1993 are not sufficient for purposes of complying
with the requirements of due process. He alleged that he was not informed of the administrative charges leveled against him nor was he given official
notice of his dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to
Executive Order No. 132. Thus, he assailed said Executive Order No. 132 and its implementing rules, namely, Revenue Administrative Orders 4-93
and 5-93 for being ultra vires. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the Executive
Department of executive agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He said that the reorganization sought to be effected by the
Executive Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of Section 2 of R.A. 6656, otherwise known as the
Act Protecting the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization.
On the other hand. respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the President.
They also contended that E.O. No. 132 and its implementing rules were validly issued pursuant to Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645.
Apart from this, the other legal bases of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its preamble are Section 63 of E.O. No. 127 (Reorganizing the Ministry of
Finance), and Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. In addition, it is clear that in Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6656 future reorganization is expressly contemplated and nothing in said law that prohibits subsequent reorganization through an executive
order. Significantly, respondents clarified that petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132. Respondents claimed that he was removed from
office because he was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination of the validity of petitioner's dismissal from office. Incidentally, in order
to resolve this matter, it is imperative that We consider these questions: a) Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings
taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c) What is the effect of petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case to his
administrative charge?, d) Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?, and e) Is the
reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service. 2 Under the law, 3
Career Executive Service officers, namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service
Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President
Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes
under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint" conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164,
which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President.
This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from noncareer service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of
tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of
P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who
enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential
appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a
career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with
procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due process, this Court, however, considers that petitioner was not
dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to look into the administrative charge against petitioner is his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. As admitted by the respondents, the administrative case against
petitioner is based on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992. Thus, in the Administrative Order No. 101 issued by Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Quisumbing which found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, it clearly states that:
This pertains to the administrative charge against Assistant Commissioner Aquilino T. Larin of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
for grave misconduct by virtue of a Memorandum signed by Acting Secretary Leong of the Department of Finance, on the basis
of a decision handed down by the Hon. Sandiganbayan convicting Larin, et. al. in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. 4
In a nutshell, the criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 as a consequence of his act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery, Inc.. The pertinent
portion of the judgment of the Sandiganbayan reads:
As above pointed out, the accused had conspired in knowingly preparing false memoranda and certification in order to effect a
fraud upon taxes due to the government. By their separate acts which had resulted in an appropriate tax credit of
P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay. The government had been defrauded of a tax revenue for the full amount, if one is to
look at the availments or utilization thereof (Exhibits "AA" to "AA- 31-a"), or for a substantial portion thereof (P73,000,000.00) if
we are to rely on the letter of Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos (Exhibits "21" for all the accused).
As pointed out above, the confluence of acts and omissions committed by accused Larin, Pareno and Evangelista adequately
prove conspiracy among them for no other purpose than to bring about a tax credit which Tanduay did not deserve. These
misrepresentations as to how much Tanduay had paid in ad valorem taxes obviously constituted a fraud of tax revenue of the
government . . . . 5
However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the Sandiganbayan was set aside by this Court in our decision
promulgated on April 17, 1996 in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. We specifically ruled in no uncertain terms that: a) petitioner can not be held
negligent in relying on the certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond the certification made by the
Revenue Accounting Division that Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing irregular or anything false in Larin's
marginal note on the memorandum addressed to Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax Division who was also one of the accused, but eventually
acquitted, in the said criminal cases, and d) there is no proof of actual agreement between the accused, including petitioner, to commit the illegal
acts charged. We are emphatic in our resolution in said cases that there is nothing "illegal with the acts committed by the petitioner(s)." We also
declare that "there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted irregularly, or performed acts outside of his (their) official functions." Significantly, these
acts which. We categorically declare to be not unlawful and improper in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same acts for
which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. Any charge of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by
our conclusion in said cases. In the light of this decisive pronouncement, We see no reason for the administrative charge to continue it must, thus,
be dismissed.
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal or
acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. 6
However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily,
where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court
upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the
petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no more
basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that the
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
he may have in support of his defense. 7 The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his letter-response dated September
30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various documents attached as annexes to his letter,
all of which are evidences supporting his defense. Prior to this, he received a letter dated September 17, 1993 from the Investigation Committee
requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It can not therefore be argued that petitioner was denied of due process.
Let us now examine Executive Order No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 132, some of the positions and offices, including the office of Excise Tax Services of
which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, were abolished or otherwise decentralized. Consequently, the President released the list of
appointed Assistant Commissioners of the BIR. Apparently, petitioner was not included.
We do not agree.
Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal bases of its issuance, namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O.
No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments,
bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations.
. . . Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. (emphasis ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or
transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the
Philippines, no organizational unit of charges in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act. (emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational charges including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. 8 Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and biding
for all intents and purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. (emphasis ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 9 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two
decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." 10 So far, there is
yet no law amending or repealing said decrees. Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future reorganizations in the government as what is
revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from service not for cause but as a result of the . . . reorganization following
the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay . . .
However, We can not consider E.O. No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as a legal basis for the reorganization of the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should be
related to the second paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive
orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety days from the approval of this act within which to implement
their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (emphasis ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of the 1987 reorganization contemplated under said provision. Obviously, it had become stale by virtue of the
expiration of the ninety day deadline period. It can not thus be used as a proper basis for the reorganization of the BIR. Nevertheless, as shown
earlier, there are other legal bases to sustain the authority of the President to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132.
While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in
accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this
Court has had the occasion to clarify that:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the
security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition
takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 11
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees
as a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing.
A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other
lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances
considered as evidences of bad faith in the reorganization of the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:
1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are abolished. An Intelligence and Investigation
Service is
hereby created to absorb the same functions of the abolished office and service. . . . (emphasis ours)
This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office is abolished and another one
performing substantially the same function is created.
Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting to a significant increase in the number of positions in the said
bureau as contemplated in paragraph (a) of Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems Group has two
newly created Systems Services. Aside from this, six new divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1, three more divisions of the Assessment
Service are formed. With these newly created offices, there is no doubt that a significant increase of positions will correspondingly follow.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under
said provision, officers holding permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern
comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next lower in rank. It is undeniable that
petitioner is a career executive officer who is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have been given preference for appointment in the
position of Assistant Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner, Antonio Pangilinan who was one of those appointed as Assistant Commissioner, "is an
outsider of sorts to the Bureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the Bureau at the time of the reorganization." We should not lose sight of the
second paragraph of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers shall
have been appointed for permanent position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of
seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the
meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age
and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Region I
Region II
Region III
Region IV-A
Region V
Region VI
Region VII
Region VIII
Region IX-A
Region IX-B
Region X
Region XI
Region XII
Cente
r
Area
Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan and the cities
of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag and San Carlos.
Cente
r
Tuguegarao, Cagayan
Area
Cente
r
Area
Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales and the cities of Angeles,
Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose
Cente
r
Area
Cente
r
Legaspi City
Area
Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon and the cities of
Legaspi, Naga and Iriga
Cente
r
Iloilo City
Area
Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental and the cities of Bacolod, Bago, Cadiz,
Iloilo, La Carlota, Roxas, San Carlos and Silay
Cente
r
Cebu City
Area
Bohol, Cebu, Negros Oriental, Siquijor and the cities of Bais, Canlaon, Cebu, Danao,
Dumaguete, Lapu-Lapu, andaue, Tagbilaran and Toledo
Cente
r
Tacloban City
Area
Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar; Southern Leyte, Western Samar; Biliran SubProvince and the cities of Calbayog, Ormoc and Tacloban
Cente
r
Jolo
Area
Cente
r
Zamboanga City
Area
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur and the cities of Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian
and Zamboanga
Cente
r
Area
Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin Misamis Occidental, Misamis
Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and the cities of Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Guingoog, Ozamis,
Oroquieta, Surigao and Tangub
Cente
r
Davao City
Area
Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Surigao del Sur and the
cities of Davao and General Santos
Cente
r
Cotabato City
Area
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan, Kudarat and the
Section 13. Offices of the City Fiscal: Their Number in Each City. There shall be in each of the following cities the corresponding
number of city fiscals and their assistants:
(a) Manila:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Twenty-Four Second Assistants
Thirty Third Assistants
Thirty Fourth Assistants
Forty Assistants
(b) Quezon City:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Twenty Two Second Assistants
Twenty Two Third Assistants
Twenty Two Forth Assistants
Twenty Two Assistants
(c) Pasay City:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Six Second Assistants
Six third Assistants
Eight Fourth Assistants
Eight Assistants
(d) Caloocan City:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Five Second Assistants
Six Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
Six Assistants
(e) Dagupan:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Four Second Assistants
Five Third Assistants
Five Fourth Assistants
Five Assistants
(f) City of Cebu:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Four Second Assistants
Six Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
(g) City of Davao:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Six Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
(h) City of Iloilo:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Five Third Assistants
Five Fourth Assistants
(i) Olongapo:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Three Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
(j) Bacolod; Baguio:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Two Third Assistants
Four Fourth Assistants
(k) Lucena:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Four Third Assistants
(l) San Pablo; Cabanatuan; Angeles; Legaspi; Cagayan de Oro:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant
the other sections or provisions of this Decree which are not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of April, in the Year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.
BIDIN, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the order dated March 18, 1994 of respondent judge, the Hon. Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, granting the Motion to Quash filed by the accused, now herein respondents Arne Strom and
Grace A. Reyes in Criminal Case No. 11529 of said court.
On February 2, 1994, a complaint (Criminal Case No. 11529) for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor
Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the
power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no
power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter
of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the
Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the "law" contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law
such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held as follows:
WHEREFORE in the light of all the foregoing facts and consideration, as the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and
prosecute this case for reasons amply discussed above, the Court hereby orders this case quashed in the interest of justice,
without costs (Rollo, p, 27).
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent judge denied the same in an order dated April 12,1994, the pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder:
. . . . It may be ignorance of the law to insist that the law, Republic Act 1130 was repealed or amended by Letter of Instruction
(sic) No. 2, Series of 1972 as what the City Prosecutor has harped all along. A Letter of Instruction (sic) is not law by any
standard and neither has it the force and effect of law. A contrary contention would be violative of Article 7 of the New Civil Code
which provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and of the Rules of Statutory Construction.
Besides, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. The rules in all criminal
prosecutions is that all counts are resolved in favor of the accused. In the case at bar, the court seriously doubts that the City
Prosecutor has the power or the authority to investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law and to file and to prosecute cases of
this kind before our courts, as that is lodged with the Anti-Dummy Board under R. A. 1130.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Motion for Reconsideration mentioned above is, hereby denied for sheer lack of merit,
and the Order dated March 18, 1994 quashing this case is maintained (Rollo, p.5).
Hence, the present petition.
After the filing of the comments by respondents, this Court gave due course to the petition, in a resolution dated October 24, 1994.
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to
warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as prayed for by petitioners herein.
In resolving this issue, it must be recalled that immediately after the proclamation of martial law, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1 to reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the National Government. To carry out the intent of P.D. No. 1, various Letters
of Implementation were issued from time to time. It was in the course of this reorganization that Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972 was
issued for the purpose of reorganizing certain agencies in the Department of Justice. One such agency was the Anti-Dummy Board which was
abolished by the aforesaid LOI, to wit:
Anti-Dummy Board
1. The investigation function of the Anti-Dummy Board shall be absorbed by the National Bureau of Investigation, and its
prosecution function by the Prosecution Staff in the Department of Justice and the various provincial and City Fiscals. Its
corresponding appropriation, records, equipment, property, and subordinate personnel are transferred to the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Prosecution Staff in the Department of Justice.
2. The services of the present members of the Anti-Dummy Board are hereby terminated.
3. The Anti-Dummy Board shall cease to exist as of the date hereof.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of September in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. (emphasis
supplied)
Later, P.D. No. 1275 was issued which reorganized the entire prosecution system of the government with the creation of the National Prosecution
Service (NPS) under the Supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, tasked with the investigation and prosecution of all violations of penal
laws, including violation of C.A. No, 108, the Anti-Dummy Law.
In his Comment on the petition, respondent judge insists that the dismissal of the case is supported by the law and existing jurisprudence . Inasmuch
as the City Prosecutor relied mainly on LOI No. 2 which according to respondent judge, is not even a law, the Anti-Dummy Board cannot be
considered as having been effectively abolished.
We reverse.
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275
aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even
assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI
No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of
LOI No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National
Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are hereby reorganized or activated in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the
argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the
former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or
done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by
former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been
expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8).
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty
to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the Prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court.
Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and (Sec. 1, Rule 129 Rules of Court).
Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their
sworn duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. As provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating in
formation regarding the law and jurisprudence.
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
The Court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in the present
case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it not for public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is but proper
that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's error is not a
simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's
competence.
The responsibility to keep abreast with the changes in the law espoused in Canon 5 above is applicable with equal force to counsel far private
respondents, Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo who first raised the issue at hand before the trial court. By insisting upon the authority of an already abolished
Anti-Dummy Board, counsel displayed blatant irresponsibility, not to mention ignorance of the law, she should be reminded that "The law, (it is not to
be forgotten), is a progressive science. There is less than full compliance with the demands of professional competence, if a member of a bar does
not keep himself abreast of the trend of authoritative pronouncements" (Bautista v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535 [1978], emphasis supplied).
Equally deplorable is the terse half-paged pleading entitled Comment filed in behalf of private respondents by the same counsel Atty. Elvira T.
Bermejo, before this Court, wherein she alleges:
1. That private respondents ARNE STROM AND GRACE REYES was (sic) properly represented by the undersigned attorney;
2. That private respondents ARNE STROM AND GRACE REYES has (sic) nothing to do with the decision of HON. EUSTAQUIO
Z. GACOTT, JR.
WHEREFORE upon premises considered it is most respectfully prayed of this Court that said certiorari (sic) be dismissed."
(Rollo, p. 33)
It need not be emphasized that the order of dismissal of the criminal case against private respondents arose out of the resolution of the Motion to
Quash/Dismiss filed by private respondents themselves, through counsel Bermejo, on the ground of lack of authority of the City Fiscal to prosecute.
In other words, such dismissal was not ordered by respondent judge motu proprio but rather, as prayed for by, and on motion of, private respondents
through said counsel. It is quite disturbing, therefore, for counsel to brazenly deny before this Court that private respondents had "nothing to do" with
the assailed resolution, the issuance of which was based on their very own pleading.
Moreover, counsel did not even bother to defend the position of private respondents before this Court by restating in the Comment, their arguments
before the trial court, being content instead with the short allegations aforequoted. These acts are indicative of counsel's incompetence and lack of
respect which this Court cannot countenance.
Undoubtedly, counsel for private respondents failed to observe the responsibility imposed upon members of the bar to keep abreast with the
developments of the law under Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as to exercise candor, fairness and good faith before the
court as prescribed by Canon 10 of the same Code, for which omissions, she should likewise be reprimanded.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of respondent judge dated March 18, 1999 dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE and the aforesaid criminal case is REINSTATED. Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED AND FINED in the
amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall merit serious
consequences. Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo is likewise REPRIMANDED AND FINED P10,000.00 for ignorance of the law and for her failure to observe
candor, fairness and good faith before this Court, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely by this Court. Let a copy of this decision be spread on the personal records of Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. and Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo.
SO ORDERED.