Laurel vs.

Misa
77 Phil. 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to
the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty
over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.
HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or
sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the
power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty
per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no
suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the
Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from
Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409
January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this
absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the
United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in
the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75
Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a

body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent
thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor
thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed.,
1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that,
as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's
contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the
decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision
in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de factotherein and its
power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer
the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to
mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is
not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said
government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the
suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907,
and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists,
as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military
government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for
the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance
which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or
subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving
them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen
who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he
has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and
would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of
his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to
in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to
govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they

exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against
public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can
not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for
the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the
said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that
is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army,
subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra;
1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or
not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the
military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and
because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by
the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of
the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted
for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free
and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political
suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in
article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized
by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the
Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the
Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but
subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our
Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in
approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the
declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1,
Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of
his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice
regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the
attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it
is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by
the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way
that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United
States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as
well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese
occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution
provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation
of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of
the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition,
as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without
prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full
harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II,
section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that
"laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that
laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff,
Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally
suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such
action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As
allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the
rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines,
to the exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the
isolated cases 1brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 August 8, 1974
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another, thereby distributing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among
the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution and pursuant to proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated
January 17, 1973 and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as part of the
law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be understood, as follows:
a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around,
between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth,
length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial
sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through
Philippine Waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing.
c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or other parts thereof, or
railway or railroad within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement
or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles, or property or both.
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by

means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or
the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon
things of other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall,
upon conviction by competents court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical
injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the
offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by
firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If
physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or
brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping
for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery/brigandage. Any
person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving
them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed knowingly,
unless the contrary is proven.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code;
and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6235
AN ACT PROHIBITING CERTAIN ACTS INIMICAL TO CIVIL AVIATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course or destination of an aircraft of
Philippine registry, or to seize or usurp the control thereof, while it is in flight. An aircraft is in flight from the
moment all its external doors are closed following embarkation until any of such doors is opened for
disembarkation.
It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign registry to land in Philippine territory or
to seize or usurp the control thereof while it is within the said territory.
Section 2. Any person violating any provision of the foregoing section shall be punished by an imprisonment of
not less than twelve years but not more than twenty years, or by a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos but
not more than forty thousand pesos.

The penalty of imprisonment of fifteen years to death, or a fine of not less than twenty-five thousand pesos but not
more than fifty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person committing such violation under any of the
following circumstances:
1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger of the aircraft;
2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or explosive to destroy the aircraft; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious physical injuries or rape.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft
operating as a public utility within the Philippines, and explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or
material.
Section 4. The shipping, loading or carrying of any substance or material mentioned in the preceding section in
any cargo aircraft operating as a public utility within the Philippines shall be in accordance with regulations issued
by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Section 5. As used in this Act
(1) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid, mixture or single compound, which by chemical
reaction liberates heat and gas at high speed and causes tremendous pressure resulting in explosion. The term
shall include but not limited to dynamites, firecrackers, blasting caps, black powders, bursters, percussions,
cartridges and other explosive materials, except bullets for firearm.
(2) "Flammable" is any substance or material that is highly combustible and self-igniting by chemical reaction and
shall include but not limited to acrolein, allene, aluminum dyethyl monochloride, and other aluminum compounds,
ammonium chlorate and other ammonium mixtures and other similar substances or materials.
(3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reaction
wears away, impairs or consumes any object. It shall include but not limited to alkaline battery fluid packed with
empty storage battery, allyl chloroformate, allytrichlorosilane, ammonium dinitro-orthocresolate and other similar
materials and substances.
(4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal drug, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which
through chemical reactions kills, injuries or impairs a living organism or person, and shall include but not limited to
allyl isothiocyanate, ammunition (chemical, non-explosive but containing Class A, B or poison), aniline oil, arsine,
bromobenzyle cyanide, bromoacetone and other similar substances or materials.
Section 6. Any violation of Section three hereof shall be punishable by an imprisonment of at least five years but
not more than ten years or by a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos but not more than twenty thousand
pesos: Provided, That if the violation is committed by a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
manager, representative, director, agent or employee who violated, or caused, directed, cooperated or
participated in the violation thereof: Provided, further, That in case the violation is committed in the interest of a
foreign corporation legally doing business in the Philippines, the penalty shall be imposed upon its resident agent,
manager, representative or director responsible for such violation and in addition thereto, the license of said
corporation to do business in the Philippines shall be revoked.
Any violation of Section four hereof shall be an offense punishable with the minimum of the penalty provided in the
next preceding paragraph.
Section 7. For any death or injury to persons or damage to property resulting from a violation of Sections three
and four hereof, the person responsible therefor may be held liable in accordance with the applicable provisions of
the Revised Penal Code.
Section 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are for hire are
authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in the presence of the owner or shipper, or
his authorized representatives if present; in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of
this Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative refuses to have the same opened and
inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the loading thereof.

Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others
the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for,
and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board
the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
Section 10. The Civil Aeronautics Administration is hereby directed to promulgate within one month after the
approval of this Act such regulations as are provided in Section four hereof and cause the publication of such
rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for
three consecutive weeks. Such regulations shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette.
Section 11. This Act shall take effect after the publication mentioned in the preceding section.
Approved: June 19, 1971
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof, states "Excessive fines shall
not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. . .";
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society;
WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the loss of human lives
and wanton destruction of property but also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable economic
development and prosperity while at the same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the
latter's ability to maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the justice, public order and the rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said
crimes;
Now, therefore,
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to foster and ensure not only
obedience to its authority, but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy in a just and humane society;
Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving
them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and
shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or
on confession of the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or,

not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel,
its equipment or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit
any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so that it
shall read as follows:
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any
of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty
of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be
committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with
preference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the execution.
As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out the sentence shall be
changed to gas poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the judgment has become final."
Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a
woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case shall be forwarded immediately
by the Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power."
Section 26.<="" p="">
Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision of this Act shall be held to be unconstitutional
or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation. The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the approval hereof.

People v. Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other
boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and
Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw.
At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they
were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high

seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of
the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
G.R. No. 17958
February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and
Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away
in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in
the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine
and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one
of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat
arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
sixvintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too
for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too
horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these
people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and
Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were
arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was
interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by
the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each
of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them
in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of
elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or
forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court,
that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter
that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral
to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not
the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal
Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with
Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished
with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of
the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles
four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and
sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it
shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the
Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of
territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is
necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules,

laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed.
(Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President
McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the
Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person
and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General
Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the
Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish
Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has
never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions
elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code
finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec.
8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever,
on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S.
Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a
definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of
the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it
should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word

"authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious,
military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall
be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be
still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are
present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or
death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding
present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused
to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken
of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must
also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose
capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon
the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to
the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it
results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is
reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced
therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twentysixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case,
shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half
part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.