carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo

1. Ramirez V. CA

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to
petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the
instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
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using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or

tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under
this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to
share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and
communication were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the
Bill.

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2. People V. Carlos

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3. Moncado V. Peoples Court

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo

Hilario Moncado v. Peoples Court case brief summary

Hilario Moncado v. Peoples Court

G.R. No. L-824, January 14, 1948

FACTS: In an ejectment case filed before the justice of the peace court of Guijulngan, Negros
Oriental, after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The
Court of First Instance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September 8, 1939 the notice
of receipt of appealed case and the period for pleading. Defendants were informed of such mail by
the postmaster but the same was not claimed, CFI of Negros Oriental, upon motion of plaintiff,
ordered defendants to vacate the land and to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of
PHP 18 as damages, plus costs. Defendants appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get
notice from post office was due to ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiffs
motion for default.
CFI denied defendants motion on June 19, 1940.

ISSUE: Was defendants failure to get notice valid and excusable?

RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendants are not entitled to a service of
copy of the motion that they are in default except when they file a motion to set aside the order of
default, in which event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings (Rule 27, Section 9,
Rules of Court). Second, failure to get notice was not excusable neglect as claimed by defendants.
Indeed, a notice, is deemed served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within 5 days from
first notice of postmaster (Rule 27, Section 8, Rules of Court).
Appealed order affirmed.

4. Bache & co., V. Ruiz

BACHE & CO (PHIL) and FREDERICK E. SSEGGERMAN vs HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ
GR No. L-32409

FACTS:

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo

Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to

respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of
Section 46 of National Internal Revenue Code and authorizing Revenue examiner Rodolfo de
Leon, to make and file the application for Search Warrant which was attached to the letter. At that
time Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note he instructed the Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of respondents de Leon and Logronio. The stenographer, upon
request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent
Judge asked responded Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found
to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz conducted a personal examination?

HELD:
No. The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus are granted. Search Warrant No. 2-M70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void.

RATIONALE:
Personal examination by the Judge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, the determination of whether
or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant and his witnesses.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was one conducted by the Deputy Clerk
of Court

Section 4 (Examination of the Applicant):

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The Judge or Justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complaint and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attached them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

5. Burgos V. Chief of Staff (AFP)

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan
Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed
by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

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Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford
vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
6. Gonzales V. Kalaw-Katigbak
FACTS:
Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review
for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and
that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of their
freedom of expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films.
For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed
an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was
classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the
abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes
showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians. VV.

Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in
some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression, so that censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting
prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other
public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive
influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test being
whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to the prurient
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interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the
Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but
it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave.

7. Iglesia ni Cristo V. CA
THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against
contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered
the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on
appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent
Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials
constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC
appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the
respondent Boards X-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted
10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB
to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program.

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Petitioner contends that the term television program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like
its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section
5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.
[The Court however] reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country
today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of
religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of
man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioners religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed
in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking
either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that
the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as
evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between
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the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace
of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech,
the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of
the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.

8. Ayer production V. Capulong

G.R. No. L-82380. 29 April 1988 (Supreme Court of the Philippines)
A politician objected to a movie being made about political events in the country in which he
would be mentioned.
Theme:

Other content restrictions

Sub-Issues:

Privacy

Test:

importance of FOE

Penalty:
Decision:

injunction for breach of privacy set aside

Jurisdiction:

Philippines (Supreme Court)

Facts:
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Australian film maker Hal McElroy and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA
(Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) to oust then President Ferdinand Marcos. They consulted with
General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who played major roles in the events.
While General Ramos signified his approval, Senator Enrile wrote a letter stating that he would
not approve of the use of his name or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television
production for commercial exploitation, and advised petitioners that in the production or
exhibition of said or similar film, no reference (whether written, verbal or visual) should be made
to him or any member of his family. The film producer deleted the name of Senator Enrile in the
script and proceeded to film the motion picture. Senator Enrile then filed a Complaint with
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking to
enjoin McElroy and Ayer Productions from producing the movie. Senator Enrile alleged that the
production of the film without his consent and over his objection constitutes a violation of his
right of privacy. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering McElroy and Ayer
Productions to desist from filming the movie, and from making any reference to Senator Enrile or
his family or any fictitious character identifiable with them. McElroy and Ayer productions
questioned the trial court decision in a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, claiming
their right of freedom of speech and expression.
Held:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
the respondent trial court.
Freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to film, produce and exhibit motion
pictures. The freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or through television. In our day and age,
motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression.
Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass
communication for information, education and entertainment.
Available to foreign-owned companies. This freedom is available in the Philippines both to locallyowned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies.
Commercial purpose does not affect the availability of the right. The circumstance that the
production of a motion picture is a commercial activity is not a disqualification for availing the
freedom of speech and of expression. Private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to
be sustained by being devoted to revenue producing activities. To exclude commercially owned
and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of
expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in the country.
Prior restraint presumed invalid. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the
instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by petitioners. The Judge restrained petitioners from filming the entire
proposed motion picture. Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights of
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freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of

prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms. The invalidity of prior restraint does not, of
course, mean that no subsequent liability may be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such
constitutional freedoms.
Counter-balancing with right of privacy on case-to-case basis. Our law, constitutional and
statutory, does include a right of privacy. It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise
scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or
"the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right.
Privacy of a "public figure" necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizens. A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy is permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a
public character. The subject matter of the movie relates to the non-bloody change of government
that took place in February 1986. Such subject matter is one of public interest and concern as it
relates to a highly critical stage in our history. It has passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media.
At all relevant times that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was
what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure." A public figure has been
defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. To be included in
this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the
public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer.
The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers,
war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand
Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some
extent at least, their right of privacy because: they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so
could not complain when they receive it; or that their personalities and their affairs had already
become public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press
had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest.
Private respondent is a "public figure" because of his participation as a principal actor in the
events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation was major in
character, a film reenactment that fails to make reference to such would be grossly unhistorical.
Privacy of a "public figure" necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizens; limitations. The
line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement
that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events. There must be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of
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private respondent. There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling
private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. To the
extent that the movie limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent to those
events which are reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into
his privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out
even without a license from private respondent.
9. Gonzales V. Comelec
[27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There
was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election
campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can
regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or
agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police
power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional
rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to
appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a
limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did
justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss
not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil
Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give
their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

RA

4880

unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present
danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
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before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It
is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive
evil
which
the
legislative
body
seeks
to
prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not
merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of
excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably
marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right
to
prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for
or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
10.

People V. Espuelas

Facts: Between June 9 and June 24, 1947, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y
Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing
on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several
newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, not only in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein
he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to
the latter's supposed wife, stating therein in part that "if someone asks you why I committed
suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the
whole world about this. And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to
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them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the
banditry of Leyte. Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our children to
burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I committed suicide because I am
ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty
government. I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self." Espuelas was charged for violating
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir
up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community. Espuelas
admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter and caused its publication in the Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one
Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as
Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a
limb of a tree. Espuelas was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a
violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Espuelas
appealed. Issue: Whether sedition laws unnecessarily curtain the citizens freedom of expression.
Held: The freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom." So statutes against sedition have always been considered not violative of such
fundamental guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily curtail the
citizen's freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. Not to be restrained is the
privilege of any citizen to criticize his government and government officials and to submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the
market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack is
nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. Herein, no particular objectionable
actuation of the government was made in the article. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it
is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article
drips with male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity
towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures Espuelas would burn and
would teach the younger generation to destroy. Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its
consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of
sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the
writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to particularize.
When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating
disturbance, the rationable of free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer is removed from
the protection of the constitutional guaranty. Although it be argued that the article does not
discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men; still, article 142
punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer at least to
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the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally
directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. To top it all, Espuelas proclaimed to
his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all
the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the
ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife", the
idea intended by Espuelas to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful
methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men. The meaning,
intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court
of appeals conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
11. Zaldivar V. Gonzalez

166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was
investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist
Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on
the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that
he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even
attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask
him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily
imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
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constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is
no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In
the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme
Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

12.Badoy V. Comelec
BADOY vs. COMELEC
35 SCRA 285
Facts: Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. avers that he is a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the lone district of North Cotabato. He prays that Section 12(F) of RA 6132 be
declared unconstitutional as the same denies individuals, who are not candidates, their freedom of
speech and of the press; and candidates the right to speak and write, discuss and debate in favor of
their candidacies or against the candidacies of others. Section 12 (F) provides that the Comelec
shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers, magazines and periodicals which shall be
known as Comelec space, and shall allocate this space equally and impartially among all
candidates within the areas in which the newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec
space, it shall be unlawful to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any
advertisement, paid comment or paid article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of
any person for delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy,
unless all the names of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are
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also mentioned with equal prominence. Comelec Resolution RR-724, as amended, merely
restates the ban in Section 12 (F).
Issue: Whether the ban in Section 12 (F) is valid or constitutional.
Held: Under Section 12 (F), the moneyed candidate or individual who can afford to pay for
advertisements, comments or articles in favor of his candidacy or against the candidacy of another
or which mention his name and the fact of his candidacy, is required to mention all the other
candidates in the same district with equal prominence, to exempt him from the penal sanction of
the law. The evident purpose of the limitation is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in
the election. The restriction is only one of the measures devised by the law to preserve suffrage
pure and undefiled and to achieve the desired equality of chances among all the candidates.
Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 12(F) in the light of the other provisions of RA
6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances among the various candidates
in the same district, the said restriction on the freedom of expression appears too insignificant to
create any appreciable dent on the individuals liberty of expression. It should be noted that
Section 8(a) of the same law, prohibiting political parties from aiding candidates and thus was
more restrictive than Section 12(F), was previously upheld to be valid. The limitation in Section
12(F) is a reasoned and reasonable judgment on the part of Congress. It is not unconstitutional.

13.Sanidad V. Comelec
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J
FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD.
1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new
constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
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The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable
question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform
such act is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the
governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for
deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the
questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation
of martial law.
14.Ledesma V. CA

FACTS:
Citiwide sold 2 cars to a certain Jojo Consunji evidenced by 2 invoices. Upon delivery of the cars,
Jojo paid with a Managers Check (PhP101,000.00). When Citiwide deposited the check, it was
dishonored for being tampered. Amount was changed from 101.00 to 101,000.00.

Citiwide reported the crime to the Phil. Constabulary where he found that Consunji was actually
Armando Suarez, a professional criminal.

One car was found abandoned, while the other was discovered to be in the possession of Jaime
Ledesma, who claims to have purchased the car in good faith from the registered owner, evidenced
by the LTO Registration.

RTC ordered the car to remain in the possession of Ledesma.

CA overruled RTC, stating that Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of property through false
pretenses amounting to fraud.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD:

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No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale. Failure to pay by Suarez through the
subsequent dishonor of the check did not render the contract of sale void. Ownership was already
transferred by the delivery of the cars to Suarez.

15.US V. Bustos
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged
communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals
signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific
charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who
have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right
to
free
speech
and
free press.

The
1987
Constitution
A
historical
and
juridical
study
The
Philippine

of

of
the
the
Philippine
constitution

Bill

Philippines
of
rights
explained

Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether
the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of
all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any
public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish
them.
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The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that
any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an
interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a
party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by
the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these
citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable.
In
no
way
did
they
abuse
the
privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.

Facts:

In 1915, numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary (privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien,
and five individuals signed affidavits, chargingRoman Punsalan, justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal.

The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens

The specific charges:

o Francisca Polintan asked for money and kept her in the house for four days as a
servant and took from hertwo chickens and twelve "gandus;"
o Valentin Sunga asked for P50
o Leoncio Quiambao: Punsalan gave him P30 and his complaint was shelved.

Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against him.
Issue: WON accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and
free press.
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law
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is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist
in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

Constitutional Discussion:
Freedom of speech was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900.

Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos" describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which
the Filipinos insist upon, said: "reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free
and by instituting Filipino delegates."

The Malolos Constitution zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and
petition.

President McKinley in the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission (1900) laying down
the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or
of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress
of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty.

The adoption of the US Constitution carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of great
English and American Constitutional cases.

Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not
be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.

Justice Gayner: "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers
or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."

The particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se.

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