Power to Reclassify Lands

A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian

after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the
following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or
(2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
Sanggunian concerned.
However, such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of
the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen
percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities,
ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%)
Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred
fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification
and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be
governed by Section 65 of said Act.
The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a
city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to
prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of
land resources: Provided. That the requirements for food production, human
settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete
application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall
be deemed as approval thereof.
It is not the tax declaration which governs but the use of the property that is
relevant for the purposes of zoning.
LGC has not amended, modified, repealed or set aside RA 6657. The
DARAB, therefore, retains jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian reform

matters even though the landowner or respondent interposes the defense of

reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural use
LGUs need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
CORPORATE POWERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

To have continuous succession in its corporate name;

To sue and be sued;
To have and use a corporate seal;
To acquire and convey real or personal property;
To enter into contracts; and
To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the
limitations provided in the LGC and other laws.
I.

To have continuous succession in its corporate name

A local government must first have a corporate name in order to be able to act as a
juridical entity and exercise such corporate powers granted to it.
Change of Name
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical
Institute, change the name of component cities and municipalities, upon the
recommendation of the Sangguanian concerned, provided that the same shall be
effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the
political unit directly affected.
It will not dissolve nor destroy the identity of the municipal corporation, nor affect its
rights, privileges or liabilities.
It is prohibited to use the names of living persons except for justifiable reasons.
Corporate
The term signifies that a local government unit has a distinct and separate
personality an action against this entity cannot be filed against the officers;
judgment against the officers alone cannot bind the LGU; and assets owned by the
LGU cannot be made to satisfy the judgment against the officers.
LGUs may only be held liable for the acts of its officers only when they acted by
authority and in conformity with the requirements of the law.
The term corporate also signifies that as an entity, the LGU generally acts through a
governing body.
II.

To sue and be sued

While not an inherent power, this is vested in LGUs not only by the LGC of 1991, but
also in the charters creating them.
This explicit grant of power is one form of an express consent on the part of the
State to be sued.

Suability v Liability
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable
law, and the established facts. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
state has allowed itself to be sued. It is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove
that the defendant is liable.
GR: LGU sues through its local chief executive and as authorized by the
Sanggunian.
Exception: [City Council of Cebu v Cuizon] through its councilors in a representative
suit and as taxpayers
GR: LGUs must be represented by accountable public officers (city attorney or
provincial fiscal)
Exception: Government lawyer is clearly disqualified to handle the case, there exists
a conflict of interest
A municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by the private
lawyer, which work is beneficial to it: provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on
the adverse party; and provide further that no compensation in any guise is paid
therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.
Unless so expressly adopted, the work of a private lawyer cannot bind the
municipality.
III.
IV.

To have and use a corporate seal

To acquire and convey real and personal property

Public and Patrimonial Properties

LGUs hold properties in their governmental capacity as for properties for public use,
and proprietary capacity as for properties deemed patrimonial.
Public use. Consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by the LGU. Congress has absolute control. LGU holds it in trust for the
State. Cannot be the subject of contract and is beyond the commerce of man.
Cannot be acquired by prescription against the state. Cannot be the subject of
attachment and execution. Cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
All other property possessed is patrimonial and shall be governed by the New Civil
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Congress has no absolute
control. Can be the subject of a contract and may be alienated.
Submerged lands, foreshore lands, and reclaimed lands
Submerged and foreshore lands belong to the state and cannot be alienated
inalienable natural resources.
After these lands are reclaimed in accordance with law they will cease to become
public properties and may thereafter be disposed of as patrimonial properties.
V.

To enter into contracts

Requisites of a valid local government contract

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

power to enter into the particular contract

prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned and a legible copy of the
contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the
city, municipal or barangay hall
if the contract involves the expenditure of public funds, there should be an
actual appropriation and a certificate of availability of funds by the treasurer of
the LGU
contract must conform with the formal requisites of written contracts
prescribed by law
if a province is a party to a contract conveying title to real property, the
contract must be approved by the President. if a municipality is a party, the
contract must be approved by the Governor.

Non-compliance with I and iii contract is ultra vires and is null and void
Non-compliance ii and iv, contract is defective, may be ratified.
The doctrine of estoppel will not apply to void contacts.
The doctrine of implied municipal liability applies to transactions without contracts but
could have been valid had one been entered into, to the extent of the benefit
received.
Power to Negotiate and Secure Grants
Local chief executives may, upon authority of the Sanggunian, negotiate
and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or
facilities under Section 17 of the LGC, from local and foreign assistance agencies
without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department,
agency, or office of the national government or from any higher local government
unit.
However, such projects financed by such grants or assistance with national
security implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned, provided
that when such national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon signing of such
grant agreement or deed of donation, report the nature, amount and terms of such
assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President.

CASE DIGESTS

TOPIC: Power to Reclassify Lands

DAR v Sarangani Agricultural CO., Inc., G.R. No. 165547. January 24,
2007

FACTS:

Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been
reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal
zoning ordinance, and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
Municipality of Alabel.
The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on
March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities
the Municipality of Alabel was made the capital of the new province where the
capitol building and all other national and provincial offices shall be
established
On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series
of 1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying
lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005
Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses
On March 2, 1998, the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Saranganiapproved the
said Resolution.
A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) commercial
farms deferment scheme
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents' properties
located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified
from agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial
institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use
plan of Alabel.
On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI)
filed an application for land use conversion of the following parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares
members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc.
(SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary opposing the application
for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were
merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial
farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, an "Urgent Petition
for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of Banana
Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the
PARC Secretariat on July 14, 1999.
DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI's application for land use
conversion
Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution

respondents appealed to the Office of the President---dismissed the appeal

and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents' motion for
reconsideration was denied
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the
same issues.----CA ruled in favor of SACI

ISSUE:
WON DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference
so as not to defeat the very purpose of the local government unit (lgu)
concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic
benefits in pursuance to its mandate towards the general welfare
HELD:
Yes.
DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or the Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural
Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion:
VI.

POLICIES AND GUIDELINES

b)
Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the
application, the lands are reclassified as commercial,
industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the new
or revised town plans promulgated by the local government
unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory
Board
(HLURB)
or
by
the
SangguniangPanlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in
accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, as implemented
by MC No. 54, and Executive Order No. 72, Series of
1993 17 of the Office of the President.

In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands.
Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of
1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into NonAgricultural Uses" issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified
the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to
reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances
authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and
approval of the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the
HLURB for highly urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with
Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993, thus:

SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans 19 and ordinances as

primary reference documents in land use conversions. Pursuant to RA 6657
and EO 129-A, actions on applications for land use conversions on individual
landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of DAR, which shall utilize as its
primary reference documents the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinance passed upon and approved by the LGUs
concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for nonagricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in
declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the
ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent
administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that
while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving
applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners on
their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to
compliance with the requirements and limitations under existing laws
and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to
be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable
for conversion and those falling under environmentally critical areas or
highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR's
power in such cases may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the
very purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve
social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general
welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as
primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by
individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with the
standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and regulations of
the DAR. . . . 20
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly
regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No.
6657 are present. 21 In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA
that DAR's scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited
to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where,
because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to
urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the
local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to
non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993,
and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the
comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of
respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for
non-agricultural uses. SCaIcA

This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is

included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be
automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject
to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is present
here is that a portion of respondents' property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion
totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts,
are covered by CARL's ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15,
1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon
the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL
or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the
Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into
non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents' properties are
located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the
reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to
supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands
explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing,
amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." Thus, where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.

TOPIC: Corporate Powers

MUNICIPAL BOARD, in representation of the City of Cebu vs. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, G.R. No. L-18946, December 26, 1964
FACTS:
The University of Southern Philippines Foundation, through its president, Mr.
Agustin Jereza, applied for inclusion in the list of real estate exempt from real
property taxation to the City Assessor of the City of Cebu for school purposes.
In reply, the City Assessor informed that the lots were considered exempt from
real property taxation except Lots Nos. 313, 317, 340, 341, 342 and 460 B. Not
satisfied with the decision of the City Assessor, the University of Southern Philippines
Foundation appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Cebu.
Thereby, said Board granted exemption to the lots.

Then, the Municipal Board, in representation of the City of Cebu, appealed to

the Court of Tax Appeals. However, the Court of Tax Appeals, dismissed the case on
the ground that the City of Cebu, represented by its Municipal Board, cannot appeal
from the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals for it is merely the
instrumentality of the City of Cebu and the latter being a governmental agency is not
among those who may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals enumerated in Section 11
of Republic Act No. 1125.
The Municipal Board for and in representation of the City of Cebu appealed to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Cebu can appeal from the decision of the Board of
Assessment Appeals.
HELD:
Yes, the City of Cebu constitutes a political body corporate created by a
special charter (Commonwealth Act No. 58), endowed with the powers which pertain
to a municipal corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and be sued. It
is authorized to levy real estate taxes for its support. For instance, Section 75 of its
charter provides, "One-fourth of all moneys realized from the real estate tax herein
provided for shall be devoted exclusively to the support of free public primary
schools of the City, and to the erection and maintenance of suitable school
buildings."
In the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu City exempting
the lots in question from the payment of real property tax, no entity is more adversely
affected than the City of Cebu, for it stands to lose a yearly income equivalent to the
realty tax: seven-eighths of one per centum on the assessed value of said lots.
As to the personality of the Municipal Board to represent the City of Cebu in
this suit, Sec. 58 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 expressly vests in the Municipal
Board the authority to appeal from the decision of the City Assessor to the Board of
Assessment Appeals. This indicates legislative intent to lodge in the Municipal Board
the right to represent the City in an appeal from an adverse decision of the Board of
Assessment Appeals.

City of Manila vs IAC, G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

FACTS:

Irene Sto. Domingo, widow and together with her minor children were the
respondents in this case. When Irenes husband died, it was buried in a memorial lot
in North Cemetery in manila which they leased (for 50 years) from the city
government. By virtue of an Administrative Order issued by then City Mayor, they
exhumed the remains of the decedent, placed it in a bag and then store it in a
warehouse together with the other thousands of bags without informing the family.
On one all souls day, Irene and the family was dismayed on what they found out.
The said lot was leased to another. Upon confrontation with the cemetery, they were
asked to look for the remains of their decedent in the warehouse.

Hence, Irene filed a case against the city of manila.

The city alleged that North Cemetery is exclusively used for public purpose.
Since the city is a political subdivision, it cannot be sued for acts committed by its
employees in the performance of their governmental functions.

Respondents on the other hand maintain that by entering into a contract of

lease, it is a proprietary function and, thus, the employees may be sued.

ISSUE:

WON the operation of a public cemetery is a governmental function.

HELD:

No, it is a proprietary function.

Municipal Corporations powers are twofold in character-public, governmental

or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state
and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and
political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate.

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable
to third persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil.
184 (1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).

The court also added..while the following are corporate or proprietary in character,
viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses,
cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city
activities of a proprietary character.

With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its
proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot
was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease
contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
(Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach
of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for
such breach is prescribed in the contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148
SCRA 635 [1987]).

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City
of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and
check the duration of the contract of lease.

Dacanay vs Asistio, G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992

FACTS:

An ordinance was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission,

designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for
flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea
markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del 96" where the
petitioner lives. Licenses to conduct vending activities on the said street were issued
to several vendors for the fees paid by the latter.

Later, the OIC mayor of Caloocan caused the demolition of the said stalls.
The said vendors applied for preliminary injunction (which was granted by the court)
to discontinue such demolition. However, the injunction was later lifted. When
Mayor Asistio later on sat as the Mayor, he did not pursue the clearing operations.

Dacanay, a concerned citizen, then wrote a letter saying that there was an
illegally-constructed wall stalls in Heroes street and such stalls must be demolished.
After several follow-ups, no response was made by the city hall. He sought the help
of the then president Aquino but his letter was referred to the city of Caloocan. The
City secretary informed the president that they are still studying whether or not to
pursue the clearing operations.

Dacanay then filed a complaint in the Ombudsman against Asistio and the
City engineer. The latter said that due to the large number of affected people, it
would be harsh and inhuman for them to pursue the clearing operations considering
also that relocation is not an easy task.

In reply, Dacanay maintained that respondents have been derelict in the

performance of their duties and through manifest partiality, have caused undue injury
to the Government and given unwarranted benefits to the stallholders.

Ombudsman recommended the filing of information. Dacanay then secured a

mandamus for the city officials to continue the clearing operations.

ISSUE:

WON public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to market

stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila
Commission.

HELD:

No.

There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents
market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, A public street is property
for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424. Civil Code).
Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other
contract

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing
portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being
contrary to law.

The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del 96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses
by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and
roads for public use. Mayor Robles Executive Order may not infringe upon the
vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to
serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the
public respondents had started to look for feasible alternative sites for flea markets.
They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.

SEVERINO B. VERGARA vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J. LAJARA,

and VIRGINIA G. BARORO,G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009

FACTS:
1. The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a member,
issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to
negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang, and
Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing, the choice for the new
city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay
Saimsin, Calamba.
2. The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing
Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by Pamana with a total area of
55,190 square meters for the price of P129,017,600.Mayor Lajara was also
authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required documents.
3. The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara,
entered into the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA).
4. The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council.
Petitioner alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the City
Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on Audit.
5. Petitioner questioned the lack of ratification by the City Council of the
contracts.
6. The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of the
MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited
Section 22of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior authority
and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did not deny the
fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate and sign the
subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact
Resolution No. 280.
7. The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not a
condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on
behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council
and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City Councils stamp
of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

8. Aggrieved by the Ombudmans findings, petitioner elevated the case before

this Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the
ratification by the City Council of Calamba.

HELD:

Ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for the local
chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior
authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution No. 280 is the City
Councils stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject
lots.

Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government

Code of 1991, provides:

Section 22. Corporate Powers. - x xx

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be

entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or
barangay hall. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and
compensation of the Chief Executive. Specifically, it states that:

Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. - x

xx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of

which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:

x xx

(vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in
its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the sangguniangpanlungsod or
pursuant to law or ordinance; (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of
prior authorization or authority from the SangguniangPanlungsod and not ratification.
It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No. 280 authorizing
Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Resolution No. 280 states:

Resolution No. 280

Series of 2001
A Resolution authorizing the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon. Severino J.
Lajara to purchase lots of Pamana Inc. with a total area of fifty five
thousand square meters (55,000 sq. m.) situated at Barangay Real,
City of Calamba for a lump sum price of one hundred twenty nine
million seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P129,017,600), subject
to the availability of funds, and for this purpose, further authorizing the
Hon. Mayor Severino J. Lajara to represent the city government and to
execute, sign and deliver such documents and papers as maybe so
required in the premises.

WHEREAS, the City of Calamba is in need of constructing a modern

City Hall to adequately meet the requirements of governing new city
and providing all adequate facilities and amenities to the general public
that will transact business with the city government.

WHEREAS, as the City of Calamba has at present no available real

property of its own that can serve as an appropriate site of said modern
City Hall and must therefore purchase such property from the private
sector under terms and conditions that are most beneficial and
advantageous to the people of the City of Calamba;

NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Kagawad S. VERGARA duly

seconded by Kagawad R. HERNANDEZ, be it resolved as it is hereby
resolved to authorize the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon. Severino J.
Lajara to purchase lots of Pamana, Inc. with a total area of fifty five
thousand square meters (55,000 sq.m.) situated at Barangay Real, City
of Calamba for a lump sum price of One Hundred Twenty Nine Million
Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P129,017,600) subject to
the availability of funds, and for this purpose, further authorizing the
Hon. Mayor Severino J. Lajara to represent the City Government
and to execute, sign and deliver such documents and papers as
maybe so required in the premises.62 (Emphasis supplied)

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not
a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution
issued by the SangguniangPanlungsod, it cannot be said that there was evident bad
faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification alone does not
characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to
Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to Calamba City.