TCAS philosophies

I decided to start this thread as a follow up of the

Ueberlingen trial thread which was used by some to re-open
what I call the TCAS Philosophies
If a mod would like to move the posts in the Ueberlingen trial
thread here, welcome, but not necessary.
The TCAS system is very complex, there is no more than a
dozen persons in Europe and in the USA who fully grasp
everything, and no more than a few more dozens that
understand more than 50% of it . ( I classify myself in the
second category )
What is below is not a lecture, this is basic stuff to help you
understand where we are .
A few facts :
The Ueberlingen collision revealed to the public ( but not to
the specialists) a few flaws in its logic , mainly that the RA
sense reversal did not work. (That is when one aircraft follow
the RA , but the second maneuvers in the opposite direction
of its RAs and both aircraft end up towards each other ).
There was request made from Eurocontrol to re-open the
work on TCAS and make a software change to correct this
flaw, but the FAA refused initially as version 7 was final in
their eyes and that the TCAS Team had been disbanded.
Nevertheless though RTCA , discussion were restarted and
what became known as Change Proposal 112 ( or CP112 )
became a fact, later it became 112E ( enhanced) , and , since
we were re-opening the Pandora box, we added a few more
flaws corrections mainly one ( CP115) on the replacement of
the RA Adjust vertical Speed ,Adjust to : Level off , Level
off and another one (CP116) on weakening RAs at low
altitudes .
There is a chance now that we will get a new version 7.1 in
the future . I do not put near future as the date is still
fought between Eurocontrol which would like 2010 for all, and
the FAA which says much later for CP 112E ( sense reversal
) and is against CP 115 , the Adjust/ level off change .
In case you are lost in the TCAS / ACAS versions here is a
short recap :
TCAS is a brand name. ICAO call its Specs ACAS
2 current sofware versions of TCAS flying around : 7 and 6.04
A
Udate to 6.04A was free, 7 was not . 7 was pushed by the
Europeans, FAA was against it. 7 is RVSM compliant , 6.04A is
not.
If a new version comes ( 7.1 ) , will it be mandated ( i.e free)
or will it be recommended ( at a cost ) is a good question to
which I do not have the answer.
Initially there were 3 TCAS intended , TCAS I : TAs only ,

TCAS II RAS in vertical plane, TCAS III RAS in both vertical

and horizontal plane. Work on TCAS III stopped as the logic
proved too complex, and vertical plane RAs were more
effective at avoiding a collision. So there will most probably
never be any TCAS III .
This is the situation today .
Now questions asked were : is a new Ueberlingen possible
today :
With TCAS sense reversal logic flaws : yes , nothing has
changed since 2002. same logic. Same version flying around
(7.0).
With procedures : maybe : ICAO has revised its
documentation and most training material have highlighted
the way to follow in case contradiction between ATC clearance
and RA. But incident statistics so far both from USA and
Eurocontrol show that some controllers still issue clearances
contrary to RAs and that pilots still choose to follow ATC
instead of RA.
( a recent case in France, with US trained and experienced
767 pilots from a major US airline , so no need to think it only
affect exotic or Russian pilots )
Main reason : lack of understanding on how humans and
automated machines function in reality. Prof Ladkin in his
excellent paper http://www.rvs.unibielefeld.de/publ...rts/SCSS04.pdfon causal analysis after
Ueberlingen call this Sociotechnical systems .
Now a last statistic : ( coming from Bill Thedford, of the
Boston MIT LLC, one of the top 12 in my first classification
earlier) Ueberlingen type encounters ( sense reversal ) occurs
at 4.7 x 10 to the minus 6 per flying hour , or 58 events a
year in Europe .If we expand this model, Bill predict that we
could have 1 Ueberlingen type mid air collision every 4 years
due to the logic flaws.
The conclusion of this all :
Do not philosophy about TCAS : It is too complex a system.
My advice : if you are a pilot : follow the RA, and if you are a
controller and you have to give anti collision instructions ,
give a turn as well, in case TCAS comes in , it will
complement your instruction instead of nullify it.
If you found this too long , this was the ( very) short version.
Safe flying.

11th September 2007,

10:23

PBL
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Bielefeld,

#8 (permalink)
Quote:

Germany
Posts: 559

T
Originally Posted by airmen, referring to TCAS
they saved already my live once at least!
here is a phenomenon here worth thinking about.
When I voiced some of my concerns about TCAS on a
pilot's mailing list some years ago, I was deluged
with affidavits from pilots who claimed that TCAS had
saved their lives. If all of these claims had been true,
that would have amounted to some 20 or so midair
collisions in a sample of a few hundred pilots (the
members of the mailing list) over the course of, say,
ten years. Let's assume 10 "life-savers", that is,
otherwise-midairs, for 500 pilots in 10 years. That is
an average of one "midair collision" per 500 pilots
per year.
There are about 15,000 aircraft from Airbus, Boeing,
MD, Lockheed still in service (calculated from figures
in Flight International, 24-30 October 2006). So
that's not counting the "commuters", or the
Tupolevs. Those aircraft are in service, let's say, 14
hours per day, for a total of 210,000 hours per day,
or 5,880,000 hours in 28 days. Duty rosters take 100
flight hours for a pilot in 28 days to be relatively
high, but let's use this figure, since it will lead to a
conservative estimate. It means there are about
59,000 captains needed to fly those 5,900,000 hours
every 28 days. With one "midair" per 500 captains
per year, and accounting for the fact that it takes 2
captains to have a "midair", we come to a figure of
59 "midairs" per year.
Compare this with actual midairs amongst airline
transport aircraft. 1959 Grand Canyon, 1976 Zagreb,
1978 San Diego, 1985 Cerritos. And then, since the
advent of TCAS, 1995 Namibia (involving a German
military machine which I do not believe was TCASequipped), 1996 New Delhi, 2002 berlingen and
2006 Amazonas. That is 4 before the advent of TCAS
(mandated 1991, I believe) and 4 since (16 years).
Those crediting TCAS with all these "saves" need to
explain why, before the advent of TCAS, there were a
statistically-negligible number of collisions in the
history of airline flying, and upon the introduction of
TCAS there are suddenly almost 60 per year. Even
considering the growth of air travel, that is an
unbelievable jump.
The obvious answer is, of course, that most of those
"saves" would not have resulted in collisions, despite
what their pilots thought or think.
Consider the following, as a thought experiment. Up
to the Congressional mandate for TCAS, there were

three collisions involving airliners in the U.S.: 1959

Grand Canyon, 1978 San Diego and 1985 Cerritos.
Suppose TCAS initiated RAs, not for 2 TCAS-equipped
aircraft, but only when one had TCAS and the other
only Mode C. That would have satisfied the issue
worrying the Congresspeople, namely incursions of
GA aircraft into zones of intensive airline operations,
and it would have saved one of the midairs since
(berlingen). The other three midairs in the TCAS
era occurred to non-TCAS-using aircraft.
Let us compare TCAS with another highly-lauded
system for avoiding accidents, GPWS/EGPWS. Also a
system introduced primarily by one manufacturer
(again Honeywell). And in contrast to TCAS
addressing a real, continuing problem which still
leads to many aircraft losses per year, namely CFIT.
EGPWS is essentially a private development
(stemming from the work of Don Bateman and
colleagues).
It is interesting in this regard to notice how TCAS is
self-advertising and EGPWS not. A pilot can say
"TCAS saved me" without it reflecting on himher self,
but rather on some air traffic controller establishment
somewhere. No pilot can say "EGPWS saved me"
without someone else asking how heshe lost
situational awareness in the first place (with rare
exceptions in which it is clear how, such as with
British Mediterranean at Addis Ababa).
So the statistics were never there to say "TCAS is a
good thing", and it is self-advertising, through pilot
"save" stories. But there are smart people in
aerospace who, no matter whether they think TCAS
is a net gain or a net problem, are able to look at the
facts and the situation just the same as I am now.
Airline CEOs, for example. So the question is: why
are collision avoidance mechanisms still being
promoted, researched and supported to such a great
extent?
I think there are two reasons. One is that they are
one attempt at a solution to a problem which no one
knows yet how to assess accurately, namely the
avoidance of midair collisions, and no one is willing to
risk misjudging (underestimating) the likelihood of
those. The other reason is that effective on-board
systems make collision avoidance a contract between
the two (or more) aircraft involved, which transfers
the costs of collision avoidance away from large ATC
organisations. Since the airlines and their passengers
ultimately fund these organisations, one could see
the financial benefits to airlines of bringing this
function in-house (after the initial cost of installing
the equipment, which has n any case been

mandated). Add to this that collision avoidance is one

of the brakes on moving to "free flight" (self-routing
IFR at high altitudes), which airlines believe would
bring them great cost reductions, and one can see
that TCAS+free flight is a politically sellable package
which could reduce the costs of air travel even
further. Without some ATC-independent collisionavoidance system regarded as effective, this move
could not happen, and TCAS is the only technology in
town.
PBL

airmen
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: planet hearth
Posts: 110

TCAS is designed to work according manufacturer

manual, it is stipulated here that pilots have to follow
orders to escape, so why argue with that and prefer
to follow ATC orders?
Maybe those guys need to have a good Sim session
to understand by doing it wrong to be able to learn
something?
PBL wrote:

Quote:

I
The obvious answer is, of course, that most of
those "saves" would not have resulted in
collisions, despite what their pilots thought or
think.
saw the conflicting aircraft (a Beech Baron) at the
last minute (sun in the back) during the escape
manoeuver, he was very close and was flying
opposite course at the same altitude (controller
error) and I can tell you that the controller went by
himself to meet us after landing, he told us that he
saw nothing and as such gave us no instructions. Off
course we followed the TCAS but I can not tell you
what the other pilot did...

Last edited by airmen : 12th September 2007 at

07:44.

12th September 2007, 10:05

ATC Watcher
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 59
Posts: 1,052

#19 (permalink)
The " value of X "
Quote:

I
One of the main issues with
TCAS, for me, is that no one
knows what the value of X is.
ndeed , and that debate is hindering
the obvious solution to our
problems : making the RA a
command, i.e. an obligation to
follow in all circumstances.
In the US, at its conception ,the
MITRE/FAA Lawyers prevented this
and insisted we call the TCAS
avoidance resolutions ' Advisories "
and not " Commands" therefore it is
called an RA.
But besides this " value of X "
technical issue , there are other
aspects as well.
I always refer to the " German
glider " one , following a
presentation by a famous German
747 Capt in ICAO : to explain why
he will never agree that following
RA a should be re mandatory in all
cases he said :
,I am in IFR in class G airspace and
I get a climb RA , but just above me
are gliders without transponders ,
my first duty as Captain is to
maintain the safe operation of my
aircraft and stay below the gliders ,
therefore I will elect not to follow
the RA in this case.
And he is right. So an advisory it
remains.

Quote:
I
TCAS is designed to work
according manufacturer manual,
it is stipulated here that pilots
have to follow orders to escape,
so why argue with that and
prefer to follow ATC orders?
ndeed why argue ? Mainly for 2
reasons : one is human : people
react differently to automation that
others and culture also plays a role.
PPRuNe is full of discussions on this
issue . Studies shows that even as
we speak today 30 to 40% of the "
Adjust vertical speed " RAs are not
followed by pilots. ( it used to be

60% 3 years ago ) . So it is not only

ATC " interference".
The other reason is the risk , the "
value of X" mentioned above. If it
would have been all without risks, ,
coupling the RAs to the auto-pilots
would have resolved the issue and
would have been done.

12th September 2007, 10:06

PBL
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Bielefeld, Germany
Posts: 559

#20 (permalink)
Quote:
Pl
Originally Posted by airmen
TCAS is designed to work
according manufacturer manual,
it is stipulated here that pilots
have to follow orders to escape,
so why argue with that and
prefer to follow ATC orders?
ease read my analysis of the
decision problem presented to the
Bakshirian crew at berlingen. They
were faced with an "intruder" at 10
o'clock which they saw, and an
unknown conflict at 2 o'clock which
they didn't see, and for which they
had an advisory to descend (that is,
he was at or above their altitude).
What would you do? Climb towards
another conflicting aircraft that you
don't see but ATC does? Or avoid
him, descend towards an aircraft
that you do see, and hope to avoid
him using visual means?
Please give some good reasons for
your answer that will also be good
reasons for any other pilot in this
situation.

Quote:
That's very interesting and I agree
with you that it counts as a save
(but of course it doesn't contradict
my observations on claimed
"saves"). I have a number of
observations.
First, Beech Barons don't have TCAS
(I don't know that the avionics are
approved for installation in a Baron,

does someone?). So he is painting

Mode C, otherwise you wouldn't
have picked him up on your TCAS.
If he is painting Mode C and you
picked him up, then how come he is
not showing up as the usual box as
big as yours on the controller's
screen? I think there is a lot more
to this incident than you are able to
tell us. If the controller said he saw
nothing, and he was telling the
truth, then it must have been a
system failure rather than controller
error, and his going to meet you
and apologising was someone else's
way of covering up a technical
system failure.
PBL
Very interesting. The difference between the "German glider"
decision problem and the Bakshirian one is that the B747 knows the
non-painted conflicts are above him. Bakshirian doesn't know that.
The "German glider" decider is therefore able to maintain altitude
without conflicting with non-painted traffic, and equally able to hope
that the intruder is TCAS-equipped and responds to a descent RA.
The "Bakshirian" decider is not able to maintain altitude without
conflict with non-painted traffic, as far as he knows.
The German-glider decider can follow the dictum not to manoeuvre
contrary to an RA. The Bakshirian decider cannot follow this dictum
without risk.
PBL

12th September 2007, 10:17

#22 (permalink)

Capt Pit Bull

Peter,

Join Date: Aug 1999

Location: England
Posts: 667

Quote:
That might be stretching it a bit.
You can have EGPWS warnings
when the aircraft is physically in the
correct part of the sky. A good
example is a that map shift on final
approach can easily lead to an
escape manoeuvre. We had a spate
of this on one type I flew. Now,
flying a go around from that point in
the sky shouldn't (in theory) unduly
tax ATC but at a busy multi runway
international airport..... well, you
get the picture.

Not that I disagree with the broad

thrust of what you are saying.
pb

17th September 2007,

21:41

alf5071h
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: An Island
Province
Posts: 649

#37 (permalink)
Peter, the GPWS situation is more complex if you
consider EGPWS which uses a database and
navigation position in its computation. You may
have meant this but your response related to
GPWS; as you realise, it is important to distinguish
between the two. This is particularly so for the crew
as the later system (EGPWS/TAWS) is more
capable and reliable than previous systems, but
then opens greater opportunity for error due to the
range of alerting and warning modes and the
terrain display, e.g. during an approach a pilot may
pull up in response to a warning and incorrectly
level at MDA, but due to a (gross) error in range,
MDA is not safe.
Also note that some versions of EGPWS use GPS
altitude as a gross error check of altitude, mainly
incorrect pressure setting. GPS (geometric) altitude
does not replace the rad alt (there are exceptions)
as its accuracy is less than that of normal altimetry,
and therefore at this time it would not be a
candidate for ACAS altitude as suggested earlier in
the thread.
As for the solution to the three aircraft ACAS
problem, this is done reasonably successfully by
combat pilots in 1 vs 2 situations. My experiences
and existence today is relevant, but based on the
same experiences I would be less confident for
situations involving 4 vs 4, due to the human
limitations in continuously computing a 4D (space
time) solution, thats assuming that you can see
everyone!
Your ACAS problem relates to a similar 4D situation
and thus might be modelled in the form the 4th
power.
Considering three aircraft avoidance, x, y and z,
then a solution could be in the form of x^4 = y^4
+ z^4.
This form of equation for powers greater than 2 has
been proven to have no solution (Fermats
conjecture). With appropriate deductive logic, no
solution relates to a collision condition, thus I claim

my PhD !

17th September 2007,

22:01

ATC Watcher

#38 (permalink)
Quote:
I

Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 59
Posts: 1,052

If this thread was about a crew's response to a

GPWS alert: "Whoop Whoop PULL UP!", which
involved pushing the stick forward instead of
back, would there be much in the way of
technical discussion required?
nteresting point .Because , if we go back in time,
there are similarities indeed . If one remembers the
introduction of GPWS, the early systems were prone
to many false alarms, which worked against crew
acceptation. ( remember for instance the Air Inter
decision in France with their new A320 fleet, and the
discussions that followed after their Mt St Odile
CFIT )
I do not have precise archive data at hand , but I
remember there were quite a few CFIT accidents in
the late 80s /early 90s , where GPWS alerts were
ignored by pilots. ( the Independent air Boeing 707
in Santa Maria /Azores in 1989 , or the Thai
International A310 in Katmandu in 92 are just two
that come to my mind for instance )
So the philosophies ( how to deal with automation
) do apply for both systems, in their early phases.
In 2007, GPWS , and especially EGPWS could be
considered mature. Not TCAS.
TCAS is, despite its age, still in its early phase , as
we now on version 7.0 of its development, and that
after a collision and a good dozen of very,very near
calls , we are most probably going to have a version
7.1 in a few years. That might resolve partially the
flaws that contributed to those accidents/incidents.
What we do in the meantime( i.e. until that new
version comes ) , is part of the debate here.

18th September 2007,

00:14

#39 (permalink)

FullWings

PBL,

Join Date: Dec 2003

Location: Tring, UK
Posts: 432

Quote:
I agree with 1. to 3. but would you agree that 4. is
likely to happen near an airport (you have to
approach the ground when landing and get near it
when taking off) and airports are well known as
places where aeroplanes like to congregate... Anyway,

the points I'm trying to make are:

a) GPWS and TCAS (and to a lesser extent EGPWS)
are last-defence systems, conceived to possibly
stop/reduce the chances of an accident occurring.
They are not designed or certified to replace ATC or
good piloting - except at the last minute when either
or both have been lacking.
so,
b) As the alerts/advisories/warnings given by the
above equipment are somewhat time constrained in
their period of usefulness (!), then a consistent
response over a short period is required to allow these
systems to function as intended, i.e. you can't
pontificate at great length about what action to take:
it must be a memory drill - "recall item". And you
have to perform it correctly.

Quote:
I assume that is the berlingen scenario? I say that it
was the worst possible because it led to a collision;
almost by definition any other action would have
produced a "miss". I know this is slightly simplistic but
if you think about it in reverse, to generate a "hit"
both aircraft have to occupy the same small space
over the same very small time period. Any changes to
the trajectories of either will quickly disrupt this
meeting. Finally, it's because the manual says:
"NEVER MANOUVER AGAINST AN RA".

Quote:
F
Those are not the only two options. Another arises
when you have an advisory to manoeuvre to avoid
a conflict from same-level or higher, and you have
an aircraft below you in sight. What would your
decision be and why?
ollow the RA. The danger in aviation comes mostly
from the aircraft you can't/haven't seen or aren't
aware of. I would posit that you are unlikely to hit an
aircraft that you have in plain sight as you can tell if it
is on a constant relative bearing or not; also you have
the option of a lateral manoeuvre to de-conflict. If the
a/c below has TCAS, there might be coordination
going on that you are unaware of. If it doesn't, then
they'll (like you) probably follow the rules of the air to
avoid a collision (if they've seen you!)
I find detailed technical discussions about most things
to do with aviation absolutely fascinating... but the job
has shown me that for some scenarios, you have to
have a fairly rote response prepared for immediate
use. I applaud scientific examination of the limits of

aircraft systems but when you get to 99.99%

confidence (or whatever) in a particular one,
especially if it involves time-critical warnings, you just
have to say: "It works, do what it says" as there isn't
any room left to do a risk analysis on an alternative
response.
I have had several RA's in real life, one caused by an
aircraft directly above deciding to descend at a great
rate through our level. Did TCAS save our lives? Don't
know but it was f***ing close when we did eventually
see it.

18th September 2007,

07:39

#40 (permalink)

mono

Dynamite,

Join Date: Feb 2002

Location: UK
Posts: 396

I will try to answer a couple of your questions.

EPR as you correctly state is a measure of the thrust
produced by a Jet engine. It is, as its name implies, the
ratio of what comes out the back over what comes in
the front. The inlet pressure P1 is sensed by a single
probe (like a pitot probe), which is usually inside the
engine inlet cowl, but can be on the spinner (B727) or
the pylon (B707). The exhaust pressure P7 is sensed by
a manifold or rack of tubes with holes in the jet pipe.
In the main all EPR indicating systems will, assuming TO
power is acheived before the a/c is rolling, show a
decrease in EPR as the a/c accelerates down the runway.
and this is quite simply because the pressure at the inlet
probe increases as the ram air effect is sensed at the
probe. A/c with the probe mounted in the inlet will only
show a small decrease because the probe also senses
the pressure of the air being sucked into the engine. The
old 707 however, with its probe mounted on the pylon,
away from the air being sucked into the engine used to
show a marked reduction in EPR as it trundled down the
runway.
Cost index is a figure provided for the a/c usually by the
airline planning and performance dept. I can't give you
any specifics, but it is used by the FMC to compute
optimum climb and cruise performance levels. A low
cost index will cause the FMC to calculate performance
levels to provide a lower fuel burn. With a higher cost
index, fuel burn becomes less important and speedy
enroute times more important. The final figure is a
compromise between fuel burn and enroute time and
may change depending on the route being flown.
INS, ahh, that old chestnut. The first and most
important thing to realise is that neither INS or IRS use

gyros to sense north. The gyros are merely there to

either electronically or mechanically maintain the
INS/IRS platform level and aligned with true north.
The system senses north in the following way:- there
are 3 sensitive acceleromerers each aligned 90 degrees
relative to each other. We'll call them the vertical, lateral
and horizontal accelerometers. During the initial
alignment process, the outputs are used to calculate the
vertical axis (in the old INS systems the platform was
actually moved by motors so that the vertical
accelerometer was physically aligned with the vertical).
Once this is known then the outputs from the
accelerometers are used to sense acceleration forces
due to the rotation of the earth and it is the resolution of
these forces that aligns the INS along the true
north/south axis. Note that due to the obvious equitorial
ambiguity (acceleration forces at 40 degs N and 40 degs
S are the same) it is not until the a/c present position is
put into the INS that true north is known.
Hope this helps

17th January 2003,

23:11

Notso Fantastic
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 1,814

#3 (permalink)
Interesting questions! Maybe the EPR does change.
Never been looking at it to notice. On the Boeings I've
flown, autothrottle sets the required thrust and i
haven't been aware of it modulating the thrust levers
to maintain constant thrust. I think any change on big
fan engines must be very minor.
Question 5- back in the 70s I was dragged out on
standby to copilot a Certificate of Airworthiness test
on a VC10 fitted with an AoA meter. Following the
incidents of superstalls on Tridents and BAC 1-11s
(always fatal), I was not altogether happy to find
myself doing stick pushes at 15,000' over Anglia.
Speed was reduced to below 100kts and AoA hovered
at 15 degrees, then twitched, then jumped to 17
degrees. The stick push horns cut in and the stick was
pushed forward and suddenly there was a nice view of
farmland. Nice to be alive and enjoy it, but Notso
couldn't help thinking 'very good theory, but what if it
doesn't work?- I'd really rather be home reading the
Sundays!' Back to your question- I assume if you
stalled in a bank situation (increased 'g'), I think the
AoA would be different?
To expand slightly on INS & True North, systems
cannot sense the direction too near the Poles, so INS
sets, although they can fly over the Poles, cannot be
aligned preflight near the Poles. I forget the
limitations, but I think if a 747 started out within

about 20 degrees latitude from the Poles, the INS sets

would have difficulty aligning themselves. Used to
take Classic 747s about 20 minutes, the 400 version
about 7.

2nd December 2002,

17:01

None
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: West
Posts: 345

#8 (permalink)
I am going to training this week, so I thought I
would look into this question. Below is from the US
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) Chapter 4.
4-4-11. SPEED ADJUSTMENTS
a. ATC will issue speed adjustments to pilots of
radar-controlled aircraft to achieve or maintain
required or desire spacing.
b. ATC will express all speed adjustments in terms
of knots based on indicated airspeed (IAS) in 10
knot increments except that at or above FL 240
speeds may be expressed in terms of Mach numbers
in 0.01 increments. The use of Mach numbers is
restricted to turbojet aircraft with Mach meters.
c. Pilots complying with speed adjustments are
expected to maintain a speed within plus or minus
10 knots or 0.02 Mach number of the specified
speed.
I'm uncertain of its applicability outside of the USA.

29th August 2002,

17:11

cwatters
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: England
Posts: 927

#3 (permalink)
Wings with a lot of sweep need less dihedral because
the sweep contributes to roll stability (don't as me
how, I don't know). If you have too much roll stability
the plane can't turn fast so they reduce stability to a
satisfactory level by giving swept wings anhedral.
Paragliders have anhedral for a different reason - to
help keep the wing open I believe.

29th August 2002,

18:08

erikv

#4 (permalink)
cwatters,
Swept wings improve directional stability.

Join Date: May 2001

Location: Netherlands
Posts: 111

For example, yawing to the right causes the left wing

to be positioned more perpendicular to the incoming
airflow. This in turn increases the drag of the left wing,
causing the a/c to yaw back to the left.
Erik.

29th August 2002,

19:39

#5 (permalink)

Keith.Williams.

Parapunter

Join Date: Aug 2001

Location: Dorset
Posts: 597

The above replies are correct, but overlook the specific

problems facing the harrier designers. In order to
produce efficient vertical thrust, the gas flowing from
the engine nozzles requires a reasonably clear path
vertically downwards. This required the use of high
wings. But high wings combined with a fairly high wing
sweep angle would produce unacceptably strong lateral
stability. The addition of anhedral both on the wings
and tailplane, reduced the larteral stability, thereby
restoring a reasonable degree of roll response.

29th August 2002,

22:04

#6 (permalink)

John Farley

Keith

Do a Hover - it
avoids G

I have grave reservations about sticking my nose in on

this one, but for the first time ever I could find myself
at odds with something you have posted.

Join Date: Oct 1999

Location: Chichester
West Sussex UK
Age: 76
Posts: 1,099

Your last sentence was The addition of anhedral both

on the wings and tailplane, reduced the lateral stability,
thereby restoring a reasonable degree of roll
response.
I can only agree with this if the roll response you quote
is that due to a lateral gust. If it is the roll response
due to aileron deflection that you mean, then I
disagree.
The rate of roll that happens following aileron
deflection on any aircraft has much more to do with
the roll damping of its wing rather than any lateral
stability it may possess. Static lateral stability of the
sort produced by dihedral ONLY produces a stable
righting moment (that opposes ailerons) if sideslip also
develops from the side of the down going wing.
It is the need to obtain a reasonable (as opposed to
huge) response to a lateral gust that leads people to

employ anhedral. Without it an aircraft with a high

wing and low CG, especially if the wing is also swept,
will have a terrible (huge) tendency to roll when hit by
a lateral gust. So whether it is a 146 (where you are
concerned about passenger comfort as well as
controllability on a gusty approach) or a Harrier (where
aiming steadiness and low level ride are the
considerations) the answer is to include a rolling
moment due to sideslip that has the opposite
arithmetic sign to that coming from sweep plus high
wing and low CG. This means anhedral.
You can even use huge lateral stabilty to generate high
roll rates. Nearly 40 years ago as a very new tp just
posted to Aero Flight I was given the SB5 (Lightning
look alike with a tiny donk and a fixed gear) to fly on
an open day. All of the experienced guys having
declined to be seen dead in the device picked rather
more manoeuvrable mounts (like the FD2 or the
HP115) On my first flight I found why: the stick forces
were huge, the rate of roll from aileron was negligible
(thanks to them being unpowered, very close to the
fuselage and being almost too heavy to deflect). But
the monster had a sweep of 60deg so this huge lateral
stability enabled a modest facsimile of a twinkle roll to
be produced by kicking the rudder and making
deliberate use of the huge rolling moment due to
sideslip.
Regards
John

30th August
2002, 12:45

Mark 1
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Warwicks, UK
Posts: 652

#7 (permalink)
As far as
Rolls-Royce
go, this
seems a
very
confused
subject.
From what I
understand
the RB
series were
originated in
Bristol,
although
their is no
RD series for

Derby. The
211 was just
a sequential
model
number,
most of
which never
saw the light
of day. The
-524
followed
from the
-22, I think
the 5
indicated it
was 50,000
lb thrust
class,
although the
-535 was
only
(originally)
35000lb
class. The
other letters
referred to
throttlepush or
growth
variants of
the same
engine.
As to why
the RB211
didn't get
named after
a major
river (as in
Spey, Dart,
Tyne, Trent
etc.), I've
never heard
an
explanation.

4th August 2002,

19:07

#4 (permalink)

Babi Melayu

Please don't call yourself a retard.

Join Date: Feb 2001

Location: Malaysia

You might be familiar with the more common 3-degree

Posts: 13

glideslope or gradient of 5%. The 5% means 5 / 100, 5

feet lost vertically (y-axis) for every 100 feet travelled
horizontally (x-axis). When you intend to find the angle
subtended by this 5 (y-axis) and 100 (x-axis), you just
take the inverse tangent of them both - opposite over
adjacent i.e. inverse tangent of 5 / 100. The result is an
angle of 2.83 degrees ( which is close to the 3-degree
we mentioned).
The TWELVE percent (12%) slope means you lose 12
feet vertically for every 100 feet travelled horizontally
and this is simply a much steeper slope i.e. a whopping
6.84 degrees glideslope! ( Inverse tangent of 12 over
100 gives us 6.84)
Who uses the 12% slope, by the way?

Last edited by Babi Melayu : 4th August 2002 at

19:14.

9th August 2002,

11:37

BlueEagle
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Australia
Posts: 2,252

#5 (permalink)
On a clear day a visual approach to R/W13 was
possible and the CX pilots often did it, they being very
familiar with the place.
For the rest of us it was usual to do an IGS,
(Instrument Guidance System), approach which gave
you Localiser and GP information down to a height of
approx. 650' but on a track 45degrees to the R/W
QDM, by which time you should be visual with the
runway and able to complete the turn on and landing
visually.

11th August 2002,

21:11

#7 (permalink)

ShyTorque
Avoid imitations

SuperTed,

Join Date: Nov 2000

Location: Still wandering in hyperspace.
Posts: 5,089

It has got
nothng to do
with static
pressure or
the capsule.
A vibrator in
an altimeter
is there to

overcome
stiction /
friction
within the
mechanism,
i.e. cogs and
a suitable
system of
levers and
pulleys etc
between the
capsule and
the
indicating
needles.
Without it
an altimeter
needle may
lag / jump
and operate
in "steps". A
vibrator just
smooths out
the
movement
of the
needle. Note
that it isn't
often
necessary to
fit one to
helicopters
or piston
engine
aircraft that
vibrate
through
other
means.

14th
January
2002, 12:06

#7 (permalink)

Shore Guy
Join Date:
Jul 2000
Location:
U.S.A.
Posts: 407

In one of my first (in person) introductions to the great dry

Britsh wit, I was in Sim 1, Day 1 on the BA-146 at Hatfield.
Instructor in the back, using his pointer to go over all the
instruments, switches, indicators (retired BA fellow as I recall).
He pointed at a red flag in the standby attitude indicator, and

said "It's time to get out the flight attendants emergency

checklist - it seems our vibrator is inoperative".

8th February 2001,

12:00

#5 (permalink)

BOING

Posts: n/a

If you want a quick mental conversion that works

quite well at lower altitudes.
TAS = IAS + (IAS/60 x Ht (in thousands of feet))
IE TAS = 240 + (240/60 x 10)
= 280
Try it and see if the answers are close enough for your
use.
------------------

9th February
2001, 05:16

#7 (permalink)

TOGA_Party

Posts: n/a

Smurfjet,
Not so much a formula as a 'rule of thumb'. Works when
conditions are close to ISA and at altitudes not flight levels.
The TAS and IAS will vary by 1.8 kts/1000'.
eg. If we're cruising at 10'000 and indicating 145kts then
TAS will be 163kts.
ie 1.8(kts/1000')X 10(lots of 1000')= 18kts
145kts (IAS)
+
18kts = 163kts (TAS)
Also works just as well the other way around!!

10th February
2001, 18:08

#8 (permalink)

fart

Posts: n/a

This will give you a quick answer that comes faily close to
the real deal:

Use 2% of IAS per 1000 ft and add to IAS:

Example: IAS is 200 Knots at 25 000 ft
therefore 2% X 25000 divide by 1000 = 25
= 50% of IAS
50% of 200Knots + 200 KNOTS = 100 + 200
= 300 Knots TAS

22nd February 2001,

15:22

#3 (permalink)

Tinstaafl

Posts: n/a

24th February 2001,

05:51

I know it's a bit pedantic but I know that rule of

thumb as TAS/10 + 7, not IAS...

#7 (permalink)

Dan Winterland

Posts: n/a

Each PAPI light is like a slide projector with a red

bottom segment white top segment. The four lights are
set at a different angle, so that when you are on the
correct glideslope you see two reds and two whites.
The slope set corresponds with the ILS glideslope angle
and will lead you to the radar touchdown point, usually
1000' in. If it isn't an ILS runway, the PAPIs are set at
3 degrees.
When you are on the slope, the red PAPIs are next to
the runway. That may not seem important, unless you
are a CAA examiner. I was asked that in my air law
exam, and couldn't remember despite having stared at
them regularly for over ten years!

11th February 2000,

02:59

#3 (permalink)

shakespeare

Posts: n/a

The thing to remember with PAPI lights is that they

bring you to the same touchdown point. i.e. 2 whites
and 2 reds = 3 degree glide path. 3 reds and 1 white
(flown constantly) reduces the angle but you will
touch down at the same point. The same applies
flying 3 whites and 1 red, however with a higher
angle.

Hope that helps!

29th January 2001,

08:06

#8 (permalink)

Yoeman

Posts: n/a

Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) was invented

in England .. the name Tony Smith is often associated
with this invention .. which is probably true ..
PAPI was adopted by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and was to replace the older
Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI) by 1995 ...
this was based on the premise that the life of VASI
was 15 years, so that when it came time to replace
VASI, it could be done with PAPI ... however, the
reality was that some countries did not have funding
arranged to do this, so VASI continues at many
sites ...
PAPI is the same as VASI in the sense of the light
units ... all that has been done is to relocate the units
to the "theoretical touchdown point" and to vertically
align the four units A, B, C, and D separately at about
20 minute increments of A=2'30", B=2'50", C=3'10"
and D=3'30" ... the units B and C define the
"approach corridor" with which the approach path
(slope) is (B+C)/2=3'00" ... pilots fly the "approach
corridor" (two whites and two reds) and not the
approach path since the path itself is not seen ...
the PAPI signal is not coincident with the ILS path ... it
can only be made to be approximately close to the ILS
path through increasing the width of the approach
corridor which is indicated by the color signals ... the
PAPI is a visual aid
information on PAPI is available in the ICAO Annex 14,
FAA advisory circulars and Transport Canada manual
TP312 ... as well as in the pilot flight manuals ...