e.

Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Unjust Enrichment; Malicious

Prosecution; Independent Civil Action; Arts. 1724; 2142; 2154; 2164;
2176, NCC

be the lowest bidder for the project. Elizaldy Co would payP8,000,000.00 to

ensure the projects award to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest, Sunwest
would subcontract 20% or P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muoz.7

1. Loria v Muoz, Jr

Since Muoz had known Loria for five years, Muoz accepted Lorias proposal.8
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

1. G.R. No. 187240

On October 2, 2000, Muoz requested Allied Bank to release P3,000,000.00

from his joint account withhis business partner, Christopher Co, to a certain
Grace delos Santos (delos Santos). Loria then obtained the money from delos
Santos.9
Four days later, P1,800,000.00 of the P3,000,000.00 was returned to Muoz.10

October 15, 2014

CARLOS A. LORIA, Petitioner,

vs.
LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
No person should unjustly enrich himself or herself at the expense of another.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to set aside the Court of Appeals'
decision2 and resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 81882. The Court of Appeals
ordered petitioner Carlos A. Loria to pay respondent Ludolfo P. Muoz,
Jr.P2,000,000.00 in actual damages with 12% interest per year from the filing
of the complaint until full payment.4
The facts of this case are as follows:
Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr. (Muoz) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
with an application for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Carlos A. Loria (Loria) with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City.5
In his complaint, Muoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under
the name, "Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr. Construction." In August 2000, Loria visited
Muoz in his office in Doa Maria Subdivision in Daraga, Albay. He invited
Muoz to advance P2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a P50,000,000.00 riverdredging project in Guinobatan.6
Loria represented that he would makearrangements such that Elizaldy Co,
owner of Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation, would turn out to

On January 10, 2001, Loria collectedMuozs P800,000.00 balance. After

deducting Lorias personal loans from Muoz, Muoz issued a check to Loria
for P481,800.00. Loria acknowledged receiving this amount from Muoz.11
The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan
was subjected to public bidding. The project was awarded to the lowest bidder,
Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation.12
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers
without
subcontracting
Muoz.13With
the
project allegedly
finished,
Muozdemanded Loria to return his P2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not
return the money.14
Muoz first charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with estafa. This criminal case was
dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Daraga, Albay for lack of probable
cause.15
Muoz then filed the complaint for sum of money. The case was raffled to
Branch 6 and presidedby Judge Vladimir B. Brusola.16
Loria answered Muozs complaint. He admitted receiving P481,800.00 from
Muoz but argued that the complaint did not state a cause of action against
him. According to Loria, he followed up the projects approval with the Central
Office of the Department of Public Works and Highways as the parties agreed
upon. He was, therefore, entitled to his representation expenses.17
Loria also argued that Muoz was guilty of forum shopping. Muoz first filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against him and Elizaldy Co, which complaint the
Municipal Trial Court of Daraga, Albay dismissed. The subsequently filed
complaint for sum of money, allegedly a complaint to recover the civil aspect of
the estafa case, must, therefore, be dismissed as argued by Loria.18

During pre-trial, the parties agreed to litigate the sole issue of whether Loria is
liable to Muoz forP2,000,000.00.19

The appellate court, however, ruled that Muoz failed to show his right to
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.30

According to the trial court, Muoz established with preponderant evidence that
Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of the riverdredging project. Since no part of the project was subcontracted to Muoz, Loria
must return the P2,000,000.00 he received, or he would be "unduly enriching
himself at the expense of [Muoz]."20

Thus, in the decision31 dated October 23, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts decision but deleted the award of exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.32 The appellate court likewise denied Lorias motion for
reconsideration in the resolution33 dated March 12, 2009.

On the claim of forum shopping, the trial court ruled that Lorias obligation to
return the 2,000,000.00 did not arise from criminal liability. Muoz may,
therefore, file a civil action to recover his P2,000,000.00.21
As to the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the trial court
denied the prayer for lack of sufficient basis.22
Thus, in the decision23 dated January 30, 2004, the trial court ordered Loria to
return the P2,000,000.00 toMuoz as actual damages with 12% interest from
the filing of the complaint until the amounts full payment. The trial court
likewise ordered Loria to pay Muoz P100,000.00 in attorneys fees, P25,000.00
in litigation expenses, andP25,000.00 in exemplary damages with costs against
Loria.24
Loria appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Muoz failed to establish
his receipt of the P2,000,000.00. Specifically, Muoz failed to establish that he
obtained P3,000,000.00from a certain Grace delos Santos. Loria also appealed
the award of attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages for
having no basis in fact and in law.25
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts factual findings. In ruling that
Loria received the net amount ofP2,000,000.00 from Muoz, the Court of
Appeals referred to Muozs testimony that he ordered Allied Bank to
release P3,000,000.00 from his joint account with Christopher Co to a certain
Grace delos Santos.26 Loria then obtained the money from delos Santos and
confirmed with Muoz his receipt of the money.27 This testimony, according to
the appellate court, was supported by Exhibit "C," a check voucher the trial
court admitted inevidence. Loria signed this check voucher and acknowledged
receiving P1,200,000.00 on October 2, 2000 andP800,000.00 on January 10,
2001, ora total of P2,000,000.00.28
Considering that Muoz did not benefit from paying Loria P2,000,000.00, the
appellate court ruled that Loria must return the money to Muoz under the
principle of unjust enrichment.29

Loria filed a petition for review on certiorari34 with this court, arguing that the
principle of unjust enrichment does not apply in this case. As the trial and
appellate courts found, Muoz paid Loria P2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a
government project. The parties agreement, therefore, was void for being
contrary to law, specifically, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
Revised Penal Code, and Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594. The
agreement was likewise contrary to the public policy of public or open
competitive bidding of government contracts.35
Since the parties agreement was void, Loria argues that the parties were in pari
delicto, and Muoz should not be allowed to recover the money he gave under
the contract.36
On the finding that he received a net amount of P2,000,000.00 from Muoz,
Loria maintains that Muoz failed to prove his receipt of P3,000,000.00 through
a certain Grace delos Santos.37
In the resolution38 dated June 3, 2009, thiscourt ordered Muoz to comment on
Lorias petition.
In his comment,39 Muoz argues that Lorias petition raises questions of fact and
law that the trial and appellate courts have already passed upon and resolved in
his favor. He prays that this court deny Lorias petition for raising questions of
fact.
Loria replied40 to the comment, arguing thathe raised only questions of law in
his petition.41 Even assuming that he raised questions of fact, Loria argues that
this does not warrant the automatic dismissal of his petition since the trial and
appellate courts allegedly erred inruling for Muoz.42
On October 8, 2010, the parties filed their joint motion to render judgment
based on the compromise agreement.43In their compromise agreement,44 the
parties declared that thiscase "was a product of a mere misunderstanding." 45To
amicably settle their dispute, the parties agreed to waive all their claims, rights,
and interests against each other.46

This court denied the joint motion for lack of merit in the resolution 47 dated
December 15, 2010.

and (10) the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.51 [Emphases omitted]

The issues for our resolution are the following:

Loria failed to convince us why we should make an exception in this case.

I. Whether Loria initially obtained P3,000,000.00 from a certain Grace

delos Santos
II. Whether Loria is liable for P2,000,000.00 to Muoz
We rule for Muoz and deny Lorias petition for review on certiorari.
I
Whether Loria initially received 3,000,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in
a petition for review on certiorari
We first address Lorias contention that Muoz failed to prove his initial receipt
of P3,000,000.00. This is a question of fact the trial and appellate courts have
already resolved. In a Rule 45 petition, we do not address questions of fact,
questions which require us to ruleon "the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts."48 Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we only entertain
questions of law questions as to the applicable law given a set of facts49 in
a petition for review on certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file withthe Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions
of lawwhich must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)50
We may review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition:
. . . (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent;

During
trial,
Muoz
testified
thathe
ordered
Allied
Bank
to
release P3,000,000.00 from his joint account withChristopher Co to a certain
Grace delos Santos.52 Loria then obtained the money from delos Santos and
confirmed with Muoz his receipt of the amount.53 P1,800,000.00 was
subsequently returned to Muoz, leaving aP1,200,000.00 balance with Loria.
This testimony was supported by Exhibit "C," the check voucher where Loria
acknowledged receiving P1,200,000.00 from Muoz.54
We agree that these pieces ofevidence duly prove Lorias initial receipt
of P3,000,000.00. We will not disturb this finding.
II
Loria must
enrichment

return Munozs P2,000,000.00

under the

principle of unjust

Under Article 22 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines, "every person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." There is unjust enrichment "when a
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money orproperty of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience."55
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have
been benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit
was derived at another persons expense or damage.56
In this case, Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of a
government projectto dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in
Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties agreement, Muoz was not
subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the P2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muozs money without valid
basis or justification. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria
must return the P2,000,000.00 to Muoz.
Contrary to Lorias claim, Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594 does not
prevent Muoz from recovering his money.

Under Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594,57 a contractor shall not
subcontract a part or interestin a government infrastructure project without the
approval of the relevant department secretary:
Section 6. Assignment and Contract.The contractor shall not assign, transfer,
pledge, subcontract ormake any other disposition of the contract or any part or
interest therein except with the approval of the Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the
Minister of Energy, as the case may be. Approval of the subcontract shall not
relieve the main contractor from any liability or obligation under his contract
with the Government nor shall it create any contractual relation between the
subcontractor and the Government.
A subcontract, therefore, is void only if not approved by the department
secretary.
In this case, it is premature to rule on the legality of the parties agreement
precisely becausethe subcontract did not push through. No actual agreement
was proven in evidence.The Secretary of Public Works and Highways could have
approved the subcontract, which is allowed under Section 6 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1594.
At any rate, even assuming that there was a subcontracting arrangement
between Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation and Muoz, this
court has allowed recovery under a void subcontract as an exception to the in
pari delicto doctrine.
In Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.,58 the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) awarded the contractto Dominador Gonzalo to improve the SadsadanMaba-ay section of the Mountain Province Road. Gonzalo then subcontracted the
supply of materials and labor to John Tarnate, Jr. without the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways. The parties agreed to a total
subcontract fee of 12% of the projects contract price.59
Tarnate, Jr. also rented equipment to Gonzalo. In a deed of assignment, the
parties agreed to a retention fee of 10% of Gonzalos total collection from the
Department of Public Works and Highways, or 233,526.13, as rent for the
equipment. They then submitted the deed of assignment to the Department for
approval.60
Subsequently, Tarnate, Jr. learned that Gonzalo filed with the Department of
Public Works and Highways an affidavit to unilaterally cancel the deed of
assignment. Gonzalo also collected the retention fee from the Department.61

Tarnate, Jr. demanded payment for the rent of the equipment, but Gonzalo
ignored his demand. He thenfiled a complaint for sum of money and damages
with the Regional Trial Court of Mountain Province to collect on the 10%
retention fee.62
In his defense, Gonzalo argued thatthe subcontract was void for being contrary
to law, specifically, Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594. Since the
deed of assignment "was a mere product of the subcontract,"63 the deed of
assignment was likewise void. With Tarnate, Jr. "fully aware of the illegality and
ineffectuality of the deed of assignment,"64 Gonzalo contended that Tarnate, Jr.
could not collect on the retention fee under the principle of in pari delicto.65
This court ruled that the subcontract was void for being contrary to law. Under
Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594, a contractor shall not subcontract
the implementation of a government infrastructure project without the approval
of the relevant department secretary.66 Since Gonzalo subcontracted the project
to Tarnate, Jr. without the approvalof the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways, the subcontract was void, including the deed of assignment, which
"sprung from the subcontract."67
Generally, parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they gave under
the contract.68 Under the doctrine of in pari delicto, "no action arises, in equity
or at law, from anillegal contract[.] No suit can be maintained for its specific
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the
money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation[.]"69 Nevertheless, this
court allowed Tarnate, Jr. to recover 10% of the retention fee. According to this
court,"the application of the doctrine of in pari delictois not always rigid." 70 An
exception to the doctrine is "when its application contravenes well-established
public policy."71 In Gonzalo, this court ruled that "the prevention of unjust
enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State."72 It is, therefore, an
exception to the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. This court explained:
. . . the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always
rigid.1wphi1 An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes
wellestablished public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined
as "that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good."
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a
person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a
recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "[e]veryperson who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the

expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
It is well to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience;guides for human conduct that should run as
golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."73 (Citations omitted)
Given that Tarnate, Jr. performed his obligations under the subcontract and the
deed of assignment, this court ruled that he was entitled to the agreed fee.
According to this court, Gonzalo "would be unjustly enriched at the expense of
Tarnate if the latter was tobe barred from recovering because of the rigid
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto."74
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found that Loria
received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of the river-dredging
project. Loria never denied that hefailed to fulfill his agreement with Muoz.
Throughout the cases proceedings, Loria failed to justify why he has the right to
retain Muozs P2,000,000.00. As the Court of Appeals ruled, "it was not shown
that [Muoz] benefited from the delivery of the amount ofP2,000,000.00 to
[Loria]."75
Loria, therefore, is retaining the P2,000,000.00 without just or legal ground.
This cannot be done. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, he
must return the P2,000,000.00 to Muoz.
This court notes the possible irregularities in these transactions. At the very
least, there appears to have been an attempt to circumvent our procurement
laws. If petitioner indeed had the authority of Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation, it is strange that Loria could have guaranteed a
bidding result. If he did not have any true dealing with Sunwest Construction,
then his is an elaborate scheme to cause financiers to lose their hard-earned
money for nothing. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals' decision and resolution in CA-GR. CV No. 81882 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to interest rate. Petitioner Carlos A. Loria
shall pay respondent Ludolfo P. Mufioi, Jr. P2,000,000.00 in actual damages,
with interest of 12% interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until
June 30, 2013, and 6% interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
payment.76
Let a copy of this decision be SERVED on the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Department of Justice for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.

2. Rosete v. Briones
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
2. G.R. No. 176121

September 22, 2014

SPOUSES TEODORICO and PACITA ROSETE, Petitioners,

vs.
FELIX and/or MARIETTA BRIONES, SPOUSES JOSE and REMEDIOS
ROSETE, AND NEORIMSE and FELICITAS CORPUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the October 30, 2006
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied the Petition for Review in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79400 and its December 22, 2006 Resolution3 denying the
herein petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
The subject lot is a 152-square meter lot located at 1014 Estrada Street,
Malate, Manila which is owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA).
On July 30, 1987, the NHA conducted a census survey of the subject lot, and
the following information was gathered:
Tag
Ricardo
Dimalanta,
Sr.
Felix
Briones
Neorimse Corpuz - lessee
Tag
Teodoro
Rosete
Jose Rosete lessee5

No.
absentee
-

structure

No.
-

residing

674
owner
lessee

87-0675
owner

The NHA awarded the subject lot topetitioner Teodorico P. Rosete

(Teodorico).6 The herein respondents, Jose and Remedios Rosete(the Rosetes),
Neorimse and Felicitas Corpuz (the Corpuzes), and Felix and Marietta Briones
(the Brioneses) objected to the award, claiming that the award of the entire lot
to Teodorico was erroneous.
In 1990, a Declaration of Real Property was filed and issued in Teodoricos
name.7 On March 21, 1991,he made full payment of the value of the subject lot
in the amount of P43,472.00.8 He likewise paid the real property taxes thereon.9
In an August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision,10 the NHA informed Teodorico that after
consideration of the objections raised by the Rosetes, the Corpuzes and the
Brioneses, the original award of 152 square meters in his favor has been
cancelled and instead, the subject lot will besubdivided and awarded as follows:
1. Teodorico 62 square meters
2. The Brioneses 40 square meters
3. The Rosetes 25 square meters
4. The Corpuzes 15 square meters
5. Easement for pathwalk 10 square meters
In the same Letter-Decision, NHA likewise informed Teodorico that his payments
shall be adjusted accordingly, but his excess payments will not be refunded;
instead, they will be applied to his co-awardees amortizations. His coawardees
shall in turn pay him, under pain of cancellation of their respective awards. NHA
also informedTeodorico that the matters contained in the letter were final, and
that if he intended to appeal, he should do so with the Office of the President
within 30 days.
In an October 18, 1994 letter11 to the NHA, Teodorico protested and sought a
reconsideration of the decision to cancelthe award, claiming that it was unfair
and confiscatory. He likewise requested that his co-awardees be required to
reimburse his property tax payments and that the subject lot be assessed at its
current value.
Meanwhile, on October 24, 1994, the Rosetes and the Corpuzes appealed the
NHAs August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision tothe Office of the President (OP), which
case was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5902.

On February 2, 1995, Teodorico filed an undated letter12 in O.P. Case No. 5902.
In the said letter, he directed the OPs attention to the Rosetes and the
Corpuzes resolve not to question the 62-square meter allocation/award to him.
At the same time, he manifested his assent to such allocation, thus:
Undersigned is satisfied with the 62 sq. m. lot awarded to him. However, in the
adjudication of the above-mentioned case and in furtherance of justice, it is
prayed that:
1. The period within which refund to the undersigned by the spouses
Jose and Remedios Rosete, Neorimseand Felicitas Corpuz, and Felix and
Marietta Briones of the purchase price of the lots awarded to them be
fixed, with interest thereon from March 21, 1991 until full
reimbursement is made;
2. The foregoing awardees be ordered likewise to reimburse to the
undersigned the real estate taxes paid on their respective lots from
1980, plus interest thereon, until full reimbursement; and 3. Other relief
in favor of the undersigned be issued.13
On November 19, 1997, the OP issued its Decision14 in O.P. Case No. 5902,
dismissing the appeal for being filed out of time.
On March 27, 1998, the OP issued a Resolution15 declaring that the above
November 19, 1997 Decision in O.P. Case No. 5902 has become final and
executory since no motion for reconsideration was filed, nor appeal taken, by
the parties.
In another July 28, 1999 letter16 to the NHA, Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the
Corpuzes sought approval of their request to subdivide the subject lot on an "as
is, where is" basis as per NHA policy, since it appeared that the parties
respective allocations/awards did not correspond to the actual areas occupied by
them and thus could result in unwanted demolition of their existing
homes/structures.
In a November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply,17 the NHA informed the parties that the
original awards/allocationswere being retained; it also advised them to hire a
surveyor for the purpose of subdividing the subject lot in accordance with such
awards.
Through counsel, Teodorico wrote back. In his November 23, 1999 letter,18 he
reiterated his request tosubdivide the subject lot onan "as is, where is" basis
and to be reimbursed by his co-awardees for his overpayments, with interest.
This was followed by another March 29, 2001 letter19 by his counsel.

Receiving no response from the NHA regarding the above November 23, 1999
letter, Teodorico senta May 7, 2003 letter cummotion for reconsideration 20 to
the OP, in which he sought a reconsideration of the November 19, 1997
Decision in O.P. Case No. 5902. Heclaimed that the August 5, 1994
LetterDecision of the NHA containing the award/allocation of the subject lot to
the parties is null and void as it violated the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 151721 (PD 1517) and PD 2016;22 that the award of 40 square meters to the
Brioneses is null and void as they were mere "renters" (lessees); that because
the August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision of the NHA is a nullity, it never became final
and executory. Thus, he prayed:
WHEREFORE, it is reiterated that the "as is, where is" policy of the NHA be
followed in the instant case and that Teodorico P. Rosete be reimbursed by
Marietta Briones, et al. of the value of the lots adjudicated in their favor and the
real estate taxes he paid on the lots they occupy, plus interest thereon to be
determined by the NHA. Wewill not demand the cancellation of the awards to
Marietta Briones, et al. so as not to prejudice their respective families.23
In a September 8, 2003 Resolution,24 the OP denied Teodoricos May 7, 2003
letter cummotion for reconsideration, saying that
Before this Office is the motion filed by Teodorico P. Rosete, requesting
reconsideration of the Decision of this Office dated November 19, 1997
dismissing the appeal for having been filed out of time.
On March 27, 1998, this Office also declared the said Decision dated November
19, 1997 as having become final and executory. Being so, this Office has no
more jurisdiction over the case. There is nothing left for the office a quo except
to implement the letter-decision of the National Housing Authority (NHA) dated
October 24, 1994.25
Besides, contrary to appellants motion, the said NHA letter-decision is in
accordance with NHA Circular No. 13 dated February 19, 1982, pertinent
provisions of which read:
"V. BENEFICIARIES SELECTION AND LOT ALLOCATION
1. The official ZIP censusand tagging shall be the primary basis for
determining potential program beneficiaries and structures or dwelling
units in the area.
xxxx

4. Only those households included in the ZIP Census and who, in

addition, qualify under the provisions of the Code of Policies, are the
beneficiaries of the Zonal Improvement Program.
5. A qualified censused-household is entitled to only one residential lot
within the ZIP Project area of Metro Manila."
Hence, the letter decision ofthe NHA is a valid judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the office-a-quo for
implementation.
SO ORDERED.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Teodorico and his wife Pacita, the Rosetes, and the Corpuzes went up to the CA
by Petition for Review,27docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79400. They essentially
claimed that pursuant to the "pertinent laws on Beneficiary Selection and
Disposition of Homelots in Urban Bliss Projects,"28 the Rosetes, the Corpuzes,
and the Brioneses are not entitled to own a portion of the subject lot since they
were mere "renters" or lessees therein; for thisreason, the NHAs August 5,
1994 Letter-Decision and November 19, 1997 Decision and September 8, 2003
Resolution of the OP are null and void. The Petition contained a prayer for the
CA to order the NHA to allocatethe subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis; that
the assailed Decision and Resolution be stayed; and that the Rosetes, the
Corpuzes and the Brioneses be ordered to reimburse Teodorico in such manner
as originally prayed for byhim in the NHA and OP.
On October 30, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision, which held as
follows:
Clearly, the Office of the President, in issuing the assailed Resolution, mainly
anchored its denial ofPetitioner TEODORICOs motion for reconsideration of the
Decision dated 19 November 1997 on the finalityof said Decision, which
accordingly, the said Office has no jurisdiction to disturb. We agree with the
Office of the President.
It bears emphasis that as early as 27 March 1998, the Office of the President
had issued a Resolution which essentially states, thus:
Considering that appellants in the above-entitled case have received certified
copies ofthe decision of this Office, dated November 17, 1997, as shown by
registry return receipts attached to the records copy of said decision, and as of

March 23, 1998, no motion for reconsideration thereof has been filed nor appeal
taken to the proper court, this Office resolves to declare said decision, dated
November 19, 1997, to have become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
Necessarily therefore, the subsequent filing by Petitioner TEODORICO of a
motion for reconsideration of the Decision, supra. before the Office of the
President did not produce any legal effect as to warrant a reversal of the said
Decision.
Generally, once a decision has become final and executory, it can no longer be
modified or otherwise disturbed. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the proper
judicial or quasi-judicial body to order its execution, except when, after the
decision has become final and executory, facts and circumstances would
transpire which render the execution impossible or unjust. On this regard, in
order to harmonize the disposition withthe prevailing circumstances, any
interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its
enforcement.
However, the Petitioners failed to prove that the aforesaid exception is present
in the case at bar. Instead, they insist that Decisions/Resolutions of the NHA
and of the Office of the President are wanting in validity because they allegedly
violated certain statutes and jurisprudence.
Sadly, We cannot sustain Petitioners theory.
xxxx
Accordingly, the findings of the NHA and of the Office of the President are
perforce no longer open for review.
xxxx
Withal, We find no legal as well as equitable reason for Us to discuss further the
issue, supra, raised by the Petitionersin the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
challenged Resolution of the Office of the President is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,30 which the CA denied in its
assailed December 22, 2006 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

5.00.1 The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner Teodorico Rosete did
not file an appeal from the decision of the National Housing Authority;
5.00.2 The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the decision of the Office of the
President against the appeal of Remedios Rosete and Felicitas Corpuz binds
petitioner Teodorico Rosete; 5.00.3 The Court of Appeals erred in failing to look
into the merits of petitioner Teodorico Rosetes claim over the subject lot.31
Petitioners Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution be set aside and that the
NHAs August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision be modified soas to allow: 1) the
subdivision of the subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis; 2) reimbursement/
refund by the respondents of Teodoricos lot and tax overpayments; and 3) the
corresponding transfer of title to them petitioners maintain in their Petition
and Consolidated Reply32 that Teodoricos October 18, 1994 letter to the NHA
which he allegedly sent on September 24, 1994 should have been treated as a
timely appeal to the OP, the same having been filed with the NHA within the 30day reglementary period prescribed by the latter in its August 5, 1994
LetterDecision and pursuant to Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series
of 198733 of the OP (OP AO 18; Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing
Appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines). Thus, the CAs
pronouncement that Teodorico made no appeal to the OP or that it was not
timely filed is erroneous.
Petitioners add that since Teodoricos October 18, 1994letter to the NHA which
should be treated as an appeal to the OP remains pending and unacted upon,
then his case is still pending as far as the OP is concerned; that the dismissal of
the appeal through the November 19, 1997 Decision in O.P. Case No. 5902
affected only the appellants therein, or the Rosetes and the Corpuzes, but not
Teodorico whose appeal remained pending asa result of the OPs failure to act
on his October 18, 1994 letter cumappeal. They add thatTeodoricos subsequent
filing of his May 7, 2003 letter with the OP seeking a reconsideration of the
November 19, 1997 Decision in O.P. CaseNo. 5902 should not have been taken
against him by the CA, as it was prompted more by confusion engendered by
the OPs failure to act on his October 18, 1994 letter cumappeal; the fact
remains that he was not a party appellant in said case, and thus could not be
bound by the November 19, 1997judgment therein rendered.
Finally, petitioners argue that the NHA committed error insubdividing the
subject lot, as it failed to accurately survey the same before making the awards;
that the NHA failed to review the sketch plans submitted by the NHA District
Office which reflected clearly the existing position of the structures built by the
awardees; that the NHA decision would result in the unwarranted destruction of

such structures in order to conform to the respective allocations of the

awardees; and that their overpayments should be returned to them by the
respondents, lest unjust enrichment results.
Respondents Arguments
On the other hand, the Rosetes in their Comment 34 argue that the NHAs August
5, 1994 Letter-Decision is erroneous and unjust, because only the Brioneses
stand to unduly benefit therefrom since their existing lot area would be
increased while that of the others would be decreased, thus resulting in the
destruction of their existing homes and structures.
The Corpuzes in their Comment35 claim that Teodoricos October 18, 1994 letter
to the NHA cannot betreated as an appeal to the OP, and the NHAs inaction or
failure to act on the said letter should be construed as an implied denial thereof
which should have prompted Teodorico to takefurther legal steps to protect his
interests. They object to being required to pay for interests on the purchase
price and taxes advanced by Teodorico, claiming that this was unjust. Finally,
they maintain that the NHA is correct in allocating the subject lot the way it did
among the parties; they should observe and yield to the law and policy of the
NHA, even if it required the destruction of their homes and structures.
The Brioneses in their Comment36 plainly adopt the decisions of the NHA, the OP
and the CA. They particularly stress thatthe OPs disposition has long become
final and executory;that the courts cannot interfere with the NHAs discretion in
awarding the subject lot; that in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the
courts cannot overturn the OPs judgment; and that petitioners have not shown
any valid ground to have the NHA and OPs respective decisions reversed.
Our Ruling
The Court deniesthe Petition.
On August 5, 1994, the NHA rendered its Letter-Decision, which Teodorico
received on September 24, 1994. In an October 18, 1994 letter to the NHA,
Teodorico sought a reconsideration ofthe said decision. This was followed by a
July 28, 1999 letter to the NHA, where Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the
Corpuzes sought approval of their request to subdivide the subject lot on an "as
is, where is" basis. In a November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply, the NHA informed the
parties that the original awards/allocationswere being retained, and advised
them to hire a surveyor for the purpose of subdividing the subject lot in
accordance with such awards. It can be said that the NHAs November 12, 1999
Letter-Reply constituted not only a written response tothe July 28, 1999 letter
of Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the Corpuzes, buta denial as well of Teodoricos
October 18, 1994 letter cum motion for reconsideration ofthe agencysAugust 5,

1994 Letter-Decision. As such, Teodorico should have thereafter filed an

appealwith the OPwithin the prescribed period. However,instead of doing so, he
sent another letter to the NHA dated November 23, 1999 reiterating his request
to subdivide the subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis and to bereimbursed by
his co-awardees for his overpayments, withinterest. He likewise filed in O.P.
Case No. 5902 a May 7, 2003 letter, in which he sought a reconsideration of the
November 19, 1997 Decision rendered in said case.
With his failure to timely appealthe NHAs August 5, 1994 LetterDecision and its
November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply denying his motion for reconsideration, and
instead taking various erroneous courses of action which did not properly direct
his grievances at the right forum and within the prescribed period, the NHAs
August 5,1994 Letter-Decision became final and executory as against Teodorico
and the petitioners for that matter. In contemplation of law, petitioners did
not at all file an appeal of the NHAs August 5, 1994 Letter Decision.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the Court cannot consider Teodoricos October 18,
1994 letter to the NHA as his appeal to the OP; it is properly a motion for
reconsideration of the agencys August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision. Indeed, OP AO
18 does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the agency
which rendered the questioned decision; in reference to such motions for
reconsideration, OP AO 18 specifically states that "[t]he time during which a
motion for reconsideration has been pending with the Ministry/agency
concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal."
With regard to O.P. Case No. 5902, Teodorico could not have validly intervened.
He had no personality to register his objections through his undated letter
which he filed on February 2, 1995 and his May 7,2003 letter in which he sought
a reconsideration of the OPs November 19, 1997 Decision; he was not a party
appellant or otherwise in saidcase. Thus, "[h]e cannot impugn the correctness
of a judgment not appealed from by him. Hecannot assign such errors as are
designed to have the judgment modified."37 This view is ineffect taken by
petitioners themselves, with their argument in the instant Petition that since
Teodorico was not an appellant in O.P. Case No. 5902,then he should not be
bound by the November 19, 1997 judgment therein dismissing the appeal. If he
did not intend to be bound by the judgment therein, then he had no business
intervening in the case.
Since petitioners did not have the personality to intervene in O.P. Case No.
5902, then Teodorico had no standing to file therein his May 7, 2003 letter cum
motion for reconsideration. The OP was thus correct indenying the same; in
turn, the CA correctly affirmed the OP.
Notably, there is very little that petitioners can benefit from in obtaining a
reversal of the assailed Decision of the CA.1wphi1 For one, they do not dispute
the award of 62 square meters in Teodoricos favor; this has been made clear as

early as in Teodoricos undated letter to the OP which was filed on February 2,

1995, where he indicated that he was "satisfied" with the award. For another,
petitioners do not seek to question the allocations made in favor of their coawardees; in fact, in the instant Petition, they openly declared that
In closing and perhaps most important of all, petitioners would like to
respectfully manifest to this Honorable Court that they have deliberately not
questioned the right of respondents to be potential beneficiaries of the ZIP
Census even if they had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondents
were mere renters. The reason for this is that, at the end of the day, the peace
of the community is paramount. x x x38
The petitioners' remaining point of contention is their claim for reimbursement.
Sad to say, this Court cannot order a refund of Teodorico's overpayments. First
of all, NHA - the recipient of the overpayment - cannot be ordered to make a
refund, since Teodorico never prayed to recover from it; in all his submissions from the NHA, the OP, the CA, and all the way up to this Court - he consistently
sought reimbursement only from his co-awardees, not the NHA. Secondly, the
specific amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record;
this being the case, it cannot be determined how much exactly each of
Teodorico's co-awardees owes him. Thirdly, this Court is not a trier of facts; it
cannot go out of its way to determine and analyze from the record what should
be returned to Teodorico, nor can it receive evidence on the matter. Suffice it to
state that petitioners are indeed entitled to be indemnified for paying for the
value of the subject lot and the real property taxes thereon over and above
what was awarded to them, pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which
states that "[w]hoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he
has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor." They may also recover from the NHA, applying the principle of solutio
indebiti.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30, 2006 Decision
and December 22, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79400 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

3. Alano v. Magud-Logmao
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION
3. G.R. No. 175540

April 7, 2014

DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, Petitioner,

vs.
ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying that the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 31,
2006, adjudging petitioner liable for damages, and the Resolution2dated
November 22, 2006, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, be
reversed and set aside.
The CA's narration of facts is accurate, to wit:
Plaintiff-appellee Zenaida Magud-Logmao is the mother of deceased Arnelito
Logmao. Defendant-appellant Dr. Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the
National Kidney Institute (NKI).
At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao, then eighteen
(18) years old, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in
Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall from
the overpass near the Farmers Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The patients
data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue,
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F.
Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the Emergency Room of EAMC, stated
that the patient is Angelito [Logmao].
Dr. Cabrera reported that [Logmao] was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was
conscious and coherent; that the skull x-ray showed no fracture; that at around
4:00 oclock in the morning of March 2, 1988, [Logmao] developed generalized
seizures and was managed by the neuro-surgery resident on-duty; that the
condition of [Logmao] progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and
ambu-bagging support was provided; that admission to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) and mechanical ventilator support became necessary, but there was no
vacancy at the ICU and all the ventilator units were being used by other
patients; that a resident physician of NKI, who was rotating at EAMC, suggested
that [Logmao] be transferred to NKI; and that after arrangements were made,
[Logmao] was transferred to NKI at 10:10 in the morning.

At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso.
Lugmoso was immediately attended to and given the necessary medical
treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant
Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media
assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the Department of Surgery,
observed that the severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms
of brain death. He requested the Laboratory Section to conduct a tissue typing
and tissue cross-matching examination, so that should Lugmoso expire despite
the necessary medical care and management and he would be found to be a
suitable organ donor and his family would consent to organ donation, the
organs thus donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to any
compatible beneficiary.
Jennifer Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988, from EAMC the identity
of Lugmoso and, upon her request, she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the
patients date sheet which bears the name Angelito Lugmoso, with address at
Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted several radio and television
stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, who was confined at NKI for severe
head injury after allegedly falling from the Cubao overpass, as well as Police
Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, whose area of jurisdiction includes Boni
Avenue, Mandaluyong, for assistance in locating the relatives of Angelito
Lugmoso. Certifications were issued by Channel 4, ABS-CBN and GMA attesting
that the request made by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to air its appeal to locate
the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was
accommodated. A Certification was likewise issued by Police Station No. 5,
Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the fact that on March 2, 1988,
at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa requested for assistance to immediately locate
the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso and that she followed up her
request until March 9, 1988.
On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Dr. Ona was informed
that Lugmoso had been pronounced brain dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a
neurologist, and by Dr. Antonio Rafael, a neurosurgeon and attending physician
of Lugmoso, and that a repeat electroencephalogram (EEG) was in progress to
confirm the diagnosis of brain death. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was informed
that the EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing, thereby confirming that Lugmoso
was brain dead. Upon learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and
that some NKI patients awaiting organ donation had blood and tissue types
compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from Jennifer Misa whether the
relatives of Lugmoso had been located so that the necessary consent for organ
donation could be obtained. As the extensive search for the relatives of
Lugmoso yielded no positive result and time being of the essence in the success
of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Executive
Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of
Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise instructed Dr. Rose
Marie Rosete-Liquete to secure permission for the planned organ retrieval and

transplantation from the Medico-Legal Office of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the incident which lead to the brain
injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a Memorandum, which reads as
follows:
This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any portion or
portions of the human body of the deceased patient, identified as a certain Mr.
Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to the National Kidney Institute on March 2,
1988 from the East Avenue Medical Center.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at
9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your
Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of
kin of the said deceased patient such as appeal through the radios and
television as well as through police and other government agencies and that the
NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is
hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys,
pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said
organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and
survive.
A Certification dated March 10, 1988 was issued by Dr. Maximo Reyes, MedicoLegal Officer of the NBI, stating that he received a telephone call from Dr.
Liquete on March 3, 1988 at 9:15 a.m. regarding the case of Lugmoso, who was
declared brain dead; that despite efforts to locate the latters relatives, no one
responded; that Dr. Liquete sought from him a second opinion for organ
retrieval for donation purposes even in the absence of consent from the family
of the deceased; and that he verbally agreed to organ retrieval.
At 3:45 in the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical team, composed of Dr.
Enrique Ona, as principal surgeon, Drs. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Rose Marie
Rosete-Liquete, Aurea Ambrosio, Ludivino de Guzman, Mary Litonjua, Jaime
Velasquez, Ricardo Fernando, and Myrna Mendoza, removed the heart, kidneys,
pancreas, liver and spleen of Lugmoso. The medical team then transplanted a
kidney and the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other kidney of
Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan. The transplant operation was completed at around
11:00 oclock in the evening of March 3, 1988.
On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the Cadaver Organ Retrieval
Effort (CORE) program of NKI, made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for

the embalmment of the cadaver of Lugmoso good for a period of fifteen (15)
days to afford NKI more time to continue searching for the relatives of the
latter. On the same day, Roberto Ortega, Funeral Consultant of La Funeraria
Oro, sent a request for autopsy to the NBI. The Autopsy Report and Certification
of Post-Mortem Examination issued by the NBI stated that the cause of death of
Lugmoso was intracranial hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing its successful
double organ transplantation. Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the
news aired on television that the donor was an eighteen (18) year old boy
whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City. As the name of the
donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao, Aida informed plaintiff of the news report.
It appears that on March 3, 1988, Arlen Logmao, a brother of Arnelito, who was
then a resident of 17-C San Pedro Street, Mandaluyong, reported to Police
Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong that the latter did not return
home after seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by a
Certification issued by said Station; and that the relatives of Arnelito were
likewise informed that the latter was missing. Upon receiving the news from
Aida, plaintiff and her other children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw
Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed with the court a quo a complaint for damages
against Dr. Emmanuel Lenon, Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its
Proprietor, Celso Santiago, National Kidney Institute, represented by its
Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo Reyes, Dr. Enrique T.
Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Dr. Rose Marie O. Rosete-Liquete, Dr. Aurea
Z. Ambrosio, Dr. Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez,
Dr. Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc, Alexis Ambustan, Dr.
Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc., represented by its President, German
E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, Jr., John
Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son Arnelito.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of Arnelito
while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his true identity.
On January 17, 2000, the court a quo rendered judgment finding only Dr.
Filoteo Alano liable for damages to plaintiff and dismissing the complaint against
the other defendants for lack of legal basis.3
After finding petitioner liable for a quasi-delict, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (RTC) ordered petitioner to pay respondent P188,740.90 as actual
damages; P500,000.00 as moral damages; P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P300,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Petitioner appealed
to the CA.

On March 31, 2006, the CA issued its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION by
DELETING the award ofP188,740.90 as actual damages and REDUCING the
award of moral damages to P250,000.00, the award of exemplary damages
to P200,000.00 and the award of attorney's fees to P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, where the following issues are presented for resolution:
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
IN HOLDING PETITIONER DR. FILOTEO ALANO LIABLE FOR MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER IS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE NOR IS
THERE ANY FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY OR DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY
SUSTAINED BY RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO.
B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING
AND/OR FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER DR. ALANO ACTED IN
GOOD FAITH AND PURSUANT TO LAW WHEN HE ISSUED THE
AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE AND RETRIEVE THE ORGANS OF
ANGELITO LUGMOSO (LATER IDENTIFIED TO BE IN FACT ARNELITO
LOGMAO) CONSIDERING THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
OR IMPUTED ON HIM IN HIS PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT MANDATED BY
LAW.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING
RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AND ARE CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.5
The first two issues boil down to the question of whether respondent's sufferings
were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in granting authorization
for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's son who had
been declared brain dead.
Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the removal of some of
the internal organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance
with the letter of the law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates instructions to exert

all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent's son.
In fact, announcements were made through radio and television, the assistance
of police authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified.
Thus, petitioner insists that he should not be held responsible for any damage
allegedly suffered by respondent due to the death of her son and the removal of
her sons internal organs for transplant purposes.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was negligence
on petitioner's part when he failed to ensure that reasonable time had elapsed
to locate the relatives of the deceased before giving the authorization to remove
said deceased's internal organs for transplant purposes. However, a close
examination of the records of this case would reveal that this case falls under
one of the exceptions to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court. There are some
important circumstances that the lower courts failed to consider in ascertaining
whether it was the actions of petitioner that brought about the sufferings of
respondent.6
The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at
9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your
Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next-ofkin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios and
television, as well as through police and other government agencies and that
the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is
hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys,
pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said
organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and
survive.7
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates
to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's
next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death
of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission
or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased was
being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied
with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his
subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the
deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer. He even
specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department
of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner
could not have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the

doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying

all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the
law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the
doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's
son to the media and sought the assistance of the appropriate police authorities
as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior
to performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the
doctors concerned also the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to
disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The
only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices
to reach the relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because
the notices did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault
cannot be laid at petitioner's door. The trial and appellate courts found that it
was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased,
who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity to NKI.
The NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the
patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already
unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.
Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed
this case.1wphi1 As stated in Otero v. Tan,8 "[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule
that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent."9 Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours
from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable
under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to prove
that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the
doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal
organs for transplantation.
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding
petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the
internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared
brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of
her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find
evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of
the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless body be categorically
attributed to petitioner's conduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,

dated March 31, 2006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against
petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4. Sesbreo v. CA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
4. G.R. No. 160689

March 26, 2014

RAUL H. SESBREO, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY
ANITA COROMINA, ELIZABETH COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE
COROMINA), VICENTE E. GARCIA (SUBSTITUTED BY EDGAR JOHN
GARCIA), FELIPE CONSTANTINO, RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO
ABELLANA, DEMETRIO BALICHA, ANGELITA LHUILLIER, JOSE E.
GARCIA, AND VISA YAN ELECTRIC COMPANY (VECO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreo
founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreo accused the violation of contract (VOC)
inspection team dispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check
his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential
premises. But the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered
judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim;1 and the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10, 2003.2
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreo.
Antecedents

At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public utility corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. VECO engaged in the
sale and distribution of electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreo was one
of VECOs customers under the metered service contract they had entered into
on March 2, 1982.3Respondent Vicente E. Garcia was VECOs President, General
Manager and Chairman of its Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. Garcia was
VECOs Vice-President, Treasurer and a Member of its Board of Directors.
Respondent Angelita Lhuillier was another Member of VECOs Board of Directors.
Respondent Juan Coromina was VECOs Assistant Treasurer, while respondent
Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECOs Billing Section whose main function
was to compute back billings of customers found to have violated their
contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and that none of it
meters had been tampered with, VECO employed respondents Engr. Felipe
Constantino
and
Ronald
Arcilla
as
violation
of
contract
(VOC)
inspectors.4 Respondent Sgt. Demetrio Balicha, who belonged to the 341st
Constabulary Company, Cebu Metropolitan Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug,
Cebu City, accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their inspection
of the households of its customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission order
issued to him.5
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:
x x x. Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this case are actually
simple enough, although the voluminous records might indicate otherwise. It all
has to do with an incident that occurred at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon
of May 11, 1989. On that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha,
conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon,
Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo, for illegal connections,
meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter
installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreos maid, unlocked
the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned
upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturned
electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreo and one of the maids
present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time,
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo was in his office and no one called to inform him of
the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcias
permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of
appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load.
Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which showed
the condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team
inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also
signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreo.

But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo there was nothing routine or

proper at all with what the VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their
entry to his house and the surrounding premises was effected without his
permission and over the objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or
coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it
upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new
electric meter. They searched the house and its rooms without his permission or
a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her
appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his
personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they
searched the house.6
Judgment of the RTC
On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. 7 It
did not accord credence to the testimonies of Sesbreos witnesses, Bebe
Baledio, his housemaid, and Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to
inconsistencies on material points in their respective testimonies. It observed
that Baledio could not make up her mind as to whether Sesbreos children
were in the house when the VOC inspection team detached and replaced the
electric meter. Likewise, it considered unbelievable that Lopez should hear the
exchanges between Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha, on one hand, and Baledio,
on the other, considering that Lopez could not even hear the conversation
between two persons six feet away from where he was seated during the
simulation done in court, the same distance he supposedly had from the gate of
Sesbreos house during the incident. It pointed out that Lopezs presence at
the gate during the incident was even contradicted by his own testimony
indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate for the VECO personnel,
because it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s, who had repeatedly stated on her
direct and cross examinations that she had let the VECO personnel in. It
concluded that for Lopez to do nothing at all upon seeing a person being
threatened by another in the manner he described was simply contrary to
human experience.
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the respondents showing that the
VOC inspection team had found the electric meter in Sesbreos residence
turned upside down to prevent the accurate registering of the electricity
consumption of the household, causing them to detach and replace the meter. It
held as unbelievable that the team forcibly entered the house through threats
and intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric meter upside down in
order to incriminate him for theft of electricity, because the fact that the team
and Sesbreo had not known each other before then rendered it unlikely for the
team to fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreos non-presentation of
Chuchie Garcia left her allegation of her being forced to sign the two documents
by the team unsubstantiated.

Decision of the CA
Sesbreo appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March 10, 2003, 8 holding
thusly:
x x x. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreos account is simply too implausible or farfetched to be believed. For one thing, the inspection on his household was just
one of many others that the VOC Team had conducted in that subdivision. Yet,
none but plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo complained of the alleged acts of the VOC
Team. Considering that there is no proof that they also perpetrated the same
illegal acts on other customers in the guise of conducting a Violation of
Contracts inspection, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo likewise failed to show why he
alone was singled out. It is also difficult to believe that the VOC Team would be
brazen enough to want to antagonize a person such as plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreo. There is no evidence that the VOC Team harbored any evil motive or
grudge against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo, who is a total stranger to them.
Until he came along, they did not have any prior criminal records to speak of, or
at least, no evidence thereof was presented. It is equally difficult to believe that
their superiors would authorize or condone their alleged illegal acts. Especially
so since there is no indication that prior to the incident on May 11, 1989, there
was already bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo and
defendant appellees to warrant such a malevolent response. In fact, since
availing of defendant-appellee VECOs power services, the relationship between
them appears to have been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges stemming from the May 11,
1989 incident were fabricated when taken together with the lower courts
evaluation of the alleged theft of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreos personal effects.
It stated that on August 8, 1989, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo wrote the
barangay captain of Punta Princesa and accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria
Villarta alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of his things that earlier he
claimed had been stolen by members of the VOC Team. When he was
confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo further claimed that the
items allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot taken by
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla. Yet not once did plaintiffappellant Sesbreo or any of his witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed
between these people. Clearly, much like his other allegations, it is nothing
more than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo.
All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees appear to be nothing
more than a put-on to save face. For the simple truth is that the inspection
exposed plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo as a likely cheat and thief.
xxxx

Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of Baledio and

Lopez.1wphi1 The lower court rightly described their testimonies as fraught by
discrepancies and inconsistencies on material points and even called Lopez a
perjured witness. On the other hand, it is odd that plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo
chose not to present the witness whose testimony was very crucial. But even
though Chuchie Garcia never testified, her absence speaks volumes. Whereas
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo claimed that the VOC Team forced her to sign two
documents that made her appear to be his authorized agent or representative,
the latter claimed otherwise and that she also gave them permission to enter
and search the house. The person most qualified to refute the VOC Teams claim
is Chuchie Garcia herself. It is axiomatic that he who asserts a fact or claim
must prove it. He cannot transfer that burden to the person against whom he
asserts such fact or claim. When certain evidence is suppressed, the
presumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the party suppressing it,
should it come to light. x x x9

without being liable to trespass to dwelling for the purpose of inspecting,

installing, reading, removing, testing, replacing or otherwise disposing of its
property, and/or removing the COMPANYS property in the event of the
termination of the contract for any cause.11

Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Sesbreo appealed.

We do not accept Sesbreos conclusion.1avvphi1 Paragraph 9 clothed the

entire VOC team with unquestioned authority to enter the garage to inspect the
meter. The members of the team obviously met the conditions imposed by
paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the objective of
conducting the routine inspection of the meter.13 Secondly, the entry and
inspection were confined to the garage where the meter was installed.14Thirdly,
the entry was effected at around 4 oclock p.m., a reasonable hour. 15 And,
fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were duly authorized for the
purpose by VECO.

Issue
Was Sesbreo entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreos main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC
team was an unreasonable search for being carried out without a warrant and
for being allegedly done with malice or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two distinct portions of
Sesbreos residence were inspected by the VOS team the garage where the
electric meter was installed, and the main premises where the four bedrooms,
living rooms, dining room and kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed, the
respondents assert that the VOC team had the continuing authority from
Sesbreo as the consumer to enter his premises at all reasonable hours to
conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling.
The authority emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract
entered into between VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as
follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized employees or
representatives of the COMPANY to enter his premises at all reasonable hours

Sesbreo contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give Constantino, Arcilla
and Balicha the blanket authority to enter at will because the only property
VECO owned in his premises was the meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla
should enter only the garage. He denies that they had the right to enter the
main portion of the house and inspect the various rooms and the appliances
therein because those were not the properties of VECO. He posits that Balicha,
who was not an employee of VECO, had no authority whatsoever to enter his
house and conduct a search. He concludes that their search was unreasonable,
and entitled him to damages in light of their admission that they had entered
and inspected his premises without a search warrant.12

Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO,16 his participation was
to render police assistance to ensure the personal security of Constantino and
Arcilla during the inspection, rendering him a necessary part of the team as an
authorized representative. Under the circumstances, he was authorized to enter
considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended such authority to "properly
authorized employees or representatives" of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreo urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the entry into the
main premises of the residence. Did this necessarily mean that any entry by the
VOS team into the main premises required a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreo insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
clause guaranteeing the right of every individual against unreasonable searches
and seizures, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched

and the persons or things to be seized.

inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a search
warrant to do so.

He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its
VOS team liable to him for damages by virtue of Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code,
which pertinently provides:

Balichas presence participation in the entry did not make the inspection a
search by an agent of the State within the ambit of the guaranty. As already
mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by virtue of his mission order
authorizing him to assist and escort the team during its routine
inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main premises of the house by
the VOC team did not constitute a violation of the guaranty.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secured in ones person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
x x x x.
Sesbreos insistence has no legal and factual basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended
as a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law
enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of State power. The Court has made this clear in its
pronouncements, including that made in People v. Marti,17 viz:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if
the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.18
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises
only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned upside down, hanging and its
disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled
electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances justified their
decision, and their inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the
authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability to determine the
unbilled electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of electricity

Our holding could be different had Sesbreo persuasively demonstrated the

intervention of malice or bad faith on the part of Constantino and Arcilla during
their inspection of the main premises, or any excessiveness committed by them
in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreo did not. On the other hand, the CA
correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreos residence
because the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine
inspection.20 This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.
Clearly, Sesbreo did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents
were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith;
otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the
concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the stability of social order. 21Moreover,
according to a commentator,22 "the exercise of right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he
unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil Code 23 sets the
standards to be observed in the exercise of ones rights and in the performance
of ones duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due;
and (c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights that in the exercise of the rights, the
standards under Article 19 must be observed.24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an
abuse of rights, like when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith.
In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the
following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or
duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that can be
applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be
invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
Sesbreo asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie Garcia to let
anyone enter his residence in his absence; and that Baledio herself confirmed
that the members of the VOC team had intimidated her into letting them in.

The assertion of Sesbreo is improper for consideration in this

appeal.1wphi1 The RTC and the CA unanimously found the testimonies of
Sesbreos witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on material points;
and even declared that the non-presentation of Garcia as a witness was odd if
not suspect. Considering that such findings related to the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now
because it is not a trier of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again.26 Verily, a review that may tend to supplant the findings
of the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the Court with prudent
hesitation. Only when Sesbreo could make a clear showing of abuse in their
appreciation of the evidence and records by the trial and the appellate courts
should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreo was denied due process by the refusal
of the trial judge to inhibit from the case. Although the trial judge had issued an
order for his voluntary inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the end in
compliance with the instruction of the Executive Judge, whose exercise of her
administrative authority on the matter of the inhibition should be respected. 28 In
this connection, we find to be apt the following observation of the CA, to wit:

5. CCI v. Quiones
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
5. G.R. No. 175822

October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial
Court and are therefore of co-equal rank. The latter has no authority to reverse
or modify the orders of Judge Paredes. But in ordering Judge Paredes to
continue hearing the case, Judge Agana did not violate their co-equal status or
unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is merely part of her administrative
responsibilities as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of
which Judge Paredes is also a member.29

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of
Court are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed
decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while
the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Michelle Ybaez (Ybaez).

Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the decision in the CA
refused to inhibit from participating in the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The motion for her inhibition was grounded
on suspicion of her bias and prejudice,30 but suspicion of bias and prejudice
were not enough grounds for inhibition.31

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication that even
suggested that the Associate Justices of the CA who participated in the
promulgation of the decision were tainted with bias against him.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t1on for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on March 10, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing

Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique
at the second floor of Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu City.
She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to
purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the
cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinsons and Mercury
Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee
approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She,
however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in
her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office
located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the
Guess employees as agreed upon.8

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly
demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her
wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument.
Respondent, thereafter, went home.10
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of
Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it
did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off
duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to
the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but the latter again refused to receive
it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of
Robinsons was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an
investigation for purposes of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card.
Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging
letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered
physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension,
besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the
Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing,
Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon
(Hawayon) and Ybaez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and
exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.16
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of
the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier
(Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did
it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the
employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo
asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former
believed to mean that the item has already been paid. 18 Realizing the mistake,
Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter,
he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not
payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop,
respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo,
Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to
respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that
respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized
that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter
who was arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners
and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.22
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint
and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court
concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith
that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive to
fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that

when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right
under the honest belief that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not
find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in front of
Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that
situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu
Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees,
because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate
respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on
the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybaez and California
Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiones
jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) and attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.24
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith
when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the
alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence
showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to
respondents employer. It found respondents possession of both the official
receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacifics
director was sent to respondents employer not merely to ask for assistance for
the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation
and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that
Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad
faith and malice when it dragged respondents employer who was not privy to
the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter
contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged
acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.27The appellate court thus held
that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral
damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable
for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its
employees; while Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand
letter sent to respondents employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalos
good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28

Ybaez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same
was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER
SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN
RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS FEES.30
The petition is without merit.
Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse
of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations.
Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they
insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop
despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop.
The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify
from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to
believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without
limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of
duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The
Courts pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or
omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated
into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral
precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human
conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known
as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x
x32The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.33

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between

the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to
respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and
discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans
was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the
question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went
overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person
must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable
if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.34 Good faith
refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another.35Malice or bad faith, on the other hand,
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity.36
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether
she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the
Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour
when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the
CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views
insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was
in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official
receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such
payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have
been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard
and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the
guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to
respondents employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1wphi1 Petitioners claimed that
after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was
noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she
was not completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances
of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly
left (sic) the store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank
expression and told me, "I cant remember." Then I asked her how much money
she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told

her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our
cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she
received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." After
asking these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely
being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear
these matters but she vehemently refused saying that shes in a hurry and very
busy.37
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that
she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the
shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of
the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment.
Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop
or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have
a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondents employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondents reputation in the
eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and
despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38

specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil

Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the
defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the
extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 42 They are awarded
not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means,
diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone.43 We find that the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that
respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in
the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November
14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

6. Hing v. Choachuy Sr.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case,
petitioners obviously abused their rights.

SECOND DIVISION

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20

and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40

6. G.R. No. 179736

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,

vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages
and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s
wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases

June 26, 2013

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for one's personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
non-interference demands respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint 5 for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr.
and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot
1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in
Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of
Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C,
adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an autorepair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005,
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that
case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid
permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building,
which is adjacent to petitioners property;9 that the court, in that case, denied
Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of
Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners
property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without the consent
of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;12 and that
the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy. 13 Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras
and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not
install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to
take pictures of petitioners construction.17 They also clarified that they are not
the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a
TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by
petitioners, which the Court sets at P50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving
camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side
of petitioners lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where
petitioners property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3
meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its
Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18
October 2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for
Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with
grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to
privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since
the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. 28The CA
alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could
not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper
parties.31 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated
October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32

Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
I.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY
2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE,
THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS
CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
III.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE
THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC.
THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY
UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
IV.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE
SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of
petitioners right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties
to this suit.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction because respondents installation of a stationary camera directly

facing petitioners property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion

of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons
from prying into the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision
pertains to the privacy of anothers residence, petitioners opine that it includes
business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming
arguendo that petitioners property is used for business, it is still covered by the
said provision.37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case,
petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that
respondents only want to hide behind Aldos corporate fiction.38 They point out
that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the video
surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to
the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners
cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a
residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the
installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo,
the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its
building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is
defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a persons ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put,
the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them
against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the
right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State,
except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right
to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to
privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled
to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence."
This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy,
because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the
same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as
are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into
the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code only to residences.

The
privacy"
whether
to privacy.

"reasonable
test
is
there
is
a

expectation
used
to
violation
of

of
determine
the
right

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use

the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has
been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of
a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community
norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable
expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation
of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to
pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction,
ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a
temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving
camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy
of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only
focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo
Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion
of the land of petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was
so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to
monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a
portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises,
then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To
allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would

violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the
issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court
taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication
of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners
are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties
to this suit.
A
real
party
defendant
is
one
who
has
a
correlative
legal
obligation
to
redress
a
wrong
done
to
the
plaintiff
by
reason
of
the
defendant's
act
or
omission
which
had
violated
the
legal
right
of
the
former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former."57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that
since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video
surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that
respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video
surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video
surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against

petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for

Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed
the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they
did not seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute
between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their
respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe
that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from
its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by
the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that
they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of
Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured
Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions
regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And
when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18,
2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer
damages
if
the
video
surveillance
cameras
are
removed
and
transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents
and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents
are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves
from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper
parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007
and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders
dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

7. PTC v. Legaspi

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
7. G.R. No. 202791

June 10, 2013

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
LEANDRO LEGASPI, Respondent.
DECISION

WHEREFORE, respondents (now petitioner) are

complainant jointly and severally, the following:

hereby

ordered

to

pay

1. US$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment as

permanent disability compensation;
2. US$1,320.00 or its peso equivalent as sick wages;
3. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
Notably, the LA awarded US$80,000.00 based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model
Agreement for Catering Personnel, not on the CBA.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the January 5, 2012 Resolution1 and July 20, 2012 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 116686, which denied the petitioners
motion to amend the dispositive portion of the June 29, 2011 CA Decision.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent) was employed as Utility Pastry on
board the vessel "Azamara Journey" under the employment of petitioner
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (petitioner). Respondents employment
was covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) wherein it was agreed
that the company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to
US$60,000.00 only.
While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD
Insertation." He was checked by the ships doctor and was prescribed
medications. On November 14, 2008, respondent was repatriated to receive
further medical treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009, the company
designated physician assessed his condition to be Disability Grade 2.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full and permanent disability
compensation against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The Labor Arbiters Ruling
In its January 25, 2010 Decision,3 the LA ruled in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

Not satisfied, petitioner appealed the LA decision before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRCs Ruling
In its May 28, 2010 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.
Petitioner timely filed its motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
NLRC in its July 30, 2010 Resolution. On September 5, 2010, the NLRC issued
the Entry of Judgment stating that its resolution affirming the LA decision had
become final and executory.
On October 22, 2010, during the hearing on the motion for execution before the
NLRC, petitioner agreed to pay respondent US$81,320.00. The terms and
conditions of said payment were embodied in the Receipt of Judgment Award
with Undertaking,4 wherein respondent acknowledged receipt of the said
amount and undertook to return it to petitioner in the event the latters petition
for certiorari would be granted, without prejudice to respondents right to
appeal. It was also agreed upon that the remaining balance would be given on
the next scheduled conference. Pertinent portions of the said undertaking
provide:
xxxx
3. That counsel (of the petitioner) manifested their willingness to tender
the judgment award without prejudice to the respondents (now
petitioner) right to file a Petition for Certiorari and provided,
complainant (now respondent) undertakes to return the full amount
without need of demand or a separate action in the event that the
Petition for Certiorari is granted;

4. That complainants counsel was amenable to the arrangement and

accepted the offer. NOW THEREFORE complainant and his counsel
hereby acknowledge RECEIPT of the sum of EIGHTY-ONE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND 0/100 (US$81,320.00) covered by
CITIBANK CHECK with No. 1000001161 dated October 21, 2010 payable
to the order of LEANDRO V. LEGASPI and UNDERTAKES to RETURN the
entire amount to respondent PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS,
INC. in the event that the Petition for Certiorari is granted without
prejudice to complainants right to appeal. Such undertaking shall be
ENFORCEABLE by mere motion before this Honorable office without
need of separate action.5[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
On November 8, 2010, petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA.6
In the meantime, on March 2, 2011, the LA issued a writ of execution which
noted petitioners payment of the amount of US$81,320.00. On March 16, 2011,
in compliance with the said writ, petitioner tendered to the NLRC Cashier the
additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorneys fees and P3,042.95 as
execution fee. In its Order, dated March 31, 2011, the LA ordered the release of
the aforementioned amounts to respondent.
The CAs Ruling
Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of judgment of the NLRC, b) the
October 22, 2010 payment of US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of execution issued
by the LA, the CA rendered its Decision, dated June 29, 2011. The CA partially
granted the petition for certiorari and modified the assailed resolutions of the
NLRC, awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between Celebrity
Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa Transporti CISL.
Petitioner then filed its Manifestation with Motion to Amend the Dispositive
Portion, submitting to the CA the writ of execution issued by the LA in support
of its motion. Petitioner contended that since it had already paid the total
amount of US$89,452.00, it was entitled to the return of the excess payment in
the amount of US$29,452.00.
In its assailed January 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the motion and ruled
that the petition should have been dismissed for being moot and academic not
only because the assailed decision of the NLRC had become final and executory
on September 5, 2010, but also because the said judgment had been satisfied
on October 22, 2010, even before the filing of the petition for certiorari on
November 8, 2010. In so ruling, the CA cited the pronouncement in Career
Philippines Ship Management v. Geronimo Madjus7 where it was stated that the
satisfaction of the monetary award rendered the petition for certiorari moot.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its
assailed July 20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
ESTOPPED IN COLLECTING THE EXCESS PAYMENT IT MADE TO THE
RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE RECEIPT OF JUDGMENT AWARD
SIGNED BY THE RESPONDENT
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN INVOKING THE RULING OF CAREER V. MADJUS
Petitioner argues that it clearly filed its petition for certiorari within the 60-day
reglementary period and, thus, the NLRC resolutions could not have attained
finality. Citing Delima v. Gois,8 petitioner avers that the NLRC cannot declare
that a decision has become final and executory because the period to file the
petition has not yet expired. Petitioner, thus, contends that the finality of the
NLRC judgment did not render the petition moot and academic because such is
null and void ab initio.
Petitioner also argues that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking,
which was never refuted by respondent, clearly stated that the payment of the
judgment award was without prejudice to its right to file a petition for certiorari
with the CA. Petitioner asserts that the case relied upon by the CA, Career
Philippines, is not applicable as it is not on all fours with this case. Instead, it
asserts that the applicable case should be Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Villamater,9 where it was held that the satisfaction of the monetary award by
the employer does not render the petition for certiorari moot before the CA.
On the other hand, respondent reiterates the CA ruling, asserting that the
voluntary satisfaction by petitioner of the full judgment award rendered the case
moot, and insists that it was a clear indication that it had already been
persuaded by the judiciousness and merits of the award for disability
compensation. He also avers that this petition is merely pro-forma as it is a
reiteration of petitioners previous issues and arguments already resolved by the
CA.
The Courts Ruling
Petition for Certiorari, Not Moot

Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that
decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, and entry of
judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said period. 10 In St. Martin
Funeral Home v. NLRC,11however, it was ruled that judicial review of decisions
of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed
sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to
file the petition. Hence, in cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the
expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but
within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant
the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.
Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed within
the 10-day period, petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 65. It has, thus, been held that the CAs review
of the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65, particularly those
which have already been executed, does not affect their statutory finality,
considering that Section 4,12 Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,
provides that a petition for certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued. In Leonis
Navigation, it was further written:
The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC,
in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to
or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without
looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can
only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to
have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in
relation to all other evidence on record.13 Notably, if the CA grants the petition
and nullifies the decision or resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or
resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence,
the decision or resolution never became final and executory.14
Career Philippines not applicable
In Career Philippines, believing that the execution of the LA Decision was
imminent after its petition for injunctive relief was denied, the employer filed
before the LA a pleading embodying a conditional satisfaction of judgment
before the CA and, accordingly, paid the employee the monetary award in the
LA decision. In the said pleading, the employer stated that the conditional
satisfaction of the judgment award was without prejudice to its pending appeal
before the CA and that it was being made only to prevent the imminent
execution.15

The CA later dismissed the employers petition for being moot and academic,
noting that the decision of the LA had attained finality with the satisfaction of
the judgment award. This Court affirmed the ruling of the CA, interpreting the
"conditional settlement" to be tantamount to an amicable settlement of the case
resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari, considering (i) that the
employee could no longer pursue other claims,16and (ii) that the employer could
not have been compelled to immediately pay because it had filed an appeal
bond to ensure payment to the employee.
Stated differently, the Court ruled against the employer because the conditional
satisfaction of judgment signed by the parties was highly prejudicial to the
employee. The agreement stated that the payment of the monetary award was
without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a petition for certiorari and
appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no longer file any complaint
or prosecute any suit of action against the employer after receiving the
payment.
In contrast, in Leonis Navigation, after the NLRC resolution awarding disability
benefits became final and executory, the employer paid the monetary award to
the employee. The CA dismissed the employers petition for certiorari, ruling
that the final and executory decisions or resolutions of the NLRC rendered
appeals to superior courts moot and academic. This Court disagreed with the CA
and held that final and executed decisions of the NLRC did not prevent the CA
from reviewing the same under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was further
ruled that the employee was estopped from claiming that the case was closed
and terminated, considering that the employees Acknowledgment Receipt
stated that such was without prejudice to the final outcome of the petition for
certiorari pending before the CA.
In the present case, the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was
fair to both the employer and the employee. As in Leonis Navigation, the said
agreement stipulated that respondent should return the amount to petitioner if
the petition for certiorari would be granted but without prejudice to respondents
right to appeal. The agreement, thus, provided available remedies to both
parties.
It is clear that petitioner paid respondent subject to the terms and conditions
stated in the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking.17 Both parties
signed the agreement. Respondent neither refuted the agreement nor claimed
that he was forced to sign it against his will.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was not rendered moot despite petitioners
satisfaction of the judgment award, as the respondent had obliged himself to
return the payment if the petition would be granted.
Return of Excess Payment

As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable

settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind.18 Respondent agreed to the stipulation that he
would return the amount paid to him in the event that the petition for certiorari
would be granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by the CA, albeit
partially, respondent must comply with the condition to return the excess
amount.

deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable

law and doctrine.21

The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was a
fair and binding agreement. It was executed by the parties subject to outcome
of the petition. To allow now respondent to retain the excess money judgment
would amount to his unjust enrichment to the prejudice of petitioner.

US$29,452.00 to petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. The amount

shall earn interest at the rate of 12o/o per annum from the finality of this
judgment.

Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make

remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that
give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them. To be entitled to
remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.
Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconveyance. Rather, it is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. 19There is unjust
enrichment when:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions, dated

January 5, 2012 and July 20, 2012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Leandro Legaspi is ORDERED to return the excess amount of
payment in the sum of

SO ORDERED.

8. Beumer v. Amores
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

1. A person is unjustly benefited; and

SECOND DIVISION

2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to

another.20
8. G.R. No. 195670

December 3, 2012

In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent US$81,320.00 in the preexecution conference plus attorneys fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to the writ
of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA Decision, however, modified the final
resolution
of
the
NLRC
and
awarded
only
US$60,000.00
to
respondent.1wphi1 If allowed to return the excess, the respondent would have
been unjustly benefited to the prejudice and expense of petitioner.

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.

Petitioner's claim of excess payment is further buttressed by, and in line with,
Section 14, Rule XI of the 20 II NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides:

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT. Where the executed

judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, the Labor Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution of the executed award, except wages paid during reinstatement
pending appeal. [Emphases supplied]
Although the Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the plight of
the workers and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers,
such inclination has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for the

DECISION

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of CoLlli assailing the October 8, 2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011
Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940, which
affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings
dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and
Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the
said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents

Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29,

1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the
nullity of their marriage in the Decision5 dated November 10, 2000 on the basis
of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership6 dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the
following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a
residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974,
containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house
constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306,
containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of
45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
23567, containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to
the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
23575, containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2)
residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any
conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint
affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased

Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.10 Accordingly,
respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as
payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit 12since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of
the lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings
from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their
marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought
along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding
machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment
have a total cost of P500,000.00.15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its
Decision, dissolving the parties conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of
land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in
favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent
Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage was previously annulled
by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared
paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while
these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union,
Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private
land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint
which were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby
declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
21974 and 22846 are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the
respondent since these were acquired during their marital union and since there

is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units.

Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for
approval their project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of
respondent for attorneys fees considering the well settled doctrine that there
should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for moral damages are
likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1,
2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over
these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding
his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
private lands.17 This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner
executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased
from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent. 18 Petitioners plea
for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to
court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of respondent. He insisted that the money
used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and
that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for
reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the
purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged
ex-wife.19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed
the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for
aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to
support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the CA Decision due to the following error:

UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
PETITIONERS ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT
OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE
REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For
Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court
had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels
of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such
prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters
name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the
constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny
petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded
equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground
that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful.27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used
to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While
admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents
personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the

Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable
refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is wellestablished that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.29 Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null
and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, 31 petitioner cannot
have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal
contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.32 Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of
unjust enrichment.33 As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a
foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of
Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action
is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights
of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land
and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing
on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties
subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to
conserve the national patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is dutybound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009
Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

9. Padalhin v. Lavia
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintiff."34 (Citations omitted)

FIRST DIVISION
9. G.R. No. 183026

November 14, 2012

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, Petitioners,

vs.
NELSON D. LAVINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on February 14, 2008 and
Resolution2 issued on May 20, 2008 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81810. The CA affirmed, albeit with modification relative to the award of
attorney's fees, the Decision3 rendered on October 3, 2003 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 165, which ordered herein petitioner Nestor
Padalhin (Nestor), to pay herein respondent Nelson D. Lavina (Lavina) the total
amount of P775,000.00 as damages.

Antecedent Facts
Lavia and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as
Ambassador and Consul General, respectively.
In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Lavia was raided twice.
Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan4 (Pasturan) delivered messages to the
Filipino household helpers in the ambassadors residence instructing them to
allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of the ivory
souvenirs kept therein.
The first raid on April 18, 1996 was conducted while Lavia and his wife were
attending a diplomatic dinner hosted by the Indian High Commission. Lucy
Ercolano Muthua, who was connected with the Criminal Investigation Divisions
Intelligence Office of Kenya and David Menza, an officer in the Digirie Police
Station in Nairobi, participated in the raid. Photographs of the first and second
floors of Lavias residence were taken with the aid of James Mbatia,5 Juma
Kalama,6 Zenaida Cabando7 (Cabando), and Edna Palao8 (Palao). The second
raid was conducted on April 23, 1996 during which occasion, the ambassador
and his spouse were once again not present and additional photographs of the
residence were taken.
On September 27, 1996, Lavia received an information from the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that an investigating team was to be sent to
Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the
Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against the
spouses Padalhin, on the other. The investigating team was led by Rosario G.
Manalo (Manalo) and had Franklin M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa Dizon
(Dizon) as members. The team stayed in Kenya from April 20, 1997 to April 30,
1997. On April 29, 1997, the team entered Lavias residence unarmed with a
search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavia alleged
that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged
furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks.
Subsequently, both Nestor and Lavia were recalled from their posts in Kenya.
On November 17, 1997, Lavia filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Nestor and his wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando,
Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998, Lavia amended his complaint to
include Pasturan as a defendant.
Lavias complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront
against his privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence
during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly instigated by
Padalhin and participated by all the defendants as conspirators; (b)

infringement of his constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures

when the investigating team sent by the DFA entered into his residence without
a warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary and confiscated some of
his personal belongings; and (c) bad faith, malice and deceit exhibited by the
defendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the raids,
engaging in a smear campaign against him, and seizing without authority his
personal effects. Lavia sought payment of actual, moral, exemplary and
nominal damages, attorneys fees and costs of suits.
In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids conducted
on Lavias residence. As counterclaims, he alleged that the suit filed by Lavia
caused him embarasssment and sleepless nights, as well as unnecessary
expenses which he incurred to defend himself against the charges. On the other
hand, Annie denied prior knowledge of and participation in the raids.
On February 24, 2000, the RTC, upon oral motion of Lavias counsel informing
the court that a settlement had been reached, dismissed the charges against
Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. As a consequence, the RTC deemed
it proper to no longer resolve the claims of Lavia relative to the alleged seizure
of his personal effects by the DFA investigating team. Lavia pursued his
charges against Nestor, Annie and Pasturan.
The Ruling of the RTC
On October 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision9 ordering Nestor to pay
Lavia P500,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as nominal damages,
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, P150,000.00 as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses, and costs of suit for the formers participation in the raid
conducted in the Ambassadors residence on April 18, 1996. The RTC ruled that:
Defendant Nestor N. Padalhin admitted in his sworn statement dated October
10, 1997 which was subscribed and sworn to on October 13, 1997 before the
Executive Director Benito B. Valeriano, Office of Personnel and Administrative
Services of the Department of Foreign Affairs, that he caused the taking of
pictures of the raw elephant tusks in the official residence of the ambassador
(Exh. "B"). x x x.
xxxx
The said affidavit was submitted by Nestor Padalhin in answer to the
administrative charge filed against him by then Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. in connection with the violation of the
diplomatic immunity of the residence of the Philippine
Ambassador to Kenya on April 18, 1996. x x x.

xxxx
When Nestor Padalhin was presented by the plaintiff as hostile witness, he
affirmed the truth of the contents of his affidavit marked as Exhibit "B". x x x.
It is therefore clear that the taking of the pictures of the elephant tusks inside
the residence of Ambassador Nelson Lavia while the latter and his wife were
out and attending a diplomatic function, was upon order of Nestor Padalhin to
his driver James Mbatia with the cooperation of Juma Kalama, a gardener in the
ambassadors residence. The admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin that he
was the one who caused the taking of the pictures of the elephant tusks in the
official residence of Ambassador Lavia in effect corroborates the latters
testimony that it was Nestor Padalhin who masterminded the invasion and
violation of the privacy and inviolability of his diplomatic residence in Kenya on
April 18, 1996.
The invasion of the diplomatic residence of the plaintiff in Kenya and the taking
of photographs of the premises and the elephant tusks inside the residence
upon order of defendant Nestor Padalhin without the knowledge and consent of
the plaintiff were done by the said defendant in bad faith. The intention to
malign the plaintiff is shown by the fact that Nestor Padalhin even went to the
Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reported the raw elephant tusks of
Ambassador Lavia as admitted in paragraph 2.a of his affidavit marked as
Exhibit "B".

defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan did

opportunity to cross-examine the said affiants.10 (Italics ours)

not

have

the

The RTC was, however, not convinced of Nestors involvement in the raid staged
on April 23, 1996. Lavias testimony relative to the raid was not based on his
own personal knowledge as it was only derived from the affidavits subscribed
and sworn to before him by Cabando, Palao, Helen Tadifa,11 John Ochieng12 and
Leonidas Peter Logarta.13 During the trial before the RTC and even in the
proceedings before the DFA, Lavia had not presented the aforementioned
persons as witnesses. Their affidavits were thus considered as hearsay evidence
since the witnesses were not subjected to cross-examination. The RTC likewise
found no sufficient evidence to render Annie and Pasturan liable and to grant
Nestors counterclaims.
Both Lavia and Nestor filed their respective appeals to assail the RTC decision.
Lavia ascribed error on the part of the RTC when it absolved Annie and
Pasturan from liability anent their supposed participation in the raid conducted
on April 18, 1996. Lavia likewise assailed as insufficient the amount of
exemplary and nominal damages imposed on Nestor by the RTC. Lavia also
challenged the propriety of the RTCs dismissal of his claims relative to the
conduct of the second raid on April 23, 1996. On the other hand, Nestor
lamented that his participation in the April 18, 1996 raid was not proven by
clear and substantial evidence, hence, the award of damages made by the RTC
in favor of Lavia lacked basis.

This incident reached not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya but also
the Filipino community in Kenya, the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila
and the circle of friends of plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff felt insulted, betrayed,
depressed and even feared for his life because the intelligence and local police
were involved in this incident. Plaintiff suffered humiliation, sleepless nights,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation and wounded feeling.

The Ruling of the CA

The admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin in his affidavit (Exh. "B") regarding
the first cause of action is binding upon him only but cannot bind his codefendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan who were not included in
the administrative case where the affidavit of

There is no doubt in our mind that defendant-appellant indeed participated in

the first raid that happened on April 18, 1997 [sic]. This conclusion of ours is
based on the admission made by the defendant- appellant himself in his
affidavit dated October 10, 1997. x x x.

Nestor Padalhin was submitted.

xxxx

The affidavits of plaintiffs maids Zenaida Cabando and Edna Palao who
implicated Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan in this case is hearsay
evidence because the said househelpers did not appear to testify in this case
and to identify their affidavits although the record will show that plaintiff
exerted all efforts to present them as witnesses but failed because their
address/whereabouts could not be traced and/or ascertained. In view of this,

Defendat-appellants affidavit constitutes as [sic] an admission against his

interest. Being an admission against interest, the affidavit is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the
rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. As a

On February 14, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision14 denying the appeals of

both Lavia and Nestor. The CA, however, reduced to P75,000.00 the award of
attorneys fees and litigation expenses made in Lavias favor. In affirming,
albeit with modification, the RTCs disquisition, the CA explained:

Consul General of the Republic of the Philippines, defendant-appellant cannot

pretend that the plain meaning of his admission eluded his mind. On the witness
stand, he testified that he was the one who voluntarily and freely prepared his
affidavit. He further stated that the contents thereof are true. His affidavit
likewise contained an apology for his lack of judgment and discretion regarding
the April 18, 1996 raid.
Anent plaintiff-appellants second cause of action, the court a quo correctly ruled
that plaintiff-appellant was not able to prove defendant- appellants participation
in the second raid that happened on April 26, 1996 [sic]. Basic is the rule in
evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the
allegations x x x. Plaintiff-appellants testimony regarding the second raid was
not of his own personal knowledge. Neither does the affidavit of defendantappellant admit that he had anything to do with the second raid. Plaintiffappellant came to know of the second raid only from the stories told to him by
his household helps and employees of the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
Inasmuch as these people were not presented as witnesses in the instant case,
their affidavits are considered hearsay and without probative value.

"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."
"Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations off [sic]
another;

x x x.

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

Next, plaintiff-appellant bewails the dismissal of the complaint against Annie

Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan. He contends that the affidavits of Cabando
and Palao, which were executed and sworn to before him, linking defendant
Annie Padalhin and B[ie]nvenido Pasturan to the two raids are binding upon the
latter two.

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition."

Such a contention by the plaintiff-appellant must fail. The failure of the plaintiffappellant to put Cabando and Palao on the witness stand is fatal to his case.
Even if defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan failed to object to
the hearsay evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant, it would only mean
that they have waived their right of confrontation and cross-examination, and
the affidavits then are admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
has no probative value.

"Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which,
although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right
when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed
under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which,
without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they
violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. x
x x."

xxxx

The question, therefore, is whether defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or

injure plaintiff-appellant when he did the acts as embodied in his affidavit.

Defendant-appellant contends that there is no factual basis to conclude that he

was motivated by malice, bad faith or deceit, which would warrant the award of
damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.
x x x Plaintiff-appellants complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation
to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code. These provisions of the law state
thus:

The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an abuse of rights under Article

19 of the New Civil Code is pertinent:

We rule in the affirmative. Defendant-appellants participation in the invasion of

plaintiff-appellants diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to
take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the
consent of the plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter.
Moreover, we find that defendant- appellant was not driven by legitimate
reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed out by the court a quo,
defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and

the Filipino community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in plaintiffappellants diplomatic residence.
xxxx

end in mind of protecting and upholding the image of the Philippine diplomatic
corps in Kenya. He may have committed a lapse in the exercise of his
discretion, but he never meant to cause Lavia harm, damage or
embarrassment.

Basic is the rule that trial courts are given the discretion to determine the
amount of damages, and the appellate court can modify or change the amount
awarded only when it is inordinate. x x x We reduce the amount of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation from P150,000.00 to P75,000.00 considering that
the instant suit is merely for damages.

Nestor avers that Lavia kept grudges against him based on a mistaken
sentiment that the former intended to oust the latter from his post. This,
however, did not justify Lavias filing of a suit for damages against Nestor.

With regard to plaintiff-appellants contention that his prayer for "other reliefs
which are just and equitable", consisting of his remuneration, salaries and
allowances which should have been paid to him in Nairobi if it were not for his
illegal recall to Manila, the same must likewise fail. First of all, it is not within
our powers to determine whether or not plaintiff-appellants recall to Manila
following the two raids was illegal or not. Second, the "other reliefs" prayed for
by the plaintiff- appellant are in the nature of actual or compensatory damages
which must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the amount of damages, but
must depend upon competent proof and on evidence of the actual amount
thereof. Here, plaintiff-appellant failed to present proof of his salary and
allowances. x x x.15 (Citations omitted and italics ours)

In his Comment,18 Lavia seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on both
procedural and substantive grounds. He alleges that the verification and
certification of non-forum-shopping attached to the petition was signed not by
Spouses Padalhin but by their son, Norman Padalhin (Norman). Such being the
case, it is as if the said verification and certification was not signed at all, hence,
legally inexistent, rendering the petition defective. Besides, even if the Special
Power of Attorney19 (SPA) signed by Nestor were to be considered as the source
of Normans authority to sign the said verification and certification of nonforum-shopping, still, the instrument is wanting as Annie, a co-petitioner in the
case at bar, had no participation in its execution.

The Resolution16 issued by the CA on May 20, 2008 denied the respective
motions for reconsideration filed by Lavia and Nestor.
Hence, Nestor filed before us the instant
Certiorari17 anchored on the following issues:

Petition

for

Review

on

I. WHETHER OR NOT NESTORS PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID CONDUCTED ON

LAVIAS RESIDENCE WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL, EXEMPLARY AND NOMINAL DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE LATTERS FAVOR.
II. WHETHER OR NOT NESTORS COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED CONSIDERING A CLEAR SHOWING THAT LAVIAS SUIT WAS
GROUNDLESS.
The Arguments in Support of the Petition
Nestor reiterates that his admission of having caused the taking of photographs
in Lavias residence was subject to the qualification that he did so sans malice
or bad faith. Padalhin insists that he did nothing unlawful. He merely intended
to verify the complaints of some embassy personnel against Lavia, with the

Lavias Contentions

Lavia likewise emphasizes that since factual and not legal issues are raised,
resort to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is erroneous.
In challenging the substantial merits of the instant petition, Lavia reiterates
the arguments he proferred in the proceedings below. He also made affirmative
references to the portions of rulings of both the RTC and the CA, relative to the
binding effect of the affidavits submitted by some of the defendants either with
the DFA or the RTC, to render all of them liable for damages for their
participation in the conduct of the supposed raids.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition is procedurally flawed.
We deem it proper to first resolve the procedural issues raised by Lavia
relative to the (a) alleged defective verification and certification of non-forum
shopping attached to the instant petition, and (b) the circumstance that factual
and not legal issues are presented before us, hence, beyond the ambit of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions. (Italics ours)
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect
fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 20 Time and again,
this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and certification
of non-forum shopping under the Rules of Court.21 Verification is required to
secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good
faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. 22 The attestation on
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the
same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim
the same as similar to the current petition.23

The circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not qualify to exempt

compliance with the rules and justify our exercise of leniency. The verification
and certification of non-forum shopping24 attached to the instant petition was
not signed personally by the petitioners themselves. Even if we were to admit
as valid the SPA executed in Normans favor allowing him to sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the instant petition, still, his
authority is wanting. Petitioner Annie did not participate in the execution of the
said SPA. In the pleadings filed with us, there is nary an explanation regarding
the foregoing omissions. The petitioner spouses took procedural rules for
granted and simply assumed that the Court will accord them leniency. It bears
stressing that procedural rules are crafted towards the orderly administration of
justice and they cannot be haphazardly ignored at the convenience of the party
litigants.
Lavia also seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of being
supposedly anchored on factual and not legal issues.
The case of Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank25 is emphatic on what
issues can be resolved in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the
petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.
x x x The substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is a factual issue which
is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.26 (Citation omitted
and italics ours)
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to
subject to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the
CA.1wphi1 Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear
and substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorneys fees
in Lavias favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses
Padalhins counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed by
Lavia before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are not a trier
of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and not

legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Even
if
we
aforecited
procedural
instant
petition,
prayed
for
by
cannot be granted.

were

to
defects
still,
the

overlook
of
the
petitioner

the
the
reliefs
spouses

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself
admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence without
the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad
faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of
good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence,
then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the
case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the
privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed
benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and
attorney's fees in Lavina's favor is proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 14, 2008 and Resolution dated May 20, 2008 by the
Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. CV No. 81810 are AFFIRMED.

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
the Order dated January 2, 2006[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William
Sy and Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,
Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No.
98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William
Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762
and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed
against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP
Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal
Case Nos. 341458-59).

SO ORDERED.

10. Cheng v. Sy
10. THIRD DIVISION
ANITA CHENG,

G.R. No. 174238

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and

TESSIE SY,
Respondents

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 7, 2009

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for
failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil
liability of Tessie Sy.[3] On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98969953 contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the accused,
the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature.[4]
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22
cases in its Order[5] dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of
petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did
not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC,
Branch 18, Manila, a complaint[6] for collection of a sum of money with damages
(Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00
covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22
cases.

In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action
to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly
instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which the court denied in its
Order[9] dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on
the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of
criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present
case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the
failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused
(respondents herein)?[10]
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on
January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated
on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective
application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is
deemed instituted with the latter
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is
necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the
case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even
more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the
civil liability of the accused amounting to a reservation
of the right to have the civil liability litigated in a
separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the

civil complaint is based on an obligation excontractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 31[11] of
the Civil Code; and

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under
Article 29[12] of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private
prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against
respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express
reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil
action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal
action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.[13]
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP
Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and
remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our
ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada[14]that the possible single civil liability arising
from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP
Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing
the prohibition against forum shopping.[15] Prior to the judgment in either the
estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be
deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the
said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other.[16]
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubtwhere in Criminal Case No. 98969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused
and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the
liability of the accused was only civil in natureproduced the legal effect of a
reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action
impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil
Code.[17]
However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on
account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner
was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together
with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of
the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the
same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioners
action to recover respondents civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately
after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
states

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res

judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view
of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code is not applicable.[19]
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not
cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice
and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.[20]
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that
petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents
the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the
petitioners Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special
Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin
Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for
failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of
time.[21] Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner
had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the
checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted by
a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner
indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her
cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during
the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly
instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now
settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time
of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[18]

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse

pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil
action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the
bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within
the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy
to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake
of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from
this rule.

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP
Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the
checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a
separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the
criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings
are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the
proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.[22] But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day
in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.[23] Tested
against these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of
existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence.Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,

they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations
as members of the Bar.[24] Further, lawyers in the government service are
expected to be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they
are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are
also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. [25] Apparently,
the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the
proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with
the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be
able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the
criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in
court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation when it
dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was
any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan
be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be
tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently
evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied
against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and
(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This
doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of
law.[26]
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a
liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties the
fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.[27] For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the
complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do
so,[28] we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452
entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby
ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

11. ASJ Corp v. Evangelista

11. SECOND DIVISION
ASJ CORPORATION and
ANTONIO SAN JUAN,

G.R. No. 158086

Petitioners,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

SPS. EFREN & MAURA

EVANGELISTA,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

February 14, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56082, which had affirmed the Decision[2] dated July
8, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 in Civil
Case No. 745-M-93. The Court of Appeals, after applying the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction, held petitioners ASJ Corporation (ASJ Corp.) and
Antonio San Juan solidarily liable to respondents Efren and Maura Evangelista for
the unjustified retention of the chicks and egg by-products covered by Setting
Report Nos. 108 to 113.[3]
The pertinent facts, as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

Respondents, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged in the
large-scale business of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their
hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products[4] in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. For the
incubation and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the hatchery
services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of San Juan and
his family.
Sometime in 1991, respondents delivered to petitioners various quantities of
eggs at an agreed service fee of 80 centavos per egg, whether successfully
hatched or not. Each delivery was reflected in a Setting Report indicating the
following: the number of eggs delivered; the date of setting or the date the
eggs were delivered and laid out in the incubators; the date of candling or the
date the eggs, through a lighting system, were inspected and determined if
viable or capable of being hatched into chicks; and the date of hatching, which
is also the date respondents would pick-up the chicks and by-products. Initially,
the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs and by-products to
respondents. But as their business went along, respondents delays on their
payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance, as
there may be, into the next delivery, out of keeping goodwill with respondents.
From January 13 to February 3, 1993, respondents had delivered to San Juan a
total of 101,3[50][5] eggs, detailed as follows:[6]
Date Set SR Number No. of eggs delivered Date hatched/Pick-up date
1/13/1993 SR 108 32,566 eggs February 3, 1993
1/20/1993 SR 109 21,485 eggs February 10, 1993
1/22/1993 SR 110 7,213 eggs February 12, 1993
1/28/1993 SR 111 14,495 eggs February 18, 1993
1/30/1993 SR 112 15,346 eggs February 20, 1993
2/3/1993 SR 113 10,24[5][7] eggs February 24, 1993
TOTAL 101,350 eggs
On February 3, 1993, respondent Efren went to the hatchery to pick up the
chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 108, but San
Juan refused to release the same due to respondents failure to settle accrued
service fees on several setting reports starting from Setting Report No.
90. Nevertheless, San Juan accepted from Efren 10,245 eggs covered by Setting
Report No. 113 and P15,000.00[8] in cash as partial payment for the accrued
service fees.
On February 10, 1993, Efren returned to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and
by-products covered by Setting Report No. 109, but San Juan again refused to
release the same unless respondents fully settle their accounts. In the afternoon
of
the
same
day,
respondent
Maura,
with
her
son
Anselmo,
tendered P15,000.00[9] to San Juan, and tried to claim the chicks and byproducts. She explained that she was unable to pay their balance because she
was hospitalized for an undisclosed ailment. San Juan accepted the P15,000.00,
but insisted on the full settlement of respondents accounts before releasing the
chicks and by-products. Believing firmly that the total value of the eggs

delivered was more than sufficient to cover the outstanding balance, Maura
promised to settle their accounts only upon proper accounting by San Juan. San
Juan disliked the idea and threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them
at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle
their accounts with him.
On February 11, 1993, respondents directed their errand boy, Allan Blanco, to
pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 110 and also
to ascertain if San Juan was still willing to settle amicably their
differences. Unfortunately, San Juan was firm in his refusal and reiterated his
threats on respondents. Fearing San Juans threats, respondents never went
back to the hatchery.
The parties tried to settle amicably their differences before police
authorities, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed with the RTC an action for
damages based on petitioners retention of the chicks and by-products covered
by Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113.
On July 8, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and made the
following findings: (1) as of Setting Report No. 107, respondents owed
petitioners P102,336.80;[10](2) petitioners withheld the release of the chicks
and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108-113;[11] and (3) the
retention of the chicks and by-products was unjustified and accompanied by
threats and intimidations on respondents.[12] The RTC disregarded the corporate
fiction of ASJ Corp.,[13] and held it and San Juan solidarily liable to respondents
for P529,644.80
as
actual
damages, P100,000.00
as
moral
damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus interests and costs of suit. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the evidence on record and the
laws/jurisprudence applicable thereon, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
unto the plaintiffs the amounts of P529,644.80, representing the
value of the hatched chicks and by-products which the plaintiffs
on the average expected to derive under Setting Reports Nos.
108 to 113, inclusive, with legal interest thereon from the date
of this judgment until the same shall have been fully
paid, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents prayed for an
additional award of P76,139.00 as actual damages for the cost of other
unreturned
by-products
andP1,727,687.52
as
unrealized
profits,
while petitioners prayed for the reversal of the trial courts entire decision.
On April 30, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied both appeals for lack of merit
and affirmed the trial courts decision, with the slight modification of including an

award of exemplary damages of P10,000.00 in favor of respondents. The Court

of Appeals, applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction,
considered ASJ Corp. and San Juan as one entity, after finding that there was
no bona fide intention to treat the corporation as separate and distinct from San
Juan and his wife Iluminada. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONERS HAVE VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED
IN ART. 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND CONSEQUENTLY IN
AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed

from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the slight modification that
exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 are awarded
to plaintiffs.

VI.

Costs against defendants.

SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, the instant petition, assigning the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING, AS DID THE COURT A QUO, THAT PETITIONERS
WITHHELD/OR FAILED TO RELEASE THE CHICKS AND BYPRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING REPORT NOS. 108 AND 109.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF MAURA EVANGELISTA SUPPORTIVE OF
ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONERS WITHHELD/OR FAILED TO
RELEASE THE CHICKS AND BY-PRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING
REPORT NOS. 108 AND 109.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS DID THE COURT A
QUO, ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
RETURN TO THE PLANT TO GET THE CHICKS AND BYPRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING REPORT NOS. 110, 111, 112
AND 113.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, AS
DID THE COURT A QUO, THAT THE PIERCING OF THE VEIL OF
CORPORATE ENTITY IS JUSTIFIED, AND CONSEQUENTLY
HOLDING PETITIONERS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO
PAY RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF P529,644.[80].
V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

AWARDING PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM.[16]

IN

NOT

Plainly, the issues submitted for resolution are: First, did the Court of
Appeals err when (a) it ruled that petitioners withheld or failed to release the
chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 and 109; (b) it
admitted the testimony of Maura; (c) it did not find that it was respondents who
failed to return to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by
Setting Report Nos. 110 to 113; and (d) it pierced the veil of corporate fiction
and held ASJ Corp. and Antonio San Juan as one entity?Second, was it proper to
hold petitioners solidarily liable to respondents for the payment of P529,644.80
and other damages?
raised.

In our view, there are two sets of issues that the petitioners have

The first set is factual. Petitioners seek to establish a set of facts

contrary to the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. However, as
well established in our jurisprudence, only errors of law are reviewable by this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.[17] The trial court, having had the
opportunity to personally observe and analyze the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying, is in a better position to pass judgment on their
credibility.[18] More importantly, factual findings of the trial court, when amply
supported by evidence on record and affirmed by the appellate court, are
binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal.[19] While there are
exceptional circumstances[20] when these findings may be set aside, none of
them is present in this case.
Based on the records, as well as the parties own admissions, the
following facts were uncontroverted: (1) As of Setting Report No. 107,
respondents were indebted to petitioners for P102,336.80 as accrued service
fees for Setting Report Nos. 90 to 107;[21] (2) Petitioners, based on San Juans
own admission,[22] did not release the chicks and by-products covered by
Setting Report Nos. 108 and 109 for failure of respondents to fully settle their
previous accounts; and (3) Due to San Juans threats, respondents never
returned to the hatchery to pick up those covered by Setting Report Nos. 110 to
113.[23]
Furthermore, although no hard and fast rule can be accurately laid down under
which the juridical personality of a corporate entity may be disregarded, the
following probative factors of identity justify the application of the doctrine of

piercing the veil of corporate fiction[24] in this case: (1) San Juan and his wife
own the bulk of shares of ASJ Corp.; (2) The lot where the hatchery plant is
located is owned by the San Juan spouses; (3) ASJ Corp. had no other
properties or assets, except for the hatchery plant and the lot where it is
located; (4) San Juan is in complete control of the corporation; (5) There is no
bona fide intention to treat ASJ Corp. as a different entity from San Juan; and
(6) The corporate fiction of ASJ Corp. was used by San Juan to insulate himself
from the legitimate claims of respondents, defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, defend crime, and evade a corporations subsidiary liability for
damages.[25] These findings, being purely one of fact,[26] should be
respected. We need not assess and evaluate the evidence all over again where
the findings of both courts on these matters coincide.

retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a

reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same
cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the
performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the
other.[28] From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the
other party begins.[29]

On the second set of issues, petitioners contend that the retention was justified
and did not constitute an abuse of rights since it was respondents who failed to
comply with their obligation. Respondents, for their part, aver that all the
elements on abuse of rights were present. They further state that despite their
offer to partially satisfy the accrued service fees, and the fact that the value of the
chicks and by-products was more than sufficient to cover their unpaid obligations,
petitioners still chose to withhold the delivery.

Nonetheless, San Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents

should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under Article 19[31] of
the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are
present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [32] Here,
while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and
oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no
legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence
all over again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will not be
disturbed on appeal.[33]

The crux of the controversy, in our considered view, is simple

enough. Was petitioners retention of the chicks and by-products on account of
respondents failure to pay the corresponding service fees unjustified? While the
trial and appellate courts had the same decisions on the matter, suffice it to say
that a modification is proper. Worth stressing, petitioners act of withholding the
chicks and by-products is entirely different from petitioners unjustifiable acts of
threatening respondents. The retention had legal basis; the threats had none.
To begin with, petitioners obligation to deliver the chicks and byproducts corresponds to three dates: the date of hatching, the delivery/pick-up
date and the date of respondents payment. On several setting reports,
respondents made delays on their payments, but petitioners tolerated such
delay. When respondents accounts accumulated because of their successive
failure to pay on several setting reports, petitioners opted to demand the full
settlement of respondents accounts as a condition precedent to the
delivery. However, respondents were unable to fully settle their accounts.
Respondents offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to
extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248[27] of the Civil Code, the creditor
cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is
an express stipulation to that effect. More so, respondents cannot substitute or
apply as their payment the value of the chicks and by-products they expect to
derive because it is necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally
of a monetary character. Needless to say, there was no valid application of
payment in this case.
Furthermore, it was respondents who violated the very essence of
reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to petitioners right of

Since respondents are guilty of delay in the performance of their

obligations, they are liable to pay petitioners actual damages of P183,416.80,
computed as follows: From respondents outstanding balance of P102,336.80, as
of Setting Report No. 107, we add the corresponding services fees
of P81,080.00[30] for Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113 which had remain unpaid.

Since it was established that respondents suffered some pecuniary loss

anchored on petitioners abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual
damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are recoverable. In
arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages of P408,852.10, which
is equivalent to the value of the chicks and by-products, which respondents, on
the average, are expected to derive, this Court was guided by the following
factors: (a) award of temperate damages will cover only Setting Report Nos.
109 to 113 since the threats started only on February 10 and 11, 1993, which
are the pick-up dates for Setting Report Nos. 109 and 110; the rates
of (b) 41% and (c)17%, representing the average rates of conversion of broiler
eggs into hatched chicks and egg by-products as tabulated by the trial court
based
on
available
statistical
data
which
was
unrebutted
by
petitioners; (d) 68,784 eggs,[34] or the total number of broiler eggs under
Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113; and (e) P14.00 and (f) P1.20, or the then unit
market price of the chicks and by-products, respectively.
Thus, the temperate damages of P408,852.10 is computed as follows:
[b X (d X e) + c X (d X f)] = Temperate Damages
41% X (68,784 eggs X P14) = P394,820.16
17% X (68,784 eggs X P1.20) = P 14,031.94

[P394,820.16 + P14,031.94] = P408,852.10

At bottom, we agree that petitioners conduct flouts the norms of civil
society and justifies the award of moral and exemplary damages. As enshrined
in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum
cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his
due.[35] Since exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees are also
proper. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that:
In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56082 is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
a.

Respondents
are ORDERED to
pay
petitioners P183,416.80 as actual damages, with interest of
6% from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid,
plus legal interest of 12% from the finality of this decision
until fully paid.

b.

The award of actual damages of P529,644.80 in favor of

respondents is hereby REDUCED to P408,852.10, with legal
interest of 12% from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

c.

d.

The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and

attorneys fees of P100,000.00, P10,000.00, P50,000.00,
respectively, in favor of respondents is herebyAFFIRMED.
All other claims are hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

12. UP v. Philab

12. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152411. September 29, 2004]

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PHILAB INDUSTRIES,

INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its
Resolution[2] denying the petitioners motion for the reconsideration thereof. The
Court of Appeals set aside the Decision[3] of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent
against the petitioner for sum of money and damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to
construct an integrated system of research organization known as the Research
Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were
purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology
(BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos
Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the
laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to
BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982,
Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for
Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory
furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for
the account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB
to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested
Padolina to forward the contract of the project to FEMF for its approval.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of
the purchase order and downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for
the project, thus:
1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building
Project

a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial

support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of buildings,
installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed P29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the
following:
ARTICLE II

Amount : P2,934,068.90
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention: Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or P1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan
Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or P286,687.50[4]
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as
possible before the issuance of the purchase orders and the downpayment for
the goods, and would be transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the
President of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture,
per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for
copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract [5] for the project, and that
such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down payment could
be remitted to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to
forward any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives
and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment
for the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued
Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another
partial payment of P800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official
Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn by
FEMF and delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los
Baos and FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed

2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting

philantrophic and scientific projects through financial support to such projects
that will contribute to the countrys economic development, shall grant such
financial support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX
as may be necessary for the construction of buildings, installation of
laboratories, setting up of offices and physical plants and facilities and other
capital investment of the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its component
Research Institutes not to exceed P29 Million. For this purpose, the
FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH
COMPLEX; and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE
MILLION PESOS (P29,000,000.00) for the construction of the buildings of the
National Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) and
the installation of their laboratories and their physical plants and other facilities
to enable them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of
Trustees of the FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the
RESEARCH COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional grants and donations for
specific research and development projects which may be mutually agreed upon
and, from time to time, additional grants and donations of such amounts as may
be necessary to provide the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research
Institutes with operational flexibility especially with regard to incentives to staff
purchase of equipment/facilities, travel abroad, recruitment of local and
expatriate staff and such other activities and inputs which are difficult to obtain
under usual government rules and regulations.[6]
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25,
1982.[7]
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the
installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However,
Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH

reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could be

submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and approval.[8] Instead of submitting the
said contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the
project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment thereon.[9] By May
1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the project, amounting to P2,288,573.74
out of the total cost of P2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent
(40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio
and furnished him the progress billing from PHILAB.[10] On August 11, 1983, the
FEMF made another partial payment of P836,119.52 representing the already
delivered laboratory and office furniture after the requisite inspection and
verification thereof by representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB.
The payment was made in the form of a check, for which PHILAB issued Official
Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through Padolina.[11]

1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute
any contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to
BIOTECH.

On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the

amount of P702,939.40 for the final payment of laboratory furniture.
Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a
verification of the accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same.
BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its
payment.[12] Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to Gapud, presumably
sometime in the early part of 1985. However, the FEMF failed to pay the bill.
PHILAB reiterated its request for payment through a letter on May 9,
1985.[13] BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the payment
of PHILABs bill.[14] It sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985,
again appealing for the payment of PHILABs bill.[15] In a Letter to BIOTECH
dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of P702,939.40 plus
interest thereon of P224,940.61.[16] There was, however, no response from the
FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH, appealing for the
payment of its bill even on installment basis.[17]

(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) exemplary

damages;

President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its
much-needed assistance for the payment of the balance already due plus
interest of P295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory furniture.[18]
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her
help to secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF.[19] The letter was
referred to then Budget Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then
UP President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On September 30, 1986, Raul P.
de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos, wrote then Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga,
submitting PHILABs claim to be officially entered as accounts payable as soon as
the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.[20]
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant
contract and the MOA for its perusal.[21]
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the
contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated October 20,

Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages

against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY NINE & 40/100 (P702,939.40) plus an additional amount
(as shall be determined during the hearing) to cover the actual
cost of money which at the time of transaction the value of the
peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and twenty seven
(27%) percent interest on the total amount from August 1982
until fully paid;

(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees;

and
(4) Cost of suit.[22]
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials,
particularly MR. WILLIAM PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff to
supply and install several laboratory furnitures and equipment at
BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein defendant located at its
campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS:
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTYEIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said
laboratory furnitures and equipment at defendants BIOTECH
Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on installment basis:
a) P600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24,
1982;
b) P800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22,
1982;
c) P836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11,
1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (P702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years,
defendant arrogantly and maliciously made plaintiff believe that it
was going to pay the balance aforestated, that was why plaintiffs

President and General Manager himself, HECTOR C. NAVASERO,

personally went to and from UP Los Baos to talk with defendants
responsible officers in the hope of expecting payment, when, in
truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay whatsoever
right from the start on a misplaced ground of technicalities. Some
of plaintiffs demand letters since year 1983 up to the present are
hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H hereof;
6. That by reason of defendants malicious, evil and unnecessary
misrepresentations that it was going to pay its obligation and
asking plaintiff so many red tapes and requirements to submit,
compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost eight (8) years to
finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to
pay, defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) exemplary
damages, so that other government institutions may be warned
that they must not unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
the people they serve.[23]
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of
action against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory
furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was
liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP
specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by
PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint without prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice
to plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid
balance of P792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the
trial court erred in finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory
furniture and equipment was between PHILAB and the Marcos
Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable
to pay the respondent the balance of the purchase price.[25]
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there
was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could
not be bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party

thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for
the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim:
No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, UP, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE
LAW ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS
FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO
PHILAB.[26]
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the
subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally restricted to questions of
law.[27] However, this rule is not absolute. The Court may review the factual
findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial
court.[28]Correspondingly, this Court may review findings of facts when the
judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts.[29]
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked
the evidentiary effect and substance of the corresponding letters and
communications which support the statements of the witnesses showing
affirmatively that an implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the
FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it
and the respondent as it could not have entered into any agreement without the
requisite public bidding and a formal written contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not
applying the law on contracts between the respondent and the FEMF. It,
likewise, attests that it was never privy to the MOA entered into between the
petitioner and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF donated was
a sum of money equivalent to P29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment
supplied by it to the petitioner. The respondent submits that the petitioner,
being the recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at the
expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondents cause of action is one for sum of
money predicated on the alleged promise of the petitioner to pay for the
purchase price of the furniture, which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to
do. However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged

itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is
not entitled to its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed
by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement.
Contracts take effect only between the parties and their assigns.[30] A contract
cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party
to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.[31] Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no
written contract executed by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to
the fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH.
Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the respondent
entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are
in accord that the FEMF had remitted to the respondent partial
payments via checks drawn and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through
Padolina, in the total amount of P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the
project of P2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received the said checks and
issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the
petitioner did not pay a single centavo for the said furniture delivered by the
respondent that the petitioner had been using ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact
contract of sale was entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract
implied in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual
intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not
expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the
existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or
explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties,
language used, or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances
attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances
must warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to
pay.[32] An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties intent to enter into a
contract; it is a true contract.[33] The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a
reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of an impliedin-fact contract.[34] The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be
considered to determine their intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise
unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or
sign.[35]
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it
for the fabrication and supply of the laboratory furniture until the go-signal was
given to it to fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that
the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina asked the respondent to
prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the
execution of the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the
respondent failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that the petitioner was
merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor
was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the inception,

the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for
which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the
FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware
that it was the Marcos Foundation who would be paying for this
particular transaction for the completion of this particular
transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there
were occasions during our inspection in Los Baos, at the
installation site, there were occasions, two or three occasions,
when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the President, I think, or
manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really
between the foundation and him to which includes (sic) the
construction company constructing the building. He is fully aware
that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged them and issued the
payments.[36]
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner
and sought its assistance for the collection of the amount due from the FEMF:
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance
still due us on the laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as
possible to keep up our operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.[37]
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance
for the payment of the amount due, in which the respondent admitted it tried to
collect from her predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:

At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were

supplied by our company to the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of the Philippines, Los Baos, Laguna, in
1984.

benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.[41] Unjust enrichment is not

itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.[42]

Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTYNINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90), the previous
administration had so far paid us the sum ofP2,236,119.52 thus leaving a
balance of PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (P1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24%
per annum and 30% exchange rate adjustment.

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other

means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface
supplied)

On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your

predecessor, the latest of which was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to
DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our
claim has remained unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto
attached for easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that
payment of this obligation will soon be made as this is one project the Republic
of the Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.[38]
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of
accounts for the payments of the laboratory furniture it delivered to the
petitioner which the petitioner, through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its
payment. However, the FEMF failed to pay the last statement of account of the
respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only when the
respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from the government and/or the
PCGG did it file the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the
payment of its last delivery of laboratory furniture.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must
be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.[43]
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available
only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and
quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of
positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem
verso will not lie.[44]
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil
Code do not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the
FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the
payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture
under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED.
No costs.

We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of
the respondent based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the
expense of another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from
the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party
was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully.[39]
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must
unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value
to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would
be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.[40] Unjust enrichment is a term
used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property
or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer

SO ORDERED.

13. Ilusorio v. Bildner

13. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139789. July 19, 2001]

IN

THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,

vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP,

JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 139808. July 19, 2001]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.

ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.[9]

The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution,
enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable
settlement of the case through mediation and other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance
of the parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000.[10]
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and
motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be
medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court.[11]

PARDO, J.:

On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda' s motion to reconsider

the Court's order of January 31, 2001.[12]

Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts
on expectancy in fabled fortune.

The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration

are mere reiterations of her arguments that have been resolved in the decision.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly
inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals[1] for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing
the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano
Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court
an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband
Potenciano Ilusorio.[2] This case was consolidated with another case[3] filed by
Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he
never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus[4] for lack of
merit, and granted the petition[5] to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling[6] giving
visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.[7]
What is now before the Court is Erlinda' s motion to reconsider the
decision.[8]
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on
October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of
the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of
petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and

Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:

First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to
live with her in consortium and that Potenciano' s mental state was not an
issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have
her husband's custody.[13] Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted
Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband
was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano
Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. [14] She
claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away
Potenciano and Erlinda' s property to companies controlled by Lin and
Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of
Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would
logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones
controlling the corporations.[15]
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the
Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.[16] Potenciano himself declared that he was
not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection
to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for
himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme
Court so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated
to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that
has been decided in the Court of Appeals.

As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporations,

these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant
in habeas corpus.

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA

K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm

Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not
rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts
mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason
why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine
states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme
Court.[17] We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over
again.[18] Although there are exceptions to the rule,[19] Erlinda failed to show
that this is an exceptional instance.

[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each
other. We agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.[20] The sanction therefor is
the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.[21]
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We
defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.[22]
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his
Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors
continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any
rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.
SO ORDERED.

14. Ilusorio v. Bildner

14. FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA

ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ
of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto.[2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with
the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."[3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of
which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause.[4] It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented
from exercising legal custody over another person.[5]
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the application for habeas corpus to
have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce
consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio [9] is to annul that portion
of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights
to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing
the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony
and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated
from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio
(age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49);
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant
drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio
due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents[11] refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
judgment is hereby rendered:

disquisitions,

"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon

petitioners manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner
and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland
Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and
Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to
allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda
Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting
visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of
refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued
be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED
DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful
restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom.[15] Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance
of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack
of merit. No costs.

The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife
and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.

In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K.
Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed

that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions
to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In
this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to
see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family
members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals.

15. UE v. Jader

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio
may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we
will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in
a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The
ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that
the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or
refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a
parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.

15. G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for
review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial
court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to
1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he
failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which
he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He
enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
"A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of
the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson
after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March

28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his
grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2N").1wphi1.nt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of
Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be
allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List
of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B)
as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.

deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered
moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of
moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of
suit.

Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to

submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").

In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it
never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a
Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of
graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates

of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name
of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6",
"B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however the following annotation:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY
PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these

candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in
the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz
Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the program of which he went
up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother
and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel
was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean
Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
His relatives took pictures of the occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3"
to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors,
friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar
examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out
(Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave
of absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September
30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the

Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with
modification. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in
addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiffappellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs
against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the
case to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that
the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the
latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor
concerned the result of his removal exam.

The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract
of education is entered into between said institution and the student. The
professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as
agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under
the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the
latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors
with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents
either professors or students from sharing with each other such information.
The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational
institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their
grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish
sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or
she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a
degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is
not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's
way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of
those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have
satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the
ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any
problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most
importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing
for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good
faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law,
together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access to those
information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and
comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation
and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much
less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs,
particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their
compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them,
it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students'
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control
over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an
academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of

faculty and student services.7 He must see to it that his own professors and
teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must
comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who
fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting
a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the
school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a
university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it
inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings
enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society, men must
be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and
moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the
general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory
of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. 9 Schools
and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them,
for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may
be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.10 Want of
care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the
essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade.
It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar
exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's
grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set
by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar.
Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the
result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had

satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following
disquisition of the respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendantappellee University had been informed during the deliberation that the
professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet,
defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to
complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name
from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendantappellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed
in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the
"tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the
deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites
program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was
allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the
hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in the
remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did
not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to
complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert
any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice
Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own
negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one
of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred
must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases
where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent
for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings
that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he
could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the
very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As
a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to
ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how
respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the
graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take
the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the
bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the

requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar
examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a
mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of
documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee
must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of
6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

16. Figueroa v. Barranco

16. EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]

PATRICIA
FIGUEROA, complainant,
JR., respondent.

vs. SIMEON

BARRANCO,

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth
attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could
take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born
to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F.
Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were
steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress
with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael

Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave
onlyP10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another
woman. Hence, this petition.

doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment
the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [6] It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]

Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies

of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to
take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating
that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required
and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June
18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relevant because mere

intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on

the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17,
1979.[2] Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution
dated September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing
his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from
1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in
the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as
reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time
and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the
required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the
Court, in response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled
oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because
of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who
also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the
bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations

were evidently consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had
been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respondents girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations
that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an
adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent
chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for
any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a
woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make
respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession
he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been
prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During
this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to
him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed,
albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of
the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.

17. Cheng v. Donini

premises and perform, all such works and activities to make the
leased premises operational as a restaurant or similar purpose.
17. FIRST DIVISION

Manila, 31 October 1990.[1]

SERAFIN CHENG, G.R. No. 167017

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
SPOUSES VITTORIO and
MA. HELEN DONINI,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 22, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition is an oral lease agreement that went sour. Petitioner
Serafin Cheng agreed to lease his property located at 479 Shaw Blvd.,
Mandaluyong City to respondents, Spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, who
intended to put up a restaurant thereon. They agreed to a monthly rental
of P17,000, to commence in December 1990.
Bearing an Interim Grant of Authority executed by petitioner,
respondents proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises. The
authority read:
I, Serafin Cheng, of legal age and with office address at Room
310 Federation Center Building Muelle de Binondo, Manila,
owner of the building/structure located at 479 Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, pursuant to a lease agreement now
being finalized and to take effect December 1, 1990, hereby
grants VITTORIO DONINI (Prospective Lessee) and all those
acting under his orders to make all the necessary improvements
on the prospective leased premises located at 479 Shaw Blvd.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and for this purpose, to enter said

However, before respondents business could take off and before any final lease
agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious
disagreements regarding its terms and conditions. Petitioner thus wrote
respondents on January 28, 1991, demanding payment of the deposit and
rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to continue with the agreement
should respondents fail to pay. Respondents, however, ignoring petitioners
demand, continued to occupy the premises until April 17, 1991 when their
caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to petitioner.
Respondents then filed an action for specific performance and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67, docketed as Civil Case No.
60769. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written
lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of
repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their
investment in the amount of P964,000 and compensate for their unearned net
income ofP200,000 with interest, plus attorneys fees.[2]
Petitioner, in his answer, denied respondents claims and sought the award of
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.[3]
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which provided:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
preponderance of evidence in favor of the [petitioner] and
hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. The Complaint is dismissed.
2. On the counterclaim, [respondents] are ordered,
jointly and severally, to pay the [petitioner] P500,000.00 as
moral
damages; P100,000.00
as
exemplary
damages;
and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
3.

[Respondents] are likewise ordered to pay the

costs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

F. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND/OR

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FIXING THE
AMOUNT
OF P961,000.00[9] CONTRARY
TO
RESPONDENTS
OWN
REPRESENTATION
AND
EVIDENCE.[10]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its

decision[5] dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and
entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount
of P964,000 representing the latters expenses incurred for the repairs and
improvements of the premises.[6]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the award of
reimbursement had no factual and legal bases,[7] but this was denied by the CA
in its resolution dated February 21, 2005.[8]
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with
petitioner arguing that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THIS CASE NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT. PUT OTHERWISE:
A. BY
ORDERING
PETITIONER
TO
REIMBURSE
RESPONDENTS THE FULL VALUE OF EXPENSES FOR
THEIR ALLEGED REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENTS OF THE
LEASED
PREMISES,
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERED RESPONDENTS NOT AS
MERE LESSEES BUT POSSESSORS IN GOOD FAITH
UNDER ARTICLES 448 AND 546 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THIS CASE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE
WHICH GIVES THE LESSOR THE OPTION TO REIMBURSE
THE LESSEE ONE-HALF OF THE VALUE OF USEFUL
IMPROVEMENTS OR, IF HE DOES NOT WANT TO, ALLOW
THE LESSEE TO REMOVE THE IMPROVEMENTS.
C. LIKEWISE,
BY
ORDERING
PETITIONER
TO
REIMBURSE THE VALUE OF ORNAMENTAL EXPENSES,
THE COURT OF APPEALS CONTRAVENED THE SECOND
PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 1678.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE
OF
EQUITY
IN
FAVOR
OF
THE
RESPONDENTS.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PETITIONER.

Respondents were required to file their comment on the petition but their
counsel manifested that he could not file one since his clients whereabouts were
unknown to him.[11]Counsel also urged the Court to render a decision on the
basis of the available records and documents.[12] Per resolution dated August
30, 2006, copies of the resolutions requiring respondents to file their comment
were sent to their last known address and were deemed served. The order
requiring respondents counsel to file a comment in their behalf was
reiterated.[13]
In their comment, respondents argued that they were possessors in good faith,
hence, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code applied and they should be
indemnified
for
the
improvements
introduced
on
the
leased
premises. Respondents bewailed the fact that petitioner was going to benefit
from these improvements, the cost of which amounted toP1.409 million, in
contrast to respondents rental/deposit obligation amounting to only P34,000.
Respondents also contended that petitioners rescission of the agreement was in
bad faith and they were thus entitled to a refund.[14]
In settling the appeal before it, the CA made the following findings and
conclusions:
1.

there was no agreement that the deposit and rentals accruing to

petitioner would be deducted from the costs of repairs and
renovation incurred by respondents;

2.

respondents committed a breach in the terms and conditions of the

agreement when they failed to pay the rentals;

3.

there was no valid rescission on the part of petitioner;

4.

respondents were entitled to reimbursement for the cost of

improvements under the principle of equity and unjust
enrichment; and

5.

the award of damages in favor of petitioner had no basis in fact

and law.[15]

As the correctness of the CAs ruling regarding (1) the lack of agreement
on the deposit and rentals; (2) respondents breach of the terms of the verbal
agreement and (3) the lack of valid rescission by petitioner was never put in
issue, this decision will be confined only to the issues raised by petitioner, that
is, the award of reimbursement and the deletion of the award of damages. It
need not be stressed that an appellate court will not review errors that are not
assigned before it, save in certain exceptional circumstances and those affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors, none of
which is present in this case.[16]
Remarkably, in ruling that respondents were entitled to reimbursement,
the CA did not provide any statutory basis therefor and instead applied the
principles of equity and unjust enrichment, stating:
It would be inequitable to allow the defendant-appellee,
as owner of the property to enjoy perpetually the improvements
introduced by the plaintiffs-appellants without reimbursing them
for the value of the said improvements. Well-settled is the rule
that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefitted at the
expense of another.[17]

Petitioner, however, correctly argued that the principle of equity did not
apply in this case. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside
legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure.[18] Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments
based on equity contra legem.[19]Neither is the principle of unjust enrichment
applicable since petitioner (who was to benefit from it) had a valid claim.[20]
The relationship between petitioner and respondents was explicitly
governed by the Civil Code provisions on lease, which clearly provide for the
rule on reimbursement of useful improvements and ornamental expenses after
termination of a lease agreement. Article 1678 states:
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which
are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor
upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half
of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor
refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall

not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the
principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Article 1678 modified the (old) Civil Code provision on reimbursement

where the lessee had no right at all to be reimbursed for the improvements
introduced on the leased property, he being entitled merely to the rights of a
usufructuary the right of removal and set-off but not to reimbursement.[21]
Contrary to respondents position, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code did not apply. Under these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement
for useful improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be
considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and 546, which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who
builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith
is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on
it. [22]
But respondents cannot be considered possessors or builders in good faith. As
early as 1956, in Lopez v. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc.,[23] the Court
clarified that a lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in good faith
x x x This principle of possessor in good faith naturally
cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he knows that
he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can he deny
the ownership or title of his lessor. Knowing that his occupation
of the premises continues only during the life of the lease
contract and that he must vacate the property upon termination
of the lease or upon the violation by him of any of its terms, he
introduces improvements on said property at his own risk
in the sense that he cannot recover their value from the
lessor, much less retain the premises until such
reimbursement. (Emphasis supplied)

Being mere lessees, respondents knew that their right to occupy the
premises existed only for the duration of the lease.[24] Cortez v.
Manimbo[25] went further to state that:

If the rule were otherwise, it would always be in the power of

the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property.

These principles have been consistently adhered to and applied by the

Court in many cases.[26]
Under Article 1678 of the Civil Code, the lessor has the primary right (or the
first move) to reimburse the lessee for 50% of the value of the improvements at
the end of the lease. If the lessor refuses to make the reimbursement, the
subsidiary right of the lessee to remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing suffers damage, arises. Consequently, on petitioner rests the
primary option to pay for one-half of the value of the useful improvements. It is
only when petitioner as lessor refuses to make the reimbursement that
respondents, as lessees, may remove the improvements. Should petitioner
refuse to exercise the option of paying for one-half of the value of the
improvements, he cannot be compelled to do so. It then lies on respondents to
insist on their subsidiary right to remove the improvements even though the
principal thing suffers damage but without causing any more impairment on the
property leased than is necessary.
As regards the ornamental expenses, respondents are not entitled to
reimbursement. Article 1678 gives respondents the right to remove the
ornaments without damage to the principal thing. But if petitioner appropriates
and retains said ornaments, he shall pay for their value upon the termination of
the lease.
The fact that petitioner will benefit from the improvements introduced by
respondents is beside the point. In the first place, respondents introduced these
improvements at their own risk as lessees. Respondents were not forced or
obliged to splurge on the leased premises as it was a matter of necessity as well
as a business strategy.[27] In fact, had respondents only complied with their
obligation to pay the deposit/rent, there would have been no dispute to begin
with. If they were able to shell out more than a million pesos to improve the
property, the measly P34,000 deposit demanded by petitioner was a mere drop
in the bucket, so to speak. More importantly, the unequivocal terms of Article
1678 of the Civil Code should be the foremost consideration.
The Court notes that the CA pegged the total value of the improvements made
on the leased premises at P964,000, which was apparently based on the
allegation in respondents complaint that it was their total investment
cost.[28] The CA lumped together all of respondents expenses, which was a
blatant error. A qualification should have been made as to how much was spent
for useful improvements (or those which were suitable to the use for which the

lease was intended) and how much was for ornamental expenses. Respondent
Vittorio Donini testified that he spent P450,000 for necessary repairs,
while P500,000 was spent for adornments.[29] The evidence on record, however,
showed respondents expenses for useful improvements to be as follows:
EXPENSE

AMOUNT

Electrical

P31,893.65

Exh. F, et seq. [30]

Roofing

P14,856.00

Exhibit O[31]

Labor

P19,909.75

Exh. P, et seq.[32]

Ceiling

P65,712.00

Exh. Q, et seq.[33]

Labor

P38,689.20

Exh. R, et seq.[34]

Electrical (phase 2)

P76,539.10

Exh. S, et seq.[35]

Door

P41,371.75

Exh. T, et seq.[36]

Labor

P25,126.00

Exh. U, et seq.[37]

Water

P 8,031.00

Exhs. W & W-1[38]

Gutters

P 35,550.05

Exhs. X & X-1[39]

Outside Wall

P 24,744.00

Exh. X-2[40]

Inside Wall

P 22,186.10

Exh. X-3[41]

Electrical (phase 3)

P 88,698.30

Exhs. X-8 to X-11[42]

Labor

P 19,995.00

Exhibit Y[43]

Total

P513,301.90

Accordingly, the 50% value of the useful improvements to be

reimbursed by petitioner, if he chose to do so, should be based on P513,301.90.
Since petitioner did not exercise his option to retain these useful improvements,
then respondents could have removed the same. This was the legal
consequence of the application of Article 1678 under ordinary circumstances.
The reality on the ground ought to be recognized. For one, as disclosed
by respondents counsel, he no longer knows the exact whereabouts of his
clients, only that they are now in Europe and he has no communication with
them at all.[44] For another, it appears that as soon as respondents vacated the
premises, petitioner immediately reclaimed the property and barred
respondents from entering it. Respondents also alleged, and petitioner did not
deny, that the property subject of this case had already been leased to another
entity since 1991.[45] This is where considerations of equity should come into

play. It is obviously no longer feasible for respondents to remove the

improvements from the property, if they still exist. The only equitable
alternative then, given the circumstances, is to order petitioner to pay
respondents one-half of the value of the useful improvements (50%
of P513,301.90) introduced on the property, or P256,650.95. To be off-set
against this amount are respondents unpaid P17,000 monthly rentals for the
period of December 1990 to April 1991,[46] or P85,000. Petitioner should,
therefore, indemnify respondents the amount of P171,650.95. This is in
accord with the laws intent of preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who now
has to pay one-half of the value of the useful improvements at the end of
the lease because the lessee has already enjoyed the same, whereas the lessor
can enjoy them indefinitely thereafter.[47]
Respondents are not entitled to reimbursement for the ornamental
expenses under the express provision of Article 1678. Moreover, since they
failed to remove these ornaments despite the opportunity to do so when they
vacated the property, then they were deemed to have waived or abandoned
their right of removal.

protect his interest.[52] Petitioner is entitled to it since exemplary damages were

awarded in this case and respondents act in filing Civil Case No. 60769
compelled him to litigate. The amount of P25,000 is in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.[53]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision dated March
31, 2004 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54430 is herebyMODIFIED in that
(1)

petitioner Serafin Cheng is ORDERED to pay respondents,

spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, the amount of P171,650.95
as indemnity for the useful improvements; and

(2)

respondents,
spouses
Vittorio
and
Ma.
Helen
Donini,
are ORDERED to pay petitioner Serafin Cheng the following
sums:
a)

b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages and

The CA also erred when it deleted the awards of moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
Petitioner is entitled to moral damages but not in the amount of P500,000
awarded by the RTC, which the Court finds to be excessive. While trial courts
are given discretion to determine` the amount of moral damages, it should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive.[48] Moral damages are not meant to
enrich a person at the expense of the other but are awarded only to allow the
former to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the other persons culpable action.[49] It
must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to
the wrong committed.[50] The award of P100,000 as moral damages is sufficient
and reasonable under the circumstances.
The award of P100,000 as exemplary damages is likewise excessive. Exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.[51] We think P50,000 is reasonable in this case.

Finally, Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows recovery of attorney's fees
when exemplary damages are awarded or when the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to

P100,000.00 moral damages;

c)

P25,000.00 attorneys fees.

Let copies of this decision be furnished respondents, spouses Vittorio

and Ma. Helen Donini, at their last known address, and their counsel of record.
SO ORDERED.

f. Unfair Competition
1. wpc vs JMC
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

1. G.R. No. 195549

September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and
Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed
this present complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for
permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation
([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office
at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in
1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and
distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts.
[Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near
that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the physical
proximity of [petitioners] office to [respondents] office, and in view of the fact
that some of the [respondents] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner],
[petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondents] products, especially
its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner]
had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products
at a lower price as [respondents] plastic-made automotive parts and to the
same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber
in the manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing,
stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among

others. [Petitioners] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic

materialwas taken from [respondents] idea of using plastic for automotive
parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondents] products all of which
acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms
oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of the
date of [respondents] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioners] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute
this action and thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorneys fees and other
litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except
for the following facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that theres physical proximity
of [petitioners] office to [respondent]s office, and that someof [respondents]
employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner]
had developed familiarity with [respondents] products, especially its plastic
made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair
competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions of
original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the
specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus,
[respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these
automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent]
indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no
exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over these
products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of
these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which
were already openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that
petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately
copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further
opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondents property rights
to be preserved, petitioners acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made
automotive parts such as those of respondents and the selling of the
sameproducts to respondents customers, which it cultivated over the years, will
have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to
plaintiff Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as attorneys fees and One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently

[enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as

those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a
good belonging to another,the copying thereof for production and selling does
not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit
consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondents
employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by
respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these can be done by
simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are
immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil
Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the
instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioners acts are contrary to
good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former
employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the
ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is
hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) actual
damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal
damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was
denied for lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following
issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations
when the parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage
on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be
moral damages and attorneys fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although
no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive
parts, should it be considered in the light of the said copyrights were
considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No.
161295?

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing

its business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the
award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one
has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in
2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy between
the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As for
Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for
1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those
made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive
parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.

In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed
acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part
of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be
awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in order
to recognize and vindicate Jesichris rights. The RTCs award of attorneys fees
and exemplary damages is also maintained.

Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of
the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act
No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not
covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is
immaterial in the present case.

xxxx

The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than

that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which
follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions,

(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not
Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6

the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery

of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment
of a competitors contracts, or any malicious interference with the latters
business.8

ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION and RAFAEL

TINIO, Respondents.

With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed acts amounting tounfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.

PERALTA, J.:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not
competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a
living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition
where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics:
(1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must
involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to

g. Civil personality
1. Alabang Dev Corp vs Alabang Hills
CIVIL PERSONALITY; BIRTH; DEATH
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
1. G.R. No. 187456

June 2, 2014

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

DECISION

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 27, 2009, in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA,
are as follows:
The case traces its roots to the Complaint for Injunction and Damages filed
[with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City] on October 19, 2006 by
[herein petitioner, Alabang Development Corporation] ADC against [herein
respondents, Alabang Hills Village Association, Inc.] AHVAI and Rafael Tinio
(Tinio), President of AHVAI. The Complaint alleged that [petitioner] is the
developer of Alabang Hills Village and still owns certain parcels of land therein
that are yet to be sold, as well as those considered open spaces that have not
yet been donated to [the] local government of Muntinlupa City or the
Homeowner's Association. Sometime in September [2006], ADC learned that
AHVAI started the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a swimming pool on
one of the parcels of land still owned by ADC without the latter's consent and
approval, and that despite demand, AHVAI failed to desist from constructing the
said improvements. ADC thus prayed that an injunction be issued enjoining
defendants from constructing the multi-purpose hall and the swimming pool at
the Alabang Hills Village.
In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, AHVAI denied ADC's asseverations
and claimed that the latter has no legal capacity to sue since its existence as a
registered corporate entity was revoked by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003; that ADC has no cause of action because
by law it is no longer the absolute owner but is merely holding the property in
question in trust for the benefit of AHVAI as beneficial owner thereof; and that
the subject lot is part of the open space required by law to be provided in the
subdivision. As counterclaim, it prayed that an order be issued divesting ADC of
the title of the property and declaring AHVAI as owner thereof; and that ADC be
made liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
Tinio filed his separate Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, practically
reiterating the defenses of AHVAI.2
On January 4, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, rendered
judgment dismissing herein petitioner's complaint on the grounds (1) that the

latter has no personality to file the same; (2) that the subject property "is a
reserved area for the beneficial use of the homeowners, as mandated by law;"
and (3) that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the RTC,
has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and respondents.3
Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision. Herein
respondent AHVAI, on the other hand, moved that it be allowed to prosecute its
compulsory counterclaim praying, for this purpose, that the RTC decision be
amended accordingly.
In its Order dated February 20, 2007, the RTC approved petitioner's notice of
appeal but dismissed respondent AHVAIs counterclaim on the ground that it is
dependent on petitioner's complaint. Respondent AHVAI then filed an appeal
with the CA.
In its assailed Decision dated March 27, 2009, the CA dismissed both appeals of
petitioner and respondent, and affirmed the decision of the RTC. With respect to
petitioner, the CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint
as the same was filed when petitioner was already defunct and, as such, it no
longer had capacity to file the said complaint. As regards, respondent AHVAIs
counterclaim, the CA held that "where there is no claim against the
[respondent], because [petitioner] is already in existent and has no capacity to
sue, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the
complaint is dismissed at the instance of the [respondent]."
Thus, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE
CASE OF "COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS" IN RESOLVING
PETITIONER'S LACK OF CAPACITY
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF
CAPACITY OFTHE PETITIONER IN FILING THE CASE CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE THAT PETITIONER
IS MANDATED TO CEDE PROPERTIES TO RESPONDENT AHVAI4
Anent the first assigned error, the Court does not agree that the CA erred in
relying on the case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 5 The CA cited
the case for the purpose of restating and distinguishing the jurisprudential
definition of the terms "lack of capacity to sue" and "lack of personality to sue;"
and of applying these definitions to the present case. Thus, the fact that, unlike
in the instant case, the corporations involved in the Columbia case were foreign
corporations is of no moment. The definition of the term "lack of capacity to
sue" enunciated in the said case still applies to the case at bar. Indeed, as held

by this Court and as correctly cited by the CA in the case of Columbia: "[l]ack of
legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil
rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or
does not have the character or representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to
sue' refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party. ..."6 In the instant case, petitioner lacks
capacity to sue because it no longer possesses juridical personality by reason of
its dissolution and lapse of the three-year grace period provided under Section
122 of the Corporation Code, as will be discussed below.
With respect to the second assigned error, Section 122 of the Corporation Code
provides as follows:
SEC. 122. Corporate liquidation. Every corporation whose charter expires by its
own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate
existence for other purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall
nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time
when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to
dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the
purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, said corporation is authorized and
empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of
stockholders, members, creditors, and other persons in interest. From and after
any such conveyance by the corporation of its property in trust for the benefit of
its stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all interest which
the corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest vests in the
trustees, and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members, creditors or
other persons in interest.
Upon winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to any creditor
or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot be found shall be
escheated to the city or municipality where such assets are located.
Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code, no
corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful
dissolution and after payment of all its debts and liabilities.
This Court has held that:
It is to be noted that the time during which the corporation, through its own
officers, may conduct the liquidation of its assets and sue and be sued as a
corporation is limited to three years from the time the period of dissolution

commences; but there is no time limit within which the trustees must complete
a liquidation placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp. Law, Sec. 78 now
Sec. 122]) that the conveyance to the trustees must be made within the threeyear period. It may be found impossible to complete the work of liquidation
within the three-year period or to reduce disputed claims to judgment. The
authorities are to the effect that suits by or against a corporation abate when it
ceased to be an entity capable of suing or being sued (7 R.C.L., Corps., par.
750); but trustees to whom the corporate assets have been conveyed pursuant
to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may sue and be sued as such in all
matters connected with the liquidation...7
In the absence of trustees, this Court ruled, thus:
Still in the absence of a board of directors or trustees, those having any
pecuniary interest in the assets, including not only the shareholders but likewise
the creditors of the corporation, acting for and in its behalf, might make proper
representations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has
primary and sufficiently broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for working
out a final settlement of the corporate concerns.8
In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioner's corporate registration
was revoked on May 26, 2003.1wphi1Based on the above-quoted provision of
law, it had three years, or until May 26, 2006, to prosecute or defend any suit
by or against it. The subject complaint, however, was filed only on October 19,
2006, more than three years after such revocation. It is likewise not disputed
that the subject complaint was filed by petitioner corporation and not by its
directors or trustees. In fact, it is even averred, albeit wrongly, in the first
paragraph of the Complaint9that "[p]laintiff is a duly organized and existing
corporation under the laws of the Philippines, with capacity to sue and be sued.
x x x"10
Petitioner, nonetheless, insists that a corporation may still sue, even after it has
been dissolved and the three-year liquidation period provided under Section 122
of the Corporation Code has passed. Petitioner cites the cases of Gelano v.
Court of Appeals,11 Knecht v. United Cigarette Corporation,12 and Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 as authority to support its
position. The Court, however, agrees with the CA that in the abovecited cases,
the corporations involved filed their respective complaints while they were still
in existence. In other words, they already had pending actions at the time that
their corporate existence was terminated.
The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is that the
trustee of a corporation may continue to prosecute a case commenced by the
corporation within three years from its dissolution until rendition of the final
judgment, even if such judgment is rendered beyond the three-year period
allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in

the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to initiate a suit after
the lapse of the said three-year period. On the contrary, the factual
circumstances in the abovecited cases would show that the corporations
involved therein did not initiate any complaint after the lapse of the three-year
period. In fact, as stated above, the actions were already pending at the time
that they lost their corporate existence.
In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate
existence was terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by
Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus, it is clear that at the time of the
filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a
corporation. To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it
until final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole
purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of
Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the instant case is
petitioner's capacity to sue as a corporation and it has already been settled that
petitioner indeed lacks such capacity. Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to
depart from the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary to delve on the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864, sustaining the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-138, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

2. Continental Steel vs Montano

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009 ]
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
VS. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO
AND NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATIONSOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2]
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming
the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave and
other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the
death
of
his
unborn
child.
The

antecedent

facts

of

the

case

are

as

follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing

Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
x

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE--The Company agrees to grant a bereavement

leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee's legitimate
dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the
following:
2.1

Within

2.2

Metro

Manila

Provincial/Outside

up
Metro

to

Marilao,

Bulacan

Manila

11

days
days

xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
x

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE--The Company shall grant death

and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
x

4.3 DEPENDENTS--Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in

case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and
children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate
parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented

(e.g.

death

certificate).[4]

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife,
Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was
in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of
the
death
and
accident
insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano's claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance
machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the
parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice
to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). [9]
In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental
Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano
was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article
X,
Section
2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue. [11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the
dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, [12]
Replies,[13]
and
Rejoinders[14]
to
Atty.
Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other
death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X,
Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the
CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel
Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister
companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to
receive
death
benefits
under
similar
provisions
of
their
CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an
employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which
had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity
leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between
his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugan's child was only 24 weeks in the womb and
died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano's child who was already 37-38 weeks
in
the
womb
and
only
died
during
labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees'
unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed
the
existing
CBA
with
the
Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all
doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety
of
and
decent
living
for
the
laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the
CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of
which existed in Hortillano's case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41
and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could
die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel
reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that
never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not
be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire
the
right
to
be
supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA,
the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA - the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of
its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the
grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for
the
loss
of
an
unborn
child
constituted
"company
practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement
leave
with
pay
and
death
benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave
with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the

parties' CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is
"death"; (2) such death must be of employee's "dependent"; and (3) such
dependent
must
be
"legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident
insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the
parties' CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is
"death"; (b) such death must be of employee's "dependent"; (c) such
dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.[18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee's
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the
labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING
[herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of
P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
All

other

claims

are

DISMISSED

for

lack

of

merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein
dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CAG.R.
SP
No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillano's
claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no
death of an employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not

that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel
pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death
was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of
a child could only be determined upon said child's birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano's
entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were
lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
Montao's Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted
death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in which the
term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is
irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing
with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus
is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such
event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death"
as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and
grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate
relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting
bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental
Steel's] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In
this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the
employee and the latter's immediate family, extend to them solace and support,
rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child.
[Continental Steel's] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration[23]
of
Continental
Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA

is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should
be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never
acquired
a
juridical
personality.
We

are

not

persuaded.

As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article
X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent,
i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate
relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and
(4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that
the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument
for denying Hortillano's claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits
rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and
"dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear
and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that
neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for
the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a
child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished
by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42
of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of
the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may
be
lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a
question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the
child's parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the

instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter's
death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those
who
have
acquired
juridical
personality
could
die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25]
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered,
qualifies
as
death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else." Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillano's child could not have reached 38-39 weeks
of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano's wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes
the
unborn
fetus
in
the
mother's
womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a
legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as
follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid

marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence,
making
said
child
legitimate
upon
her
conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation
of
the
death
certificate
of
his
unborn
child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillano's claims for the same should have been
granted
by
Continental
Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to
an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents' grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn
child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave
and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that
in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and
CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the
assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and
the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor."
While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor
Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is
the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What
petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are,
likewise,
sworn
to
uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451
(1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of
social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)],
we
declared:

to provide for an open space in the subdivision for recreational and community
activities. In its assailed decision, the CA remanded the case to the HLURB for
determination of a definitive land area for open space.[4] Petitioner assails also
the Court of Appeals Resolution[5] dated July 31, 2001, denying her motion for
reconsideration.
The

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant
to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February
2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the
death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing
Corporation.
SO
Carpio,

ORDERED.
(Chairperson),

Velasco,

Jr.,

Nachura,

and

Peralta,

JJ.,

concur.

facts

of

this

case

are

as

follows:

Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos
who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares
located at General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio
had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J.
Santos Subdivision (for brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then Land Registration
Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority
(NHA) issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the
time of Cecilios death in 1988, there were already several residents and
homeowners
in
Santos
Subdivision.
Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for
recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of
P.D. No. 957,[6] as amended by P.D. No. 1216.[7] Petitioner, however, rejected
the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the
NHA.
On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to
Romulo Q. Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB in
Quezon
City.[8]

3. Duenas vs Santos
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 149417, June 04, 2004 ]
GLORIA SANTOS DUEAS, PETITIONER, VS. SANTOS SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 29, 2000, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601, setting aside the Decision[2] of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-9802270032 which earlier affirmed the Decision[3] of the HLURB-NCR Regional Field
Office in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821. Said Regional Field Office
dismissed the petition of herein respondent Santos Subdivision Homeowners
Association (SSHA) seeking to require herein petitioner, Gloria Santos Dueas,

In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field
Office, HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision. [9]
SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration,[10] docketed as HLURB
Case No. REM-070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No.
957 should apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the
subdivision plans were approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos Dueas should
be bound by the verbal promise made by her late father during his lifetime that
an open space would be provided for in Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots
of
which
were
at
that
time
already
for
sale.
Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that
she was not a party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation
nor involvement in the development of Santos Subdivision and the sale of the
subdivisions lots. As affirmative defenses, she raised the following: (a) It was
her late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned and developed the subdivision, and
she was neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this suit was filed by an

unauthorized entity against a non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos

Subdivision are not juridical entities, authorized by law to institute or defend
against actions; (c) that P.D. No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make
it applicable to Santos Subdivision as the law does not expressly provide for its
retroactive applicability; and (d) that the present petition is barred by laches.
On January 14, 1998, HLURB-NCR disposed of HLURB Case No. REM-0702979821
in
this
wise:
In

view

of

It

the

foregoing,
is

the

complaint
So

is

hereby

dismissed.
Ordered.[11]

In dismissing the case, the HLURB-NCR office ruled that while SSHA failed to
present evidence showing that it is an association duly organized under
Philippine law with capacity to sue, nonetheless, the suit could still prosper if
viewed as a suit filed by all its members who signed and verified the petition.
However, the petition failed to show any cause of action against herein
petitioner as (1) there is no evidence showing Santos-Dueas as the
owner/developer or successor-in-interest of Cecilio Santos, who was the
owner/developer and sole proprietor of Santos Subdivision; (2) the LRCapproved subdivision plan was bereft of any proviso indicating or identifying an
open space, as required by P.D. No. 957, as amended, hence there was no legal
basis to compel either Cecilio or his daughter Santos-Dueas, as his purported
successor, to provide said space; and (3) the alleged verbal promise of the late
Cecilio Santos was inadmissible as evidence under the dead mans statute. [12]
SSHA then appealed the NCR offices ruling to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. The latter body, however, affirmed the action taken by the
HLURB-NCR office, concluding thus:

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51601, was decided by the appellate court in this
manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED--and the decision, dated January 20,
1999, of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case
No. REM-A-980227-0032 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this
case is ordered REMANDED to the HLURB for the determination of the definitive
land area that shall be used for open space in accordance with law and the rules
and standards prescribed by the HLURB. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In finding for SSHA, the appellate court relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec.
Drilon,[16] which held that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its
retroactive application, nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent
that it was to be given retroactive effect so as to extend its coverage even to
those contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976. The Court of Appeals
also held that the action was neither barred by prescription nor laches as the
obligation of a subdivision developer to provide an open space is not predicated
upon an oral contract, but mandated by law, hence, an action may be brought
within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues under Article
1144[17] of the Civil Code. Moreover, the equitable principle of laches will not
apply when the claim was filed within the reglementary period.
Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on
July
31,
2001.
Hence, this petition grounded on the following assignment of errors:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW BY

TAKING COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENTS PETITION (WHICH ASSAILS
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB)
WHEN JURISDICTION THEREON IS WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, AS CLEARLY MANDATED BY SEC. 2, RULE XVIII OF THE
1996 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD.

II.

IT WAS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HAVE

ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION BELOW WHEN
RESPONDENTS CLEARLY FAILED TO EXHAUST THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM UNDER THE LAW.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, A
NON-REGISTERED ORGANIZATION, LACKED THE LEGAL PERSONALITY
TO SUE.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED

and the decision of the Office below is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel the petitioner to
provide an open space within Santos Subdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision
plans approved on July 8, 1966, did not provide for said space and there was no
law requiring the same at that time. It further ruled that P.D. No. 957 could not
be given retroactive effect in the absence of an express provision in the law.
Finally, it found the action time-barred since it was filed nine (9) years after the
death of Cecilio. The Board noted that SSHA sought to enforce an alleged oral
promise of Cecilio, which should have been done within the six-year prescriptive
period
provided
for
under
Article
1145[14]
of
the
Civil
Code.
Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition,

HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER; NEITHER WAS

SANTOS SUBDIVISION, A NON-ENTITY, POSSESSED WITH CAPACITY
TO BE SUED NOR IS PETITIONER GLORIA SANTOS-DUEAS A PROPER
PARTY TO THE CASE, THE LATTER NOT BEING THE OWNER OR
DEVELOPER OF SANTOS SUBDIVISION.
V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS

FINDINGS WITH THAT OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD AND BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB WHEN THEIR DECISION IS BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CAN
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM.

VI.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DEVIATED FROM THE EXISTING LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT P.D. 957 HAS RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION -- WHEN THE LAW ITSELF DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ITS
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE THEREON
CLEARLY PRONOUNCED THAT IT HAS NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.
TO PROVIDE RETROACTIVITY TO P.D. 957 WOULD CAUSE IMPAIRMENT
OF VESTED RIGHTS.

VII.

WHILE AS A GENERAL RULE, THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS IS BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT, THE SAME IS NOT
TRUE WHEN THE FORMERS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON SPECULATION,
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES, THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN OR ABSURD, THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
JUDGMENT IS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS CONTRARY TO
THOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED, AND IT WENT
BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND THE SAME IS CONTRARY TO
THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH PARTIES.[18]

To our mind, the foregoing may be reduced into the following issues: (1) the
applicability of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2)
the legal capacity of respondent to sue the petitioner herein; and (3) the
retroactivity of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the filing of CA-G.R. SP No.
51601 was premature as SSHA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
Petitioner submits that since Section 1,[19] Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule of Civil
Procedure does not mention the HLURB, the respondent should have appealed
the decision of the HLURB Board in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 to the
Office of the President prior to seeking judicial relief. In other words, it is the
decision of the Office of the President,[20] and not that of the HLURB Board,
which
the
Court
of
Appeals
may
review.
We find petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case,
inapplicable. While this Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek
intervention of the courts, it is a pre condition that he avail himself of all

administrative processes afforded him,[21] nonetheless, said rule is not without

exceptions.[22] The doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of each
case.[23]
In the instant case, the questions posed are purely legal, namely: (1) whether
the respondent had any right to demand an open space and the petitioner had
any legal obligation to provide said open space within Santos Subdivision under
P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, and (2) whether the action had
already prescribed under Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals found that SSHA had sought relief from the Office of the President, but
the latter forwarded the case to the HLURB. In view of the foregoing, we find
that in this particular case, there was no need for SSHA to exhaust all
administrative
remedies
before
seeking
judicial
relief.
On the second issue, the petitioner claims that respondent SSHA failed to
present any evidence showing that it is a legally organized juridical entity,
authorized by law to sue or be sued in its own name. Thus, pursuant to Section
1, Rule 3[24] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it has no legal capacity to file
this
suit
before
the
HLURB
and
the
Court
of
Appeals.
SSHA counters that it has the capacity to sue as an association, since it is a
member of the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., which is
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the alternative, the
individual members of SSHA who signed both the resolution and the complaint
in
this
case
may,
as
natural
persons,
pursue
the
action.
There is merit in petitioners contention. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. Article 44 [25] of the Civil Code enumerates the
various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is
considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and
distinct from that of its members.[26] The records of the present case are bare of
any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine
law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the
complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHAs lack of
capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the
complaint as a suit by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The
members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal
authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal
capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of
Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the
personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation
are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical
personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-0702979821 nor in this case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized
to represent SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or

the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the

legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party,
must be averred.[27] Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity,
endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of
any
legal
capacity,
whatsoever,
to
institute
any
action.
Anent the third issue, the petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for
holding that P.D. No. 957 has retroactive application. She points out that there
is no retroactivity provision in the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied
retroactively pursuant to Article 4[28] of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957
and imposed the open space requirement in subdivisions. Petitioner stresses
that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14, 1977 or more than ten (10)
years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio Santos.
Although it may seem that this particular issue, given our ruling on the first
issue regarding the lack of capacity of SSHA to bring any action in its name, is
now moot and academic, we are constrained to still address it.

At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an
amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus on
the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se.
We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause
or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule
that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given
retrospective effect unless explicitly stated.[31] Hence, there is no legal basis to
hold
that
P.D.
No.
1216
should
apply
retroactively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the HLURB dated January 20, 1999 sustaining that of its
Regional Office is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO

ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

This petition was brought to us not by respondent SSHA but by Gloria Santos
Dueas who assails the appellate courts finding that our ruling in Eugenio v.
Exec. Sec. Drilon[29] allows P.D. No. 957, as amended, to apply retroactively.
We

find

merit

in

petitioners

contention.

Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant
case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase
agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was nonpayment of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. We held
therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive
application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens
from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into
prior to its enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-payment of amortizations
was justified under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the
subdivision
owner
to
develop
the
subdivision
project.
Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case,
nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a
subsequent case[30] that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied
retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive
application. Thus:
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision
for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such
provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a
situation that occurred years before their promulgation

h. Domicile
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision

rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos commonlaw wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia
Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her
children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. 3 In her
Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove
her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her
father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement of
decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that
there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of
Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled
that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was
in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court
of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No.
88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of
Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF
LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the

settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the

exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase
5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of
his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the
entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where
they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates
can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the
contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995.
This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20
That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final
days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial

court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred
in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it
was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights.
Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void
marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to
the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place
and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party
to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we
now proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is
void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less
than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by
the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac.
The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said

marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than
50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore,
void ab initio.27

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise
has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by

the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to
Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of
the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her
right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after
the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution
of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered
as an interested party within the purview of the law.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in

the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees.28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
Associate Justice

PORTUGAL

PEREZ

2. Jalosjos vs Comelec
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013 ]
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG AND RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner) comes before this Court on a Petition for
Review under Rule 64 with an extremely urgent application for the issuance of a
status quo order and for the conduct of a special raffle,[1] assailing the 04 June
2010[2] and 19 August 2010[3] Resolutions in SPA No. 09-161 (DC) of the

Commission on Elections (respondent COMELEC). These Resolutions granted

the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed
by Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private respondents) against
petitioner. At the heart of this controversy is whether petitioner complied with
the
one-year
residency
requirement
for
local
elective
officials.
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She
indicated therein her place of birth and residence as Barangay Tugas,
Municipality
of
Baliangao,
Misamis
Occidental
(Brgy.
Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued
that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she
was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her
previous domicile, Dapitan City.[4] To support this claim, they presented the
following as evidence:
1. Certification from the Assessors Office of Baliangao that there was no
tax declaration covering any real property in the name of petitioner
located at any place in the municipality;[5]
2. Certification from the Civil Registrar of Baliangao that petitioner had no
record of birth in the civil registry of the municipality;[6]
3. Joint Affidavit of three residents of Baliangao incumbent Barangay
Chairperson Gregorio P. Gayola (Gayola) and incumbent 3 rd Kagawad
Felicisimo T. Pastrano (Pastrano), both officials of Barangay Tugas,
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, and former police officer Adolfo L.
Alcoran (Alcoran);[7]
4. Affidavit of Patricio D. Andilab (Andilab), official of Purok 5, Brgy. Tugas,
Baliangao.[8]
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in
the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of
land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes
Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her house.
Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in her place of birth was
committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in a CoC, an error in the declaration
of the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law.[9]
Petitioner presented the following evidence to sustain her claims:
1. Certificate of Live Birth;[10]
2. Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale executed by the heirs of
Agapito Yap, Jr. (Yap, Jr.) pertaining to two parcels of land covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 12410 and P-33289 in favor of

petitioner;[11]
3. TCT Nos. 12410 and P-33289 in the name of Yap, Jr.;[12]
4. Two Declarations of Real Property in the name of Yap, Jr.;[13]
5. Two sketch plans of lots covered by TCT Nos. 12410 and P-33289
prepared by the Office of the Provincial Assessor for Yap, Jr.;[14]
6. Photographs of the alleged residence of petitioner in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental;
7. Sketches of structures petitioner constructed
developed in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental;[15]

in

the

resort

she

8. Petitioners Application for Voters Registration and Voters Certification

issued by the Office of the Election Officer of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental;[16]
9. Petitioners CoC;[17]
10. Joint Affidavit of Rodolio R. Yap III (Yap III), Roger V. Villanueva
(Villanueva), Romeo A. Duhaylungsod, Jr. (Duhaylungsod) and Dennis
M. Estrellada (Estrellada), who undertook the construction and
development of petitioners residential house and resort;[18]
11. Affidavit of incumbent Barangay Chairperson Marichu Michel Acas-Yap
(Acas-Yap) of Barangay Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental
(Brgy. Punta Miray);[19]
12. Affidavit of Nellie E. Jumawan (Jumawan), the president of the Center
for Agriculture and Rural Development, Inc.;[20]
13. Affidavit of Dolores B. Medija (Medija), the president of Women for
Children Association;[21]
14. Joint Affidavit of Emily J. Bagundol (Bagundol) and Nelia D. Colaljo
(Colaljo), presidents of the Paglaum Multi-purpose Cooperative;[22]
15. Joint Affidavit of Charles C. Tenorio (Tenorio) and Reynold C. Analasan
(Analasan), presidents of Tamban Multi-Purpose Cooperative and Balas
Diut Brotherhood Association, respectively;[23]
16. Affidavit of Pedro Rio G. Bation (Bation), president of the Del Pilar Lawn
Tennis Club of Baliangao;[24]
17. Affidavit of Jessie P. Maghilum (Maghilum), a member of the Phi Omega
Sigma Fraternity/Sorority of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental Chapter; [25]
and
18. Affidavit of Ophelia P. Javier (Javier), petitioners personal secretary.[26]

The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy

remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered
the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected
municipal
mayor.[27]
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is DISQUALIFIED from running
for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for
this coming May 10, 2010 elections.[28]
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the
Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or cancelling her CoC.
COMELEC Ruling
Respondent COMELEC ruled in its 04 June 2010 Resolution that
misrepresentation as to ones place of birth is not a ground for the cancellation
of a CoC. Petitioner merely committed an oversight when she declared that she
was born in Baliangao when she was actually born in San Juan. However, the
COMELEC ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner never acquired
a new domicile in Baliangao, because she failed to prove her bodily presence at
that place, her intention to remain there, and her intention never to return to
her domicile of origin. Hence, respondent COMELEC disqualified her from
running for the position of mayor of Baliangao[29] pursuant to Section 78 in
relation
to
Section
74
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.[30]
In response to this adverse ruling, petitioner elevated her case through a Motion
for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that the evidence she
presented proved that she had established her domicile in the said
municipality.[31]
Nonetheless, in its 19 August 2010 Resolution, respondent COMELEC affirmed
the earlier ruling of the Second Division. In upholding the latters ruling,
COMELEC En Banc said that (1) the Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous
Sale was not sufficient proof that petitioner had purchased two parcels of land,
because she was never a party to the agreement, and it was quite unusual that
she never acquired a deed of sale or title to protect her interests; (2) the
sketch plans were not signed by the corporate engineer who purportedly
prepared them, nor was there an affidavit from the engineer to authenticate the
plans; (3) the application of petitioner for voter registration only proved that
she had met the minimum six-month residency requirement and nothing more;

and (4) the affiants of the Sworn Statements were all partial, because they
either worked for her or were members of organizations that received financial
assistance
from
her.[32]
Hence, the instant Petition arguing that respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that
petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental and in thus
justifying the cancellation of her CoC. She also asserts that the 04 June 2010
and 19 August 2010 COMELEC Resolutions are null and void, being violative of
her right to due process, because there was no promulgation or prior notice as
required by Sec. 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 or by the Rules on
Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the 10 May 2010 Automated
National
and
Local
Elections.
In a Resolution dated 07 September 2010, we issued a Status Quo Ante Order,
which required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the
issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.[33] Thereafter, the parties filed
their respective pleadings.
Issues
The issues before us can be summarized as follows:
I.

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to

promulgate its 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions in
accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and

II.

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that

petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.

Our Ruling
COMELECs
failure
the
promulgation
August
2010
them.

to
serve
advance
notice
of
of
the
04
June
2010
and
19
Resolutions
does
not
invalidate

Petitioner assails the validity of the 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010
Resolutions, because she was not served an advance notice that these
Resolutions were going to be promulgated. This failure was allegedly a violation
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Hence, she argues that her right to due
process was violated. In response, respondent COMELEC asserts that it
suspended COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 through an En Banc Order dated 04
May 2010.[34] Furthermore, the suspension was in accordance with its power to

promulgate its own rules as provided by the Constitution. Nevertheless,

petitioner was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support
of
her
defense.
We

agree

with

respondent

promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the

trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did not
vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor [sic] of the
promulgation
of
said
decision.

COMELEC.

As stated by respondent COMELEC, Resolution No. 8696 was suspended through

an Order dated 04 May 2010. However, assuming that this Resolution was still
in effect, the failure to serve notice of the promulgation under Section 6 thereof
did not make the 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 COMELEC Resolutions
invalid. The Court held thus in Sabili v. COMELEC:[35]
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,[49] petitioner claimed that there was no
valid promulgation of a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof
was merely furnished the parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set
date for the promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of
the
COMELECs
own
Rules
of
Procedure,
as
follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall
be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the
parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for
reconsideration
shall
be
entertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the additional rule
requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not
part of the process of promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not
prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a
procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is
published, officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the
clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria
v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is
the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication
(Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision with
the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En
Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC
rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of
promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioners contention that there
was no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court did not deny
that it had officially made the decision public. From the recital of facts of both
parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and
petitioners [sic] himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was
not the promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial court to
serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its decision as required
by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the

Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,[50] citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,[51] we

further held in the same case that failure to receive advance notice of the
promulgation of a decision is not sufficient to set aside the COMELECs
judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard
before
judgment
is
rendered,
viz:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the
promulgation of the decision in the election protest cases, in Our view,
does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient enough to
compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the
Comelec. Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to
them [sic] due process to the deviation by the Comelec from its own
made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in
the
case
were
afforded
an
opportunity
to
be
heard.
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies
attendant to the holding of the countrys first automated national elections had
necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to
promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the
Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no
prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELECs Order did not affect the
right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal.
In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to
make its own rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order
suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the
second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground
of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of the
promulgation thereto. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, even if COMELEC failed to give advance notice of the promulgation of the
04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions, its failure to do so did not
invalidate
them.
Petitioner
one-year
local

failed
to
residency
elective

comply
with
requirement

the
for
officials.

Petitioners uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is

whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she

had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the

May
2010
elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is
synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Guray[36] held as follows:
The term residence as so used, is synonymous with domicile which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.[37]
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to
remain there.
Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.[38]
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held in
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC[39] and subsequently in Dumpit-Michelena v.
Boado:[40]
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence
of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time.[41]
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof,
the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also
be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the
same
standard
of
evidence.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and
positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year
prior
to
the
10
May
2010
elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva,
Duhaylungsod, Estrellada, Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio,
Analasan,
Bation,
Maghilum
and
Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008. However, they declared in the
same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was being
constructed
in
Brgy.
Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and Estrellada
asserted that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing. By their
assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May 2010 elections,

petitioner

had

not

yet

moved

into

her

house

at

Brgy.

Tugas.

Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited
Baliangao occasionally when they stated that at times when she (petitioner)
was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her
residential
house
was
being
constructed.[42]
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that
petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most,
the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and
developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed
in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the
resort
and
the
house.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez
v. COMELEC[43] has established that the ownership of a house or some other
property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case
as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the locality and her
intent to stay there at least a year before the elections, to wit:
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect,
imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which
property requirement would be unconstitutional.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter
only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a
voter.[44] This minimum requirement is different from that for acquiring a new
domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office.
Accordingly, in the CoC of petitioner, her statement of her eligibility to run for
office constitutes a material misrepresentation that warrants its cancellation. [45]
She contends that respondent COMELEC never made a finding that she had
committed material misrepresentation. Her contention, however, is belied by its
factual determination in its 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions that
she
had
failed
to
meet
the
one-year
residency
requirement.
During the pendency of the case, we deemed it proper to issue an Order dated
07 September 2010 directing the parties to observe the status quo before the
issuance of these COMELEC Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from the
mayoralty race in Baliangao. We issued the Order, considering that petitioner,
having garnered the highest number of votes in the 10 May 2010 elections, had
assumed office as municipal mayor. However, with this final determination of
her ineligibility to run for office, there is now a permanent vacancy in the office
of the mayor of Baliangao. Hence, the vice-mayor of Baliangao shall become its
mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Status Quo

Ante Order issued by this Court on 07 September 2010 is hereby LIFTED.
SO

ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion,
J.,
on
official
leave.

support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution
issued
by
the
RTC
in
the
said
case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of
both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay,
American.

3. Bayot vs CA
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 155635, November 07, 2008 ]
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 163979]
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca
Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of
Appeals
(CA)
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
68187.
[1]

In the first, a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635,Rebeccaassails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of
the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, [3] granting a
writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal
Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979,
assails the March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No.
01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie
Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First
Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of
the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over
a year later, the same court would issue CivilDecree No. 406/97,[9] settling
the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement [10] they executed on
December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502
Acacia
Avenue,
Alabang,
Muntinlupa."[11]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil
Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition [12] dated
January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and
secured
approval[14]
of
the
motion
to
withdraw
the
petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment[15] stating
under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente
have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage [16] on the
ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No.
01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal
Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with

application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that
Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix
in
the
amount
of
PhP
220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss [17] on, inter alia, the grounds
of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her
application
for
support
pendente
lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore,
there
is
no
valid
divorce
to
speak
of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other.
Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling
of
the
RTC
on
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

the

Motion

to

Dismiss

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicente's motion to

dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support
pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent
is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support
Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a
month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the
instant
Petition.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a
matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support
pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8,
2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar,
let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the
respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August
8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in
the
amount
of
P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April
30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary
injunctive writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this
issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R.
No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25,
2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed
CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for
failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the
basis
of
the
following
premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or
petition states a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the
essential elements of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action
against
Vicente
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on
February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not
shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not
indicate
the
nationality
of
her
father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to
that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and
eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her
marriage
(Civil
Case
No.
96-378)
on
March
14,
1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino
father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured
her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning
the
validity
of
the
divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but
this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. [29]
Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed
under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds
for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that
the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT

OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND

ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO
THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO
PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT
AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE
ABUSE.[30]
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.[31]Second, the reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute
divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction.[32]
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the
appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in
the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the
judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling

Issued for identification purposes only.

The petition is bereft of merit.

NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be
one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following
are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was
born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her
marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix;
and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention
may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment [34] in which she stated being
an
American
citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau)
of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its
face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that
such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To

Whom

It

May

Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph

and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this
Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth:
Guam, USA
Date of Birth:
March 5, 1953
Sex:
female
Civil
Status:
married
Color
of
Hair:
brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article
IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL
95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995,
and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 st
Indorsement
dated
June
8,
2000.

(SGD)
EDGAR
ASSO. COMMISSIONER

L.

MENDOZA

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

at

Manila

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez
issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement
of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date
of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly
issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on
October
10,
1995
per
OR
No.
5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been
issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued
the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for
this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance
of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate
in
question
must
be
spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino
citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued
by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the
DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission
and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically
furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition
within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive

Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the

date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall
prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and
Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate
No.
RC
9778.

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport
only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero
issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too
much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to
us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was
not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply
that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau
Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall
be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a
few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to
dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said
petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's
opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case
of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

When
Divorce
Was
Granted
Rebecca,
She
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

Was

not

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But
from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that
status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No.
96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of
her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows
that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on
March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22,
1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no
mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents
appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca
Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If
indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October
11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended
to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her
case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second,
she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the
text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of
temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia
Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO,
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43
years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR.
ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney
given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all
the acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96
was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No.
406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca
was
valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as
a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. [39] Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union,[40] the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on
the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in
Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the
title
to
the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect
to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,
consequently,
bind
both
Rebecca
and
Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the
pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
xleaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance,
be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.[44]
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art.

26.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability
of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact
of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed
citizenship
during
the
valid
divorce
proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property
and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No.
168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati,
Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to
Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the
divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97
dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines
shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that
the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision
of
said
agreement."[47]
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court
from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca
lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications
v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an

obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.[49]
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of
a
marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. [50] With the valid
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly
show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born
on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or
four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity.
She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate
civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of
Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca.
The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that
support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente
lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability
of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal
anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby
DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R.
No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187
are
hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
petitioner.
SO

ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Brion, JJ., concur.

4. Limbona vs Comelec

of

which

provides:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the

foregoing recommendations of the Law Department, as concurred in by
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as follows:
1. To GIVE due course to the Affidavits of Withdrawal of Certificates of
Candidacy
of
the
following
candidates:

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008 ]

Norlaine

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, RESPONDENTS.

On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to

comply with the residency requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No.
07-188. Subsequently, or on April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to
disqualify Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency
requirement.
The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-611.[3]
On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy.[4] Thereafter, or on May 2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss[5] the petition for
disqualification in SPA No. 07-611 on the ground that the petition had become
moot in view of the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy.
The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainie's certificate of
candidacy in Resolution No. 7949[6] dated May 13, 2007, the dispositive portion

Limbona

Mayor

Pantar,

x
Lanao

del

Norte

2. To direct the Election Officers concerned to DELETE the aforementioned

names of candidates from the Certified List of Candidates.

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:

Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G.

Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized
National and Local Elections. Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of
candidacy with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago, on January 22, 2007 and
March 29, 2007, respectively; while Malik filed his certificate of candidacy with
the
Office
of
the
Election
Officer
on
March
26,
2007.

M.

xxxx

DECISION

This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeks to reverse and nullify the
September 4, 2007 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in
SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of the municipality
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, as well as the January 9, 2008 Resolution [2] denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration.

Let

the

Law

Department

implement

this

resolution

with

dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May 24, 2007 a Resolution[7]
in SPA No. 07-188 granting the petition filed by Malik and disqualifying
Mohammad from running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for
failing to satisfy the one year residency requirement and for not being a
registered voter of the said place, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.
Respondent Mohammad "Exchan" G. Limbona is hereby disqualified.
Accordingly, his name is ordered deleted from the official list of candidates for
the position of mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and executory on June 2, 2007. [8]
Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute
candidate for Mohammad which was given due course by the Comelec en banc
in its Resolution No. 8255[9] dated July 23, 2007, the dispositive portion of
which states:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the
foregoing recommendations of the Law Department, as follows:
1. To GIVE due course to the Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance of Norlainie "Lai-Exchan" Mitmug
Limbona as substitute candidate for Mohammad "Exchan" G.
Limbona for Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and

2. To direct the Election Officer of Pantar, Lanao del Norte to DELETE the
name of Mohammad "Exchan" G. Limbona from the Certified List of
Candidates for Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del Norte and to INCLUDE therein
the name of Norlainie "Lai-Exchan" Mitmug Limbona.

evidence

that

would

corroborate

such

statement.

dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent's intention to stay
in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has
chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA
No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter
in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.[11]

Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie docketed
as
SPA
No.
07-621.

On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in SPA No. 07-611 denied Norlainie's
motion
for
reconsideration.

After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly
took
her
oath
and
assumed
office.

Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in proceeding to resolve the petition in SPA No. 07-611 despite the
approval
of
petitioner's
withdrawal
of
certificate
of
candidacy. [12]

Let

the

Law

Department

implement

this

resolution

with

However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07611 disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency
requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her
certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place other than the Office of
the
Election
Officer.
Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition in SPA No. 07-611
moot and/or for reconsideration, arguing that the Comelec en banc had
approved the withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy and had given due
course to her new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for
Mohammad.
Malik
opposed
the
omnibus
motion.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-621, promulgated on
November 23, 2007 a Resolution[10] disqualifying Norlainie from running as
mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. It held thus:
As

regards

the

residency

requirement,

We

rule

for

petitioner.

As borne out from the record, respondent's domicile of origin was in Maguing,
Lanao del Norte, which is her place of birth. When she got married, she became
a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in Barangay Rapasun where her husband
served as Barangay Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by
operation of law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case of
Larrazabal v. Comelec (G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).
What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she has changed her
aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
x x x
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely
of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her
domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent
"has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent

On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
effective immediately enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing
the Comelec Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for mayor in
Pantar,
Lanao
del
Norte.[13]
The

petition

lacks

merit.

The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the

certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced
thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn. [14]
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as
amended) provides:
Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the
period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy
may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the
office concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall be
eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files
his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificate of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible
and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices. The filing
or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever
civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have
incurred. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007, such
act produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the same, despite the approval
of the Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal proceedings it had set
in motion. As such, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when

it ruled on the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioner's

certificate of candidacy. The Comelec correctly held that a case only becomes
moot when "there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits."[15] In the instant
case, although petitioner withdrew her first certificate of candidacy, the
subsequent disqualification of her husband required that she file a new
certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate. The second filing of a
certificate of candidacy thus once again put her qualifications in issue. Hence, a
ruling
upon
the
same
is
necessary.
The fact that petitioner's certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was
given due course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her
qualifications to run as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec:
Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the following: a)
movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for her husband
who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly accomplished in
form and substance and c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion
among the voters. Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the
Commission
in
the
said
resolution.
Movant may have been given the impression that the Commission's act of giving
due course to her substitute certificate of candidacy constitutes a
pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out, however,
that the bases for giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally
different from those for enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x
x[16]
Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) "authorizes the
Commission (Comelec) to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after
the elections,"[17] thus:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis ours)
As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with the trial and hearing of
the
petition
for
disqualification.
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is
synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a

fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.[18] The manifest intent of the law in fixing a
residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from
an
elective
office
to
serve
that
community.[19]
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person
actually resides.[20] Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have
but
one
domicile
at
a
time.[21]
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.[22] A person's "domicile" once established
is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.[23]
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new
domicile
must
be
actual.[24]
Petitioner's claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in
Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections,[25] is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely
of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her
domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent
"has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent
evidence
that
would
corroborate
such
statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent's intention to stay
in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has
chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA
No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter
in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.[26]
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is
Maguing, Lanao del Norte,[27] which is also her place of birth; and that her

domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City.

The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner's husband, effected the change
of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006.
Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal
residence,[28] then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile
also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are
other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise,
reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance
with
human
experience.[29]
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However,
petitioner's disqualification would not result in Malik's proclamation who came in
second
during
the
special
election.
The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, ViceGovernor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office
of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor.
x

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or
is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated
to
discharge
the
functions
of
his
office.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao
del Norte, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4,
2007 Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611
disqualifying petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the

Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of the permanent
vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED
as Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is
ordered
LIFTED.
SO

ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,

Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De
Castro,
and
Brion,
JJ.,
concur.

5. EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008 ]
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND EPHRAIM M. TUNGOL, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7
of the Constitution, challenging the May 8, 2007 and September 28, 2007
Resolutions[1] of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
First
Division
and
En
Banc,
respectively.
The

facts:

Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty

candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14,
2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy (COC).
On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion's
declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation
because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card" holder or a permanent resident of
the United States of America (USA). Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC
that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for forty-one years before
May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign
country.
It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on
September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the United States Immigration and

Naturalization Services[2] (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.[3]

For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent
to residence, and he retained his domicile of origin (Albuquerque, Bohol)
notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency in the USA.
Ugdoracion then pointed to the following documents as proof of his substantial
compliance with the residency requirement: (1) a residence certificate dated
May 5, 2006; (2) an application for a new voter's registration dated October 12,
2006; and (3) a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident
Status
dated
October
18,
2006.
On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated one of the herein
questioned resolutions canceling Ugdoracion's COC and removing his name from
the certified list of candidates for the position of Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol.
Posthaste, on May 11, 2007, Ugdoracion filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid resolution arguing in the main that his status as a "green card"
holder was not of his own making but a mere offshoot of a petition filed by his
sister. He admitted his intermittent travels to the USA, but only to visit his
siblings, and short working stint thereat to cover his subsistence for the
duration
of
his
stay.
In yet another setback, the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned
resolution denying Ugdoracion's motion for reconsideration and affirming the
First Division's finding of material misrepresentation in Ugdoracion's COC.
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC.
Subsequently, Tungol and the COMELEC filed their respective Comments [4] on
the petition. On March 7, 2008, Ugdoracion filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to
Reiterate Issuance of an Injunctive Writ.[5] On March 11, 2008, we issued a
Status Quo Order. The next day, March 12, 2008, Ugdoracion filed a
Consolidated
Reply
to
respondents'
Comments.
Ugdoracion's argument focuses on his supposed involuntary acquisition of a
permanent resident status in the USA which, as he insists, did not result in the
loss of his domicile of origin. He bolsters this contention with the following facts:
1. He was born in Albuquerque, Bohol, on October 15, 1940 and as such, is
a natural-born Filipino citizen;
2. He was baptized in the Catholic Church of Sta. Monica Paris in
Albuquerque, Bohol on February 2, 1941;
3. He was raised in said municipality;
4. He grew up in said municipality;
5. He raised his own family and established a family home thereat;

6. He served his community for twelve (12) years and had been the former
Mayor for three (3) terms;
7. From 1986 to 1988, he was appointed as Officer-in-Charge;
8. He ran for the same position in 1988 and won;
9. He continued his public service as Mayor until his last term in the year
1998;
10. After his term as Mayor, he served his people again as Councilor;
11. He built his house at the very place where his ancestral home was
situated;
12. He still acquired several real properties at the same place;
13. He never lost contact with the people of his town; and
14. He secured a residence certificate on May 5, 2006 at Western Poblacion,
Albuquerque, Bohol and faithfully paid real property taxes.[6]
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
canceling
Ugdoracion's
COC
for
material
misrepresentation. Essentially, the issue hinges on whether the representations
contained in Ugdoracion's COC, specifically, that he complied with the residency
requirement and that he does not have "green card" holder status, are false.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of
Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition must
fail.
Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
unmistakable terms, requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true, and
any false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for
cancellation thereof, thus:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. -- The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of

candidacy
x

are

true
x

to

the

best

of
x

his

knowledge.
x

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the
election.
The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to
material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a
candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's citizenship and
residence.[7] Our holding in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[8] reiterated in Lluz v.
COMELEC[9] is instructive, thus:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the
Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the
filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x
x

As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of

candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation
mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by
this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate-- the right to
run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although
the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material
representation," the court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying
Section
78
of
[B.P.
881].
x

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation

contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective
office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the]
certificate of candidacy are grave--to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It
could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic
and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any
innocuous
mistake.
x

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section

78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for
public office.
Viewed in this light, the question posed by Ugdoracion is hardly a novel one.
Ugdoracion urges us, however, that he did not lose his domicile of origin
because his acquisition of a "green card" was brought about merely by his
sister's petition. He maintains that, except for this unfortunate detail, all other
facts demonstrate his retention of residence in Albuquerque, Bohol. Believing in
the truth of these circumstances, he simply echoed in his COC a truthful
statement that he is a resident of Albuquerque, Bohol, and, therefore, eligible
and
qualified
to
run
for
Mayor
thereof.
We are not convinced. Ugdoracion's assertions miss the mark completely. The
dust had long settled over the implications of a "green card" holder status on an
elective official's qualification for public office. We ruled in Caasi v. Court of
Appeals[10] that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a permanent resident status
abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. In short, the "green card" status in the USA is a renunciation of
one's
status
as
a
resident
of
the
Philippines.[11]
We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is
synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and
remain (animus manendi).[12] It consists not only in the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative
of
such
intention.[13]
Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of
the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.
In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally
conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules, namely:
(1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once
established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can
have
but
one
residence
or
domicile
at
any
given
time.[14]
The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only
when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with such purpose.[15] In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's
acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the United States amounted

to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the

Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was
Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.
The contention that Ugdoracion's USA resident status was acquired
involuntarily, as it was simply the result of his sister's beneficence, does not
persuade. Although immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a family
member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration laws,[16] the petitioned party
is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status. Permanent
residency in the USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is
not bestowed by operation of law.[17] And to reiterate, a person can have only
one
residence
or
domicile
at
any
given
time.
Moreover, Ugdoracion's contention is decimated by Section 68[18] of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f)[19] of the Local Government Code,
which disqualifies a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign
country, unless said person waives his status. Corollary thereto, we are in
complete accord with the COMELEC's ruling on the validity and effect of the
waiver of permanent resident status supposedly executed by Ugdoracion, to wit:
Following the Caasi case, in order to reacquire residency in the Philippines, there
must be a waiver of status as a greencard holder as manifested by some acts
or acts independent of and prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In
the case at bar, [Ugdoracion] presented a photocopy of a document entitled
Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18, 2006. A
close scrutiny of this document however discloses that it is a mere application
for abandonment of his status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does
not bear any note of approval by the concerned US official. Thus, [w]e cannot
consider the same as sufficient waiver of [Ugdoracion's] status of permanent
residency in the USA. Besides, it is a mere photocopy, unauthenticated and
uncertified
by
the
legal
custodian
of
such
document.
Assuming arguendo that said application was duly approved, [Ugdoracion] is
still disqualified for he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement.
[Ugdoracion] has applied for abandonment of residence only on 18 October
2006 or for just about seven (7) months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections,
which
clearly
fall
short
of
the
required
period.
The Permanent Resident Card or the so-called "greencard" issued by the US
government to respondent does not merely signify transitory stay in the USA for
purpose of work, pleasure, business or study but to live there permanently. This
is the reason why the law considers immigrants to have lost their residency in
the Philippines.[20]
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a

material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.[21]
Ugdoracion claims that he did not misrepresent his eligibility for the public office
of Mayor. He categorically declares that he merely stated in his COC that he is a
resident of the Philippines and in possession of all the qualifications and suffers
from none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Unfortunately for
Ugdoracion, Section 74 specifically requires a statement in the COC that the
candidate is "not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country."
Ugdoracion's cause is further lost because of the explicit pronouncement in his
COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines before the May 14,
2007 elections for forty-one (41) years.[22] Ineluctably, even if Ugdoracion might
have been of the mistaken belief that he remained a resident of the Philippines,
he hid the fact of his immigration to the USA and his status as a "green card"
holder.
Finally, we are not unmindful of the fact that Ugdoracion appears to have won
the election as Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Sadly, winning the election does
not substitute for the specific requirements of law on a person's eligibility for
public office which he lacked, and does not cure his material misrepresentation
which
is
a
valid
ground
for
the
cancellation
of
his
COC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
COMELEC Resolutions dated May 8, 2007 and September 28, 2007 are
AFFIRMED. The STATUS QUO Order issued on March 11, 2008 is hereby
LIFTED.
SO

ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Reyes, Leonardo De Castro,
and
Brion,
JJ.,
concur.
Azcuna,
J.,
on
official
leave.

6. San Luis vs San Luis

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 133743, February 06, 2007 ]
EDGAR SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 134029]

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS ALIAS

FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and
set aside the September 12, 1995[2] and January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its
May 15, 1998 Resolution[4] denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce [5] before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973.[6]
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.[7] He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage
up
to
his
death
on
December
18,
1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration[8] before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of

Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death,
was
still
legally
married
to
Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
trial court issued an Order[11] denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5,
1994 her opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2,[13] Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down
in
Van
Dorn
v.
Romillo,
Jr.[14]
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. [15]
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256[16] of the
Family
Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage,
filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from
hearing
the
case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[17] denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic[18]
because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador
S.
Tensuan
pending
the
resolution
of
said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration [20] from the
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts
and
law
on
which
it
was
based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order [21] granting the motion
for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested [23] that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14,[24] and June 20,[25] 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled
that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested
rights
of
Felicisimo's
legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for the disqualification[27] of Judge
Arcangel
but
said
motions
were
denied.[28]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October
24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.[29]
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue

of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus With the well-known rule - express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, - there is no justiciable
reason to sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force
and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been
obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,[32] the Filipino divorcee, "shall
x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the
marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. x x x[33]
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration[34] which
were
denied
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari.[35] Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition
which
was
granted.[36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of
the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[38] "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time.
Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration
should
have
been
filed
in
Sta.
Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter's
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving
wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of

administration.
The

petition

lacks

merit.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence - as contradistinguished from domicile - of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence
or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required
though;
however,
the
residence
must
be
more
than
temporary.[41](Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes
of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in

Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent

submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address
of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association[46] and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to
1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased's calling cards[49] stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is
in
"Provincial
Capitol,
Sta.
Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed
in the Regional Trial Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3.[51] Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Makati
City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino
who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on
June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential
basis
allowing
us
to
rule
in
the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner
and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of

husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife,
or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.[53]
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should
not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.[54] (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it
was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."[56]
[57]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,

the Court stated that where a Filipino
is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.[58]
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition
of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law."[59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the Court likewise cited

the

aforementioned

case

in

relation

to

Article

26.[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988.
Article
26
thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended,
it
now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1),
(4),
(5)
and
(6),
36,
37
and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry
under
Philippine
law.
(Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the

Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to

remarry under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of
the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
law
already
established
through
judicial
precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse,
as
in
this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However,
in light of this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.[67] In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning
of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the
legislature,
is
to
render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be
sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as
the
law
is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
x

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.[69]
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.[71]
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show
that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must
be
alleged
and
proved.[73]
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent
and
Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the coowner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint
efforts
during
their
cohabitation.
Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration
may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2,
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters

of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far
as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.[75]
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of
the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the coowners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. [77]
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife
but are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held
that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[80] The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding
shares
shall
be
presumed
to
be
equal.
x

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponent's defense. x x x[81]
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code
or
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let
this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO
Austria-Martinez,

ORDERED.
Callejo,

Sr.,

and

Chico-Nazario,

JJ.,

concur.

7. Morigo vs People
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004 ]
LUCIO MORIGO Y CACHO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which
affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also
assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years
(from
1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant
Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January
17,
1992
and
to
take
effect
on
February
17,
1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago [4]
at
the
Virgen
sa
Barangay
Parish,
Tagbilaran
City,
Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually
took
place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5]
filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the
civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied
upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the
bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner
pleaded
not
guilty
to
the
charge.
Trial
thereafter
ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal
Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio

Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of
Prision
Mayor
as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that
his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v.
Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony
is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
be
allowed
to
marry
again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses
is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial
status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting
the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10]
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know
that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences
thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R.
CR
No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision,
which
then
became
final
and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED
in
toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed
that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil
Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be
punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a

second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA
held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense
in
a
bigamy
case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia
from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines,
pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary
to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 [14] of the Civil Code, a
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated
in
a
foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision,
contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a
difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a
basis
for
good
faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate
courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria,
joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent
observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith
upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he
contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The
crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a
complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount
to
an
intent
to
commit
bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General
relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can
be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that
under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must
before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied
on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil
Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal
intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present
in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy
thus:
(1)

the

offender

has

been

legally

married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively
dead;
(3)

he

contracts

subsequent

marriage;

and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down
the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of

rendered decreeing the

Lucio Morigo and Lucia
directing the Local Civil
the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was
a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio,
in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void
ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal
was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision
had
long
become
final
and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two
were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage
to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We
held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
void.[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired,
although
later
declared
void
ab
initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed
a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts
a
subsequent
marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of
the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as
the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on
the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO

ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

i. Statutory Law vs Equity

1. cotoner zacarias vs revilla G.R. No. 190901

November 12, 2014

AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO AND THE HEIRS REVILLA OF PAZ REVILLA,
Respondents.

DECISION

the loan. He then discovered that the propertys tax declaration was already in
the name of the Sun spouses.10

LEONEN, J.:
Well-settled is the rule that "conveyances by virtue of a forged signature ... are
void ab initio [as] [t]he absence of the essential [requisites] of consent and
cause or consideration in these cases rendered the contract inexistent[.]"1
Before us is a petition for review2 filed by Amada Cotoner-Zacarias against
respondent spouses Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla, praying that this
court render a decision "reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and
Court of Appeals and declaring the transfer of title to the Petitioner and then to
her successors-in-interest as valid and binding as against the respondents."3
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows.
Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla spouses) are the owners in fee
simple of a 15,000-square-meter unregistered parcel of land in Silang, Cavite,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 7971.4
In 1983, the Revilla spouses faced financial difficulties in raising funds for
Alfredo Revillas travel to Saudi Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money
from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada). By way of security, the parties verbally
agreed that Amada would take physical possession of the property, cultivate it,
then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan and realty taxes.5
Upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return the property to the Revilla
spouses.6
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihanng Lupa" before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. This
document was executed on March 19, 1979 with the Revilla spouses as sellers
and Amada as buyer of the property.7 Consequently, Tax Declaration No. 7971
in the name of the Revilla spouses was cancelled, and Tax Declaration No.
19773 in the name of Amada was issued.
On August 25, 1984, Amada sold the property to the spouses Adolfo and Elvira
Casorla (Casorla spouses) by "Deed of Absolute SaleUnregistered Land." Tax
Declaration No. 30411-A was later issued in the name of the Casorla spouses.8
In turn, the Casorla spouses executed a deed of absolute sale dated December
16, 1991 in favor of the spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses). Tax
Declaration Nos. 30852-A and 18584 were issued in favor of the Sun spouses.9
In December 1994, Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia. He asked Amada
why she had not returnedtheir tax declaration considering their full payment of

On February 15, 1995, the Revilla spouses were served a copy of the answer11
in the land registration case filed by the Sun spouses for the property.12 The
Revilla spouses then saw a copy of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" and
noticed that their signatures as sellers were forged.13
They then demanded the cancellation of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
from Amada and all subsequent transfers of the property, its reconveyance, and
the restoration of its tax declaration in their name.14 Amada failed to take
action.
On November 17, 1995, the Revillaspouses filed a complaint before the
Tagaytay Regional Trial Court for the annulment of sales and transfers of title
and reconveyance of the property with damages against Amada, the Casorla
spouses, the Sun spouses, and the Provincial Assessor of Cavite.15
In her answer, Amada denied that the property was used as a security for the
Revilla spouses loan.16 Instead, she claimed that the Revilla spouses
voluntarily executed the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" in her favor on March
19, 1979. She added that the Revilla spouses cause of action already
prescribed.17
For their part, the Sun spouses argued good faith belief that Amada was the real
owner of the property asAmada showed them a tax declaration in her name and
the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" allegedly executed by the Revilla spouses.18
When the Sun spouses discovered there was another sale with the Casorla
spouses, they were assured by Amada that she had already bought back the
property from the Casorla spouses.19 Subsequently, the Casorla spouses
executed a deed ofabsolute sale dated December 16, 1991 in favor of the Sun
spouses.20 They also argued prescription against the Revilla spouses, and
prayed for damages against Amada by way of crossclaim.21
On August 3, 2006, the Regional Trial Court22 found the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa" to be a fictitious document, and ruled in favor of the Revilla spouses:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the sales/transfers from Tax Declaration No. 7971, s. 1980
to Tax Declaration No. 18584, s. 1994 as NULL and VOID, without valid
transmission of title and interest from the original owners, plaintiffs
herein and consequently, entitling plaintiffs to reinstatement and
reconveyance of their title/taxdeclaration as well as possession of the
subject property;

2. Ordering defendant Zacariasto pay the following:

2.1 To the Plaintiffs:
a. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
b. P20,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
c. P80,000.00 for attorneys fees.
2.2 To Defendant-Spouses Sun:
a. P467,350.00 for actual damages;
b. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
c. P20,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
d. P100,000.00 for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.23
Amada appealed the trial courts decision, while the Sun spouses partially
appealed the decision as to interest and damages.
On August 13, 2009, the Court of Appeals24 dismissed the appeal of Amada,
and partially granted the appeal of the Sun spouses. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
by us DISMISSING the appeal filed by defendant appellant Amada C. Zacarias in
this case, and PARTIALLY GRANTING the appeal filed by the Spouses Rodolfo
and Yolanda Sun. The Decision dated August 3, 2006 rendered by Branch 18 of
the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Tagaytay City,
Cavite in Civil Case No. TG-1543 is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellant
Amada C. Zacarias is ordered to pay interest at 6% per annum on the principal
obligation in the amount of P467,350.00 from February 3, 1995, the date of the
first judicial demand by the Spouses Sun, until said decision on the principal
obligation became final and executory, and interest at 12% per annum on the
principal obligation, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees,
from the time said decision became final and executory until full payment of
said amounts.

SO ORDERED.25
The Court of Appeals denied Amadas motion for reconsideration; hence, she
filed this petition. Petitioner argues that the antichresisclaim of the Revilla
spouses was not reduced into writing, thus, it is void under Article 2134 of the
Civil Code.26 She submits that the allegation of antichresis was only an excuse
by the Revilla spouses for their failure to impugn possession of the property by
Amada and her successors-in-interest for over 16 years.27
Petitioner contends that the sale inher favor was established by the "Kasulatan
ng Bilihan ng Lupa," the delivery of the tax declaration, and the testimony of
one Mrs. Rosita Castillo (Rosita).28 Rosita was the second wife of Felimon
Castillo, the previous owner of the property. She testified that respondent Paz
Castillo-Revilla admitted toher father, Felimon, that she and Alfredo Revilla sold
the property to Amada.29
On the alleged forgery, petitioner submits that the court misapplied the principle
that "he who alleges not he who denies must prove" when it stated that she had
the burden of proving the due execution of the deed of absolute sale. Since the
Revilla spouses alleged that the deedwas a forged document, they had the
burden of proving the forgery.30 She then cites the trial court in that
"[a]ccordingly, the National Bureauof Investigation was not able to ascertain the
genuineness of the signatureof plaintiff Paz Revilla because of lack of sufficient
sample signatures. . . ."31
On the prescription argument, the parties live in a very small barangay. While
Alfredo Revilla worked in Saudi Arabia, he admitted returning to the Philippines
twice a year, while his wife never left Silang, Cavite,32 and yet the Revilla
spouses never questioned the activities on the property for more than 16
years.33
On the proper docket fees, petitioner contends that the Revilla spouses paid
docket fees based on their prayer for actual damages of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P50,000.00, and attorneys fee of P80,000.00, when they should
have based it on P12,000,000.00, the value of the property they alleged in their
supplemental pre-trial brief.34
Lastly, petitioner argues that the property is conjugal in nature, but the court
never declared that respondent Paz Castillo-Revillas signature was falsified.
Thus, the sale over her half of the property cannot be declared void.35 She
adds that the Sun spouses are buyers in good faith for value, making
reinstatement of the property impossible.36
Respondents Revilla spouses counter that the factual issue of whether the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" isa falsified document was already conclusively

resolved by the lower courts and, generally, factual findings are beyond this
courts power of review.37
On the prescription issue, respondents Revilla spouses argue that an action or
defense to declare a document null is imprescriptible.38 Laches also does not
apply since they immediately questioned the fraudulent transfers by filing a
complaint in November 1995 upon learning of the questionable documents in
February 1995, after Alfredo had returned from Saudi Arabia in December
1994.39
Respondents Revilla spouses contend that they paid the proper docket fees. The
P12,000,000.00 mentioned during pre-trial that petitioner insists should have
been the basis of the fees was neither stated in the complaint nor awarded by
the court.40
Respondents Revilla spouses argue that the court did not err in ordering
reinstatement of the property tothem. First, the defense that the Sun spouses
were buyers in good faith is a personal defense that cannot be raised by
petitioner who was not privy to the sale between the Casorla spouses and the
Sun spouses.41 Second, an alternative prayer for damages cannot be
interpreted as an admission that the relief for reinstatement is not viable.42
Third, the transaction happened prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; thus,
Article 172 of the Civil Code applies such that "[t]he wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by
law."43 Consequently, the result is the same even if respondent Paz CastilloRevilla did not testify that the signature is not hers, as she cannot bind the
entire property without her husbands consent.44 Lastly, no unjust enrichment
exists since they were deprived of their property for so long.45
The issues for this courts resolution are as follows:
First, whether respondents Revilla spouses cause of action is barred by
prescription or laches; Second, whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction
when respondents Revilla spouses paid filing fees based on the P50,000.00
claim for damages in the complaint but stated in their supplemental pre-trial
brief that the property is valued at P12,000,000.00; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the reinstatement and
reconveyance of the property in favor of respondents Revilla spouses.
I.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that respondents Revilla spouses claim is
barred by laches since theyallowed 16 years to lapse, with petitioner having
possession of the property, before filing suit.46

Laches has been defined as "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by the exercise of due diligence
could or should have been done earlier."47
The elements that need to be present and proven before an action is considered
barred by laches are the following:
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint
is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or
the suit is not held to be barred.48
There was no delay by respondents Revilla spouses in asserting their rights over
the property. The lower courts found that respondents Revilla spouses first
learned of the existence of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" in February 1995
when they were serveda copy of the pleading in the land registration case
instituted by the Sun spouses.49 They filed their complaint within the same
year, specifically, on November 17, 1995. The lapse of only nine (9) months
from the time they learned of the questionable transfers on the property cannot
be considered as sleeping on their rights.
In any case, doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of
statutory law. The Civil Code clearly provides that "[t]he action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."50 This court
has discussed:
Lachesis a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not
courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside
legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of
the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the
inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly
vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.51
II.
On the second issue, petitioner argues that respondents Revilla spouses did not
pay the correct docket fees. She submits that docket fees paid were based on

the prayer for actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00,

and attorneys fee of P80,000.00, when the spouses Revilla should have based it
on P12,000,000.00, the value of the property they alleged in their supplemental
pre-trial brief.52 Petitioner cites Supreme Court Circular No. 7 and
jurisprudence holding that the payment of proper docket fees is crucial in
vesting courts with jurisdiction over the subject matter.53
This court finds that respondents Revilla spouses paid the proper docket fees,
thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction.
It is true that "[i]t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action."54
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 this court
"condemned the practice of counsel who in filing the original complaint omitted
from the prayer any specification of the amount of damages although the
amount of over 78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint."56 The court
gave the following warning against this unethical practice that serves no other
purpose than to avoid paying the correct filing fees:
The Court serves warning that itwill take drastic action upon a repetition of this
unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only inthe body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in sofar as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned
and reversed.57 (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling was circularized through Supreme Court Circular No. 758 addressed
to all lower court judges and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
dissemination to and guidance for all its members.
The facts of this case differ from Manchester and similar situations envisioned
under the circular. The complaint filed by respondents Revilla spouses included
in its prayer the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages, without mention of
any other amount in the body of the complaint. No amended complaint was filed

to increase this amount in the prayer. Thus, the Court of Appeals found as
follows:
In the case at bench, the complaint filed by the Spouses Revilla only asked for
actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00. While the Spouses Revilla
mentioned the amount of P12,000,000.00 as actual damages in the pre-trial,
said amount was not stated in the complaint and neither was it awarded by the
lower court in its judgment. Hence, said amount was not even considered by the
court a quo when it awarded damages in favor of the Spouses Revilla.
Considering that the complaint was not formally amended by the spouses to
increase the amount of actual damages being sought, the trial court was not
stripped of its jurisdiction to try the case since the Spouses Revilla correctly paid
the docket fees based merely on what was prayed for in the complaint.Indeed,
the mere mentioning by the Spouses Revilla of the amount of P12,000,000.00
during the pre-trial is inconsequential, as the trial court properly acquired
jurisdiction over the action when the Spouses Revilla filed the complaint and
paid the requisite filing fees based on the amount as prayed for in the
complaint.59 (Emphasis supplied)
In Padlan v. Dinglasan,60 this court reiterated that "[w]hat determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint [and] [t]he averments therein and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted."61
Petitioner attached copies of the tax declarations and deeds of sale over the
property to the petition. Tax Declaration No. 7971 in the name of respondents
Revilla spouses provides that the land had a market value of P13,500.00, while
the mango trees had a market value of P3,500.00.62 Petitioner alleged in her
petition that respondents Revilla spouses offered to sell the property to her for
P50,000.00,63 while the trial court found that the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" reflected the amount of P20,000.00.64 Subsequent tax declarations in the
name of petitioner, the Casorla spouses, and the Sun spouses all provided for
land market values lower than P50,000.00.65 The deed of sale in favor of the
Casorla spouses states that the assessed value of the property was P1,400.00,
and the consideration for the sale was P50,000.00.66 The subsequent deed of
sale in favor of the Sun spouses provides for the same amount as
consideration.67
None of these documents submitted by petitioner indicate an amount in excess
of the P50,000.00 prayed for by respondents Revilla spouses as actual damages
in their complaint. Thus, the basis for the P12,000,000.00 value raised during
pre-trial is unclear. Based on the complaint, respondents Revilla spouses paid
the correct docket fees computed from the amounts in their prayer.
III.

The third issue involves the reinstatement of respondents Revilla spouses in the
property and reconveyance of its tax declaration in their favor.
Petitioner argues that antichresis is a formal contract that must be in writing in
order to be valid.68 Respondents Revilla spouses were not able to prove the
existence of the alleged antichresis contract. On the other hand, the sale of the
property to petitioner was established by the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
and the testimony of Rosita Castillo, the second wife of the previous owner,
Felimon Castillo.69
We affirm the lower courts order of reinstatement and reconveyance of the
property in favor of respondents Revilla spouses.
Respondents Revilla spouses complaint sought "to annul the sales and transfers
of title emanating from Tax Declaration No. 7971 registered in their name
involving a 15,000-square[-]meter unregistered land . . . with prayer for
reconveyance and claims for damages."70 There was no prayer to declare the
purported contract of sale as antichresis.71 Thus, respondents Revilla spouses
neither discussed nor used the term "antichresis" in their comment and
memorandum before this court. They focused on the nature of their complaint
as one for annulment of titles on the ground of forgery.72 At most, the trial
courts summary of respondents Revilla spouses evidence described the parties
agreements as follows:
Plaintiffs evidence and the testimony of plaintiff Alfredo Revilla tend to indicate
that plaintiffs are the owners in fee simple of a 15,000-square[-]meter
unregistered land, located at Brgy. Adlas, Silang, Cavite. Their ownership being
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 7971, s. 1980 (Exh. "A"). Sometime in 1981,
plaintiffs needed money for the travel and deployment of plaintiff Alfredo to
Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff Paz Revilla sought financial help from defendant CotonerZacarias from whom she was able to obtain a loan but secured with and by way
of mortgage of the subject property. The parties further agreed that defendant
Cotoner Zacarias would take possession of the subject property and cultivate it
with the earnings therefrom to be used to pay-off the loan and the annual realty
taxes on the land.It was their agreement with defendant Cotoner Zacarias that
the latter will rent the subject property and with that agreement, the lease
started sometime in 1981 and plantiffs got from defendant Cotoner-Zacarias the
amount of Php3,000.00 as rental for the first year, 1981, with no specific
agreement as to the period covered by such rental[.]73 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2132 of the Civil Code provides that "[b]y the contract of antichresis the
creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor,
with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and
thereafter to the principal of his credit."

Thus, antichresis involves an express agreement between parties such that the
creditor will have possession of the debtors real property given as security, and
such creditor will apply the fruits of the property to the interest owed by the
debtor, if any, then to the principal amount.74
The term, antichresis, has a Greek origin with "anti (against) and chresis
(use) denoting the action of giving a credit against the use of a property."75
Historically, 15th century B.C. tablets revealed that "antichresis contracts were
commonly employed in the Sumerian and Akkadian Mesopotamian cultures."76
Antichresis contracts were incorporated in Babylonian law, modifying and
combining it with that of mortgage pledge.77 Nearing the end of the classical
period, antichresis contracts entered Roman law that "adopted the convention
that the tenant usufruct had to be exactly compensated by the interest on the
lump sum payment."78 During the middle ages, canon law banned antichresis
contracts for being a form of usury.79 These contracts only reappeared in the
1804 Napoleonic Code that influenced the laws of most countries today.80 It
had been observed that "antichresis contracts coexist with periodic rent
contracts in many property markets."81
In the Civil Code, antichresis provisions may be found under Title XVI, together
with other security contracts such as pledge and mortgage.
Antichresis requires delivery of the property to the antichretic creditor, but the
latter cannot ordinarily acquire this immovable property in his or her possession
by prescription.82
Similar to the prohibition against pactum commissorium83 since creditors
cannot "appropriate the thingsgiven by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose
of them,"84 an antichretic creditor also cannot appropriate the real property in
his or her favor upon the non-payment of the debt.85
Antichresis also requires that the amount of the principal and the interest be in
writing for the contract to be valid.86
However, the issue before us does not concern the nature of the relationship
between the parties, but the validity of the documents that caused the
subsequent transfers of the property involved.
The reinstatement of the propertyin favor of respondents Revilla spouses was
anchored on the lower courts finding that their signatures as sellers in the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" were forged.
This court has held that the "question of forgery is one of fact."87 Well-settled is
the rule that "[f]actual findings of the lower courts are entitled great weight and

respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by substantial

evidence on the record."88
The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the trial court that the signature
of Alfredo Revilla in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" was forged:
It was convincingly found by the court a quo that the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupaor Deed of Sale covering the subject property allegedly executed by the
Spouses Revilla in favorof Zacarias was spurious, as the trial court, after relying
on the report of the handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) saying that "there exist significant differences in handwriting
characteristics/habits between the questioned and the standard/sample
signatures ALFREDO REVILLA such as in the manner of execution of strokes,
structural pattern of letters/elements, and minute identifying details", as well as
the trial courts own visual analysis of the document and the sample signatures
of plaintiff-appellee Alfredo, clearly showed that his signature on the said
Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupawas indeed forged.89
Petitioner contends that the lower courts never declared as falsified the
signature of Alfredos wife, Paz Castillo-Revilla. Since the property is conjugal in
nature, the sale as to the one-half share ofPaz Castillo-Revilla should not be
declared as void.90
The transaction took place before the effectivity of the Family Code in 2004.
Generally, civil laws have no retroactive effect.91 Article 256 of the Family Code
provides that "[it] shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws."
Article 165 of the Civil Code states that "[t]he husband is the administrator of
the conjugal partnership." Article 172 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except
incases provided by law."92 In any case, the Family Code also provides as
follows:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other

spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or

encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer iswithdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "assuming arguendo that the
signature of plaintiff-appellee Paz on the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupawas not
forged, her signature alone would still not bind the subject property, it being
already established that the said transaction was made without the consent of
her husband plaintiff-appellee Alfredo."93
Lastly, petitioner argues that she has no obligation to prove the genuineness
and due execution of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" considering it is a
public document.94
The trial court found otherwise. Atty. Diosdado de Mesa, who allegedly notarized
the "Kasulatanng Bilihan ng Lupa," was not a commissioned notary public. The
trial court discussed as follows:
Furthermore, it was discovered that the notary public who purportedly notarized
the "Kasulatanng Bilihan ng Lupa" has not been registered notary public in the
province of Cavite in 1979 nor at present. The record bears out various
Certifications to prove there is no available record on file with the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cavite City of a Commission/Order
appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa, the lawyer who notarized the subject
document, as Notary Public for the Province and City of Cavite (Exh. "Y" to "Y2"); Certification from the Records Management and Archives Office, Manila that
no copy is on file with the said office of the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by
plaintiffs before Notary Public Diosdado de Mesa, for and within Imus, Cavite,
acknowledged as Doc. No. 432, Page No. 45, Book No. VIII, Series of 1979
(Exh. "Z" to "Z-1"); Certification issued by Clerk of Court, Atty. Ana Liza M.
Luna, Regional Trial Court, Tagaytay City that there is no available record on file
of a Commission/Order appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa as Notary Public for
the Province and Cities of Tagaytay, Cavite and Trece Martires in 1979 (Exh.
"AA" to"AA-2"); Certification issued by Clerk of Court, Atty. Jose O, Lagao, Jr.,
Regional Trial Court, Multiple Sala, Bacoor, Cavite that there isno available
record on file of a Commission/Order appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa as
Notary Public for the Province and City of Cavite (Exh. "BB" to "BB-2"); and
Certification issued by Clerk of Court, Atty. Regalado E. Eusebio, Regional Trial
Court, Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite that there is no available record on file of a
Commission/Order appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa as Notary Public for the
Province of Cavite (Exh. "CC" to "CC-2").95 (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner contends that the Sun spouses were buyers in good faith for value,
thus, the court erred in ordering reinstatement of the property in favor of
respondents Revilla spouses.96
This court has held that "the rule in land registration law that the issue of
whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the
subject of the sale is registeredland and the purchase was made from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean[.]"97 Our laws have adopted
the Torrens system to strengthen public confidence in land transactions: [T]he
Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to insure
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If
a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of losing his acquisition. If this were
permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.98
Necessarily, those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the
Torrens system for registered lands must be protected.1wphi1 On the other
hand, those who purchase unregistered lands do so at their own peril.99
This good faith argument cannot be considered as this case involves
unregistered land. In any case, as explained by respondents Revilla spouses in
their memorandum, this is a defense personal to the Sun spouses and cannot be
borrowed by petitioner.100 The Sun spouses no longer raised this argument on
appeal, but only made a partial appeal regarding legal interest on the
award.101
WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals dated August 13, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC
Associate Justice

M.V.F.

2. Republic vs MIC
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156205, November 12, 2014

LEONEN

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REGION IV, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES, Petitioner, v.MARJENS
INVESTMENT
CORPORATION AND PATROCINIO P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the November 19, 2002
Decision[1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50023, which dismissed
petitioner Republic of the Philippines' petition on the ground that the disputed
property had already been segregated and classified as private property and no
longer form part of the public domain.
Background
The Court of Appeals gave a short background on the subject property.
In Land Registration Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3454, entitled, "Hammon
H. Buck, et al. vs. Director of Lands," the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas rendered a Decision dated March 30, 1951 x x x granting the
application for registration of several parcels of land in favor of the applicants
therein,
Hammon
H.
Buck,
et
al.
In the said judgment, it was established that the lands described in Plans Psu118922 and 114430 were originally owned by Rita Vda. de Ilustre since 1890.
In 1923, the parcels of land applied for were purchased by Donato Punzalan.
Later, the lots under Plan Psu-114430 were purchased from Donato Punzalan by
Agustin Canoso and Gregorio Decepeda and in consideration of the survey and
registration thereof, Lots 1 and 2, Plan Psu-114430 were ceded to Hammon H.
Buck. This was to become the basis of Hammon H. Buck's application for
registration
under
Land
Registration
Case
No.
52.
As a consequence of the final and executory decision in Land Registration Case
No. 52, Decree No. 6610 was awarded to Hammon H. Buck which finally led to
the issuance in his name of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-669 x x x on
February 18, 1952.2
The Facts of the Case
On December 22, 1998, or almost 46 years after the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-669, petitioner Republic, represented by the
Region IV Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), filed a petition before the Court of Appeals for
annulment of judgment, cancellation of title, and reversion against respondents

Marjens Investment Corporation (Marjens) and Patrocinio Villanueva

(Villanueva), the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas (Tanauan,
Batangas), and the Regional Trial Court of LipaCity.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), alleges that
respondents Marjens and Villanueva appear as registered owners of a land
identified as Lot 1 (LRC) Pcs-943, which is a portion of Lots 1 and 2, plan Psu114430 LRC (G.L.R.O.) Record No. N-3454, with an area of five thousand
(5,000) square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T18592 issued on April 7, 1976 by the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Tanauan,
Batangas.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The OSG avers that TCT No. T-18592 appears to have emanated from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-669 in the name of Hammon H. Buck issued by
virtue of a Decision5 dated March 30, 1951, rendered in Land Registration Case
No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-3454 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Lipa
City,
Batangas,
Eighth
Judicial
District.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The OSG further alleges that upon verification through a certification7 dated
April 30, 1997 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR in Batangas City, it was ascertained that the land
covered by TCT No. T-18592 is within the unclassified public forest per Land
Classification Control Map No. 10 for the Provinces of Batangas and Cavite.
The OSG argues that the land in question cannot be the subject of disposition or
registration, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said property,
much less to decree the same as private property. Therefore, the registration
proceedings, the judgment in the subject case, the OCT No. O-669 issued
pursuant thereto, and all subsequent titles are null and void. The land covered
by TCT No. T-18592, not having been legally registered, remains and forms part
of
the
public
domain
of
the
State.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In their comment, respondents deny the OSG's allegations. They claim that their
titles, their predecessors' titles, and their mother title are issued in accordance
with law, and that the property was registered and brought under the Torrens
system. Respondents contend that the subject property was already private
property even before the Spanish Crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine
Islands to the United States of America.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents assert that the government has lost its rights by laches and
estoppel to question the validity of the OCT No. 0-669, the proceedings in LRC
Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-3454, and the corresponding decree
(Decree 6610) issued after almost 50 years have lapsed. They maintain that the
proceeding for its registration was made in accordance with the requirements of
the law, including the publication of notices addressed to the Solicitor General,
the Director of Lands, and the Director of Forestry, among others, in the Official
Gazette (Vol. 46, No. 12, pp. 6381-6382 and Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 438-439).

Despite
the
notices,
there
was
government.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

no

opposition

from

the

Respondents insist that it will be most unfair and will violate their right to due
process if they will again be required to undergo another trial to establish their
long continued, open, public, adverse possession and cultivation of the property
in the concept of owners as against the whole world, now that all their witnesses
are long dead, senile, or impossible to locate. They also point out that the
subject property has transferred to various parties who have been regularly
assessed and paying realty taxes for several years.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents allege that the government through the Bureau of Lands had
presumably issued various free patents over the subject property that has
constrained petitioners to file a petition for annulment based on these free
patent titles that overlap with the respondents' title. They questioned why the
government issued free patents over the subject property when it believed that
the same is part of an unclassified public forest. They even suggested to
implead the individuals with titles overlapping with their titles for a complete
determination of the issues in the case and to avoid unnecessary and wasteful
duplication
of
valuable
time
and
resources
of
the
OSG.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To bolster its argument, respondents cited that there are many real estate
developments going on near or around the area where the property is located,
one of which is the Splendido Gardens, a resort and golf course. Respondents
speculated how the said developments proceeded if the property covered
therein is within the unclassified public forest as the government claims, and
that is assuming all the requisite government approvals have been secured by
the
developers.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents availed of two modes of discovery, and moved to serve written
interrogatories to parties and for the production of documents. 14 The Court of
Appeals granted the motions,15 to which the petitioner filed its comments. The
Court of Appeals likewise directed both parties to file their respective
memoranda,
after
which
the
case
was
submitted
for
decision.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court of Appeals Decision
On November 19, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED.
No cost.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals applied the case of Cariho v. Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands,18which recognized private ownership of lands already

possessed or held by individuals under claim of ownership as far back as

testimony or memory goes and therefore never to have been public land that
Spain
could
bequeath
to
the
United
States
of
America.
Reiterating the CFI Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the subject
properties under Plan Psu-114430 were originally owned by Rita Vda. de Ilustre
since 1890 before the Treaty of Paris. Reckoned from such time, under the
Cario ruling, the subject property had already ceased to be public, had been
appropriated into private ownership, and therefore excluded from the "public
domain" ceded by Spain to the United States of America in the Treaty of Paris of
1898.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court of Appeals pronounced that the CFI of Batangas is unmistakably
equipped with jurisdiction and authority to legally adjudicate the land applied for
in Registration Case No. 52 in favor of the applicants. Consequently, Decree
6610, OCT No. O-669, and TCT No. T-18592, in respondents' name, must be
upheld as valid issuances and documents of title.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, the Court of Appeals said that there are still other reasons in rejecting
the arguments of the petitioner that the controversial lot and title in this petition
still forms part of the public domain. By its own act and admission in the answer
to the written interrogatories, petitioner confessed to have issued several
Environmental Compliance Certificates (ECCs) to projects within Land
Classification Control Map (LCCM) No. 10, although identification is not feasible
as the issuance of ECCs began in 1982, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586 dated June 11, 1978, among others.21 The foregoing admissions militate
against petitioner's assertion and cast serious doubts on what the DENR
certification contains. The Court of Appeals said that it is inconceivable how
petitioner can claim that the subject land is an inalienable forest land when it
had been alienating it by the numerous grants and decrees it had
issued.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Court of Appeals and Cosalan,23 wherein
the Court declared that despite the general rule that forest lands cannot be
appropriated by private ownership, it had been previously held that while the
government has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of
a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much
prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by
after-events
which
could
not
have
been
anticipated.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed that LCCM No. 10 is not dated.
Petitioner explained that according to the Land Classification Department of
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), LCCM No. 10
is not dated because it is used as a control map or reference in order to
determine which land classification map is to be used. When the lot covered by
TCT No. T-18592 was plotted based on the given tie point/line, it is covered by
LC Map No. 3013 under the land classification for Batangas. LC Map No. 3013

was certified under Forest Administrative Order No. 4-1656 dated March 15,
1982. The Court of Appeals concluded that long before LC Map No. 3013 was
certified, the subject property covered by TCT No. T-18592 had already acquired
the character of a private ownership before the reclassification of the area to an
unclassified
forest.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As for respondents' affirmative defenses of estoppel and laches, the Court of
Appeals ruled that estoppel and laches run against the State, citing Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Santos,25cralawred as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also
subject to exceptions,viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except in ra[r]e and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they
would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect
the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only
in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby
thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.
(Citations omitted.)
Unconvinced, the OSG filed this petition for review on certiorari before the Court
assigning
the
following
as
errors:cralawlawlibrary
1) The Court of Appeals' finding that the property covered by TCT No. T- 18592
had become private property prior to the classification of the area to an
unclassified
forest,
and
2) The Court of Appeals' ruling that the instant case is an exception to the
general rule that laches and estoppel do not run against the
State.[26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The

petition

is

denied.

First Issue: Whether or not the subject property covered by TCT No. T18592 is a private property or part of the public domain.
The case of Cario v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands27 states that
"[prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited
in 3 Philippine, 546; '[w]here such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid
title by prescription.' It may be that this means possession from before 1700;

but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown
lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands
over
which
Spain
had
only
a
paper
sovereignty."
The United States Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
pronounced in theCario case28 that "every presumption is and ought to be
against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper
and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest,
and
never
to
have
been
public
land."
The records did not categorically state that Rita Vda. de Ilustre had Spanish title
over the subject property. But by virtue of her long continued, open, public,
adverse possession and cultivation of the property in the concept of owner as
against the whole world she is deemed to have acquired ownership over the
subject
property.
As for respondents, it is undisputed that the property covered by TCT No. T18592 traces its title to the property originally owned by Rita Vda. de Ilustre
since 1890. From her it passed on to several hands until it was transferred to
Hammon H. Buck, who successfully registered it in his name on February 18,
1952. From 1890, respondents' predecessors in interest had been in peaceful,
open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession in the concept
of an owner of the subject property including the portion covered by TCT No. T18592. Following the Cario ruling, the subject property had been a private land
and excluded from the public domain since 1890 prior to the signing of the
Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. Therefore, it is not part of the public
domain that passed on from Spain to the United States of America.
For the same reason, it is also not part of the unclassified public forest as
petitioner claims. InRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Cosalan,29 the Court held
that "[d]espite the general rule that forest lands cannot be appropriated by
private ownership, it has been previously held that 'while the Government has
the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a private
individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to
such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by afterevents which could not have been anticipated...Government in the first instance
may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such
reservation
is
made'"
The map (LC Map No. 3013), which is the basis of petitioner's claim, is
inexistent at the time Hammon H. Buck was issued an original certificate of title.
Therefore, the subject property had been a private property before it was
classified. Thus, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals' findings and

upholds

the

private

character

of

the

subject

property.

The Court also agrees with the Court of Appeals' observation that petitioner
admitted in its answer to the written interrogatories that the DENR issued
several ECCs to projects within LCCM No. 10. The admissions go against
petitioner's assertion and cast serious doubts on what the DENR certification
contains. The Court of Appeals said, to which the Court concurs, that it is
inconceivable how petitioner can claim that the subject land is an inalienable
forest land when it had been alienating it by the numerous grants and decrees it
had issued. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from petitioner's answer to
respondents' written interrogatories.
10. Have you issued any Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) for any
property or development project of any project situated within (and/or where
any portion of such project is located within) LC Map CM-10 for the Province of
Batangas and Cavite mentioned in Annex "D" of your petition?
ANSWER:

Yes.

11. If your answer to the immediately preceding interrogatory is in the

affirmative,
please
identify
such
ECC
and/or
the
project.
ANSWER: The DENR Region IV had already issued several Environmental
Compliance Certificates (ECC) to projects within [the] Land Classification Control
Map (LCCM) 10. Identification of such projects is not feasible considering that
the issuance of the ECCs began in 1982 pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586 dated June 11, 1978 and the said map covers the two (2) Provinces of
Batangas and Cavite. The issuance of the ECCs in 1982 up to 1992 was
previously done by the defunct National Environmental Protection Council
(NEPC), then by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) and
subsequently, upon the implementation of Executive Order No. 192, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Reorganization Law,
it was issued by the DENR-EMB, however, there were projects within the
jurisdiction of the DENR Regional Office and the issuance of the ECCs was
devolved
to
the
latter
office.
x

16. Has the government issued any free patents, sales patents, or homestead
patents, under the provisions of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141, as amended),
over any property located within (or including within its boundary any portion
thereof) the area covered by LC Map CM-10 for the Province of Batangas and
Cavite?
ANSWER:

Yes.

17. If your answer to the immediately preceding interrogatory is in the

affirmative, please identify such free patents, sales patents and homestead
patents.
ANSWER: It is impossible to identify all the patents issued within the area
covered by LCCM-10 considering that thousands were already issued within the
Provinces of Cavite and Batangas since the approval of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act on November 7,
1936.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
From the foregoing, the Court sustains the Court of Appeals' ruling that the CFI
of Batangas has jurisdiction and authority to legally adjudicate the land applied
for in Registration Case No. 52 in favor of the applicants. Consequently, Decree
6610, OCT No. 0-669, and TCT No. T-18592, in respondents' name, must be
upheld
as
valid
issuances
and
documents
of
title.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No.198878

RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB & TEACHERS' VILLAGE, STO. TOMAS

PROPER BARANGAY, BAGUIO CITY, represented by BEATRICE T. PULAS,
CRISTINA A. LAPP AO. MICHAEL MADIGUID, FLORENCIO MABUDYANG
and FERNANDO DOSALIN, Petitioners,
vs.
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

Second Issue: Whether or not the government is barred by laches and

estoppel.
Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by observance of due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert
it."31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches: (a)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights
after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the opportunity
to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the
defendant
in
the
event
the
relief
is
accorded
to
the
complainant.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We find it unnecessary to discuss further this issue in view of our ruling that
Decree No. 6610, OCT No. 0-669, and TCT No. T-18592 registered in the name
of
respondents
were
validly
issued.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated
November
19,
2002
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
50023
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
3. Baguio Residents vs. SMIDC

October 15, 2014

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside: 1) the August 5, 2011
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84561 which affirmed
the December 6, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
(Baguio RTC), Branch 6 in Civil Case No. 4946-R; and 2) the CA October 3,
2011 Resolution 4denying herein petitioners' Motion for Reconsider.5
Factual Antecedents
In May 2001, petitioners residents of Lower Atab & Teachers Village, Sto.
Tomas Proper Barangay, Baguio City filed a civil case for quieting of title with
damages
against
respondent
Sta.
Monica
Industrial
and
DevelopmentCorporation. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4946-R and
assigned to Branch 59 of the Baguio RTC.6 The Complaint7 in said case
essentially alleged that petitioners are successors and transferees-in-interest of
Torres, the supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City (the
subject property, consisting of 177,778 square meters) which Torres possessed
and declared for tax purposes in 1918; that they are in possession of the
subject property in the concept of owner, declared their respective lots and
homes for tax purposes, and paid the real estate taxes thereon; that in May
2000, respondent began to erect a fence on the subject property, claiming that
it is the owner of a large portion thereof8 by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-631849 (TCT No. T-63184); that said TCT No. T-63184 is null and void, as
it was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. O-281 (OCT No. O-281),
which was declared void pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 127110 (PD 1271)
and in the decided case of Republic v. Marcos;11 and that TCT No. T-63184 is a
cloud upon their title and interests and should therefore be cancelled.

Petitioners thus prayed that respondents TCT No. T-63184 be surrendered and
cancelled; that actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, legal
expenses, and costs be awarded in their favor; and finally, that injunctive relief
be issued against respondent to prevent it from selling the subject property.

validated by the PD 1271 Committee in a May 9, 1989 Resolution; that

petitioners could not present any title to the subject property upon which to
base their case for quieting of title, and have failed to show during trial that
they have a cause of action against respondent.

In its Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, 12 respondent

claimed that petitioners have no cause of action; that TCT No. T- 63184 is a
valid and subsisting title; that the case for quieting of title constitutes a
collateral attack upon TCT No. T-63184; and that petitioners have no title to the
subject property and are mere illegal occupants thereof. Thus, it prayed for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 4946-R and an award of exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs in its favor.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 but the trial court denied the
same in a January 17, 2004 Resolution.19

In their Pre-Trial Brief13 and Memorandum,14 petitioners acknowledged that

while they declared their respective lots for tax purposes, they applied for the
purchase of the same through Townsite Sales applications with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the Baguio RTC issued a Decision15 dated December 6, 2004, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendant Sta. Monica
Industrial and Development Corporation and against the plaintiffs, as follows:
1. Dismissing the Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction of plaintiffs;
2. Dismissing likewise the counterclaim for Damages and attorneys fees
of defendant corporation since it has not been shown that the plaintiffs
acted in bad faith in filing the Complaint. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.16
The trial court held that Civil Case No. 4946-R constitutes a collateral attack
upon respondents TCT No. T-63184, which became indefeasible after one year
from the entry of the decree of registration thereof. It held that if it is claimed
that respondents title is void, then a direct proceeding should have been filed
by the State to annul it and to secure reversion of the land; petitioners have no
standing to do so through a quieting of title case. The trial court added that TCT
No. T-63184 is a subsisting title; its validity was confirmed through the
annotation therein by the Baguio City Register of Deeds Entry No. 184804-2115917 that TCT No. T-27096, from which TCT No. T-63184 was derived, was

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In an appeal to the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84561,
petitioners insisted that they have a cause of action against respondent for
quieting of title and damages; that Civil Case No. 4946-R is not a collateral
attack upon respondents title; that Civil Case No. 4946-R is not a case for
reversion and annulment of title which could only be filed by the State; and that
the trial court erred in finding that respondents title was validated in
accordance with law.
On August 5, 2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court,
thus:
In this case, plaintiffs-appellants20 are without any title to be cleared of or to be
quieted nor can they be regarded as having equitable title over the subject
property. Ballantines Law Dictionary defines an equitable title as follows:
"A title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized
equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal
title transferred to him (15 Cyc. 1097; 16 Id. 90). In order that a plaintiff may
draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one from whom he
derives his right had himself a right to transfer. x x x"
xxxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellants cannot find refuge in the tax
declarations and receipts under their names considering that the same are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellants act of questioning the validity of the title of the
defendant-appellee21 constitutes a collateral attack and under Section 48 of P.D.
1529, "a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. x x x"
xxxx

Meantime, it is meet to point out that P.D. 127[1] invoked by

plaintiffsappellants themselves, specifically provides under Section 6 (paragraph
2) thereof that "the Solicitor General shall institute such actions or suits as may
be necessary to recover possession of lands covered by all void titles not
validated under this Decree." Hence, the Office of the Solicitor General, being
mandated by law, must be the proper party to institute actions to recover lands
covered by void titles under the said decree x x x.

fraud, [thus] it should be the Solicitor General who should file the case
for reversion.
4. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
validation of TCT No. T-63184 registered in the name of respondent
Corporation was in accordance with law.23
Petitioners Arguments

xxxx
As regards the validation of TCT No. T-63184 x x x, no error was committed by
the Court a quo in ruling that the same is in accordance with law. It is important
to note that the validation of the subject TCT was never disputed by the
Register of Deeds or any other government agency. Moreover, there is no
showing that the TCT of the defendant-appellee and the OCT wherein it was
derived were declared null and void by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1271. While
the TCT of the defendant-appellee was issued under L.R.C. Case No. 1, Record
No. 211, it was validated in accordance with law in Entry No. 184804-21-159
annotated at the dorsal side of the subject title.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 6, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in its October 3, 2011 Resolution, the
CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in this Petition:
1. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
Petitioners x x x have no cause of action.
2. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
action is a collateral attack on the Torrens Title of respondent
Corporation.
3. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
present action is to annul the title of respondent Corporation due to

In their Petition and Reply,24 petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed CA

dispositions and the nullification of respondents TCT No. T-63184 so that said
title shall not "hinder the approval of the Townsite Sales Application of the
[p]etitioners by the [DENR]-Cordillera Administrative Region and stop the
harassment being done by the Corporation on the [p]etitioners x x x."25 They
argue that they have equitable title over the subject property, having possessed
the same for many years and obtained the rights of their predecessor Torres;
that Civil Case No. 4946-R is not a collateral attack upon TCT No. T-63184, as
said title is null and void by virtue of PD 1271 and the ruling in Republic v.
Marcos; that there is no need to file a reversion case since TCT No. T-63184 has
been effectively declared void, and respondent is not in possession of the
subject property; and finally, that Entry No. 184804-21-159 cannot have the
effect of validating TCT No. T-63184, because PD 1271 itself states that only
certificates of title issued on or before July 31, 1973 are considered
valid.26 Since OCT No. O-281 the predecessor title of TCT No. T-63184 was
issued only on January 28, 1977, it is thus null and void, and all other titles
subsequently issued thereafter, including TCT No. T-63184, are invalid as well.
Respondents Arguments
On the other hand, respondents Comment27 simply reiterates the
pronouncement of the CA. Consequently, it prays for the denial of the instant
Petition.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be
present, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy."28

"Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership."29

to purchase the subject property, it appears that they are not claiming the same
through acquisitive prescription.

Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and

capable of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner.
Blacks Law Dictionary indicates that the term is used in two senses: first, to
indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also called "equitable
ownership"); and second, to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to
buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the
corporations books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished
from naked ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges
of ownership, as against possession of the bare title to property.30

The trial and appellate courts are correct in dismissing Civil Case No. 4946-R;
however, they failed to appreciate petitioners admission of lack of equitable
title which denies them the standing to institute a case for quieting of title.
Nevertheless, they are not precluded from filing another case a direct
proceeding to question respondents TCT No. T-63184; after all, it appears that
their townsite sales applications are still pending and have not been summarily
dismissed by the government which could indicate that the subject property is
still available for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. If TCT No. T-63184 is
indeed null and void, then such proceeding would only be proper to nullify the
same. It is just that a quieting of title case is not an option for petitioners,
because in order to maintain such action, it is primarily required that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the subject property a condition
which they could not satisfy.

Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently,
there are no certificates of title in their respective names. And by their own
admission in their pleadings, specifically in their pre-trial brief and
memorandum before the trial court, they acknowledged that they applied for
the purchase of the property from the government, through townsite sales
applications coursed through the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they
particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in order that the said title
would not hinder the approval of their townsite sales applications pending with
the DENR.Thus, petitioners admitted that they are not the owners of the subject
property; the same constitutes state or government land which they would like
to acquire by purchase. It would have been different if they were directly
claiming the property as their own as a result of acquisitive prescription, which
would then give them the requisite equitable title. By stating that they were in
the process of applying to purchase the subject property from the government,
they admitted that they had no such equitable title, at the very least, which
should allow them to prosecute a case for quieting of title.
In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject
property lies in the State.1wphi1 Thus, as to them, quieting of title is not an
available remedy.
Lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation are public land.31 Laws and
decrees such as PD 1271 were passed recognizing ownership acquired by
individuals over portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, but evidently,
those who do not fall within the coverage of said laws and decrees the
petitioners included cannot claim ownership over property falling within the
said reservation. This explains why they have pending applications to purchase
the portions of the subject property which they occupy; they have no legal or
equitable claim to the same, unless ownership by acquisitive prescription is
specifically authorized with respect to such lands, in which case they may prove
their adverse possession, if so. As far as this case is concerned, the extent of
petitioners possession has not been sufficiently shown, and by their application

With the conclusion arrived at, the Court finds no need to resolve the other
issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 5, 2011 Decision and
October 3, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84561 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.