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Less Pain, Same Gain: The

Effects of Priming Fairness
in Price Negotiations
Sarah Maxwell
Fordham University

Pete Nye
University of Washington, Bothell

Nicholas Maxwell
University of Washington, Bothell

ABSTRACT
This research demonstrates that, by priming a consideration for
fairness, a seller can increase a buyers satisfaction without
sacrificing profit. In simulated negotiations, participants primed to
consider fairness demonstrated more cooperative behavior, making
greater concessions that led to faster agreement. Fairness-primed
buyers consequently had a more positive attitude toward the seller
and expressed significantly greater positive subjective
disconfirmation of their expectations. These results show how selfinterest and social utility can work in concert once a concern for
fairness is activated. The results support the Models of Social Utility
and Group Identification and confirm the Expectancy
Disconfirmation Model of Negotiations. 1999 John Wiley
& Sons, Inc.

Negotiations are central to economic exchange. They are critical not only
in industrial selling (Alexander, Schul, & McCorkle, 1994), but also in
consumer exchange (Evans & Beltramini, 1987), particularly in foreign
countries. Because of the importance of negotiations, an ongoing effort
has been directed at facilitating the bargaining process.
Psychology & Marketing
1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Vol. 16(7):545562 (October 1999)

CCC 0742-6046/99/070545-18
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The present study extends this line of research by examining the

antecedents of negotiations. The context is a purely distributive price
negotiation with two people bargaining over the price of a used car for
which the seller wants more money and the buyer wants to pay as little
as possible (Thompson, 1990). The approach is social psychological
rather than economic, focusing on how antecedents affect not only the
monetary outcome but also the negotiation process and the buyers postpurchase satisfaction.
From the viewpoint of the buyer, it is obvious that the negotiation
could be expedited and the result would be more satisfactory if the seller
simply agreed to sell at a lower price. This, however, would be unsatisfactory to the seller. The contribution of the present study is to investigate a method whereby the buyers satisfaction with the process
and outcome can be increased without the sellers profits being decreased.
The proposed method is based on a finding reported by Lind and Tyler
(1988, p. 29, italics in original): The use of a fair procedure can increase
the satisfaction of all concerned without any increase in the real outcomes available for distribution. As applied to negotiation, this suggests that the perceived fairness of the process can increase buyers
satisfaction without any decrease in the price.

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BACKGROUND
Self-Serving Models of Negotiation
The traditional approach to price negotiations has evolved from the selfserving models of economic theory. Both buyers and sellers are assumed
to be motivated by self-interest. Both want to maximize their individual
utilities. Sellers want maximum profit and buyers want minimum cost.
The adversarial stance of the negotiators creates a competitive negotiating environment. In such a win lose environment, negotiators tend
to be inflexible. This tendency has been shown to be counterproductive
in that it can hamper the negotiation process and sometimes produce a
zero-sum outcome (Rhinehart & Page, 1992).
Research into negotiations from the economic perspective tends to
focus on possible means of resolving the parties conflicting motivations.
Raiffa (1982) presented the concept of a zone of agreement as a means
of reconciling these differences. Both buyer and seller are assumed to
have an internal reservation price, the most extreme price at which
each would settle. Because of self-interest, these reservation prices are
biased, but can overlap. Agreement is then possible within this overlapping zone.

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Social Utility Models of Negotiation

An alternative approach to understanding price negotiations is based
on social psychology. According to this approach, a negotiation is not
just an economic but a social interaction. Individuals are motivated to
maximize not only their own individual utility but the utility of the
group. [People] are concerned not only with the outcomes they receive
but also with the outcomes of their opponents (Loewenstein, Thompson,
& Bazerman, 1989, p. 426).
Although economic models of negotiation focus primarily on the outcome of a negotiation, social-utility models focus more on the process.
The judgment of social utility is frequently expressed in terms of fairness, in the sense of whether the process demonstrates a concern for
social utility by conforming to the standards of the community. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) proposed that Dual Entitlement
is one such standard of fairness.
Dual Entitlement is based on the recognition by both buyers and sellers that their opponents have a right to their reference (or expected)
transaction. For example, 75% of the respondents found it acceptable
for landlords to maintain their profits by raising rents when costs increase, even if it means that tenants living on fixed incomes would have
to move (Kahneman et al., 1986). It appears that, even when the outcome is against the interest of the buyers, they recognize the rights of
sellers to maintain profits when they are determined by a fair procedure
of cost-plus pricing.
Empirical evidence supports the motivating influence of social utility.
For instance, Loewenstein et al. (1989) conducted a study of preferences
for different distributions of payoffs among members of a group. They
found that, instead of maximizing their own utility, most disputants
preferred equal payoffs over either advantageous or disadvantageous
inequality (Loewenstein et al., 1989, p. 438). As Thaler (1992) concludes, a concern for fairness is an important influence on negotiation
outcomes.
Although some researchers, such as Loewenstein et al. (1989), have
argued that fairness is a preference, others, like Messick and Sentis
(1983, p. 64) established that preference (what one wants) and fairness (what one believes just) are distinct variables. They showed
that how much people would like to be paid is much higher than what
people think would be fair to be paid. Messick and Sentis (1983)
were concerned, however, that by asking two separate questions,
they had sensitized participants to the difference between the concepts. They therefore conducted a between-subjects study in which
they asked respondents to give either preferred or fair prices for different tasks. The results confirmed the distinctiveness of the concepts.

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Joint Self-Serving and Social Utility Models

The Messick and Sentis (1983) results are interesting in that they demonstrate how self-interest and social concern can have a dual effect. As
predicted by the self-serving models, respondents estimates of a preferred price and a fair price are both biased in favor of themselves. However, in accordance with the social utility models, the fair price is less
biased. Buyers estimates of a preferred price are more in their own
favor than their estimates of a fair price. Hence, it appears that a buyers
determination of a fair price incorporates both a concern for the self and
a concern for the seller.
Strong empirical support for the combined effect of both social utility
and self-interest was provided by Van Avermaet (1974). He conducted
a study in which participants completed a task for which they were to
be paid. The experimenter then told each participant in private that the
participant in the next room had left before he or she had received payment. The experimenter asked the participant to take the payment for
both him or herself as well as the other participant and to mail the
others portion to him or her. All but 2 out of 94 participants actually
did mail the money, demonstrating a social concern. However, how they
divided it with the other was biased in their own favor. They divided
the money based on a calculation of either hours worked or amount of
work accomplished, using whichever calculation would give them more
money. Thus, while exhibiting a concern for the other, participants also
demonstrated a concern for their own self-interest.

Social Utility and Cooperation

A concern for social utility has implications for negotiations in that it
can reduce the conflict between the partners and facilitate the process
(Bagozzi, 1995). When negotiators have a concern for the other party,
they tend to exhibit more coordinative behaviors. As opposed to the use
of competitive behaviors, coordinative behaviors tend to expedite the
negotiation process and increase the possibility of mutual satisfactory
win win agreements (Pruitt, 1983).
However, Pruitt (1983) cautions that too much cooperation can be
counterproductive, because it can result in less than optimal outcomes.
He contends that a concern for social utility needs to be offset by a
concern for self-serving utility. He calls this a Flexible Rigidity Model
(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), where negotiators are flexible about the
means (the negotiation process), but rigid about the ends (the final monetary outcome). As support for his theory, Pruitt (1983) cites the Dual
Concern Model put forth by Filley (1975). Filley says that there are two
motivational dimensions in negotiations: a concern for self and a concern for the relationship with the other party. Joint benefits are greatest
when both concerns are high.

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Social Utility Research

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Research into social utility has been approached in at least three different ways. For example, the Messick and Sentis (1983) approach assumes that both a self-serving concern and a group concern are always
present. The two opposing concerns are conceived to have simultaneous
effects that function in parallel (Lind & Tyler, 1988). As Macneil (1986,
p. 568) commented, Humans are cannot otherwise be inconsistently selfish and socially committed at the same time.
A second approach assumes that self-interest and group-interest vary
across individuals: Some people are more self-centered and concerned
about their own utility; others are more group-centered and concerned
about fairness. For example, Loewenstein et al. (1989) classify participants into three groups, depending on their degree of self- versus groupinterest: Ruthless competitors are those who consistently prefer to get a
better outcome than others; loyalists are those who want different outcomes depending on whether they have a relationship with the other
partner to the exchange; and saints are those who consistently prefer
equality of outcomes.
A third approach, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), assumed that negotiations are context based. A concern for ones own selfinterest versus group-interest can vary depending on the situation. According to this theory, one always acts in ones own self-interest, but
how one defines self can vary. People can define themselves on either
an individual or a group level. Individuals responses vary depending
on which level is more salient at the moment.
To test this hypothesis, Brewer and Kramer (1986) manipulated the
salience of either an individual- or group-level identification. They found
that when individuals were primed to have a group-level rather than
an individual-level identity, they took fewer points from a resource pool
for themselves, leaving more for the group.
Priming effects are achieved by highlighting for participants information that otherwise would not come to mind as quickly or strongly.
For example, researchers have primed prosocial concern in automobile
drivers stuck in traffic by having a confederate pass in front of their
cars, struggling with crutches. This prime diminished the drivers tendency to beep their horns (Baron, 1976). Priming has its influence not
because it changes how participants process available information and
not because it changes participants values, but rather because it
changes what information comes to mind as participants choose their
actions.
The present research investigates how individuals can be primed to
think of themselves in terms of the group, and thereby have greater
concern for the other party to the negotiation and a more cooperative
attitude to the negotiating process. Based on the premise that fairness
reflects a concern for group utility, it seems logical that instilling
thoughts of fairness would suggest a group orientation.

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Figure 1 Fair prices versus acceptable prices.

PILOT AND MAIN STUDIES

Pilot Studies: Priming Fairness
Two pilot studies were conducted to examine the perceptions of fair and
acceptable prices prior to negotiation. The first study was survey based
(N 134). The purpose was to verify that fairness and preferences are
distinct constructs in the context of negotiations.
In the study, participants were randomly assigned to buyer or seller
roles. They were given information about a used car and an apartment.
They were then asked to state their planned opening bid and reservation
price; this established their economic-based zone of agreement (Raiffa,
1982). In addition, they were asked to give the lowest and highest settlement prices that they considered fair; this established their social
psychological fair price zone (Maxwell, Maxwell, & Nye, 1997). To test
the effect of question order, the sequence of questions was reversed in
half of the surveys. Questions about a fair price range were consequently
asked first in half the cases and second in the other half.
Based on the results of the Messick and Sentis (1983) study, significantly different responses were anticipated as to what constitutes an
acceptable price and a fair price. Specifically, it was expected that both
would be biased in favor of the self but that a fair price would be less
biased (Figure 1). The results did confirm the Messick and Sentis (1983)
study, but only when questions about a fair price were asked after questions about an acceptable price.
To refine the test instrument and further substantiate the results, a
second survey was conducted (N 74). Again a fair price was significantly different from an acceptable price only when asked second. When
fair-price questions were asked first, it appeared that a concern for fair-

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ness was then incorporated into the determination of an acceptable

price. Hence, it appeared that questions of a fair price served to prime
respondents to consider social utility.
These two pilot studies supported the Messick and Sentis (1983) finding that fairness and preference are two distinct constructs, at least for
buyers. Buyers acceptable price ranges and fair price ranges are both
biased in the buyers self-interest, but their fair price ranges are significantly higher, at the high end of their acceptable ranges. Thus, when
primed to consider fairness, buyers appear to demonstrate a social concern in that they recognize the entitlement of the seller and shift their
range of fair prices in the direction of the seller. Based on the results of
these pilot studies, the main study investigated the effects on negotiations of priming a concern for fairness.

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The Study: Priming a Concern for Fairness

Prior studies into the effect of cooperative behavior in negotiations have
considered situations of integrative bargaining where there is opportunity for coordinative, problem-solving activities. The present study,
on the other hand, tests the effect of a concern for fairness in a distributive type of negotiation, where price is the only bargaining point. In
this study, both processes and outcomes are examined.
To support the hypothesized relationships, the literature of joint selfserving and social utility models is drawn on. Specifically, a self-serving
bias is assumed, but it is conceived that a concern for fairness also activates a greater concern for the other partys outcomes. This concern
for the other is then expected to create a more cooperative negotiation
environment. A more cooperative environment should affect the bargaining process and postnegotiation satisfaction.
To test the effects of a concern for fairness, half the respondents were
primed to think of fairness. The effects were tested within the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model of Negotiation (Oliver, Balakrishnan, &
Barry, 1994) (see Figure 2). This model is based on the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model of Satisfaction (Oliver, 1977) that represents satisfaction as the affective reaction to the perceived difference between
ones expectations and the actual outcome one experiences. This theory
was developed as an explanatory tool of consumer reactions, but was
modified by Oliver et al. (1994) to apply in the context of negotiations.
According to the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model of Negotiation,
negotiators have an internalized reference for the settlement price they
expect, just as consumers have for a purchase price. The actual settlement price in the negotiation is then compared with the internalized
expected price to determine disconfirmation. A negotiated price better
than the expected price is termed positive disconfirmation, in that it
disconfirms the expectation but the result is better than anticipated. An
actual price not as good as expected is termed negative disconfirmation.

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Figure 2 Expectancy Disconfirmation Model of Negotiation (Oliver, Balakrishnan, &

Barry, 1994).

It has been demonstrated empirically that satisfaction is the result of

positive disconfirmation (an actual settlement price that is better than
expected) (Oliver, 1977).
The comparison of expectations and outcomes can be either objective
(a quantitative analysis of the difference) or subjective (a perception of
the difference). In their test of the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model
of Negotiations, Oliver et al. (1994) showed that subjective disconfirmation was the more powerful antecedent of satisfaction. Subjective
disconfirmation mediated all the effects of expectations and actual outcome on outcome satisfaction. Satisfaction then had a positive effect on
the desire for future negotiations with the same partner.
Hypotheses
The study tests the effects of priming fairness only with buyers. The
hypotheses compare the bargaining process and outcomes of fairnessprimed buyers with those not primed.
Expected Settlement Prices. The social utility models of negotiation
suggest that a concern for fairness results in a recognition of the rights
of others. This was supported in the pilot studies: Fairness-primed buyers designated ranges of fair prices that were at the high end of their
acceptable prices, in the direction of the sellers range of acceptable
prices. Because priming for fairness shifts the buyers range of fair
prices, it was expected that his or her expected settlement price would
also shift.
H1: Fairness-primed buyers will expect a less favorable (higher) settlement price

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Actual Settlement Price. Based on the Dual Concern Model and

Pruitts Flexible Rigidity Model, it was anticipated that, despite buyers
shifting their expected settlement price in favor of the seller, their selfinterest would protect their actual settlement price. Hence, no difference was expected between the settlement prices of those who were
primed for fairness and those who were not.

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H2: Fairness-primed buyers will negotiate a settlement price that is

not significantly less favorable

(Note that, in conformance with the conventions of inferential statistics, the alternative hypothesis was tested: that a fairness-primed buyer
would achieve a less favorable settlement. However, no significant treatment effect was expected.)
Concessions. Participants primed to have a concern for fairness were
expected to be more flexible about the means and therefore more cooperative. They would respond more readily to the other party in the exchange. Because of their greater responsiveness, it was anticipated that
fairness-primed participants would make greater concessions, both initially and in their follow-up bids.
H3: Fairness-primed buyers will make higher opening offers.
H4: Fairness-primed buyers will make proportionately larger initial
concessions.

Process Facilitation. Because buyers primed for fairness were expected to make higher opening offers as well as larger concessions, the
two parties to the exchange were expected to move more rapidly and
more assuredly to a mutually agreeable price. It was therefore hypothesized that priming considerations of fairness would reduce the number
of innings and the negotiating time required.
H5: Fairness-primed buyers will conclude the negotiation in fewer innings (negotiation rounds)
H6: Fairness-primed buyers will conclude the negotiation in less time.

Subjective Disconfirmation. Consistent with the robust laboratory

finding cited by Neale and Bazerman (1991) that buyers generally outperform sellers, it was anticipated that the actual settlement price
would be in favor of the buyer, lower than the expected prices of both
treatment and control groups. Hence, both groups would report positive
subjective disconfirmation. However, fairness-primed buyers were expected to experience more positive subjective disconfirmation than selfcentered buyers. Because they expected a higher settlement price, the

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difference between their expectations and the actual would be greater.

Thus, the objective disconfirmation would be more. As a result, and
more important according to Oliver et al. (1994), the subjective disconfirmation would also be greater.

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H7: Fairness-primed buyers will express more positive subjective disconfirmation.

Outcome Satisfaction. Oliver et al. (1994) demonstrated that in negotiations, the effect of expectations on satisfaction is entirely mediated
by the subjective disconfirmation. Because the subjective disconfirmation of those primed to consider fairness was anticipated to be more
positive, their satisfaction with the outcome was expected to be greater.
In addition, based on the complementariness of the disconfirmation and
equity processes (Oliver & Swan, 1989), fairness-primed respondents
were also expected to perceive the outcome as being less inequitable.
H8: Fairness-primed buyers will be more satisfied with the outcome.
H9: Fairness-primed buyers will perceive the settlement as less inequitable.

Satisfaction with Opponent. Outcome satisfaction is an affective response to the bargaining process and outcome. Satisfaction has been
shown to have a direct effect on the desire of a buyer to participate in
another negotiation with the seller (Oliver, 1980). Hence, the higher
level of satisfaction on the part of those primed for fairness would result
in a greater desire to negotiate with the partner in the future.
H10: Fairness-primed buyers will be more willing to negotiate again
with the seller

Method
Participants and Task. Thirty-four undergraduate students (enrolled
in a negotiation workshop) participated in a one-on-one negotiation over
the price of a used car. All participants played the role of buyer and
were told that they would negotiate with the seller through a computer
link. In fact, all participants negotiated with the same seller, a computer
stooge programmed1 to respond to the buyers concessions with a medium (60%) reciprocity. That is, when the buyer made a price concession
the computer made a concession 60% as large.
The computer was also programmed to have a delayed response, increasing the perception that a real person was responding. Only one
1

The stooge program was developed by Professor P. V. Balakrishnan, University of Washington,

Bothell.

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Figure 3 Distribution of recent settlement prices, examined by all participants.

participant questioned whether he was negotiating with an actual person or with the computer itself.
All participants read the following background information:
Imagine that you are trying to buy a used car. The car is a red 1991
Toyota Celica, with 43,000 miles, air conditioning, air bag, cruise control, and an automatic transmission. You are not too sure what used
Celicas are selling for, so you looked through recent classified advertisements and found ten 1991 Toyota Celicas with similar options and
similar miles. When you called about those advertisements, you found
that those cars had been sold. You kept track of what they had sold for.
Heres your list of what the other Celicas sold for.
$8,300 $8,400 $8,400 $8,500 $8,500 $8,500 $8,600 $8,600 $8,700
$8,900
You decided to see how those prices were spread out, so (perhaps with
the help of a friend) you made the graph of the previous purchase prices
(see Figure 3).

They all examined the same bar chart (see Figure 3), summarizing
the distribution of recent settlement prices for the sale of similar used
cars. They negotiated until they reached agreement or deadlocked. Participants were assigned randomly to two groups, a control group and a
treatment group. All participants prepared for the negotiation by answering the same four questions as to highest price, opening price, lowest price, and expected price.
Experimental Manipulation. To prime the treatment group to consider fairness, they were also asked to give the lowest and highest fair
prices for the used car. Because all treatment participants responded to
these questions, they clearly had to think about fairness before entering

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the negotiation. Aside from this manipulation, all participants were

treated identically.

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Dependent Variables. Although the pilot studies examined only prenegotiation planning and expectations, the main study examined the
bargaining process and outcomes as well. The computer recorded the
final settlement price and several process measures, including the opening offer, the relative magnitude of the first concession (the concession
as a percentage of the bargaining range) and the number of innings and
time required to reach agreement.
Subjective outcome measures were collected with a brief postnegotiation questionnaire completed by the participants immediately after the
settlement. These measures included satisfaction with the outcome, perceived inequity, subjective disconfirmation, and willingness to negotiate
again with the opponent. Satisfaction was measured on a 7-point semantic-differential scale. Subjective disconfirmation was measured
with the 1-item scale used by Oliver et al. (1994). All other items were
measured on 7-point Likert scales.

RESULTS
The fairness effect observed in the pilot studies was replicated. The
range of prices that fairness-primed buyers considered fair was higher
than the range considered acceptable (see Figure 4). Among fairnessprimed buyers, the lowest price considered fair ($8,174) was significantly higher than both their lowest acceptable price ($4,794, p
.001) and their opening bid ($5,653, p .001).
Contrary to H1, fairness-primed participants expected settlement
prices that were not significantly different from control participants (Table 1: $8,408 vs. $8,352). Consistent with H2, fairness-primed participants did achieve the same settlement price as control participants
($8,021 vs. $8,168). In addition, the two groups were equally likely to
reach agreement (71%). However, treatment participants employed
more conciliatory processes to achieve these outcomes, were more satisfied with the results, and viewed the process as more equitable.

The Bargaining Process (See Table 1.). Fairness-primed buyers did

not make initial offers significantly higher than control participants
($5,653 vs. $5,045), contrary to H3. However, thereafter they made
larger concessions. The first concession (H4) made by treatment participants averaged 24% of the disputed price difference, whereas control
participants conceded only 9% (p .10). This concessionary behavior

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Figure 4 Fair-price zone versus acceptable-price zone. The buyers lowest fair price
($8,174) is significantly higher than both the lowest acceptable price ($4,794, p
.0001) and the buyers opening bid ($5,653, p .001).

moved treatment participants quickly toward their fair price zone.

Treatment participants reached agreement in fewer innings (16.7 vs.
28.6, p .05) and less time (12.8 vs. 21.3 minutes, p .05) than control
participants, confirming both H5 and H6.
Outcome Satisfaction and Perceived Fairness. As anticipated, the
actual settlement price was lower than the expected price for both
groups, but only treatment participants reported that the settlement
exceeded their expectations; control participants reported that the settlement fell slightly short of their expectations. This confirms H7: Treatment participants expressed significantly greater positive subjective
disconfirmation than control participants (5.18 vs. 3.76, p .05).
These results, however, do not support the argument put forth for
H7. The greater positive subjective disconfirmation of fairness-primed
buyers cannot be explained by greater objective disconfirmation, because control participants and treatment participants did not differ significantly in either their expectations or their outcomes. A possible
alternative explanation is that the more positive subjective disconfirmation of fairness-primed participants was encouraged by their
recognition of the sellers entitlement to a fair settlement. They were

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Hypothesis Test: Fairness-Primed Buyers versus Control Group

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Means
Hypotheses
Compared to the control group, buyers
primed for fairness will:
Planning Process
H1
expect a higher settlement price
Final Settlement
H2
negotiate a settlement price that is not
higher
Bargaining Process
H3
make higher opening offers
H4
make proportionately larger initial concessions
H5
conclude the negotiation in fewer innings
H6
conclude the negotiation in less time (minutes)
Subjective Outcomesa
H7
express more positive subjective disconfirmation
H8
be more satisfied with the outcome
H9
perceive the settlement as less inequitable
H10 be more willing to negotiate again

Control
Group

Fairness
Primed

Significance
(p Value)

n 17

n 17

8,325

8,408

ns

8,168

8,020

ns

5,045
0.091

5,653
0.240

ns
.06

28.6
21.3

16.7
12.8

.02
.02

3.76

5.18

.02

4.47
2.35
3.94

5.35
1.41
5.35

.08
.05
.03

Seven-point scales (1 low, 7 high).

consequently more aware of the sellers concessions. In contrast, the

more self-centered buyers needed much greater concessions to perceive
positive subjective disconfirmation.
As hypothesized (H8 and H9), fairness-primed participants also expressed greater satisfaction with the outcome (5.35 vs. 4.47, p .10)
and less perceived inequity (1.41 vs. 2.35, p .05). Not surprisingly, the
more satisfied treatment respondents were more interested in negotiating again with the seller (5.35 vs. 3.94, p .05) than were the control
participants. Thus H10 was also supported.

DISCUSSION
This study investigated one antecedent of price negotiations, the priming of a concern for fairness. Priming fairness was shown to elicit more
cooperative behavior. The result was increased satisfaction without a
lower final settlement price. The pilot studies verified that preference
and fairness are distinct constructs. Although the ranges of acceptable
and fair prices both demonstrate a self-serving bias, the range of fair
prices shifts in the direction of the other party to the negotiation, demonstrating a social concern.

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In the pilot studies, however, it was shown that when the range of
fair prices is asked first, the concern for fairness is then incorporated
into the range of acceptable prices. The pilot studies indicated, therefore, that a concern for ones own self-interest is fundamental to price
negotiations; at least for some people, a concern for fairness has to be
evoked.
The study indicated that once evoked, a concern for fairness has an
effect on the buyers behavior. The negotiation process is facilitated by
the buyer exhibiting more cooperative behavior, making greater concessions that result in faster agreement. Buyers have a more positive
attitude toward the seller and are generally more satisfied with the
outcome, even though there is no difference in the actual monetary
amount of the settlement.
What is especially intriguing about the results of the study is that
they were realized through the actions of the buyers alone: It was the
greater concessions on the part of the buyers who had been primed for
fairness that sped up the negotiation process and increased the satisfaction. It appears that there is something intrinsically satisfying about
acting in a manner that considers the other person to the exchange.

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Managerial Implications
The implication of the research is that by instilling thoughts of fairness
in a buyer before a negotiation, it is possible for a seller to increase a
buyers satisfaction without sacrificing profit. In addition, it is possible
to increase the buyers willingness to negotiate with the seller in the
future, indicating the inception of a relationship. This relationship does
not depend on the seller having to make concessions in the final price
to the buyer, but on both parties working together according to principles of fairness.
Theoretical Implications
The results of this study demonstrate how self-interest and social utility
models work in concert if a concern for fairness is activated. Otherwise,
as predicted by the economic models, self-interest is paramount in distributive type models of price negotiations.
Support is provided for the various models of social utility. The studies show that fairness-primed buyers recognize the entitlements of the
seller as suggested by the principle of Dual Entitlement (Kahneman et
al., 1986). Primed buyers consider a fair price to be one that is closer to
the interests of the seller. In addition, they are more likely to make
greater initial concessions to the sellers.
In support of the Group Identification Model of Lind and Tyler (1988),
the results provide evidence that there is a difference in behavior when
negotiators are primed to have a concern for fairness. The Group Iden-

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tification Model would explain this by saying that the priming causes
buyers to think of their self as being part of a group. The identification
with a group, however, does not negate the identification as an individual. The buyers concern for their own well-being is still evident. The
difference is that they also have a concern for the other.
This research also corroborated the importance of process as claimed
by Lind and Tyler (1988). The buyers acted in a more cooperative manner and subsequently judged the process to be more fair. The effect of
the process was more salient than the actual outcome in determining
satisfaction. It appears that although the economic outcome is influenced primarily by self-interest, the process is influenced by a social
concern. Buyers primed to consider fairness remained rigid about the
outcome but were more flexible about the process.
Finally, although not the purpose of this research, the study confirmed the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model of Negotiations developed
by Oliver et al. (1994): The buyers satisfaction was influenced more by
subjective than objective disconfirmation. This result provides empirical
support for Bagozzis (1995) contention that a social concern reduces the
conflict between the opposing goals of the buyer and the seller, thereby
facilitating the process.

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Opportunities for Future Research

The present research is limited in that the negotiations were conducted
under simulated conditions and several real-life situations were not addressed. First, the pilot studies gave conflicting evidence as to whether
sellers primed for fairness shift their range of fair prices toward the
buyer. This suggests that the effect of fairness priming might be less
with sellers than with buyers.
In the simulation, the computer was programmed to respond with
only medium (60%) reciprocity. If the reciprocity had been greater, perhaps both the treatment and control groups would have been more cooperative and more satisfied. Conversely, if the reciprocation had been
less, perhaps even priming a concern for fairness would not have any
effect. Alternatively, activating a concern for social utility might make
buyers even more angry with sellers. Further study is required to clarify
these effects.
This research also did not address a situation in which one participant in the negotiation is primed for fairness but the other is not. Further research is needed to analyze situations in which participants have
different levels of concern for fairness. Such situations could easily
arise, particularly in negotiations between participants from different
cultures, whether the culture of different industries or that of different
nations.
Finally, the studies were limited to only the single issue of price in
negotiations. It is anticipated that the results would be magnified in

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integrative negotiations where even greater emphasis is placed on process. Subsequent research is required to determine the effect of a concern for fairness in integrative negotiations.

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CONCLUSION
These studies demonstrate the positive effects of priming fairness in
distributive-type price negotiations. It appears that even in an individualistic society such as the United States, people have an underlying
social concern that can affect their economic interaction. Their concern
for maximizing their own economic utility is constrained by a concern
for the other party in the exchange, at least when a concern for fairness
is activated. Furthermore, demonstrating a concern for the other party
appears to be intrinsically rewarding, leading to greater subjective satisfaction despite no change in the objective outcome. Considerable further research is needed, however, to understand fully the role of fairness
in negotiations.

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The authors appreciate the helpful comments of Sundar Balakrishnan and the
anonymous reviewers of Psychology & Marketing. The research was partially
supported by a grant from Fordham University.
Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to: Sarah Maxwell,
Fordham University, 113 W. 60th St., New York, NY 10023 (maxwell@mary.fordham.edu).

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