Trespass to the Person:

A. Assault
Assault is an intentional and direct act of the Df which causes the Pf reasonable
apprehension of the immediate infliction of a force onto his person.
4 elements:
1. The mental state of the Df
In Tuberville v Savage, the Df told the Pf if it were not assize-time, I would not
take those words from you. The court held that these words negative the element
of intention on the Dfs part to injure the Pf and therefore assault was not
established.
2. The effect on the Pf
The Pf must feel reasonable apprehension of fear that a force will be inflicted
upon him and any reasonable man in his position will feel the same. In R v St
George, it was held that pointing an unloaded gun at a person constituted an
assault.
3. Capability to carry out the threat
In Stephen v Myers, the Pf threatened to hit the Pf and he advanced with clenched
fists upon the Pf. He was stopped by a 3 rd party just before he could reach the Pf.
Liable for assault as he was capable of carrying out his threat if he wasnt stopped
by 3rd party.
In Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (South Wales Area), picketing
miners threatened some other miners who did not join in the picketing. Not liable

as the picketing miners were in fact controlled and observed by the police. Thus,
not capable to commit any form of physical contact with the others miners. There
was no means of realising the threats of violence and abuse.
4. Bodily movement
In Innes v Wylie, a policeman, acting under an instruction, prevented the Pf from
entering a room. No assault as the policeman didnt take active measure to prevent
the Pf from entering the room, he was entirely passive and simply obstructed the
entrance of the Pf.
In R v Ireland, the court held that words which instil a reasonable fear of unlawful
and immediate physical violence does amount to assault.

B. Battery
Battery is an intentional and direct application of force to another person without that
persons consent.
4 elements:
1. The mental state of the Df
In Scott v Shepherd, the Df thrown a lighted squib into an open market area. A
picked it up and threw it upon B, B then picked it up and threw it away. The squib
hit the Pf whereupon it burst into flames. Df liable although his initial gesture did
not directly affect the Pf. While A and B were not liable as they reacted for their
own safety, and so they dont have intention to commit the act.
2. The Dfs act was under his control

In Gibbons v Pepper, the Df was riding a horse when someone hit the horse from
behind, causing the horse to bolt and collided with the Pf. Df not liable as the
incident was outside his control.
3. Contact
In Pursell v Horn, the court held that throwing water on Pf may constitute a
battery but throwing water on the clothes worn by the Pf might not be battery.
(contact with things attached to the person will be battery only if there is a
transmission of force to the body of the Pf)
In Cole v Turner, the court held that least touching of another in anger is battery.
In Wilson v Pringle, the CoA held that there must be hostile touching before it
amounted to a battery. (what is hostile touching? Df know that he is doing
something that the Pf may object to. No necessary involve violence or
malevolence)
4. Without the Pfs consent
In Nash v Sheen, the Pf went to a hairdressing salon where the Df used a tonerinse without first obtaining the Pfs consent. The Pf then suffered skin
complications due to an adverse reaction to the tone-rinse. Df liable as the consent
obtained did not include the tone-rinse and its consequences.
Asiah bte Kamsah v Dr Rajinder Singh & Ors stated that the existence of consent
will negative the purported unacceptable conduct of the Df.

C. False Imprisonment
In Termes de la Lay, false imprisonment is defined as the restriction of a persons
freedom of movement.
In Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd, FI is defined as infliction of body
restraint which causes Pf to be confined in an area determined by Df, which is
unlawful.
3 elements:
1. The mental state of the defendant
In W Elphinstone v Lee Leng San, it was held that false imprisonment cannot be
established through negligence. Intention of the doer is a prerequisite.
2. The restraint must be a direct consequence of the Dfs act
Aitkeen v Bedwell stated that only the person who directly causes the confinement
may be successfully sued for FI.
Ansell v Thomas stated that a person may be liable either because he himself
commit the act or that he had instigated another person to confine the Pf.
In Harnett v Bond, Pf was given a months leave but D2, who is the owner of the
asylum has the discretion to call the Pf back if he felt that the Pf couldnt look
after himself during the one month. D1 met Pf during his second day out when he
paid visit to some people at an office. D1 called D2 as he felt Pf acted strangely.
D2 asked D1 to make sure that the Pf stayed there. Pf was then brought back to
the asylum after 3 hours by car sent by D2. After nine years, Pf was sent to
another institution and was released as he was proven to be sane. D1 liable for FI

during the 3 hours restraint while D2 liable for the nine years restraint as the jury
held that Pf was sane 9 years previously at the time of committal to the institution.
3. The restraint must be complete
In Bird v Jones, Pf insisted on passing through a part of a bridge which was
appropriated for seats for a regatta. The Df stopped and directed the Pf to take
another route but the Pf refused and remained there for half an hour. No FI as the
restraint was not complete.
In Wright v Wilson, the court held that there were no FI arose when the Pf could
have escaped from his confinement, although it meant he would have trespassed
on anothers land in order to regain his liberty.
However, if a person is partially restrained but can only escape at the risk of injure
to himself, then the route of escape is not a reasonable way out. FI still exist.
Other considerations:
1. Knowledge on the part of the Pf
In Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd, the court held that a person can
be imprisoned without his knowing it.
In Murray v Ministry of Defence, the court held that it is not an essential
element that the victim should be aware of the fact of denial of liberty.
2. Entering premises under a contract
In Herd v Weardale Steel, the appellant wanted to be brought up at 11.00 a.m.
and was only brought up at 1.30 p.m. The court held that there were no FI as

the agreement between the parties was that the appellant should only be
brought up from the mine at 4.00 p.m.
3. Arrest and restraint by the authorities

D. Principle in Wilkinson v Downton

In this case, Df had jokingly told the Pf that her husband had broken both his legs as a
result of an accident and was lying in The Elms in Leytonstone. The Pf believed and
as a result she suffered nervous shock. Df liable as he had intentionally done an act
that was calculated to cause harm to the Pf, and the harm had in fact occurred when
the Pf suffered nervous shock.
4 elements:
1. There is an act, and not a mere omission.
In this case, the court held that the Dfs conduct is the direct cause of the Pfs
illness as it is the natural a consequence which can be expected.
2. The act must be wilfully done in that it is deliberate.
In this case, the court held that the Df wilfully done an act calculated to cause
physical harm to the Pf as there being no justification alleged for his act.
3. The act is calculated to cause some harm.
In Pasley v Freeman, the court held that a person who makes a false statement
intended to be acted on must make good the damage naturally resulting from its
being acted on.

4. Actual damage must occur.

In this case, actual damage is a necessary part of the cause of action.

E. Tort of Harassment
Khorasandjian v Bush, Pf was granted an injunction so that she would be protected
from further harassment as the Df, the former boyfriend of the Pf persistently pursued
the Pf as well as her family with unwanted visits and abusive phone calls.
Burris v Azadani followed the Khorasandjian v Bushs case.