G.R. Nos.

L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court
of
First
Instance
of
Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307).
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administratorappellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR
GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION
CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO
ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:

FACTS:
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well
as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years
and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each
one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and
debts) of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my
beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural
lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived
the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n),
devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was
appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same
date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties)
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of
account of his administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always
made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is

the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and
testament.
On December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein
respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
Although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was
appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672,
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of
the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate
together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in
turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
PCIBs Stand
PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect
closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to
Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any
estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests
whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to
this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's
orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as
detailed earlier above, be set aside.
Responent Magnos Stand
Respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of
Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction of
past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of
administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was
given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime
usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing
directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil
Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas
under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs.
Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership
properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact
and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate
passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of
Hodges.

ISSUE: WON foreign laws have to be proven by the administrator of the

estate

RULING:
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the
laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact,
not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice
of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any
proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already
within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally
known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of
the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West
Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and
that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of
section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg
Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National
Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of
the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no
showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published
under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate
of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was
introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at
the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records
of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented
opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the
matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did
make reference to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the
disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would not permit
Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been
amended or changed in the meantime.

When, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a
given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court
may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said
laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the
presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point.

G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitionerappellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving
the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference
to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts
into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

ISSUE: 1.)WON the approval of the scheme of partition is erroneous

2.)WON a Turkish citizen can dispose of his will in accordance with
the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
RULING:
1.The fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

2. In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as
such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of
my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article
792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088

July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE

SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In
re:
Intestate
Estate
of
the
deceased
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.

B.

SUNTAY.

JOSE

B.

SILVINO

SUNTAY,

PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing
the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the
alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January
1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the deceased is more than
P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines,
died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and
personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China,
and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely,
Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr.
and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim
Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of
administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.

After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the
estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have
been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B.
Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the
petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to
establish the loss of the said will.
In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April
1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7
February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing
sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In
the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had
found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January
1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,
Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4
January 1931 (Exhibit N).
ISSUE: WON the proceedings in the court of a foreign country were held
for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witness can be
deemed to be for the probate of a will.
RULING:
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be
proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931
should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these
points. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the
appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and
R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from
the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who
holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters and Consuls
are appointed to attend to trade matters.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the
will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to
probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is
a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be
presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the
Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate
or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will

and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed
and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.

G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943

ERNESTO
vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA
appellees.

M.
and

GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
her

Primacias,
Abad,
Mencias
Pedro C. Quinto for appellees.

husband
&

PEDRO
Castillo

BUISON, respondentfor

appellant.

OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A),
apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following
bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a
gold chain worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all
the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of
the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara,"
a pair of earrings worth P120; to his stepson Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and
to his wife by second marriage, Angustia Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth
P1,020.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament,
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the
various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or
have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions
therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this
case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto
M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the

registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the
purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will
and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary
dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as
his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a
portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will.
But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she (assisted by her husband)
commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose
hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she
presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to
prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural
daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate,
because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the
betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals
sustained that theory.

ISSUE: WON the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance
with the will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court.
RULING:
We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a
will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial
partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and
divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions
of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away
with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression
of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may
be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could
be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might
agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the
present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge
of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be
disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal
of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the

partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no
will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in
rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or
extrajudicial, without offending against public policy.
Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted
by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the
plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the
proven existence of a will left by him and solely because said will has not been
probated due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the
duty imposed upon her by the law.
It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in
said will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did
not signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section 3
of Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his
contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is
concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the
subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL
GRIMM
ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila;
MAXINE
TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD
MILLER
GRIMM
II
and
LINDA
GRIMM, respondents.
AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical
Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate
Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda
Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two
children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will
disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself
and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E.
LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court
of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs.

Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the
probate proceeding.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by
Ethel in January, 1978.
On April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties,
and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the
second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine
estate (par. 2).
At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or
January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers
Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila
Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024for the settlement of his
estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the
pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved
that she be appointed special administratrix.
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by
lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge
Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8)
of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or
12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
On August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del
Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of
partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had already
approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition.
On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for
the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be
ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to
Maxine.
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement
was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and
that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit
in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or.
alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and
that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior
to the petition for probate.
ISSUE: WON
consolidated.

the

testate

proceeding

and

intestate

proceeding

be

RULING:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and
"no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed"
(Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss
and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in
the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers
in the testate case.

G.R. No. 139868

June 8, 2006

ALONZO
Q.
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

ANCHETA, Petitioner,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it,

she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as
executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richards
renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he
has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle.
Petitioner filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with
Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., andP9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and
Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in
its Order dated February 12, 1988.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16Respondent contended that petitioner
willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of
Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely thereof, and
since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner, being an ancillary administrator of the estate,
is duty-bound to introduce in the evidence the pertinent law of the State
of Maryland.
RULING:
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will
Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them; 37 however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law
is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court
peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the
trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The
Court cannot accept petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume
that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audreys will before the
trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen,
domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." 39 He had
all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him
to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to
discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
perform his fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the
trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs,
and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
successional right to the Makati property.