Bok:978 3 319 18221 6 PDF

International and Cultural Psychology
Series Editor: Anthony J. Marsella, Ph.D.
LouiseSundararajan
Understanding
Emotion in
Chinese Culture
Thinking Through Psychology
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6089
Louise Sundararajan
Understanding Emotion
in Chinese Culture
Thinking Through Psychology
Louise Sundararajan
Rochester Psychiatric Center, NY
Rochester, NY, USA
ISSN 1574-0455
ISSN 2197-7984 (electronic)
ISBN 978-3-319-18220-9
ISBN 978-3-319-18221-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18221-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015937941
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
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Dedicated to the memory of My Mother:

Jin Ze-Xuan
In the whole wide world, the person whose
heart aches the most for me is no more.
()
Preface
I dont have time for that, I kept telling myself and my friend Tony Marsella, who
has been asking me for quite some time to edit a volume on indigenous psychology.
It didnt work. I finally put my foot down and said No to Tony in a roundabout
way, so typical of many Asians: If I ever do a book, Id rather write a book of my
own. Thatll stop him, I thought. Fine, said Tony, send me the book proposal.
Little did I know that I would be stuck with my own pretense. The result is this book.
Whats This Book About?

;()
If names are not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language
is not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.
(Confucian Analects)
This book is about lived experiences in search of a correct name, as Confucius

put it, or in psychological lingo, a conceptual framework that can serve them well.
Imagine having certain experiences that have become an integral part of you like
your own skin, but somehow they do not fit any given categories. In order to tell
yourself as well as others what you have been through, you may try for fit all the
ready-made categories, and in the process invent terms and concepts that have a
better fit. This, in a nutshell, is the journey of indigenous psychology (Gergen,
Gulrerce, Lock, & Misra, 1996; Sundararajan, 2014a, 2014b; Sundararajan, Misra,
& Marsella, 2013). Indigenous psychology is a psychological inquiry that subsists
in the gap between the canonical terms of mainstream psychology and a phenomenal world that has as its point of reference a Mecca that falls outside the pale of the
epistemological universe of Western psychology. For experiences to remain nameless; or worse yet, to have to take on ill-fitting terms and concepts that falsify and
distort them is the agony that drives the endeavors of this book.
vii
viii
Preface
It is, therefore, not simply an academic exercise for me to weave together phenomenal descriptions and abstract terms and concepts in psychology. In addition to
being a personal quest, this book is an invitation to think things through with me. By
thinking I mean double thinkingnot only to think through culture, as recommended by Shweder (1991), but also to think through psychology. In thinking
through psychology, I make subdisciplines talk to each other. For instance, in citing
empirical evidence to support theoretical conjectures, I do not mean that the validity
of the latter is thereby boosted by the former. Termssuch as validation, truth, and
factshave no purchase in this book. This book is not about apodictic truth so
much as cross-fertilization of ideas, especially ideas from different lines of inquiry
or different levels of analysis in psychology.
Synopsis of the Book

Part I: Conceptual Foundations for the Analysis of Chinese Emotions
Chapter 1 focuses on the rationale and methodology of the book. Replacing the
ever expanding list of attributes in cross-cultural psychology, I offer an explanatory model of culture to explain the well-documented cross-cultural differences
in cognitive styles. More specifically, I use the framework of symmetry and symmetry breakdown, derived from physics, to explain how cultures that differentially privilege relational and non-relational cognition are mirror images of each
other.
Chapter 2 examines harmony as the Chinese version of symmetry. Harmony has
been found to help as well as hinder creativity and other important human flourishing. Scholars have also drawn a distinction between optimal and suboptimal
harmony, known as deep versus superficial, true versus false harmony, and so on.
This chapter uses the framework of symmetry and symmetry breakdown to
explain the difference between these two versions of harmony, and to guide a
structural analysis of optimal harmony.
Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of Confucianism. Once Nisbett (2003) asked a
Chinese scholar why Westerners and Easterners had developed different ways of
thinking, the scholar replied, Because you had Aristotle and we had Confucius
(p. 29). This chapter explains this enigmatic answer. More specifically, it shows
how in contrast to Plato and Aristotle who privileged reason and logic, Confucius
considered the cultivation of emotions (qing) the goal of education, and used
poetry as a primary means for this goal.
Chapter 4 focuses on an analysis of Daoism. If Confucianism privileges the coordination games of group living, how does the quest for autonomy and independence fair in the collectivist niche of traditional China? The answer is very well,
thanks to Daoism. Daoist values are examined, with special emphasis on the fact
that Daoism shares with Confucianism an interest in intimacy in relationships,
except that in Daoism intimacy has shifted to the transcendent context of communion with Nature.
Preface
ix
Part II: Chinese Emotions in the Everyday

Chapter 5 focuses on empathy-based emotions. A primitive form of empathy,
akin to contagion, was promoted and used by the Confucian philosopher Mencius
as the building blocks of his moral edifice. This chapter examines a household
termxin-teng (heart-aching love)to show how, consistent with the moral
vision of Mencius, Chinese learn morality at their mothers lap.
Chapter 6 examines the art of intimacy from Chinese poetics to the everyday.
The West tends to define intimacy in terms of the behavioral and experiential
characteristics of a relationship. By contrast, the Chinese notion of intimacy
focuses on the epistemological and ontological transformations of this relationship. The Chinese notion of intimacy poses to emotion theory an interesting
question: Does the self get a boost from positive emotions, such as intimacy, to
be grounded more firmly in its self-esteem, or does it thereby vault over its ego
and land in a different universethe we-ness?
Chapter 7 explores the influence of Daoism on Chinese emotions. Spontaneity is
considered the hallmark of true feelings. This Daoist doctrine of freedom and
authenticity in emotion has far reaching implications for both cognitive appraisal
and dual-process theories in contemporary psychology.
Chapter 8 focuses on hierarchy-based emotions. Fitting in is very important in
collectivist cultures, where the individual needs to suppress his or her personal
needs and feelings in order to fit in, so the collectivism story goes. Yet, there is
room for indulgence in selfishness in the Confucian society, provided that you
assume the lower status of being young and immature. The term that marks the
site of selfishness reserved for the young and immature is sajiao, which refers to
the behaviors of young children who act like spoiled brats, and by extension,
young women acting childish as a form of flirtation. The focus of sajiao, however, falls not on the selfish and sometimes downright manipulative behaviors, so
much as on the relational context of intimacy that warrants such behaviors. This
chapter examines how the rationality behind this hierarchy-based intimacy fosters gratitude.
Part III: Chinese Creativity
Chapter 9 examines emotional creativity as exemplified by the lives of hermits.
This chapter calls attention to the so far neglected fact that hermits in Asia
embody a well-established tradition of social nonconformity and independent
thinking since antiquity.
Chapter 10 focuses on savoring and its implications for emotion theory. In contrast to emotional regulation prevalent in the West, the Chinese privilege refinement of emotions. Overall in the Confucian system, it is difficult to make a
compelling argument for the elimination or control of something intrinsically
bad in emotions. For instance, desire is not intrinsically bad in the Analects. To
Confucius a desire is good or bad depending on whose desire it was, a virtuous
or a petty persona refined person would have refined desires. The main thrust
therefore is on refinement, or self-cultivation. Refinement sets goals above and
Preface
beyond regulation. The goal of regulation/coping/management of emotions is

reached once the undesirable consequences are eliminated or held in check. The
benchmarks of emotional refinement include more elusive goals such as creativity, personal growth, and development. One consequence of emotional refinement is refined emotions. This chapter examines one of the most common-place
practices of refined emotions, namely savoring.
Chapter 11 focuses on insight-based emotional transformations associated with
the Buddhist notion of kong (emptiness). It is well documented that the Chinese
prefer intuitive over formal reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett,
2002). It is also widely known that intuition is more conducive to creativity than
analytical thinking (Sternberg, 2006). However, the connection between creativity and intuitive reasoning does not seem to carry beyond the Western hemisphere. When it comes to the cognition of the Asians, their intuitive approach is
cast in the dual-systems framework of decision-making (Kahneman, 2003), in
which gut feelings and intuitions join the ranks of the unconscious, associative
processes that are shown to be fast but error prone, relative to the conscious,
systematic processing that are supposedly more accurate and capable of learning.
This chapter restores the connection between intuition and creativity in the
Chinese context, by investigating the Buddhist notions of kong (emptiness) and
wu (enlightenment), with special focus on associated emotional
transformations.
Part IV: Conclusion
Chapter 12: The term qing has been left undefined but introduced piecemeal in
the previous chapters. In this concluding chapter, I give a formal definition of
qing and explore its connotations as candidates for an alternative to the standard
answers in mainstream psychology to the question posed by William James
(1884) more than a century ago: What is an emotion?
Potential Contributions
This book has the potential to make the following contributions to culture and psychology, and more specifically global psychology, for it is in investigating painstakingly the innards, case by case, of the multiple and diverse mental universes sported
by cultures that psychology, in its aspiration to become a global science, can hope
to attain a comprehensive understanding of the mental life (Teo & Febbraro, 2003):
This book is the first systematic study of Chinese emotions from a theoretical
framework that seeks not only to do justice to the indigenous perspectives, but
also uses the latter to interrogate mainstream psychological theories and research
on emotions.
It intends to enhance genuine understanding across cultures at a level deeper than
the utilitarian purposes of tourism and trade. By rendering accessible the episte-
Preface
xi
mological universe of a culture, this book makes it possible for an outsider to

experience the local culture more fully beyond the level of intellectual understanding, and hopefully to see the world and feel the way the locals do.
This book demonstrates how folk theories of non-Western cultures can function
as potential competitors and valued interlocutors in the theory construction of
emotions. More specifically, it demonstrates how the Chinese notions of qing
(emotion) can bring greater clarity to existing concepts, can participate meaningfully in the current debates on emotions, and hopefully will tip the balance of
assimilation and accommodation in mainstream psychology (Teo & Febbraro,
2003), thereby rendering the latter more open to novel and deviant ideas from
within as well as without the field of affective science.
At the practical level, this book enlarges our repertoire of adaptation to a changing world. By mapping out the ecological niches in traditional China with corresponding algorithms for emotional fitness, this book contributes to resources
for creative problem solving for the Chinese as well as the non-Chinese, at this
particular juncture in history when all cultures are facing unprecedented challenges at multiple levels.
Tips on Reading
Take small bites, with savoring. Inviting thinking and reflection, chapters in this book
are not meant to be finished in one sitting. Your best bet is to read a few chucks of ideas
at a time, allow time for your mind to play with the ideas, and savor the journey.
Have fun skipping. If you come across a terminology that you either dont know
or dont care enough to know, just skip it. Rest assured that there is enough redundancy in this book that you are not missing anything by skipping. I usually say the
same thing twice, one in lay terms, and one in psychological jargons. The point
made in one chapter will also be reiterated in other chapters, so skip as you like and
you may still be able to follow the thread.
No need to start from the beginning. There is more than one way to skin the
cat, so it is with reading this book. If you are not a theory person, you may consider starting in the middlebegin with Part II and continue to Part III. When you
read about the Chinese experiences in these sections, you will realize that descriptions inevitably come with conceptsyou may consider these cultural phenomena as uniquely Chinese, or something universal, typical of all cultures, or a
mixture of both, universal and unique. How do you decide? How far do you agree
with my interpretation of the Chinese experience? What is the basis of my interpretations? When you start wondering about such questions, you may want to
turn to the first and the last sections (Parts I and IV) to address the question of
psychological theory.
In case you are a theory person. In case you think the way I do that psychology
is all about theory and constructsthe so-called empirical evidence, facts, and
behaviors are all consequences of theory, since these are contingent upon sampling,
xii
Preface
and sampling flows right out of theory implicit and/or explicit, then you can take a
plunge into the first (Part I) and last (Part IV) sections, with no particular order
you can start with the last chapter if you want to. After you have digested these
theory-laden sections, you will be able to read the middle sections (Parts II and III)
as footnotes to the theoretical investigations.
It would be good to know in advance what to expectwhat you will and not find
in this book.
This is not a book on Chinese philosophy. I make no attempt to give a comprehensive introduction to Chinese philosophy. In order to map out the conceptual
space of Chinese emotions, I focus on early, primarily Confucian and Daoist, texts
during the formative period of the Chinese civilization.
Where is emotion? If you are looking for explicit treatment of blue ribbon emotions, such as happiness, anger, sadness, and so on, you will be disappointed. For
reasons explained in Chap. 12, Chinese emotions are registered in an implicit code,
like salt flavor in the soup, rather than explicitly represented like clumps of salt that
spoil the soup. In comparison to the English term emotion, the Chinese counterpart
qing covers a much broader spectrum, ranging from moods and sentiments to ever
so subtle emotional nuances that color everything we see through the affective lens.
Furthermore, the following chapters on emotion may contain chunks of discussions
based on cognitive psychology, since the Chinese term xin , which constitutes the
heart radical () in the Chinese character of qing , refers to both heart and mind.
Lastly, you can expect certain peculiarities about books on Chinese culture.
The confusing Romanization system. Anyone who tells you that cultures can be
a neat and tidy system is lying. There is no consensus among different Chinese
populations, any more than among scholars, concerning the two Romanization systems of Chinese characterspinyin versus Wade-Giles. In this book, the pinyin
method will be followed, except in citations from scholarly works that employ
Wade-Giles.
Chinese names. I will follow the Chinese convention, in which the family name
goes first, in contrast to the Western custom of putting the family name last.
No clear demarcation of things. Things seem to be clear only on paper. For
instance, it is possible to differentiate the three traditions of Confucianism, Daoism,
and Buddhism, but it is near impossible to find a Chinese who is only one and not
the other. When I was a student of Zen Buddhism under the late Master Nan HuaiJin, I used to participate in parties he gave in honor of a visitor. Master Nan would
ask us our preference: Shall we be Daoist or Buddhist tonight? Since the former
drinks alcohol and the latter does not, we all opted to be Daoist for the occasion.
Now you are on your way. Hope you will have as much fun reading this book as
I had writing it. I wish to thank Tony Marsella for talking me into it. Had I known
that writing a book could be so much fun, I would have done it sooner.
Rochester, NY
Louise Sundararajan
Preface
xiii
References
Gergen, K. J., Gulrerce, A., Lock, A., & Misra, G. (1996). Psychological science in cultural context. American Psychologist, 51, 496503.
James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind, 9, 126.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.
American Psychologist, 58, 697720.
Nisbett, R. E. (2003). The geography of thought. New York: Free Press.
Norenzayan, A., Smith, E. E., Kim, B. J., & Nisbett, R. E. (2002). Cultural preferences for formal
versus intuitive reasoning. Cognitive Science, 26, 653684.
Shweder, R. A. (1991). Thinking through culture: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Sternberg, R. J. (2006). The nature of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 18, 8798.
Sundararajan, L. (2014a). Eastern Psychologies. In T. Teo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of critical psychology (Article 85). New York: Springer.
Sundararajan, L. (2014b). Indigenous psychology: Grounding science in culture, why and how?
The Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 45, 6380. (Special issue on indigenous
psychology).
Sundararajan, L., Misra, G., & Marsella, A. J. (2013). Indigenous approaches to assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of mental disorders. In F. A. Paniagua & A. M. Yamada (Eds.), Handbook
of multicultural mental health (2nd ed., pp. 6987). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. R. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. Theory &
Psychology, 13, 673694.
Acknowledgements
The reigning emotion that I felt throughout the process of writing this book is gratitude. First of all, I wish to thank a linguistic scholar from The Australian National
University, Zhengdao Ye, who not only coauthored a chapter with me (Chap. 5), but
also supplied all the Chinese characters in this book. I wish to acknowledge my debt
to fellow researchers in the diverse fields of psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. In particular, I am indebted to James R. Averill, who has been a long time
collaborator and whose insights and erudition have nurtured many of my ideas that
give content and expression to this book. I also wish to thank the Indigenous
Psychology Task Force, which is a bourgeoning international community of
researchers in whose company I never feel alone. At the personal level, I wish to
thank my daughter Radhika Sundararajan for giving permission for me to use baby
Lukas Bodhis pictures for this book (Figs. 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). I thank my husband
K. R. Sundararajan for taking good care of himself, thereby setting me free to roam
the universe with my ideas. Last but not least, I am eternally indebted to my mother,
who taught me everything I need to know about Chinese emotions.
xv
Contents
Part I
Conceptual Foundations for the Analysis of Chinese Emotions
The Mirror Universes of East and West ...............................................

What Is Culture? .......................................................................................
Toward an Explanatory Model of Cross-Cultural Differences .................
Rationality, East and West ........................................................................
Ecological Niche .......................................................................................
Cultural Ideals ...........................................................................................
Toward a Symmetry and Asymmetry Model of Culture ...........................
Symmetry and Relational Cognition.........................................................
Upside-Down Universes ...........................................................................
Once Again, What Is Culture? ..................................................................
References .................................................................................................
3
3
4
7
9
11
12
13
15
18
18
Harmony: A Delicate Dance of Symmetry ...........................................

Introduction ...............................................................................................
The Structure of Harmony ........................................................................
Harmony as Symmetry Maintenance and Restoration..............................
Dialectic Thinking ....................................................................................
Holistic Thinking ......................................................................................
Low Cognitive Control .............................................................................
What Tips the Balance Between Optimal and Suboptimal
Harmony? ..................................................................................................
Summary and Conclusion .........................................................................
References .................................................................................................
21
21
21
24
24
25
27
In the Crucible of Confucianism ...........................................................

Introduction ...............................................................................................
Collectivism, an Animal Model ................................................................
Two Types of Collectivism .......................................................................
Humanizing Power Through Li (Rites).....................................................
From Might to Rite ...................................................................................
39
39
39
40
42
43
30
35
36
xvii
xviii
Contents
Self and Group: Toward a Deeper Integration ..........................................

From Group to Self ...................................................................................
Ritualization of Emotions Through Poetry ...............................................
Confucian Rationality Revisited ...............................................................
The Lasting Legacy of Confucianism .......................................................
References .................................................................................................
45
47
48
50
53
55
On the Wings of Daoism .........................................................................

The Asocial Fish .......................................................................................
The Chinese Hermits.................................................................................
Refusal to Serve ........................................................................................
Staying or Splitting ...................................................................................
Breeding Independently ............................................................................
Dao as Oceanic Merging ...........................................................................
Anti-hierarchy ...........................................................................................
Alone, Together.........................................................................................
Creativity and Society, a Dialectic Relationship .......................................
The Legacy of Daoism ..............................................................................
References .................................................................................................
59
59
60
60
61
64
65
66
66
68
70
72
Part II
Tracing Emotions Daintily Through Things

Psychologically Chinese
Heart-Aching Love (Teng,) ...............................................................

Love, Bitter and Sweet ..............................................................................
A Linguistic Analysis of Teng ..................................................................
Xin-teng in the Everyday ................................................................
Heartaching Love and Empathy ................................................................
The Unbearing Mind and Cognitive Appraisal .........................................
Care-Based Morality .................................................................................
Concluding Observations ..........................................................................
References .................................................................................................
77
77
80
81
84
85
86
88
90
The Art of Intimacy ................................................................................

Introduction ...............................................................................................
The Sympathetic Universe of Gan-Lei (Responding in Kind) ........
The Resonating Feedback Loop of Gan-Ying
(StimulatingResponding) ........................................................................
Mind-to-Mind Transactions in Protoconversation ....................................
Resonance and Mental Sharing .................................................................
Comment Versus Topic in Protoconversation ...........................................
Attention to Intention ................................................................................
Xing: Resonance Through Poetry .............................................................
In the Everyday World of Our Lives .........................................................
References .................................................................................................
93
93
94
97
98
99
101
102
103
106
107
Contents
Freedom and Emotion: Daoist Recipes for Authenticity

and Creativity ..........................................................................................
Freedom from Emotions ...........................................................................
Freedom for Emotions ..............................................................................
Authenticity as Spontaneity ......................................................................
Authenticity and Freedom.........................................................................
Freedom from Appraisal ...........................................................................
Freedom from the Tyranny of Cognitive Control .....................................
From Cognition to Metacognition ............................................................
A Lasting Legacy ......................................................................................
Coda: The Good Guys and Bad Guys in Emotion ....................................
References .................................................................................................
111
111
112
114
116
116
117
118
121
121
122
Being Spoiled Rotten (Sajiao ): Lessons in Gratitude..................

Introduction ...............................................................................................
Ecological Conditions for Sajiao ..............................................................
The Favor-Based Rationality of Sajiao .....................................................
The Strange Math of Favor .......................................................................
Basking in Gratitude .................................................................................
A Celebration of Asymmetry in Sajiao ....................................................
Invoking the Maternal Order .....................................................................
Regression with Discretion .......................................................................
Regression in the Service of the Ego: Males Flower Drinking ...............
How to Be Spoiled Like a Man .................................................................
Indulgence with Restraint .........................................................................
The Payback Schedules of Favor ..............................................................
Summary with Some Concluding Observations .......................................
References .................................................................................................
125
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
139
Part III
9
xix
Chinese Creativity
Chinese Creativity, with Special Focus on Solitude

and Its Seekers.........................................................................................
Introduction ...............................................................................................
Relational Versus Non-relational Cognition .............................................
Creativity Without Creator Myth ..............................................................
Solitude and Creativity in Daoism ............................................................
Creation of the Self ...................................................................................
Ideal Mental World ...................................................................................
Designer Environment ..............................................................................
Portrait of the Artist as a Hermit ...............................................................
Freedom Skills ..........................................................................................
Community/Intimacy Skills ......................................................................
Coda ..........................................................................................................
References .................................................................................................
143
143
143
144
145
146
147
148
148
150
151
154
154
xx
Contents
10
Savoring (Pin wei ), from Aesthetics to the Everyday..................

Introduction ...............................................................................................
Three Flavors of Savoring .........................................................................
An Overview of Savoring .........................................................................
The Temporal Structure of Savoring .........................................................
The Proto-Narratives of Savoring .............................................................
The Cognitive Structure of Savoring: An Animal Model .........................
Self-reflexivity ..........................................................................................
Engaged Detachment ................................................................................
Savoring as a Paradigm of Self-regulation................................................
A Contemporary Application of Savoring ................................................
References .................................................................................................
157
157
157
158
159
160
162
163
165
167
171
172
11
Emptiness (Kong ): Insight-Based Emotional

Transformations ......................................................................................
Introduction ...............................................................................................
Heuristics, Simple but Smart ....................................................................
The Gist of Things ....................................................................................
The Chinese Notions of Wu ......................................................................
The Chinese Buddhist Notion of Emptiness (Kong).................................
Second-Order Desires ...............................................................................
Moral Maps ...............................................................................................
Transformation of Emotion in Kong .........................................................
References .................................................................................................
175
175
176
176
178
180
181
181
183
186
187
Part IV
12
Conclusion
What Is an Emotion? Answers from a Wild Garden

of Knowledge ...........................................................................................
Introduction ...............................................................................................
Definition of Terms ...................................................................................
The Extended Mind Hypothesis................................................................
Leaving Information in the World.............................................................
Toward a Psychology of Chinese Emotions..............................................
Toward an Impact-Focus Approach to Emotion .......................................
References .................................................................................................
191
191
192
193
194
196
197
200
202
Index ................................................................................................................. 205
Part I
Conceptual Foundations for the Analysis

of Chinese Emotions
This book is an attempt to replace the ever expanding list of cultural attributes
prevalent in cross-cultural psychology (Sundararajan, Misra, & Marsella, 2013)
with a coherent explanatory framework which is the task of this section to explicate.
This section consists of four chapters. The first chapter explains the methodology
and theoretical frameworks of my investigation. The second chapter presents a root
metaphor of Chinese thoughtharmony. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the two primary
conceptual spaces carved out by Confucianism and Daoism, respectively. Buddhism
as a late comer is not included, since the focus of this section is on ways of thinking
that can trace their roots to the formative period of Chinese civilization.
Reference
Sundararajan, L., Misra, G., & Marsella, A. J. (2013). Indigenous approaches to assessment,
diagnosis, and treatment of mental disorders. In F. A. Paniagua & A. M. Yamada (Eds.),
Handbook of multicultural mental health (2nd ed., pp. 6987). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Chapter 1
The Mirror Universes of East and West
What Is Culture?
as a Chinese jar still Moves perpetually in its stillness.
T. S. Eliot
There are literally hundreds of definitions of culture (Cohen, 2009). A dictionary

definition of culture is easy to come by, but not so useful for the responsible scholarship that I aspire to pursue. By responsible scholarship, I refer to the reflexive transparency by means of which the researcher spells out clearly the theoretical
assumptions behind her methodology. The following definitions of culture that
I espouse are, therefore, not intended to be encyclopedic so much as to reflect my
theoretical assumptions and research method.
Culture as repository of emotional knowledge. Since my topic is emotion,
I subscribe to Roger Scrutons (2007) definition of culture as the repository of
emotional knowledge, through which we can come to understand the meaning of
life as an end in itself (p. 41). I also share his bias to focus on high culture, which
is the accumulation of art, literature, and humane reflection that has stood the test
of time (p. 2); and through which a civilization rises to consciousness of itself
and defines its vision of the world (p. 2). He goes on to say: Culture is the collective practice which renews those visions and extends our sympathies into all the
corners of the heart. It is the ongoing record of the life of feeling, which offers to
every new generation the examples, images, and words that will teach it what to
feel (p. 42). Translating this definition into research method, I resort to two other
definitions of cultureas conceptual space and as rationality.
Culture as conceptual space. According to Margaret Boden (2009), conceptual
space refers to culturally accepted style of thinking, which could be a theory of
chemical molecules, a style of painting or music, or a particular national cuisine.
Just as the conceptual space of French cuisine is not confined to France, Confucianism
and Daoism are conceptual spaces not bound by national or geographical borders.

L. Sundararajan, Understanding Emotion in Chinese Culture,
International and Cultural Psychology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18221-6_1
1 The Mirror Universes of East and West
Thus, I may use data from Japan and Korea sometimes to shed light on Chinese
thinking because of their shared cultural heritage with the Chinese.
A conceptual space is defined and constrained by a set of generative rules, which
are largely implicit (Boden, 2009). These rules serve a similar function as the
English syntax that determines the extent to which any word string is a grammatically acceptable English sentence. The rules that define and constrain a conceptual
space are part and parcel of rationality.
Culture as rationality. Rationality may be defined as a functional mindset that
operates in a particular ecological niche for which it is evolved (Todd, Gigerenzer,
& The ABC Research Group, 2012). The central question addressed by rationality
is this: What does mind do in its ecological niche in order to contribute to a life that
is good, right, and reasonable? This is consistent with Richard Shweders definition
of culture: Culture is the affect-laden ideas about what is good, true, beautiful and
efficient made manifest or expressed in the customary practices of a group (personal communication, December 21, 2011). Shweder (1991) claims that rationality
is not one size fits all, but rather comes in multiple and varied formsin a phrase,
as he puts it famously one mind, many mentalities (Shweder et al., 1998). A nice
footnote to Shweders claim would be Dantes statement:
Since the power of human thought cannot be fully simultaneously translated into action by a
single man and a single specific community, there must be within the human race a multitude
through which this power in its entirety can be realized. (cited in Moscovici, 2013, p. 51)
But Shweder takes the multiplicity claim one step furtherfrom many mentalities to many worlds.
By many mentalities Shweder (1991) means the multiplicity of mental worlds. In
his own words: It is a supposition of cultural psychology that when people live in
the world differently, it maybe that they live in different worlds. It is an appreciation
of those different worlds that cultural psychology tries to achieve (p. 23, emphasis
added). He has also spelt out the consequences of this formulation of culture: If
cultures disagree, They are not contradictions battling with each other in the same
world. They are arguments in different worlds When you live in the same world
all disagreements are matters of error, ignorance, or misunderstanding. When you
live in different worlds there is far more to a disagreement than meets the eye
(p. 18, emphasis added). Thus, there is the possibility of incommensurability in
meaning across cultures, says Shweder.
Toward an Explanatory Model of Cross-Cultural Differences

One of the prevailing paradigms of culture in psychology is the individualismcollectivism comparison and its corollary, the independent versus interdependent selfconstruals. Central to this framework is the assumption of a binary opposition between
self and group: In collectivist cultures the self is an aspect of some collective,
whereas in individualist cultures the self is independent of in-groups (Triandis, 1995).
Toward an Explanatory Model of Cross-Cultural Differences
While this model gets individualism right, its formulation about collectivism is overly
vague and sometimes misleading (Harb & Smith, 2008; Voronov & Singer, 2002).
Fiske (2002) has opined that individualism is the sum of cultural characteristics by
which Americans define themselves, while collectivism is formalized to show characteristics of the antithetical other in accordance with the American ideological
understanding that we are not that kind of person (p. 84).
Going back to the drawing board, I propose to replace individualismcollectivism with an explanatory model that casts the East and West difference in cognitive
styles as difference in rationality. Cognitive styles are distinct habitual approaches
to information processing and knowledge representation that are evolved to serve
the purposes of different ecological environments (Kozhevnikov, Evans, & Kosslyn,
2014). From the perspective of ecological rationality (Todd et al., 2012), cognitive
styles shape as well as being shaped by different types of adaptations in response to
the varying environmental demands. For illustration, we may look at culture at a
smaller scalecorporate culture.
Let us start with the best known East and West differencesassociative/holistic
versus rule-based/analytic reasoning (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).
These cognitive styles are also the topics of management and other fields of research.
Pertinent to these cognitive styles is the four knowledge categories proposed by the
management researcher Martin (2009; 2009, Winter)mystery (something we
cant explain), heuristic (a rule of thumb that guides us toward solution), algorithm
(a predictable formula for producing an answer), and code (when the formula
becomes so predictable it can be fully automated). Here, the associative/holistic
processing subtend the first two knowledge categories, i.e., mystery and heuristic,
whereas rule-based/analytic reasoning the last two knowledge categories, i.e., algorithm and code. To see how these families of cognitive styles operate as different
rationalities, let us follow Martins analysis of corporations.
Using McDonalds Corporation as illustration, Martin (2009, Winter) points out
how in 1955 at a time of the emergence of freeways and beach culture in Southern
California, the McDonald brothers stared into the face of a mystery: how and what
do Californians want to eat (p. 6)? For an answer, they came up with a heuristicthe
quick service restaurant. When the investor Ray Kroc bought the McDonalds restaurant chain, he developed an algorithmexactly how to cook a burger, exactly how to
hire people, and so on. From there, it was only a short step to management by code:
Under Kroc, nothing was left to chance in the McDonalds kitchen: every hamburger
weighing exactly 1.6 ounces, its thickness measured to the thousandth of an inch, and the
cooking process stopped automatically after 38 seconds, when the burgers reached an internal temperature of exactly 155 degrees. (p. 7)
Martin claims that there is a natural progression of knowledge categories from

mystery to code, which signifies a progression in knowledge representation from
implicit to explicit, from vagueness to clarity, and from superabundance of possibilities to restricted, but precise implementations. This trajectory from mystery to code
is just one example of a universal process, called symmetry breaking, according to
Bolender (2010), through which all things ranging from matter to thought progress
from high symmetry states to low symmetry states. Bolender (2010) claims that the
process of symmetry breaking in thought is evidenced by the four measurement

scales, which in turn correspond to the fourfold relational cognition as proposed by
Fiske (1991): Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching
(EM), and Market Pricing (MP). Now, we have three corresponding sets of progression from high symmetry to low symmetry states of the thought process:
Knowledge categories: Mystery heuristic algorithm code
Measurement scales: Nominal ordinal interval ratio
Relational cognition: CS AR EM MP
While McDonalds capitalizes on the knowledge progression from mystery and
heuristics to algorithm and code, another viable strategy is for thought to move in
reverse direction from code back to mystery. Martin (2009, Winter) points out that
Advancing from mystery to code does not come without costs: by its very nature,
it involves a significant narrowing of the problem space (p. 8). Thats how at one
point its competitors drove McDonalds into a tailspin (p. 7). Martin explains:
While the algorithm-runner is standing still other organizations [such as Taco
Bell and Subway] that continue to stare into aspects of the mystery that the algorithm-runner has left out may come up with alternative and potentially superior
heuristics, algorithm and codebecause there will always be multiple paths out of
any mystery (p. 8). Thus, whereas contemporary business management prefers the
trajectory from mystery to code, Martin (2009) advocates for the strategy of going
back to mystery, a trajectory of thought that he claims to be associated with creativity. This reverse progression of thought is referred to by Bolender (2010) as symmetry restoration.
Symmetry restoration and symmetry breaking are two different and opposed orientations of thought. This, I argue, constitutes the major difference in rationality
between China and the West. My argument can be broken down into the following
interrelated propositions:
1. Building on the notion of cognition as adaptive systems shaped by environmental
demands and life experiences (Kozhevnikov et al., 2014), I argue that the ecological
niche of strong ties puts a premium on mind-to-mind transactions, which are tasks
best served by the relational cognition, whereas that of weak ties capitalizes on mindto-world transactions, which are tasks best served by the non-relational cognition.
2. Mind-to-mind transaction, served by relational cognition, capitalizes on similarity and resonance, whereas mind-to-world transaction, served by non-relational
cognition, privileges detection of difference. To the extent that similarity entails
symmetry, whereas difference asymmetry, relational cognition tends to privilege
symmetry, whereas non-relational cognition asymmetry.
3. The major difference in cognitive styles between China and the Westsuch as
holistic versus analytic, or associative versus rule-based reasoningfalls along
the divide between the two distinct cultural idealssymmetry versus asymmetry, or symmetry restoration versus symmetry breakdown.
This, in a nutshell, is the gist of my argument. Now you may sit back, relax,
and see how all these threads develop into confluent tributaries of a coherent
explanatory framework for Chinese emotions. In case you want to cheat a bit,
Rationality, East and West
Table 1.1 Cognitions and cognitive styles that differentially serve the cultural ideals of symmetry
versus asymmetry
Types of cognition
Ecological niche
Cultural ideals
Mental mapping
Cognitive orientation
Cognitive task
Attributes
Cognitive styles that

differentially serve
the purposes of
symmetry or
asymmetry
Relational cognition
Similar other, strong ties, synergistic
community
Symmetry
Dao/chaos
(orderly contrast low, ambiguity high)
Communal sharing
Mind-to-mind transaction
Within-mind mappings
Between-mind mappings
Inner
Private
Making social connections
Cognitive control low
Similarity-based reasoning
(resonance, analogy)
Privileging awareness to preserve the
wholeness of experience
Leveling (similarity)
Implicit code
Associative, heuristic, intuitive
Associative connection between
things
Holistic
Integrative, relation between
subsystems
System 1
High capacity
Perceptual/nonverbal
Rapid
Low cognitive effort, unconscious
Non-relational cognition
Dissimilar other, weak ties,
scarcity-based community
Asymmetry
Order (orderly contrast high,
ambiguity low, clarity high)
Market pricing
Mind-to-world transaction
Mind-world mappings
Outer
Public
Control and mastery of the
environment
Cognitive control high
Difference detection
Privileging information to
increase knowledge production
Sharpening (difference)
Explicit code
Rule-based reasoning
Overruling associative
connection between things
Analytic
Linear, fragmenting
System 2
Low capacity
Conceptual/language
Slow
High cognitive effort, conscious
which is highly recommended, you may take a peek at the chart attached at the
end of this chapter (Table 1.1), as you navigate your way through the thickets of
the following discussions.
Rationality, East and West

What are our Big Brains for? Conventional wisdom in psychology has it that our big
brains are evolved to be smartto learn, figure things out, and problem-solve. It is
more important to be social than smart, counters Joseph Henrich (Henrich et al., 2001),
who points out that the amount of knowledge in any culture is far greater than the
capacity of individuals to learn or figure it all out on their own. Challenging the
supremacy of non-relational cognition, he suggests that individuals tap into the cultural store of knowledge simply by mimicking those around themand social mimicking is something even lower animals can do. Thus, it is group-living that constitutes
the niche for which our big brains are evolvedthis is known as the social brain
hypothesis.
The social brain hypothesis can be further refined. Dunbar and Shultz (2007)
suggest that it is not the computational demands of living in a large group per se, but
rather the demands of intense pair-bonding that spurred the evolution of large brains
in primates (see also Dunbar, 2014; Fletcher, Simpson, Campbell, & Overall, 2015).
The pair-bonding hypothesis can be extended from mating to family relationships.
Physical anthropologist Konner (2011) has documented how the development of
our big brains has to do with the long protected childhood that was a by-product of
the bipedal locomotion. Humans distinctive upright bipedal mode of locomotion
meant that the mammalian pelvis was substantially narrower, making it necessary to
deliver babies when they are still extremely immature. This makes it possible for
greater extra-uterine brain development in the context of an extended period of
dependence. So it all goes togethergroup living, long protected childhoods,
enduring social bonds, and big brainsfactors that contribute to the extraordinary
success of the human species in the animal kingdom.
Consistent with the two competing hypotheses about our big brainscognitive
versus socialis Blooms (2009) claim that there are two independently evolved
systems for reasoning about the worldone for the physical world and the other for
the social world. While it is necessary to have both types of rationality, cultures differ in their emphasis on one or the other. The rationality of individualist cultures
capitalizes on non-relational cognition, generally referred to as intelligence, whereas
that of collectivist cultures, such as China, relational cognition.
These two types of rationalityreasoning about the physical world versus reasoning about the social worldmay also be understood in terms of two types of
transactions of the mind: Mind-to-world versus mind-to-mind. In psychology, mental transactions have been investigated in the framework of mental mappings
(McKeown, 2013), where mind-to-world transaction corresponds to mind-world
mappings, whereas mind-to-mind transaction entails two types of mental mappingwithin-mind and between-mind mappings. Mind-to-world transaction focuses
on difference, whereas the mind-to-mind transaction similarity; or to anticipate later
discussion, the former privileges asymmetry, whereas the latter symmetry.
Similarity versus difference detection. Difference detection is essential to cognition
and intelligence. This central doctrine of psychology is part and parcel of the mindto-world mindset, which operates on the assumption of a deep-seated subject-object
dichotomy, a dichotomy well articulated by the Kantian dictum that We are
subjects thinking about objects (Freeman, 2000, p. 117). Note the disparity
or asymmetry here: The mind can think about objects, but not the other way around.
In sharp contrast is the symmetrical relationship in the mind-to-mind transaction, as
Ecological Niche
evidenced by the mutual gazing between the Tang poet Li Bo (701762) and the
mountain:
Never tired of looking at each other
Only the Ching-ting Mountain and me. (Liu & Lo, 1975, p. 110)
The symmetrical relationship between the two parties lies in the fact that it makes
no difference to say who is gazing at whomboth are agents or subjects. How to
relate to objects in the world as a similar other? You will need relational cognition
for that.
Perception of the similar other seems to be innate. Even infants and young children prefer those who are similar to themselves (Mahajan & Wynn, 2012)infants
even prefer those who harm dissimilar others (Hamlin, Mahajan, Liberman, &
Wynn, 2013). Detection of similarity is something the Chinese seem to be preoccupied with. Hall and Ames (1987) point out that the term comparison (pi) in the
Confucian Analects is always a comparison of likenesses, not differences
(p. 287). Getting much mileage out of the perception of similarity is the Chinese
notion of lei. Lei literarily means category, but it is a concept that pertains to the
intrinsic affinity between things of the same kind (Munakata, 1983; Sundararajan,
2009). Central to the notion of lei is ontological parity, for instance, the mind relating to the world as its equal, namely as another mind. A relationship of deep affinity
with nature to the extent of finding a responsive heart in rocks and stones is well
documented in Chinese aesthetics (Rowley, 1974).
For the poets mutual gazing with the mountain, there is no need to invoke magical thinking as an explanation. The propensity of the human mind to find its double
everywhere it looks is a robust phenomenon in human history, ranging from animism to anthropomorphism (Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). This phenomenon
may be attributable to relational cognition which is particularly sensitive to similarities. In the words of Bloom (2007), our tendency to attribute agency and intention
based on minimal cues is attributable to a hypertrophy of social cognition (p. 149).
Now let us take a look at the other side of the cointhe ecological niches that
differentially privilege relational versus non-relational cognitions.
Ecological Niche
Strong versus weak ties. Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) claim that collectivist cultures are characterized by the permanent bonds formed among similar
others, whereas individualist cultures temporary relations formed in complex
societies among dissimilar others (p. 3, emphases added). This point can be further
elaborated by the theory of strong versus weak ties, proposed by Granovetter (1973).
The important contribution of Granovetter lies in his insight that tie strength is a
useful variable in the study of social networking (p. 1371, ft. 15). Tie strength, it
turns out, has to do with similaritystrong among similar others, and weak among
dissimilar others. Along the divide between similar and dissimilar others, strong ties
10
may be defined as genetically based personal networks resting squarely on the

principle that blood is thicker than water; weak ties by contrast capitalizes on
networking with strangers.
Oishi and Kesebir (2012) define strong versus weak ties in terms of narrow, deep
ties versus broad, shallow ties. They have also added another variable to consider
mobility. Similarity and mobility are inversely relatedthe more mobility, the more
likely you will be rubbing elbows with strangers. This is indeed what Oishi and
Kesebir (2012) found with their computer simulations, namely that high mobility
fosters weak ties, whereas low mobility strong ties.
Granovetter (1973) has made the keen observation of how rumors will not spread
like wildfire within the enclaves of strong ties. By contrast, weak ties are conducive
to information dissemination. Challenging the claim of Buss (2000) that humans are
evolved for closely knit groups such that narrow deep ties are the basis of human
happiness, many researchers argue that the modern life of high mobility and information explosion are in favor of weak ties, which find their breeding ground in
formal organizations and work settings, and can also be readily activated by chance
meetings (Granovetter, 1973). Thus, Granovetter (1973) proclaimed the strength
of weak ties. Similarly, the computer simulation of Oishi and Kesebir (2012) found
that there is no advantage in having narrow deep ties, except in environments with
low mobility and low resources. This may be true in modern societies. To understand the advantages of strong ties, we need to turn to more traditional societies.
Synergistic versus scarcity-based community. Based on fieldwork with aboriginal peoples, Richard Katz and colleagues (Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2012) propose two paradigms for communitysynergistic versus scarcity based. The scarcity
paradigm assumes that valued resources are scarce: it is their presumed scarcity, in
fact, that largely determines their value. It further assumes that individuals or communities must compete with each other to gain access to these resources, struggling
to accumulate their own supply, and resisting pressures to share (p. 21). A scarcitybased community par excellence is the modern Western society where information
and knowledge, for instance, are considered limited resources such that legislations
of copyrights and so on are required to ensure equitable distribution and fair
exchange.
An alternative to the scarcity paradigm is an approach based on synergy,
whereby valuable resources become renewable, expanding, and accessible (p. 11).
This is the synergistic community, in which there is a paradoxical and generative
quality of synergy in that the more you use a resource, the more it is there to be
used (p. 54). This phenomenon is reminiscent of Durkheims (1995) collective
consciousness of effervescence. There seems to be an intimate connection between
synergistic communities and strong ties. Indeed, a synergistic community may be
strong ties at their strongest. Thus, collectivist cultures which capitalize on strong
ties tend to favor the paradoxical notion that the more you use a resource, the more
it is there to be used. By contrast, individualist cultures which capitalize on weak
ties are more likely to consider valued resources as limited in supply. To explore
further the psychology of super-abundance versus scarcity, I turn to the cultural
ideals of chaos versus order.
Cultural Ideals
11
Cultural Ideals
Within the ontological sphere the possible is higher than everything actual.
(Heidegger, 1982, p. 308)
Each hair of the lion contains the potentialities of the whole lion, and therefore all the hairs
of the lion have the potentialities of the infinitude of lions and this infinitude of lions is
further contained within each single hair. (A Buddhist analogy cited in Chang, 1970, p. 204)
Chaos and its vicissitudes. The sense of plenum characteristic of the synergistic community may be understood in the framework of chaos. In everyday language, chaos is
the opposite of order. The technical term for chaos is entropy. So far as possibilities
of things are considered, the relationship between order and chaos/entropy is that
between scarcity and abundance. Campbell (1982) illustrates this point with a pack of
cards, of which a particular orderly arrangement is one out of an astronomically large
number of possible arrangements. Thus, the higher the entropy, the more numerous
are the possible ways in which the various parts of the system may be arranged
(p. 44). According to this perspective, the path from the possible to the actual is that
of degeneration from an original plethora to impoverished simplification.
A similar view is found in Daoism. As Hall (1978) puts it succinctly: Tao is
Chaos as the sum of all orders (p. 279). More precisely, in Daoism, The Cosmos
becomes, like Chaos, the sum of all orders. Somewhere or somewhen, every possible order is extant (p. 278). This notion is compatible with the superposition of
states in quantum mechanics, according to which an electron can be located in multiple places and spin in multiple directions at once. The Daoist metaphor for this
primordial state of plenum is an uncarved block, a matrix of actualizable orders,
passive to infinite patterning (p. 278). How did we get from chaos to order, from
the world of plenitude to that of scarcity and limitations? This is the theme of a
famous parable in the Chuang Tzu:
The emperor of the Southern Sea was Lickety, the emperor of the Northern Sea was Split,
and the emperor of the Center was Wonton [or Hun-tun]. Lickety and Split often met each
other in the land of Wonton, and Wonton treated them very well. Wanting to repay Wontons
kindness, Lickety and Split said, All people have seven holes for seeing, hearing, eating,
and breathing. Wonton alone lacks them. Lets try boring some holes for him. So every day
they bored one hole, and on the seventh day Wonton died. (Mair, 1994, p. 71)
The death of Wonton signifies the loss of undifferentiated wholeness, and the
emergence of clarity, order, knowledge, and information made possible by the
organs of differentiationthe seven senses.
The connection between differentiation and scarcity/limitations is only hinted at
here by the tragic death of Chaos. For a more explicit exposition of this connection,
we need to turn to modern physics. Our way is prepared by Mair (1994) who underlines a connection between the humble Chinese wonton soup and cosmic chaos by
noting how the term wonton refers to The undifferentiated soup of primordial
chaos. As it begins to differentiate, dumpling-blobs of matter coalesce (p. 386).
With Mairs exegesis, we elide subliminally into the story of the Big Bang, where
instead of Wonton we meet the protagonist called symmetry.
12
Toward a Symmetry and Asymmetry Model of Culture

The story of the Big Bang goes something like this: In the beginning was a hot
primordial soup in perfect symmetry, out of which the orderly known universe
freezes out when the hot cosmic soup cools down. In lay terms, symmetry refers
to an undifferentiated wholeness which dwindles through spontaneous symmetry
breaking that gives rise to differences and differentiations, with the more differentiation, the more loss of symmetry. In technical terms, Bolender (2010) defines
symmetry and symmetry breaking in terms of transformations. Symmetry refers to
invariance in transformation; and symmetry breaking, loss of invariance in transformation. More specifically, a transformation is a rule for moving things around
(p. 10); a symmetry is a transformation that makes no relevant difference (p. 10).
In plain English, the more things can be moved around in anyway but still look the
same, the more symmetry there is. Water in a glass is an example of symmetry:
No matter which way you rotate it, and no matter to what degree, it will look the
same (p. 27).
The principle of invariance in transformation helps to explain the paradoxical
structure of chaos, which evinces homogeneity on one level and diversity on another.
What Campbell (1982) said about entropy applies here: A system in a state of maximum entropy is in a ferment of constant change beneath the visible surface, as molecules shuffle and collide in random confusion . The whirlwind of change beneath
the surface does not produce any appreciable change at the surface itself, but merely
insures that there is more of the same (pp. 3334). The principle of invariance in
transformation can be understood in terms of admissible transformations.
One of the hallmarks of symmetry is the abundance of admissible transformationsarrangement of things that makes no appreciable difference to the system.
By contrast, restriction of admissible transformations is attributable to the loss of
symmetry. Thus, the progression from order to chaos/entropy may be formulated in
terms of the decreasing restriction in admissible transformations, or decreasing
constraints in plain English. Consider a crossword puzzle, in which the correct
answer [admissible transformation = 1]:
is a unique sequence of letters, so there is only one possibility and no variety at all. The
variety, the number of possibilities increases a great deal when all constraints are
dropped and nonsense words are permitted, at which stage there are two dozen possible
sequences, all different. (Campbell, 1982, p. 46, emphasis added)
If we have this progression in the reverse direction, from chaos/entropy to order,

we can speak of increasing restriction in admissible transformationsand we would
be describing the sequence of symmetry breaking. Consider two hypothetical libraries used by Campbell (1982) to illustrate the difference between chaos/entropy and
order. In the first library, books are arranged on the shelves according to the color of
their bindings. In the second library, the book War and Peace is catalogued with a
given decimal number. The difference between these two libraries lies in the degree
of constraints in the possibility of arranging books (or in more technical terms,
restriction in admissible transformations). In the first library: Since there are no
Symmetry and Relational Cognition
13
rules governing the ordering of books on the shelves by title and author within the
red section, the number of possible ways of arranging the books there is much
greater (p. 47); whereas in the second library: There is only one possible way in
which War and Peace can be arranged in relation to all the other books (p. 47).
It is in the same vein that Bolender (2010) talks about symmetry breaking. A drop
of water, for instance, contains all possible patterns of a snowflake. From this plethora of possibilities, only one particular snowflake pattern emerges, when that drop
of water freezes and all the other possible patterns for snowflakes are lost.
Bolender (2010) uses the phase transitions from plasma to gas to liquid to solid
(p. 95) to describe the sequence of symmetry breaking found in nature as a descending chain of symmetry subgroups nested like the Russian dolls, with each lower
symmetry concealed by the next higher symmetry. For instance, water in its frozen
state, such as the ice crystal, is a lower symmetry subgroup of the group for liquid
water. He further claims that the same sequence of symmetry breaking is found in
thought, as evidenced by the four measurement scales: nominal (A versus not A),
ordinal (plus direction of difference), interval (plus quantifiable amount of difference), and ratio (plus an absolute zero)note the increasing restriction in admissible transformations with each added plus. Bolender (2010) considers this
progression as a descending chain of symmetry subgroups:
the four scales correspond to a descending sequence of subgroups, a group for the nominal scale containing the group for an ordinal scale, the group for that ordinal scale containing
the group for an interval scale, and the group for that interval scale containing the group for
a ratio scale. (86)
Thats nice. But what has all this got to do emotions, not to mention Chinese
emotions?
Symmetry and Relational Cognition

According to Fiske (1991), the social relations of humans, and other animals to
some extent, can be modeled by four types of relational thinking which correspond
to four measurement scales:
Communal Sharing: Characterized by homogeneity, or lack of differentiation
between members of the group. This type of relational thinking makes only one
distinction consisting of two nonoverlapping categories: in-group versus outgroup. This minimum differentiation corresponds to the nominal scale of measurement, such as books in red versus not red covers.
Authority Ranking: Characterized by hierarchy, which serves as the major basis
for differentiation between members of the group. In addition to the previous two
categories of in-group and out-group, this type of relational thinking consists of
a third category: greater-than and less-than. With increased differentiation, this
relational thinking corresponds to the ordinal scale of measurement.
14
Equality Matching: Basis for this relationship is equality or fairness in exchange,

such as tit for tat. Requiring finer differentiations than Communal Sharing and
Authority Ranking, the notion of equity corresponds to the interval scale of
measurement.
Market Pricing: This type of relational thinking, consistent with the rational
actor model privileged in individualist societies, is guided by utilitarianism and
the calculation of proper proportions as in cost/benefit analysis. The level of differentiation required to compute exact proportions is embodied in the ratio scale
of measurement.
Bolender (2010) predicts that restriction in admissible transformations will
increase as we go down the descending chain of symmetry subgroups in Fiskes
(1991) fourfold relational model. Unrestricted admissible transformations can be
observed in a family meal or people at a party drinking from a punch bowl: One
drinks three cups; another only one. But if the numbers had been reversed, it would
have made no social difference. This is a symmetry (p. 87). The type of relational
cognition that best captures this symmetry is Communal Sharing (CS), according to
Bolender: In CS, one takes whatever one needs or desires, and one gives whatever
one can [without making any appreciable difference to the relation] (p. 88). The
increasing loss of symmetry with corresponding increase of restriction in admissible transformations can be demonstrated by the descending chain of symmetry subgroups of relational cognition:
Communal Sharing: It makes no difference, so far as group harmony is concerned, whoever eats or drinks more than the next person at a family meal.
Authority Ranking: So long as the elders get to be served first, or are seated at the
head table, guests are free to eat and drink as they like without disrupting the
group harmony.
Equality Matching: There is more restriction in admissible transformations. For
instance, all guests are allowed the same amount of free drinks at the party; no
one can drink more than the other without paying.
Market Pricing: Admissible transformations become much more restricted. For
instance, a $10 plate and a $30 plate cannot be switched among the unrelated
customers at a restaurant.
The Chinese have a term for admissible transformations called mei guanxi
(it does not matter. Literally No guanxi). The term guanxi could mean
either it matters or affect-based social connections. Thus, the negation (mei) of
guanxi could mean either it does not matter, or no affective connection. The
intimate connection between strong ties and unrestricted admissible transformations is foregrounded by a pun which plays the double meanings of guanxi and mei
guanxi: If there is affective connection (you guanxi ), then it (violation of
rules) does not matter (mei guanxi ); if there is no affective connection (mei
guanxi ), then every rule matters (you guanxi ) (for a more literal
translation of this phrase, see Yeh, 2010, p. 91). The pun is suggestive. But more
rigorous scholarship is needed to demonstrate the connection between guanxi and
Upside-Down Universes
15
the relational cognition as formulated by Fiske (1991). Hwangs (2000, 2012, 2014)
research on guanxi has done just that.
According to Hwang (2000), guanxi consists of three subtypesexpressive ties
among family members, mixed ties among friends and acquaintances, and instrumental ties among strangers. Hwang (2014) has demonstrated the compatibility
between his guanxi matrix and Fiskes (1991) fourfold model of relational cognition.
Elsewhere, Sundararajan (2014) has further mapped Hwangs guanxi matrix unto
the descending chain of symmetry subgroups as adumbrated by Bolender (2010).
In sum, I have transposed the individualismcollectivism hypothesis of culture onto
two axes of cognitioninvolvement and differentiationthe former focuses on
similarities, the latter differences (Sundararajan, 2002; Sundararajan & Averill,
2007). At the intersection of these two axes can be located strong-ties- and weakties-based social networkingthe former is characterized by high involvement and
low differentiation, as exemplified by Communal Sharing, whereas the latter low
involvement and high differentiation as evidenced by Market Pricing. These ecological niches give rise to different rationalities.
To see how rationalities East and West constitute an upside-down universe to
each other, let us refresh our memories of symmetry and symmetry breakdown.
Schrdingers cat is both live and deadthis is a state of symmetry. The cat is in
either one or the other state but not both, after you take a peek, an act which constitutes symmetry breakdown. Thus, symmetry is high in ambiguity and low in informationwe dont know whether the cat is alive or dead. Symmetry breakdown, on
the other hand, results in less ambiguity and more informationnow you know
exactly the status of the cat.
The Chinese version of symmetry and symmetry breakdown is found in the Dao
De Jing (Chapter 42): Dao begets the One; the One begets two; two beget three;
and three beget the myriad things (Lynn, 1999, p. 135). Cast in the framework of
Fiske (1991), twoness corresponds to Communal Sharing which is marked by the
distinction between two terms, i.e., in-group and out-group. But oneness is anticipated by Bolender (2010), who speculated that there could be a level of ultra-symmetry beyond Communal Sharing, called Oceanic Merging. Oceanic Merging is
defined by Bolender as the perception of being united in love with everything
(p. 107). Incorporating the Daoist version of symmetry ad symmetry breakdown, I
have expanded Fiskes (1991) model of relational cognition to include Oceanic
Merging, see Fig. 1.1.
The mirror image of Fig. 1.1 is Fig. 1.2.
For interpretation of Fig. 1.1, I rely on the East and West comparisons of a marketing scholar Zhou (2011, 2012). Figure 1.1 represents the Chinese value hierarchy
where merging with and participating in the Dao ranks the highest, while the low
involvement and high differentiation mode of Market Pricing ranks the lowest
values in the former framework have more to do with the cultivation of life, whereas
16
Dao
Oceanic Merging
Communal
Sharing/Nominal scale
Authority
Ranking/Ordinal
scale
Equality
Matching/Interv
al scale
Market
Pricing/Ra
tio scale
Fig. 1.1 The descending chain of symmetry subgroups with progressive symmetry breakdown
Market Pricing/Ratio
scale
Equality
Matching/Interval scale
Authority
Ranking/Ordinal scale
Communal
Sharing/Nominal
scale
Oceanic Merging
Dao
Fig. 1.2 The descending progression of measurement scales from more to less precision, or from
order to entropy
17
those in the latter framework, the pursuit of profits (Zhou, 2012). This ranking order
is explained by Zhou (2011) in terms of gentlemen aspire to move upward, petty
persons, downward (,) (p. 3). The same logic applies to
Fig. 1.2, except in reverse direction.
Figure 1.2 represents the world of knowledge acquisition where explicit and concise representations are privileged. This value system is evident in the four measurement scales from ratio to nominal. The ratio scale is the ideal measurement, the kind
that Western gentleman/scientist would want to possess because it allows you to get
much information. The nominal scale, by contrast, is not very useful because it does
not give you a lot of information. In Fig. 1.2, if we look at the symmetry subgroups
as a ladder of knowledge, the Western orientation is going up, whereas that of the
Chinese seems to be going down the ladder. Why? Zhous (2011) answer is as succinct as it is convincing: The path to knowledge is by incremental increase; that to
Dao by incremental decrease (,) (p. 6). This contrast, says Zhou
(2011, 2012), stems from the fundamental difference between West and Chinathe
former capitalizes on the non-relational cognition of object-centeredness (
), whereas the latter relational cognition of human-centeredness ().
Reprise. In a nutshell, China and the modern West constitute upside-down universes to each other. I attribute the basis of their difference to the two types of cognitionrelational and non-relational, the former is needed for social bonding among
conspecifics, the latter mastery and control of the world. While life requires both
types of cognition to function, cultures have preferences for either one or the other.
Under the sway of relational cognition, Chinese culture tends to privilege the high
symmetry state of Communal Sharing as the ideal situation of life where harmony
prevails among members of strong ties. A rationality that privileges high degrees of
symmetry is likely to prefer the abundance of possibilities among close relations
over the effortful management of limited resources among strangers; the spontaneity and freedom of associative thinking that revels in the ambiguities and paradoxes
of meaning through implicit communication among similar others over the toils of
analytic, rule-based reasoning necessary for explicit, clear and concise communication among strangers; and the joyous widening of consciousness in resonance with
another mind among similar others over the acquisition of knowledge and information for its own sake. Conversely, a rationality that privileges the high asymmetry
state of Market Pricing, as is the case in the modern West, is likely to prefer the
either-or logic that drives ever more precise differentiations over the both-and logic
that harbors ambiguities and paradoxes.
To give the screw another turn, difference in cognitive styles between China and
the West may be summed up by a series of contrasting pairs that fall along the divide
between symmetry maintenance/restoration and symmetry breakdown, with the
first terms of the contrasting pairs leveling out differences thus maintaining or
restoring symmetry, and the second terms sharpening differences thus breaking down symmetry (for leveling versus sharpening, see Gardner, Holzman,
Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959): holistic versus analytic; associative versus
rule-based; implicit (intuitive, heuristic) versus explicit code; system 1 thinking
18
(automatic, associative, and holistic) versus system 2 thinking (effortful, reflective)

(Evans, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2000). For your convenience, I have summed up
these cross-cultural differences in a chart (Table 1.1) below.
This long litany of attributes takes us back to the list approach to culture. The
explanatory framework offered here helps us to integrate this list and ground it on
one pertinent question of rationality, namely: How do all these differences in cognitive styles play out in our emotional lives? Answer to this question is a book that
needs to be writtenand the following chapters will write it. In particular, the following chapters will show that, consistent with the Chinese notion of the heart/mind
(xin) which presumes an intimate connection between affect and cognition, the cognitive styles of Chinese culture are simultaneously translated into the affective register as a unique style of being present (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 14), and vice
versa. And in the process of this translation, received wisdom in psychology about
cognitive styles may also be challenged. Put another way, Table 1.1 lists only the
ingredients of the cognitive doughhow all these cognitive ingredients come out as
the Chinese style of being present affectively is a story of baking yet to be told by
cultural and indigenous psychologies. As a Yiddish proverb puts it so aptly:
Everybody is kneaded out of the same dough, but not baked in the same oven.
Once Again, What Is Culture?

In the final analysis, approaching cultures as styles of being present entails a shift
from the undue emphasis on explicit beliefs in cross-cultural psychology to lived
experiences, which are multifaceted and rich in meanings that are encoded and
decoded experientially through affect. As Averill (2011) points out rightly:
Cultures are characterized by the emotional lives of their members rather than by the
intellectual content of their ideologies. An anthropologist, say, may come to understand the
ideology of a culture while remaining an outsider. True acculturation occurs when the outsider comes to experience the kinds of emotions characteristic of the culture. (p. 7)
It is my hope that in the following chapters as we enter the Chinese discourse on

emotions, the reader will be able to experience the perturbations of Chinese thought
that are reverberating through the long corridors of time like the still movement of
a Chinese jar.
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Chapter 2
Harmony: A Delicate Dance of Symmetry
Introduction
Harmony is a concept that plays a pivotal role throughout Chinese history (Li, 2008)
as much as love does in Christianity. Also similar to love in Christianity, much good
as well as evil has been done in the name of harmony. It is important therefore to
delineate the basic structure of this root metaphor in order to differentiate between
optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony. This chapter shows how casting
harmony in the framework of symmetry (Chap. 1) will help us in this endeavor.
Harmony may be defined as an aesthetic emotion, a pleasure derived from the
pleasure of attaining multiple goals at once. Aesthetic emotions are defined by
Deacon (2006) as essentially emotional relationships between emotions (p. 51). As
such, harmony entails two essential elementsrelations between terms, and awareness of the relations between terms. The topic of awareness, especially second-order
awareness (pleasure of pleasure), will be briefly mentioned but not explored here, as
it will be treated more fully in later chapters (especially Chap. 10). This chapter
focuses on only one of the key elements of harmonyrelations between terms.
My investigation is divided into three parts: First, a structural analysis suggests
that harmony is a high dimensional complex system that is invested in symmetry
maintenance. Second, I examine cognitive styles and associated strategies that serve
the purpose of symmetry maintenance. Third, I put forward the argument that there
are two factors that tip the balance between optimal and suboptimal versions of
harmonyavoidance of symmetry breakdown, and lack of cognitive complexity.
The Structure of Harmony

Chinese notions of harmony in the classics. The Chinese term for harmony is he
() which is derived from terms for musical instruments and the cooking cauldron
(Lu, 2004). With regard to cooking, a statement in the Tso Chuan stated that
21
22
Harmony
Harmony is like soup. There being water and heat, sour flavoring and pickles, salt
and peaches, with a bright fire of wood, the cook harmonizing all the ingredients in
the cooking of the fish and flesh (Fung, 1962, p. 107). In reference to music, it is
said in another classical text, the Book of Documents: When the eight instruments
are in good accord and do not encroach upon one another, then the spirits and man
will be brought into harmony (Holzman, 1978, p. 23). Note the salience of multiplicity and diversity, as symbolized by the many ingredients of the soup and the
large number of musical instrument, in the above discourse on harmony. Thus,
Sundararajan (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2010, 2013) defines harmony as a high dimensional structure that computes the equilibrium among multiple systems. This definition underlines two attributes of harmony that are relevant to
the notion of symmetry: high dimensionality, and dynamic, not static, equilibrium.
High dimensionality. Harmony is intrinsically pluralistic in structure, as evidenced by the prevailing yin and yang polarity. This point can be illustrated
by one well-known polarityinner (yin) versus outer (yang). Wu Daozi (d. 792),
the famous painter, had been working on a painting for the court for a long time.
When he was finally done, the Emperor came to the unveiling of the painting. As
Wu carefully drew aside the coverings, the Emperor gazed at the magnificent scene
down to every detail:
woods, mountains, limitless expanses of sky, speckled with clouds and birds, and even
men in the hills. Look, said the artist pointing, here dwells a spirit in a mountain cave.
He clapped his hands and the gate of the cave immediately flew open. The artist stepped in,
turned, and said, The inside is even more beautiful. It is beyond words. Let me lead the
way! But before the Emperor could follow or even bring himself to speak, the gate, the
artist, the painting and all faded away. Before him remained only the blank wall with no
trace of any brush marks. (Chang, 1970, p. 95)
Chang Chung-yuans (Chang, 1970) commentary of this anecdote is illuminating: within the outward appearances of all beauty there lies the unity of background It is through this ultimate reality that our minds are opened to see our
own wholeness of spirit, and enter into the wholeness of the universe, the deep
underlying harmony of all things (pp. 9596). Note the Russian doll structure in
the binary oppositions of figure and ground or outer appearance and inner reality,
where the lower symmetry subgroup (figure; outer appearance) is embedded in the
higher symmetry subgroup (ground; inner reality), with the former deriving its significance from the latter. Thus, Chang (1970) writes: According to the Taoists, our
daily life gains its significance by being rooted in a deep underlying harmony, or
ultimate reality (p. 96).
This two-tiered structureinner and outerof harmony has direct implications for harmony maintenance strategies. A case in point is the way Chinese
make compromises by conforming to conventions in ones outer, public reality,
while remaining a nonconformist in ones inner reality. In one phrase, obey publicly and defy privately (Hwang, 2000, p. 172). An illustrious example of this
approach to harmony maintenance is found in the physicist Nobel laureate Hideki
Yukawa (1973), who attributed his scientific creativity to his rebelliousness in a
The Structure of Harmony
23
characteristically East Asian waydocile on the outside, but a rebel on the inside:
I can never work on a problem that Ive been told to solve by someone else. My
subconscious always rebels against being ordered to do something. Personally,
I look on myself as a docile kind of man (p. 37).
Harmony as a dynamic equilibrium. In everyday life, harmony is generally
understood as moderation, a form of self-regulation guided by the principle of the
golden mean (zhong yong ). One of the most insightful formulations of harmony is found in the text Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of the Mean, 1971):
While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the
state of EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree,
there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. (p. 384, emphasis in the original)
Note here that harmony is differentiated from equilibrium along the divide
between pre- and post-perturbation. Cast in the framework of symmetry and symmetry breaking, this passage tells a story that goes something like this: The original
symmetry, referred to as equilibrium, is characteristic of the pre-perturbation state of
the mind, which, often compared to still waters in the Daoist texts, is a condition in
which homogeneity looms large. Emotional episodes result in symmetry breaking;
and successful symmetry restoration is referred to as harmony, in the words of Fung,
(1962): To have the emotions welling up and yet in due proportion is also a state of
the mean [equilibrium] (p. 107). As such, harmony is not the original but the second,
restored symmetry, otherwise known as dynamic equilibrium (Fung, 1962). Whereas
the original symmetry before the Big Bang, so to speak, is an order of reality characterized by the absence of differences, harmony as second, restored symmetry is an
emergent order contingent upon the shifting balance within the mix of differences.
As Sundararajan (2013) points out, the Chinese notion of harmony as a dynamic
equilibrium has far reaching ramifications:
First, not hankering after the primordial symmetry (Bolender, 2010) where
homogeneity reigns supreme, harmony as a second, restored symmetry thrives in
the aftermath of symmetry breaking (Bolender, 2010)a world rife with difference and diversity.
Second, subsisting in the aftermath of symmetry breakdown, the main function
of harmony is necessarily symmetry maintenance and restorationto prevent
further symmetry break down.
Third, as a symmetry maintenance and restoration mechanism, the Chinese
notion of harmony may have a built-in aversion toward (further) symmetry
breakdown.
There may be an inherent tension within harmony: Aversion toward symmetry
breakdown can lead to rejection of differences, whereas harmony as dynamic equilibrium works well only to the extent that it gives importance to difference and diversity.
Thus, aversion toward symmetry breakdown maybe a determining factor between the
optimal and not so optimal types of harmony, to be elaborated later. For now, let us
examine the optimal use of cognitive strategies for symmetry maintenance.
24
Harmony
Harmony as Symmetry Maintenance and Restoration

The task of symmetry maintenance lies in neutralizing the effects of difference.
Recall that symmetry is a structure in which transformations make no relevant difference (Zee, 1986). For instance, a = b, in which case b = a. This has been formulated by Bolender (2010) as unrestrictedness in admissible transformations. Put
more simply, admissible transformations are differences that make no difference
in other words, neutralized. Neutralizing differences can be illustrated by the
Chinese expression It does not matter (mei guanxi) (see Chap. 1) as a harmony
maintenance technique. This expression can be paraphrased as follows: Whatever
difference there is as a result of the transformation (e.g., the son lost money in the
family business), it does not change anything so far as the relationship is concerned
(e.g., we are still family). In the following sections, I examine important cognitive
styles (see Table 1.1, Chap. 1)yin and yang dialectics, holistic thinking, and low
cognitive controland associated strategies that help to neutralize differences.
Dialectic Thinking
One cognitive style privileged by harmony is dialectic thinking, best exemplified by
the yin and yang dialectic (Fang, 2010; Li, 2012). The yin and yang dialectic may be
understood as an order-preserving transformation (Bolender, 2010) that neutralizes
differences by means of the principle of complementarity (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).
According to the principle of complementarity, the opposing forces A and Not-A are
needed antipode and complement to each other. Thus, it is stated in the Tso Chuan
that the five-note pentatonic scale; the six-pitch pipes; the seven sounds all of
which complement each other. There are the distinctions between clear and turbid,
small and great plaintive and joyous all of which augment each other (cited
in Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 255). Here in spite of the multiplicity of musical
instruments and the diverse and contrasting sounds they produce, harmony is maintained thanks to the dialectic of yin and yang which neutralizes differences by playing the terms of opposition off of each other. This is how the yin and yang dialectic
works: No term can ever make an irrevocable difference, since whatever difference
term A makes is counterbalanced by the opposing term Not-A.
But the yin and yang dialectic does more than preserving the existing order. It also
creates a new order of harmony which has the capacity to encompass both A and
Not-A. Thus, one unique feature of the complementarity principle is its inclusiveness
toward difference. This point can be illustrated by the statement of Yen Tzu in the
Tso Chuan that The salt flavoring is the other to the bitter, and the bitter is the other
to the salt. With these two others combining in due proportions and a new flavor
emerging, this is what is expressed in harmony (Fung, 1962, p. 108). Difference,
referred to as the other in the above quote, is not to be eliminated but rather
included and duly combined to create harmony. This is consistent with the observation of Cheng, Lee, and Chiu (1999) that Chinese dialectical thinking has a high
Holistic Thinking
25
degree of inclusiveness, capable of reconciling seemingly inconsistent behaviors and

ideas, thus contributing to the establishment and maintenance of harmony in life.
Due proportion. Another strategy to neutralize difference is to reduce excess difference and contradiction to a range that allows for coordination. In the words of
Fung: Harmony is the reconciling of differences into a harmonious unity But in
order to achieve harmony, the differences must each be present in precisely their
proper proportion, which is chung [zhong] (moderation or the mean). Thus the function of chung is to achieve harmony (Fung, 1966, p. 174).
Keeping things in due proportion requires inhibition and constraint. Thus, the
principle of moderation or the mean is often expressed in terms of negation. Similar
to the Goldilocks formula, the principle of the golden mean (zhong yong) can be
formulated as A but not A~, where A ~ is the extreme of A (Lu, 2004, p. 145). To
wit, Confucius said of the first ode in the Book of Songs: The Kwan Ts is expressive of enjoyment without being licentious and of grief without being hurtfully
excessive (Confucian Analects, 3/20, Legge, p. 161, emphasis added).
In everyday parlance, the golden mean (zhong yong) is known as taking the middle way in contrast to the polarizing tendencies of going to extremes. It is said in the
Book of Documents regarding music: When the eight instruments are in good
accord and do not encroach upon one another, then the spirits and man will be
brought into harmony (Shang Hsu, II, 1/5, in Holzman, 1978, p. 23, emphasis
added). Encroaching upon is a phenomenal description of hegemony in which A
overwhelms Not-A or vice versa. This winner-take-all phenomenon may be understood as the difference that makes a difference, resulting in symmetry breaking. By
contrast, the middle way maintains the multidimensionality and diversity of harmony by not allowing any difference to break the symmetry of differences, thereby
preserving the dynamic balance between A and Not-A. Put another way, harmony
as the dynamic relationship between terms is intrinsically pluralistic, thus its optimal functioning depends on the preservation of difference and diversity by preventing the hegemonic winner-take-all kind of symmetry breakdown.
Holistic Thinking
Another cognitive style favored by harmony is holistic thinking. Holistic thinking
has two attributes: (a) it subsists in a high dimensional conceptual space; and (b) it
specializes in forming sets. First, high dimensional conceptual space. The yin and
yang dialectic can be understood as the logic of both-and in contrast to that of either/
or (Li, 2014a). The either/or framework entails a one-dimensional space, which
allows for only one term at a time to operate. By contrast, the both-and framework
consists of a multidimensional space that allows for parallel processing on multiple
levels at the same time.
Second, holistic thinking is sensitive to relations between terms, thereby capable
of combining multiple terms into one unit of analysis or a set. In everyday life,
holistic thinking approaches life not in terms of a choice between different orders of
26
Harmony
reality so much as affirming both realities, and negotiating for a viable relationship
between the two. In science, holistic thinking is the basis of the mathematical model
called dynamical systems or chaos theory, which approaches diverse systems such
as the predator and the host as one unit of analysis (Sabelli, 2005), in contrast to the
conventional linear, causal analysis.
Since holistic thinking contributes to symmetry maintenance and recovery by
forming sets, we can expect a corresponding aversion in holistic thinking toward
symmetry breakdown. There is some empirical evidence for this conjecture.
Set and set breaking. You are asked to choose for a friend two puppies from five
photographs and then learned that the landlord would allow only one pet per apartment. What a bomber! This is the type of experiment known as the blocked-choice
paradigm. Consider this scenario: You get to choose a drink and a snack from three
bottled beverages (milk, soda, fitness water) and three packaged snacks (cookies,
chips, fitness bar). Say you picked soda and chips. Then you are told, Whoops! A
mistake had been made: Instead of getting to choose two options, you can select
only one. How would you like to proceed? Pick one out of the selected pair (soda
or chip)? Or start over and choose one from the unelected items (milk, fitness water,
cookies, or fitness bar)? It turns out that the choice you make in this type of situations depends on whether you have a collectivist or individualist mindset, according
to a series of studies conducted by Mourey, Oyserman, and Yoon (2013).
Mourey et al. (2013) found that compared with those in the individualist-mindset
condition, participants in the collectivist-mindset condition listed more reasons
their initial snack and beverage selections went together and then, when told that
one of their selected items was unavailable for consumption, chose to select a new
snack or beverage instead of consuming their other initially selected item that was
available (p. 1620). Participants in the individualist-mindset condition seemed to
be more rationalthey would simply go for soda or chips, if they are allowed to
pick only one, as can be predicted by the theory of rational decision-making. For
instance, the dominance principle in choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) predicts
that if prospect A is as good as prospect B in every respect and better than B in at
least one respect (for instance, you picked it), then A (soda or chip) should be
preferred to B (the rest of the items you did not pick initially). But participants with
the collectivist mindset thought otherwise.
Proceeding with only the available products meant that participants had broken
up their selected set, whereas not willing to proceed with it suggests an unwillingness to break up with their initially selected set. Mourey et al. (2013) found repeatedly that an accessible collectivist mindset increased the likelihood of rejecting a
partial set and the willingness to pay more to complete the set (p. 1618). And
again: Latinos and people randomly assigned to the collectivist-mindset condition
were more hesitant to break up a set, more willing to pay extra to restore a set, and
more sensitive to the existence of a relationship among members of a set (p. 1620).
Why is a set, even an arbitrarily chosen one such as the soda and chips pair, so
important to people with a collectivist mindset? For an explanation, Mourey et al.
(2013) attributed this to the penchant for forming relationships in collectivist
cultures: a collectivist mind-set creates a momentary attunement to the possibility
Low Cognitive Control
27
of a relationship, such that people with collectivist mind-sets can and do create
relationships among objects on the spot and are loath to break up these relationships (p. 1620). Following this line of reasoning, one would expect Asians to be
especially prone to the minimal group effect (Tajfel, 1970). In a series of studies
conducted by Tajfel (1970), individuals were randomly assigned to groups on the
basis of some bogus group differences. Regardless, participants seemed to have
readily identified with these arbitrarily formed groups as evidenced by their ingroup favoritism. The minimal group effect has been widely replicated in the West,
but not in the Chinese population. In fact studies (e.g., Brewer & Yuki, 2007) show
that the very opposite seems to be the caseAsians are less likely, relatively to
Westerners, to form relationships on the spot.
A more cogent explanation for the findings of Mourey et al. (2013) lies in the
robust finding (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) of the difference between
the holistic thinking style of collectivist cultures in comparison to the analytic reasoning of individualist cultures. In holistic thinking, when items combine they form
a new entitya set. Thus, if:
a = soda; b = chips; a + b = C
The question of C did not arise for analytic thinking, which sees (a) and (b) as
individual items only (a, b), even when combined. Thus to the individualist mindset,
the blocked-choice paradigm simply means a reduction of the number of ones
choice from two items (a, b) to one(a) or (b). But to the holistic mindset, the
blocked-choice paradigm entails the symmetry breakdown of C, which is something
to be avoided if possible. This is consistent with my hypothesis of an aversion
toward symmetry breakdown, which predicts that when confronted with the
blocked-choice problem, this particular mindset would prefer choosing from the
unselected items that have never formed a set over choices that involve breaking a
ready-made set. This is exactly what the researchers (Mourey et al., 2013) found.

As a multidimensional system, the emergent order of harmony entails the proper
coordination of multiple and diverse subsystems. Proper coordination raises the
question of cognitive control, which can be either high or low. High levels of cognitive control are exemplified by controlled serial processing, whereas low levels of
cognitive control are evident in automatic parallel processing. More specifically,
High levels of control are best suited for explicit, rule-based, verbal tasks that
depend on the capacity limits of working memory, whereas low levels of control are
best suited for implicit, reward-based, nonverbal tasks that can be accomplished
irrespective of working memory limitations (Bocanegra & Hommel, 2014, p. 1254).
The difference between levels of cognitive control seems to fall along the divide
between symmetry maintenance and symmetry breakdown. High levels of cognitive
control entail symmetry breakdown. For instance, controlled processing filters out
28
Harmony
irrelevant information; and explicit, rule-based reasoning reduces ambiguity in the

service of greater clarity. Low levels of cognitive control, by contrast, contribute to
symmetry maintenance through the use of a more inclusive approach to information
processing. For instance, implicit, associative reasoning helps to maintain the free
flow of information without the interference of top-down control.
Different levels of cognitive control are adaptive in different ecological niches
(Bocanegra & Hommel, 2014): Low levels of cognitive control with their characteristic bottom-up parallel processing are adaptive in the predictable environment of
strong ties, whereas high levels of cognitive control, characteristic of rule-based
reasoning, are needed for the reduction of uncertainty and ambiguity in the relatively unpredictable environment of weak ties. Control can be translated into cost,
thus the relatively low cost of low cognitive control in the predictable environment
is consistent with Dunbars (2014) observation that Family relationships come at
less [cognitive] cost because we need to know only how they relate to us, not the
detailed history of our past interactions (p. 111). One implication of this formulation is the possibility of interference in cases of mismatch: High levels of cognitive
control can impair and interfere with the otherwise automatic exploration of information privileged in the predictable environment (Bocanegra & Hommel, 2014). In
the following paragraphs, I apply this insight from cognitive psychology to an analysis of harmony.
Cognition without control. Moderation entails the due proportion of things.
Growth and decay of impulses, onset and release of restraints, oscillation of balances between impulses and restraints may be out of proportion or of due proportion. How to achieve due proportion of things in the mix of competing subsystems?
There are two possible ways to accomplish this goal: One is to increase control, for
instance, to streamline things by the suppression of differences in a top down fashion. Another, somewhat counterintuitive approach favored by the harmony principle
is to increase diversity and difference. The essential insight of the harmony principle
is that moderation is the result of the inherent capacity of the system to regulate
itself through the mutual inhibition and restraint between competing cues. This
insight is supported by the studies of Kpetz, Faber, Fishbach, and Kruglanski
(2011), who found that the simultaneous activation of multiple goals resulted in a
restricted set of acceptable means that benefited the entire set of active goals. This
regulatory strategy that capitalizes on the bottom-up processes of the system is an
example of cognition without control.
According to Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, and Chrysikou (2009), tasks that capitalize on cognitive control are performance tasks which require focused attention to
filter out task-irrelevant information, and selectively maintain task-relevant information. By contrast, learning and creativity require cognition without control, since
these tasks capitalize on holistic, defocused attention (Sundararajan, 2004) which
facilitates competition between multiple cues. The authors claim that the competitive processor what the Chinese refer to as the yin-yang balanceamong multiple cues in learning and creativity can be interfered with by cognitive control, and
facilitated by the absence of the same.
29
Cognition with and without control (see Chaps. 5 and 7) can be illustrated by two
different approaches to cookingrecipe versus harmony. The difference between
these two approaches may be explored along the two components of cooking:
A. External regulation, which refers to what the cook does.
B. Internal process, which refers to transformation of the food stuff in the
cooking pot.
Recall the code approach to cooking at McDonalds (Martin, 2009, Winter; see
Chap. 1). This is an example of the recipe approach, in which A directly controls B
such that emphasis is placed entirely upon A, which attempts to get the cooking
process down to a science by specifying with precision the ingredients, the proportion, and the exact sequence of action. By contrast, according to the harmony
approach, cooking is considered a subtle art. The Lushi chunqiu puts it this way:
In combining your ingredients to achieve a harmony, you have to use the sweet, sour, bitter,
acrid, and the salty, and you have to mix them in an appropriate sequence and proportion.
Bringing the various ingredients together is an extremely subtle art in which each of them
has its own expression. The variations within the cooking pot are so delicate and subtle that
they cannot be captured in words or fairly conceptualized. (Ames & Rosemont, 1998,
pp. 257258, emphasis added).
Approaching cooking as a creative task, rather than a recipe-based performance,

the above passage evinced a clear demarcation of A and Bthe former refers to the
cook combining ingredients, paying attention to sequence and proportion; the latter
to the delicate and subtle process in the cooking pot. Whereas A can be formulated into instructions or recipes, B defies conceptualization, so we are told. With its
emphatic distinction between A and B, this passage advocates cognition without
control by making it clear that A does not directly control, so much as facilitate B,
which is a process that presumably lies beyond language and conceptualizations.
The key to harmony, from this perspective, lies in the internal process B, in
which it is the competition among multiple constituentssuggested by the various
ingredients each having its own expressionthat results in the overall harmony
of flavors. Thus in the harmony framework, the role of the expert system A, be it the
cook or cognition, is to facilitate the process B, rather than to micromanage it the
way cookbooks do.
Priming versus planning. Daniel Siegel (2007) makes the distinction between
planning and priming. Planning is a top-down, prefrontal intervention, involving the
use of abstract concepts, and is outcome oriented. Priming by contrast is a bottomup, parallel-distributed process of the brain that is always readying itself for the next
moment. As an illustration of priming, consider the following recommendation
from The Doctrine of the Mean (1971):
It is said in the Book of Poetry: Happy union with wife and children is like the music of
lutes and harps. When there is concord among brethren, the harmony is delightful and
enduring. Thus may you regulate your family, and enjoy the pleasure of your wife and
children. (pp. 396397)
30
Harmony
How to achieve harmony in the family? The recommendation is enjoy the

pleasure of your wife and children. Enjoyment (Sundararajan, 2009) is a form of
savoring, in which the object of ones pleasure is ones own experience, rather than
the stimuli per se (for more details, see Chap. 10, this book). What is savored is
apparently harmony, as evidenced by the allusions to music, and to experiences of
concord seemingly delightful and enduring. However, the argument seems to be
circularone attains the emotional goal, such as harmony, by having a foretaste of
the same in ones anticipation.
This non-suppressive and non-avoidant regulation strategy is different from the
mechanisms of self-control, which may entail global deactivation of both action
schema and its underlying intentions. For instance, in delay-of-gratification situations (Mischel, 2014), consummatory ideation (yumminess and chewiness of
the marshmallows) is discouraged in favor of task-oriented ideation (I am waiting
for the marshmallows). By contrast, in the approach canvassed here, consummatory
ideations are utilized to stoke desire and foster intent. Presumably, once a certain
intention is in place, the rest will follow. It is in this vein that Siegel (2007) claims
that in the cultivation of mindfulness, If you have a COAL stance, the rest takes
care of itself (p. 19). COAL is acronym of four mental states which are part and
parcel of mindfulness: curiosity, openness, acceptance, and love. Once again, the
outcome (mindfulness) is foreshadowed by the intentional stance (COAL), which
although makes a circular argument works well by priming.
Now, we are ready to tackle the question of what tips the balance between optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony.
What Tips the Balance Between Optimal

and Suboptimal Harmony?
Not all harmonies are created equal, some are optimal, and some not so optimal
(Lun, 2012). The optimal version of harmony is associated with psychological wellbeing in both Western and Chinese samples (Chen, Chan, Bond, & Stewart, 2006).
The suboptimal version of harmony has been found to fuel the violation of basic
individual rights (Weatherley, 2002). This section will examine two possibly interrelated factors that can discriminate between optimal and suboptimal harmony:
avoidance of symmetry breakdown, and lack of cognitive complexity.
Avoidance of symmetry breakdown. In light of its invested interest in symmetry
maintenance and recovery, harmony may be beneficial or not depending on the extent
to which it succumbs to aversion toward symmetry breakdown. Put another way,
avoidance of symmetry breakdown may be a discriminating factor between optimal
and suboptimal harmony. There is some empirical support for this conjecture.
Leung (1997) has identified two harmony motivesharmony enhancement and
disintegration avoidance. Disintegration avoidancewhich corresponds nicely to
my formulation of aversion toward symmetry breakdownputs a premium on
What Tips the Balance Between Optimal and Suboptimal Harmony?
31
keeping the status quo and fitting in. By contrast, harmony in the classical Chinese
texts is pursued as an end in and of itself. A similar distinction is made by Huang
(1999) between true and surface harmonythe latter is found to be a contributing
factor to the Asian preference for usefulness/conformity over novelty (Leung &
Morris, 2011), whereas the former is found to be beneficial in creative conflict management (Leung, Koch, & Lu, 2002).
The same applies to the two corresponding versions of zhong yong (the
golden mean). The disintegration-avoidance version of zhong yongcharacterized
by the preference for moderation and the avoidance of extreme positionswas
found by Yao, Yang, Dong, and Wang (2010) to be a contributing factor to the suppression of creative ideas. By contrast, the harmony enhancement version of zhong
yong plays an important role in emotion refinement (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007),
emotional creativity (Sundararajan, 2002, 2004), and aesthetic savoring (Frijda &
Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2010).
In sum, since the structure of harmony is intrinsically pluralistic as a relation
between terms/systems, avoidance of symmetry breakdown would result in reduction of diversity hence compromising the structure of harmony. Thus, the difference
between optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony may be measured by the commitment to diversity or the lack thereof. In the optimal version of harmony, neutralization of differences is intended to preserve diversity by preventing the hegemonic
takeover by extreme differences. In suboptimal versions of harmony, avoidance of
symmetry breakdown invariably results in reduction of difference and diversity. Let
us examine, in the following sections, how optimal harmony is committed to the
preservation of difference and diversity.
Preservation of difference and diversity in harmony. Historically, the distinction
between optimal and suboptimal harmony goes all the way back to Confucius, who
once said explicitly: Exemplary persons seek harmony not sameness; petty persons, then, are the opposite (Analects, 13/23, in Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 169).
Lu (2004) explains that the Confucian gentleman can be in a harmonious relationship with the world without losing his individuality, whereas the petty person simply follows the crowd (p. 182). Thus contrary to the collectivistic stereotype of the
Chinese culture, Confucius argued emphatically against simply blending in.
The distinction drawn by Confucius between the optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony can be further clarified by the difference noted by Abler (1989)
between particulate and blending systems (see Fig. 2.1).
As Fig. 2.1 shows, novelty in a blending system is an averaging of inputs, such
that repeated blending results in decreasing difference and increasing uniformity.
By contrast, combination in a particulate system results in greater variety. In this
light, optimal harmony, as represented by the Confucian gentleman, is a particulate
system, whereas the suboptimal harmony, as exemplified by the petty person, a
blending system.
Besides Confucius, other thinkers in ancient China have also recognized the
importance of difference and diversity. For instance, an association of diversity
with growth, and uniformity with sterility, is found in the Kuo Y which states,
32
Fig. 2.1 Blending systems
(upper tier) and particulate
systems (lower tier). In the
former, repeated combination
of things may lead to greater
uniformity, while in the latter,
to greater variety. Adapted
from Abler (1989, Fig. 1,
p. 2), with permission from
Journal of Social and
Biological Structure
Harmony
+
+
To ameliorate one thing with another is the meaning of harmony. The result is
flourishing and growth, and thereby creatures coming into existence. But supposing
uniformity is supplemented by uniformity, nothing new can be produced (Fung,
1962, p. 107). In sum, consistent with the blending versus particulate systems divide
(Abler, 1989), suboptimal harmony operates like a melting pot, whereas optimal
harmony toss salad or stir fry (Sundararajan, 2010), in which the diverse ingredients
contribute to the overall flavor of the whole by each retaining its uniqueness in taste
and texture. The insightful statement of the Lushi chunqiu is worth quoting again:
In combining your ingredients to achieve a harmony, you have to use the sweet, sour, bitter,
acrid, and the salty, and you have to mix them in an appropriate sequence and proportion.
Bringing the various ingredients together is an extremely subtle art in which each of them
has its own expression. (Ames & Rosemont, 1998, pp. 257258, emphasis added).
Harmony: A delicate dance of symmetry breakdown and symmetry maintenance.

Cast in the framework of symmetry, optimal harmony entails a dynamic interplay of
symmetry breakdown and symmetry maintenance/restoration. Difference and diversity, so essential to optimal harmony, depend on symmetry breakdown. To ensure
that the diverse subsystems can coordinate without sacrificing their respective integrity, one needs symmetry maintenance strategies to prevent the winner-take-all
phenomena. When diverse subsystems coexist in peace, and be nurtured together,
the state of affairs would approximate optimal harmony, as is envisioned by the
Doctrine of the Mean (1971): All things are nurtured together without their injuring one another. The courses of the seasons, and of the sun and moon, are pursued
without any collision among them (p. 427, italics in original).
This dynamic process of symmetry breakdown and symmetry maintenance can
be illustrated with a contemporary example. Li Xin (2014b) has proposed a business
model based on the golden mean called Zhong Yongs four-stage process model.
The four stages are: inclusion, selection, promotion, and transition: Inclusion means
one should always include at least two contrary elements; selection refers to prioritizing some elements according to circumstances; promotion means promoting the
other un-prioritized elements to prevent the potential crowding out of the unprioritized by the prioritized; transition means shifting to new prioritizing when
What Tips the Balance Between Optimal and Suboptimal Harmony?
33
circumstances change. Cast into the framework of symmetry, we arrive at the

following algorithms:
1. Inclusion: A and its other, Not-A, are intentionally paired up to make a set. This
helps to build a model of harmony as unity in diversity.
2. Selection: Symmetry breakdown by prioritizing one of the binary oppositions in
the set, say, A.
3. Promotion: Symmetry restoration by neutralizing the difference made in (2), by
promoting the un-prioritized element, Not-A.
4. Transition: If circumstances change, the shifting balance of A and Not-A can
change accordingly. Neutralizing change helps to maintain symmetry.
Another discriminating factor between optimal and suboptimal harmony is cognitive complexity. To the extent that cognitive complexity tends to break down
under anxiety, high pressure for harmony will only produce suboptimal versions of
the same. It is in the pressure-free private pursuits of the individual, ranging from
cooking to self-cultivation, that harmony in its optimal functioning as a particulate
system, rather than a blending system, is most evident.
These possibilities are explored in the following sections.
Harmony and cognitive complexity. According to Triandis (2009), cognitive complexity is a matter of cultivation of the mind, not of speed of learning or execution of
cognitive tasks. Cognitive complexity can be examined along three aspects:
Discrimination (does the person see a number of shades of the concept? e.g., different political parties), differentiation (does the person use many dimensions when
discriminating among concepts? e.g., many dimensions for discriminating among
political parties), and integration (does the person see many relationships among
these dimensions?). Central to this formulation of cognitive complexity is the
premium placed on difference (discrimination and differentiation) which are not possible without symmetry breakdown. Thus just as uniformity renders harmony sterile,
avoidance of difference also results in cognitive simplicity. Indeed, avoidance of difference is the thread that runs through suboptimal symmetry maintenance strategies
such as self-effacement as a means to maintain group harmony (Matsumoto, 1989,
1990). Optimal harmony, by contrast, consists of a dynamic interplay of differentiation (symmetry breakdown) and integration (symmetry restoration).
It is well known that cognitive complexity deteriorates with anxiety (Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999). Thus suboptimal harmony, such as fitting in or maintaining status
quo to avoid differences, can be predicted to prevail when it is difficult for cognitive
complexity to be sustained, such as in settings where there is high social pressure.
By contrast, optimal harmony can be predicted to flourish in conflict-free zones,
such as in private life where one may pursue the art of cooking and self-cultivation.
Indeed, Chinese cooking is testimonial to the Chinese penchant for harmony as the
particulate system, in which repeated combination of yin and yang types of foods
does not ever end up with a bland blend, but instead generating ever more creative
innovations. The same can be said of the art of self-cultivation, as evidenced by
emotional refinement (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007).
34
Harmony
Optimal harmony in emotional refinement. How do the Chinese make compromises? Take the middle road, be moderate in what you say or dothis is the zhong
yong (the golden mean) way of thinking, according to Ji, Lam, and Guo (2010). This
formulation raises the question as to whether emotion moderation of the Chinese
results in more refined and differentiated experience as would be the case of a particulate system, or more blunted, less differentiated affect as would be the case of a
blending system. The foregoing analysis of optimal harmony suggests the possibility of the particulate scenario and that emotional refinement (Frijda & Sundararajan,
2007) would therefore be a more appropriate framework for our understanding of
the moderate emotions in China.
For an illustration, consider the following description of Confucius as a moderate, well-balanced person:
The Master was mild, and yet dignified; majestic, and yet not fierce; respectful, and yet easy
(Confucian Analects, 7/37, 1971, p. 207).
Emotional refinement requires two capacities: awareness and cognitive complexitythe former serving as the scaffold for the latter. First, awareness: To appreciate
the very fine quality of Confucius as portrayed here, one needs to sense in oneself the
tension that arises from reactions to personality traits that belong to two diametrically
opposedvertical versus horizontaldimensions of collectivism: authority versus
friendliness; austerity versus easy going; standing on ceremony versus being casual.
To have an emotional experiencesuch as tension, relief, and so onof these complex reactions rests squarely upon the capacity to be aware of ones own responses
and experiences at multiple levels, a skill known as intrapersonal attunement (Siegel,
2007), or savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007). The levels of awareness along
with the feedback loops between them can be adumbrated as follows:
(a) Awareness level 1: A juxtaposition of discrete emotions: fear, respect, and awe
toward an authority figure, on the one hand; and feeling at ease, comfort, and
casual toward a friend, on the other.
(b) Awareness level 2: The mind presenting to itself, unconsciously, a mental representation of (a) as a matrix of relationships between emotionscontrast and
complementarity, or the yin and yang dialectic.
(c) Awareness level 3: Conscious awareness of ones own affective responses to the
mental representation of (b), resulting in an experience of the emergent aesthetic emotion known as harmony.
According to Deacon (2006), aesthetics constitutes an emergent domain:
Emergent in the sense that its function is more a reflection of the form of the relationships that have been brought into being than of the component emotions that are
necessarily constitutive of the experience (p. 52). As an appreciative (i.e., savoring)
awareness of the intricacies of relationships between multiple subsystems that are
fostered by the cognition without control mode of processing (Thompson-Schill
et al., 2009), harmony constitutes a fine example of aesthetic emotions.
As for cognitive complexity, the refined emotions evoked by the portrait of
Confucius as the model of a life governed by harmony cover all the bases of cognitive
Summary and Conclusion
35
complexity: Discriminationmany shades of the notion of a harmonious personality

as embodied by Confucius; and differentiationpersonality traits of Confucius are
plotted along two opposed dimensions (vertical versus horizontal) of collectivism.
Lastly, integrationthe dialectic relationship, such as contrast and complementarity,
among ones emotions evoked by the perceived personality traits of Confucius
assumes center stage of an aesthetic experience of the Master.

To sum up the foregoing analysis, I cast harmony in the framework of concurrent
goal pursuit. According to Orehek and Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis (2013), there are two
strategies for the pursuit of multiple goals: one is sequential, the other concurrent
the former capitalizes on analytic, the latter holistic reasoning. One major difference between these two strategies is instrumentality versus value considerations.
Thus when the dominant concern involves making immediate and steady progress,
sequential goal pursuit will be preferred; whereas when the major concern is making the best possible choice, concurrent goal pursuit, namely the harmony approach,
will be preferred. The instrumental approach of the sequential goal pursuit entails
goal shielding which consists of high prioritizing of the focal goal and inhibition of
alternative goals. By contrast, concurrent goal pursuit entails low prioritization to
enhance inclusiveness of multiple goals, an approach that is driven by a value concernnamely to make the best possible choice for all. To satisfy the multiple goals
all at once, not one at a time, is to find multifinal options. The conditions for multifinal options, according to Orehek and Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis (2013), sum up very
well the key principles of harmony:
Two goals must be activated at the same timethus the importance of pluralism
and diversity in harmony.
When ones goals are of similar priority, the same block of time can be allocated
to each goal and a multifinal means can then be soughtthus, the need for moderation to avoid polarizing.
Now let us revisit the blocked-choice paradigm of Mourey et al. (2013). Cast into
the framework of multiple goal pursuit, the blocked-choice paradigm goes something like this: First, the participants were asked to engage in a multiple goal pursuit
(picking a pair of puppies, etc.) to come up with a multifinal means, namely a set;
then, the multifinal means was blocked, forcing the participants to make a choice
either to find an alternative multifinal means to the same goals, namely to form
another set, or to break up the multiple goals and switch to a strategy of sequential
goal pursuit. As predicted, those primed with the individualist mindset readily
switched to the sequential goal pursuititems are chosen one at a time; if one is not
available, pick the next one available. But not those primed with the collectivist
mindset. How do we understand the persistence of this group?
36
Harmony
According to Orehek and Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis (2013), since concurrent goal

pursuit entails the activation of more goals, and the pursuit of those goals either succeeds or fails in unison, succeeding in attaining multiple goals at once should garner
more overall value and lead to relatively greater positive affective experiencesor
what we have been referring to as harmonythan sequential goal pursuit. This
observation is consistent with the finding of Mourey et al. (2013) that for those
primed with the collectivist mindset (which entails holistic thinking that prefers
concurrent to sequential goal pursuit) even an arbitrarily formed set carried relatively more value.
Finally, the concurrent goal pursuit of harmony has one important advantage
over the sequential goal pursuit strategy, namely moderationespecially in the
domain of morality. Orehek and Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis (2013) point out that due to
its goal shielding which inhibits competing goals, sequential goal pursuit has relatively greater potential for morally questionable behavior. By contrast, concurrent
goal pursuit has to satisfy multiple goals, which necessarily constrains behavior in
ways that limit some of the most extreme options. Kirk Schneider would have
agreed. In his analysis of human atrocities across cultures, Schneider (2013) argues
persuasively for the moral imperative to use moderation as an alternative to the ravage of polarizing tendencies that have contributed to the pursuit of extreme options
resulting in much suffering throughout history.
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Chapter 3
In the Crucible of Confucianism
Introduction
Once Nisbett (2003) asked a Chinese scholar why Westerners and Easterners had
developed different ways of thinking, the scholar replied, Because you had Aristotle
and we had Confucius (p. 29). This chapter explains this enigmatic answer.
My investigation takes three steps: First, I start with an agenda highly valued by
Confucius, namely the rectification of names concerning collectivism. I distinguish
various types of collectivism, and show how Confucianism is relational rather than
group based. Next, I introduce the Confucian project as a unique approach to the
problems posed by mass society. I focus on two choice points in the history of
human civilizationstrong ties versus big gods; and inner/private space versus
outer/public space. Monotheism and the law, representing the choice of big gods
and public space, respectively, have been important milestones in the history of
Western civilization. Confucius, by contrast, chose strong ties and the inner/private
consciousness as the arena for the development of a rites-based society. In the concluding section, I examine how this particular approach of Confucius is both shaped
by relational cognition and also makes important contributions to it.
Collectivism, an Animal Model

N. pulcher is a cooperatively breeding cichlid fish, which lives in family groups
consisting of a breeding pair and 56 helpers of both sexes and different ages
(Bergmller, Heg, & Taborsky, 2005; Bergmller & Taborsky, 2007). Because of the
constraints on independent breeding, helpers of N. pulcher have two alternative lifehistory options, to stay or to disperse: (a) stay in the home territory and eventually
inherit it by queuing for the breeding position, or (b) disperse to breed independently
by acquiring a breeding position elsewhere. The two cognitive strategies (of the fish)
39
40
3 Confucianism
in niche selectionto stay and pay or disperse and breed independentlymay be

considered an animal model of collectivism versus individualism.
According to Bergmller and Taborsky (2007), stayers, relative to the dispersers,
have the benefit of lower risk of predation, but they need to pay for their stay by
engaging in helping behaviors such as brood care and territory maintenance (digging to remove sand from the breeding shelter, and so on). This animal model sheds
some light on collectivism. The cognitive strategy (of the fish) to stay and pay is
consistent with the two aspects of interdependent self-construalharmony seeking and rejection avoidanceproposed by Hashimoto and Yamagishi (2013,
p. 143). The authors claim that rejection avoidance refers to the wise strategy for
individuals to keep a low profile and avoiding being a target of envy, spite, and
rejection (p. 143). Harmony seeking is motivated by the fact that People almost
exclusively depend on closely related others for the resources needed for their survival (p. 143). The constraint of this social reality is that they have no freedom to
leave such relations, as they have no alternatives to turn to for the needed
resources . people must fit in with and be accepted by closely related others
(p. 143, emphasis in the original). Similarly, Cheung et al. (2001) constructed a
Chinese personality dimension called interpersonal relatedness which is defined
as a strong orientation toward instrumental relationships, emphasis on occupying
ones proper place and engaging in appropriate action; avoidance of internal, external, and interpersonal conflict, and adherence to norms and traditions (p. 425).
But if this is all there is to collectivism, we would not need Confucius
(551479 BC).
Two Types of Collectivism

Corresponding to the two types of cognition, non-relational versus relational
(Chap. 1), there are two types of collectivismcollective (group-based) versus relational (relationship-based). Group-based collectivism focuses on adaptation to the
group through paying ones dues and conforming to group norms; relational collectivism capitalizes on involvement and commitment in personal connections.
Brewer and Gardner (1996) were among the first to draw a distinction between two
levels of social selvesthose that derive from membership in impersonal collectives versus those that derive from interpersonal relationships. Similar distinction
holds up in later research between group-based and relational collectivism (Brewer
& Chen, 2007) or between two self-construalscollective versus relational (Harb
& Smith, 2008; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Cross-cultural differences have been
reported along this divide. For instance, Yuki (2003) found US respondents more
collective and Japanese more relational.
The group-based collectivism has some overlap with the stay and pay strategy
of the fish, but relational collectivism seems to be more uniquely human.
The communal/relational orientation is defined by Clark and Mills (1979) as an
outlook de-emphasizing self and focusing on the needs of others and felt closeness
Two Types of Collectivism
41
(see also Gergen, 2009). Testing the communal/relational dimension in collectivism, Bresnahan, Chiu, and Levine (2004) found that relational interdependent selfconstrual was indeed related to the communal orientation, while collective interdependent self-construal was only marginally associated with it. The distinction
between relational versus group-based collectivism has also surfaced in the laboratory studies of yielding, which is one of the hallmarks of collectivism.
Two versions of yielding. To study cross-culture differences in social behavior,
Kim and Markus (1999) came up with an ingenious pen-choice paradigm:
Participants were asked to pick one among five pens that came in two colors, with
the ratio of 23 or 14 pens of the same color. A common finding is that collectivists
relative to individualists tend to favor the majority choice rather than picking the
pen with the unique color. Modifying slightly the pen selection paradigm by adding
a private condition, Hashimoto, Li, and Yamagishi (2011) found that when by themselves or being the last to choose, most people seemed to prefer the unique object
regardless of cultural background. This is consistent with an earlier study by
Yamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug (2008), who found that people avoid the option
for the unique object when under social pressure. Invoking the group-based version
of collectivism as explanation, the authors attributed the majority choice to the strategy to not stand out and accrue negative reputationa strategy that is contingent on
the presence of others, hence is not operative in the private condition.
Van Doesum, Van Lange, and Van Lange (2013) made another modification to
the pen-choice paradigm by adding a consideration for others: Which object would
you choose? You pick first, then the other (p. 89). Participants were told to imagine
playing with another person a decision task to choose one among three objects, of
which two were identical, and the third different. The participants were asked (a) to
keep the perspective of the other in mind, (b) to keep the others best interest in
mind, or (c) to think of their own preferences (p. 90). The authors predicted and
found that majority choices were the result of Social mindfulness [which] makes
people leave choice for others out of other-regard (p. 88). Invoking the communal
orientation, the authors claim that refraining from taking the last single cookie (or
pen) is to leave a next person something to choose from (p. 86). Challenging the
group-based interpretation of the majority choice, the authors argue for the communal dimension of collectivism, in which social mindfulness is the driving force
behind the proverbial self-effacement of collectives: Self sacrifice by the socially
mindful person is motivated by improving relationships with the person(s) one is
being mindful of (p. 98).
In sum, two competing interpretations for yielding have been offered by laboratory studies, one invoking group-based collectivism which focuses on conformity to
group norms and adaptation under social pressure; the other invoking a communal
dimension of the same that is concerned with the quality of relationships, along with
a genuine concern for the otherthe former emphasizes the vertical orientation of
obedience to hierarchy and authority, whereas the latter, according to Van Doesum
et al. (2013), the horizontal orientation of making other-regarding choices (p. 98),
such as leaving choice options for others (p. 86).
42
3 Confucianism
Two versions of power. Corresponding to the two types of collectivism, groupbased versus relational, there are two power motivespersonalized versus socialized, according to Torelli and Shavitt (2010). Personalized power orientation focuses
on recognition and status enhancement, whereas socialized power orientation puts a
premium on the need of others, caring, and positive transformation of others.
Furthermore, parallel to these power orientations are two viable strategies to gain
power and influencedominance and prestige, according to Cheng, Tracy,
Foulsham, Kingstone, and Henrich (2013). Dominance is characterized by the use
of force and intimidation to induce fear, whereas prestige, the sharing of expertise
or know-how to gain respectthe former is a strategy that humans share with other
animals (recall the pay-to-stay strategy of the fish); the latter, as exemplified by
teachers/gurus, seems to be uniquely evolved to suit the human needs for social
learning and information sharing.
In ancient China, the dominance orientation is found in the Realist, also known as
the Legalists. According to Waley (1939), they held that law should replace morality (p. 151); and that Force can always secure obedience; an appeal to morality,
very seldom (p. 155). Consistent with the pay-to-stay strategy of the fish, which
involves punishment as a means for dominants to control payment by subordinates
(Bergmller et al., 2005), the Legalists capitalized on punitive measures to motivate
behavior: When offences are concealed, the people become stronger than the Law;
when crimes are punished, the Law is stronger than the people. When the people are
stronger than the Law, there will be disorders in the land; when the Law is stronger
than the people, the land will be powerful in war (Waley, 1939, pp. 172173).
By contrast, the agenda of Confucius was to humanize power by the prestige
strategy to power, in which respect is earned through sharing and helping, and by the
socialized power orientation, which Torelli and Shavitt (2010) found to be associated with horizontal collectivism, characterized by caring for others, and opposition
against authoritarian aggression and social inequality. In other words, faced with the
choice between a government which is suffused with the spirit that maintains the
harmony of an ideal family life and a government in which hierarchy and authority
are based on brute force or mere interest without any sense of spiritual-moral constraint (Schwartz, 1985, p. 70), Confucius opted for the former by capitalizing on
the relational cognition, as embodied in the transformational power of rituals.
Humanizing Power Through Li (Rites)

When human societies scale up from small, tight-knit groups of hunter-gatherers to
big groups in which those in charge are not directly related to those under their
control, the mass society can become a human jungle where naked power carries
the day. How to steer the mass society away from the big-fish-eat-little-fish trajectory is a question that confronts all civilizations. The answer, according to cultural
psychologist Ara Norenzayan (2013), lies in the evolution of big gods who watch
from the sky so that people will curb their self-serving and predatory impulses.
From Might to Rite
43
Instead of big gods, Confucius found his answer in strong ties (Chap. 1). This could
be as significant a milestone in human consciousness as the evolution of big gods.
According to Read (2010), a major transition in human evolution is a shift to relational reasoning in social groups.
Relational reasoning of strong ties was seen as the solution to mass society by
both Confucianism and Daoism, except that the latter privileged the maternal order,
whereas the former the patriarchic order, according to Bollas (2013):
Lao Tzu, Confucius, and other philosophers of the 100 year period (4th century BCE) all perceived the hazards of the large group. Daoism brings the group together through mystical
unity with the maternal order and Confucius convenes the group around filial identity. (p. 47)
Daoism is reserved for the next chapter. For now, we consider the Confucian
project of humanizing power through strong ties.
From Might to Rite

For Confucius the ideal model of social order is the family. This strong-ties-based
paradigm of society has far reaching consequences, one of which is to privilege
Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991) as the model rationality. Recall that
Communal Sharing contains within itself the sub-symmetry group of Authority
Ranking (see Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1). This suggests a two-dimensionalvertical and
horizontalstructure of the ritual consciousness: The vertical dimension is inhabited by Authority Ranking that sustains role-based rules of behavior, whereas the
horizontal dimension, sentiments and virtues infused with the relational thinking of
Communal Sharing.
Benjamin Schwartz (1985) claims that the rites (li ) are Janus-faced, to humanize and to support power: While the ultimate end of li may be to humanize hierarchy and authority, it certainly also is meant to maintain and clarify its foundations
(68). What Schwartz seems to have missed is a strategic move on the part of
Confucius to shift the foundation of power from the contingent social and environmental factors to the principles of a viable social order. Thus for Confucius, as
Schwartz (1985) points out: The obedience [to li] is not simply to parents but to the
entire system of li which is the foundation of human society (p. 71). This shift from
brute force to rite-based social order is well explained by Bollas (2013):
For although ritual may at times represent the imposition of fatiguing, rule-bound behavioral directives, it may also replace the presence (in person) of an oppressive, dominating
other with the mandate of a set of laws. If the self transforms these laws into more benign,
ordered forms of behavior, and sees that other selves have done the same, then we might say
that the group triumphs over the primitive law of the father. (pp. 4445)
With this shift in rationality from personalized to socialized power, Confucius

has taken the first step toward integrating the self and society by rendering both
amenable to the regulation by li. In the framework of li, self and society can be differentiatedand therefore better integratedby categories that fall along the divide
between the substance and form of ritualsthe former pertains to benevolence (ren );
the latter codified behavior.
44
3 Confucianism
The external form of rituals. Bollas (2013) makes the interesting observation that
if The Book of Songs sequesters the soul in poetry (to be elaborated later), then
The Book of Rites is a literary boot camp for character formation (p. 42). The Book
of Rites is a compendium of texts (dating back to twelfth century BC, and standardized in the third century AD) that address:
amongst other things, how and where one should stand in the presence of others, where
one should sit at a table, how one should eat, how men and women should behave in one
anothers presence, how rulers should behave in the presence of the people, how sons
should behave in relation to fathers and elders, how long one should mourn and in what
manner. It is a seemingly endless, meticulous detailing of behavior. (Bollas, 2013, p. 42)
Referring to the rites as reverent formality (Bollas, 2013, p. 67), Hsn Tzu
outlined the many rituals one can live byfor example, how the sounds of different
bells announce different events. He claimed that rituals are needed because humans
find pleasure in a patterned, regulated existence. Thus, Rites are a means of satisfaction, said Hsn Tzu (Bollas, 2013, p. 67).
The internal substance of rituals. Ren (benevolence) refers to virtues and
capacities modeled on the nurturance and reciprocity of affection among those near
and dear. Although taking social hierarchy for granted, Confucius put emphatic
stress not on the group-based behaviors of obedience or fitting in, so much as on
benevolence or nurturance (ren): When asked by his disciples to share his personal
aspirations, Confucius said (Analects, 5/25), in regard to the aged, to give them
rest; in regards to friends, to show them sincerity; in regard to the young, to treat
them tenderly (Confucian Analects, 1971, p. 183).
While Confucian morality is based on strong ties, the moral identity one gains
through a life-time cultivation of ren may also help to attenuate one major drawback
of strong-ties-based rationality, namely in-group favoritism. There is some empirical support for this conjecture: In a series of experimental studies, Smith, Aquino,
Koleva, and Graham (2014) found that in-group favoritism, as evidenced by supporting torture of or withholding help from out-group members, was attenuated
among participants who also had a strong moral identity. Otherwise put, people with
a strong moral identity are more likely than those with weak moral identity to extend
moral concern to out-groups.
One of the virtues of ren that lies at the core of ritual action (li) is yielding (rang ),
which according to Confucius holds the key to humanizing power: If one is able to
rule a state by li and the spirit of yielding [rang] [appropriate to it] what difficulty will
there be? If one is not able to rule a state by li and the spirit of yielding, of what use is
li? (Analects, 4/13, translated by Waley, 1983, p. 104). Schwartz (1985) explains:
The spirit of yielding to others involves precisely the capacity to overcome such
passions as the love of mastery, self-aggrandizement, resentment and covetousness
of which he speaks elsewhere (p. 73).
Yielding to others can be understood in the context of social mindfulness.
According to Van Doesum et al. (2013), Being socially mindful means to safeguard other peoples control over their own behavioral options in situations of interdependence (p. 86, emphasis in original). This entails other-oriented capacities
Self and Group: Toward a Deeper Integration
45
and/or tendencies (p. 87) with a benevolent focus on the needs and interests of
others (p. 86). In everyday life, yielding (rang) translates into being considerate or
being polite.
Integration of form and substance. Integration of the two components of ritualsform and essenceconsists in a dual emphasis of both li and ren. This vision
of Confucius is summed up by Schwartz (1985) as follows (where the older
Romanization of jen was used instead of ren):
only through the established channels of li can ones inner self-mastery make itself manifest to society and lead within to the higher moral excellence of jen . Acting according to
the civilized practices of the normative tradition is a necessary ingredient of Jen, and making
ones Jen manifest through the li is the only way in which li can be brought to life. (p. 77)
The Confucian vision also finds an eloquent expression in Bollas (2013):

Our natural self, our simple self, uncontaminated by complexity, can filter into the ritualized forms of being like water into a container and imbue the realm of adaptation with a
kind of luminous spirituality. (p. 46).
So far, so good. But the weight of adaptive formality can also stiffen the life of
the (natural) self, a problem that Confucius was keenly aware of.
Self and Group: Toward a Deeper Integration

Durkheim (1995) claims that ritual creates social bondedness, which in turn produces energy, and necessity for cultural power (Wiley, 1994, p. 106). In this formulation, ritual and group/society constitute a positive feedback loop which
generates the collective effervescence. Thinking beyond Durkheims (1995) groupbased collective loop, Confucius located the power of li instead in the individual
constituents of the group, thereby rendering visible an inherent gap between self
and group, a gap marked by the Chinese distinction between inner and outer, or
private and public selves.
The private versus public distinction is well articulated by Bollas (2013):
We live in two worlds. In the first very private realm, cocooned by the self-hypnotic trance
of meditation, we find a certain form for our being and relating. A derivative of the maternal
order, it is very familiar to us and we do not feel alone when in this state. But it is in marked
contrast to the social world of political interaction, in which it is mandatory to learn how to
behave in order to avoid corruption, materialism and the lure of ambition and pride. (p. 45)
Cast in the framework of rituals, the two worlds of the selfa spontaneous, relational being, and a collective, codified beingraises the question as to whether
over-adaptation to the group may cause dispossession of the true self (Bollas, 2013).
After all, how can the self be natural and spontaneous (hence true) after what
amounts to a rigorous training in adaptation through li? (Bollas, 2013). Atrophy of
the (true) self results in observance of rituals in hollow form, a practice toward
which Confucius expressed strong objections.
46
3 Confucianism
Authenticity and ritual efficacy. Confucius said:

Detestable is the substitution of purple for vermillion; detestable is the pollution of elegant
classical music with the sounds of Cheng; detestable is the subversion of family and state
by glib talkers. (Analects, 17/18, in Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 276)
Lau points out that each of the things Confucius detested bore a superficial
resemblance to the proper thing, and it is because of this superficial resemblance
that the specious can be mistaken for the genuine. Confucius abhorrence is directed
against this spuriousness (cited in Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 279). The simulacrum
par excellence is the village worthy, one who shows outer conformity but lacks the
inner spirit. Thus Confucius said: The village worthy is the thief of virtue (Ames,
1996, p. 236). And again, I dislike weeds lest they be confused with grain .
I dislike the village worthy lest he be confused with the virtuous (Ames, 1996,
p. 237). Mencius explained: If you want to condemn the village worthy, you have
nothing on him; if you want to criticize him, there is nothing to criticize. He chimes
in with the practices of the day and blends in with the common world. Where he
lives he seems to be conscientious and seems to live up to his word, and in what he
does, he seems to have integrity. His community all like him, and he sees himself as
being right. Yet one cannot pursue the way of Yao or Shun [the sage kings] with
such a person (Ames, 1996, p. 236). In the final analysis, the village worthy,
according to Ames (1996), is a case of lack of creativity: the creative element necessary for his personalization and renewal of the exemplary role is absent. He has no
blood. He is a hypocrite because he has nothing of quality to contribute on his own
(Ames, 1996, p. 237).
To understand Confucius abhorrence of hypocrisy, we do well to follow
Fingarettes (1972) lead in locating the efficacy of ritual action in that of magic.
The basic principle of magic is like produces like, effect resembling cause, a
principle summed up by the Chinese term kan-lei (Munakata, 1983,
p. 107; Chaps. 6 and 12), which means literally, similar natures or kinds [lei]
mutually influence or respond to each other (Goldberg, 1998, p. 36). For illustration, consider the ritual for rain:
The leading principle in organizing this ritual [Asking for Rain] was apparently that everything in the ritual should be of similar kinds in order to get a sympathetic response. Since
the basic nature of rain is water with the force of yin, the things related to water, and things
which are yin, feature prominently in the components of the ritual. (Munakata, 1983, p. 110)
Imagine what happens if one of the ingredients of this elaborate preparation turns
out to be a sham. From the perspective of sympathetic magic, the problem with
simulacrum lies in the fact that it has the appearance of the real thing but cannot
effect a sympathetic response from the real thing, due to its lack of inner
substance. That is why hollow form is not merely trivialfor Confucius, it is insidiously deceptive (Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 279).
By locating the power of rituals in the (true) self, Confucius has redefined power.
He replaced the collective force of coercion with the relational power of attraction
as captured by the notion of gan-lei (like attracts like) that lies at the core of magic.
Furthermore, to make clear that the power of the individual (to attract others) is a
moral one, he situates the power of attraction in sincerity: A commentary on the
From Group to Self
47
I-Ching hexagram (61) Inner Truth (Chung Fu) reads: This is the echo awakened
in men through spiritual attraction. Whenever a feeling is voiced with truth and
frankness, whenever a deed is the clear expression of sentiment, a mysterious and
far-reaching influence is exerted . The root of all influence lies in ones own inner
being (Wilhelm, 1967, p. 237).
To solve the problem of the hollow forms of rituals, and to foster the true self
with its natural goodness, Confucius has a twofold agenda: To counterbalance group
living with the private life of the self, and to complement ritual with the arts.
From Group to Self

Kaitibai (2005) claims that agency is a separate dimension from relatedness. She
defines autonomy as a state of being a self-governing agent (p. 404). The antithesis of autonomy is heteronomy, which is defined as reliance on others as a source
of guidance. Autonomous-relational self-construal would therefore characterize
persons high on both autonomy and relatedness. This profile is consistent with the
Confucian emphasis on character building. The consensus among China scholars
(Waley, 1983; Schwartz, 1985) is that the Analects is not much concerned with the
details of ritual so much as with the general principles of morality, the locus of
which are in the specific living persons. Tu (1994) states the matter in no uncertain
terms: Confucians, as opposed to collectivists, firmly establish the subjectivity of
the person as sui generis. No social program, no matter how lofty, can undermine
the centrality of selfhood in Confucian learning (p. 184). In contradistinction to
received wisdom that the primary focus in collectivist societies falls on the collective life of the group, Tu claims that in the Confucian tradition, The ultimate purpose of life is neither regulating the family nor harmonizing the father-son
relationship, but self-realization (Tu, 1985a, p. 243).
This Confucian emphasis on the self is promoted through the inner versus outer
rhetoric (Sundararajan, 2002).
Inner higher than Outer. The rhetoric of inner versus outeralong with its many
permutations such as substance versus form, private versus publicsays basically
that the first terms are higher in importance than the second terms of the binary
opposition. For instance, Hsn Tzu draws a number of binary oppositions: intrinsic
honor versus extrinsic honor; intrinsic or just shame versus circumstantial shame
(Cua, 1996, p. 196, note 48). A gentleman may have circumstantial shame, but not
intrinsic shame, for the former is a matter of circumstance beyond ones power or
control, while the latter has a source within oneself (Cua, 1996, p. 183). Likewise,
a sharp distinction between the inner self and the external behavior/appearance
is found in the Book of Rites. In describing the filial son in mourning, the text has
this to say: The severest vigil and purification is maintained and practiced in the
inner self, while a looser vigil is maintained externally (Fung Yu-lan cited in Tu,
1985a, p. 235).
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3 Confucianism
Personalization. Hall and Ames (1987) point out that ritual action is truly meaningful only as a particular and personal disclosure of meaning (p. 274). They argue
that ritual action is best translated as propriety meaning to make ones own,
for appropriate ritual actions require a personalization and a making over fitting
to ones own specific condition (p. 274). But the classic text shall have the last
word. The text Hsn Tzu cites three responses, reflecting three levels of moral
understanding, to the question of Confucius: what is the jen (ren) person like?
Tzu-lu replied, one who causes others to love him; Tzu-kung replied, one who
loves others; Yen Yan replied, an authoritative person is one who loves himself
(Ames, 1991, p. 106). Amess exegesis is illuminating. He suggests that the first
level of moral understanding as indicated by the first answer entails a selfishness;
the second level as indicated by the second answer is higher, but is self-effacing.
Ames concludes: The highest level, then, is necessarily reflexive (1991, p. 106).
Self-reflexivity. The Chinese notion of the self is consistent with Kierkegaards
purely structural definition of the self: The self is a relation which relates itself to
its own self (cited by Neville, 1996, p. 204). On this view, the self is not necessarily
knowledge representation, an aggregate of attributes so essential to the Western selfconcept, so much as relational consciousnesswhere there is self-reflexive consciousness, there the self must be. Chinese classic texts are replete with
self-reflexivity. Cua (1996) investigated reflexive binomials such as tzu-locutions in
ancient texts, and came up with: examine oneself, reproach oneself, disgrace oneself (The Analects); do violence to oneself, nourish oneself, realize [Dao] in oneself (Mencius). This self-reflexive orientation is referred to by Tu (1985b) as
authenticity: the word authenticity seems to me more appropriate than narrowly conceived moralistic terms such as honesty and loyalty to convey the original Confucian sense of learning for the sake of the self (p. 52). Self-reflexivity
plays an important part in Confucian virtues such as ren (benevolence), which
includes a capacity of self-awareness and reflection (Schwartz, 1985, p. 75), and
cheng (sincerity or inner truthfulness), which is defined by Mencius as He who
is sincere with himself is called true (Tu, 1985b, p. 96).
Toward the cultivation of this true self, Confucius turned to the arts. Thus in
contrast to Plato who privileged logic and rhetoric, Confucius made poetry and
music the foundation of his pedagogy.
Ritualization of Emotions Through Poetry

The Book of Rites is a manual on how to behave, but it must be read along with The Book
of Songs if one is to appreciate how the Chinese see formthe form of a poem, the form of
behavioras strikingly similar projects. There is no such sense, or depth of comprehension, of the formal presentation of self in the Occidental world. (Bollas, 2013, p. 119)
Contrary to the utilitarian orientation of the secular worldviews, the ritual consciousness is essentially aesthetic (Dissanayake, 1992). Thus rites are supposed to
function in tandem with the arts, especially poetry and music. In comparison to laws,
Ritualization of Emotions Through Poetry
49
rituals are transformative rather than coercive. The regulatory function of poetry rests
squarely upon this noncoercive, transformative power of rituals. Owen (1992)
explains: Poetry occupied a very important place in the Confucian cultural program,
but its instruction is not supposed to be coercive . when combined with music, the
poems of the Book of Songs were supposed to influence people to good behavior
unconsciously: listeners apprehended and thus came to share a virtuous state of mind,
and the motions of their own affections would be shaped by that experience (p. 45).
Chinese aesthetics is an eloquent articulation of the two cardinal principles of the
ritual consciousnessveneration of tradition and hegemony of the inner reality
the former prefers continuity over innovations in domain constraints; the latter seeks
creativity in the inner spirit that transcends all outer forms (Li, 1997). Through
these two aspects of the ritual, poetry integrates the two worlds of the selfpublic
and private. Bollas (2013) points out how poetry not only offers a dwelling place for
the soul, thereby housing the intimate particularity of individual experience, the
privacy of deep emotional experience (p. 40), but also allows us to dive into an
unconscious matrix, in which we find a shared canon of common objects that yield
deeply private and idiosyncratic meaning. This two-tiered structure characteristic of
the ritual consciousnessthe public, shared formality on the one hand; and private,
idiosyncratic meaning, on the otheris what makes poetry the ideal instrument for
integrating the self and the group. Bollas (2013) explains:
Structured, ritualized, mannered and stylized, the poem is the quintessential human reflection of the Eastern mind. As mass society develops in China and human behavior is codified, people live within the parameters of social metrics and rhythms, rhyming with one
another through collective being. In the poem, however, they find their double a literary
Doppelgnger which obeys all the rules and yet finds in the poetic structure room for
unique arrangements of common themes. (p. 39)
To see how the two aspects of the ritual consciousnessinner substance versus
outer form; private versus public; self versus groupinterweave into the larger
wholeness of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991), we need to see the
Confucian curriculum in its full spectrum, which reads as follows, in the words of
Confucius: Aroused by the Odes [the Book of Song]; established by the Rites;
brought into perfect focus by Music (Fang, 1954, p. 9). In this threefold program,
emotions are first aroused by poetry, then molded by li. This makes sense. According
to Dissanayake (1992), rituals pattern and manipulate emotions by means of shaping and elaboration.
Molding emotions with rituals are distinctly different from the Western notion of
emotion regulation (see Chap. 10). In the latter, it is reason that does the regulating,
whereas in the former, rituals are guided by the logic of emotion to serve the purpose of emotion. This point is made clear by the fact that emotional engagement is
considered by Confucius to be the sine qua non of ritual action: In the ceremonies
of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow than a minute attention to observances (Confucian Analects, 1971, p. 156).
Hsn Tzu (cited in Bollas, p. 67) asked: What is the point of a period of mourning that lasts 3 years? He answered himself: it is a form which has been set up after
consideration of the emotions involved. He claimed that there is a temporal logic
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3 Confucianism
to rites, one that follows emotional needs. Rites trim what is too long and stretch
out what is too short. Thus rituals, said Hsn Tzu, satisfy human emotions. Indeed
when rites are performed in the highest manner, then both the emotions and the
forms embodying them are fully realized. This would be an apt description of
music, in which form and substance, the group and the self are fused in the mode of
Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991).
In the Confucian project, the trajectory of emotions is from personal to communal, culminating in a synergistic community (Chap. 1; Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu,
2012). Now, we are back to Durkheims (1995) collective effervescence, but we get
there via a detour through the cultivation of the self. It is this detour that constitutes
the lifes journey for a Confucian gentleman.
But is this detour through the inner, private self to group harmony worth all that
trouble? What if alternative or even more efficient means to social coordination
exists? In fact, there is some evidence, based on a series of experimental studies by
Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, and Pinker (2014), that public knowledge provides the
most effective and reliable path to coordination (p. 659). If the Confucian project
of the inner, private self is not absolutely necessary for social coordination, what
advantage is there?
Let us pause for a moment here. How to make sure that people will curb their
selfish impulses in a mass society? In comparison to the Western solution of big
gods and the law, the choice made by Confucius seemed to be a more circuitous
routecultivation of strong ties and private consciousness. In the following section,
I revisit this choice by a close examination of the study by Thomas et al. (2014) on
the cooperation games.
Confucian Rationality Revisited

Cooperation is essential for group living in all cultures. Thomas et al. (2014) claim
that the challenge of cooperation is not motivational but epistemological because it
is a question of mind readinghow do actors know and coordinate with each others state of knowledge? The authors adumbrated three types of knowledge states:
private, shared, and common knowledge. Private knowledge is shared with no one
else; common knowledge is publically shared with all. Structurally more complex is
shared knowledge, which is privately shared between some but not all individuals.
Shared knowledge consists of two subtypes, depending on the levels of awareness:
Shared knowledge based on secondary awareness is A knows that B knows X
(p. 658); shared knowledge based on tertiary awareness is A knows that B knows
that A knows X (p. 658). Which of these three knowledge states is the most conducive to group cooperation? By group cooperation, the researchers meant the most
basic form of social coordination, namely reciprocal or mutualistic, not altruistic,
cooperation. So they designed an experiment to find out.
In a series of studies, the participants interact with partners in a role playing scenario that involves a coordination game. In the coordination game, participants must
decide either to work alone, which offers a small but certain profit, or to work with a
Confucian Rationality Revisited
51
partner, which has the potential to make more money only if the partner makes the
same choice: If one party decides to work with a partner, but the partner chooses to
work alone, both parties earn nothing. The scenario of the coordination game involves
two merchants, a butcher and a baker, with the only means of communication between
the two an unreliable messenger boy. Working independently, the butcher sells
chicken wings, and the baker dinner rolls. Working together they can sell hot dogs for
which they earn more. The hot dog price varies from day to day, rendering their collaboration sometimes profitable, and sometimes not. The hot dog price was conveyed
to the participants by a messenger boy displayed in a private box they were told only
the participant and the partner could see, or by a loudspeaker displayed in a public
box they were told other participants could see. Four conditions were set up to model
the knowledge states as follows (as seen from the bakers experience):
Common knowledge (a). In the public box, the baker read that the loudspeaker
broadcast the market price of today. In the private box the baker read, The
Messenger Boy did not come by. Because the market price was broadcast on the
loudspeaker, the Butcher knows [todays price], and he knows that you know this
information as well (p. 663).
Private knowledge (b). In the private box, the baker read, The Messenger Boy
has not seen the Butcher today, so he cannot tell you anything about what the
Butcher knows (p. 662). The public box said that the loudspeaker was silent.
Secondary shared knowledge (c1). The baker read in the private box, The
Messenger Boy says he stopped by the butcher shop before coming to your bakery. He tells you that the Bucher knows what todays hot dog price is. However,
he says that he forgot to mention to the Butcher that he was coming to see you,
so the Butcher is not aware that you know todays hot dog price (p. 662). The
public box said that the loudspeaker was silent.
Tertiary shared knowledge (c2). The baker read in the private box, The
Messenger Boy mentions that he is heading over to the butcher shop, and will let
the Butcher know todays price as well. The Messenger Boy will also tell the
Butcher that he just came from your bakery and told you the price. However, the
Messenger Boy will not inform the Butcher that he told you he would be heading
over there. So, while the Butcher is aware that you know todays price, he is not
aware that you know that he knows that (pp. 662663). The public box said that
the loudspeaker was silent.
Nicely captured here are the two epistemological spacesprivate versus public:
The loudspeaker, signifying the public space, is on in only one of the four conditionscommon knowledge. The rest of the conditions, from private to shared
knowledge, belong to the private space where the loudspeaker plays no role (i.e., is
silent). Corresponding to the knowledge states modeled here are different states of
the mind. The knowledge states of (b) and (c), above, are associated with subjective
awareness, whereas (a), objective awareness. The (a) condition of public knowledge
can be formulated in accordance with the mind-to-world transaction:
A, B, C all know about X.
Where A, B, C = multiple minds; X = objective knowledge about the world (price
of hot dogs).
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3 Confucianism
Note that in this condition (a), there is no transaction between the minds, since the
messenger boy is rendered unnecessary by the loudspeaker that publicizes the message. Mind-to-mind transaction takes place in the private space of (b) and (c). The
condition of (c), denoting (privately) shared knowledge, has two variantssecondary and tertiarywhich permit the following formulations: A knows that B knows
X (secondary, p. 658); and A knows that B knows that A knows X (tertiary,
p. 658). Another variation of (c) is (b) which refers to private (unshared) knowledge,
where A and B have coalesced into the same person, thus A knows that A knows
X. Note the prominence of relational cognition in both (b) and (c), which are concerned with the parity between two mind states (I know what you know or I know
that I know), not simply the objective knowledge X. Corresponding to these mental
states are the three levels of mind mappings proposed by Gary McKeown (2013).
Objective awareness of common knowledge (a) corresponds to mind-world mapping; subjective awareness of private knowledge (b), within-mind mappings; and
subjective awareness of privately shared knowledge (c), between-mind mappings.
Public versus private knowledge representation. Mind-to-mind mapping(b)
and (c)is a messy business, full of uncertainties. By contrast, public broadcast
comes with knowledge explicit and clear, thereby rendering unnecessary all the
convoluted loops of private awareness in (b) and (c) as symbolized by the highly
idiosyncratic and unpredictable itineraries of the Messenger Boy. It is publically
shared knowledge, not mind-to-mind transactions through the labyrinth of private
awareness, that facilitates mutualistic cooperation, so the study of Thomas et al.
(2014) found: In comparison to all the other conditions (b and c), participants were
more likely to choose the cooperation game when the loudspeaker broadcasted the
daily price of hot dogs. Why then did the traditional Confucian society prefer (b)
and (c) over (a)?
The short answer to this question is that the subjective reality of (b) and (c) cannot always be shared publically. There may be good reasons why traditional societies
keep distinct these two realitiesprivate and public. Conflation of the two in modern times has caused much concern:
every disaster inevitably brings the television journalist who protrudes a microphone
into the face of the distraught victim and asks, How does it feel? to have had your son
killed by a snipers bullet, to have been raped Once the private domain of individuals
reacting to personal losses, emotions such as grief and rage are now broadcast around the
world (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 97).
The long answer to this question is the social brain hypothesis (Chap. 1), which
posits social interaction, rather than food gathering and tool use, as the key factor
behind the evolution of human intelligence. In particular, Dunbar and Shultz (2007)
locate the main contributing factor not in group living per se so much as in the
strong ties through social cohesion, and pair-bonding.
Rationality of Community Sharing. The study of Thomas et al. (2014) is based on
the rationality of Market Pricing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991) which is privileged by the
modern societies of weak ties. A very different paradigm for the mutualistic cooperation game can be derived from the rationality of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1;
Fiske, 1991), which is privileged by the traditional societies based on strong ties.
The Lasting Legacy of Confucianism
53
Suppose the Baker and the Butcher are siblings or a couple, how would they make
business decisions concerning whether to sell hot dogs or not on any given day?
Should they follow the algorithm of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991)
one for all and all for oneonly one of the partners needs to know the hot dog price
at any time, and makes a decision accordingly for both parties. In this strong-tiesbased cooperation game, investment of energy would shift from objective states of
knowledge (daily fluctuation of the hot dog price) to subjective knowledge representations, such as shared intentions and desires. As McKeown (2013) points out, in the
mode of transaction that capitalizes on within-mind mappings (Are you thinking
what I am thinking?), the representational options for communication will likely
include a high proportion of social relationships and group dynamics rather than the
concrete perceptual representations of mind-world mappings (the hot dog prices).
Thus when shared subjective reality is the primary concern, the mutualistic cooperation game also changes: According to the rationality of Market Pricing, cooperation is based on careful analysis of cost and benefit, whereas according to the
rationality of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991), cooperation is not necessarily the end in itself, but also serves as a means of communication. According to
McKeown (2013), humans communicate for three purposes(1) exchange propositional information (the hot dog price), (2) align representational parity (Are you
thinking what I am thinking?), and (3) display mind-reading abilities (I bet you will
like this.). The shift from (1) to (2) and (3) entails a transition from mind-to-world
orientation to mind-to-mind transactions. This shift has far reaching ramifications.
McKeown (2013) and others claim that shift to relational reasoning paves the
way for a more abstract representations. For instance, mothers mother is a categorization based on relations and recursive reasoning, which is much more abstract
than hot dog prices. One of the best fruits of the relational cognition is the arts,
which constitute the core of the Confucian curriculum. In contrast to the world of
objective reality which is the primary focus of science, art resides in a world of
subjective reality, a reality made possible by mind-to-mind transactions. Thus
McKeown (2013) points out that literature may confirm more strongly to a world
defined by between-mind mappings rather than the stochastic realities of an objective world (p. 281). In the following chapters we will have the opportunity to delve
into this shared subjective reality which is sustained by the relational cognition and
honed to nuance and precision by the Confucian curriculum.
The Lasting Legacy of Confucianism

After Confucius died, the following, according to Waley (1939), became the scene
of Chinese philosophy in the fourth century BC:
The Taoists were indifferent to society, morality, law, and order, and opposed to them a
mystical self-fulfillment. The Confucianists, following the path of their great master, scurried from court to court, looking still for the philosopher king who would establish an order
of goodness, righteousness, and morality. And then there were the Realists [Legalists],
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3 Confucianism
who believed in neither man nor God, but simply that government must be based on the
actual facts of the world as they are, and who, following this principle, worked up a blueprint for a totalitarian society more thorough and more detailed than any the West was to
know for two thousand years. (backcover)
Throughout the long history of Chinese government, Confucianism prevailed

only in name. Most of the time, rulers utilized a combination of Confucian and
Legalist schools of thought.
One best known legacy of Confucianism is filial piety. According to Yeh (2010),
the rationality of filial piety consists of an older, authoritarian version which predated Confucius, and a newer, reciprocal version introduced by Confucius to
humanize the former. With his emphasis on the affection between parent and child,
Confucius has transformed filial piety from a formal, obligatory system to one
guided by feelings (qing, ). According to Yeh (2010), these two elementsreciprocal and authoritarianof filial piety have their roots in the interactive patterns of
the rites (li) which consist of the principles of favoring the intimate [benevolence]
and respecting the superior [authority] (p. 76).
In modern times, there are two versions of filial piety (Yeh & Bedford, 2003)
reciprocal versus authoritarianthe former focuses on reciprocity and benevolence
(ren), whereas the latter hierarchy and submission to authority. Cast into the symmetry framework, we can predict the optimal version of filial piety to have a Russian
doll structure with authority embedded in the benevolence framework, just as
Authority Ranking (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991) is a lower symmetry subgroup embedded
in the higher symmetry subgroup of Communal Sharing (see Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1).
But when the lower symmetry subgroup of Authority Ranking breaks off from its
foundation of benevolence, the authoritarian version of filial piety signifies a loss of
complexity and can be predicted to be deleterious to health, especially in the modern Chinese society where affection, intimacy and trust are more important than
norms, power and role constraints (Yeh & Bedford, 2003, p. 226). This prediction
is supported by ample empirical evidence. For instance, belief in the reciprocal version of filial piety which put an emphasis on gratitude was negatively related to
adolescents internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors, whereas belief
in the authoritarian version of the same was positively related to depression, anxiety,
and aggression (Yeh, 2006).
Whereas Confucianism has had a checkered history in Chinese politics, and
whereas the optimal version of filial piety is not always practiced, the lasting legacy
of Confucius lies in Chinese emotions, thanks to his poetry-based curriculum.
Bollas (2013) claims that the poem is a form that serves as a template of the mind.
More specifically, he claims that the poetry-centered pedagogy is meant to develop
structures of consciousness:
If Confucius and others were developing the Oriental mind, then their sayings, songs and
poetry are all exercises of that mind. The aim is not to tell a story but to be inhabited by the
mentality of the telling: to experience this particular form. In this way self and other, individual and group, region and nation, one country [China] and another [for instance Japan
and Korea], develop and share the same mental processes even though they will differ in
their histories. (p. 29)
References
55
The combined influence of poetry, music and the rites has left an indelible mark
on the emotional landscape of the Chinese, which we will explore in the following
chapters.
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Chapter 4
On the Wings of Daoism
The Asocial Fish

Recall that the helper fish N. pulcher have two choices in niche selectionto stay
and pay or to disperse and breed independently (see Chap. 3). Bergmller and
Taborsky (2007) predicted and found that these options have significant but contrasting fitness consequences: Staying in the natal territory for a prolonged time
period correspond with a low inclination to be aggressive and to engage in risky
exploration, but a high tendency to engage in territory maintenance. In contrast,
dispersing early correspond to a high tendency to explore new habitats and to exhibit
territory defense, but a low inclination to maintain the natal territory.
The asocial fish that prefer the disperse-and-independent-breeding option may
be considered an animal model of Daoism. The philosopher who makes the greatest
contribution in shaping the way of thinking of the dispersers is Chuangzi, who is
known through the text that bears his name, which is a compendium of Daoist
writings dating back to the fourth century BC. Mair (1994) points out that the Chuang
Tzu is the earliest surviving Chinese text to present a philosophy for the individual.
The authors of the Tao Te Ching were interested in establishing some sort of Taoist
rule, while the authors of the Chuang Tzu opted out of society, or at least out of
power relationships within society (pp. xxviixxviii).
The Confucian ideals are embodied in the gentleman/mandarin; the Daoist ideals
the hermit. In contrast to the stayer fish, dispersers spend more time at the edge of
the territory, show little brood care and territory maintenance, but tend to be explorative (Bergmller & Taborsky, 2007). These personality traits of the fish sum up
in a nutshell the key attributes of the hermit.

59
60
4 Daoism
The Chinese Hermits

Hermits or recluses (yin-i ) have existed for millennia in China (Porter, 1993).
According to Mote (1960), one defining feature of Chinese eremitism is educated
individuals who refused to serve the state:
To bar ones gates and earn ones own living without reliance on the emolument of office,
to display a lack of regard for the social status which could be attained only by entering
officialdom, and to devote ones life to self-cultivation, scholarship or artistic pursuits made
one a recluse. (p. 203)
Due to the high esteem for hermits, many Chinese intellectuals were proud to add to
their names the comment lived as a recluse, and would not serve in office (p. 299).
In this protocol, the Chinese hermits share in common with the asocial fish the
following traits which will be examined in the following sections:
Refusal to serve.
Splitting rather than staying.
Breeding independently.
Refusal to Serve
According to Mote (1960), the keystone of Chinese eremitism (p. 204) lies in
refusal to take office. The distance to which one withdrew, the firmness with which
one barred the gate, and the seriousness with which one cultivated oneself (p. 203)
were not the deciding factors. It was the renunciation of office-holdingeither at
the outset or after a period of public lifethat defined the recluse (pp. 203204).
The Confucian gentlemen were supposed to serve the state. With its characteristic
apathy toward politics, Daoism becomes a major source of inspiration for the
Confucian gentlemen who decided to make a drastic career change. Chuangzi
famously preferred fishing to high status and political office. He asked what a turtle
would choose if offered the option of being nailed in a place of veneration and honor
in some place of worship or staying at the lake and dragging his tail in the mud
(Watson, 1964, p. 109). This radical career choice has far reaching ramifications for
the hermits.
Independence as fitness. In order to make it on their own without the security of
a salaried position in the government, the hermits need to have a relatively high
degree of autonomy and competence. In other words, they need skills to eke out a
living that is self-reliant and financially independent. Thus instead of scholars who
figure prominently in the Confucian texts, the Chuang Tzu finds inspiration in the
skilled performance of lowly occupations such as butchers, lute players, cicada
catchers, and wheelwrights.
Staying or Splitting
61
In addition to the practical needs for financial independence, the skilled execution
of virtuosity also serves for Chuangzi the model of a good life, in which superior
wisdom is acquired through experience and practice. Chuangzi was particularly
interested in the uniqueness of the individual performance which defies replication.
His attention to uniqueness contributes importantly to the Chinese notion of unique
individuality (Ames, 1991, p. 109), which is defined by Ames (1991) as the character of a single and unsubstitutable particular, such as a work of art (p. 108).
Whether to come forth and serve, or to retire in withdrawal, is not a fortuitous decision.
(Chao Meng-fu, 12541322) (Mote, 1960, p. 236)
Whereas the asocial fish cant tell us why they disperse rather than stay and pay,
the hermits have been articulate about their reasons for leaving society. According
to Mote (1960), social withdrawal as an alternative way of life gained importance
in times of disorder and impending doom, when thoughtful pessimism seemed
more attractive to educated men than the normal pattern of life (p. 205). This is
consistent with the Chinese belief that when things are under the sway of the Dao,
one endeavors to benefit oneself as well as the world; when the world is exhibiting
no evidence of the Dao, one retires to cultivate oneself alone (Porter, 1993). Thus,
the main reason behind voluntary withdrawal from active participation in public life
seems to be self-preservation in times of social upheaval, or circumstances that
threatened ones integrity and/or ones life. This sentiment behind eremitism is well
expressed by the Confucian scholar Liu Yin (124993), who lived as a hermit under
the rule of the Mongols:
When one is born in a degenerate and disorderly age
And there is no one worthy of being called a ruler, who would want to serve?
If one must drift and float like a cross-current in a measureless ocean,
Is it because one would have chosen to do so? (Mote, 1960, p. 225)
In Chinese history, when the intellectual climate and moral tone sank into pessimism and apathy during hard times, stayers consist of two groups of literatione
group would continue to serve the corrupt court, while another group would turn in
despair to various forms of escapism, such as indulgence in wine and sex. Eremitism
represents the third choice, which renounced both state service and extreme selfindulgence and chose some variety of withdrawal (Mote, 1960, p. 203). In contrast
to the first two groups which remained in society, the third choice entails the abandonment of the existing social order in search of a new habitat which is solitude.
Solitude as habitat selection. When solitude is sought as a particular life style, it
may be understood as an alternative habitat in lieu of society. The hermits choice
of solitude over society may be understood in light of the distinction between
civilization and genuine culture drawn by Edward Sapir (1956). Sapir claims that
genuine culture is reflected in the energy set free for the pursuit of the remoter
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4 Daoism
(noneconomic, nonutilitarian) ends, such as rituals, arts, and literature. He argues

that advanced civilization and genuine culture work at cross purposes. The more
advanced the civilization the more likely it is to have spurious culture, in which
group think, imitative, mindless practices loom large. Simpler civilizations, therefore, can be expected to be more congenial to genuine culture. Cast into Sapirs
framework, the Chinese hermits are individuals who chose solitude as an alternative
habitat to advanced civilization in which bureaucracy, power, and oppression hold
sway. Here Daoism shares with Confucianism the same distaste for inauthenticity
and the same interest in the pursuit of authenticity, characterized by a high degree
of integration between self and community. But the two differ in their methods.
Whereas Confucianism seeks solution in a building up process through perfecting
the rites, Daoism finds solution in going back to Nature, which entails a strip down
process that seeks to reduce civilization to the minimum.
The Daoist vision finds an eloquent articulation in the following passage of
Chuang Tzu:
Do you, sir, not know of the age of ultimate integrity? Long ago . the people knotted
ropes to keep records; they considered their food to be savory, their clothes to be beautiful,
their customs to be pleasurable, their dwellings to be secure. They could gaze across at the
neighboring state and hear the sounds of its dogs and chickens, but the people would never
travel back and forth till they died of old age. Such a time as this was one of ultimate government. (Mair, 1994, p. 88)
This Daoist vision of an ideal society is consistent with the findings of Oishi and
Kesebir (2012) that strong-ties-based communities do well in environments of low
mobility. It also finds support in the social brain hypothesis. According to Dunbar
(2014), the optimal group size is 150, characteristic of communities ranging from
small-scale societies to Facebook. His explanation is that communities of this size
strike a balance between the minimum size for effective functionality and the maximum size for creating a sense of commitment to the community (and, hence, willingness to compromise on self-interest) (p. 112).
However, whereas under the rule of the sage kings people in the mythical past
might not have traveled beyond the bounds of their villages, the attempt to regain
paradise lost through habitat selection necessarily entails high mobility.
Mobility and creativity. Mobility has been found to be associated with certain
personality traitsindependence or the frontier spirit, explorativeness, and creativity. Concerning independence, Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, and Ramaswamy
(2006) found greater independence in Hokkaido than in the rest of Japan, which is
a collectivistic culture that privileges interdependence. The authors attribute the
spirit of independence to the voluntary settlement of the population in Hokkaido.
Scholars are in general agreement that The central theme of the Chuang Tzu
may be summed up in a single word: Freedom (Watson, 1964, p. 3); more specifically, freedom from the world and its conventions (Mair, 1994, p. xliii). To
Chuangzi, low mobility and mental stagnation are intimately related such that mental emancipation requires venturing out of ones comfort zone in thinking. He makes
this point through a parable: You cant discuss the ocean with a well froghes
limited by the space he lives in . You cant discuss the Way with a cramped
63
scholarhes shackled by his doctrines (Watson, 1964, p 97). As an antidote for

mental stagnation, Chuangzi recommended mental excursions, the playfulness and
explorativeness of which is well captured by his notion of Wandering (you ). The
importance of wandering is driven home by Chuangzi through another parable
(Watson, 1964, p. 29): Hui Tzu, the logician who is the prototype of rigid thinking
in the Chuang Tzu, once smashed a huge gourd because it was uselesstoo heavy
for a water container and too large and unwieldy for dippers. Chuang Tzu suggested
to his friend the logician that he might have used the gourd as a great tub for floating
around on rivers and lakesan apt metaphor of Wandering (you) and exploration.
Wandering (you), in its literal sense, plays an important role in the lives of many
hermits. A case in point is the famous traveler and geographer X Xik (1587
1641). X was a scholar, who instead of taking the national examination for government service, dedicated his life to explorations of the Chinese landscape. He traveled
all year long, except for the winter when he stayed home to care for his mother.
From age 22 till his death, he spent over 30 years exploring the mountains and
streams all over China. When he hiked in the mountains, he would go without
cooked food for 7 or 8 days, live in the caves, and keep company with wild animals
(Han, 1998). He left behind extensive record of his travels, but for which many
beautiful mountains in China would have remained unknown to this day.
Another consequence of high mobility is weak ties (see Chap. 1). According to
research on social mobility (Oishi & Kesebir, 2012), strong ties do well under conditions of low mobility and high social stability, whereas weak ties high mobility
and low social stability. The connection between high mobility, weak ties, and novelty/creativity is found in the following parable of the Chuang Tzu:
In Sung there was a man who was skilled at making a salve to prevent chapped hands, and
generation after generation his family made a living by bleaching silk in water. A traveler
heard about the salve and offered to buy the prescription for a hundred measures of gold.
The man called everyone to a family council. For generations weve been bleaching silk
and weve never made more than a few measures of gold, he said. Now, if we sell our
secret, we can make a hundred measures in one morning. Lets let him have it! The traveler
got the salve and introduced it to the king of Wu, who was having trouble with the state of
Yeh. The king put the man in charge of his troops, and that winter they fought a naval battle
with the men of Yeh and gave them a bad beating. [Because the salve, by preventing the
solders hands from chapping, made it easier for them to handle their weapons.] A portion of
the conquered territory was awarded to the man as a fief. The salve had the power to prevent
chapped hands in either case; but one man used it to get a fief, while the other one never got
beyond silk bleachingbecause they used it in different ways. (Watson, 1964, pp. 2829)
This parable makes a vivid contrast between stayers and dispersers. The stayers,
as exemplified by the silk bleachers, moved within their clan (strong ties), were
invested in the maintenance of the trade (doing the same thing for generations), and
evinced no interest in novelty and innovations. By contrast, the disperser, as exemplified by the traveler who was just passing through as a stranger (weak ties), was
able to come up with novel ideas for the use of a device the maintenance of which
he made no contribution to.
The connection between eremitism and creativity is robust in Chinese history.
According to Han (1998), the hermits were pioneers in Chinese philosophy, scholarship, poetry, music, painting, the arts of tea, medicine, geography, health sciences,
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4 Daoism
and more. For instance, the founding fathers of Daoism are two famous hermits,
Laozi and Chuangzi. Many eminent poets and painters took hermitage in the mountains. Since creativity involves independent production of memes (novel ideas), it
may be considered the human counterpart of the fishs independent breeding.
Breeding Independently
Humans use solitude for a wide variety of reasons, such as relaxation, freedom from
social pressure, and so on (Averill & Sundararajan, 2014). But when it comes to the
more serious pursuit of solitude as a habitat selection, humans seem to approximate the
asocial fish which seeks a new habitat for one purpose onlybreeding independently
instead of taking care of the brood of the breeding pair. Similarly, independent production of memes, rather than maintenance of the reigning ideology, rank high on the priority of hermits. Indeed, many hermits are meme machines in the sense that they tend
to dedicate their lives to the production of high quality memes. For illustration, consider the following lines of the Tang hermit and one of the most influential theorists in
Chinese poetics, Si-Kong Tu (837908) (Chap. 9; Owen, 1992; Sundararajan, 2004):
Myriad problems in this world do not concern me,
The only thing that I am ashamed of is this:
Not to have poetry this fall. (Cited in Zhu, 1984, p. 13)
Here, the hermits concerns seemed to have made a drastic shift from things
worldly to a life dedicated to poetry, which is one of the most important memes in
Chinese society.
The fish analogy goes further. In order to defend their new territory, the disperser
fish tend to be more aggressive than the stayers. Likewise, when it comes to defending their own principles (memes), hermits are relatively more aggressive.
The heroic hermits. Hermits were willing to give up the comforts of society, the
financial security and social status procured by a career in public service, and much
more, for their memes/ideals. As Mote (1960) points out, bona fide hermits were
uncompromising men of principle, who saw in office-holding the chief threat to
their ethical principles, and whose refusal to serve was an expression of protest
against the ruler and his government. Some would refuse to serve even unto death.
A case in point is Jie Zhi-tui (600 BC). As one of the chief advisers of King Wen
Gong of Jing, Jie contributed much to the kings success in conquests. After the king
secured his power, Jie was disgusted with the strife for power and profits at the
court. He left without a notice and went into the deep mountains to become a hermit.
Not able to find Jie, the king set fire in the hope of forcing Jie to come outonly to
find Jies body in the mountain, burnt with the trees (Han, 1998).
Another principle for which the hermits are willing to defend at any cost is freedom to be oneself, especially in terms of emotional and spiritual integrity. Since
public service puts much demand on fitting in, refusal to manage ones emotional
expressions for the sake of fitting in constitutes one of the major reasons behind the
Dao as Oceanic Merging
65
hermits pursuit of solitude. As the hermit Guo Pu (276324) put it: Giving free
reign to my feelings lies in going it alone (Li, 1986, p. 251). The most famous
example of this trend is the poet Tao Yuanming (365427).
Tao was born of an official family, but managed to secure only minor positions
in the government. One day upon being told to dress up to receive an inspector sent
by his superior he quit, saying famously, How could I bow to the country bumpkins
for the sake of five bushels of rice! (Han, 1998, p. 24). Retiring to his home and
gardens while still in his early 1940s, he spent the rest of his life as a gentleman
farmer in the foothills of Lushan. He led a simple and contented life devoted to
poetry and wine, amidst abject poverty. A later recluse Chao Meng-fu (12541322)
wrote of his admiration for Tao Yuanming:
How readily he gave up his official position.
And bore poverty, dozing contentedly by his north window. (Mote, 1960, p. 237)
Social withdrawal is at best passive aggressiveness. The offensive type of aggressiveness is not prominent in Daoism, due to the Chinese penchant for transcendence. In comparison to the crowd-defying genius in the West, the hermits
approximate more closely the disperser fish that take off to new territories.
Transcendence names this counterpart tendency in the humans to open up new frontiers in mental space.
Dao as Oceanic Merging

Accordance to Bollas (2013), the West privileges heroism, whereas the East transcendence. In Daoism, transcendence entails moving up a notch in symmetry, via
consciousness, to open up a new frontier in conceptual space. This new frontier is
OM (Oceanic Merging) (see Chap. 1).
Bolender (2010) speculates that there could be a higher order of symmetry above
and beyond Communal Sharing which marks the highest order of symmetry in the
framework of Fiskes (1991) fourfold relational cognition (Chap. 1). Bolender
(2010) calls this relational cognition with ultra-symmetry Oceanic Merging
(p. 104) or OM for short. OM is defined as the perception of being united in love
with everything (p. 107). It is a maximally symmetric relational model (p. 106),
in which transformation would be totally unrestricted such that any transformation
whatsoever makes no informational difference. Otherwise put, no differentiation is
possible. And without differentiation, knowledge representation becomes impossiblethis takes us right to the realm of mysticism, where the real Dao transcends all
representations, in the words of Laozi: The Dao that can be put in words is not the
real Dao (adapted from Lynn, 1999, p. 51). Furthermore, the absence of differentiation means that even the minimum distinction in Communal Sharing between
in-group and out-group has to goeverything merges into an all-pervading sense of
oneness. Bolender (2010) claims that the OM experience is captured by Henry
Thoreaus Walden, which is a treatise on mystical communion with Nature.
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4 Daoism
Whereas Confucianism privileges Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking

(see Chap. 3), Daoism is modeled on the higher symmetry group of OM. In the following sections, I explore the ramifications of this ultra-symmetry in the Daoist
thinking.
Anti-hierarchy
In Confucianism, the Dao (Way) is a system of moral truths; in Daoism, it is Nature
in the most fundamental senseeternal, nameless, indescribable. The Confucian
Dao is embodied in the asymmetry of order and hierarchy; the Daoist Way, in the
highest order of symmetry that levels all order and hierarchy to a thoroughgoing
pluralismas Chuangzi puts it, the Dao resides in everything down to excrements.
Along with hierarchy goes orthodoxythe belief held by Confucius and other
thinkers that proper order would be achieved only when society follows a single,
true, Dao. Daoism has no use for orthodoxy. Mair (1994) is not exaggerating when
he writes that Master Chuang was the first great proponent of true diversity and
that he had the good sense to recognize that it could not be achieved through government fiat (p. xli).
The Confucian sage is one who speaks the authoritative voice of the truth that
cuts through the polyglot of half-truths. In stark contrast is the Daoist text Chuang
Tzu, which delights with fantasy conversations between multiple and equally valid
perspectives. Demonstrating open-mindedness and receptivity to all the different
voices of the Dao, particularly the voices of those who have run afoul of human
authority or seem least authoritative, these fantasy conversations take place among
a motley group of interlocutors ranging from crooked and foul-smelling trees, millipedes, convicts, physically deformed individuals, to musicians and the wind. And
the arguments tend to end with a reflective question (is it or isnt it ?) than a
strong conclusion (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/). In sum, denying
that the Cosmos is one world, Daoism rejects any privileged order, since at any
given time any one factor may take the highest place in a hierarchy of cause and
effect (Hall, 1978, p. 277).
Recall that Confucianism has two componentsAuthority Ranking and
Communal Sharing (see Chap. 3). Daoism seeks to demolish the former, but retain
and improve on the latter.
Alone, Together
To refresh our memories, symmetry (see Chap. 1) refers to the superposition of all
potentials, which can be understood in terms of quantum mechanics. For instance,
Schrdingers cat is both live and deadthis is a state of symmetry. The cat is in
either one or the other state but not both, after you take a peekthis is symmetry
Alone, Together
67
breaking. Thus, OM as the highest order of symmetry necessarily entails a superposition of multiple states. This opens up for Daoism the possibility of endorsing both
strong and weak ties at once, a possibility not available in the lower symmetry subgroups, where one ends up with either one or the other type of relationships, depending on whether one decides to stay (strong tiesnetworking among kith and kin) or
split (weak tiesnetworking with strangers). With OM it is now possible for hermits to be amphibianto stay and be away at the same time, for instance to be a
hermit in the market place (see Chap. 9 for details).
Spiritualizing strong ties. In endorsing strong ties, Daoism has also spiritualized
it. This consists of several important modifications. First, Daoism privileges the
only horizontal relationfriend to friendout of the five cardinal, predominantly
vertical, relations of the Confucian society (ruler and minister; father and son; husband and wife; elder and younger siblings; friend and friend). One of the most celebrated friendships in China is that between Y Po-ya and Chung Tzu-chi (Henry,
1987, pp. 910): Y Po-ya was a great official; Chung Tzu-chi a woodcutter.
Whether Chung Tzu-chi was a hermit or not, he represents many important motifs
in Daoism: (a) self-employment as woodcutter or fisherman is one of the few career
paths preferred by hermits; (b) equalitarianism, as evident in the leveling effect of
the friendship between the high official and a humble woodcutter; (c) weak ties in
which mobility and association between strangers play an important role. Let us
take a closer look at this celebrated friendship.
The two met by chance when the woodcutter recognized the musical talent in
Po-ya, who tried to amuse himself by playing the zither as his boat was moored
beneath a mountain in wilderness. They had but a single night to appreciate each
others skills before Po-ya must continue north to report to his superiors in court. A
year later, when Po-ya returned to the wilderness on the anniversary of the occasion,
his friend had died. After that Po-ya smashed his zither and played no more.
This story gives dramatic expression to many essential elements of mind-tomind transactions (see Chaps. 3 and 6). First, it underlines the importance of
between-mind mappings (McKeown, 2013; Chap. 6). It is said that when Po-ya
played the zither, Chung Tzu-chi the woodcutter could always tell from the sounds
what Po-ya was thinking of. Second, sharing of information, acquisition of knowledge, mastery and control of resources, be they objects or peoplenone of these
familiar themes of the Western epistemology loom large in the narrative landscape
under consideration. It is not epistemology but ontology that takes center stage here.
Why is it, asked the great historian Ssu-ma Chien, that Po Ya never again played
his zither after Chung Tzu-chi died? And he answered his own question: A gentleman acts on behalf of one who knows him, as a woman adorns herself for one
who delights in her. He goes on to say that the one thing without which it is
impossible to act is the presence of a knower (Henry, 1987, p. 12).
The second modification of strong ties by Daoism lies in the extension of
Communal Sharing beyond the blood ties and the in-group. This allows the hermits
to find their kith and kin in trees, rocks, mountains, and rivers (Rowley, 1959). More
important, this expansion of strong ties makes it possible for Daoism to advocate
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4 Daoism
universal altruism (Lee, Chen, & Chan, 2013) beyond the confines of reciprocity
and in-group favoritism. An altruism modeled on water that benefits all things
(Lee et al., 2013, p. 89) has remained a central aspiration in Daoism throughout history. Broadening the scope of Communal Sharing (Fiske, 1991), however, does not
necessarily entail diluting the interest in intimacy. If anything, the opposite is true
with Daoism.
The third modification of strong ties lies in a shift in the basis for intimacy from
paternal to maternal order. Bollas (2013) claims that the mother and infant relationship is the basis for maternal order. In contrast to the rank and hierarchy characteristic of the paternal order, maternal order is a maternal world based on fusion
between self and other, empathic attunement rather than speech, and form-language
rather than linguistic discourse as a means of being-together (p. 73). A case in
point is the chance meeting at night between Y Po-ya and Chung Tzu-chi (Henry,
1987, pp. 910). Their (nonverbal) communication took place in the enshrouding
darkness of the night that concealed all differences in social status between the government official and the woodcutter, thereby bringing to the fore their resonating
affinities in music appreciation.
Creativity and Society, a Dialectic Relationship

The hermits bring to light a dialectic relationship between creativity and society.
The creative individuals tend to be asocial in the sense of being relatively less compromising, on the one hand; yet on the other, they also make greater contributions
to the group than those who are content with perpetuating the conventional memes.
This point is brought home by the sexual selection hypothesis of creativity.
The sexual selection hypothesis of creativity. The sexual selection hypothesis
claims that the competitive mating game contributes to society by functioning as
selection pressure for cognition, more specifically relational cognition (McKeown,
2013). A case in point is the development of communication skills. To the extent
that competition for resources is as important as bonding with intimate others in
group living, human communication will have to serve Machiavellian as well as
affiliative purposes. Along the divide between social bonding and competition,
McKeown (2013) makes a distinction between alignment and display goals in
human communication. Whereas personal display can be self-serving and manipulative, alignment goals in communication are not. Dunbar (1996) points out that the
affiliative, social bonding puts a premium on alignment-related activities such as
intimacy, empathy, self-disclosure, and so on with correspondingly little emphasis
on personal display. But this neat distinction no longer holds when it comes to creativity. For instance in artistic creativity, alignment skills, originally serving the
affiliative bonding purposes, get coopted to serve display goals in competition for
social status and a quality mate. Competition for mate in turn drives the evolution of
the alignment skills.
Creativity and Society, a Dialectic Relationship
69
Intense competition of the mating game tends to drive displays to ever costly and
hard to fake signals of mate quality. This explains why ready-made displays such as
conventional expressions are avoided in art in favor of displays that are fast, novel,
spontaneous, and contextualin other words, hard to fake (McKeown, 2013). This,
according to the sexual selection hypothesis, is how competition for mates via display of artistic creativity becomes the driving force behind the evolution of social
bonding and alignment skills. If we broaden the notion of mate selection to include
partners in social networks, we can apply the sexual selection hypothesis to an analysis of the hermits contributions to society.
Consider the anecdote of carpenter Shih as recounted by Chuangzi (Mair, 1994,
p. 244): Master Chuang was accompanying a funeral when he passed by the grave
of Master Hui. He told his attendants a story:
There was a man from Ying who sent for carpenter Shih to slice off a speck of plaster like a
flys wing that had splattered the tip of his nose. Carpenter Shih whirled his ax so fast that it
produced a wind. Letting the ax fall instinctively, he sliced off every last bit of the plaster but
left the nose unharmed, while the man from Ying stood there without flinching. When Lord
Yan of Sung heard about this, he asked the same to be done for him. Sorry, your servant
used to do that kind of thing, said carpenter Shih, but my chopping block died long ago.
Then Chuangzi gave the punch line of his story: Since your death, Master Hui,
I have had no one who can be my chopping block, I have had no one with whom
to talk. (adapted from Mair, 1994, p. 244)
Chuangzis personal narrative is a story of intimacyan intimacy punctuated
by loneliness and nostalgia, characteristic of the mixed modes of strong and weak
ties that constitute the warp and the weft of a hermits life. The talk between
Master Chuang and his friend Huizi the logician, as recorded numerous times in
the Chuang Tzu, is riddled with differences of opinions as if the two thinkers simply could not see each other eye to eye. Attesting to the Daoist openness to diversity and tolerance of differences, there is yet another, completely different
conversation between the two at the nonverbal level that is marked by a high degree
of intimacy as exemplified by the story of carpenter Shih. Yet, perfect communion
with another person tends to be fleeting moments that reside mostly in nostalgia
(see Chap. 9), rather than in the everyday reality where the hermit finds himself
alone, having no one with whom to talk.
The story within Chuangzis storythe anecdote of carpenter Shihis pertinent
to the sexual selection hypothesis of creativity. The virtuosity of carpenter Shih
consists of mastering a full range of alignment skills. First, his skillful use of the ax
entails within-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013), a perfect coordination in body,
mind, and action. This type of skilled performance is much celebrated in Daoism as
What he achieves in his heart is made known by his hand (Fu Tsai cited in Chang,
1970, p. 207). Second, it entails between-mind mapping, as evidenced by the perfect
trust and communion between carpenter Shih and his partnera state of intimacy
that approximates the bond between the infant and mother. But these alignment
skills were coopted for display purposes.
70
4 Daoism
The skill and virtuosity of carpenter Shih in whirling his ax without hurting his
partners nose was used as a personal display for multiple purposes: First, to gain
social status by impressing his audience; second, to celebrate and advertise the superb
alignment skills with a partner; third, to snub the admiring authority, Lord Yan of
Sung, as an unfit partner. Consistent with the sexual selection hypothesis of creativity
(McKeown, 2013), this story is a tapestry of two interwoven motifs in Daoismthe
asocial tendencies of the hermit, on the one hand; and their contribution to the depth
and scope of the alignment, or mind-to-mind transaction, skills, on the other.
The Legacy of Daoism

According to Triandis (1996), every culture has both individualism and collectivism,
along with their corollaries of independence versus interdependence. If we look at
cultures as chronic primes for behavior, Confucianism seems to be a system that
primes interdependent behaviors. Indeed, Confucian aspirations fit the description of
the interdependent-behavior prime, according to Hamedani, Markus, and Fu (2013):
flexible, receptive to other people, and skilled at working with others (p. 191). The
Daoist hermits, by contrast, excel in behaviors that fit the description of independent-behavior prime: in control, self-reliant, and skilled at working on her own
(p. 191). In light of the ultra-symmetry framework of the Dao (see Chap. 1), the
opposing claims of both independence (solitude) and interdependence (receptivity to
and cooperation with others) can be expected to coexist in Daoism.
The independence strand of Daoism offers a more salutary version of individualism without compromising the latters well-documented connection with creativity.
As Goncalo and Krause (2010) point out, individualism may reflect either independence or competition, the two elements which are theoretically and empirically distinct. The Daoist version of individualism capitalizes on need for uniqueness (Joy,
2004), and transcendence, thereby avoiding the many pitfallssuch as egocentrism,
hostility, and related health consequences (Simonton, 1999)of the Western brand
of individualism that capitalizes on competition.
The interdependence strand of Daoism would have blended in nicely with
Confucianism, except that it is a radical interdependence in which the fusion of oneness has obliterated all distinctions including social hierarchy. The Daoist version of
nonhierarchical interdependence has relevance for modern management that privileges decentralization, flat structure, and employee discretion. A far more important
contribution of the Daoist version of interdependence lies in its ecological vision
(Sessions, 1995), which finds an eloquent expression in Bollas (2013): An awareness, originating thousands of years ago, that unless human nature recognizes its
place in the natural worldnot over it, but in itthen human nature will destroy the
earth (p. 105). This has direct implications for creativity.
The ecology of creativity. The Chinese eremitism reminds us of the ecological
wisdom, deeply rooted in Daoism, that the potential for creativity in any civilization
may lie in its ability to make room for wilderness. Wilderness can be understood in
The Legacy of Daoism
71
a twofold senseas the undomesticated species and as the man-less expanse needed
for the survival of the undomesticated species. The first sense of wilderness refers
to the asocial fish in search of a new niche, or the unconventional individuals in need
of solitude. The second sense of wilderness is embodied in the ecological insight
best expressed by Paul Errington (1967): For every living creature [including
humans!], there are places where it does not belong (p. 251). Errington goes on to
say: I believe it is a public responsibility to safeguard what we can of wilderness
before the great push of mans numbers; and to safeguard with it the shy wild
ones that need man-less expanses in which to thrive (p. 262).
All these potential contributions of Daoism are underutilized so far.
Underutilization of Daoism may have to do with the charges of escapism that
Daoism in general, and hermits in particular, have to endure throughout history.
This is understandable. From the stayers point of view, those who do not pull their
weight in the maintenance of the status quo are morally suspect. Tolerance for eremitism varies in Chinese history. According to Mote (1960), eremitism fared better
with the tender-minded (p. 207) strand of Confucianism. Hermits were one of the
endangered groups that Confucius advocated for in his political vision that consists
of rebuilding the vanquished state; reviving the extinct tradition; and promoting
the recluse (Han, 1998, p. 7, emphasis added). But the touch-minded strand of
official Confucianism under the influence of the Legalists thought otherwise.
According to Mote (1960), legalism in its insistence on the importance of ruler and
state left little room for a man to maintain any private and personal moral standards
that might under any circumstances conflict with the primary duty of serving the
ruler (p. 207). In the language of the fish: No independent breeding allowed; all
helper fish must take care of the brood of the reigning pair. Thus, some Legalist
writers considered the hermit ungovernable, disloyal, and even guilty of a
crime meriting death (p. 207).
It may not be a coincidence that the times when eremitism flourished were Tang
and Song dynasties when Chinese civilization was at its zenith; and conversely that
the decrease in tolerance toward hermits was evinced in the last three dynasties
beginning with the Mongol rulers, when imperial China was on the decline. The
most intolerant period for the hermits was the China under the last majority Han
ruler before the Manchus took overnamely the Ming dynasty, during which time
refusal to take office was a punishable crime. Might it not be that a societys tolerance for the shy wild ones (Errington, 1967, p. 262 ) is in direct proportion to its
capacity for opening up new frontiers in thought?
Maybe we can learn a thing or two from the fish. You can divide the mosquito fish
into two personality typessocial and asocial (Bergmller & Taborsky, 2007). The
asocial fish flee the crowds and move readily into open habitat, when a population
builds up. And they keep drifting on from one frontier to the next without building up
big numbers in one place. According to a Science News report (Milius, 2012), a
healthy mix of the social and asocial fish is essential to optimal functioning of the fish
society. For instance, when the social fish numbers build up and some of them spill
over, they will find the new frontier already opened up by the asocial fish. Researchers
also found that a social mosquito fish that hangs out with the asocial ones may have
better access to food than a social fish that travels with the social ones.
72
4 Daoism
References
Ames, R. T. (1991). Reflections on the Confucian self: A response to Fingarette. In M. I. Bockover
(Ed.), Rules, rituals, and responsibility (pp. 103114). La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Averill, J. R., & Sundararajan, L. (2014). Experiences of solitude: Issues of assessment, theory, and
culture. In R. J. Coplan & J. C. Bowker (Eds.), The handbook of solitude: Psychological perspectives on social isolation, social withdrawal, and being alone (pp. 90110). Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
Bergmller, R., & Taborsky, M. (2007). Adaptive behavioural syndromes due to strategic niche specialization. BMC Ecology, 7, 12. Retrieved from http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6785/7/12
Chang, C.-Y. (1970). Creativity and Taoism. New York: Harper & Row.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. London: Faber and
Faber.
Errington, P. L. (1967). Of predation and life. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press.
Goncalo, J. A., & Krause, V. (2010). Being different or being better? Disentangling the effects of
independence and competition on group creativity. In S. R. Thye & E. J. Lawler (Eds.),
Advances in group processes (Vol. 27, pp. 129157). Bingley, England: Emerald.
28, 271285.
Hamedani, M. G., Markus, H. R., & Fu, A. S. (2013). In the land of the free, interdependent action
undermines motivation. Psychological Science, 24, 189196.
Han, Z. Q. (1998). Hermits in ancient China (in Chinese). Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Shang Wu.
Henry, E. (1987). The motif of recognition in early China. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,
47(1), 530.
Joy, S. (2004). Innovation motivation: The need to be different. Creativity Research Journal, 16,
313330.
Kitayama, S., Ishii, K., Imada, T., Takemura, K., & Ramaswamy, J. (2006). Voluntary settlement
and the spirit of independence: Evidence from Japans Northern frontier. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 369384.
Lee, Y. T., Chen, W., & Chan, S. X. (2013). Daoism and altruism: A ChinaUSA perspective. In
D. A. Vakoch (Ed.), Altruism in cross-cultural perspective (pp. 85100). New York: Springer.
Li, F. M. (1986). The Taoist tales of the six and the Sui and Tang dynasties (in Chinese). Taipei,
Taiwan: Xue Seng Shu Ju.
Lynn, R. J. (1999). The classic of the way and virtue. New York: Columbia University Press.
267287.
Milius, S. (2012, April 21). Mixed results: Having the right blend of animal personalities can make
or break a group. Science News, 2429.
Mote, F. W. (1960). Confucian eremitism in the Yan period. In A. F. Wright (Ed.), The Confucian
persuasion (pp. 202240). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Oishi, S., & Kesebir, S. (2012). Optimal social-networking strategy is a function of socioeconomic
conditions. Psychological Science, 23, 15421548.
Press.
Porter, B. (1993). Road to heaven: Encounters with Chinese hermits. Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint.
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Sapir, E. (1956). Culture, genuine and spurious. In D. G. Mandelbaum & E. Sapir (Ed.), Culture,
language and personality (pp. 78119). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Original
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Sessions, G. (1995). Deep ecology and the new age movement. In G. Sessions (Ed.), Deep ecology
for the 21st century (pp. 290310). Boston: Shambhala.
Simonton, D. K. (1999). Origins of genius: Darwinian perspective on creativity. Oxford, England:
Oxford University Press.
Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. American
Watson, B. (1964). Chuang Tzu: Basic writings. New York: Columbia University Press.
Zhu, B. Q. (1984). The poetics of Si-Kong Tu (in Chinese). Shanghai, China: Gu Ji.
Online Resource
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/
Part II
Tracing Emotions Daintily Through

Things Psychologically Chinese
Shih (lyric poetry) traces emotions daintily.

(Lu Chi in Fang, 1951, p. 12)
Having delineated the conceptual spaces carved out by ancient Chinese thought in
the previous chapters, this section fills in some details of the Chinese emotional life
that inhabits these conceptual spaces. The following four chapters will cover empathy-based emotions, resonance-based emotions, freedom-based emotions, and
indulgence/gratitude-based emotions, respectively. These are general contours of
the emotional landscape, in which can be found a wide spectrum of emotional
states, but none of the blue ribbon emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, etc.) or the
so-called basic emotions receive special treatment here. I have spelled out the reasons for my approach to emotions in Chap. 12. For now, it suffices to say that I
believe that researchers of Chinese emotions do well to emulate the poet Lu Ji
(261303), who attempts to trace the phenomena with a gentle paintbrush, rather
than to nail discrete emotions down, if there is such a thing, with codified labels and
categorizations.
Reference
Fang, A. (1951). Rhymeprose on literature: The Wen-fu of Lu Chi (A.D. 261-303). Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies, 14, 527566.
Chapter 5
Heart-Aching Love (Teng, )
Love, Bitter and Sweet

Loving him, mad at him, and yet heart-aching (teng) for him, Xiao Geng gazed attentively, with
deep feelings (qing), at her husband who was waxing eloquent on the podium. (
,,,) (CCL Corpus, 2009)
In the above quote, the wifes love for her husband comes in many distinct avors, resulting in a nuanced (Sundararajan, 2002)not mixedemotional state.
There is the widely accepted notion that Asians have a proclivity for mixed, otherwise known as ambivalent, emotional states, due to their subscription to the dialectics that allow for the simultaneous experience of positive and negative emotions
(Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010). The
problem with this formulation is that emotion is treated by the researchers as a
blending system, when it is in fact a particulate system (Abler, 1989). An example
of the blending system is color such that gray results from mixing black and white
(see Chap. 2, Fig. 2.1). But emotions operate as a particulate system such that blends
of feeling states do not necessarily become one monochromatic emotional state,
called ambivalent or mixed feelings. For many people, emotional blends are nuanced
experiences with a richness and complexity that cannot be found in the simple structure of ambivalence or mixed feelings.
A good example of nuanced emotional blends is heart-aching love (xin-teng
or teng for short). How far are the Chinese in command of these complex
feelings of love? Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) found that 70 % of the Chinese
mothers of 30- to 35-month-olds claimed that their children could understand the
term heart-aching love (xin-teng) rendered sorrow/love (p. 199) by the authors.
How the emotions embodied by the term teng govern the lives of the Chinese from
the cradle to the grave is the focus of this chapter. In the following analysis, all the
passages in Chinese are retrieved from the CCL Corpus (2009).

77
78
5 Heart-Aching Love
The term teng has two expressions:

Teng1, used as an intransitive verb, means be in pain/ache/hurt. This is the
predominant usage found through the dataset.
Teng2, used as a transitive verb, means to dote on/love. There are not many
examplesfar less than xing-teng (heart-aching). This is expected because teng
in this sense is restricted to very specic and special relationshipfrom parents
to children or grandparents to children. In the case of X teng Y, other types of
relationship are generally not permissible (the only exception is couple/spouse
relationship).
In either form, teng almost always implies deep love.
Wow, dont tell me you are hurting inside (xin-teng)? I see . You love her so deeply.
(,? )
Teng can be explored in three interrelated frameworkstender feelings in intimate relations, empathy toward others, and innate vulnerability to others.
Tender love: There is some overlap and afnity between teng and feelings of
tenderness. This is evident in the dictionary denition of xin-tengheart-aching
love; cannot bear; cherish (: ; ;)suggesting the connotations of attachment to and cherishment of something precious and fragile.
The tenderness connection is consistent with the nding of a study by Shaver,
Schwartz, Kirson, and OConnor (1987), who categorized a sub-cluster of love as
tenderness which was associated with emotions such as love, adoration, fondness,
attraction, caring, and compassion. This association of terms that converge on tenderness can be understood in the framework of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969),
according to which the caregiving behavioral system is sensitive to and can be triggered by signs of vulnerability. One of the signs of vulnerability is appearance of
innocence and need (as exemplied by babyish features such as big head combined with small body and large Bambi-like eyes, etc.). It is these signs of vulnerability and defenselessness that trigger the tender feelings.
The tender feelings can be sexually arousing:
Lin Jiaozi pulled the woman into his arms. She started to shake in his arms, which made
him feel this heart-aching love for her. The more his heart ached for her, the more she
moaned and groaned, and the more ecstatic Lin Jiaozi became. (,
, , ,
, )
The erotic component of tender love nds an eloquent expression in Levinas

(1969): Being moved is a pity that is complacent, a pleasure, a suffering transformed into happinessvoluptuosity (p. 259).
But teng goes much deeper than the tender feelings triggered by signs of vulnerability. Thus while tender feelings do not mix well with anger, heart-aching love can
coexist with the latter, resulting in novel emotional blends:
Filled with both heart-aching love and anger, he slammed the door loudly when he returned
to the car. (, .)
Love, Bitter and Sweet
79
In order for the transient tender feelings to become the deeper, more enduring
emotions entailed in teng, the caregiving behavioral system has to be activatednot
partially triggered by signs of vulnerability but fully activated by a deep love.
Teng and the caregiving behavior system: Teng reects the importance of lial
bonds in the Chinese culture, in particular the parents emotional experience towards
their esh and blood. A few examples shall sufce:
In the whole wide world, the person whose heart aches the most for me is no more. (
). (This expression usually refers to mothers passing.)
The child is the esh on the mothers heart. Is there a mother whose heart does not ache
for her own child? (, ?)
A tting explanatory framework for this phenomenon is attachment theory

(Bowlby, 1969), which concerns the bond between the child and the caregiver. The
Chinese version of the attachment theory situates heart-aching love at the very core
of this bond:
Mammals in general have the instinct to have heart-aching love for their offspring. When
the cow gives birth to a calf, it cannot bear to be separated from its young even by one step. (
,
)
The mother monkey has much heart-aching love for its young, always holding the baby
monkey in its arms. (, )
Cast in the framework of attachment theory, teng is an aspect of what Bowlby

calls the caregiving behavioral system. According to Bowlby (1969), the function of
the infants bond with the mother is to promote safety. In this capacity, the ideal
attachment gure should have lowered threshold for perturbation. Lowered threshold for perturbation can be inferred from sympathic sensitivity and responsiveness
to not only detect but also anticipate stress in the child, thereby conferring timely
relief, as well as keeping the fear system of the child deactivated to provide a sense
of safety and protection. In China the ideal attachment gures vigilance and commitment to protection is manifest as worry.
Meng Wubo asked about lial piety. Confucius said, Parents are anxious lest
their children should be sick (Confucian Analects, 1971, 2/6, p. 148). According to
another rendition of the text, the Master replied, Give your mother and father nothing to worry about beyond your physical well-being (Ames & Rosemont, 1998,
p. 77). Either version bespeaks of the anxiety prone caretaker. Consistent with this
observation is the nding of Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, and Morelli (2000)
that Japanese parents prefer to anticipate their infants needs, and take anticipatory
measures to minimize the stress.
Phenomenologically, the structure of heart-aching love (teng) has three componentsstimulus-bound triggers (perception of vulnerability), painful affect
(empathic pain marked by stress and anxiety over the well-being of those incapable
of fending for themselves) (Sundararajan, 2014), and caregiving response. This
structure is rendered visible by a linguistic analysis of teng in the following section,
written by the coauthor of this chapter, Ye Zhengdao who is a linguistic scholar.
80
5 Heart-Aching Love
A Linguistic Analysis of Teng

The following citations are taken from Dreams of the Red Chamber (Cao & Gao, 1998):
(a) Our young lady was brought here for a few years while she was still only a
child, because the old lady felt for [teng] her and didnt think her uncles could
take the place of her parents (p. 781).
(b) Thanks to the Lady Dowagers partiality, Chin Chung often stayed for a few
days with the Chia family. Indeed, she treated him like one of her own grandsons, giving him clothes, shoes, and other necessities when she saw that this
family was hard up (p. 133).
The above examples suggest that teng is a tender-hearted love that ows in a
trajectory from elders to their young, sometimes without the awareness of the latter.
The love is unconditional. In the eyes of the elder family members, their loved ones
are small, weak, and vulnerable; incapable of taking care of themselves. The elders
take special care to protect the young, lest bad things happen to them. Shown in
example (a) is that the grandmother made special arrangements to have her granddaughter live with her after her mother (i.e., grandmothers daughter) died. In example (b), the grandmother took Qin Chung under her wings, treating him like her own
grandchild and providing him with material sufciency.
The pity felt towards the other being small and weak, the constant worry and
concern for them being susceptible to hunger, coldness, or hurt from the outside
world constitutes the source of the pain. This pain prompts the experiencer to do
something all the time to make sure that the other is well taken care of, and this pain
may be soothed momentarily by care. It cannot be soothed forever, however. The
love is endless, the worry is endless. In the view of the experiencers, they can never
do enough for their young, and they cannot do it once and for all. This is a vicious
circle that pains the experiencers. Teng is a heavy-hearted affection shown through
protection and caring. In simple and universal concepts, the full meaning of teng can
be explicated as follows:
someone X tng someone Y
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
someone X thinks like this at this time about someone Y:

this someone is like a part of me
this someone cannot do much
because of this, many bad things can happen to this someone at any time
I dont want bad things to happen to this someone
I want to do many good things for this someone all the time because of this
if I do these things, maybe bad things will not happen to this someone
because of this, this someone feels something at this time like someone can feel
when this someone thinks like this
(i) because of this, this someone does many good things for someone Y all the time
The cognitive structure of teng turns out to be quite complex. Components (b)
(this someone is like part of me) and (c) (this someone cant do much) seek to
reect the parentchild relationshipthe prototypical relationship associated with
Xin-teng in the Everyday
81
teng. In particular, (c) reects the inability of the other to take care of themselves in
the eyes of the experiencer. Component (d) (because of this, bad things can happen
to this someone at any time) captures the consequent concern of the experience
that the other is vulnerable. The good wish to protect and care for the child is shown
in components (e)(f) (I dont want bad things to happen to this someone; I want
to do many good things for this someone all the time because of this). One may not
be able to protect their young all the time, thus component (g)if I do this, maybe
bad things will not happen to this person. This maybe may well be the constant
source of pain. Component (i) (because of this, this someone does many good
things for someone Y all the time) shows that the wish is realized through constant
care of the other person.
So much for the pity-pain-protection structure of heart-aching love. Now we
proceed to examine its unique properties through everyday usage.

Teng as doting. Teng has a connotation of doting, an indulgent tendency to yield to
the impulses of love when they speak louder than reason. Examples are parents
feeding into every demand of the child:
Some parents consider heart-aching love as granting every wish of the child (
)
Industries seem to be taking advantage of this tendency of the parents:

There wont be any shortage of audience. There are more than two trillion children in
Chinathey all love movies. All parents have heart-aching love for their only child; who
would begrudge spending some money to let the child have a good time in the movie theater? (, , , ,
, .)
There are parents, especially mothers, who take their children out of school or
sports training, because they cannot bear to see the child going through the hardships of rigorous training. Critics consider this irrational:
The teacher said with a sigh: This type of heart-aching love is going too far! (
: , !)
But a Chinese proverb comes to the parents defenseEverybodys heart aches

when it comes to their own child. (: .)
To the extent that love has its follies, teng may have its excesses. Of all the
excess that parental love is capable of, teng is relatively benign, in comparison to,
for instance, the following episode about the internationally acclaimed pianist Lang
Lang, who was forced to play piano since childhood:
One day, Lang Langs father went out for some errands, and came back to nd his son playing with other kids when he was supposed to be practicing. He immediately grabbed a
bottle of poison and said, If you dont want to practice, you drink half, I drink half. Your
mom can die with us too. This bottle of poison continued to sit on top of the piano. (Kuan,
2011, p. 89)
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5 Heart-Aching Love
What is missing from this fathers love is teng, the soft spot in most parents that
constraints them from using excess force in the name of love.
Capitalizing on perceptual cues of suffering. Heart-aching love tends to be a
painful feeling triggered by perceptual cues of the suffering intimate other.
Seeing their hardships and feeling the heart felt pain (teng) for them, their children, who
worked in the city, pleaded repeatedly for them to move to the city, but the elderly couple
would not budge. (, ,
, .)
In this episode, the heartfelt pain was triggered by seeing that capitalizes on
the perceptual cues, rather than appraisals of suffering at the conceptual level.
Teng is also a mental pain that carries an action impulse, which is evident in the
following episode of heart-aching love triggered by sound, not sight, of the beloved:
His daughter called. The minute she greeted him, he was lled with such a heart-aching
love that he wished he could y to her instantly. (,
.)
The action impulse of heart-aching love has its roots in the caregiving system of
attachment, in which pain is a signal that prompts one to take immediate action to
care or protect.
Sometimes Xu Yanru was so tired that she fell asleep on the desk involuntarily. With a heartaching for her, her sister usually let her sleep for 10 minutes before waking her up. (
, 10,
.)
The perceptual cues are evident in the above scenario, although the term seeing is omitted as the story line hurries to underscore the intimate connection
between teng and the protective and caring action.
The seeing and empathic pain connection is found again in the following scenario, where the action impulse did not materialize in any specic response, but
instead interfered with the current action programstudying, which was discontinued by the protagonist, because he could not bear any more to see the continual
suffering of his parents.
His parents are starving themselves to feed the children. Seeing it all, Jiang Wei felt the pain
inside (his heart). Seeing his parents getting thinner by the day, he could not bear any more
to continue his studies. (, , ,
, , .)
One more example of the intimate connection between seeing and feeling
(the sadness) will sufce to make a mental note of the importance of perceptual cues
in teng, to be elaborated later:
Seeing that her husband took such painstaking care of her, Bao Junqings heart ached so
much that she cried numerous times. (,
.)
Heart-aching love is implicit: There are no known facial expressions of teng,

possibly because such feelings are kept private. Along the distinction, made by the
83
Chinese between inner/private and outer/public (see Chap. 3), teng always falls on
the inner/private side in contrast to facial expressions that can be shown publicly:
Father and mother showed happiness in their faces, but felt the pain [for the child] inside.
(, .)
The hidden pain is like the bitterness of chocolate that adds to the richness and
complexity of positive responses evoked by the success of the belovedpleased on
the one hand, empathic pain for the hardship the beloved endured, on the other. Here
is another example:
Promptly every month, Xiaoli Guniang gave all the money she earned from hard labor to
her mother. Her mothers heart ached for her on the one hand, and proud for her on the
other. (, )
Teng as a component of filial piety: To the extent that reciprocity lies at the very
core of lial piety, parents heart-aching love can be reciprocated by adult
children.
In the past mother had heart-aching love for the child; now child has lial piety for mother.
(, .)
Daughter loves mother; mothers heart aches for daughter. (,
.)
Their hearts ached for the elderly couple, such that they came on their pass-days to cook
a weeks supply of food for them. (,
.)
In most families, mother cajoles daughter, and gives her tender loving care (teng). In my
house, its the daughter who cajoles the mother and gives tender loving care (teng) to the
mother. (, .)
In childrens upbringing, empathic pain becomes the path to social mindfulness

(Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange, 2013; see also Chap. 3) such as being
considerate to others.
Being the oldest child, Hui Fang knows how to have a heart that aches for others ever since
she is little. She never demands anything from her mother. (,
, .)
If children dont follow this path of empathy, they can be called on it:
I have to be running around to do everything for you. Dont you have a heart (that aches) for
your mothers old bones? (, ?)
Thus children learn to anticipate the heartache parents go through on their behalf:
They all hurried away and hid. When asked why, they said, I dont want my mother to see
this and feel pain-stricken [teng]. (, , :
.)
This harkens all the way back to the denition of lial piety by Confucius: Give
your mother and father nothing to worry about beyond your physical well-being
(Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 77). In sum, it is not an exaggeration to say that heartaching love is the foundation for the relational version of lial piety, in contrast to
84
5 Heart-Aching Love
the authoritarian version of the same (Chap. 3). Whereas intimate relationships are
the breeding ground of teng, the implications of teng have extended beyond the
in-group to empathy for all, thanks to the philosophy of Mencius.
Heartaching Love and Empathy

The Chinese notion of empathy may be considered an extension of teng, with some
modicationthe tender love component is dropped, while the pity-pain-protection
connection is kept intact. In particular, the two components of teng as a caregiving
behavioral systemempathic pain and action impulse toward care and protection
play important roles in empathy.
Empathic pain capitalizes on the intimate connection between perceptual cues of
suffering and a felt pain:
Upon seeing his ghastly hands that were tortured by the gasoline, comrades all shed tears
out of a heart felt pain [xin-teng] .
( , )
In most cases, altruistic action follows on the heels of empathic pain.

A bird fell under her feet. Huang Zongying saw that its wings were covered with blood.
With a heartfelt pain [xin-teng], she held it in her hands and took it home. (
, , .)
Empathic pain constitutes the foundation of Confucian ethics. According to

Mencius (371289 BC), what makes us human is the heart-mind (xin), the hallmark of which he attributes to an inability to bear the suffering of others: all men
have the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others (Chan, 1963, p. 65).
The unbearing mindor in plain English, cant stand it in seeing the suffering of
othersmay be considered as an extension of teng from the in-group to the
out-group.
As Fung Yu-lan points out that what Mencius called the feeling of commiseration or the unbearing mind (bu ren zhi xin ) is simply an expression of
this [organismic] connection between ourselves and other things. (1966, p. 283).
Since, as Wang Yang-ming (14721529) points out, we form one body with all
things (Tu, 1984, p. 385), our sympathy can extend very far indeed:
We become fellow members of the animal kingdom because of our inability to bear the
pitiful cries and frightened appearance of birds and animals about to be slaughtered; we
become part of the living world because of a feeling of pity for the destruction of forest and
vegetation; and we become organismically harmonized with the whole ecological system
because of a feeling of regret when we see tiles and stones shattered and crushed.
(Tu, 1984, p. 386)
In this extension of kinship from the similar other (kith and kin) to the dissimilar
other (tiles and stones), the moral impulse gains a wider scope of application while
its instinctual drivenness is kept intact.
The Unbearing Mind and Cognitive Appraisal
85
There is increasing evidence that from an early age, humans seem to have
genuine concern for others. Using pupil dilation, Tomasello and colleagues found
that 2-year-old children showed intrinsic motivation both when they helped a person as well as when they saw the latter being helped by someone else (Hepach,
Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). It is in the same vein that Mencius proposed his famous
thought experiment. Consider the scenario, he says, of rescuing a child about to fall
into a well: Now, when men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all
have a feeling of alarm and distress . (Chan, 1963, p. 65, emphasis added). In
this hypothetical scenario, the child belongs to the out-group, unrelated to the rescuer, whose unbearing mind, once triggered by perceptual cues (seeing), automatically carries out the action impulse of altruism. Mencius further points out that this
altruistic action is not to be contaminated by deliberations of personal concerns:
not to gain friendship with the childs parents, nor to seek the praise of their
neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity
if they did not rescue the child] (Chan, 1963, p. 65). To shed some light on these
stipulations of Mencius, we turn to theories of cognitive appraisal.
The Unbearing Mind and Cognitive Appraisal

An analysis of the unbearing mind may start with the appraisal theory of Magda
Arnold (1960), who made an important distinction between two kinds of appraisal
primary and secondarya distinction which falls along the divide between system 1 and system 2 thinking (Stanovich & West, 2000; Chap. 1). Primary appraisal
is referred to by Arnold (1960) as appraisal direct, immediate, intuitive, which is
not the result of reection (p. 172). Secondary appraisal, in contrast, is a reective judgment that takes place only as a secondary evaluation (p. 175). For illustration, she gives the following example:
When the outelder judges a y ball, he simply senses where he is going and where the
ball is going and gauges his movements so that he will meet the ball. If he stopped to reect,
he would never stay in the game. (p. 175)
Paraphrasing Arnold, Mencius seems to be saying that it is better not to stop and
reect, if you wish to run with the ball when the unbearing mind kicks in. Thus the
agenda of Mencius for the unbearing mind is to privilege the simple and basic
appraisals of valence over the more complex cognitive processing. The radicalness
of Menciuss agenda becomes clear, if we factor in the neuroscience behind it.
LeDouxs study of fear in rats found two separate routes of information to the
amygdalaone going through the cortex, one does not. The implication of this
nding for emotions is spelled out by Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996), who posit
two separate signals for the emotion system: the emotion signal and a propositional signal of the evaluation that caused it. (p. 364). The emotion signal, corresponding to simple appraisals, has a direct route to the amygdala: Because it
bypasses the cortex, the signal depends on only a crude analysis. It is purely
emotional: One feels fearful without knowing why. Only the cortical route allows
86
5 Heart-Aching Love
one access to a full representation of what caused the response (Johnson-Laird and
Oatley, 2000, p. 466). It is in the same vein that Clore and Ortony (2000) have identied two ngers on the emotional trigger: one controlled by early perceptual processes that identify stimuli with emotional value and activate preparation for action,
and a second controlled by cognitive processes that verify the stimulus, situate it in
its context, and appraise its value (p. 41).
Received wisdom in the eld is that complex processing/appraisal is a necessary
condition for higher emotional development, and by extension, morality. Along the
same line is the prevalent assumption that the effortful, reective system 2 thinking
is superior to the stimulus-bound, error-prone system 1 thinking in decision making
(Kahneman, 2011). In direct contradiction to all this is the agenda of Mencius,
whose algorithm of the unbearing mind may be spelled out as follows: Capitalize on
the instinctual, unreective trajectory of system 1 thinking, on the one hand; and
avoid traversing the trajectory of system 2 thinking characterized by reections and
deliberations, on the other. Is it reasonable to build a moral edice on the errorprone system 1 instead of the rational deliberations of system 2 thinking?
To understand the rationality behind the unbearing mind, we need to situate this
phenomenon in the context of care-based morality.
Care-Based Morality
The unbearing mind presupposes an innate vulnerability to the other. The sympathy
that capitalizes on our innate vulnerability is a case of what Decety and Cowell
(2014) refer to as care-based morality (p. 533). The authors claim that this system
of sympathy piggybacks on older evolutionary motivational mechanisms associated
with parental care (p. 533), in particular emotional contagion which constitutes one
primary component of empathy (p. 529).
The concept of the unbearing mind entails two presuppositions:
(a) Sympathy hinges on the low threshold for stress at the sight of others
suffering.
(b) This innate vulnerability can be interfered with by rational deliberations, such
as utilitarianism.
These assumptions are consistent with the properties of emotional contagion
referred to by Decety and Cowell (2014) as a component that plays a fundamental
role [a] in generating the motivation to care and help another individual in distress
and [b] is relatively independent of mindreading and perspective-taking capacities
(p. 529). The second attribute (b) of emotional contagion can be further elaborated.
The authors reported studies that show that utilitarian judgments are facilitated by a
lack of empathic concern. For instance, the orbitofrontal cortex/vmPFC is a region
across species that is critical for care-giving behavior, particularly parenting
through reward-based ad affective associations (p. 533). Lesions or dysfunctions of
this region lead to decreased empathic concern and increased utilitarian judgment.
Care-Based Morality
87
In sum, the notion of the unbearing mind has the following insights that are
borne out by psychological studies on morality:
Feeling plays a more important role than thinking in moral decisions (Haidt, 2001).
Altruism is more of an instinct than rational thinking (Righetti, Finkenauer, &
Finkel, 2013; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013).
Being moved is essential to emotional development. Decit in the capacity of
being moved plays an important role in emotional disorders such as autism
(Hobson, 2007).
Direct route to the amygdala plays an important role in empathy. Abnormity of
this route is implicated in psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005).
So far, so good. But whats the next step? How do we advance from care-based to
more mature morality? Or as Decety and Cowell (2014) put it, how to extend empathic
concern outside the tribe (p. 533)? Answers to this million dollar question diverge
along the divide between non-relational and relational cognitionthe former climbs
a cognitive ladder; the latter an awareness ladder (see Table 1.1, Chap. 1).
Typical of the cognitive ladder approach to morality is Kohlbergs (1984) paradigm of moral reasoning that privileges cognitive deliberation, decision making,
and top-down control. By contrast, the notion of heart-aching love develops along
an awareness ladder, which covers the whole spectrum of perception from sense
perception at the low end to mental perception of feeling states at the high end.
Along this awareness ladder, action, which is stimulus-bound at the low end, drops
out of the picture at the high end, where emotion becomes what the medieval
German mystic Johannes Tauler (around 13001361) referred to as an inward,
contemplative desire (Shrady, 1985, pp. 139140).
To elaborate on this awareness ladder, we may turn to William Grays (1979)
theory of emotional renement. Gray maintains that
the basic global emotions differentiate during child development into a large number of
ever ner less intense emotional nuances, or feeling tones, of precise, sharply dened quality, and that these become patterned in a nearly innite number of ways to constitute an
emotional language for coding cognitive experience. (p. 7)
He goes on to say that to feel an emotion deeply, intensively, and sometimes

overwhelmingly (p. 8) constitutes the rudimentary stage of emotional development, which, through stages of progressive renement, culminates in the nuancing
and meditational phases:
Then, there is the last stage, the meditational one, in which the nuanced feeling tone is held
in awareness or alternately in the preconscious state for a time duration of from seconds or
minutes to years. (p. 5)
An empirical measure of the awareness ladder is the LEAS scale by Lane,

Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, and Zeitlin (1990). LEAS consists of ve levels of emotional awareness, which in ascending order are physical sensations, action tendencies, single emotions, blends of emotion, and blends of blends of emotional
experience. Our data on teng have covered the full spectrum of LEAS: the unbearing
mind is triggered into altruistic action by the rst two levels of physical sensations
88
5 Heart-Aching Love
and action tendencies; heart-aching love belongs to the fourth level of blended
emotions; while the last stages of blends of blends are evidenced by the following:
Loving him, yet also vexed at him, and yet still heart-aching (teng) for him, Xiao Geng
gazed attentively, with deep feelings (qing), at her husband who was waxing eloquent on
the podium. (CCL Corpus, 2009)
At this last stage of emotional blending, there are no specic action correlates.
Here emotion, along with all its impulses, has come to serve the same function as
what Levi-Straus said about deathits good for thought.
Whereas the cognitive ladder puts a premium on the higher levels over the lower
ones such that system 2 is privileged over system 1 thinking, the awareness ladder
in Chinese emotions seems to value both high and low levels equally. The Confucian
agenda consists in self-cultivation that starts with the unbearing mind at the lower
levels of the awareness ladder, to culminate in rened emotions (Frijda &
Sundararajan, 2007) at the higher levels of the same ladder. This affective path to
morality is gaining support in recent years.
Let us go back to the question posed by Decety and Cowell (2014): How to
extend sympathic concern beyond the tribe? After all, it is natural for our sympathic
concerns to stay within the connes of strong tieseven rodents, as the authors
point out, do so. For instance, female mice had higher fear responses when exposed
to the pain of a close relative than to that of a more distant relative. How do humans
manage to extend this empathic concern to strangers? The key lies in the education
of the heart through literature and the arts, according to Confucius (see Chap. 3).
Steven Pinker (2011) would have agreed, as he nds a similar agenda in Europe
thousands of years later. More specically, Pinker claims that the expansion of
empathy is the result of the expansion of literacy during the eighteenth century in
Europe. Decety and Cowell (2014) explain: Mounting evidence [e.g., Djikic et al.
(2009)] seems to indicate that reading, language, the arts, and the media provide
rich cultural input that triggers internal simulation processes and that leads to the
experience of emotions inuencing both concern and caring for others (p. 534).
In sum, we learn our morality at our mothers lap. In our adult years, heartaching love with all its variegated expressions at the higher levels of awareness may
serve the function of chronic priming for social mindfulness, which, while manifest
as sensitivity and responsiveness in everyday social transactions, can spring into
altruistic action at any moment when the unbearing mind kicks in.
Concluding Observations
The unbearing mind brings into sharp relief the difference between the two pathways to moralitycold (non-relational) cognition privileged by the West and hot
(relational) cognition privileged by the Chinese. When addressing moral questions,
the West asks: Can you think rationally about it? The Chinese asks, by contrast:
Concluding Observations
89
Can you feel it? Not grasping this difference can lead to misunderstandings about
the Asian practices of no-mind in one form or another (Zen, the Daoist cult of
spontaneity, and so on). To the Western observer, putting rational thinking on hold
risks losing ones moral moorings. To the Chinese, such worries are not warranted,
since no thinking is not so serious a threat to morality as no feeling.
The gut-feeling approach to morality is effective in the world of strong ties
(Chap. 1), where moral parameters are known and familiar such that it is quick
action that makes the difference. The effortful, reective, cold cognition approach
to morality is probably advantageous in the modern world of weak ties where conventions are not binding, and where problems, such as global warming, rely on
abstract reasoning rather than proximal, perceptual cues for a solution. Nevertheless,
even in the globalizing era where weak ties hold sway, a healthy morality still takes
its roots in the empathy one learns from mothers lap, and still needs to be nurtured
throughout life by the rich emotional undercurrents of strong tiesthis, in a nutshell, sums up the function and purpose of teng in our lives.
To show how a little unbearing mind can go a long way, we conclude with an
experience of Michelle Brenner (Brenner, 2015, p. 324) in Australia:
A couple of years ago I had an accident. My thumb was almost cut off and even now,
my stomach turns as I think about it. In the emergency room at the hospital, the
surgeon was able to sew it back together. Strangely enough, I remember that there
was no actual pain from by thumb; I think the fright blocked out the pain, however
the feeling of trauma was very much a part of the experience. I remember after the
surgeon did a great job of sewing back my thumb, he asked the nurse to put a bandage on it. The nurse placed a tiny translucent band-aid on the stitched up thumb.
I sat there in shock. How can they expect me to leave with this little band-aid after
almost losing my thumb? I looked up at the nurse and said, I think you need to
put something more on, this is not enough. Her response was strong and adamant
that there was no need. I sat looking at my thumb and feeling the trauma of the
accident knowing that this band-aid did nothing to recognize what my thumb had
been through. I needed padding, something to soften the impact of any unfortunate
future knock as well as a sign of care, soft comforting care. I waited till the surgeon
came back and then insisted. Please put something else on my thumb as a bandage. The nurse was told to put a bandage on top of the band-aid. With an attitude
of deance, the nurse put a more protective layer of padding on my thumb.
Compassion is a transcendent emotion. Compassion is by this denition beyond
logic, beyond rational thinking. It was obvious from the perspective of the nurse
that my thumb needed only a small band-aid; this was her logical, rational
response to bandaging my thumb. However, I was experiencing my thumb being
in the process of moving from the trauma of disconnection to the process of
recovery, a band-aid did little to symbolize or care for what I as a person had just
been through and what my thumb needed to feel secure and ready to reengage in
life. Compassion in practice goes beyond rational logical sense making, and
embraces a more sensitive awareness of existence.
90
5 Heart-Aching Love
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Chapter 6
The Art of Intimacy
Introduction
Americans described intimacy much more often in terms of mutual closeness and mutual
friendship ; Indian respondents describe their intimate relations more often than
American participants in terms of what might be called a we feeling.
(Mascolo, Misra, & Rapisardi, 2004, pp. 1819, emphasis in original)
When you have leisure time how often do you choose to spend it with him/her
alone? (Miller & Lefcourt, 1982, p. 516). This item from the Miller Social Intimacy
Scale (Miller & Lefcourt, 1982) is representative of a general tendency in the West
to define intimacy in terms of the behavioral and experiential characteristics of a
relationship. By contrast, the Chinese notion of intimacy focuses on the epistemological and ontological transformations of this relationship. Underscoring a transcendent function of emotion (Sundararajan, 2014), the Chinese notion of intimacy
poses to emotion theory an interesting question: Does the self get a boost from positive emotions, such as intimacy, to be grounded more firmly in its self-esteem, or
does it thereby vault over its ego and land in a different universethe we-ness?
Encoding the epistemological and ontological transformations involved in the
journey to we-ness, the Chinese notion of intimacy has the following attributes: It
privileges bonding through shared intention; it is modeled on the parentchild
instead of the mating pair; and it is not a mental so much as an inter-mental phenomenon. The following investigation consists of three parts: First, I trace the epistemological foundation of intimacy to the Chinese notion of affectivity (gan ), in
particular to two of its many compoundsgan-lei (responding in kind) and
gan-ying (stirring and responding). Next, I examine the phenomenology of
resonance through mental sharing, with special focus on mind perception and the
attribution of intent. Lastly, I present a wide variety of mind-to-mind transactions as
illustrations of intimacy and resonance.

93
94
6 Intimacy
The Sympathetic Universe of Gan-Lei (Responding in Kind)

The mind, I have argued, is capable of two modes of transactionsmind-to-world
and mind-to-mind, depending on whether one is dealing with objects and things or
with people (see Chap. 1). These two modes of transactions are evident even in
preverbal infants (see Figs. 6.1 and 6.2).
This formulation finds support and elaboration in McKeown (2013). According
to McKeown (2013), there are three cognitive mappings (see also Chap. 3), or in
more technical terms, three levels of isomorphic relationships between mental
representations (p. 274):
(a) Mind-world mappingsan isomorphic mapping between mental representations and perceived objects in the world.
Fig. 6.1 Mind-to-world transaction of a 5-month-old infant at the aquarium
The Sympathetic Universe of Gan-Lei (Responding in Kind)
95
Fig. 6.2 Mind-to-mind

transaction of a preverbal,
5-month-old infant
(b) Within-mind mappingsisomorphic mappings between representations within

the mind of an individual.
(c) Between-mind mappingsan isomorphism between the representations of
individuals.
Corresponding to mind-to-world transactions is (a); corresponding to mind-tomind transactions are (b) and (c), where (b) may be considered a variant of (c) with
both minds belonging to the same person. Now can (a) also become a variant of (c)?
Put another way, is it possible to extend the mode of mind-to-mind transactions to
objects and things in the world? Contemporary philosophy that lends support to this
proposal is the extended mind hypothesis (Clark, 2008; No, 2009; see also
Chap. 12). According to Chalmers (2008), it is not implausible for the world to be
an extension of the mind, because when parts of the environment are coupled to the
brain in the right way, they become parts of the mind (p. x). Coupling in the right
way is compatible with the lei (similarity or parity) concept (Sundararajan, 2009).
The landscape painter Tsung Ping (373443) claimed that Spirits are in essence
eternal and they dwell (temporarily) in forms and respond sympathetically (kan)
[gan] to the [similar] kinds (lei) [in the painter] (cited in Munakata, 1983, p. 123).
This is a statement of the extended mind hypothesis in reverse orderthe painters
mind is an extension of the spirit in nature. To the Chinese, it matters not which pole
of the coupling one starts out with. It boils down to the same thingbetween-mind
mappings (McKeown, 2013). From here it is only a minuscule step to saying that
the relation between mind and world is not mental so much as inter-mentala
transaction between mind and mind.
From the perspective of gan-lei (responding in kind), mind-to-mind transactions
are not confined to the social arena but rather constitute the resonating feedback
loop of a sympathetic universe.
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A magistrate of Jing Zhou district prohibited Buddhism and ordered hundreds of monks to
return to society. Everybody panicked; both old and young were weeping in sorrow. The
statue of Buddha in one temple of Chang Sha was found perspiring continuously for five
days. The abbot of the temple, Master Hung Chang, was summoned by the magistrate to
give an explanation. Master Hung said, No matter how far away the sage is, nothing can
be hidden from him. The Buddhas past and present, they think of each other. Is it possible
for the present Buddha not to mind the other Buddhas? (Dao Xuan, 1929, p. 415c)
This phenomenon is understood in psychology as anthropomorphism. There is

an ethical dimension to anthropomorphism, as Waytz et al. (2010) point out: just
as increased similarity to the self or humans increases the tendency to anthropomorphize a nonhuman agent, so too does decreased similarity increase the tendency to
dehumanize other people (p. 60). For our purposes, one of the most important consequences of anthropomorphism is not moral so much as epistemologicala shift
from mind-to-world, or subject-to-object, to mind-to-mind, or subject-to-subject
mode of thinking as embodied in gan-lei (responding in kind). Relevant to anthropomorphism is the research on mind perception.
Mind perception: Mind perception (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) refers to the
attribution of the qualities of life and mind to what we see (Looser & Wheatley, 2010).
One of the earliest distinctions made by infants is that between animate and inanimate
objects (Mandler, 2004). Is it possible that mind perception entails the principle of
leisimilarity due to categorical correspondence? Support for this conjecture comes
from a study by Looser and Wheatley (2010). The authors investigated the mechanism of perceiving mind and life in a face by presenting participants with morphed
images on a continuum from inanimate (mannequin) to animate (human). They found
that life and mind were perceived at a point close to the human endpointthings that
are like me probably have mind and life, so the participants figured.
The Chinese notion of gan-lei (responding in kind) finds an eloquent expression
in the claim of Yan Yan Zhi (384456):
Things dont interact at random; they are responsive [gan] to each other according to categorical correlations [lei]. Of all the things, the human heart/mind has the greatest capacity
for responsiveness in kind [gan-lei]. (cited in Seng Yu, 1929, p. 23b)
Yans claim for the superior human capacity for mind perception is supported by
empirical studies on anthropomorphism. Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley,
and Heatherton (2014) argue that as a social species, it is important for humans to
efficiently detect targets in the environment capable of making meaningful mental
connections. Along this line, we can go one step further to predict that those cultures
or individuals who are invested in making connections would be more readily able
to detect mind where it may not be. This hypothesis was tested and found to be true.
Using animacy as a proxy for mind perception, Powers et al. (2014) tested perception of animacy with morphed faces and found that individuals who experienced a
greater desire for social connection actually decreased their thresholds for mind
perception, consistently observing animacy when fewer definitively human cues
were present in the morphed faces. The authors argue that overattributing animacy
may be a fundamentally adaptive strategy, since those who can more readily detect
97
The Resonating Feedback Loop of Gan-Ying (StimulatingResponding)
animacy can cast a wider net when identifying possible sources of social connection, thereby maximizing opportunities for renewing social relationships.
The parity principle of lei offers the epistemological grounds for the mind-andworld coupling, but leaves out the affective dimension of this coupling. As Reddy
points out that similarity (parity) is not sufficient ground for engagement (2008).
What explains engaged living? Enter gan (responsiveness) which makes it clear that
when affinity is felt rather than simply perceived, powerful things happen, as Byrne
(1971) would have predicted with his theory of similarity-based attraction. Gan as
affinity-based responsiveness gives rise to a cosmology that is inherently affective:
According to Confucian teaching, a mutual attraction of things for each other functions at all levels of reality as the interior binding force of the cosmic, social, and
personal life (Berry, 2003, p. 96).
The Resonating Feedback Loop of Gan-Ying

(StimulatingResponding)
When we are connected we are no longer blinded by intellect.
Emerson
Gan-yin (see Chap. 12) literally means stimulating-responding. But it is not a

simple stimulusresponse (SR) arc so much as a resonating feedback loop based
on the intrinsic affinity between all things in a sympathetic universe. This epistemology adds a positive spin to the otherwise negative connotation of passivity that
is associated with affectivity. In this context, to be affected is to participate in the
cosmic loop of mutual responsiveness, akin to a tuning fork that needs to be affected/
stirred in order to affect/stir others thereby keeping the resonating feedback loop
going.
The literary critic Lu Chi (261303) sang of the poets responsiveness to seasonal changes:
Grieves for the falling leaves in strong autumn, Rejoices in the plant branches in sweet
spring; His mind shivers, taking the frost to heart (Owen, 1992, p. 90)
Owen (1992) explains: Our participation in nature is attested by the affective

power that nature has over us: grieving, rejoicing, and shivering. The repeated
antithesesgrieve and rejoice, autumn and springemphasize a full range of
responses to a full range of changes(p. 91). Thus poetry, according to Wang Fu-chih
(16191692), functions to reestablish that bond between man and the universe that
many have broken (cited in Wong, 1978, p. 150). Wong explains: poetry comes
about as mans consciousness reacts to the stimulation of wu [objects] When
the poetry is read and the readers mind is stirred into activity, it is no more than a
continuation of the eternal process of things, acting and reacting among themselves (1978, p. 148).
Together, gan-lei and gan-ying bring to light the fact that the Chinese notion of
affectivity (gan) is undergirded by an epistemology that consists of three interre-
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lated components: (a) The Chinese SR arc consists of a resonating feedback loop
(gan-ying ); (b) this resonating feedback loop is sustained by an affective bond of
mutual attraction among all things in a sympathetic universe; (c) this sympathetic
universe is governed by the principle of parity (lei). All these connotations of gan
are embodied in the protoconversation (Trevarthen, 1993) between infant and the
caregiver.
Mind-to-Mind Transactions in Protoconversation

The child is father of the man.
Wordsworth
Protoconversation refers to affective prelinguistic exchanges between infant

and the caregiver. Corresponding to the notion of a resonating feedback loop (a),
protoconversation is a co-regulated affective exchange, in which the child or the
caregiver functions not as independent organisms, but rather as part and parcel of
the larger co-regulation system which functions to maintain shared homeostasis.
Corresponding to an affective bond of mutual attraction (b), Bogdan (2000) points
out that it is a clever ploy of evolution for the biological co-regulation of infant
and mother to have taken the form of affective bonding. Corresponding to the
principle of parity (c), perception of a similar other (someone like me) lies at the
core of infant imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1999) and protoconversation
(Trevarthen, 1993).
The Cartesian intuition that there is a one-to-one correspondence between an
isolatable individual and her mind is belied by the fact that the child is a functioning
organism only to the extent that there is a working mind outside her head. This possibility of the child to function by means of cognitive prosthesis in the world is
consistent with the extended mind hypothesis (Clark, 2008), which claims that the
mind is not confined to ones skull so much as distributed across bodies. The Chinese
notion of gan with its cluster of associated concepts takes us further. The gan-based
epistemology is compatible with a philosophy of the mind that is modeled on the
primordial communion between infant and caregiver, an emotional bonding that is
grounded physiologically in the mutual regulation of a shared homeostasis (Bogdan,
2000). In the words of No (2009), the young child, in her relation to the caretaker, is really the paradigm [of the mind] (p. 33).
Consider a hypothetical protoconversation:
the baby who is angry and begins to make an angry expression through a grimace is
conveying the intent to bite or hit through the expression. If the caregiver responds before
the baby actually bites or hits, that is, responds to the intent, the baby is likely to respond in
return with another intent. For example, the parent responds to the babys angry looks with
a soft soothing look of whats the matter and, with hands out, an offer to pick him up
The baby responds with a softening of his grimace and anger and a look of expectation. The
parent then responds with another gesture and the baby now begins to break into a
smile . A second later, the parent is holding the baby and the baby relaxes. The tension
in his body dissipates and he has a look of calm. (Greenspan & Shanker, 2004, pp. 3132)
Resonance and Mental Sharing
99
Conventional account of this scenario would go something like this: The babys
expressive behavior is appraised by the parent as anger, which is deemed in need of
an intervention to de-escalate. The parent acts accordingly, with good effect. An
alternative account is to approach protoconversations as mind-to-mind transactions,
in which exchange of intentions take center stage. Thus Greenspan and Shanker
(2004) paid special attention to how the parent responds to the babys signal of
intent, how the baby responds back, and how together the two negotiate an outcome
characterized by shared soothing pleasure rather than a unilateral aggressive
action (p. 32). The authors continued to say that this initiation into a (proto)conversation is crucial for the emotional learning of the young child: As his intentions are
responded to, the baby becomes better and better able to signal intent without escalating into direct action (p. 32).
Casting this scenario into the framework of gan (affectivity), the key player here
is lei (parity)the ontological categorization that opens up a common ground
between similar others. This process is initiated by the caregiver (Mind1), who
interprets the babys facial grimaces as expressions of a being capable of sharing
intentions, just like herself. When a relation of parity between Mind1 (caregiver)
and Mind2 (baby) is thus established, the responsive order becomes operative,
which subsequently unfolds as a chain of emotional signaling in recurrent feedback
loops. The babys ticket to the game is an innate responsiveness (gan) to the caregiver. That suffices. The rest of the story is told by the feedback loops between
Mind1 and Mind2, with more rounds of the mind-to-mind (proto)conversation
resulting in more refined development in emotional signaling. On this view, the
childs emotional development can be summed up as a footnote to the affective law
of attraction, which is eloquently expressed by Johannes Tauler (around 1300
1361), a medieval German mystic: So God [read caregiver] attracts, invites, and
draws man [read child] out of himself, from a state of unlikeness into one of likeness (Shrady, 1985, p. 142).
This is the prototype of intimacy characterized by shared intentions. The hallmark of this intimacy is resonance.
Resonance and Mental Sharing

Whereas the West capitalizes on the rhetoric mode of persuasion, the Chinese privilege the poetic mode of thinking in which resonance looms large, as evidenced in
ancient Chinese texts (Tu, 1989). According to Siegel (2007), the social brain has
resonance circuits consisting of the insula, superior temporal, mirror neuron, and
middle prefrontal areas. Resonance in intimacy has to do with mental sharing. One
of the prerequisites of mental sharing is mind perception.
Mind perception versus mind reading: Mind perception can be differentiated from
mind reading (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000) which is also known
as mentalization (Jurist, Slade, & Bergner, 2008). These two types of knowing the
mindmind perception versus mind readingcorrespond to the two types of mental
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transactions, mind-to-mind versus mind-to-world, respectively. Mentalization or

mind reading may serve us well in the environment of dissimilar others, as it has its
evolutionary origin in competition and social survival (Fonagy & Target, 2008).
It privileges accuracy in the interpretation and representation of self and others
mental states. While mind reading can serve exploitative purposes toward the other
(McKeown, 2013), mind perception serves affiliative purposes only and is necessary
for mental sharing among similar others (McKeown, 2013; Sundararajan, 2009).
One way to tease apart the affiliative versus exploitative functions of knowing
the others mind is to examine mimicry. Mimicry has all the attributes of mind perception: It is contingent upon the perception of animacy, as Meltzoff and Moore
(1999) point out that for an infant to learn about inanimate objects she must manipulate or mouth them, but to learn about people she must imitate them. And it enhances
social bonding (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). More important, mimicry does not seem
to serve the purposes of mind reading, such as accurate decoding and representation
of the others mind. This hypothesis can be tested by transporting mimicry from the
context of bonding among similar others to that of exploitation among dissimilar
other, for instance by adding a liar to the mix. This hypothesis finds some empirical
support in the study by Stel, van Dijk, and Olivier (2009). In this study, targets (persons to be mimicked) were instructed either to lie or tell the truth, and observers
were divided into three groups: mimickers received instructions to mimic, nonmimickers were instructed specifically not to mimic, and controls who received no specific instructions either way. The results showed that observers who were
nonmimickers were more accurate in their estimates of the targets truthfulness and
experienced emotions than mimickers, which included those who were told to
mimic as well as the controls who mimicked automatically even without being told
to do so. Why is it that peoples ability to detect deception is improved when they
are given explicit instructions NOT to mimic? The authors attribute this effect to the
fact that mimicry hinders observers in objectively assessing targets true feelings
(Stel et al., 2009, p. 9). This conclusion is consistent with the prediction of Fonagy
and Target (2008) that social competition promotes, while social bonding inhibits,
mind reading.
Intention and Mental Sharing: Tomasello and Herrmann (2010); Tomasello et al.,
(2005) claim that the major difference between ape and human cognition lies in the
latters capacity for shared intentionality. The notion of intentionality entails two
essential assumptions about the mind: First, to the extent that it is a sign to be
decoded only by a mind, intention is the privileged currency in the mind-to-mind
transactions. We dont share our intentions with the wall, do we? Even babies know
that. Infants can grasp others intentions before their first birthdays (Woodward,
2009), way before they can pass the mind reading test of inferring false beliefs
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Infants are born with minds that are especially attuned
to other minds, says Stern (2004).
This leads to the second assumption behind the attribution of intentions, namely
that the mind has expressive needs, such as making its inner states known and sharable with another mind. As Evan Thompson (2007) points out:
Comment Versus Topic in Protoconversation
101
in empathy we experience another human being directly as a personthat is, as an intentional being whose bodily gestures and actions are expressive of his or her experiences or
states of mind. (p. 386)
Unlike instrumental actions, expressive actions are not meant to change the
world so much as to expand consciousness. A case in point is resonance. Attuned or
shared intentions result in resonance, as Siegel (2007) points out: An attuned system is one in which two components begin to resonate with each other (p. 206).
Resonance as a result of mental sharing, through what McKeown (2013) refers to as
between-mind mapping, will be illustrated in the following sections.
Comment Versus Topic in Protoconversation

Cognitive appraisals, according to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), revolve around the
main evaluative issues of personal stake such as Am I in trouble or being benefited, now or in the future, and in what way? (p. 31). By contrast, protoconversations revolve around ones personal take on things. The difference in orientation
between personal stake and person stake may be explored along the divide between
topic and comment in linguistics (Bogdan, 2000).
In linguistics, a sentence can be parsed into topic and comment:
About x (topic), I think that y (comment).
Topic concerns what the statement is aboutinformation necessary for the evaluation of whether ones personal goals are at stake. By contrast, comment has to do
with the sharing of personal take on things: The comment is some mental take or
mental relation to a topic, expressing an experience, emotion, stance or attitude
(Bogdan, 2000, p. 78). Comment looms large in the protoconversation between the
child and the caregiver. Joint attention (Tomasello, 1995) is another instance in
which the sharing of (the caregivers) personal take on things is of paramount
importance to the child.
Bogdan (2000) claims that comment in protoconversations is topic irrelevant,
since its utility is in the shared homeostasis between infant and the caregiver, and
nothing else. For instance, infants smile at a facial expression or gesture is topicless
in the sense that it is not about anything in particular (see Fig. 6.3 for an example).
Thus comments concern not the current goals and behaviors, so much as the mode
of communionto be with, to share, or to join in the inner states of another
person (Stern, 1985).
The topic and comment distinction is often exploited in classical Chinese poetry.
Here is an example:
Calling for Little Jade [the maid] time and again
For no particular reason,
Except in the hope that the beloved
May recognize my voice. (Du, 1976, p. 367)
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Fig. 6.3 The faint smile of a

2-month-old infant
Here the communicative act of calling for the maid serves no practical purposes,
other than to be mentally together with the beloved. According to Bogdan (2000),
communications that serve the sole purpose of mental sharing is uniquely human.
Attention to Intention
Intention is closer to a wish than a goal. Whereas intention is an impulse or an
inclination of heart as Germer (2009, p. 138) puts it, goals are stored representations that are stable over time. The difference between goals and intentions seems to
fall along the divide between cognition with and without control (see Chaps. 2 and 7).
As Siegel (2007) points out, goals have to do with planning, whereas intentions priming. Planning is a prefrontal intervention, involving the use of abstract concepts, and
is outcome oriented. Priming by contrast is a parallel distributed process of the brain
that is always readying itself for the next moment. Siegel explains: Intentions create an integrated state of priming, a gearing up of our neural system to be in the
mode of that specific intention: we can be readying to receive, to sense, to focus, to
behave in a certain manner (p. 177).
Siegel (2007) claims that resonance is created when what is happening matches
what the brain was primed to anticipate. He points out that, for instance, attending
to our own intentions creates an internally resonant state. He claims that In mindful
awareness, the attention to intention creates an important resonance of what is
and what was anticipated (p. 180). For instance in the mindful awareness of breathing: During the out-breath we are readied for the in-breath, and then it arrives, and
the mapping matches (p. 175), the result is resonance.
What Siegel (2007) talks about is resonance through within-mind mapping
(McKeown, 2013). It is possible to extend this priming-based resonance to betweenmind mapping (McKeown, 2013) as well. For illustration, consider a vignette from
the memoir of Sei Shnagon (965?-c. 1020), lady in waiting to the Japanese Empress
around the turn of the eleventh century (Sei, 1967):
Xing: Resonance Through Poetry
103
It was a clear, moonlit night a little after the tenth of the Eighth Month. Her Majesty, who
was residing in the Empresss Office, sat by the edge of the veranda while Ukon no Naishi
played the flute for her. The other ladies in attendance sat together, talking and laughing; but
I stayed by myself, leaning against one of the pillars between the main hall and the veranda.
Why so silent? said Her Majesty. Say something. It is sad when you do not speak.
I am gazing into the autumn moon, I replied.
Ah, yes, she remarked. That is just what you should have said. (Section 66, 125)
The intention of the lady in waiting (A) was to savor her experience of the moon;
that of the Empress (B), to find out about As intention in the hope for resonance
with her own. Resonance as a result of between-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013)
was indeed experiencedThat is just what you should have saidwhen Bs prediction of As intention matched As self-report. Note that the emphasis here falls on
the self avowal of intent (what A said explicitly to B) which is a case of within-mind
mapping (McKeown, 2013), rather than Bs mind reading which was rendered uninteresting by the self-evident behavior of As gazing at the moon. Furthermore, resonance is not simply a brain event so much as the building block of a shared reality
(Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009), a reality that both parties knew all along,
namely that they belonged to a special class (lei, similar other) of individuals with
sensibilities far more refined than the rest of the crowd, who chose to amuse themselves with talking and laughing instead on this enchanted occasion.

Xing literally means stirring or arousing. In Chinese poetics, Hsing [xing]
is an image whose primary function is not signification but, rather, the stirring of a
particular affection or mood: hsing does not refer to that mood; it generates it
(Owen, 1992, p. 46). The Chinese literary critics are emphatic about the fact that
xing is not mental so much as inter-mental. When moved by the stimuli, the poet
uses imageries to evoke resonating moods and imageries in the reader; the reader/
critic in turn can convey to others his/her understanding of the poem through resonating imageries of their own. This resonating chain of imagery from writer to
reader/critic is hailed by Yeh as the ideal type of literary criticism that perpetuates
the moving power of poetry (2000, p. 327).
Traditional Chinese literary criticism suggests that xing works its magic through
a lackits lack of explicitness in representation. In Chinese poetics, xing is a technical term that refers to one of the two types of indirect expression of emotions: bi
(comparison) and xing ( evocative image) (Wixted, 1983, p. 238). The major
difference between these two tropes has traditionally been understood along the
divide between explicitness and covertness. As metaphor or similesuch as My
love is a red, red rosebi is explicit in its signification. Evocative image (xing)
in contrast does not have a clear connection between its source and target, thus signifying in a covert, latent, or concealed way.
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Consider, for instance, this evocative image from The She King (the Book of
Songs):
Kwan-kwan go the ospreys,
On the islet in the river.
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady:
For our prince a good mate she. (Part 1, p. 1)
The connection between the ospreys and the princes sexual feelings is obscure,
at best. This lack of apparent connection between the evocative imagery (xing) at
the beginning and the rest of the poem is a peculiar feature of xing that has generated much discussion among critics. Some Song dynasty scholars described xing as
an essentially arbitrary opening to a poem or stanza, selected and varied for purely
formal reason such as rhyme, and simply juxtaposed without any meaningful connection to the human topic which follows (Yu, 1987, pp. 6263). Concerning this
particular poem, for instance, Zheng Qiao (11041162) wrote:
Guan guan cry the ospreys is what stimulated the writer of the poem at some time. He
saw something here, and it happened spontaneously to move his heart/mind. All examples
of a stimulus [xing] involve seeing something here and obtaining something there: there is
no relationship of categorical correspondence between the two situations, nor is there a
meaning to be sought. (Yu, 1987, pp. 6061)
Without any apparent connection to the main topic of the poem, the reader is left
with nothing but a trusting willingness to open herself up to the perturbation of the
evocative imagery (xing) in the hope of arriving intuitively at associations comparable to the writers own. In this way every comprehension of the poem becomes an
occasion for the meeting of the minds between the reader and the writer.
How do the minds meet in xing? We may turn to Indian poetics for some insight.
Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) draw a comparison between Western and Indian
which can be extended to Chinesepoetics along the mind-to-world versus mindto-mind divide: While the Western tradition has tended to concentrate on Aristotles
mimesis, how a text can relate to the world the Indic tradition has tended towards
dhvani and the relation between writer and reader or audience member (p. 247).
The Indian term dhvani means suggestion, which is an indirect and implicit mode
of communication. Xing may be considered the Chinese counterpart of dhvani (suggestiveness) (Oatley, 2004), which has been interpreted convincingly by Hogan
(1996) as priming.
How does priming work in dhvani? Hogan (1996) uses rasa-based stories for
illustration. In classical Indian literature, each rasa (literary emotion) portrayed provides a context within which certain kinds of associations are made more easily than
others. For instance, a story of erotic love would render certain sexual associations
more accessible to the reader than others. Here we see the parallel with xing: The
imagery of the ospreys in the Book of Songs is supposed to prime certain associations
in the reader. But priming works only to the extent that the reader is willing to be
primedherein lies the importance of mind-to-mind transactions between the reader
and the writer. As Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) point out: It [priming] only really
works when we are willing to engage ourselves in the story, and allow its associations
to resonate with remembered experiences and longings of our own (p. 248).
105
To probe further the intimate relationship between reader and writer through
xing, let us follow the lead of Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) to cast dhvani , and
by extension xing, in the framework of metonymy. Metonymy, according to Oatley
(2010), has an association structure and works through suggestiveness in a personal
and idiosyncratic way. The associative structure of metonym has been contrasted
with metaphor by Jakobson (1956), who proposed that metaphor and metonym are
at the two poles of languageMetaphor is at the semantic pole (a is b); and metonym at the syntactic pole (a is juxtaposed with b). This structural difference
between metaphor and metonym corresponds nicely to the distinction between bi
(comparison) and xing (evocative image) in Chinese poetics.
According to Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012), Metonymy is a principal means
by which intimacy can be achieved between a reader and writer (p. 248). They
claim that metonymy is a form of intimacy via language: telepathic transmission of thoughts wouldnt work because minds are too different from each other.
Language, however, acts as an interface so that, with metonymies, intimate
(telepathy-like?) communication can occur (p. 245). They went on to say: Pieces
of mindsequences of consciousness with their associations between memories
and future possibilities, between understanding what is happening and what can be
said about itcan thus be passed from one person to another. Metonymy is a making of connections of these kinds, which can be passed to readers (p. 245).
Coming back to the present context, we may ask: How does xing work to create
intimacy? The answer lies in its seeming arbitrariness as an entry point to the poem.
What is peculiar about xing is that there is no logical connection between the
objectsay the ospreysthe poet chooses to begin the poem with, and the associations of meaning in the rest of the poem. This arbitraries is a hallmark of metonymy.
Papafragou (1996) claims that the production or reception of metonyms need not
depend on any previous actual association between its terms or their referents. The
arbitrariness of metonymy only serves to highlight the importance of between-mind
mappings, which seem to be the primary basis for the poems comprehension. As
Papafragou (1996) puts it: the only constraint on the use of metonymy is its
expected computability by the hearer. Thus it is natural for metonymy to be
extremely context-dependent and idiosyncratic (p. 184).
The context-dependent and idiosyncratic nature of metonymy can be illustrated
by the choice of the ospreys. Why ospreys of all kinds of birds that might work
equally well as an evocative imagery for mating? This, in the framework of metonymy, is known as a novel fixation of reference for an existing expression
(Papafragou, 1996, p. 181). Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) remind us that this
arbitrary fixation of reference in metonymy can be traced back to the childhood
experience of between-mind mapping, known as joint attention (Tomasello, 1995).
Look, the caregiver points to an arbitrarily chosen object and calls the childs
attention. By the same token the poetic convention of xing works the same way.
According to Zhu Xi, The meaning of the word xing is to beginto begin with
an object and arouse a meaning (Yu, 1987, p. 63, note 43). Through joint attention,
the child comes to appreciate the particular perspective of the individual who called
her attention to an arbitrarily chosen object (Bruner, 1983). Do I see what you
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see? This is the task for between-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013) that the child is
called upon to learn through joint attention. The same task confronts the reader of
metonyms, such as xing.
In the Everyday World of Our Lives

Comradery. How can momentary intentions constitute the basis for predictable
behavior? Transitory intentions are stabilized through sharing; shared intention in
turn can serve as grounds for joint action. As Gergen (2009) points out, there is in
principle no limit to the kinds of meanings that might be cocreated by persons in
joint action. No wonder that the term for comrade in Maos China is literally those
with shared intentanything short of that may not warrant the high stakes of collaboration in a revolution. Today, this term refers to homosexuals among young
Chinese in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Fang, 2010). In both usage of the term,
shared intent seems to be essential to the joint action and intimate relationship in
an unconventional context that involves risk taking.
A we discourse. Mind-to-mind transactions are privileged in the East Asian
cultures of China, Korea, and Japan. For instance, Choi and Kim (2006) claim that
the main currency in Korean relationships is a mind exchange rather than a behavioral exchange (p. 358). This point can be illustrated by a Korean concept, shimjung which consists of two Chinese characters, Shim (xin, mind) and jung (qing, the
genuine state of things, see Chap. 12). Thus Choi, Han, and Kim (2007) claim that
shimjung is primarily a quality of mind state (p. 324), rather than any specific
emotional feelings such as sadness, happiness, or anger.
Shimjung is engendered when expected or desired outcomes from close relationships are not achieved (Choi & Kim, 2006, p. 360). According to Choi et al.
(2007), repair of this mind state constitutes the culturally prescribed shimcheong
discourse, in which the interaction partners are called upon to confirm the weness and to view the problem from the perspective of mutuality (p. 327). The
authors point out that shimcheong is not mind reading: That which needs repair is
located not in the psyche of the interacting individuals, so much as in their shared
mental space, the we-ness. Thus it is not a call on the interaction partner to activate
cognitive abilities in the sense of theory of mind, rather it is a request for the activation of an emotional, affective mutuality (p. 327).
The following is an example of shimjung (mind state) discourse (Choi & Kim, 2006):
On a rainy day, a mother was waiting for her son back from school with an umbrella for him
at a bus stop. Finally, the bus arrived and the son got angry on seeing his mother, You
shouldnt have come out here with the umbrella for me. The mother replied, My baby,
sorry about that. (p. 363)
The authors suggest that the son hides his gratitude by getting angry with the
mother; and the mother her disappointment by apologizing to the son. At a deeper
level, according to the authors, the strength of shimjung in close relationships is
reinforced by expressed emotions that are opposite to the real and hidden emotions
(p. 363), such that both feel identical shimjung (p. 364).
References
107
Perhaps Emily Dickinsons lines below may serve as an exegesis for this shared
intention between the Korean mother and son:
But trifles look so trivial,
As soon as you have come,
That blame is just as dear as praise,
And praise as mere as blame. (To March)
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Chapter 7
Freedom and Emotion: Daoist Recipes

for Authenticity and Creativity
Passion individualizes, yet it also enslaves

(Emile Durkheim)
Successfully negotiated, freedom and emotion converge as expressions of spontaneity. Spontaneity in turn is considered the hallmark of authenticity and creativity.
This chapter focuses on an analysis of how freedom serves as the nexus of these
termsspontaneity, authenticity, and creativity in emotion. The key ingredient of
the Daoist recipe for emotional creativity lies in freedom from cognitive control.
Challenges posed by this Daoist recipe to the dual process theories and cognitive
appraisals of emotions will be examined.
A central theme in Daoism is freedom (Hall, 1978). How does this quest for
freedom impact on emotion? One influential articulation of this question is found in
Chuangzis claim that the sage has no emotions (qing ):
Are there really men without emotions? Master Hui asked Master Chuang.
Yes, said Master Chuang. (Mair, 1994, p. 49)
This enigmatic statement has generated much discussion throughout Chinese

history. In the following sections, I examine these responses to Chuangzi under the
rubrics of two alternative perspectives on the question of freedom and emotion
freedom from or for emotion.
Freedom from Emotions

Freedom from emotion takes the path of reason, an approach that has some overlap
and affinity with the emotion regulation strategy of reappraisal (Gross, 2007). This
rational approach capitalizes on the belief that the sage has no emotions because her
mind is like a mirror. It is said in the Chuang Tzu (chap. 7): The mind of the perfect
man is like a mirror. It does not move with things, nor does it anticipate them. It

111
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Freedom and Emotion
responds to things, but does not retain them. Therefore the perfect man is able to
deal successfully with things but is not affected by them (Fung, 1966, p. 287). One
way to attain a mind that approximates the emptiness of a mirror and the evenness
of a balance (Fung, 1962, p. 183) is to take an objective perspective, as advocated
by the philosopher and literary critic Wang Fu-chih (16191692): those who are
not reduced to helplessness by ching [qing , emotions], they recognize that when
they are sad, things can still be happy, but this does not alter the fact that they are
themselves sad; when they are happy, things can still be sad, but this does not alter
the fact that they are themselves happy (Wong, 1978, pp. 128129).
This rational approach to emotion capitalizes on a notion of harmony as the preperturbation equilibrium, a state of perfect symmetry akin to a lake without a ripple
(see Chaps. 1 and 2). Note how Wang Fu-chihs extensive use of the yin-yang polarity (happy versus sad; inner versus outer reality) to neutralize the impact of emotionssadness in subjective reality is counterbalanced by happiness in the objective
world, and vice versa. Cast in the framework of harmony as symmetry (Chap. 2), we
may say that through the yin-yang polarity, emotional perturbations are rendered
differences that make no difference, thereby maintaining the original symmetry or
mirror state of the mind.
Freedom for emotions, by contrast, espouses the version of harmony as postperturbation, or dynamic, equilibrium (see Chap. 2). There are two variants of this theme.
Freedom for Emotions

True emotion. There is a famous dialogue between Chuangzi and Huizi. When queried by Huizi as to how the sage could be without qing (emotion), Chuangzi replied
that judging between right and wrong is what I mean by qing. What I mean by
being without qing is that a man does not inwardly harm himself by likes and dislikes, but instead constantly follows the spontaneous and does not add to what is
natural in him (adapted from Graham, 1986, p. 62). Grahams (1986) exegesis is
illuminating: He claims that qing is the state of perfect genuineness which the sage
recovers (p. 62), unless it is a case of distinguishing right from wrong that Man the
incurable rationalist and moralist is especially prone to (p. 62).
This discussion is an extension of the nature versus culture debate that looms
large in Daoism. The Daoist back-to-nature project intends to recover the original
innocence in emotions by divesting of qing (emotion) all the vestiges of conceptualization, convention, society, and language (Hansen, 1995, pp. 200201). True
emotion (qing) unsullied by judgment, according to the Neo-Confucianist Chou
Tun-yi (10171073), is vacuous in quiescence and straightforward in movement
(Fung, 1966, p. 290), as exemplified by the impulse to save a child falling into the
well (see Chap. 5). Fung (1966) explains that if one does not act on ones first
impulse but pauses instead to think the matter over before coming to the childs
rescue, he is motivated by secondary selfish thoughts and thereby loses both his
original state of vacuity in quiescence and the corollary state of straightforwardness
in movement (p. 272).
Freedom for Emotions
113
Another variant of the freedom for emotion theme is to modify the original
statement of Chuangzi from having no emotions (qing) to having emotions but
without ensnarement. This was the exegesis of Wang Bi (226249) on the Chuang
Tzu: That in which the sage is superior to ordinary people is the spirit. But what the
sage has in common with ordinary people are the emotionsand therefore cannot
[but] respond to things without joy or sorrow. He responds to things, yet is not
ensnared by them. It is wrong to say that because the sage has no ensnarement, he
therefore has no emotions (Fung, 1966, p. 238). How does one have emotions
without ensnarement? The answer from Neo-Daoism of the third and fourth centuries is feng liu.
The romantic spirit. Feng liu means literally wind and stream and is rendered by Fung (1966) as the romantic spirit (p. 231). According to Fung (1966),
in Neo-Daoism of the third century, feng liu was derived from zi-ran (spontaneity, naturalness), and is in opposition to morals and institutions (p. 240). The
essential quality of feng liu is to have a mind that transcends the distinctions of
things and lives in accord with itself, rather than with others (p. 291).
In this mode of independence, feng liu tends to privilege novelty. Consider the
following episode about the Neo-Daoist Liu Ling (c. 221c. 300):
Liu had a habit of going completely naked in his room. To his critics he said, I take the
whole universe as my house and my room as my clothing. Why, then, do you enter here into
my trousers? (Shih-shuo, chap. 23, cited in Fung, 1966, p. 235).
To his contemporaries, Liu was considered feng liu not because of his nudity, but
because of his novel take on it. And it is novelty in a radical way: One is to transcend
all given norms, from the biologically given sensory experiences to the socially
given codes of conduct. The result is what may be called a cult of spontaneity, characterized by a paradoxical combination of impulsivity, on the one hand, and a more
subtle sensitivity for pleasure and more refined needs than sheerly [sic] sensual
ones (p. 235), on the other. Thus individuals of feng liu acted according to pure
impulse, but not with any thought of sensuous pleasure (p. 235). With the romantic spirit, the question of ensnarement of emotions is no longer whether to have
emotion or not, but how: How are emotions to be expressed, with refined sensitivity
and freedom of the spirit, or not.
This brief overview of the two versions of freedom for emotions suggests a close
association between true and creative emotionsconcepts which share in common an emphasis on spontaneity. This observation is consistent with the claim of
Scheibe (2000) that there is an intrinsic connection among authenticity, spontaneity,
and creativity: Theater is authentic only if it is novel, spontaneous, and fresh
authenticity in the drama of everyday life has to do with our capacity to improvise
with creativity and originality on the materials and themes we have been given to
play on (p. 240).
Chinese poetics is one site where these interrelated ideas of the ideal states of
emotiontrue, creative, spontaneous, and freeconverge, as evidenced by the
traditional criteria of good poetry. One criterion in particular that melds together
creativity, authenticity, and freedom is the following: Simple message with deep
meaning flow freely (Okabe, 1983, p. 35). If you dont mind me jumping the gun
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Freedom and Emotion
the key to this ideal type of poetry or life lies in freedom from cognitive control. In
the following analysis, I will focus on the cognitive mechanisms behind the nexus
of freedom, authenticity, and spontaneity of emotions.
Authenticity as Spontaneity
Like the Sage, the poet moves with the Way [Dao], and takes what is given as it is given.
He transmits it to his work whenever he sets his hand to paper and is not allowed to brood
on his writing or to revise: it comes right out and comes out right. (Owen, 1992, p. 325)
Characterized by a combination of effortlessness, accuracy and speed, the notion

of spontaneity is one of the legacies of Zen and Daoism that shape the Chinese conceptualizations of creativity. A survey of creativity concepts among Mainland,
Hong Kong, and Taiwanese Chinese (Rudowicz & Yue, 2000) found that the item
quick in doing had high loadings on the creativity factor called dynamic
(p. 183). Likewise in another study (Chan & Chan, 1999), Hong Kong teachers
considered students quick in responding as a creative attribute.
As evident from the quote from Owen in the above, there is an intimate connection in Chinese aesthetics between spontaneity and authenticity, namely that true
expressions of the self in art are expected to come right out and come out right. This
emphasis on spontaneity as an indicator of true and creative emotions does not sit
well with mainstream psychology of emotions. Received wisdom in the field is that
emotion serves the action system as a speed breaker to increase behavioral flexibility
by decoupling response from stimulus. In the words of Clore and Ketelaar (1997):
emotion evolved as protocognition, as a psychological waystation between stimulus and response that afforded flexibility. Emotions can thus provide information and
motivation, without triggering obligatory behavior (p. 112). The waystation function of emotion entails a latency period, in the words of Scherer (1994): a latency
period intervenes between stimulus evaluation and reaction (p. 128). He goes on to
say that The latency period also gives the organism time to internally monitor (or
even reflect on, in the case of man) these various processes (p. 130). Thus emotions
can be expected to work best with the slow, reflective system 2 processes.
In sharp contrast is the Daoist notion of spontaneity, marked by the absence of
latency, as a measure of true, and creative, emotions. Central to the Chinese formulations of spontaneity is coupling, not decoupling, between mind and environment.
This coupling can be discerned at multiple levels of analysis.
Consider spontaneous communication in the animal kingdom. One case in point
is the instinctual response of the young to the call of its mother, as captured by an
image from the Chung Fu hexagram (61) of I-Ching (Wilhelm, 1967, p. 237):
A crane calling in the shade.
Its young answers it.
The instinctual response of the young to the call of its mother may be understood
in terms of a hypothetical biologically shared signal system involving both sending
Authenticity as Spontaneity
115
and receiving mechanisms (Buck, 1984, p. 6). Owren and Bachorowski (2001)
also suggest that the instantaneous signal pick up between the two parties suggests
the possibility of sending and receiving being integrated functions of a unitary
mechanism (p. 172)in other words, tight coupling between the two parties. In
addition to speed of communication, these naturally coupled signs tend to be nonvoluntary, hence not falsifiable (Buck, 1984)herein lies the connection, from the
Chinese point of view, between authenticity and spontaneity.
Timing is everything: Latency period, although necessary for deliberations, is not
always helpful. There is some evidence that implicit information-integration can be
impaired by latency period. In a study by J. D. Smith et al. (2014), participants performed two types of tasks that either had a rule-based solution, characteristic of
system 2 reasoning, or an information-integration solution, characteristic of the
holistic thinking of system 1 processes. Feedback on participants task performance
was provided after each trial (immediate condition) or at the end of each block of
trials (deferred condition). The researchers found that deferred reinforcement compromised information-integration learning (the system 1 processes) but not rulebased learning (system 2 processes). Thus one of the reasons why Daoism privileges
spontaneity could be due to the fact that latency interferes with its preferred processing style, namely holistic integration of information.
To the extent that immediate feedback entails tight coupling between signals,
spontaneity entails community.
Spontaneity and community.
Authenticity presupposes a community. (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 75)
More important than getting a cognitive map of the world, the community with
strong ties is interested in assessing each others trustworthiness. One of the measures of trustworthiness is spontaneity. As Edward Slingerland points out, spontaneity is an indication of freedom from cognitive control: if I see evidence of cognitive
control in you, I start to think that maybe somethings going on, because when were
being conscious and using cognitive control, were often doing it to deceive or lie or
figure out whats best for us. (Retrieved from http://edge.org/conversation/
the-paradox-of-wu-wei).
Spontaneity in the sense of latency-free interaction lies at the core of responsiveness. Parental responsiveness has been found to foster the development of speech
and the childs learning to turn-take in other situations (Tamis-LeMonda, Kuchirko,
& Song, 2014). Other aspects of social interaction also rely on responsiveness to
make the inter part of interaction work. Otherwise, we would each be performing social actions on each other without any interchange, says Tantam (2009).
Besides responsiveness, another form of spontaneity that serves the function of
social glue is empathy.
Empathy as Coupling.
Master Chuang and Master Hui were strolling across the bridge over the Hao River. The
minnows have come out and are swimming so leisurely, said Master Chuang. This is the
joy of fishes. Youre not a fish, said Master Hui. How do you know what the joy of
fishes is? (Mair, 1994, p. 165).
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Freedom and Emotion
Chuangzis answer is I know it by strolling over the Hao (Mair, 1994, p. 165).
This automatic knowing exhorted by Chuangzi is based on empathy. A modern version of Chuangzis approach is found in Tantams (2009) account of Wittgenstein:
Tantam claims that Wittgenstein dissolved the question, asked often by philosophers, of how can I know that others exist by arguing that he did not need to know,
because he just found himself taking that attitude. There is accumulating evidence
that individuals suffering from autism-related disorders have difficulty with automatic knowing of others states of mind, possibly due to deficits in empathy. These
individuals need theory of mind to figure out about others (Baron-Cohen, TagerFlusberg, & Cohen, 2000). Thus the more emotionally impaired, the more the individual is in need of the slow deliberative process of system 2 thinking to process
social and emotional informationand still may not get it right.
Authenticity and Freedom

Another connotation of spontaneity in emotion is freedom from the interference of
cognition. This project is best known through the Daoist notion of nonaction, which,
according to Ames and Hall (2003), is often marked by wu-forms (p. 32) of which
the most familiar articulations are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu , meaning, an action which is noncoercive, a knowing without recourse to rules or principles, and a desiring which does not seek to possess or control its object, respectively
(p. 32). The authors point out that:
The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the
ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know
the world and to optimize the human experience. (p. 36)
For our purposes, unmediated representation and expression of emotional energies entail freedom from cognition in a twofold sense: freedom from cognitive
appraisal (see Chap. 5), and freedom from cognitive control (see Chaps. 2 and 5).
Freedom from Appraisal

According to appraisal theories (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), one of the necessary
conditions for emotion is knowledge representation of the world, generally known
as cognitive schemas. Harr (2009) draws an analogy of the duckrabbit sketch that
requires cognitive appraisalthe duck-schema or the rabbit-schemato determine
what one sees:
In like manner the complex event of an environmental disturbance and a bodily perturbation
requires the use of a cognitive schema to determine whether it is part of an emotional experience, and which emotional experience that is. (Harr, 2009, p. 299).
Freedom from the Tyranny of Cognitive Control
117
But what if one prefers to dwell, as many poets and artists do, in that dizzying
indeterminacy of the duckrabbit world (Sundararajan, 2004, 2008a)? The notion of
authenticity in the sense of emotion restored to its original innocence speaks to this
desire to experience the world beyond cognitive schemas.
Would it be possible to decouple emotion and appraisal? According to the strong
version of the cognitive appraisal theory, emotion is contingent upon appraisals.
The logical conclusion of this strong version would be no appraisal, no emotion.
This is the basis of the claim of Chuangzi who stated that the sage has no emotions
(qing), since the latter has transcended the discriminating mind of right and wrong,
good and bad. A broader definition of qing, however, would support the contention
of mindfulness researchers that the brain can experience raw, direct sensation without the personal identity constraints that usually filter ongoing experience (Siegel,
2007, p. 152). In order to get at the experience beneath narrative and memory,
emotional reactivity and habit (Siegel, 2007, p. 100), Chinese poetics joins forces
with mindfulness researchers to advocate putting classification on hold (Siegel,
2007, p. 250).
Cognitive appraisal theories are products of the mind-to-world framework,
where the agent is the subject standing over against the world as object and finding
out about it. This perspective capitalizes on stable, stored representations, such as
the self and goal representations, which can be constructed and maintained independently of the environment. Of all the mental representations, the self is the most
invested. The self seems to be the center of gravity for all cognitive appraisals,
which revolve around the main evaluative issues of Am I in trouble or being
benefited, now or in the future, and in what way? (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, P.
31). Working in concert, self-narrative and cognitive appraisal can drive up the reactive mode.
Mindfulness researchers claim that cognitive appraisals are self-generated
accounts about life (Brown & Cordon, 2009, p. 227) that interferes with living.
One of the problems of interference by stored representations is filtering. According
to the literary critic Wang Guo-wei (18771927), good poetry is measured by minimum amount of filtering (ge ) through stored representations that deprive experience of its immediacy and direct impact (Averill & Sundararajan, 2006; Yeh, 2000).
But simply trading lightly on cognitive appraisals is not enough. Freedom of emotion in the Daoist vein lies in freedom from cognitive control (Chaps. 2 and 5).
Freedom from the Tyranny of Cognitive Control

Cognitive control is often claimed to be adaptive in the sense that it counteracts or
regulates automaticity in order to optimize goal-directed behavior by prioritizing
the processing of features that are task-relevant. Previous research has shown that
top-down cognitive control is especially important for performance in unpredictable
task environments, where it is difficult to predict what responses should be made.
But in the familiar, predictable environment of strong ties (see Chap. 1), where the
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ideal mode of communication is marked by spontaneityresponding is done without a deliberate mind (Fung, 1962, p. 184)cognitive control is not as helpful.
Bocanegra and Hommel (2014) conducted a series of experiments to find out
whether cognitive control is always adaptive. The results suggested that top-down
control can actually impair and interfere with the otherwise automatic integration of
information, rendering behavior less efficient. They concluded that cognitive control is not needed, if the environment provides sufficient information for the cognitive system to behave on autopilot based on automatic processes alone. This type of
processing, known as cognition without control (see Chap. 2), is what undergirds
the Daoist agenda of spontaneity.
Less is more: The advantage of cognition without control is evident in the learning tasks of children. According to Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, and Chrysikou
(2009), there are inherent trade-offs between learning and performance tasks: a
system optimized for performance may not be optimal for learning, and vice versa
(p. 260). Performance tasks capitalize on the PFC (prefrontal cortex) function as a
dynamic filter, selectively maintaining task-relevant information and discarding
task-irrelevant information (Chrysikou et al., 2014). While children with their
underdeveloped PFC are at a disadvantage in performance tasks, they excel in learning language and social conventions. This is because their learning is relatively less
interfered with by the top-down control processes, thanks to their immature PFC. In
addition to learning, creativity is another instance where it is advantageous to cruise
along with system 1 processing without the interference of top-down cognitive control. Since adult life in all societies is pretty much preoccupied with performance
tasks, the back-to-nature project of Daoism constitutes a call to put breaks on cognitive control in order to return to the creative and learning mode of the child.
From Cognition to Metacognition

Bocanegra and Hommel (2014) claim that the adaptive nature of cognition lies not
in the control mechanism itself so much as in the metacognitive skillsthe voluntary regulation of ones control to suit both the intended goal and the external contexta kind of metacontrol (Memelink & Hommel, 2012). One important function
of metacognition is to ensure freedom from undue cognitive control, as Bocanegra
and Hommel (2014) point out, cognitive control is adaptive only to the degree that
it can restrict its impact to conditions in which it is really required (p. 1254). In a
phrase, wisdom lies in keeping cognitive control under control.
Dual process theory revisited: The story told about emotions in mainstream psychology can be summed up in a tale of two systems (E. R. Smith & Neumann,
2005). The basic building blocks of emotion come from the evolutionarily older
mechanisms. Automatic, associative processing, pattern-completion processes, and
schematic representation are some of the characteristics of these presumably simple, reactive, and not cognitively penetrable modules. Needless to say, this affective
system, which capitalizes on system 1 processing, is error prone and needs to be
From Cognition to Metacognition
119
regulated by reason or cognition, which belongs to system 2 processing, of which

deliberate, reflective, rule-based reasoning, and propositional representation are
some of the hallmarks (E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005). This story has been told
famously by the Nobel laureate and psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2003).
However, this particular cast of the dual process theory is not universal, according
to Buchtel and Norenzayan (2009). In support of these cultural psychologists prediction that non-western versions of the two-systems story may look very different
(see also Chap. 5), I supply the Daoist account below.
From the perspective of Daoism, both systemssystem 1 versus system 2; the
subcortical versus the cortical; the evolutionarily primitive versus advancedcan
contribute to maladaptive functioning, or not, depending on ones level of awareness. Thus metacognition may be defined as awareness-mediated cognition that
serves to monitor and curb the excess of cognitive control. In the following sections,
I explore how metacognition contributes to the Daoist approach to emotions as genuine and spontaneous manifestations of human nature.
From appraisal to awareness: According to Scherer (1994), cognitive appraisals
purchase us freedom from contingencies of the moment, thereby enhancing flexibility of action. Daoism, joined by mindfulness practitioners, offers another route to
flexibility of action, an approach in which self-regulation is more clearly driven by
awareness itself, rather than by self-relevant cognition (Brown & Cordon, 2009,
p. 216). Here we have two competing algorithms of adaptive emotional functioning.
Appraisal theories claim that a well-constructed cognitive map of the world, complete with identifiable causes and intentional objects, is necessary for an adaptive
emotional response (Deonna & Scherer, 2010). The competing claim from Daoism
is that adaptive action rests squarely upon the metacognitive skills that reside in
higher levels of awareness.
Metacognitive skills consist of decoupling components that have melded into
cognitive schema through habitual living, and curbing the excess of system 2 processes. One example of deconstructing the cognitive schema is found in mindfulness practices. Challenging the received wisdom that attention and appraisal are
tightly intertwined, mindfulness has demonstrated the possibility of decoupling
attention and cognitive appraisal by allowing inputs to enter awareness in a simple
noticing of what is taking place (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, p. 213). This
decoupling goes with inhibition of appraisal: In mindfulness practices, emotion
scripts are held in check while awareness of the emotions impact is gracefully
accepted. As Germer (2009) puts it: Mindfulness is the ability to feel our painif
theres pain to feeland stay out of the drama (p. 132). These metacognitive skills
lie at the core of the Daoist notion of refined pleasure.
A good example of refined pleasure is found in an anecdote about the artist Wang
Hui-zhi (died c. 388). One night, when awakened by a heavy snowfall, Wang Huizhi thought of his friend Tai Kuei:
Immediately he took a boat and went to see Tai. It required the whole night for him to reach
Tais house, but when he was just about to knock at the door, he stopped and returned home.
(Shih-shuo, chap. 23, Fung, 1966, p. 235).
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Freedom and Emotion
To those who were puzzled by his action, Wangs explanation was: I came on
the impulse of my pleasure, and now it is ended, so I go back. Why should I see
Tai? (Fung, 1966, p. 236). The key to the refined pleasure of Wang seems to lie in
the virtuosity of his controlled processing that selectively activated one impulse
(paying someone a visit) and inhibited another (seeing someone), thus defying the
ordinarily tight coupling of these action tendencies in the goal-oriented thinking
that Daoism never tires of disparaging.
Paradoxes abound in Daoism. Just as bonsai is not raw but cultivated nature, the
immediacy/impulsivity celebrated by the Neo-Daoists may best be understood as
mediated immediacy or controlled impulsivity. This formulation challenges the
dichotomy, prevalent in dual process theories (Kahneman, 2011), between the
impulsivity of system 1 thinking and the controlled processing of system 2 thinking.
Was the Daoist painter being impulsive? The traditional view is that he was modeling spontaneity, which was much celebrated during the period of Neo-Daoism (see
Fung, 1966). Daoist spontaneity mimics impulsivity, but rests squarely upon mindfulness, the very antithesis of impulsivity. The higher order awareness of mindfulness is evident in Wangs action: (a) minute attention to the ebb and flow of his urge/
impulse; and (b) an act of self avowal, thereby owning up to and allowing himself to
ride on the crest of his urges, but not one minute longer when the impulse was spent.
Was this action adaptive? Taking into consideration the cultural climate of the
time, the answer is definitely in the affirmative. The Daoist painter knew exactly
what he was doinghe was trying to impress his Neo-Daoist friends, including the
one who did not get a visit, by showing off the extent to which his heart s yearnings
could remain free, untethered to the goals and objectives of a conventional life.
Lastly, this episode of refined pleasure decouples intent and goal by pursuing the
former while inhibiting the later. As an impulse or an inclination of heart (Germer,
2009, p. 138), intent is more transitory than goals (see Chap. 6). Note that the artists
approach to intent is not quiet introspection, so much as active pursuit and deriving
of pleasure from its fulfillment. What remained unfulfilled was the goal plan of
visiting a friend which, as a stored representation unaffected by the ebb and flow of
the impulses, left the Daoist painter cold as butter to the flies.
Eccentric as it may seem, this legend has a grain of truth that is celebrated
throughout the ages in Chinese history, namely that creative action consists of a
paradoxical combination of simple cognitive mechanisms of the young child, on the
one hand; and a mature adults mindful awareness, on the other. The Taoist sage is
old and young at oncea paradox which is best expressed by Victor-Emile Michelet:
Alas! We have to grow old to conquer youth, to free it from its fetters and live
according to its original impulse (cited in Bachelard, 1964, p. 33).
To unpack this Daoist paradox, we may speak of two types of complexities
cognitive and consciousness (see also Chap. 5). In the Daoist tradition, these two
complexities are combined in reverse order: up the ladder in consciousness (secondary, or tertiary awareness), and down the ladder in cognitive mechanismsprivileging the system 1 processes such as impulses and uninhibited responsiveness to the
environment. The result is a unique appraisal profile of Chinese emotions, in which
responding is done without a deliberate mind (Fung, 1962, p. 184).
Coda: The Good Guys and Bad Guys in Emotion
121
A Lasting Legacy
Daoism is one of the major factors in the shaping of Chinese Buddhism, as Mair
(1994) points out, Chinese Buddhists received more inspiration from the Chuang
Tzu than from any other early Chinese text. This is especially true of members of the
Zen (Chan) school (p. xliv). Chinese poetics also owe much to Daoism for its
unique appraisal profile, in which the relatively simple and automatic processes are
privileged as the hallmarks of spontaneity and genuineness, whereas the more cognitively elaborate appraisals are distrusted for being calculative and infested with
value judgments.
A comparable perspective in the West is found in Christian mysticism
(Sundararajan, 2008b). Rudolf Otto (1970/1923), an authority on mysticism, claims
that the unleavened bread of mystical experience has no use for the yeast of discursive thought. He goes on to say that the mystical experience can be firmly grasped,
thoroughly understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the
feeling itself (p. 34). Replacing the term mystical with affective in Ottos statement above, and we have a concise summary of the information processing strategies of emotion in Daoism and Chinese poetics. The unique processing strategies of
these traditions that privilege attention to experience over attribution of cause can
make a significant contribution to emotion research.
Coda: The Good Guys and Bad Guys in Emotion

The extensive contribution of cognition without control to the Daoist virtuosity in
refined pleasure challenges the conventional wisdom in the West about the primitiveness of system 1 processes and the supremacy of cognitive control. In a larger
context, we may wander about the ubiquity of the primitive in a culture such as
the West that puts a premium on cognitive control:
emotion, like the female, has typically been viewed as something natural rather than
cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather than ordered, subjective rather than
universal, physical rather than mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and
hence often dangerous. (Lutz, 1996, p. 151)
Might it not be that the alleged primitiveness of emotions and other human
functions are the result, not the justification, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of cognitive control? Put another way, cultural scripts can be self-fulfilling prophecies such
that chronically inhibited cognitive processes may stay primitive which in turn justifies their inhibition. One case in point is system 2 thinking in the Chinese context,
where concern with its calculating and manipulative potentials in the mind-to-mind,
relational (Chap. 1) context may have inadvertently inhibited its development in a
different contextthe mind-to-world non-relational arena, where science can flourish only with a sustained development in system 2 thinking.
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Freedom and Emotion
Be that as it may, cultural scripts cannot be modified at will without serious consequences. A case in point is the fanshen movement during the 1940s, in
which large-scale aggression was unleashed by a change in the traditional Chinese
appraisal of suffering. Ann Anagnost (1997) documented how the practice speaking bitterness (bitterness is a literal translation of suffering) as introduced by the
land reform led to unbridled violence and aggression when the Longbow villagers
learned to attribute their suffering to class exploitation rather than to fatetheir
traditional attribution of the cause of suffering.
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Online Resource
http://edge.org/conversation/the-paradox-of-wu-wei
Chapter 8
Being Spoiled Rotten (Sajiao

):
Lessons in Gratitude
Introduction
With the exception of friendship, the majority of Chinese relationships are hierarchical in nature. An example of intimacy in a vertical relationship is sajiao .
Seemingly contrary to the Confucian emphasis on social mindfulness or being considerate to others (Chap. 3), selfishness has a place in the Confucian tradition, provided that you are young and immature, and provided that someone loves you
enough to put up with your immaturity. This is the gist of sajiao:
The youngest boy was often described to me by his mother as keai [adorable] and tiaopi
[mischievous], both of which were perfectly true. While she [the mother] was trying to
carry on a conversation with me, he constantly climbed on her back and implored her, in his
best sajiao voice, to carry him piggyback. She finally complied, saying with a laugh to me:
Sajiao! (Farris, 1994, p. 18).
According to Catherine Farris (1994), sajiao means adorably petulant (p. 161).
It is a term used only in reference to small children and young women. Sa means
letting loose; jiao means beautiful, tender, indulged, and petted. The compound
sajiao means (1) to show pettishness, as a spoiled child, and (2) (of a woman) to
pretend to be angry or displeased (pp. 1213). As a form of communication, sajiao
entails the use of verbal and nonverbal cues to construct a nurturing relation.
It makes extensive use of linguistic and nonverbal forms of communication:
Kinesically, head, face and body movements index the sajiao-ness of the utterance. At the phonological level, the sajiao tone indexes the speakers intent in and
of itself (p. 23). More specifically, facial kinesics include eye-rolling, rapid
blinking and extended, pouting lips (p. 16). linguistically, the particles (ma and la)
index a comment (see Chap. 6) which point to the speakers attitude toward the
speech event (p. 23). For instance, the particle Ma conveys an expressive overtone
to soften a remark made in a pleading style (p. 14).
Young children are demanding, who take you for granted, who want what they
want, and get what they want by exploiting your affection for them. This is a pro Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
125
126
8 Being Spoiled Rotten
totypical scenario of sajiao. Is it good to spoil our children like that? I leave this
question to experts of child rearing practices. For now, I ask a more practical question: Who has the stamina to deal with spoiled brats all day long? The short answer
to this question goes something like this: It may depend on whether you rely on
willpower or lovethe former but not the latter is susceptible to depletion. The
long answer to this question will take you through the meandering trails of inquiry
in this chapter. This inquiry will address three topics: First, synergistic community
as the ecological background of sajiao; second, the rationality of favor consisting
of two elementsthe cold computation of debt-based transactions, and the hot
cognition of gratitude; and third, the function of sajiao as the training ground for
gratitude. For illustration, I examine the modifications of the sajiao principles in
the males socialization practice of flower drinking. I conclude with the suggestion that gratitude may serve as an alternative route, instead of cold reason, to
self-control.
Ecological Conditions for Sajiao

Received wisdom in psychology is that willpower is a limited resource that can be
depleted after exertion (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Challenging this prevalent
view, Job, Dweck, and Walton (2010) propose that physical and mental stamina can
be depletedor not, depending on our assumptions about resources in general. The
researchers gave two different instructions to participants randomly assigned to
either limited-resource theory, or non-limited-resource theory. They found that after
the completion of some strenuous mental tasks, the participants stamina could be
depleted or not, depending on whether they were primed to think that their resources
were limited or not.
The limited and non-limited theories of resource correspond to the two paradigms for communityscarcity-based or synergistic (Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu,
2012) (see Chap. 1). The scarcity-based community assumes that valued resources
are limited, whereas synergistic community assumes that there is a paradoxical
and generative quality of synergy in that the more you use a resource, the more it
is there to be used (p. 54). Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) argue that scarcity
whether of food, time, or anything elsechanges how you think. They have documented how scarcity improves focus but can contribute to tunnel vision, characteristic
of high cognitive control. By contrast, super-abundance in resource makes one
relaxed and cruise along with low cognitive control (see Chaps. 1, 2, 5, and 7).
There is different math involved. Scarce resource means tight budget, which
requires precise calculations (high cognitive control), so as to ensure fair distribution of resources. Super-abundance in resource makes you think that you can get by
with low cognitive control and rough estimates instead of rigorous math; furthermore it makes you think that you can afford to splurge.
The Favor-Based Rationality of Sajiao
127
The Favor-Based Rationality of Sajiao

To understand sajiao, we need to situate it in the context of favor (Hwang, 2012), a
traditional Chinese practice that operates on the assumption of the synergistic community that the more you use a resource, the more it is there to be used (Katz
& Murphy-Shigematsu, 2012, p. 54). I have argued (see Chap. 1) that synergistic
and scarcity-based ways of calculation correspond to relational and non-relational
cognitions, respectively. Chinese do both types of math, depending on context
relational (in-group) or non-relational (out-group). A study by Leung and Bond
(1984) found that whereas American students made distribution of award according
to effort, which entails a relatively fair and precise calculation characteristic of
scarcity-based community, Hong Kong students applied effort-based distribution to
the out-group only. Within the in-group, Hong Kong students tended to use a less
precise mathequal distribution of reward regardless of meritcharacteristic of
the low cognitive control of synergistic community. Less rigorous mathor as the
Chinese put it more graphically Keeping one eye open and one eye closedis
good for group cohesion. This point finds support in Chius (1990) study which
found that equal distribution of reward (everybody in a group project gets the same
grade) was positively related to the perception of group cohesiveness among Hong
Kong college students.
Splurging a Favor. The scarcity-based rationality computes everything in terms
of a tight budget. For instance, time is on tight budgettransactions are one-time
deals such that both parties want the outcome to be fair and square. By contrast,
synergistic rationality has a tendency to think in terms of super-abundance of
resources, including time. For instance, the long-term relationship of strong ties
allows for repeated transactions, in which, with theoretically unlimited time and
unlimited cycles of transaction, loss and gain will eventually balance each other out.
Thus, these two rationalities approach the question of a balanced transaction differently: scarcity-based rationality relies on precise calculation to render explicit the
account of a one-time deal; synergistic rationality operates on fuzzy logic and
implicit reasoning to compute a balanced ledger in repeated cycles of transactions.
This relaxed calculation of the synergistic rationality supports a debt-based relationship which allows for asymmetrical, not balanced, transactions. In the words of
Bedford (2011): The way to maintain the relationship is to store up favors and keep
the other indebted (p. 152).
Debt-based transactions have two components, symmetry breaking and symmetry restoration (see Chap. 1; Bolender, 2010). In symmetry breaking, the resource
allocator is a person with enough resources (such as the social capital of face) to
splurge on someone thereby rendering the latter a debtor. Once a debt is incurred,
symmetry restoration is set in motion, because the debtor feels the obligation to
rectify this imbalance or asymmetry. Psychologically, the awareness of indebtedness is important to the emotion-motivation system of gratitude. As the sociologist
Lin (2001) points out, to the extent that the resource allocator does not demand or
enforce an immediate payback, the debtor is forever grateful.
128
In paying back the debt, one common strategy is to further increase the social
capital, such as face, of the benefactor. This is consistent with the algorithm of synergistic communities, namely that the more you use a resource [such as face], the
more it is there to be used (Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2012, p. 54). For illustration, consider the following anecdote from a Chinese blog Boss, would you
please invite my father to dinner?(,?) (retrieved from
http://t.hexun.com.tw/20367218/30487805_d.html):
A young man fresh out of college found a job working at entry level at an international trading company in Suzhou. His father decided to pay him a visit in order to find out how he
was doingdoes he have friends; where does he live, and so on. But the young man was all
alone in a big city. He recalled how his father brought him up after his mother passed away;
how his father carried him on the bike, peddling from street to street selling bean curd.
He wanted to put his fathers concerns for him at ease, but how? With no friends to turn to,
the young man approached his boss. With great embarrassment and all flustered, the young
man asked his boss to take his father out to dinner. The boss more than accommodated his
requestupon arrival, the employees father was given a chauffeur along with the company
car, taken to an expensive hotel, entertained by a banquet at a fine restaurant, to which the
company staff were invited. In addition, the young man was given time off to tour the city
with his father in the company car. After the young mans father left, the boss called for a
company meeting to explain why he did what he did: An organization is not simply a place
to work. It is also a big family where people show concern and loving care for each other.
In addition to competition, benefits and development, there should also be the warmth of an
ordinary family. This is what makes a good organization, a forever progressive organization. The boss was right. This company grew and made money even during the recession
of 2009. To this day, the young man, now a business manager in the company, tells this story
to every new employee with this punch line: the all surpassing power is affection (qing).
Cast into the symmetry framework (Chap. 1), the gist of this blog goes something
like this: A young man low in social capitalall alone in a big city and a big company
went to his boss to borrow some social capital in the form of face and recognition, in
order to meet the expectations of his father who was coming to town to check on him.
The boss splurged favor on the young man, giving him and his father face and recognition far beyond what was warranted by the work relationship. To rectify this asymmetry
of imbalanced transaction, the young man, now rendered debtor, openly publicized the
favor he received from the boss, thereby increasing social recognition and reputation of
the latter. This, according to Lin (2001) is a common practice for debtors to maintain
relationship (in other words, to restore symmetry) in debt-based transactions.
The Strange Math of Favor

As a type of investment in social capital, favor has a strange maththe scores dont
ever seem to be kept even. As Bedford and Hwang (2013) point out, People do not
request favors just because they have a relationship, they ask and preemptively offer
favors in order to create a relationship or guanxi (p. 306). Debt-based, asymmetrical transactions have a built-in momentum to keep cycles of transaction going. This
momentum is driven by the need to restore symmetry in the relationship. Bedford
and Hwang (2013) put it this way: One possible reason why exchange of favors
Basking in Gratitude
129
builds relationships is that doing a renqing [favor] creates a relationship by creating

indebtedness. As long as a favor is owed, there is a relationship between the two
people (p. 307). Thus the steeper the debt, i.e., the greater the asymmetry, the better
it is for the relationship. The reason behind this lies in the nature of mixed ties.
The rationality of mixed ties. The rationality that governs mixed ties is Equality
Matching (see Chap. 1; Hwang, 2012). The tit-for-tat rationality of Equality
Matching (Fiske, 1991) is operative in primates who come to each others aid in time
of need. Studies (e.g., Cheney, Moscovice, Heesen, Mundry, & Seyfarth, 2010) show
that when a primate sounds a help call, relatives come to help regardless of their
recent history of interactions, because we are family as the strong-ties-based rationality would say. By contrast, among unrelated primates, the decision to help or not
hinges on the nature of the recent encountergrooming versus a fight, for instance,
the former motivates helpful behavior whereas the latter does not. The same principle applies to what Hwang (2012) refers to as mixed ties (see Chap. 1), in which the
Equality Matching principle of reciprocity, or you-rub-my-back-I-rub-yours, constitutes the determining factor as to whether one gets a helper or not in time of need. In
the context of this tit-for-tat rationality, imbalanced transaction poses a threat of
wrecking the relationship if the imbalance or asymmetry is not fixed.
To make things worse, Hwang (2012) points out that there is a near impenetrable
boundary between the blood ties of family and the mixed ties of friends, whereas the
boundary between friends and strangers is relatively penetrable. This means that
mixed ties are in a precarious position where it is near impossible for friends to
become family, but it is always possible for friends to become strangers. Thus mixed
ties are particularly motivated to symmetry restoration so as to maintain the relationship and not to become strangers. This configuration of sensitivities and motivations in mixed ties is what renders the imbalanced debt-based transactions so
effective in motivating relationship maintenance.
Indebtedness, however, is not simply a matter of cold math, but also feelings:
Business involves both economic and social transactions. Purely economic transaction is
cold with precise calculations. Social transactions usually come with a flavor of relational
feelings (ren-qing ). In buying and selling, we accumulate emotional debt to each
other, which through the reciprocity of paying back the debt gives both parties a warm and
fuzzy feeling. Relational feelings (ren-qing) are rich and ambiguous. Both parties of the
transaction operate on an emotional ledger, which is neither visible nor graspable but palpable enough to provide a general principle and direction for the relational debt to be kept
in balance. (Zhou, 2012, p. 85)
The feeling dimension of indebtedness is embodied in gratitude (Emmons &

McCullough, 2003).
Basking in Gratitude
Gratitude is a moral emotion (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001).
The Chinese term for gratitude is another gan compound: gan-ji. The gan-ji
compound refers to the sensitivity and responsiveness to the impact of indebtedness.
130
Due to individual differences in sensitivity, the impact of indebtedness need not be

in proportion to the actual favor incurred. Consistent with synergistic communities
in which a small input can result in exponential output (Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu,
2012), the more disproportionate the ratio between response and favor, the better it
is for gratitude. As a Chinese proverb goes: Reciprocating a drop of beneficence, a
surging fountain of gratitude (,) (for another translation, see
Bedford & Hwang, 2013, p. 299). Thus it is important to develop this sensitivity and
responsiveness to indebtedness as early as possibleone may even get an early start
in childhood with sajiao.
Sajiao is the training ground for gratitude, but it does not give lessons in saying
thank you. It teaches something more fundamental than that: Sajiao fosters the
sensibility behind the expressions of thanks-giving when one is mature enough to
do so later down the pike. Sensitivity and responsiveness to indebtedness can start
in the cradle with the cultivation of two essential ingredients of sajiaoacknowledging dependency and associating asymmetrical relationship with nurturance.
A Celebration of Asymmetry in Sajiao

Sajiao implies both intimacy and subordination (Farris, 1994, p. 14). To the extent
that indebtedness is the medium through which this intimacy is experienced, sajiao
is indebtedness a galore. But indebtedness works differently in sajiao than it does in
the context of mixed ties.
Whereas indebtedness in mixed ties comes with a certain anxiety, sajiao is
indebtedness without anxiety. The difference lies in the context of the relationship.
Sajiao takes place in the context of expressive ties within the family, in contrast to
mixed ties where individuals are not related to one another biologically (Hwang,
2012). According to the symmetry model of relationships (Chap. 1, Fig. 1.1), expressive ties are situated at a higher echelon of the descending chain of symmetry subgroups than mixed ties, suggesting that the former has more symmetry to spare and
therefore more secure and tolerant toward symmetry breaking than the latter. Since
mixed ties are vulnerable to the destabilizing effect of symmetry breaking, relationship maintenance through symmetry restoration is an all-consuming task that overshadows feelings (qing). In sajiao, by contrast, feelings (qing) predominate and the
asymmetrical relationship is celebrated instead of being repaired. A corollary of the
dominance of feelings is low cognitive control (see Chaps. 2, 5, and 7)sajiao gives
all parties involved a break from cognitive controlits all play, no work.
In sajiao, the child actively creates asymmetry by inducing the superior to
splurge a favor. To revel in asymmetry, sajiao acts out the worst while expecting the
best. Worse than normal behaviors are exhibited in sajiao, in particular, selfishness
and immaturity. Selfishness is manifest in the manipulations of others to splurge a
favor; immaturity is exhibited mainly through the expression of anger-related affect.
Acting like a spoiled brat. Fitting in is very important in collectivistic cultures,
so we are told. The individual needs to suppress his or her personal needs and feel-
Invoking the Maternal Order
131
ings in order to get along with others, so the collectivism narrative continues. Yet,
there is room for selfishness in the Chinese society. Selfishness, understood as a sign
of immaturity, is a prerogative of the very young. Sajiao marks this site of selfishness reserved in particular for the young and immature. This term refers to the
behaviors of young children who act like a spoiled brat, and by extension, young
women acting childish as a form of flirtation.
Sajiao can be outright manipulative. This is implied in many of its connotations,
according to Farris (1994): a general linguistic form expressing wheedling with
subordination which is a strategy available to children and adults of both sexes
(p. 13). Or the adorable petulance of a spoiled child or young woman who seeks
material or immaterial benefit from an unwilling listener (p. 13). Farris (1994)
points out that Children learn early not only to do sajiao so as to get what they
want, but also that this behavior has a specific label (p. 18), such as adorable or
mischievous.
Sajiao can be used to show displeasure by the use of linguistic forms that are a
metaphorical extension of baby talk (p. 16). Certain particles are used to indicate
the tone of voice: Ba is a particle which indicates mild imperatives like come on,
lets; ma is a particle used to soften a remark made in a pleading style, like
please! In response to her husband who called in to say that he couldnt come
home for dinner, a young bride said in a sajiao tone, I have already cooked dinner
(le la)! (p. 19). Baby talk legitimizes the display of anger-related affect, such as
peevishness, which is not considered negative so much as immature emotions.
The focus of sajiao, however, falls not on the selfish and sometimes downright
manipulative behaviors, so much as on the relational context of such behaviors. It is
the context of intimacy. Thus young children may act like a spoiled brat with parents, but not necessarily with teachers, and definitely not with strangers. And a
young woman may act childish only with selective mates. This deliberate act of
regression is done not in the service of the ego so much as in that of a relationship.
This point is best expressed by another dictionary definition of the term sajiao:
Relying on dotting affection to bring forth an indulgent attitude (Farris, 1994,
p. 13). This reminds us of the Japanese term amae.
Invoking the Maternal Order

Farris (1994) suggests that sajiao is close to amae in which individuals presume and
depend upon anothers benevolence. According to the Japanese psychoanalyst
Takeo Doi (Doi, 1981), amae is a uniquely Japanese need to be in good favor with,
and be able to depend on, the people around oneself. Amae is the nominal form of
the verb amaeru, which Doi uses to describe the behavior of a person attempting to
induce an authority figure, such as a parent, spouse, teacher, or supervisor, to take
care of him or her. The person who is carrying out amae may beg or plead, or alternatively act selfishly while secure in the knowledge that the caregiver will indulge
him or her. Based on Dois work, Bollas (2013) claims that amae invokes the
132
maternal order in the other by behaving on the assumption that each of us has a
right to be loved by the maternal features resident in the other (p. 120).
The maternal order is a nurturing relationship characteristic of the parentchild
attachment, and is reminiscent of therapeutic relationships such as Rogers unconditional positive regard. However, what is unique about its manifestation in amae
and sajiao is the emphasis on the imbalanced transaction, as evidenced by indulging
the other. Cast in the framework of symmetry (Chap. 1), indulgence underscores a
superabundance of symmetry, sufficient enough to withstand the symmetry breaking acts of selfishness.
The connection between superabundance and self-indulgence finds empirical
support in the research by Emily Bianchi (2014), who reported a positive correlation
between economic affluence and narcissistic personality traits. Narcissistic individuals are full of themselves, characterized by self-focus, self-importance, and
self-deserving. To this type of brats, sajiao forms an illuminating contrast.
The difference between these two types of bratsone related to narcissism, the
other sajiaoseems to fall along the divide between two transactions of the mind:
mind-to-world versus mind-to-mind (see Chap. 1). In the context of mind-to-world
transaction, material affluence in the world contributes to indulgence which in turn
breeds narcissism. In the context of mind-to-mind transaction, maternal order is a
superabundance that breeds indulgence. But the brat in the relational context of
mind-to-mind transactions finds himself or herself in a subordinate position. Turning
upside down the rights-based reasoning of individualistic societies, sajiao says
something to the effect that My right of way is not what I am entitled to, but rather
what others grant me out of grace. Thus, instead of feeling entitled and deserving,
the sajiao brat is keenly aware of his or her dependence on the other mind, in which
alone lies the hope of invoking the maternal order.
Regression with Discretion

In the non-relational context, to be a brat is to take without asking. But contrast, the
brat in the sajiao context will ask for things, albeit not necessarily asking in a mature
manner. Brats in the non-relational context tend to rely on force to get what they
want, such as bullying, throwing temper tantrums, and threatening. By contrast,
preferred strategies in sajiao are actions associated with subordination such as
pleading, or requests based on appealin other words, the use of personal charm is
preferred over brutal force.
How can the antics of immaturitysuch as pouting, whining, petulance, manipulativeness, and so onbe charming? Charm is in the eyes of the beholder. A brat
is cute only in the eyes of the admiring other. Thus acting bratty in the sajiao context
presupposes an audienceanother mind that embodies the maternal order. That is
why children are expected to use discretion in the use of sajiao, including the ability
to discern for what social contexts (intimate, familiar) and what social identities
(young children and women) it is appropriate (Farris, 1994, p. 18).
Regression in the Service of the Ego: Males Flower Drinking
133
As for young women, their display of sajiao is primarily found in the context of
the mating game. Young women act bratty to make sure that (a) a good mate is one
who finds them charming even when they let their hair down so to speak; and (b) to
bank their romantic relationship on gratitude. There is ample empirical evidence
that gratitude is good for relationships (Algoe, 2012), especially romantic commitment (Algoe, Gable, & Maisel, 2010). Algoe, Haidt, and Gable (2008) suggest that
gratitude functions to draw attention to that potentially high-quality relationship
partner, and provide fuel for the binding of the two people more closely together.
Consistent with this hypothesis is the finding that feelings of gratitude and appreciation constitute an important component in the marital intimacy of Chinese couples (Li, 1999).
While children and young women have had their fun with sajiao, how about
adult males? In the following sections I examine a male socializing practice in
Taiwan that involves significant modification of the sajiao game as the right-ofpassage in becoming a man.
Regression in the Service of the Ego: Males Flower Drinking

A common practice in Taiwan, flower drinking is defined by Bedford and Hwang
(2011) as the consumption of alcohol in bars [hostess clubs], often integrated with
prostitution (p. 82). Since there is the notion that going to a hostess club is a key
way to become a man (p. 84), initiation to the hostess clubs begins for many men
in their teens. As adult males, visits to the hostess clubs are an integral part of the
work life: The practice of flower drinking is widely believed to be crucial to doing
business in Taiwan (p. 83). In the following my investigation is based on the data
collected by Bedford and Hwang (2011), unless otherwise noted.
One of the functions served by flower drinking seems to be males self-enhancement.
A few examples based on the authors interviews shall suffice: The interviewees said
they went flower drinking to become an emperor. The hostess club was like a gas
station where the hostesses could fill their masculinity (p. 90). A man wants to satisfy his vanity, to play the hostesses, so whenever he has money he will go there and
be the master (p. 88). And one of the self-enhancement (gaining face) practices is to
bestow on others extravagant gifts, which include women. Here is one example:
I know this guywho was once a big shot in Taiwan. Every time he walked in a club he
would shut it down by hiring the whole place for the night. So 50 or 60 hostesses would be
on their knees pouring drinks for a few [people]. Hed try to be more extravagant each
time to gain face, meaning that hed be spending more and more money just to feel that kind
of satisfaction. (Bedford & Hwang, 2013, p. 304)
This observation is relevant to the ongoing debate over Asians self-enhancement.

Heine and Hamamura (2007) claim that Asians are not into self-enhancement,
whereas Sedikides, Gaertner, and Toguchi (2003) argue that self-enhancement is
universal. Both are correct to a point, as we shall see.
134
Males self-enhancement in hostess clubs can be analyzed along the lines of the
sajiao game, which entails the following rules for a male child:
A. He is taking advantage of the benevolent other, who allows him to:
Let his hair down;
Indulge in his lower impulses;
Gain his self-worth through the adoring gaze of the other.
B. And he is expected to play this self-indulgence game with discretion.
But since flower drinking takes place in the context of mixed ties rather than in
that of the family, it entails one major modification of the sajiao game, namely that
the benevolent other is split into two rolesthe hostess who entertains you and the
boss who pays for all your expenses there. These two benevolent others take care of
two separate components of the sajiao game: The hostess takes care of activities
that fall under A above, which pertains to two essential components of selfenhancementfeeling good and ego repair. The boss takes care of activities that fall
under B, which pertains to the capacity for self-control and use of discretion.
How to Be Spoiled Like a Man

Self-indulgence constitutes the gist of the hostesss services.
Feeling good, fun, and relaxing. The hostess club is the place to take advantage
of the benevolent other. A salesman said, I spend so much money at hostess clubs
to play, to have a really good time, and to feel really good. (Bedford & Hwang,
2011, p. 88). What if the boss offers to cover all the expenses there? Taking advantage of the opportunity to take advantage of the hostess for free is double advantage
taking, which may double the good feeling, as one interviewee in the study of
Bedford and Hwang (2011) put it: being seduced and flattered by women without
paying [when being treated as a guest or paid to go by ones employer] is relaxing
and fun (p. 87).
Indulging in lower impulses. Hostesses drink with customers and engage in sexual games with them such as kissing, fondling, wiping the hostesses private parts
with an object (p. 83), and so on. However, sex is not the main focus. A salesman
put it this way: I spent money to have fun, not for sex. If I want sex, I wont spend
so much money, but just find a woman to have a forty-five-minute fuck (p. 88).
The real service of the hostess lies in giving the customer an ego boost.
Ego Repair in the presence of the benevolent other. Were you enjoying being an
emperor last night? (p. 88) is a common teasing to a friend who frequents the hostess club. A military officer stated, Men like the hostesses company because their
ego, which is so often belittled in front of superiors at work, could be repaired
(p. 88). The same man said, Only there can a man feel such a strong feeling of
dignity (p. 88). What does the hostess do to repair a mans ego?
One interviewee drew an interesting parallel between playing ball and playing
women, both are hobbies of menhis preference is the latter: Other men love
Indulgence with Restraint
135
playing ball. Most men go [to the hostess club] to play women (p. 88). What is
the difference between balls and women? Women, but not balls, have minds hence
can be mindful of you. The hostesses in high-class clubs in particular come from a
long tradition in which courtesans are trained to serve as mens intellectual companion. Most women in traditional China were not educated: Only courtesans studied
art, music, and literature. And they acquired these skills in order to serve as intellectual companions to men of the upper class (p. 89).
One salesman described the experience of being in the presence of the mindful
hostesses:
When you enter the place in a bad mood, the girls still smile at you. You want to smoke,
she lights up a cigarette immediately; your glass is empty, she pours more drinks. Its a kind
of respect you get sitting next to her. Girls nowadays? If you want something, get it yourself. (p. 88)
These skills of social mindfulness (see Chap. 3, Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van
Lange, 2013) create the illusion that a hostess compliments him because she
admires and respects his social status and character, which is irrelevant to the fact
that she is being paid (Bedford & Hwang, 2011, p. 90). While this illusion of selfimportance feels good, it is tempered by another considerationyour boss is watching you.
Indulgence with Restraint

Discretion is important not only for the spoiled brat in childhood, but also for men
who visit hostess clubs. As Bedford and Hwang (2011) put it succinctly:
Competency conveys status (p. 90). What are the competencies required for a
male to be deemed a good business partner?
The requisite skills were: how not to fall in love with the hostesses, how not to confuse the
game with real feelings, how to drink without going to excess, and how to enjoy oneself
without caring too much or spending so much that it would impact the family. The core skill
for all the men was restraint. (p. 90)
Restraint is especially important for the upper-class men: They practiced

restraint in nearly every way, except expense (p. 90). Display of self-control sets
the upper-class men apart from the uninitiated and the lower-class patrons for whom
self-control is less important. One example of self-control is To play, but to take
care of your family as well (p. 89). An old man recalled that when he worked as a
miner in his youth, I earned daily wages that could be used for three days. I spent
one days share at a tea house [hostess club], and gave my family the other two
shares (p. 89).
Lastly, flower drinking is usually a collective game.
A ritual of male bonding. Men seldom go alone to hostess clubs. The authors point
out that the reason to visit a hostess club seemed to center first and foremost on group
excitement (p.86). The collective excitement, or what Durkheim (1995) refers to as
136
collective consciousness of effervescence, at the hostess club is a form of male bonding that involves collective regression via alcohol and women. In the words of one
interviewee in the study of Bedford and Hwang (2011): Men get together to do something bad in order to cement their relationships (p. 88, emphasis added). As another
interviewee put it: These places are definitely necessary to men. They help us relax,
to be free, and let down our defenses. We can talk about anything (p. 87).
In addition to the collective excitement, flower drinking is a rite of passage for males,
as Bedford and Hwang (2013) point out: Participants bonded not just as individuals but
as men (p. 308), and I would add, as mature men. The hallmark of maturity here seems
to be discernment, for which flower drinking poses significant challenges.
The Payback Schedules of Favor

Akin to the pressure of mate selection in the animal kingdom (McKeown, 2013),
flower drinking is the crucible in which males are expected to demonstrate fitness
for potential business partners. As Bedford and Hwang (2013) point out:
Socializing at hostess clubs can be a tactic for enhancing affective bonds and for evaluation
and demonstration of moral character and social competence related to career development.
Success at projecting the correct image was crucial for building relations with the in-group.
Inability to perform resulted in loss of face and weakened the relationship. (p. 308)
One of the indicators of fitness for business partner is discernment, which is by

no means an easy task. Flower drinking is a paradoxical combination of regression
and self-controlthe former pertains to self-indulgence and play; the latter is
essential to work, especially career development. How to distinguish one from the
other, especially under the influence of alcohol?
Key to the daunting task of discernment lies in the ability to distinguish between
emotions real and not so real. The stimulus-bond pleasure and feeling states associated with alcohol and women are considered not real as they are marked by the word
play. By contrast, emotions developed through interactions with ones business partners are real. This distinction between real and not so real emotions falls along the
divide between in-group and out-group (see Chap. 1). Real emotions develop among
similar others in the in-group of males, whereas not so real feeling states are associated with playing women who are the dissimilar otherthe out-group. It is of
course crucial not to confuse ones feelings toward these two types of associations.
Imagine a man making the mistake of becoming grateful to the hostess for making
him feel good, important, and manly? This would be confusing the real benevolent
otherthe boss who paid for your expenses at the hostess clubwith the hostess who
admires you for a fee. To the extent that emotions are valuable resources, this confusion would be tantamount to making a bad investment. The key to discernment, therefore, lies in the ability to understand the intricate rules of favor. As Bedford (2011)
points out, Ganqing [emotion in general and affection in particular] can only develop
through social interaction, which is why the exchange of favors is crucial (p. 155).
The algorithm of favor may be formulated as follows: In favor, payback schedule
is the key. Real emotion and relationship are measured by the latency in payback to
Summary with Some Concluding Observations
137
favors bestowedthe longer the latency period, the more real things become. In the
context of strong ties, the in-group consists of the expressive ties of family, and the
mixed ties of friends (Hwang, 2012). The out-group, by contrast, consists of dissimilar others such as the hostesses who are sex objects for men to play with.
According to Bedford (2011), favors to family members need not be repaid,
whereas favors from nonfamily members must be (p. 150). Thus the latency in
payback is the longest (i.e., no need to reciprocate a favor) for the expressive ties of
family, and the shortest for the out-group which requires immediate and exact payback for services rendered. It is this no-latency-pay-schedule that marks the relationship with the hostess as unreal, as Bedford (2011) points out that immediate
repayment may be seen as an effort to close off the relationship (p. 152). As for the
mixed ties of friends and business associates, the payback is protracted to match the
slow process of building an affect-based connection (guanxi): Working guanxi is
developed slowly without knowing what payoff one may receive down the line
(Bedford, 2011, p. 154).
Summary with Some Concluding Observations

Sajiao constitutes one of the first lessons in gratitude. Through sajiao the child
learns two sets of values: (a) good feelings based on gratification of impulses, and a
glow of self-worth borrowed from the adoring gaze of the benevolent other; (b)
indebtedness and gratitude made salient by an asymmetrical relationship. This
sajiao ritual is reenacted by young women in the mating game. For males, flower
drinking is a rite of passage in which significant modifications are made to the original components of sajiao: (a) the value of good feelings derived from gratification
of impulses and adoration of the benevolent other is degraded by rendering these
desiderata pay for service; (b) the value of indebtedness and gratitude to superiors
at work is enhanced through the skill requirement of discernment that teases apart
momentary good feelings in (a) and the enduring emotion of gratitude in (b).
As we have seen, the differentiation between true and not so true emotions hinges
on the payback schedule of favor. To elaborate on this point, I invoke the theory of
emotion as frustrated action. According to Nina Bull (1951), felt emotions result
from delay in the bodily responses upon which they are based. For example, grief is
felt if bodily preparation to sob and shed tears are delayed. In the present context,
when the action impulse to payback a favor is frustrated by delay, the emotion of
gratitude will be felt, so the theory goes. Thus with immediate payback for services
rendered by the hostess, there wont be any gratitude felt; with near complete frustration of payback to family members, gratitude would be felt strongly and perhaps
strong enough to last a life time. For business associates who are neither closely
related as family members nor un-related as out-group, but belong to the in-between
category of the mixed ties the best strategy would be to delay gratification of the
payback impulse as much as possible so as to bank on gratitude. The protracted
payback schedule of gratitude entails patience, which is essential to delayed gratification. Delayed gratification can be analyzed in terms of short-term cost (refraining
138
from payback right away, enduring the discomfort of being in debt, and so on) with
the hope for long-term gain such as an enduring relationship.
Short-term cost, long-term gain. The ability to delay short-term gratification for
future gains has been studied extensively in psychology under the rubrics of willpower, self-control, or self-regulation (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). One of the best
known studies on delaying gratification is conducted by Walter Mischel (2014) and
colleagues. In this now famous marshmallow test, young children were offered a
choice between one small reward of marshmallow provided immediately or two
small rewards if they waited for a short period, approximately 15 min, during which
time the tester left the room and then returned. In longitudinal follow-up studies, the
researchers found that children who were able to wait longer for the bigger rewards
tended to have better life outcomes, such as higher SAT scores, higher educational
attainment, better physical health, and so on.
In sharp contrast to the Western emphasis on delaying gratification for young
children is the scenario of sajiao. Gratification of impulses is not a problem, so long
as the child learns gratitude through it, for it is gratitude that will, later in adult life,
facilitate the self-control necessary for delaying gratifications so the reasoning
behind sajiao goes. There is some empirical support for this line of thinking.
First, there is the possibility that childrens ability to wait for a future reward depends
on other factors besides willpower. To find out, Kidd, Palmeri, and Aslin (2013) modified the original marshmallow test by dividing children into two groups: one group was
given a broken promise before the marshmallow test was conducted (the unreliable
condition), and the second group had a fulfilled promise before their marshmallow test
(the reliable condition). Children in the reliable condition waited four times longer than
those in the unreliable condition for the second marshmallow to appear. Along this line,
the sajiao scenario suggests that it certainly does not hurt for children to feel loved and
well taken care ofsecure attachment would enhance their ability to wait. This is consistent with the observation of Mischel (2014) that children from intact families showed
superior ability to delay gratification. But from the Chinese perspective, sajiao is simply preparing the ground for gratitude which is the main engine that drives the motivation for making short-term sacrifices for long-term gains in a relationship.
Support for the connection between gratitude and delay of gratification comes
from evolutionary theory. Trivers (1971) suggests that gratitude may be a proximate
motivator for reciprocal altruism, in which one has to accept short-term costs in
resources in an effort to access future gains. Following up on this line of thinking,
DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, and Dickens (2010) found empirical evidence that gratitude motivates behaviors that are costly in the moment but hold the
potential to build long-term cooperation in the future.
An affective route to self-control. The foregoing analysis suggests two competing
routeswillpower versus gratitudeto the goal of investing on future gains while
curbing temptations at the moment. Willpower, as we know, has a downside, namely
that it is energy consuming and can run out (Vohs et al., 2008). By contrast, gratitude can last a life time, especially if its action impulses are frustrated indefinitely. This
suggests the possibility of using emotion to regulate emotion (for more details, see
Chap. 10). More specifically, the positive emotion of gratitude that feeds on the delayed
gratification of its payback impulses may be able to mollify negative emotions of
References
139
frustration and impatience that also grow with delayed gratifications. Empirical support for this conjecture comes from a study by DeSteno, Li, Dickens, and Lerner
(2014), who found effects of gratitude in reducing impatience for delayed rewards.
The significance of this finding lies in suggesting the possibility that affect can serve
as an alternative approach to self-regulation, a route that bypasses the high cognitive-control (see Chaps. 2, 5, and 7) and energy consuming path of willpower. Thus
the authors conclude that in addition to the cold-cognition of rational decisions that
capitalize on effortful self-control or willpower, there is a second route to combat
excessive impatience. Moreover, this route can operate relatively intuitively and thus
effortlessly from the bottom up (p. 1265).
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http://t.hexun.com.tw/20367218/30487805_d.html
Part III
Chinese Creativity
According to von Neumann (Burks, 1966), systems have a complexity barriera

critical level of complexity below which the power of synthesis decays, giving rise
to ever simpler systems. Above that level, however, the synthesis of more elaborate
systems may become explosive. This latter trajectory toward increasing complexity
is seldom traversed by mainstream psychology, which tends to be preoccupied with
the ever more basic building blocks of emotions. As a counterpoint, this section will
examine systems that have crossed the complexity barrier toward more and more
elaborate synthesis. To address the roles of emotional creativity, aesthetics, and
expansion of consciousness in Chinese emotions (see Sundararajan & Averill,
2007), the following three chapters will focus on the solitude seekers, the art of
savoring, and enlightenment, respectively.
References
Burks, A. W. (Ed.). (1966). Theory of self-reproducing automata. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press.
Chapter 9
Chinese Creativity, with Special Focus

on Solitude and Its Seekers
Introduction
It is not that the Chinese did not get so far as the Greeks; they simply advanced in a different
direction. (Jean-Pierre Vernant, cited in Bollas, 2013, pp. 89)
The widespread canard that Asians are not very creative is unfortunately well
supported by robust empirical data (e.g., Bond, 1991; Gardner, 1996; Hannas, 2003;
Ng, 2001). One major flaw in these cross-cultural studies on creativity lies in looking for Asian creativity in the wrong places (Sundararajan & Raina, 2015). Toward
a more informed approach to Asian creativity, I first identify the essential attributes
of Chinese creativity. Then I demonstrate the application of these principles in the
context of Daoism, with special focus on solitude and its seekers. In particular, I cast
the ideal mental world of the recluse in the context of a designer environment that
nurtures as well as demands cognitive and emotional skills pertinent to solitude. For
illustration, relevant poems by Si-Kong Tu (837908) are examined to shed some
light on the emotional landscape of the poet/recluse.
Relational Versus Non-relational Cognition

Chinese privilege art, whereas the West science, as the primary venue for creativity.
This has to do with the differential emphasis on relational versus non-relational cognition, respectively (see Chap. 1). As Forgeard and Mecklenburg (2013) point out:
Creators motivated to enhance communication and empathy in others focus on transmitting
knowledge about other peoples thoughts, feelings, and subjective experiences, with the
ultimate goal of facilitating an emotional connection with others. In contrast, creators motivated to discover, disseminate, and use knowledge toward problem-solving, think of these
goals as ends in themselves, as opposed to means to enhancing others emotional wellbeing and sense of connection (p. 261).

143
144
9 Solitude and its Seekers
Forgeard and Mecklenburg (2013) propose a four-cell grid of creativity based on

two axes: First, there is the conventional axis of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations, which refer to qualities intrinsic or extrinsic to the creative process itself.
Intrinsic motivation is associated with the pursuit of learning goals, extrinsic motivation the pursuit of performance goals. The second axis of creativity pertains to
intended beneficiaries of creativity, which could be either self or others. This axis is
related to processes which have been a neglected dimension in mainstream research
on creativity (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007), but is of particular interest to the Chinese
because of their relational orientation. In combination, the two axeslocus of motivation and intended beneficiariesmake a grid of four cells along which creativity
can be analyzed. The following items of the grid capture well the general orientations of Chinese creativity:
(a) Intrinsic-self-oriented: Intrinsic motivation with self as intended beneficiary of
creativity. This is characteristic of the motivation for growth, e.g., personal
feelings of interest, flow, positive emotion, meaning, competence (p. 259).
(b) Intrinsic-others-oriented: Intrinsic motivation with other as intended beneficiary of creativity. This is characteristic of the motivation for guidance, e.g.,
teaching and modeling for others, fulfilling mentors expectations (p. 259).
Cast in this framework, Chinese creativity is unique in the premium it places on
the artists growth and self-transformation and on the artists role in teaching others
the art of living.
Creativity Without Creator Myth

Either everything shares in creativity, or there is no creativity.
(Ames & Hall, 2003, p. 17)
In contrast to Greek or Indian traditions, the creation myth is not prominent in

China. This has at least two ramifications for Chinese creativity: One, no need for
heroic narratives of revolutionary creativity; and two, no need for causal accounts of
creativity.
A quiet revolution. One of the hallmarks of revolutionary creativity is to confront
and go against the crowd, so we are told in mainstream psychology (e.g., Sternberg,
2006). Not so, according to the harmony model, in which creative action requires
going both with and against the flow, as in crossing a river diagonally rather than
either struggling against the current or letting oneself go (Sabelli, 2005). In Daoism,
as exemplified by the hermits, the creative individual goes away from instead of
going against the crowd.
Self-reflexivity as the key to creativity. The model of creativity for the Chinese is
not God so much as Nature (Niu & Sternberg, 2002). Since nature is self-generating,
creativity does not require a causal account. In the words of David Hall (1978): A
self-creative event is the efficient cause of itself (p. 277). Nature thus embodies the
Solitude and Creativity in Daoism
145
principle of self-reflexivity. One important ramification of self-reflexivity is the

collapse of the dichotomy between the creator and the created product (Sundararajan
& Averill, 2007). The self-reflexivity principle posits that the product of creativity
is the creative individual him- or her-self. Thus instead of patents or other measures
of product in the West, the measure of creativity in China has consistently been selftransformation (Hsu, 1966) of the creative individual him- or her-self, as evidenced
by the quality of the artists mental world (Liu, 1975; Wang, 1977) to be elaborated later.
For a demonstration of these principles of Chinese creativity, I turn to Daoism
with special focus on its inspiration for the solitude seekers.
Solitude and Creativity in Daoism

to be creative requires solitudethe capacity to be alone (Feist, 1999, p. 162).
Creativity in the Daoist vein is fostered by solitude. One third of classical Chinese
poetry is by hermits and about hermits (Han, 1998). The Chinese have many names
for hermits: the recluse, the Daoist immortals, the minister in the mountains (some
hermits were consultants for the emperor), the hermit in the market place, and so on.
Hermits exist even in contemporary China. There is a book (Porter, 1993) and a film
(Burger, 2005) documenting hermit monks in Chinas deep mountains which have
been home to recluses for thousands of years.
One consistent motivation behind hermitage is self-preservation.
An animal model of hermitage. According to a Science News report (Milius,
2013), self-preservation by hiding has its advantages: Cicadas spend the majority of
their lives underground. They emerge after 13 or 17 years to mate, reproduce, and
die shortly after. Hiding underground for a long time may be a good idea, if you are
a cicada. Samples of cicadas from underground dont show much evidence of premature death by predator, and spending more time growing may mean bigger bodies
to leave more offspring. Indeed, the 17-year cicadas were found to have more eggs
than the 13-year ones.
The wisdom of the cicadas can also be observed in contemporary Chinese leaders. There is a Chinese saying that The bird that sticks its head out gets shot (
). Zhou Nan, a marketing professor, explained: If we look at top leaders,
they need to stay very quiet and wait unbelievably patiently for their turn. In comparison, every 4 years there is a presidential election in USA (personal communication, April 23, 2014). This wisdom is described in more details by Jing and Van
de Ven (2014), who studied the Chinese notion of situational momentum (shi ).
Situational momentum (shi) can be favorable or unfavorable: Shi or situational
momentum is favorable when it aids efforts. Shi or situational momentum is unfavorable when it dampens efforts (p. 34). Open communication is used when situational momentum (shi) is perceived to be favorable, where actions must be done
quickly without delay. Change agents must use their clear vision and goals to
146
encourage internal actors to participate in the change process. Thus, open intentions
become reasonable (p. 50). By contrast, as the Chinese proverb goes, the master
holds back secret tricks, the authors point out that secrecy is often an auxiliary
strategy when situational momentum (shi) is perceived to be unfavorable. For illustration, the success story of the CEO of the Chengdu Bus Group is cited to show
how since unfavorable contexts bring high environmental uncertainty. By keeping his intentions secret, he had more opportunities to adjust his plans without losing authority or respect (p. 49). Thus, similar to the cicadas, change agentswait
and save their energy and credibility during an unfavorable shi to take better advantage of the next favorable shi (p. 50).
In addition to self-preservation, solitude also satisfies the need for self-creation.
Creation of the Self

Creativity, as the spontaneous realization of novelty, requires that there be freedom to produce the novelthe locus of freedom is the self. (Hall, 1978, p. 273)
Chinese solitude is both voluntary as well as involuntary: It is voluntary in terms

of decision and commitment; it is involuntary in the sense that one is compelled to
make such a decision under the circumstances that threaten ones integrity and
sometimes ones life. One prominent reason behind the decision to seek solitude is
to be true to oneself. This quest for freedom from group pressure is not different
from the Western notion of independence, except that the Chinese battle for independence is fought in a different way. To the Chinese, freedom means to be away
from the crowd, instead of going against the crowd.
A man named Nan-jung Chu went to see Lao Tzu for advice. Lao Tzu said to
him, Why did you come with all this crowd of people?
The man whirled around in astonishment to see if there was someone standing behind him.
Needless to say, there was not; the crowd of people that he came with was the baggage of
old ideas, the conventional concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, life and death, that
he lugged about with him wherever he went. (Watson, 1964, p. 4)
The moral of the story is clear, namely liberation is from within: Independence
is won not by opposing the group, so much as by opening up a new frontier within
the self.
Prioritizing private over public. The private and public distinction exists in
Confucianism (Chap. 3; Sundararajan, 2002). But Confucius, while privileging the
private over the public, is interested in the integration of these two realms of reality.
For instance, he used rites to integrate alignment and display goals in communication (McKeown, 2013). In the funeral rites, music serves the alignment purposes of
facilitating attunement and social bonding, while wailing serves the purpose of public display of emotions. By contrast, Chuangzi, the hermit philosopher who has the
greatest impact on Chinese creativity, thinks otherwise. He dissociates the alignment
and display goals of communication by a display of unconventional
Ideal Mental World
147
emotionssinging and drummingat his wifes death (Mair, 1994, pp. 168169).
The message of Chuangzi is loud and clear: How the person feels privately cannot
and should not be yoked to public coordination games such as the funeral rites.
The supremacy of inner/private over outer/public reality finds an eloquent
expression in the story of the old man who lives in the kettle: There was an old man
who sold medicine in the market place. He gave his daily income to the poor and the
hungry, keeping only the minimum for himself. Then every day when the sun went
down, he jumped into an empty kettle that hung above his seat and disappeared
without a trace (Q. C. Zhou, 2004, pp. 305309). The Taoist immortal in this story
is amphibian, one who does business with the world to meet his basic needs and to
help others, but when it comes to nurturing his soul and spirit, he dwells in an
entirely different universe.
The transcendent universe of the artist, or creativity for that matter, is known as
the ideal mental world or jing-jie .
Ideal Mental World

The Chinese notion of jing-jie or ideal mental world (J. Li, 1997; Liu, 1975;
Sundararajan, 2004; Wang, 1977) stems from the Buddhist notion that the world is
a projection of the mind such that different states of consciousness result in different
mental worlds (jing-jie) or Visaya in Sanskrit. The capacity for a creative or ideal
mental world is supposedly a matter of attainment in spiritual development or selfcultivation on the part of the individual (Yeh, 2000, Vol. 1). One of the first literary
critics who developed an influential theory of the mental world (jing-jie) is Si-Kong
Tu (837908) (Owen, 1992; Sundararajan, 1998, 2004; Yu, 1978). A modern development of this theory is by the literary critic and philosopher Wang Guo-wei (1877
1927) (Wang, 1977; Yeh, 2000, Vols. 1 and 2). Wangs now classic definition of the
term is as follows:
The world [jing-jie] does not refer to scenes and objects only; joy, anger, sadness, and happiness also form a world in the human heart. Therefore, poetry that can describe true scenes
and true emotions may be said to have a world; otherwise, it may be said not to have a
world. (Wang, 1977, p. 4, emphasis in original).
The basic idea is that poetry, or art in general, is a projection of the artists ideal
mental world, a new frontier in mental space which can be co-inhabited by the audience, who thereby is able to attain similar states of consciousness as the artist. To
explain how the ideal mental world of poetry can facilitate the development of consciousness on the part of the audience, and more specifically for our purposes, how
a poets imageries of solitude can offer ideal mental worlds for the readers to inhabit
and thereby develop emotional skills necessary for the capacity to be alone, I turn to
the theory of designer environment.
148
Designer Environment
to live deliberately (Thoreau, 1966, p. 61).
As social animals, humans tend to select society as their habitat, which satisfies
their need for belonging, but also imposes much pressure for conformity. Those
who choose to be alone will have to make a trade-off between freedom from social
pressure and loneliness. But it is possible to have the best of both worldsfreedom
from group living on the one hand, and emotional bonding, on the other. This can be
done, if one knows how to construct designer environments (Clark, 2008).
Many infrahuman animals have special skills that allow them to construct niches
in which to flourish, for example, spiders weave webs, birds build nests, and beavers
construct dams. Designer environments are the cognitive counterpart of niche construction by animals.
In contrast to natural habitats which are grounded in physical and social reality,
designer environments are found only in cognitive space. As a virtual reality, the
designer environment is a concept cast in the similar vein as the Chinese jing-jie or
ideal mental worlds.
Both the ideal mental world and designer environment share in common with
natural habitats the requirement of skillsincluding a particular lifestyle, and certain cognitive and emotional capacitiesin order for the organism to make it in
these environments. As descried by Clark (2008), humans construct and inhabit
cognitive niches which include designer environments in which to think, reason,
and perform as well as special training regimes to install (and to make habitual) the
complex skills such environments demand (p. 59). Likewise there is much emphasis in Chinese aesthetics on self-cultivation as prerequisite for anyone who wishes
to inhabit the ideal mental worlds of art/poetry.
To demonstrate how the jing-jie or ideal mental world of the poet/hermit is a designer
environment that nurtures as well as demands cognitive and emotional skills pertinent
to solitude, I turn to the work of a hermit-Si-Kong Tu (837908) (see Wu,1963).
Portrait of the Artist as a Hermit

He who hid well, lived well.
(Descartess inscription for his own tombstone, in Damasio, 2003, p. 21)
The recluse typically withdrew to a rural place, had a small following of apprentices, and
practiced some more-or-less obscure Taoist art such as medicine or alchemy. He was likely to
be at least slightly eccentric, if not awesomely unfathomable (Mote, 1960, p. 204).
The ninth century poet/critic Si-Kong Tu (837908) is best known for his The
twenty-four categories of poetry (Erh-shih-ssu shih-pin or Shih-pin for short)
(Owen, 1992). The Shih-pin is ostensibly a taxonomy of poetic styles. It consists of
a set of twenty-four poems dividing poetry into different categories and illustrating
these with vivid images (Wu, 1963, p. 78). But it is as much a typology of poetic
Portrait of the Artist as a Hermit
149
moods. In fact, what Hartman (1964) says about the romantic lyric of surmise
applies very well: this kind of lyricdisconcertingly turns all terms descriptive of
mode into terms descriptive of mood (p. 11). From here we need to make another
movetransitioning from the mood of poetry to that of the poetin order to complete the hermeneutic circle. This relatively smooth conceptual transition from
poetry to poet is made possible by the self-reflexivity in Chinese creativity, in which
the product of ones creativity is first and foremost the creative person him- or
her-self.
The central theme that serves as the root metaphor for all these moods/modes of
poetry as well as poet is solitude. As Pauline Yu (1978) points out, the ideal poet
in the Shih-pin is an aloof solitary figure (p. 91). In fact When Ssu-kung Tu
[Si-Kong Tu] employs any human figures at all, he characteristically chooses the
lone hermit. Specific mention of the hermit occurs in at least six poems, and the
word tu (alone) and references to the lofty crane in several more (p. 90).
In sum, if I may spell things out prosaically and in plain English, Si-Kong Tu
claims that the ideal poet is a recluse, and he has identified 24 categories of the ideal
mental worlds of both poetry and the poet to make his point. In the following pages,
I examine some of the imageries in the Shih-pin in order to gain some insight into
the ideal mental worlds of the poet/hermit. Since these categories in the Shih-pin
are arranged numerically from 1 to 24, I shall refer to each category by its number
as Cat. #.
Imageries of solitude. A good place to start is Cat. 16 entitled Lucid and
Strange: Here the recluse is compared to the atmosphere of autumn: Like autumn
in the weather (Owen, 1992, p. 338). Lu (1989, p. 189) explains that the personality style of lucid and strange involves risk taking, and using unexpected words to
shock others, such that its impact on others is comparable to that of the chilly and
desolate atmosphere of autumn (p. 189). This cold, lofty, chilly, and desolate
mood/mode (Lu, 1989, p. 189) of the poet/recluse is a far cry from the conventional
sage who embodies social harmony and is frequently compared to the spring
weather.
Consider another imagery of solitude in Cat. 5 (Lofty and Ancient):
The moon emerges in the eastern Dipper,
And a good wind follows it.
Tai-hua Mountain is emerald green this night,
And he hears the sound of a clear bell. (Owen, 1992, p. 313)
Owens (1992) exegesis of these lines captures well the mental world of a lofty
hermit: All is wind, light, and sound, with the only shape in the void being the
mysterious and dark mass of Mount Tai-hua, around which immortal beings from
the past play unseen (p. 315). It is reasonable to assume that this designer world of
solitude requires as well as nurtures emotional creativity. Indeed, emotional creativity, as assessed by the Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 1999), was found by
Long, Seburn, Averill, and More (2003) to be the personality variable most highly
related to positive experiences of solitude. In the following sections, I use imageries
from Shih-pin to illustrate some emotionally creative skills that are pertinent to
solitude, with special focus on two sets of capacitiesfreedom and communion.
150
Freedom Skills
Independence with a touch of arrogance. If arrogance is associated with creativity
(Silvia, Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011), the lofty hermits certainly
have their share. As Sundararajan (2004) points out, the Chinese protocol of creativity shares in common with creative individuals in the West a large dose of arrogance
and reward-independence, but not the hostility (aggressive, assertive, argumentative) traits (Feist, 1999) that plague Western creativity. More pertinent to solitude
than arrogance is independence.
Independence serves solitude well as a buffer against social rejection. In a series
of studies, Kim, Vincent, and Goncalo (2013) found that the experience of social
rejection may stimulate creativity but only for individuals with an independent selfconcept. More specifically, individuals who hold an independent self-concept performed more creatively after social rejection relative to inclusion. The results also
show that this boost in creativity is mediated by a differentiation mindset characterized by salient feelings of being different from others. Consistent with this profile is
the lofty hermit who is highly independent and unconventional. A few examples
from Shih-pin (Owen, 1992) shall suffice:
Cat. 5: In air he stands long in spiritual simplicity,/All limits and boundaries lightly
passed (p. 313).
Cat. 21: If for a moment you have the chi [qi] of the Way [Dao],/You will ultimately escape the ordinary (p. 346).
Cat. 22: Set apart, on the point of departing,/Rising loftily, not of the crowd
(p. 348).
As Owen (1992) points out, these lines describe a quality of personality that is
high-minded, free, and holds apart from others (p. 348).
A rolling stoneroaming, exploring, inaccessible. Consistent with Cloningers
(1987) conceptualizations of the high-novelty-seeking trait of creativity, hermits
tend to be engaged in extensive exploratory activities. Consider a portrait of the lone
poet/recluse in the following lines of Cat. 16:
An agreeable person, like jade,
Pacing clogs seek in secluded places.
Now peering, now stopping,
Emerald skies stretching on and on. (p. 338)
The hermit in this poem engages himself with extensive exploratory activities:
pacing, seeking, peering, and stopping from time to time. Here novelty and solitude
have coalesced, thereby rendering secluded places the goal of novelty seeking.
The designer environment for a hermit with high mobility is a poetic mode/mood
best represented by Category 22, called Drifting Aloof in which one moves with
things but has no attachments, no signs of care (Owen, 1992, p. 349). Elements of
this mode/mood can be found in the following poems:
Cat. 2: If there is some resemblance of shape,/The grasping hand has already
missed it (Owen, 1992, p. 306)
Community/Intimacy Skills
151
Cat. 22: As if just about to echo;/Those who recognize already understand,/But

seek it and it will move further away (Yu, 1978, p. 91)
Cat. 21: Advance from afar, almost arrive,/Yet approach it and its already gone
(Yu, 1978, p. 91)
A recurrent motif that runs through these lines may be summed up as a narrative
of inaccessibility: A shape so seemingly tangiblewho can resist the temptation to
grasp and take hold of it (Cat. 2); a word is about to be heardwho can resist the
temptation to wait with intense anticipations (Cat. 22); that which is distant is about
to arrivewho can resist the temptation to approach it with eager expectations (Cat.
21)? Alas, the instant one reaches out for it, the alluring presence has turned into
absence! The ideal poet/recluse is one who is tantalizingly inaccessible. The hermits tantalizing inaccessibility is a well celebrated motif in Chinese poetry. This
motif is summed up by Henry (1987) as follows:
The sight of a deserted room or an unswept walkway means that the adept is roamingperhaps through heaven or in the realm of immortals. The seeker awakens with a shock to the
magnitude of the adepts spiritual attainments. He now knows the adept (p. 30).
In creating the ideal self, the hermit is simultaneously creating an ideal community.
The ideal community of the hermit has the best of both worldsfreedom from
social constraints, on the one hand, and communion with like-minded others, on the
other. The paradoxical combination of freedom and community is the hallmark of
the hermits designer environment. This entails a novel emotional landscape, in
which both community and intimacy are redefined.
Ideal community. Society is only one type of community that humans make to
serve their needs as relational beings; other types of community include virtual
communities with God, Natureand even, on occasion, with inanimate objects.
This perspective allows us to appreciate how some individuals leave society for
another community in a manner analogous to the habitat selection (see Chap. 4) and
niche construction of nonhuman animals.
Hermits enjoy the visits of a select few:
Cat. 13: Someone comes to the emerald hills/Clear wine, a deep goblet (Owen,
1992, p. 332).
Cat. 6: Fine scholars are his guests,/All around him, fine bamboo (Owen, 1992,
p. 315).
With these lines, we can imagine the ideal community for the hermit to be a
gathering of like-minded individuals, a community marked by the absence of
unwanted companyresulting in bamboos outnumbering the human guests. This
152
gathering is also marked by the absence of senseless chattersilence reverberates

through the sounds of lute and waterfalls, and most important:
The falling flowers say nothing:
The man, as limpid as the chrysanthemum. (p. 315)
Since the hermit lives alone, such gatherings are rare if they happen at all. A
more common type of the ideal community is alone togetherfor this to happen,
a few novel innovations are needed.
One innovation is to replace the human companion with nature:
Cat. 2: Infusing with perfect harmony,/Join the solitary crane in flight (Owen,
1992, p. 306).
Another solution is to have virtual community:
Cat. 5: The Yellow Emperor and Sage-King Yao are in his solitude (Owen, 1992,
p. 313).
Here a Taoist immortal is enjoying the company of the cultural heroes from time
immemorial. In the absence of like-minded others, an ideal community is still possible for the artists/hermits, since they can find minds even in stones and rocks
(Rowley, 1959; see Chaps. 4 and 6).
Direct communication. Freedom from society is referred to by Larson (1990) as
time off stage (p. 157), when one is free from public scrutiny and the need to manage a public self. It is conceivable that when individuals relate to each other offstage
as authentic selves, divested of the need for impression management in the public
space, their reciprocal exchange of information and affect, referred to by Larson
(1990) as companionship (p. 157), would improve.
A case in point is direct communication of the hermits, which is in direct contradiction to the indirect communication privileged in the Confucian society
(Sundararajan, 2002), and more in line with vertical individualism as defined by
the item: I prefer to be direct and forthright when discussing with people (Singelis,
Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995, p. 255). It is said that the True Man of old,
when annoyed, he let it show in his face (Watson, 1964, p. 75). Likewise the poet
Kuo Pu wrote: Giving free reign to my feelings lies in going it alone (F. M. Li,
1986, p. 251). What happens when these individuals come across each other?
Si-Kong Tu answered this question in Cat. 18: the words employed are extremely
direct, when Suddenly one meets a recluse (Owen, 1992, pp. 341342).
Intimacy steeped in absence. Loneliness can literally kill you through the wear
and tear of the chronic stress of being alone, according to the extensive research of
Cacioppo (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008). That is more the reason to study the solitude
seekers who seem to have a potent antidote to lonelinessthe capacity to be alone.
The capacity to be alone can be examined on two registers, cognition and emotion.
Cognitively, it is the capacity for absence; emotionally, it is the capacity for loneliness. Both are required skills for the designer environment of solitude.
The emotional state that names this absence-based intimacy is nostalgia. A button sold in the souvenir shop in Taiwan reads: Transform the grief of separation
153
into nostalgia. This makes sense, as nostalgia has been found to be effective in
countering loneliness (X. Zhou, Sedikides, Wildschut, & Gao, 2008). Beyond its
function as an effective buffer against loneliness, nostalgia seems to be closely
related to an orientation best exemplified by the hermits, namely an intrinsic, in
contrast to the extrinsic, self-focus. This is the finding from a series of studies conducted by Baldwin, Biernat, and Landau (2015). Defining extrinsic self-focus as
being concerned with meeting externally imposed value standards, and intrinsic
self-focus as being concerned with the true self, in other words authenticity (see
Chaps. 3 and 7), the researchers found that nostalgia is associated with authenticity
and a sense of well-being. More specifically, they found that state nostalgia was
associated with higher authenticity and lower extrinsic self-focus; that experimentally primed nostalgia increased perceived authenticity of the past self, which in
turn predicted reduced current extrinsic self-focus; that nostalgia increased the
accessibility of the intrinsic self-concept but not the everyday self-concept; that
recalling a nostalgic event increased felt nostalgia and positive affect, but this effect
was attenuated if participants were prompted to recognize external factors controlling their behavior during that event; and lastly, dispositional nostalgia positively
predicted intrinsic self-expression and well-being.
To shed further light on the emotional landscape of the ideal poet/recluse, I conclude this chapter with an exploration of longing, which constitutes the most emotionally creative component of nostalgia.
An anatomy of longing.
Longing the so-said mind long lost to longing. (Beckett, 2006, p. 481)
According to Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and OConnor (1987), longing is a

blended emotion, consisting of a mixture of sadness and lovea painful feeling
related to separation from a loved one (p. 1082). For my analysis of longing, I rely
on one of the ideal mental worlds of the hermit/poet as portrayed by Si-Kong Tu:
Category 4 entitled Firm and Self-Possessed (Owen, 1992, p. 311).
The central theme of this poem is coping with depression. According to Owen
(1992), the title suggests a certain tension: a self-assurance that proves itself by
overcoming the threat of depression (p. 312). The poem begins with a scene of
isolation: A rude dwelling in green forests (line 1). The hermit seems to be enjoying his freedom in the first stanza: He takes off his headband, walks alone (line 3).
Owen (1992) points out that the gesture of removing ones headband (in English
letting ones hair down) suggests a positive freedom from restraints (p. 312).
However in the second stanza, the good cheer is interrupted by the thought of a
companion from whom one is separated and from whom one has no news (p. 312):
The wild geese do not come,
And the person travels far away. (lines 56)
Consolation lies in the possibility of having companionship in thought, in other

words, reminiscence:
But the one longed for is not far
it is as it always was. (lines 78)
154
This emotion regulation, however, needs to be challenged in order to reach a

higher level of emotion refinement (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007) marked by
self-composure in the face of depression. This is accomplished in the last stanza of
the poem (p. 311):
A breeze from the sea, emerald clouds,
Moonlight brightens the isles by night.
If there are fine words,
The great river stretches out before him.
The sea below, the clouds above, in between there is the vast expanse of space
with nothing but wind and (moon) lightthis scene evokes a sense of freedom. The
ocean wind sweeps the clouds at will, just as the bright moonlight pours over the
nightly isles freely. The highest manifestation of mental and spiritual freedom is
reached when the hermit proves himself to be free from depression in the face of
harsh realitiesthe insurmountable barriers to communication (fine words to be
conveyed to the beloved), as suggested by the imagery of the mighty river that cuts
across his path. In sum, self-composure in the face of depression is the capacity to
hold in juxtaposition positive as well as negative ramifications of absencefreedom of mind and spirit, on the one hand; and longing for the impossible community,
on the other.
Coda
In case you think that these ideal mental worlds (jing-jie) along with their ethereal
imageries are the pastimes for the select few in another era far removed from the
hustles and bustles of modernity, nothing can be farther from the truth. The term
jing-jie is by no means obsolete, and the creative construction of such a mental
world is the aspiration of many in contemporary China. The following Chap. 10 will
give an example of this practice in mainland China.
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Chapter 10
Savoring (Pin wei ), from Aesthetics

to the Everyday
Introduction
Proust argued that for the most part experience passes us byit goes too fast and its sensory
basis is dissipated, or our attention moves elsewhere before its meaning can be understood.
The coming together of a particular experience and its meaning is rare. (Oatley, 2002, p. 65).
Savoring (pin wei ) (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007) may be defined formally
as appreciation and extensive processing of personal emotional information that
includes but is not confined to aesthetic experiences. In common parlance, savoring
names the coming together of experience and meaningan occurrence which is not
necessarily rare in the lives of the Chinese.
This chapter begins with an overview that distinguishes the Chinese notion of
savoring from its Western and Indian counterparts. Then I examine the temporal,
narrative, and cognitive structures of savoring. I focus in particular on Si-Kong Tus
formulation of aesthetic savoring, and analyze it in terms of engaged detachment, a
formulation that is consistent with modern explanations of the aesthetic paradox.
Along the way, I point out the wide-ranging implications of savoring for the
narrative-based theory of emotion, dual process theory, emotion regulation, and
self-reflection. Lastly, I examine savorings contribution to self-regulation and the
authentic self, focusing especially on its implications for problems in self-regulation such as self-deception and self-alienation. In the concluding section, I sum up
the principles of savoring with a contemporary Chinese application.
Three Flavors of Savoring

There are at least three flavors of savoring: Chinese, Indian, and Western. The
Chinese notion of savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2004,
2008; Sundararajan & Averill, 2007) differs from the typical Western formulation as

157
158
10
Savoring
well as from the Indian rasa. The Western formulation is confined to positive
experiences (Bryant & Veroff, 2007), whereas the Chinese savoring includes
negative experiences as well, and has a relatively wider scope of temporality that
extends to both the aftertaste of an experience (Eoyang, 1993) and the subtle incipient phase of things (Sundararajan, 2004). Furthermore, the Chinese notion of savoring (pin wei) is more elaborate and wider in scope than what is implied by its English
counterpart. The English term savoring in its common parlance is restricted to
consumption or perception with prolonged attention. By contrast, the Chinese concept of savoring is linked to a number of process terms, such as evaluation of flavor
(pin wei ), being cognizant of flavor (zhi wei ), and retrospective flavor
(hui wei ). All these terms indicate specific modes of processing.
As an aesthetic emotion, the Chinese savoring differs from the Indian rasa
(Sundararajan, 2010) in three respects: first, whereas rasa concerns discrete emotions of anger, erotic love, and so on (Shweder & Haidt, 2000), the Chinese savoring
computes multiple emotional states to capture a particular affective brew; second,
whereas rasa seeks to transcend the self in its mundane existence, the Chinese
savoring is an affirmation of the individual self with its taste, values, and memories
as the sole measure of what is worth savoring; and third, whereas rasa is otherworldly oriented with its highest aspiration to be the tasting of ultimate reality
Brahman (Dehejia, 1996), the Chinese aesthetics of savoring is part and parcel of
the Confucian program of self-cultivation for social harmony and the art of
government.
An Overview of Savoring
The Chinese notion of savoring can be traced back to classical texts of high antiquity (third century BC, if not earlier), but the earliest and one of the most influential
theorists of savoring is the ninth century poet and literary critic Si-Kong Tu (837
908) (Chap. 12; Owen, 1992; Sundararajan, 1998, 2004). In its rudimental forms,
savoring is manifest in movements designed to enhance and prolong pleasurable
sensations that Frijda (2007) refers to as acceptance wriggles: when the tongue curls
around the savors from the morsel in ones mouth; when the fingers follow the surface of the loved skin while ones eyes follow the loved bodys contour. Acceptance
wriggles of taste and smell have their animal precursors in the orofacial patterns of
hedonic response in rats and other animals. In humans savoring has a stronger connection with meaning than with pleasurable sensations.
The following are a few contemporary examples of savoring from mainland
China, retrieved by Yahoo.Chinese (Ye, 2007)
(A) Pain is like a book. By studying it [tiwei], thinking about it, and digesting it,
one will come to have many special feelings about it (p. 123).
(B) [Only when you are not in front of me am I immersed in the feelings towards
you], and to experience [tiwei] my longing for you in every fine detail (p. 123).
The Temporal Structure of Savoring
159
(C) The lyric from a pop song adapted from an ancient poem refers to an emotional
experience as having a rather unusual kind of flavor [ziwei] in the heart
(adapted from Ye, 2007, p. 116).
In the above quotes, the three Chinese terms sharing the same root wei (taste,
flavor) are variants of the savoring theme: ziwei (in C) is simply flavor, whereas
tiwei (body-taste, in A and B) means savoring in an embodied way, a notion
that is at once experiential and cognitivea deep, fine and detailed thinking process (Ye, 2007, p. 122). The depth of processing implied by tiwei underscores one
essential feature of savoring, namely its readiness for meaning.
The information-processing strategy of savoring may be described in terms what
Pribram and McGuinness (1975) refer to as the arousal system. Characteristic of
arousal is readiness to respond meaningfully to input as evidenced by increase in
the number of sensory channels available (p. 135), in contrast to the lack of readiness to respond meaningfully to input, which is characterized by effort to cope with
the situation and attempt to shut off further input. This processing strategy characteristic of savoring is in direct contrast to the stress and coping model of emotion
regulation (to be elaborated later), which tends to approach emotion as an alien,
potentially disruptive force that must be controlled. In this respect, savoring is akin
to what Arnheim (1966) said about artistic creativity: Faced with the pregnant sight
of reality, the truly creative person does not move away from it but toward and into
it (p. 299).
The Temporal Structure of Savoring

Savoring has a unique temporal dimensionit thrives in the post-stimulus phase.
As Owen points out, the flavor of texts endures, changes, and attenuates after
reading much as that of food lingers after eating (Owen, 1992, p. 593). The literary critic Liu Hsieh (ca. 465522) claimed that When the sensuous colors of physical things are finished [i.e., processed and done with], something of the affections
(or circumstances) lingers on (Owen, 1992, p. 284). Owen (1992) explains that
qing (feeling or emotion) is what survives the momentary experiencesnot the
sensuous colors per se, but something of their quality, their mood, the circumstances, the way we respond to them (p. 285). This lingering qing is also referred
to by Liu Hsieh and others as the flavor of an experience. Owen (1992) explains
further that the term flavor is used as a model to suggest that it is not just the
concentrated and momentary taste, but the unfolding and savoring of flavor after
the initial moment of tasting (p. 285) that is essential to aesthetic experience.
Awareness of temporality is important, as it allows manipulation of time to
enhance the experience. There are two important temporal markers in savoring:
evaluation of (current) flavor (pin wei proper) and savoring in retrospect
(hui wei ). Evaluation of flavor entails slow, prolonged processing to better
appreciate and discriminate the ongoing experience in its multifarious nuances.
160
10
Savoring
Hui-wei means literally re-tasting, which refers to a recollection in the mind of a

previously encountered flavor (Eoyang, 1993, p. 230). Thus hui-wei is savoring
that thrives on the post-stimulus phase of the phenomenon (Sundararajan & Averill,
2007). Its emphasis falls on the experiences aftertaste. As Owen (1992) points out,
Chinese theorists [of aesthetics] tended not to speak of acts of reflection on the
meaning of a text, but rather of the continuation of the text in the mind after reading is over, a time in which the significance of the text gradually unfolds (pp. 593
594). Ming Dong Gu has made a similar observation. Drawing a parallelism between
music and textual appreciation, he writes that the zither was intended in part to
create a lingering sound from the instrument, suggestive of endless resonance,
those reverberations may be comparable to the intro-textual relations of and extratextual responses to a profound writing: the words of a text have come to an end, but
the implications do not (Bollas, 2013, p. 111).
The Proto-Narratives of Savoring

In a practical way, sensing novelty may require that we turn toward images, not word-based
categories. (Siegel, 2007, 252)
We live beyond any tale that we happen to enact. (V. S. Pritchett, cited in Strawson,
2004, 15th October, p. 15).
Categorical emotions, such as happiness or anger, are narrative structures with

distinct topics (whats it about) and goals that shape behavior (Oatley, 2004).
Emotional states in savoring, by contract, are protonarratives (Frijda & Sundararajan,
2007; Sundararajan, 2008), which are short on the story line but long on the experience. Protonarratives are what Mark Turner refers to as small stories such as
The wind blows clouds through the sky, a child throws a rock, and so on (Turner,
1996, p. 13). These seemingly uneventful events that may or may not be emplotted
into the narrative of the so called basic emotions are nonetheless pregnant with
meaning when the potential for savoring is open to them.
The difference between the narrative of basic emotions and the protonarrative of
savoring is summed up succinctly by James Russell as follows:
Imagine a state of heightened pleasure and arousal. Could one attend to it, savor it, observe
it, yet not want to enhance or diminish it, utilize it for some purpose, and act on it or anything else? For a blue ribbon emotion, one would have to attribute it to the upcoming event,
express it, plan out actions based on it, and categorize it as, say, enthusiasm. (Personal
communication, June 1, 2007)
Privileging the protonarratives of emotion renders many Chinese writers unwilling to settle for any particular emotion labels. One example from a classical novel
by Feng Meng-long (15741645) shall suffice:
Axiu was dumfounded upon hearing this. It is difficult to describe how she felt inside:
panicnot exactly; ashamednot exactly; worriednot exactly; sorrownot exactly.
Like being pierced by a disorderly multitude of needles, she felt an indescribable mixture
of pain and itch. (Feng, 1991, chap. 2, p. 142).
The Proto-Narratives of Savoring
161
There may be good reasons for the writers indecisiveness, for such mental states
have no names, says Gelernter in another context:
Its hard to get a purchase on such mental stateswhat a person might feel on an unexpectedly warm spring morning, on an empty beach in winteror pounding a nail squarely into
a wooden plank. Such occasions might evoke an emotional response. But those emotions
are a far cry from happy or sad.They are subtleThey are idiosyncratic, blended to
order for a particular occasion. They may contain recognizable traces of primary emotion
(a touch of sadness, a trace of anxiety), but these are nuanced, complicated mixtures. They
have no names. (Gelernter, 1994, pp. 2728)
Overlooking these nameless affect, mainstream psychology is interested in the

canonization of selective categorical emotions into basic emotions, basic in the
sense of biologically wired-in systems. One prominent basic emotions researcher is
Carroll Izard (1984), who draws the analogy between emotion and taste to argue for
the universality and invariance of basic emotions:
If we accept the analogy between the development of the four basic gustatory sensations
and the development of the basic emotion feelings, then it is reasonable to assume that the
invariance of the feeling state of a fundamental emotion goes back through eons of evolutionary time. (p. 27)
By contrast, Si-Kong Tu (837908) used the same analogy to argue for the variability and combinatory freedom of feeling states, in his letter to a certain Mr. Li:
In my opinion we can adequately speak of poetry only in terms of making distinctions
in flavors. In everything that suits the palate in the region south of Chiang-ling, if it is
a pickled dish, then it is indeed sourbut it is nothing more than sour. If it is a briny
dish, then it is quite saltybut nothing more than salty. The reason people from the
north, when eating such food, simply satisfy their hunger and then stop eating is that
they recognize that it somehow falls short of perfect excellence and lacks something
beyond the distinction between the merely sour and the merely salty (Owen, 1992,
p. 351).
The ideal poet, according to Si-Kong Tu, is one who is able to make subtle discriminations beyond the conventional palette of emotions (see Sundararajan, 1998,
2004). Owen explains: The opposition is between gross categories that have
names, and fine judgments for which there are no names. Furthermore, those finer
gradations are learned by experience: one who knows only the gross categories can
apprehend only the gross categories; to be able to recognize the finer distinctions
requires the education of a sensibility (Owen, 1992, p. 352). Exactly this kind of
sensitivity lies at the root of creativity, writes Gelernter in reference to subtle discrimination of emotional nuances called emotional acuity (Gelernter, 1994,
p. 89). Emotional acuity constitutes the following components according to
Gelernter (1994):
1. That you are able to register subtle or nuanced emotionsto experience subtle emotional reactionswhere less acute people would have no emotional reaction at all;
2. That you are able to distinguish many elements in a subtle emotional palette,
where a less acute person would distinguish the emotional equivalent of red,
green, blue. (pp. 8990)
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Savoring
Si-Kong Tu said the same in another context: in my opinion we can adequately

speak of poetry only in terms of making distinctions in flavors (Owen, 1992, p. 351).
So much for the narrative structure of savoring. Now we turn to the cognitive
structure of savoring, which may be examined along two cognitive dimensions
(Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007)self-reflexivity and detachment. Both dimensions
can be illustrated with an animal model of savoring.
The Cognitive Structure of Savoring: An Animal Model

One animal model that can shed some light on the Chinese notion of savoring is
the taste aversion paradigm of Garcia. Garcia (1989) claims that there is a fundamental duality between two isolable mammalian defense systems, external versus
internal, or skin versus gut. Auditory, visual, and cutaneous stimuli activate the
external (skin) defense system associated with the fear responses, which are
evolved under the selective pressure of predation. By contrast, taste and emetic
toxins impinge upon an internal (gut) defense system associated with distaste reactions, which are evolved under the pressure of poisonous plant and animal foods.
Corresponding to the skin and gut divide are two different types of learning,
according to Garcia: one is cognitive coping in which the animal utilizes environmental information to form field expectancies; the other is affective adjustment
known as incentive modification in which affective value of a goal object is
modified according to homeostatic feedback, as is the case with flavor aversion.
Garcia claims that conditioned flavor aversion entails more than an avoidance of
the foodthe taste actually undergoes a hedonic or palatability shift such that it
becomes distasteful. The mechanisms of the palatability shift underscore a reflexive turn of attention to ones own experience, and learning from it. Otherwise put,
palatability shift in taste aversion is not learning about field expectancies so much
as learning about a change in the animals own affective reactions to a commodity
(Balleine & Dickinson, 1998).
In sum, consistent with the two foci of cognitive attention (Lambie & Marcel,
2002)outward toward the world versus inward toward the selfGarcia makes a
distinction between the two defense systems of skin versus gut: External cognitive coping in which the rat learns instrumental action in accordance with its
expectations of the world versus internal affective adjustment in which the rat
pays attention to feedback from the gut and learns from it. Translating this model
into the feeding behavior of rat, Garcia (1989) claims that taste plays the important
role of ending the instrumental action phase and initiating the attention to internal
feedback phase. More specifically, taste by oral contact signifies for the animal that
the instrumental action of food acquisition has accomplished, and that the next thing
to do is to turn its attention inward to process the feedback from within.
So much for Garcias (1989) animal model. Now lets see how this applies to the
cognitive structure of savoring.
Self-reflexivity
163
Self-reflexivity
The application of Garcia to savoring would complement a better known extension
of the same in Paul Rozins theory of disgust. Disgust is understood as one of the
three other-condemning moral emotions (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000,
p. 644)disgust, contempt, and anger. In sharp contrast to this other-focused attribution, savoring shares with the sick rat a self-referential focus in attribution of the
cause of pain (or pleasure): It must have been something I ate (Garcia, Ervin, &
Koelling, 1966, p. 124, emphasis added).
Savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2008) entails response
(such as enjoying) to ones own response to the stimulus (the taste of food). Chinese
theories of savoring emphasize the self-reflexive awareness in which the intentional
object of emotion is the experience, rather than the experienced objectone does
not primarily relish the smelling rose, but the delightful smell. On this account, a
Western formulation of savoring also agrees (Bryant & Veroff, 2007), but does not
go into details of how this works.
Besides taste, other instances of self-reflexivity can be found. For instance in
perception, Humphrey (2006) claims that when S finds red light exciting, it is his
own phenomenal experiencethat he judges exciting, and not the fact that the
screen is colored red (p. 21). Self-reflexivity pertains to two attributes of savoring:
enhanced consciousness and a unique mode of knowing. As a re-entrant feedback
loop, self-reflexivity enhances consciousness.
According to Humphrey (2006), the key to the special quality of consciousness lies in the re-entrant circuits in the brain, namely, neural activity that
loops back on itself, so as to create some kind of self-resonance (p. 121). Selfreflexivity also underscores the fact that, as No (2009) points out: We are not
merely recipients of external influences, but are creatures built to receive influences that we ourselves enact (p. 181). One implication of this for information
processing is a mode of knowing referred to by Reddy (2008) as knowing feelingly (p. 26).
Knowing feelingly (Reddy, 2008) refers to certain modes of knowing in which
feelings precede and form the basis of appraisals. This point is well articulated by
the modern scholar Li Jian-Zhong who claims that Only when the mind is moved,
can one savor the text (Li, 1993, p. 336). Note that this assertion puts the conventional causal chain of appraisal and emotion (Arnold, 1960) in reverse order: Rather
than being the shaping factor of emotions, appraisals (in the sense of appreciation or
savoring) of the text seem to depend critically on whether one is moved or not by
the text. There is some empirical support for this position. Barefoot and Straub
(1974) conducted a study in which they used fake heartbeat sounds to make the
participants think that certain nude models were particularly exciting. Later they
tested the participants again without the fake heartbeat sounds, and found that the
same nude models were still preferredthe participants seemed to be still savoring
what moved them earlier. This is applicable to interpersonal contexts as well, as
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Savoring
Reddy (2008) points out, one must experience a response to an other in order to
know them appropriately (p. 234).
Second-order awareness. Self-reflexivity combines two variants of consciousness, as distinguished by Lambie and Marcel (2002)second-order consciousness,
as opposed to first-order consciousness, and self-directed as opposed to outwarddirected attention. Second-order consciousness consists of experience plus an
additional experience of that experience (Zelazo, 1996, p. 73). It involves awareness that can be recalled and reported. The Doctrine of the Mean stated that There
is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors (1971,
p. 387). The term rendered here by distinguish is zhi , which means literally
cognize. To be zhi or cognizant of flavors implies knowing that one knows the
flavors. Articulate cognizance enables manipulating ones experience in ways characteristic of savoring by seeking and making fine discriminations.
This second-order awareness (awareness of awareness), is referred to in mindfulness literature as mindful awareness or reflexivity (Siegel, 2007, p. 98). Mindful
awareness can be differentiated from simple awareness, which is on a lower level of
consciousness. According to Siegel (2007), mindful awareness permits the decoupling of automaticity (p. 144), whereas mere attention to the present moment is not
able to do so.
Mind-to-mind transaction. One advantage of higher level awareness lies in the
fact that it renders the mind relational to itself. Mind-to-mind transactions (see
Chaps. 1, 3, and 6) are privileged in the East Asian cultures of China, Korea, and
Japan. For instance, Choi and Kim (2006) claim that the main currency in Korean
relationships is a mind exchange rather than a behavioral exchange (p. 358).
Savoring has its roots in the Chinese tradition of intrapersonal mind-to-mind
transactions, otherwise known as within-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013). Consider
the following passage from The Doctrine of the Mean (1971):
There is nothing more visible than what is secret, and nothing more manifest than what is
minute. Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself, when he is alone. (p. 384)
The main idea here is that in solitude one should pay attention to ones thoughts
and feelings down to their subtlest variations. The Chinese text puts a premium on
detecting (bringing to awareness) what is normally below the radar, thus capitalizing on expansion of awareness. The everyday reflection or introspection does not
have that emphasisit simply dwells on whatever is readily accessible, such as
ready-made self-narratives. By contrast, the Chinese introspection has the potential
to get past these ready-made self-narratives to bring to awareness protonarratives of
the moment. In this sense the above scenario of introspection foreshadows the
mindfulness practices today.
Furthermore, the text gives a transactional account of mindful awareness, as evidenced by the reference to how one should be watchful over oneself when alone.
Why all this fuss about being alone? According to Zhu Hsis commentary in The
Doctrine of the Mean (1971), alone refers to the place which other men do not
know, and is known only to ones self (p. 384, para. 3). Legge who translated the text
Engaged Detachment
165
explains: the secrecy must be in the recesses of ones own heart, and the minute things,
the springs of thought and stirrings of purpose there (p. 384, para. 3). Tu (1989) points
out that the ultimate goal of this self-examination is to be at ease with oneself (p. 27).
Savoring is not self-reflection. From the foregoing analysis, savoring is different
from the garden variety of introspection or self-reflection. Although both are selfreflexive, savoring differs from self-reflection along the divide between mind-tomind and mind-to-world transactions (see Chap. 1). This point can be illuminated
by the two types of attending distinguished by Charles Siewert (2001)Attending
to X versus attending to the way X looks to you. Savoring is attending to the way X
looks to you, where the focus is not on X per se so much as on how X is being experienced by a mind. Put another way, savoring is the mind talking to itself about how
X makes it feel. Self-reflection, by contrast, is simply attending to X, where X happens to be oneself. This formulation of savoring makes it clear why self-analysis,
self-criticism, and many other kinds of self-reflections do not qualify as savoring.
Engaged Detachment
A unique quality of savoring is referred to by Frijda and Sundararajan (2007) as
engaged detachment (p. 237). The detachment element entails a mental distance
from pragmatic actions. For instance, in savoring food or drink, one holds back from
swallowing; in witnessing actors on stage, one is not inclined to jump onstage to
intervene or participate. The engagement element lies in immersion in the aesthetic
experiences. These two elements have their precursors in the rats feeding schedule,
as Garcia (1989) points out that for rats taste plays the important role of ending the
instrumental action phase corresponding to human detachment, and initiating the
attention to internal feedback phase corresponding to human engagement.
Savoring constitutes a delightful interplay of these two elements of aesthetics
engagement and detachment. We may begin our investigation with the Chinese
notion of flavor. Flavor is an example of what Eoyang (1993) refers to as the peculiarity of much of Chinese literary criticism, which uses the lower sense metaphors when it attempts to characterize work of the highest quality (p. 215). Unlike
sight and sound, taste and smell are processed relatively fastbypassing the multiple editing processes of the brain. The relatively fast, rough, and unedited information in these lower senses is therefore ineffable, as Si-Kong Tu would say, to be
elaborated later. Empirical support for this conjecture comes from a recent study by
Olofsson et al. (2014), who found that participants had relatively more difficulty in
matching words with odors than with pictures, suggesting that unlike visual and
auditory information taste and smell do not translate very well into language and
concepts. But if Eoyang (1993) is right, it is the least abstract of the senses (such as
taste and smell) that the Chinese choose to use as vehicle to carry the freight of the
most abstract of ideas. How is it possible? Si-Kong Tu managed to accomplish this
feat by means of the rhetoric of beyondflavor beyond flavor (Zhu, 1984, p. 21),
and its corollary, image beyond image.
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Savoring
Image beyond image. Si-Kong Tu claimed that the aesthetic experience of poetry
comes from image beyond image (Yu, 1978, p. 97). In a letter to a certain Wang
Chi, he cited another poet to illustrate this point:
Tai Jung-chou said, Poets scenes, such as At Lan-tien [Indigo Field] when the sun is
warm, from fine jade arises smoke, can be gazed at from afar but cannot be placed in front
of ones eyebrows and lashes. An image beyond the image, a scene beyond the scenecan
these be easily verbalized? (Yu, 1978, pp. 9697, emphasis added).
An aerial view of mist and sunlight over bluish soilthat is all there is perceptually. The rest is invisible but can be palpably felt, such as the jade under the ground
giving off a vapor of mist, as it is getting toasty warm on a sunny day. Not unlike the
fine jade, experiences buried deep in memory can be evoked by poetry and warm up
to life in the process of savoringthis is one of the rich suggestions I get out of this
imagery, when it sets my mind off dreaming. But back to our analysis.
Si-Kong Tus aesthetic gazing entails both elements of detachment and engagement. The aerial view suggests detachment, via conceptual abstraction, from the
external reality of pragmatic concerns and instrumental action; while the palpably
felt but ineffable imageries suggest immersion in concrete experiences currently
lived or retrieved from memory. In sum, Si-Kong Tus theory of image-beyondimage brings to the fore the engaged detachment of savoring, which constitutes an
integration of the higher and the lower facultiesabstract contemplation made possible by detachment on the one hand, and immersion in the ineffable and concrete
experiences of life, on the other.
For further insight into this unique attribute of savoring, we may turn to an investigation of the aesthetic paradox (Mukhopadhyay, 2014, p. 237).
The aesthetic paradox. Dyutiman Mukhopadhyay (2014) defines esthetic delight
as a paradoxical combination of, or dynamic, oscillatory temporary balance
between (p. 241), two opposing phases of the aesthetic experience, each with their
respective neural networkssuspension of the belief of surface reality (p. 240),
on the one hand, and introspective detached contemplation, on the other. This
formulation of aesthetic delight reiterates the notion of engaged detachment
engagement in the aesthetic experience (via suspension of reality testing, pragmatic
concerns, etc.), and with detached contemplationas proposed by Frijda and
Sundararajan (2007).
To delve deeper into the aesthetic experience, Mukhopadhyay (2014) resorts to
the framework of reflexivity (metarepresentation) to formulate the aesthetic delight
as an integration of three types of metarepresentation (MR), which refers to the
representation of a representation (p. 241, emphasis in original), or image beyond
image (Yu, 1978, p. 97) as Si-Kong Tu would have said:
MR1. This brings into conscious awareness that it is I who is feeling an emotional
attachment toward the art.
MR2. This reminds us that this is a percept of representation
MR3. This is the aesthetic delight that makes us know that MR1 and MR2 are interlinked. We know that we are attached but simultaneously detached. (p. 241)
Savoring as a Paradigm of Self-regulation
167
Cast into the framework of image beyond image (Yu, 1978, p. 97), MR1 refers
to awareness of engagement with ones personal experiences of art or life; MR2, the
detached contemplative phase as embodied in the rhetoric of beyond; MR3,
Si-Kong Tus imagery of gazing from afar in which one is aware of being simultaneously both attached and detached.
A face lift for dual process theories. The savoring discourse traverses in both
directionsthe high and the low roadof emotion (see Chap. 5), with much more
ease than mainstream psychology. Psychology of emotion can be divided into two
campsthose who take the low road, invoking evolution and neuroscience, tend to
argue for the continuity of basic emotions from animals to humans (e.g., Izard,
2007), whereas those who take the high road, invoking culture and language, tend
to emphasize the uniqueness of the human (J. A. Russell, 2003).
This dichotomy between nature and culture collapses in savoring. Cast in the
framework of information processing, the aesthetic paradox of savoring entails a
combination of both the low road that capitalizes on early, rapid, pre-attentive processing, and the high road that capitalizes on controlled, post-stimulus elaborationstwo processing strategies that are generally assumed to be dichotomous
(Christianson, 1992). Thus the aesthetic paradox of savoring opens up new possibilities for the dual process framework which posits (e.g., Kahneman, 2003) two
modes of information processing, system 1 and system 2. Consistent with the processing mode of taste and smell, system 1 is experiential, automatic, effortless,
intuitive, unconscious, energy efficient, and a faster mode of processing. Consistent
with the mode of introspective contemplation in savoring, system 2 is cognitive,
deliberate, consciously effortful, energy consuming, and a relatively slow mode of
reasoning. The foregoing analysis suggests that aesthetic paradox constitutes an
integration of these two systems.
Kahneman (2011) suggests that creativity requires the activation of both systems
in tandem, so that while system 2 is in operation, and the person is mindful, he or
she is also highly aware of intuitive cues generated by system 1. This requires being
in a state of cognitive ease that loosens the control of system 2 over performance
(p. 69). But what is this mysterious state of cognitive ease (Kahneman, 2011,
p. 69)? According to Hart, Ivtzan, and Hart (2013), this state of cognitive ease is
manifest in the phenomenon of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992), in which people are
fully immersed in their semiautomated activity, while at the same time fully aware
of their creative insights. Besides flow, savoring offers another, well-documented
case of cognitive ease.

Savoring offers two insights so far neglected in theories of emotion regulation: One
is the active rather than reactive mode of emotion, as evidenced by its effort after
meaning. The other is self-reflexivity, which refers to emotion regulating itself, in
contrast to the assumption, prevalent in emotion regulation, of one system
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Savoring
regulating another, such as reason controlling or be controlled by emotion. Savoring

is an emotion-based action that modulates emotions for the sake of more nuanced
emotional experiences, rather than primarily for better behavioral control. The
savoring approach is therefore more appropriately referred to as emotion refinement
(Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007). The notion of emotion refinement stems from a perspective on human nature as intrinsically good, or at least as potentially perfectible.
The metaphor used for self-cultivation in the Chinese tradition is the polishing of
jadeto bring out the beauty and luster of a precious gem.
The antinomy between regulation and refinement of emotions. Emotion regulation is presumably necessary when presence or absence of emotional experience or
expression interferes with a persons goal (Thompson, 1994). Emotion regulation
privileges the cybernetics of control, which tends to objectify that which is regulated, and conceptually to separate the object from the regulatory process. To the
extent that the self can relate to itself as an object (a non-self, or object indistinguishable from other objects), objectification applies also to cases where one regulates ones own emotions. A case in point is Grosss (1998) definition of emotion
regulation as processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have,
when they have them and how they experience and express these emotions (p. 275).
Objectification of emotion leads naturally to a two-factor approach to emotion
regulation: the first factor is the generation of emotion; the second factor, which
presumably comes after the first, is its management (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004).
As Campos, Frankel, and Camras (2004) point out, the canonical instances of twofactor emotion regulation is a form of conflict regulation (p. 385). To illustrate the
difference between emotion regulation and savoring, consider the comparison
between a vintner and a connoisseur, according to James Averill:
The vintner may know all about the production of fine wines but have little appreciation for
fine nuances in flavor; his aim is simply to control the processes of production. By contrast,
the connoisseur may know little about how wine is produced, and yet have great appreciation for differences in flavor among wines. In the Chinese tradition of savoring, the goal is
not so much to regulate ones emotions, but to become an emotional connoisseur. (Personal
communication, September 7, 2005)
Savoring and the self. In contrast to the objectification of self and emotions in
emotion regulation, savoring contributes to the authentic self (see Chaps. 3, 7, and 9).
In the previous chapter (Chap. 9), I have reviewed the contribution of longing to
authenticity. Longing is a process in which savoring may be involved. Basically,
there could be cultural differences in peoples reaction to longing. In the context of
a culture that privileges presence over absence and positive over negative emotions,
longing may be accompanied by anxiety, whereas in a culture that is more accepting
of absence and negative emotions (Sundararajan, 2014), longing may be approached
with savoring. But apart from longing, savoring has its own contributions to make.
The meta-knowledge about the self fostered by savoring is experience near in
contrast to the experience distant forms of meta-cognition through the garden varieties of self-reflection. Bertrand Russell (1930) once compared the emphasis on
increasing self-awareness and consciousness raising (p. 161) to focusing on the
169
workings of a sausage machine rather than the productIf we knew how sausages
were made, we might lose our appetite for them.
This type of self-awareness is a far cry from savoring. The difference between
savoring and the self-objectifying type of awareness falls along the divide between
two forms of self-focus, variously referred to as experiential versus analytical
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001); mindfully aware versus conceptual-evaluative
(Teasdale, 1999); or concrete process focused versus abstract-evaluative self-focus
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005). The experiential self-focus, relative to the abstractevaluative self-focus, was found to improve social problem solving in depressed
patients (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Similarly, experiential self-focus (Teasdale,
1999), and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy were found to decrease depressive
relapses (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). In the same vein, development of self-reflexive awareness of present experience has been found to be effective in the prevention of depression relapse (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
Having adumbrated the benefits of the experiential self-focus, our investigation
of savoring will now focus on its contribution to self-regulation and self-integration
in a twofold senseit is coterminous with the authentic self; and it enhances the
accuracy of within-mind mappings (McKeown, 2013).
First, experience is inextricably connected with a sense of the self. According to
Humphrey (2006), phenomenal experience constitutes the very essence of ones
subjectivityit is the centerpiece of what its like to be me at this moment. When
attention is directed to the experience itself, the self is savored along with the experience. For instance, one may realize that the apples taste is ones own experiencea sense of mine-ness, due to the fact that sensations come with a sense of
ownership, as Humphrey (2006) points out. Awareness that emerges out of that
peculiar nearness between self and experience can contribute to ones self-model
(Metzinger, 2003), which is a form of meta-knowledge about oneself.
Savoring, as pleasure derived from ones own awareness of pleasure, is basically
a self-to-self transaction. This formulation of savoring is consistent with Siegels
(2009) definition of mindfulness as a relational process where you become your
own best friend (p. 145). Part and parcel of this intimate relationship with oneself
is a sense of agency. Savoring is a self-initiated action that cannot be done vicariouslyone cannot savor the taste or experience of someone elses, but ones own.
Neither can it be imposed from withoutthe devil can be made to taste his own
medicine, but not to savor it, unless he himself wants to. All of this protects us from
self-alienation, where the self is approached as an object or a stranger. This close
connection between savoring and the authentic self is also found in its Indian counterpart, rasa. Aesthetic experience in the rasa tradition entails an active participation
in ones own self, and thus the absence of the character of otherness proper to cognition of the thoughts of others (Gnoli, 1956, pp. 101102).
Second, fine discrimination of experience is not simply an exercise in aesthetics.
It reinforces a sense of self as the subject of experience, and contributes to the selfreflexive ability to make within-mind mappings (McKeown, 2013). This has relevance to many problems of self-regulation such as self-deception and self-alienation
(Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994).
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Savoring
Authenticity versus self-deception. Within-mind mappings are important for

valid representations of ones inner states. There seems to be an intimate connection
between valid self-representation and authenticity of the self. Consider the following statements in The Great Learning:
What is meant by making the thoughts sincere? One must not allow self-deception, as
when we detest a bad smell or as when we love a beautiful color (cited in Cua, 1996,
p. 180).
Cua (1996) explains that If a person really detests a bad smell, she will not pretend to herself or others to the contrary (p. 181). This formulation of self-deception
hinges on self-awareness of experience, otherwise known as within-mind mapping
(McKeown, 2013). If ones self-awareness of experience is as clear as detection of
a bad smell or the delight in beautiful color, then sincerity in the sense of being true
to oneself is more likely, and self-deception is less likely, so the argument goes. For
an empirical support of this perspective, we may take a look at one corollary of the
argument, namely that self-deception is more likely when there is impairment in
self-awareness of experience.
Savoring versus self-alienation. Self-deception may be understood as a form of
self-alienation. According to Kuhl and Beckmann (1994), an important issue concerning self-awareness or meta-knowledge about oneself is alienation, which refers
to alienation from ones deeper preferences and needs. Symptoms of self-alienation
include failure to perceive ones emotional preferences, to become immersed in
pleasant activities, and to perform preferred activityall of these deficits impact on
optimal self-regulation (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). For our purposes, one pertinent
component of self-regulation is self-discrimination which, according to the
authors, is part and parcel of a learning process through which individuals attach a
self- or alien-attribute to any state or process that they become aware of.
(pp. 1819). Thus impairment in self-discrimination can be expected to impact on
the sense of mine-ness with regard to ones experience.
The authors conducted many studies, in which those who had deficit in selfdiscrimination were found in a later recognition task to confuse tasks assigned by
the experimenter with tasks that were self-chosen. In other words, these individuals
seemed to be confused about personal desires (self-chosen asks) and social obligations (tasks assigned by others). Thus self-discrimination is important for the negotiation between the two obligations of the self as a social being: the satisfaction of
personal needs and compliance with social demands. The authors claim that this
negotiation requires a valid discrimination between needs and demands (i.e., self
and non-self), a positive emotional response to self-related needs, a belief in ones
ability to perform actions necessary for need satisfaction, and, in a later stage of
development, an integration between personal needs and social demands (p. 19).
Each step of the way in this ongoing negotiation between the self and society, selfdiscrimination skills can be honed by savoring with its explicit representation of
ones emotional preferences, and its second-order positive emotional response
relishingtoward ones personal preferences.
A Contemporary Application of Savoring
171
A Contemporary Application of Savoring

By way of conclusion, I present below a contemporary application of many of the
principles of savoring, based on the data transcribed by Kuan (2014). Zhou Ting is
an expert in China on the education of emotions (qinggan ). She claims that
Your qinggan channels are your eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin, your sense of movement. Including your sense of your insides (p. 74). Implementing her sensorybased affect theory, she took a group of school children in July 2004 on a field trip
to the Summer Palace, former retreat of Empress Dowager Ci Xi, in Beijing. This is
her instruction at the lakeside of Kunming Lake:
Zhou asked the children if they could describe the kind of wind in the air. She suggests
gentle breeze. One child jokingly answers with typhoon. She instructed them to pay
focused attention on their feeling (ganshou), and then directed their attention across the
lake. Please look at the little island and then at Seventeen-Arch Bridge from this angle,
she said to themZhou continued, At this moment, all of the natural conditions, weather,
view, color, etc., how is this affecting your state of mind?. (p. 73)
Paying attention to ones state of mind is one of the savoring techniques involved in
the construction of the ideal mental world (Chap. 9). For the construction of the
ideal mental world known as jingjie (here rendered xinjing ), an integration of sensory input and higher cognitive functioning such as poetry appreciation is
crucial. Thus Zhou instructed her kids to:
Look at how the water in front of you twinkles like jade. Ripples on the surface of the water,
those phrases [in classical Chinese poetry], this is it, the image before your eyes. (p. 74)
She called their attention to the transitory nature of this state of mind, which
therefore requires savoring to be consigned to memory:
This kind of beautiful, calm, and peaceful state of mind (xinjing) [a more literal translation of
the term would be state of mind as a manifestation of the ideal mental world], Ill tell you,
you cant buy this with money, [we] only have these few minutes, here and now. Thats why
you are making deposits into your state-of-mind-bank (xinqing yinhang) right now. (p. 74)
Before departing, Zhou instructed the group to remember this very moment, to
store the moment in their qinggan [emotion] bank so as to have a good state of
mind in the face of daily tasks and difficulties (p. 75). Thus she concluded her lesson with the following instructions:
Having seen all this, the next time youre in pain, think a little, and go into your qinggan
[emotion] bank right away and move these things out. Your state of mind will immediately
return to the feeling you now have (p. 76)
Western readers will probably have no problem understanding all these instructions on savoring the moment in order to construct an ideal mental world for later
use in self-regulation, especially if you are familiar with the mindfulness literature.
The only term that might be jarring is Zhous use of a capitalist metaphorthe bank
(qinggan [emotion] bank)for the consolidation and retrieval of memory. This can
be easily fixed: Replace the emotional bank with another metaphor more familiar
in the Westthe emotional brain.
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Savoring
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Chapter 11
Emptiness (Kong ): Insight-Based Emotional

Transformations
Introduction
The Chinese Buddhist notion of kong (emptiness) names an existential shudder
that results from savoring negative experiences in life. It may be considered the
affective side of the insight coin known as wu (enlightenment) in Chinese
Buddhism. According to the neuroscience of insight as adumbrated by Kounios and
Beeman (2014), solving problems by insight differs from solving it by analytic thinking. Compared to analytic solving, solution by insight requires (a) greater input from
and integration of relatively coarser semantic processing of the right hemisphere, (b)
a relative emphasis on internal processing and de-emphasis on external stimuli, and
(c) greater sensitivity to competing non-dominant associations supported by the
anterior cingulate cortex. The components of (b) and (c) are processing strategies of
savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007), which is the topic of the previous Chap. 10.
This chapter, therefore, will focus on an analysis of component (a), the coarse processing known as heuristics; and I will mention, but not explore, savoring when its
contributions to the emotional transformations in kong are duly acknowledged.
Heuristics are one particular type of holistic thinking. For heuristics to be smart
there are two requirementsgist-based intuition and metacognition. The following
analysis takes three steps. First, I introduce the two relevant attributes of heuristic
thinkingthe gist of things and categorical reasoning. Next, I demonstrate that the
same processing strategies of heuristics are cast in a different registermetacognition or higher level of consciousnessfor the Buddhist wu (enlightenment) and
kong (emptiness). Third, I suggest that the breakthroughs in kong (emptiness) are
driven by the combined forces of two factorsstrong evaluation made possible by
the categorical reasoning of heuristics and extensive processing made possible by
savoring severe loss and goal block in life. Lastly, I suggest that the breakthroughs
of insight do not simply solve problems so much as opening up new possibilities;
and it is savoring that explores and gives content to these new possibilities of thinking and feeling. For illustration, both popular and classic Chinese literature is used.
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Heuristics, Simple but Smart

Heuristics are simple rules of thumb, such as Better safe than sorry. Such cognitive
strategies are evolved to deal with an uncertain world. How best to handle uncertain
situations? How best to solve complex problems? Should we maximize on information and processing or should we take shortcuts? Contrary to the common sense
assumption that complex problems require complex cognition to master them, and
conversely that fast thinking may compromise accuracy, research on simple heuristics
suggests that complex problems can be mastered by ignoring information and avoiding complex processing; and conversely that increasing cognitive processing can result
in decreasing accuracy (Mikels, Maglio, Reed, & Kaplowitz, 2011; Reyna, 2004).
Formally defined, A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information,
with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than
more complex methods (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454). Research in heuristics is inspired by Herbert Simons (1982) notion of bounded rationality. Being
critical of the universal, context-free problem-solving strategies of neoclassical economics, which presupposes a logical and omniscient rationality with unbounded
knowledge, computational capacity, and time, Simon (1982) proposes the alternative
model of bounded rationality more suitable for an uncertain world where the conditions for logical rationality cannot be met. In social psychology the notion of bounded
rationality has been equated with failures due to mental and motivational capacity
restrictions that prevent people from more systematic processing (Kahneman, 2003).
However, for Simon (1989) the fundamental question for bounded rationality is not
what we do wrong, so much as what we do right in an uncertain world. More specifically:
How do human beings reason when the conditions for rationality postulated by the
model of neoclassical economics are not met? (p. 377). The answer from heuristics may
be counterintuitive: In an uncertain world, it is adaptive to go with less, not more, information. But researchers are also quick to point out that heuristics per se do not guarantee
good outcome; it is selection of the right heuristics that makes the difference between
smart and not so smart decisions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Sundararajan, 2013).
In addition, another requirement for smart heuristics is, according to the researchers
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011), higher order cognition which is the so-called metacognition (see Chaps. 7 and 10) or what I have referred to as higher levels of awareness.
In the following sections, I will examine the rationality of gist-based intuition in
terms of two principles: the less-is-more principle of gist and all-or-none categorical thinking.
The Gist of Things

Master Bo Le was known for his uncanny ability to identify good horses. But
when asked about the color and the mane of his selection, he said he did not know.
The horse master Bo Les legendary neglect of details becomes understandable
when cast into the theoretical framework of gist. A gist is a fuzzy mental
The Gist of Things
177
representation of the general meaning of information or experience, and gist-based

intuition is reasoning or decision making based on these fuzzy representations
(Reyna & Farley, 2006, p. 6).
In studying gist, researchers make a distinction between two types of
representationsverbatim and gist or detailed and coarse (Malcolm et al., 2014).
Verbatim representation which refers to memory for an items surface details (e.g.,
its exact wording), is precise and quantitative. Gist representation, which refers to
memory for an items meaningis fuzzy and qualitative (Abadie, Waroquier, &
Terrier, 2013, p. 1254). This distinction has far reaching implications. For instance,
memory accuracy is a matter of retrieving details in verbatim representations, whereas
reasoning accuracy entails getting at the essential meaning of an experience known as
the gist of things. Why is it that Master Bo Le had a good eye for horses, but was
negligent of surface details such as color and mane? Reyna (2004) can explain: reasoning accuracy is independent of memory accuracy because gist representations are
independent of verbatim representations (p. 61).
The distinction between gist and verbatim representations falls along the divide
between system 1 and system 2 processes (Stanovich & West, 2000). According to
Abadie et al. (2013): Verbatim representations are assumed to be retrieved through
a consciously controlled process [generally associated with system 2 thinking],
whereas gist representations are thought to be retrieved through an automatic process [generally associated with system 1 thinking] (p. 1254). System 1 thinking
that provides rough estimates of things is quick but error prone, and needs to be
monitored by the more mature thinking of system 2 processes, so we are told.
Challenging this conventional wisdom in the field (see also Chaps. 5, 7, and 10) is
Valerie Reynas fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna, 2004), which is a dual process theory
that turns the conventional dual process theory on its head.
According to Reyna (2004), conventional theories of reasoning are modeled on
logic or computation, in which reasoning is said to occur in a series of ordered
stepsand precision is considered a hallmark of good reasoning. In contrast,
according to fuzzy-trace theory, reasoning processes unfold in parallel rather than in
series, often operating on the barest sense of ideas (the gist of a problem), and are
fuzzy or qualitative rather than precise (p. 61). As if this is not radical enough, she
further places intuition at the apex of development, considering fuzzy intuitive
processing more advanced than precise computational processing (p. 60). In a
phrase, intuition with all its fuzziness is an advanced form of reasoning.
Intuition is defined as fuzzy, gist-based thinking that unfolds in parallel to analytical deliberation and in which few dimensions of information are processed when
making a decision (Reyna & Farley, 2006, p. 15, emphasis added). Note here the
less-is-more principle of heuristics as a defining characteristic of intuitionprocessing less, not more, dimensions of information. Reyna and Farley (2006) found
that experts process fewer dimensions of information and do so more qualitatively
than non-experts. More specifically, the authors found that Advanced decision
makers rapidly home in on the essential gist, ignoring verbatim detail and irrelevant
cues (p. 20). Here the horse master Bo Le is joined by all kinds of experts, studied
by the researchers, ranging from medical specialists to professional thieves.
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The authors also found that the ability to quickly react to a small number of relevant cues (p. 20) increases with age. Indeed, the ability to base decisions on simple
qualitative gist increases with age, experience, and expertise. One important application of gist-based intuition is decision about risks. The authors point out that As
decision making becomes cognitively simpler (but not simpleminded) and gistbased, the tendency to take risksgenerally declines (p. 19).
To understand how and why gist-based intuition makes smart decisions, we have
to understand categorical reasoning.
Categorical reasoning. Deliberate, analytical thinking, characteristic of System
2 process, is supposed to be more developmentally advanced than holistic thinking,
characteristic of the automatic, non-deliberate System 1 process. Not so, according
to the fuzzy-trace theory of Reyna (2004). This point can be demonstrated with one
particular form of holistic thinking known as categorical reasoning.
Is it a good idea to swim with sharks? It turns out that adults and adolescents
process this question in very different ways. Adolescents showed longer reaction
time than adults in response to this type of questions, because they tend to capitalize
on the rational decision-making process, which stresses deliberate, quantitative
trading off of risks and benefits (Reyna & Farley, 2006, p. 1): Weighing the amount
of fun and degrees of risk, computing the costs and benefits, making fine-grained
distinctions about low frequencies of exposure to potential harm, and so on. This is
system 2 thinking, a process which is slow, and deliberatebut more accurate
(Kahneman, 2003), right? Wrong! According to Reyna (2004), most adults would
cut the chase and come up with a much faster and more accurate answer that says
something like No amount of fun can compensate for the risks (p. 65) involved,
or No risk is better than some risk. This is characteristic of categorical reasoning
that applies crude all-or-none categorization (p. 65) in assessing risks.
Consistent with the documented developmental increase in gist processing,
Reyna and Farley (2006) point out that adults process risks categorically or qualitatively rather than as a matter of degree, reflecting a developmental shift toward
greater gist-based reasoning with age and experience (p. 27). They further point
out that with age, analytical processing of risks and rewards gives way to the
cruder, qualitative processing (p. 36), and this contributes to risk avoidance. But
how? The authors explain in more details:
Mature adults apparently resist taking risks not out of any conscious deliberation or choice,
but because they intuitively grasp the gists of risky situations, retrieve appropriate riskavoidant values, and never proceed down the slippery slope of actually contemplating tradeoffs between risks and benefits. (p. 2)
The Chinese Notions of Wu

One of the most celebrated forms of gist-based intuition in China is wu or what is
known as satori in Zen Buddhism. Satori or wu is the Asian path to set breaking or
thinking outside the box, a creative process much more radical than simply
The Chinese Notions of Wu
179
generating new ideas. As Langer (1997) points out that in contrast to the intellectbased approach to creativity that privileges new solutions to problems, the
consciousness-based approach puts a premium on new optionsthe former capitalizes on the linear thinking from problems to solutions, whereas the later the nonlinear dynamics of shifting paradigms. More than the generation of new ideas, the
breakthroughs involved in the generation of new options rest squarely upon selfreflexive consciousness, in which the mind gets out of the cognitive entrapment of
its own making by stepping back from received problems and solutions to explore
new perspectives on the situation (Sundararajan & Raina, 2015).
It is in the arena of metacognition that the Zen tradition is best known for its acrobatics in radical set breaking (Pritzker, 2011). The set-breaking practices in Zen entail
an abrupt break between two paradigmsA versus B. The relationship between A
and B is incommensurable such that there is no linear progression from A to B. Getting
from A to B requires a quantum leap of consciousness, which constitutes wu or satori.
The relationship between B and A is comparable to that between gist and verbatim
representations, such that choice of the former (B or gist) over the later terms (A or
verbatim representation) entails a reduction in information processing, characteristic
of heuristics. But now the supremacy of gist over verbatim representation is played
out in another registermetacognition. In the arena of metacognition, the shift to
higher consciousness usually entails repudiation of lower consciousness. Thus the
function of B is to repudiate A, rendering the latter invalid; B in turn can be repudiated
or negated by insight based on a higher still level of consciousness, and so on.
Consider this classic example of wu (enlightenment): The time had come for the
Fifth Patriarch of the Zen school to select his successor. An announcement was
made for a competition to show the best comprehension of the religion. A learned
disciple by the name of Shen-hsiu composed a poem (A) and posted on the wall of
the meditation hall:
This body is the Bodhi-tree,
The soul is like a mirror bright;
Take heed to keep it always clean,
And let not dust collect on it. (Suzuki, 1956, p. 67)
Hui-neng (638713), who won the competition and later became the Sixth
Patriach, wrote the winning poem and posted alongside of Shen-hsius. The poem
(B) of Hui-neng went as follows:
The Bodhi is not like the tree,
The mirror bright is nowhere shining;
As there is nothing from the first,
Where can the dust itself collect? (Suzuki, 1956, p. 68)
Cast into the set-breaking framework, we have here two assumptions about meditation, A and B:
Athe conventional assumption that the mind is like a mirror that needs to be kept
clean by diligent practices of meditation.
Bthe metacognitive awareness that repudiates the lower level cognition (A) as a
delusion based on reification of the mind.
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Similar to the verbatim representation, (A) focuses on details about the meditation practice, of which the more is supposedly the betterthe more thoroughly one
keeps the mind pure from delusions through the diligent practice of meditation, the
closer one gets to the goal of enlightenment. Fat chance, said the Sixth Patriarch in
so many words. As a Zen saying goes, like polishing a brick in the hope of making
a mirror, enlightenment is an entirely different ball game from studies and practices
of the religion. It is along this line that (B) reiterates the gist of the Buddhist insight
that the attempt to rid the mind of its delusions inevitably creates a more intractable
delusionreification of the mind.
Such sudden shift in conceptual paradigms from A to B is an example of set
breaking. Set breaking was examined before in connection with a series of studies
by Mourey, Oyserman, and Yoon (2013) to shed some light on holistic thinking (see
Chap. 2). To refresh our memories, the studies by Mourey et al. (2013) went something like this: You get to choose a drink and a snack from three bottled beverages
(milk, soda, and fitness water) and three packaged snacks (cookies, chips, and fitness bar). Then you are told, Whoops! A mistake had been made: Instead of getting to choose two options, you can select only one (a beverage or snack) (p. 1619,
emphasis in original). How would you like to proceed? Pick one out of the selected
pair? Or start over and choose from the unelected items? The researchers found that
those primed with the individualist mindset, which privileges analytical reasoning,
would chose within the (broken) set, whereas those primed with the collectivistic mindset, which prefers holistic thinking, would abandon the (broken) set and start over.
Starting all over is a form of set breaking (in the sense of thinking outside the box). But
a more radical form of set breaking is a so far neglected option that was included in
Study 1 conducted by Mourey et al. (2013)to select nothing and exit. This is the
option represented by the Buddhist notion of kong (emptiness), which entails a radical
set breaking by which the agent says, in effect, Stop the busI want to get off.
The Chinese Buddhist Notion of Emptiness (Kong)

The Chinese notion of kong can be traced back to the Buddhist concept of sunyata
meaning nothingness or emptiness which may be considered the affective
counterpart of wu (enlightenment). For the following analysis, I focus on the folk
psychology of kong as represented by a book of aphorisms written by Hung Yingming of the sixteenth century, Cai-gen Tan (Discourse on vegetable roots) (for an
English translation, see Isobe, 1926). As something of a Chinese version of the
Chicken Soup for the Soul, this book has been popular to this day (see a contemporary Chinese commentary by Wang, 2004).
Central to kong is higher level of awareness (see Chaps. 7 and 10). In the following
sections, all the previous analyses of heuristics (gist versus verbatim representations, and categorical reasoning) will be repeated, but cast in another registerthat
of metacognition or higher levels of awareness. More specifically, I will show how
in the arena of metacognition, categorical reasoning becomes second-order desire
Moral Maps
181
and strong evaluation of kong (emptiness); and how the emotional transformation of
kong (emptiness) with its characteristic palatability shift parallels the set breaking
of wu (enlightenment), which also capitalizes on metacognition.
Second-Order Desires
According to Frankfurt (1971), while all nonhuman animals exhibit desires, only
humans exhibit the desire to have certain kinds of desires and not others. This selfreflexive dimension of desires is referred to by Taylor (1985) as second order
desires, which is the power to evaluate our desires, to regard some as desirable
and others as undesirable (p. 16, emphasis in original).
Second-order desires are usually accompanied by second-order awareness. At
the level of second-order awareness, ones attention shifts from the object of emotion to emotion itself as the object of ones reflection. The first-order consciousness
is expressible through behavior but not reportable; the second-order awareness in
contrast is reportable (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). For instance, anger at the level of
first-order consciousness is expressible through the behavior of slamming the door,
but not necessarily reportable as the person may not be aware of his or her own
anger. Anger at the level of second-order awareness, in contrast, is always reportableI am angry when I slammed the door. Likewise, savoring (Chap. 10) is
always reportableI am savoring this moment. To anticipate later discussion, the
Buddhist notion of kong entails the savoring of loss and pain. But before we consider savoring, we need to consider one important consequence of the second-order
desire in kong, namely the moral map with strong evaluations.
Moral Maps
Moral map, according to Charles Taylor (1985), consists of certain essential evaluations which provide the horizon or foundation for the other evaluations one makes
(p. 39), such as happiness or the good life. The moral map has two versionsstrong
and weak evaluation (Taylor, 1985). Similar to verbatim representation, weak evaluations capitalize on pragmatic considerations such as the utility value of the object,
pros and cons of a situation, and so on. Similar to gist heuristics, strong evaluations
capitalize on categorical reasoning, as evidenced by its all-or-nothing thinking
based on moral and ontological categories such as right or wrong, good or bad, and
being or nonbeing (nothingness). Second-order desires tend to privilege strong
evaluations.
Strong evaluations with explicit articulation of the moral map can result in cognitive reappraisal of experiences and even transformation of the emotional intent. For
illustration, consider two contrasting perspectives on goal block (i.e., situations in
which ones goal attainment is impeded)the scientific theory of hope versus the
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Emptiness (Kong)
Cai-gen Tan. The scientific theory of hope by Snyder, Cheavens, and Michael
(2005) deals primarily with first-order experiences, in which one is immersed in
action (Frijda, 2005) such that emotional experiences are understood in terms of the
consequences of goal pursuits, rather than as phenomena in and of themselves.
Reiterated in the hope theory is the received wisdom in psychology that emotions
reflect the persons perceived success (positive emotions) or lack of success (negative emotions) in goal pursuit activities (Snyder et al., 2005, p. 114).
The Cai-gen Tan, in contrast, deals primarily with second-order desires that are
undergirded by the moral map with strong evaluations, rather than being driven by
the allegedly hard wired circuits of stimulus and response. The contrast between the
two can be stark. For instance, the hope theory (Snyder et al., 2005) predicts that
impediments in pursuits of goals decrease well-being. Not so, says Cai-gen Tan,
frustration is good for you and gratification of desires rots like opium: Words that
grate on ones ears, and things that frustrate ones desires are the foundation stones
for self cultivation in virtue. A life filled with words pleasant to ones ears, and
things gratifying to ones desires is a life buried in opium (Wang, 2004, p. 24). This
calls for a closer examination of the reappraisal of experience in the Buddhist notion
of emptiness (kong).
The categorical reasoning of kong. Recall the categorical reasoning of risk
assessment in gist heuristics, which states that certain risks cannot be quantified
the risk of being infected with HIV is one time too many, for instance. Similarly, the
appraisal of meaning in kong tends to be in global, stark termslife either has
meaning or no meaning. Thus Cai-gen Tan says, All glamour is empty in the end
(Wang, 2004, p. 80). This statement is a strong evaluation based on the Buddhist
sentiment of vanity, vanity, all is vanity.
Typically kong entails not simply an appraisal of the success or failure of particular goals, so much as an appraisal so far reaching that it calls into question the very
possibility of having goals and concerns at all. Otherwise put, kong names the existential shudder that shakes up the very foundation of thingsthe very basis of our
goals and concerns that the Buddhists call attachment. Indeed a common expression for the word kong is ten thousand desires/concerns have become ashes. Or in
the words of Cai-gen Tan: Whats life like before you were born and after you are
dead? Upon such reflections all desires become cold ashes (Wang, 2004, pp. 303
304). However, this type of appraisal in kong does not necessarily spell nihilism.
Rather, it tends to come in tandem with emotional transformationwith the deconstruction of attachment comes the consolation of detachment.
Detachment entails a very complex emotional state, a phenomenon aptly captured by the following statement of Master Eckhart: Therefore, detachment is the
very best thing. It purifies the soul, cleanses the conscience, inflames the heart,
arouses the spirit, quickens desire, and makes God known (cited in ONeal, 1996,
p. 193). The above statement of Eckhart shows how detachment is not to be confused with resignation, nor with social withdrawal in sadness. In comparison to
these manifestations of negative affect in response to goal block, detachment is
much more complex in structure. It is second-order awarenessor savoring (see
Chap. 10)of loss and grief that results in transformation of the original emotional
Transformation of Emotion in Kong
183
intent. In Eckharts statement above, this emotional transformation takes the form of
a creative combination of emotional intentspurifies (the soul) and cleanses
(the conscience), on the one hand, and inflames (the heart) and arouses (the
spirit), on the other.
Lets slow down and take a closer look at the emotional transformations in kong.

One prevalent type of emotional transformation associated with kong is taste aversion (see Chap. 10). According to Garcias (1989) animal model, taste aversion
entails a hedonic or palatability shift such that the food which used to taste good
becomes distasteful to the animal, after the researcher adds something to the food
that makes the animal throw up. In the discourse on kong, palatability shift can be
triggered by the salience of mortality: Fame and material gain are sweet, but upon
the thought of death they both taste like chewing wax (Cai-gen Tan, in Wang, 2004).
The palatability shift associated with the realization of kong (emptiness) may be
considered the affective counterpart of the paradigm shift or set breaking associated
with wu (enlightenment). Recall that in the wu discourse, the paradigm shift from
cognition at lower consciousness (A) to cognition at higher consciousness (B) entails
the invalidation of A by B. The same mechanism is found in the palatability shift
showcased here: The experience of sweetness at a lower level consciousness (A) is
no longer valid, as the flavor has become unpalatable (B) after insight is ushered in
by mortality prime. For another illustration, consider the following quotation from
Cai-gen Tan, in which we can see a clearly delineated sequence of a palatability shift:
The guests are crowded in the hall and the revelry is at its height [the initial state]. What a
happy occasion [original emotion]! All of a sudden, the water in the clepsydra comes to an
end, the candles and the incense go out, and the tea grows cold [change as antecedent].
What a dreary scene! Disgusting and utterly tasteless [new emotion]. This is the way most
things are [new insight]. (Adapted from Isobe, 1926, p. 202)
Here concomitant with the palatability shift from happiness to disgust is the paradigm shift of wu (enlightenment), as evidenced by the claim that impermanence is
the rule of life, or something to that effect. But what is the cause of all these radical
shifts, both cognitively and affectively? We are only given the triggerssuch as
mortality salience, or when the party is overbut not an explanation for these radical shifts in consciousness. I surmise that for kong (emptiness) to happen, one contributing factor is the special way these triggers are processed, namely savoring (see
Chap. 10). One clue to the possible contribution of savoring lies in the fact that
affect and experience are acutely felt in all the above scenarios of kong.
In contrast to conventional emotion regulation strategies which tend to downregulate emotions, the function of savoring in the context of kong is not inhibitory
so much as excitatoryto enhance and deepen emotional experiences. Let me put
forward a formal proposition, then, that in kong (emptiness), the breakthroughs in
consciousness, known as insight or wu (enlightenment), are driven by the combined
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forces of two factors: Strong evaluation and extensive processingthe former is

made possible by the categorical reasoning of heuristics; the latter by savoring of
loss and severe goal block in life. Since we have discussed at length strong evaluations, I will for the remainder of this chapter focus on the connection between savoring and kong, using two classical Chinese poems as illustrations.
A poem by Li Y (937978). The following lyric is written by the last ruler of
Southern Tang, Li Y (937978), who, in addition to personal tragediesthe death
of his wife and their young son, lost his throne and was taken as a captive to the new
capital of the usurping Sung dynasty, where he stayed for the rest of his life until his
forty-first birthday, upon which occasion he was forced to drink the poisoned wine
and died. This lyric was written during Li Ys captivity away from his palace:
Tune: Ripples Sifting Sand (adapted from the translation of Daniel Bryant, in Liu & Lo,
1975, p. 303)
Things of the past may only be lamented,
Sceneries confront me with thoughts hard to brush aside.
Autumn wind, vacant courtyard, moss invading the steps;
A row of unrolled beaded screens hangs idly down,
All day long, who comes?
Buried deep is my golden sword,
Turning to weeds is my prime youth.
Cool evening, still sky, the moon blossoms forth.
I think of all those towers of jade and marble palaces reflected,
Shining with sheer emptiness [kong] in the River Qin-huai.
As can be expected, there is much grief and loss in the last emperors reminiscences, but the sense of kong (emptiness) that concludes the poem is not simply all
that. The last emperor contemplated on the gleaming reflection of his palaces in the
river Qin-huai, and felt empty (kong). In vain is the beauty of the former palacesall their grandeur in reminiscence only mocks the dethroned ruler. Yet, there
is more. Kong is the feeling that everything is empty to the very core. Indeed the
imagery of the shimmering reflections of grandeur captures well this Buddhist sense
of emptiness: all that gleaming splendor of towers and palaces, of jade and marble,
turns out to be sheer reflection on water, a mirage shot through and through with
nothingness.
In the midst of all this disillusionment, there is yet a hint of consolation, an
appreciationso characteristic of savoringfor the aesthetic beauty of things,
without which it would not have been possible for the poet to capture that enchanted
moment, when the moonlight shines forth in full splendor against the coolness and
serenity of the evening sky. This imagery also captures well the moment of wu
(enlightenment), when a flash of insight dawns like the sudden emergence of the
moon in the nightly sky. This kong-related insight of the poet is reminiscent of the
flaming vision that Heidegger (1971) talks about: The souls greatness takes its
measure from its capacity to achieve the flaming vision by which the soul becomes
at home in pain (p. 180).
The second poem on kong is less emotionally wrenching while more philosophically contemplative.
185
A poem by Ou-Yang Xiu (10071072). Ou-Yang Xiu was known as a statesman,

historian, philosopher, essayist, and poet of the Northern Song Dynasty. The following is one of the poems he composed on the famed West Lake.
Recollections of West Lake (adapted from the translation of Jerome P. Seaton, in
Liu & Lo, 1975, p. 331, emphasis added)
Gone are all the blossoms, yet West Lake is good,
Shattered scattered residue of red,
As willow down comes misting down;
Hanging over the railings, the willows sway in the wind all day long.
Vanished are the music and the songs,
Gone are the tourists of the lake,
Not till then do I realize the emptiness [kong] of spring.
Letting dawn the thin gauze curtain, [I welcome]
A mated pair of swallows, coming home in fine rain.
Here again a sense of kong is triggered by the awareness that the party is over
tourists are gone and music bands dispersed at the famed West Lake. But more than
the realization that spring has come to an end, kong entails a self-reflexive appraisal
of ones attachment to spring as well. The concomitant emotional transformation
consists of, again, a paradoxical combination of emotions: on the one hand, there
are the sentiments of resignation and emotional withdrawal as suggested by the
fallen curtain; on the other, there is an appreciation of affective ties as suggested by
the return (presumably out of attachment to the nest-site) of the mated swallows.
There is also the emergence of a mental space. It is from this mental space, cordoned off as it were by layers of diaphanous screensthe gauze curtain and the fine
rainthat the poet welcomes the returning swallows with renewed appreciation but
without attachment. Note the profound transformation of the poets emotional intent
from tenacious attachment to springnot till (third line from the last) all the
merry making of the season has come to an end will he give up the hope for spring
to quiet resignation (letting down the curtain); from a sense of loss marked by the
departure of spring to a sense of gain as suggested by the returning swallows. But
things do not necessarily go full circlethe poet has come to approach loss and
gain alike with a sense of equanimity.
Along with the emergence of psychological space is the transformation of time.
The impetuousness of spring with its festivitiesthe tourists and the music bands
is transformed, with the realization of kong (emptiness), into a leisurely, contemplative time, as embodied by the willows that sway gently in the wind all day long.
Note the absence of goal directed energy characteristic of agency thinking
(Snyder et al., 2005) in this picture. What we have instead is receptiveness: the willows languidly in the wind with as little self-determination and purposeful pursuit
as the contemplative poet behind the gauze curtain.
Finally, concomitant with the shift from attachment to detachment, there is in
evidence a palatability shift characteristic of taste aversion (Chap. 10), except that in
the present context the realization of kong entails a double reversal of flavor from
good to bad, and back again. Shweder and Haidt (2000) found in Medieval Hindu
texts a subtype of disgust that entails horror and disillusionment, as well as
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world-weariness associated with the quest for detachment, transcendence, and

salvation (p. 403). The possible connection between disillusionment and disgust as
the rejection response to bad-tasting foods [and by extension, experiences] (Rozin,
Haidt, & McCauley, 2000, p. 644) is intimated at the beginning of the poem in reference to the spoliation of spring: Gone are all the blossomsShattered scattered
residue of red (First two lines). But the implicit disgust/disillusionment was countered with the opposite evaluationcontrary to conventional wisdom, the scene of
devastation at West Lake is pronounced good (line 1). This is what Rozin (1999)
refers to as hedonic reversals in which objects that initially give rise to aversion are
liked. For instance, people may develop a preference for the fiery chili pepper, even
when they initially rejected it because of its burning sensations. However, more than
hedonic reversals, the poets emotional transformation entails a re-definition of
pleasure, thereby a distinction is drawn between conventional pleasure, which does
not survive the spring (or, symbolically, youth), and refined pleasure, which does.

To recapitulate, the Buddhist notion of kong (emptiness) entails radical emotional
transformation that parallels the set breaking of wu (enlightenment). The two phenomena tend to happen in tandem, and both share in common one basic cognitive
mechanism, namely gist-based intuition. I have shown how heuristic thinking can
cut the chase and get to the gist of things, a capacity which is the necessary, albeit
not sufficient, condition for any kind of insight. Another component of kong is
metacognition, or second-order awareness, which in combination with heuristic
thinking gives rise to strong evaluation. The difference between strong and weak
evaluations falls along the divide between heuristic and analytic thinking (see
Chap. 1, Table 1.1). Analytic thinking is the processing strategy of weak evaluations, in which one computes the pros and cons of a situation. The coarser processing of heuristics, by contrast, gives rise to strong evaluation, which is preoccupied
not with the pragmatic questions of cost and benefit so much as with ontological
concerns such as good versus bad, right versus wrong, and being versus nonbeing/
nothingness. I have argued that when strong evaluation couples with savoring the
experiences of severe loss and goal block in life, we have a recipe for the radical
emotional transformation associated with kong (emptiness). Characteristic of this
kong-based emotional transformation is a palatability shift reminiscent of the rats
taste aversion.
It is not difficult to identify with the taste aversion of lab rats (Chap. 10) when
they turn away from a food they used to like, after the researcher adds something to
it that makes them throw up. I never went back to the restaurant where I found floating in my favorite soup a bug. The more rational analytic thinking would compute
the pros and cons of things: A dead bug is not going to kill you; how about the other
good dishes that you are giving up by not going to that restaurant? By contrast, my
References
187
reasoning is coarse and categorical, characteristic of heuristics: This is disgusting!

I will never go there again!
But how do we get from here to the creative responses to lifes challenges that we
see in the poems cited above? What do we need for the heuristics of strong evaluations to become the poets nuanced responsessuch as a fine sense of detachment
and equanimity characterized by acceptance, but not resignation; letting be, but not
giving upto the worst kind of disappointments and goal blocks in life? The
answer, I have argued, lies in the combined use of two factors, metacognition and
savoring (Chap. 10).
Concerning metacognition (see Chaps. 7 and 10) or higher level of consciousness, true insight such as wu (enlightenment) consists in a breakthrough in consciousness, not simply flipping polarities from likes to dislikes as is the case with
the palatability shift of the rat, or with my unhappy experience with a restaurant.
Concerning savoring, its extensive processing can take advantage of one of the
bonuses of insight, namely new options opened up by the breakthroughs in consciousness (Langer, 1997). New options for feeling and thinking may lie in nondominant associations known as protonarratives (Sundararajan, 2008), which as we
have seen can be rendered accessible by savoring (see Chap. 10). More specifically,
savoring capitalizes on the relatively broader, less selective attention known as
defocused attention (Sundararajan, 2004), which makes it possible for weak and
distant associations to compete successfully (Kounios & Beeman, 2014). For
instance in the poem by Li Y cited above, a sense of appreciation of beauty,
although a very distant and weak association to loss and grief, is not drowned out
by the clamors of depression as it would have been in the case of a less creative
mind, whose capacity for savoring negative emotions (Sundararajan, 2014) may
not be as well developed. Thanks to the triumph of a protonarrativea small story
of the moon shining forth in the nightly sky and other eternal imageries, Li Y
the emperor who lost his kingdomhas been crowned as one of the reigning poets
throughout Chinese history.
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Part IV
Conclusion
Chapter 12
What Is an Emotion? Answers from a Wild

Garden of Knowledge
Introduction
some rooftops are overcrowded with people looking down at the same courtyard,
quibbling about specks of dirt in colleagues eyes, while some distance away, lies terra
incognita, a wild garden of knowledge.
(Picard, 2010, p. 251)
In 1884, William James (1884) asked the question: What is an emotion? More
than a century later, we now have a burgeoning affective science with multitude of
data on emotions. But there remains a significant lacuna in knowledge-base due to
sampling biases among other things (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a,
2010b). Before the lacuna is filled by answers from the wild gardens of knowledge
that fall outside the pale of Western psychology, I propose a more modest beginning
toward an answer to James question. Instead of asking what an emotion is, we may
ask how we model emotions. In this chapter I will examine the Chinese folk models
of emotion.
This chapter presents the Chinese folk theories of emotion in three steps. First, I
define the Chinese terms of emotion, spell out the epistemology that undergirds
these terms, and draw out their implications for emotion theory. Next, I adumbrate
the possibilities for a theory of Chinese emotions by incorporating cognate ideas
from Western psychology. In particular, I put forward an impact-focus account of
Chinese emotions. Lastly, I conclude with the speculation that the Chinese theories
of emotion focus on the upstream, whereas the Western theories of discrete emotions, downstream of the river called emotions.
An overview of the Chinese folk theories of emotion may begin with a definition
of terms concerning emotion.

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What is an Emotion?
Definition of Terms
The modern Chinese term that comes closest to emotion is the compound qing
gan or gan qing with qing often serving as a short hand for the
compound. Although qing by itself is often taken as the Chinese term for emotion
(Hansen, 1995), it is well to remember that the Chinese notion of emotion has two
tributaries, qing and gan , which warrant separate treatment.
Qingemotion is for truth. The term qing , as documented in pre-Han texts
(500-200 BC), means primarily genuine, the facts, or what essentially is
(Graham, 1986, p. 63). This truth connotation of qing has two registersworld and
mind. Pertaining to the world, qing means the true condition of a situation; pertaining to the mind-and-heart (both denoted by the same character xin ), the term,
according to Harbsmeier (2004), means essential sensibilities and sentiments
(p. 94), or individual deep convictions, responses, feelings (p. 101). In a phrase,
qing refers to manifestations of human nature.
There is a long tradition in the West, from Plato to Sartre (with the exception of
Heidegger), that considers emotions to be somehow distorting reality. The Chinese
believe, on the contrary, that emotion (qing) discloses something that is true about
the person and the world. One of the most articulate expositions of this view is
found in the writings of Feng Meng-leng (15741645), the eminent compiler and
writer of folktales. Feng claims that it is qing that grounds us in reality; it is humans
who distort reality when they fail to be true to their qing (Feng, 1983).
Ganaffectivity that connects us all. Turning to the other half of the compound,
gan means stirring, affecting, but more often is used in the passive tense of
being affected or stirred. Gan is usually used in combination with two other terms:
gan-ying (responsiveness) and gan-lei (responding in kind) (Chap. 6).
Generally rendered as responsiveness, the compound gan-ying literally means
stimulating-responding which entails not a simple SR (stimulusresponse)
relation, but rather a resonating feedback loop based on an intrinsic affinity
between all things in a sympathetic universe. This point is clarified by the compound gan-lei. Lei literally means category, thus gan-lei means responding
according to categorical correlations (Goldberg, 1998, p. 35). In essence, lei
refers to the principle of parity or correspondence that lies at the core of sympathetic magic (like attracts like). It is said in the I-Ching commentary attributed to
Confucius: Things that accord in tone vibrate together. Things that have affinity
in their inmost natures seek one another. Water flows to what is wet, fire turns to
what is dry (Munakata, 1983, p. 106). Another ancient text Lieh n chuan puts
it this way: When an ox lows and a horse makes no response, it is not because the
horse does not hear the noise; it is because it belongs to another species [category]
(cited in Henry, 1987, p. 27).
Together, qing and gan make one important claim about what it is to be human:
Feelings are an integral part of human nature, the essence of which is affectivity. In
contrast to the reactive responses to occurrences or events that constitute the primary framework of emotion in mainstream psychology, the Chinese notion of qing-
The Extended Mind Hypothesis
193
gan resets the focus by underscoring the affective disposition of responsiveness as

being primary. Here the Chinese approach to emotion is consistent with
Wittgensteins (1953) analysis of emotion concepts in terms of (universal) affective
dispositions that denote not occurrent states but human possibilities to have particular feelings, given certain conditions.
This folk model of emotion is incomplete without its underpinning epistemology, to which we now turn.
The Extended Mind Hypothesis

The Chinese folk theory of the mind finds an eloquent expression in one school of
contemporary philosophy known as the extended mind hypothesis (Clark, 2008;
Chap. 6). The mind according to conventional wisdom in the West is a private
space for internal, mental processing that is privy only to introspection. By contrast,
the extended mind hypothesis states that the mind is distributed in the world and
outside the head. Otherwise put, the extended mind hypothesis refers to the fact that
the mind does not entail a brain event so much as an encounter with the world
(Clark, 2008; No, 2009). One consequence that flows out of this is a shift in focus
from representing an environment to continuously engaging that environment
(Clark, 2008). Thus the extended mind hypothesis is consistent with the embodied,
embedded mode of transaction with the world, a line of thinking that finds an eloquent expression in Dourish (2001): We inhabit our bodies and they in turn inhabit
the world, with seamless connections back and forth (p. 102). This has implications for theories of perception and emotion.
According to conventional wisdom, perception is widely considered a brain
event, an internal processing. Within this framework, the role of affect is to collect
evolutionarily relevant information about the world for the brain to make a quick
and handy map (representation) of the world. The world itselfjust doesnt get
into the act. At best. The world causally perturbs the nervous system at its
periphery (the senses), thus giving rise to the events that cause us to seem to see
(No, 2009, pp. 136137). By contrast, according to the extended mind hypothesis,
seeing is a kind of coupling with the environment, as No (2009, p. 145) puts it.
This point can be elaborated with the notion of affectivity as a sensing mechanism.
Coupling-style sensing. Emotion can be understood in terms of sensing mechanisms. A sensor is an open conduit allowing environmental magnitudes to exert a
constant influence on behavior (Clark, 2008, p. 16). The difference between the
resonating feedback loop of gan-ying (stimulating-responding) and the conventional SR arc in psychology falls along the divide between two sensing mechanisms, coupling-style and conventional sensing.
According to conventional wisdom, sensing is a means of transduction of information into internal models. By contrast, the extended mind hypothesis (Clark,
2008) proposes that Sensingacts as a constantly available channel that productively couples agent and environment (p. 15), resulting in adaptively potent,
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What is an Emotion?
closed-loop, feedback-dependent processes (p. 152). Consistent with the emphatic

stress, in Chinese texts, on the mutuality of the mind and world interactions, Clark
has used (2008) the analogy of dance to explain the continuous reciprocal causation
of coupling-style sensing: when some system S is both continuously affecting and
simultaneously being affected by activity in some other system O (p. 24). This
explains nicely why gan (affecting) and ying (response to being affected) are
used interchangeably in Chinese texts.
As Averill, Stanat, and More (1998) point out, the reciprocal relation between
stimuli and responses plays an important role in the theories of quite a few Western
thinkers especially Dewey (1896), von Uexkll (von Uexkll & Kriszat, 1957), and
Gibson (1979). But it is the extended mind hypothesis that spells out more fully the
epistemological ramifications of coupling-style sensing, to one of which we now
turn.
Leaving Information in the World

According to the extended mind hypothesis, it is better to leave information in the
world rather than putting it all in the head (Clark, 2008, p. 156). What might be
some of the advantages in not representing the world in the head? One advantage,
according to Clark (2008), is to spread the problem-solving load between brain,
body, and world by using less by way of internal (specifically representational)
resources and more by the way of ongoing world-engaging action (p. 141). This
principle is followed by the Ju/hoan, a hunting-gathering community in the northwestern Kalahari Desert, Botswana, who keep food accumulation to a minimum
food is not gathered until needed, because The environment itself is their
storehouse (Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2012, p. 30). But more so than humans,
other organisms seem to capitalize on this principle.
The dolphin and the ocean liner. One advantage of leaving information in the
environment is to save energy. Instead of heavy investment on internal resources
such as the computational power of a big brain, some nonhuman organisms simply
take advantage of the resources in the environment. Clark (1997) points out that the
swimming capacities of many fishes are paradoxes of propulsion. The dolphin, for
instance, is estimated to be not strong enough to propel itself at the speed it exhibits.
The hypothesis Clark favors is that their extraordinary swimming efficiency is due
to an evolved capacity to exploit and create additional sources of kinetic energy in
the watery environment (219). By contrast, ships and submarines look clumsy,
ponderous, and laggardly (p. 219), because these vessels treat the aquatic environment as an obstacle to be negotiated and do not seek to subvert it to their own ends
by monitoring and massaging the fluid dynamics surrounding the hull (p. 218).
The ducks are the first to know. While our ocean liners have not paid much attention to the wisdom of the fish, the Chinese are impressed with that of the duck. As a
Chinese saying goes: Water in the river is warming up in the springthe ducks are
the first to know This has implications for science.
Leaving Information in the World
195
According to Fan Fa-ti (Fan, 2004), during the Cultural Revolution Chinese
scientists conducted studies in collaboration with the masses to use animals as
earthquake detectors.
In addition to using animals, humans can also imitate them. The assumption that
information lies not in the head, so much as in the environment may have contributed to an arms race in the ability to pick up subtle cues in the environment. The
Chinese have many terms that denote subtle environmental cues.
One term that calls attention to the environment is shi which refers to the
momentum of a situation. Situational momentum can be favorable or unfavorable
(see also Chap. 9). As Jing and Van de Ven (2014) point out, From the yin-yang
view, environments constantly and cyclically change, so current situations eventually transform to their opposite, indicating either favorable or unfavorable momentum, called shi (p. 32). To take advantage of the changeable environment,
change agents must vigilantly keep monitoring the situation for evidence of momentum switching (p. 50). The authors explain: When situational momentum (shi) is
perceived to be favorable, change agents can take a leveraging momentum (ying-shi
) strategy to seize the opportunity to change. When situational momentum
(shi) is perceived to be unfavorable, change agents adopt a building momentum
(zao-shi ) strategy for the next favorable situational momentum (shi) to come
(p. 44). These strategies of manipulating the situational momentum have been documented by the authors in their analysis of the phenomenal success of She Chen, the
CEO of the Chengdu Bus Group. Their analysis of the ingenuity of Chen in taking
advantage of situational momentum (shi) to propel his business is reminiscent of
Clarks (1997) description of the fishs exploitation of aquatic swirls, eddies, and
vortices to turbocharge propulsion and aid maneuverability (p. 219), such that it
is even possible for some fish to exceed 100 % of swimming efficiency.
Savoring the subtle ji. Another term that calls attention to the environment is ji
. Ji in common parlance is the environmental cues that one does well to take
advantage of. In literary theory ji refers to the most subtle, incipient phase of a
movement in a natural process; in this case it is best translated as impulses or, in
the perception of chi [ji], intimations (Owen, 1992, p. 584). How to pick up such
subtle cues in the environment? Savoring will do, according to the poet/critic
Si-Kong Tu (837908).
In the framework of savoring (see Chap. 10; Sundararajan, 2004, 2008; Frijda &
Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan & Averill, 2007), ji has to do with the protonarratives of emotionthe amorphous undercurrents of feeling states too subtle and
nuanced to carry any conventional label. Thus wrote Si-Kong Tu: Reside in plainness and quiet:/How faint, the subtle impulses [ji] (Owen, 1992, p. 306). Here
Si-Kong Tus take on ji deviates from the everyday use of the term. In common
parlance, ji is associated with action, as the environmental cues that one may choose
to act on. In Si-Kong Tus usage, however, it is the stimulus feature, rather than
response outcome, of ji that takes center stage. Ji becomes for the poet not a cue for
action, so much as an end in itself, an affective experience to be savored. But it is
entirely possible that aesthetic savoring serves practical purposes in even more
important ways than the action-oriented version of jisavoring may very well be a
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training ground for the mind to emulate the duck: In order to pick up subtle cues in
the environment, a good place to start would be the internal environment of feeling
states; and a good skill to learn would be making subtle distinctions, through savoring, of qualities that are both an essential part of emotional experience and are
exceedingly difficult to describe in any language, Chinese or English.
So much for the Chinese terms of emotion and associated epistemology. Now
back to the question of William James: What is an emotion? In the remainder of this
chapter, I adumbrate possibilities toward an answer that, by incorporating cognate
ideas in contemporary psychology, may develop into a coherent theory of Chinese
emotions.
Toward a Psychology of Chinese Emotions

A standard definition of emotion in psychology goes something like this: an emotion is a psychological system that appraises internal or external, context-related
causes in terms of their significance for the satisfaction of personal motives
(Holodynski & Friedlmeier, 2010, p. 89). If emotions come in categorical and discrete experiences that capitalize on appraisal of concern-relevant stimuli such as
causal attribution, norm compatibility, and coping actions, then the neonate does not
have emotions, except for some precursory responses such as sensitivity to the caregiver and motor imitation, precursors which will be superseded by later development. For instance, defocused attention of the baby will be superseded by focused
attention to the cause of the emotion, and co-regulation with the caregiver will be
superseded by increasing autonomy in coping action of the adult (Holodynski &
Friedlmeier, 2010). As the previous chapters have shown, this received wisdom in
mainstream psychology is a procrustean bed for Chinese notions of emotion, which
are modeled on the child rather than the adult. It is necessary, therefore, to look
elsewhere and find illuminations in the few dissenting voices in psychology. The
benefits of incorporating non-dominant views could be mutual: These dissenting
views can help to articulate the Chinese perspective on emotion; they in turn may
find in the Chinese framework a more natural site of application.
In the following sections I review, in ascending order of their overlap and affinity
with the Chinese notions of emotion, some cognate and prominent ideas in contemporary psychology (no intention to be comprehensive here).
Core affect theory. Core affect theory (CAT) (Russell, 2003) constitutes one of
the most trenchant criticisms against the notions of discrete emotions and cognitive
appraisals, along with the associated notions of causation, and narrative of emotions. While both qing and CAT privilege feelings and experience, the two have
some irreconcilable differences. CAT is intrapsychic and analytic in orientation, an
approach which reduces the affective phenomena of impact to an undifferentiated
point in valence by activation space, leaving the world out of the picture (Deonna &
Scherer, 2010). By contrast, the Chinese approach to feelings and experience is
holistic and does not reduce the phenomenon to the psyche.
Toward an Impact-Focus Approach to Emotion
197
Transactional account. The world is put back in the picture by the transactional
account of emotion, an approach which is compatible with the framework of gan-ying
(responsiveness), in both of which emotions emerge as unfolding reactions to a
responsive social environment (Parkinson, 2010, p. 160). The transactional account
highlights one major difference in epistemology between the appraisal theories and
the Chinese notions of emotion. In the appraisal framework, knowing is not doing
the latter (emotional response) is mediated by the former (knowledge representation
of the world). By contrast, the Chinese account shares with the transactional framework the assumption that knowing is doing (Woodward, 2009)one learns about the
world not through knowledge representation of it, so much as by world engaging
actions. As Griffiths (2010) puts it: Emotions are forms of skillful engagement with
the world which need not be mediated by conceptual thought (p. 24).
Mindfulness. Research on mindfulness makes a twofold contribution to Chinese
psychology of emotion: First, it calls for a moratorium of cognitive appraisals.
Brown and Cordon (2009) claim that appraisals are self-generated accounts about
life (p. 227) that interferes with living. Echoing the concern about filtering in
Chinese poetics (see Chap. 7), Siegel (2007) claims that filtering events and experience through cognitive representations of self and others twist our capacity to read
our own cues (p. 70) and obscure direct experience (p. 99). Second, it calls attention to the environment, as Siegel (2007) points out that in mindfulness practice,
the aim of our attention is primarily on the outer worldbut the self is a full participant (p. 255).
Lastly, the framework that holds the greatest potential for a psychology of
Chinese emotions is the impact-focus approach (Murphy, Hill, Ramponi, Calder, &
Barnard, 2010), which warrants a closer attention.

According to Murphy et al. (2010), the impact-focus approach is prominent in artistic discourse and photojournalism, but so far neglected in psychology. The Chinese
notion of gan (affectivity) fills this vacuum. Central to gan is the notion of impact,
which can be compared and contrasted with the appraisal-focus approach to emotion prevalent in mainstream psychology. A cogent argument for cognitive appraisal
is given by Harr (2009), who invokes the duckrabbit sketch to show that one
requires stored representations, the duck-schema or the rabbit-schema, to determine
what one sees (see Chap. 10). But, as Wittgenstein points out (Wittgenstein, 1953),
if asked to draw it, those who saw a duck and those who saw a rabbit produce the
same sketch. This innate capacity to be impacted (gan) more than one can conceptualize is capitalized by the impact-focus approach to emotion.
Impact can be differentiated from arousal and valence, according to Murphy
et al. (2010), but its sharpest difference is with appraisal. For illustration, consider
the authors instructions for the impact rating scale: The participants are instructed
to view a briefly presented series of pictures with varying content and to:
198
12
What is an Emotion?
rate each one for its immediate impact. By this we mean that before you get to think
about what is in the picture you may be instantly affected by itwithout necessarily knowing why. We would like you to consider each picture as a whole. Just judge whether you feel
the content of the image created an instant sense of impact on you personally. Try not to
think in detail about the picture or its contents in terms of particular properties(e.g., fear,
anger, joy, etc.)or how many thoughts and ideas it leads to. We just want an estimate of
its overall immediate impact, irrespective of what it is that might underlie its impact on you
personally (i.e., whether its positive, negative or neither). (Murphy et al., 2010, p. 607)
Based on the above instructions for the impact rating scale, we may differentiate
the impact-focus (IF) approach from the mainstream psychology (MP) approach to
emotion along the following parameters:
1. How versus what: IF concerns how one is affected; MP asks What is it?
2. Effect versus cause: IF concerns the effect of the emotional stimuli; MP the
causal explanations for the effect.
3. Outward attention versus intrapsychic orientation: IF focuses on the stimuli attributes in the environment; MP has an inward focus, such as personal concerns or
brain mechanisms.
4. Holistic perception versus analysis of details: IF is concerned with an overall
impression of the situation; MP takes an analytic approach to discrete aspects of the
phenomenon such as arousal, valence, or categorical emotions (fear, anger, etc.).
5. Nonpropositional versus propositional representations: IF privileges nonpropositional representations such as images or protonarratives (see Chap. 10); MP
capitalizes on propositional representations or narratives of emotion.
Implications of these differences for a Chinese theory of emotion have been
addressed elsewhere (Averill & Sundararajan, 2006) and in the previous chapters
(see especially Chap. 1). A summary is presented below.
From appraisal to awareness. Appraisal theories (see Chaps. 5 and 7) claim that
a well-constructed cognitive map of the world, complete with identifiable causes
and intentional objects, is necessary for an adaptive emotional response (Deonna &
Scherer, 2010). The competing claim from Chinese aesthetics is that adaptive action
rests squarely upon higher levels of awareness, otherwise known as metacognition
(Chaps. 7 and 10). In savoring the protonarratives of experience, for instance, emotion scripts are held in check while awareness of impact (gan) reigns supreme.
Discrete emotions, now you see them, now you dont. Chinese use a large and
varied store of phrases to describe facial expressions suggesting that people do not
generally correlate facial expressions with a discrete emotion category (Ye, 2004,
p. 198). By contrast, categorically discrete emotions are the building blocks for the
basic emotions (Ekman, 1992) that are considered universal in mainstream
psychology.
Classical Chinese texts do not agree on what constitute basic emotions. A few
lists from Eifring (2004) should suffice: from The Book of Rites: joy and anger,
sorrow and fear, love, aversion and desire (p. 13); from Xunzi: cheerfulness and
gloom, joy and anger, sorrow and delight, love, aversion and desire (p. 28); from
Chuang Tzu: aversion and desire, joy and anger, sorrow and delight (p. 29). Liu
199
Xie (ca. 465522) wrote that Man is endowed with seven emotions [qing], which
are moved [gan] in response [ying] to objects. When moved [gan] by objects one
sings of ones intent totally spontaneously (Yu, 1987, p. 34). From the perspective
of mainstream psychology, this seems to be getting things backwards: the discrete
emotions were mentioned before the perturbation of the mind, then after one is
moved by external things (objects) in the world, intent gets expressed, and
the discrete emotions seemed to have dropped out of the picture!
The first part of the puzzle is easy to resolve: Emotion (qing) and human nature
are two sides of the same cointhe latter refers to the pre-perturbation phase, the
former, the post-perturbation phase of the mind (Eifring, 2004). Thus the discrete
emotions in the pre-perturbation phase refer to potentials in human nature rather
than actual emotions.
What is more illuminating is the second part of the puzzle: Intent takes precedence over discrete emotions as a privileged sign (see Chap. 6).
From personal stake to personal take on things. Cognitive appraisals, according
to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), revolve around the main evaluative issues of
personal stake such as Am I in trouble or being benefited, now or in the future, and
in what way? (p. 31). By contrast, impact has to do with ones personal take on
things. Thats why the instructions for the impact rating scale stated: Just judge
whether you feel the content of the image created an instant sense of impact on you
personally (Murphy et al., 2010, p. 607, italics added).
To reiterate a point made before (Chap. 6), the difference in orientation between
personal stake and person take falls along the divide between topic and comment in
linguistics. Topic concerns what the statement is aboutinformation necessary for
the evaluation of whether ones personal goals are at stake. By contrast, comment
has to do with the sharing of personal take on things: The comment is some mental
take or mental relation to a topic, expressing an experience, emotion, stance or attitude (Bogdan, 2000, p. 78). In developmental literature, the topic irrelevance of
infants expressions is attributed to their inability to focus on the cause of the emotion, a phenomenon which is expected to be superseded by topic-focused categorical emotions, as the child matures. For instance, Holodynski and Friedlmeier (2010)
point out that the expressive reactions used by neonates are not directed toward any
specific object (p. 102). As the child matures, these unfocused and undifferentiated
expressive reactions of the neonate will be superseded by the adults categorically
organized feeling focused on a cause that can be used to monitor the course of the
emotion and that allows coping actions to be triggered (p. 98).
The Chinese account of emotion suggests otherwise. Consistent with the Chinese
perspective is the observation of Stern (1985) that infants smiles (see Chap. 6,
Fig. 6.3) concern not the current goals and behaviors, so much as the mode of communionto be with, to share, or to join in the inner states of another person. Thats
why, says Stern (1985) that protoconversation is topicless, behaviorally irrelevant,
and world-indifferent (p. 76). There is ample evidence that humans have a particular propensity to share inner states with each other (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine,
2009). Thus the need for humans to share personal takes on things is continuous
from the cradle to the grave.
200
12
What is an Emotion?

As an ensemble of undulating affective states, qing (emotion) is the manifestation of the
human capacity to be impacted affectively (gan). In contrast to the reactive responses to
occurrences or events that constitute the primary framework of emotions in mainstream
psychology, the Chinese notion of gan (affectivity) puts a premium on the expression
and sharing of ones personal take on impact. In contrast to the Western notion of emotion as a disruptive force to be regulated by reason and cognition (Chap. 10; Averill &
Sundararajan, 2006), the Chinese consider the human capacity for responding to impact
affectively as a positive quality to be enhanced through expanding consciousness.
Consciousness expands not by reason or cognition, but by mind-to-mind transactions
(Chaps. 1, 3, and 6). The more developed one is in the skills of within- and betweenmind mappings (McKeown, 2013) as a result of mind-to-mind transactions in the intraand inter-personal contexts, the more refined will ones qing be (Chaps. 6 and 10). This,
in a nutshell, is my impact-focus account of Chinese emotions.
In the final analysis, the story about emotions can be told in many different ways,
depending on our models of the mind. The adult-normed account of the mind privileged by mainstream psychology capitalizes on the narrative structure of goals
which loom large in adults life. The child-normed account privileged by the
Chinese (Chap. 6) capitalizes on the expressive dimension of emotions, a dimension
that plays a pivotal role in the protoconversation between the infant and the caregiver. From the Chinese point of view, discrete emotions are downstream phenomena that flow from the more primordial experiences that constitute the basis of qing:
Our life begins with a form of mind-to-mind transaction known as protoconversation between the infant and the caregiver, a transaction that takes place in the primordial space of intersubjectivity. It is in this shared mental space that the child
learns about personal take on things, such as intents, moods, and desires. How do
we get from this co-regulated homeostasis of the young child to the discrete emotions of the adult, if we do not subscribe to the trajectory of the later superseding the
former as assumed by many developmental psychologists? Heidegger can help.
According to Heideggers mood (Stimmungen) theory (Smith, 1981), it is our
personal take on things such as mood that opens up a world in which we encounter
things that matter to us, and through our appraisal of how things matter to us, we
have discrete emotions. This point is well articulated by a philosopher of emotions,
Heleen Pott:
A world is neverstuck together from a multiplicity of perceived things collected after the
fact, but it is what is the most primordially and the most properly manifest, within which we
are able to encounter this or that thing. The movement of the opening of the world happens
in the fundamental mood. So, protoconversation comes first, as an initial, topic-less,
worldless, emotional intersubjectivity at the level of the infant-caregiver homeostasis.
Affective intentional states (moods, Stimmungen) come later, as disclosive submissions to
the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.
(Personal communication, March 17, 2008)
Whether or not you agree with this phenomenological account, one thing seems
clear, namely that the Chinese notions of qing focus on the upstream, whereas the
201
Western theories of discrete emotions, downstream of the river called emotions.

Heleen Pott has an explanation which I like:
This is probably because European philosophy right from the beginning had an overly moralistic attitude towards emotions and the self, and Chinese philosophy an aesthetic attitude.
The implications are hugeit took us twenty-five centuries before we (that is: we, embodied phenomenologists) finally started to conceptualize emotions as experiences of a feeling
self. (Personal communication, March 15, 2015)
Taking this perspective further, I offer my explanation below.

Some concluding observations. The upstream and downstream analogy can be
cast in the framework of symmetry and asymmetry (Chap. 1). The previous chapters
have shown how the Chinese privilege relational cognition which puts a premium
on symmetry, as evidenced by a tendency to capitalize on harmony, resonance, and
mind-to-mind transactions. By contrast, the West tends to privilege non-relational
cognition that capitalizes on symmetry breakdown which is necessary for tasks of
differentiation and cognitive control. Consistent with this framework, the Chinese
child-based model of emotion is situated at a higher echelon, or upstream, of the
descending chain of symmetry subgroups with progressive symmetry breakdown
(see Chap. 1, Fig. 1.1), relative to the Western adult-based model of emotion.
Since all cultures need both relational as well as non-relational cognition, difference between cultures is not a matter of presence versus absence so much as that of
prevalence in one or the other modes of cognition. This point is best articulated by
the polarities of yin and yang, in which the dominant element in one system is present as the non-dominant element in the other. A graphic representation of this point
is the so-called yin-yang fish (see Fig. 12.1), in which the defining color of the yin
fish is found in the eye of the yang fish, and vice versa.
This formulation of cultural comparisons is consistent with Shweders (1991)
vision for cultural psychology: To discover other realities hidden within the self,
waiting to be drawn out into consciousness (p. 69). Not till thennot until
psychology, no less than a developing self, can be more open to deviant and nondominant ideas from both within as well as without the field of affective science
(Sundararajan, 2009)will we be able to connect the upstream and the downstream
of the emotion river and arrive at a coherent answer, made possible by a more
comprehensive understanding of the mental life (Teo & Febbraro, 2003), to the
question posed by James (1884) more than a century ago: What is an emotion?
Fig. 12.1 The yin-yang fish,

symbolizing the dynamic
relationship between systems
that are antagonistic and
mutually complementary at
the same time. Note:
Yin = predominantly black;
yang = predominantly white
202
12
What is an Emotion?
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Index
A
Amae, 131132
Anthropomorphism, 96
Attachment theory, 78, 79
Authority Ranking (AR), 6, 13, 14,
43, 54, 66
B
Benevolence (ren) , 4445, 48
Blocked-choice paradigm, 2627, 35
The Book of Rites, 44, 47, 48, 198
C
Cai-gen Tan, 180, 182, 183
Care-based morality
awareness ladder, 8788
cognitive ladder, 87, 88
emotional contagion, 86
emotional refinement, 87
empathic concern, 88
gut-feeling approach, 89
innate vulnerability, 86
LEAS scale, 8788
psychological studies, 87
sympathic concern, 88
Caregiving behavioral system, 78, 79, 84
Categorical reasoning, 175, 178, 180,
182, 184
Chaos theory, 26
Cheng , 48
Cognitive appraisal, 196, 197, 199
freedom, 116117
unbearing mind, 8586
Cognitive control, 121

freedom, 117118
harmony, 2730
sajiao , 126, 127, 130
Collectivism
animal model of, 3940
group-based vs. relational collectivism
communal/relational orientation, 4041
pen-choice paradigm, 41
personalized vs. socialized power
orientations, 42
social mindfulness, 41
Communal Sharing (CS), 6, 1317, 43, 5253,
6568
Communion, 69, 101, 199
Compassion, 89
Confucianism
collectivism
animal model of, 3940
group-based vs. relational collectivism,
4042
conceptual spaces, 3
filial piety, 54
harmony
cognitive complexity, refined emotions,
3435
particulate vs. blending systems, 31, 32
interdependent-behavior, 70
rationality
Communal Sharing, 5253
private, shared, and common
knowledge, 5052
rituals (li)
aesthetics (art, poetry, music), 4850
authenticity, 4647

International and Cultural Psychology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18221-6
205
206
Confucianism (cont.)
autonomy, 47
benevolence (ren) , 4445
big gods, evolution of, 42
inner vs. outer, 47
personalization, 48
private and public selves, 45
reverent formality, 44
self and society, 43
self-reflexivity, 48
strong ties, relational reasoning of, 43
Core affect theory (CAT), 196
Coupling-style sensing, 193194
Creativity
Asian creativity, 143
creation myth
revolutionary creativity, 144
hermits (yin-i), 6364
ecology, 7071
sexual selection hypothesis of, 6870
relational vs. non-relational cognition,
143144
solitude
absence-based intimacy, 152154
designer environments, 148
direct communication, 152
freedom skills, 150151
ideal community, 151152
ideal mental world (jing-jie) ,
147, 154
self-creation, 146147
self-preservation, 145146
Shih-pin, 148149
Culture
associative/holistic vs. rule-based/analytic
reasoning, 5
cognitions and cognitive styles, 57, 1315
conceptual space, 34
corporate culture, 56
fourfold model of relational cognition,
6, 1315
individualism vs. collectivism, 45
mind-to-world vs. mind-to-mind
transactions, 68
order and chaos/entropy, 11
pair-bonding hypothesis, 8
as rationality, 4
repository of emotional knowledge, 3
similarity vs. difference detection, 89
social brain hypothesis, 8
strong vs. weak ties, 910
symmetry, 1213, 1517
symmetry breaking, 56, 12, 13, 1518
Index
symmetry restoration, 6
synergistic vs. scarcity-based community, 10
Curiosity, openness, acceptance, and love
(COAL), 30
D
Daoism
animal model, 59
anti-hierarchy, 66
Chinese poetics, 121
conceptual spaces, 3
freedom (see Freedom and emotions)
hermits/recluses (yin-i)
bona fide hermits, 64
creativity (see Creativity)
freedom, 6465
heroic hermits, 64
mobility, 6263
refusal to serve, 6061
social withdrawal, 61, 65
solitude as habitat selection, 6162, 64
spiritualizing strong ties, 67
independence vs. interdependence, 70
maternal order, 68
as Oceanic Merging, 6566
order and chaos/entropy, 11
solitude and creativity in, 145146
symmetry, 6667
Depression, 153154
Dialectic thinking
moderation/the golden mean
(zhong yong), 25
yin and yang dialectics, 2425
Direct communication, 152
Discrete emotions, 34, 158, 198201
Dual process theory, 177
freedom, 118119
savoring, 167
E
Emotion
core affect theory, 196
coupling-style sensing, 193194
definition, 192193
emptiness (see Emptiness (kong))
extended mind hypothesis, 193194
freedom (see Freedom and emotions)
harmony(see Harmony)
Heideggers mood theory, 200
impact-focus approach
appraisal, 197, 198
basic emotions, 198
207
Index
communion, 199
discrete emotions, 198201
mainstream psychology (MP)
approach, 198, 200
metacognition, 198
protoconversation, 199, 200
topic vs. comment, 199
intimacy (see Intimacy)
leaving information in environment
save energy, 194
savoring (ji), 195196
situational momentum (shi), 195
love (see Heart-aching love (teng))
mainstream psychology, 198, 200
mindfulness, 197
transactional account, 197
yin-yang fish, 201
Emotional contagion, 86
Empathy
freedom, 115116
heart-aching love, 8385
Emptiness (kong)
emotional transformations, 183186
gist-based intuition
categorical reasoning, 178
fuzzy-trace theory, 177
gist vs. verbatim representation, 177
less-is-more principle, 177
satori/wu, 178180
heuristics, 175, 176, 186
metacognition, 179181, 186, 187
second-order desires, 181
strong and weak evaluation, 181183
Enlightenment (wu) , 175, 178180, 187
Entropy, 11, 12, 16
Equality Matching (EM), 6, 14, 129
Eremitism. See Hermits (yin-i)
Evocative imagery (xing)
bi (comparison) , 103
dhvani (suggestiveness), 104105
explicitness and covertness, 103
joint attention, 105106
metonymy, 105
stirring/arousing, 103
Extended mind hypothesis, 95, 193194
Extrinsic motivation, 144
definition, 133
discernment, 136
discretion, 135
males self-enhancement, 133134
payback schedule, 136
self-control, 135
self-indulgence, 134135
Freedom and emotions
authenticity and spontaneity
community, 115
creativity, 111, 114
empathy, 115116
timing, 115
wu-forms, 116
cognitive appraisal, 116117
cognitive control, 117118, 121
feng liu , 113
harmony, 112
metacognitive skills
awareness, 119
dual process theory, 118119
refined pleasure, 119120
mirror state of mind, 111112
suffering, 122
true emotion, 112
Fuzzy-trace theory, 177, 178
F
Feng liu , 113
Filial piety
Confucianism, 54
heart-aching love, 79, 8384
Flower drinking
collective excitement, 135136
H
Harmony
aesthetic emotions, definition of, 21
cognitive complexity, 3335
concurrent vs. sequential goal pursuit,
3536
as dynamic equilibrium, 23
G
Gan-ji , 129
Gan-lei (responding in kind) , 192
affinity-based responsiveness, 97
anthropomorphism, mind perception, 9697
between-mind mappings, 95
mind-to-mind transaction, 94, 95
mind-to-world transaction, 94, 95
similarity-based attraction, 97
within-mind mappings, 95
Gan qing , 192
Gan-ying (stirring and responding) ,
9798, 192
Ging gan , 192
Golden mean (zhong yong) , 23, 25, 31,
32, 34
Gut-feeling approach, 89
208
Harmony (cont.)
good and evil, 21
he , 2122
high dimensionality, 2223
particulate vs. blending systems, 31, 32
symmetry breakdown
blocked-choice paradigm, 26, 27
disintegration avoidance, 3031
four-stage process model, 3233
harmony enhancement, 31
high cognitive control, 2728
symmetry maintenance and restoration
admissible transformations, 24
COAL, 30
cognition without control, 2829
low cognitive control, 27, 28
moderation/the golden mean (zhong
yong), 25
neutralizing differences, 24
priming vs. planning, 2930
set and set breaking, 2527
Harmony seeking, 40
Heart-aching love (teng)
ambivalent/mixed feelings, 77
attachment theory, 78, 79
caregiving behavioral system, 78, 79
deep love, 78
definition, 78
as doting, 78, 8182
empathic pain, 8485
filial piety, 79, 8384
implicit, 8283
intimate relationships, 78, 84
linguistic analysis of, 8081
nuanced emotional blends, 77
pain/ache/hurt, 78
suffering, perceptual cues of, 82
tender feelings, 7879
unbearing mind
care-based morality (see Care-based
morality)
and cognitive appraisal, 8586
compassion, 89
Heideggers mood theory, 200
Hermits (yin-i)
bona fide hermits, 64
creativity, 6364
ecology, 7071
sexual selection hypothesis of, 6870
freedom, 6465
heroic hermits, 64
mobility, 6263
refusal to serve, 6061
social withdrawal, 61, 65
Index
solitude as habitat selection, 6162, 64
spiritualizing strong ties, 67
Holistic thinking
harmony
set and set breaking, 2527
heuristics, 175, 176
Hope theory, 181182
Hui-wei , 159, 160
I
Ideal community, 151152
Ideal mental world (jing-jie) , 147, 154, 171
Impact-focus (IF) approach, 197199
Interpersonal relatedness, 40
Intimacy
evocative imagery (xing)
bi (comparison) , 103
dhvani (suggestiveness), 104105
explicitness and covertness, 103
joint attention, 105106
metonymy, 105
stirring/arousing, 103
gan-lei (responding in kind)
affinity-based responsiveness, 97
anthropomorphism, mind perception,
9697
between-mind mappings, 95
mind-to-mind transaction, 94, 95
mind-to-world transaction, 94, 95
similarity-based attraction, 97
within-mind mappings, 95
gan-ying (stirring and responding) ,
9798
intention, priming-based resonance, 102103
Miller Social Intimacy Scale, 93
mutual closeness and friendship, 93
protoconversation
mind-to-mind transactions in, 9899
resonance and mental sharing
mind perception vs. mind reading,
99100
shared intentions, 100101, 106107
sajiao , 125
Intrinsic motivation, 85, 144
J
Jen, 45
Ji , 195196
Jing-jie. See Ideal mental world
(jing-jie)
Joint attention, 101, 105106
Index
K
Kan-lei , 46
Kong. See Emptiness (kong)
L
Legalists, 42, 53, 54, 71
Li . See Rituals (li)
Love. See Heart-aching love (teng)
M
Mainstream psychology (MP) approach, 198, 200
Market Pricing (MP), 6, 1417, 52, 53
Marshmallow test, 138
Maximally symmetric relational model, 65
Mei guanxi , 14
Mental sharing
and intentions, 100101
mind perception vs. mind reading, 99100
Metacognition, 198
awareness, 119
dual process theory, 118119
emptiness, 175, 179181, 186, 187
refined pleasure, 119120
Metarepresentation (MR), 166167
Metonymy, 105
Miller Social Intimacy Scale, 93
Mimicry, 100
Mind perception
anthropomorphism, 9596
vs. mind reading, 99100
Mysticism, 65, 121
O
Oceanic Merging (OM), 15, 6566
P
Pair-bonding hypothesis, 8
Pen-choice paradigm, 41
Pin wei. See Savoring (pin wei)
Protoconversation, 199, 200
mind-to-mind transactions in, 9899
R
Rang , 44, 45
Rationality
Confucianism
private, shared, and common
knowledge, 5052
209
culture
definition, 4
mind-to-world vs. mind-to-mind
transactions, 8
pair-bonding hypothesis, 8
similarity vs. difference detection, 89
social brain hypothesis, 8
Rejection avoidance, 40
Ren , 4445
Resonance
evocative imagery (xing) (see Evocative
imagery (xing) )
and mental sharing
mind perception vs. mind reading,
99100
shared intentions, 100101, 106107
Revolutionary creativity, 144
Rituals (li)
aesthetics (art, poetry, music), 4850
authenticity, 4647
autonomy, 47
benevolence (ren) , 4445
big gods, evolution of, 42
inner vs. outer, 47
personalization, 48
private and public selves, 45
reverent formality, 44
self and society, 43
strong ties, relational reasoning of, 43
Romantic spirit, 113
S
Sajiao ,
adorably petulant, 125
asymmetrical relationship, 130131, 137
communication, 125
debt-based transactions, 127128
delayed gratification, 138139
discretion, 132133
expressive ties, 130
flower drinking
collective excitement, 135136
definition, 133
discernment, 136
discretion, 135
males self-enhancement, 133134
payback schedule, 136
self-control, 135
self-indulgence, 134135
gratitude
delayed gratification, 138139
indebtedness and, 129130, 137
210
Sajiao (cont.)
intimacy, 125, 130
maternal order, 131132
mixed ties, 129
scarcity-based community, 126, 127
synergistic community, 126, 127
Savoring (pin wei)
acceptance wriggles, 158
basic emotions and protonarrative of,
160162
Chinese notion of, 157159
definition, 157
emotion regulation
authenticity vs. self-deception, 170
emotion refinement, 168
self-alienation, 170
self-awareness, 168169
two-factor approach, 168
engaged detachment, 165167
Garcias animal model, 162
ideal mental world (jingjie) , 171
Indian rasa, 158
information-processing strategy, 159
self-reflexivity
disgust, 163
enhanced consciousness, 163
knowing feelingly, 163164
mind-to-mind transactions, 164165
second-order consciousness, 164
sensory-based affect theory, 171
temporal structure of, 159160
Western formulation, 158
Self-creation, 146147
Self-focus, 132, 153, 169
Self-preservation, 61, 145146
Self-reflexivity
authenticity, 48
benevolence, 48
creativity, 144145
savoring
disgust, 163
enhanced consciousness, 163
knowing feelingly, 163164
mind-to-mind transactions, 164165
second-order consciousness, 164
Sensory-based affect theory, 171
Set breaking, 2627
Shared intentions, 100101, 106107
Shi , 145146
Shimjung, 106
Situational momentum (shi) , 145146, 195
Index
Social brain hypothesis, 8, 52, 62
Social mindfulness, 41, 44, 83, 135
Solitude
creativity (see Creativity)
habitat selection, 6162
Symmetry breakdown
culture, 56, 12, 13, 1518
gratitude, 127
harmony
blocked-choice paradigm, 26, 27
disintegration avoidance, 3031
harmony enhancement, 31
high cognitive control, 2728
symmetry maintenance/restoration,
3233
Symmetry restoration
culture, 6
gratitude, 127
harmony (see Harmony)
T
Tender love, 7879
Teng . See Heart-aching love (teng)
W
Wandering (you) , 63
Willpower, 138
Wu , 178180
Wuwei , 116
Wuyu , 116
Wuzhi , 116
X
Xing . See Evocative imagery (xing)
Xin-teng . See Heart-aching love
(teng)
Y
Yin-i . See Hermits (yin-i)
You , 63
You guanxi , 1415
Z
Zhi , 164
Zhong yong , 23, 25, 31, 32, 34

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International and Cultural Psychology

Series Editor: Anthony J. Marsella, Ph.D.

International and Cultural Psychology

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6089

Dedicated to the memory of My Mother:

Whats This Book About?

This book is about lived experiences in search of a correct name, as Confucius

Synopsis of the Book

Part II: Chinese Emotions in the Everyday

beyond regulation. The goal of regulation/coping/management of emotions is

mological universe of a culture, this book makes it possible for an outsider to

Conceptual Foundations for the Analysis of Chinese Emotions

The Mirror Universes of East and West ...............................................

Harmony: A Delicate Dance of Symmetry ...........................................

In the Crucible of Confucianism ...........................................................

Self and Group: Toward a Deeper Integration ..........................................

On the Wings of Daoism .........................................................................

Tracing Emotions Daintily Through Things

Heart-Aching Love (Teng,) ...............................................................

The Art of Intimacy ................................................................................

Freedom and Emotion: Daoist Recipes for Authenticity

Being Spoiled Rotten (Sajiao ): Lessons in Gratitude..................

Chinese Creativity, with Special Focus on Solitude

Savoring (Pin wei ), from Aesthetics to the Everyday..................

Emptiness (Kong ): Insight-Based Emotional

What Is an Emotion? Answers from a Wild Garden

Index ................................................................................................................. 205

Conceptual Foundations for the Analysis

The Mirror Universes of East and West

There are literally hundreds of definitions of culture (Cohen, 2009). A dictionary

Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

Toward an Explanatory Model of Cross-Cultural Differences

Toward an Explanatory Model of Cross-Cultural Differences

Martin claims that there is a natural progression of knowledge categories from

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

process of symmetry breaking in thought is evidenced by the four measurement

Rationality, East and West

Cognitive styles that

Rationality, East and West

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

may be defined as genetically based personal networks resting squarely on the

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

Toward a Symmetry and Asymmetry Model of Culture

If we have this progression in the reverse direction, from chaos/entropy to order,

Symmetry and Relational Cognition

Symmetry and Relational Cognition

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

Equality Matching: Basis for this relationship is equality or fairness in exchange,

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

(automatic, associative, and holistic) versus system 2 thinking (effortful, reflective)

Once Again, What Is Culture?

It is my hope that in the following chapters as we enter the Chinese discourse on

1 The Mirror Universes of East and West

Harmony: A Delicate Dance of Symmetry

The Structure of Harmony

The Structure of Harmony

Harmony as Symmetry Maintenance and Restoration

degree of inclusiveness, capable of reconciling seemingly inconsistent behaviors and

Low Cognitive Control