XV.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

A. Criminal Due Process
1. PEOPLE v. ESTRADA
Facts: December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, while
the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man
from the crowd walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the Bishops
chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant saw this. He requested the
accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite
repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the
victim with his nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife
and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up and shouted via
the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a man, with red
stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him
to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard,
was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a Demurrer to Evidence where he claims that:
prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the
victim; and that accused-appellant was of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez
(Jail warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant, to be treated at
the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or
be transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was
pending, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused
for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel
informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting
the same. The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the
Demurrer to Evidence. Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in
the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the
accused being confined and diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue: WON he was indeed insane
Held: When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have
been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law

presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during
a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is
always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are certain
circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant
may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he
attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone. Accused-appellants history
of mental illness was brought to the courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct
matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally incompetent
person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity
investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of
the trial court. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental condition,
the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded
on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The fact that accusedappellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist
in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity
of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or
some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the medical
history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of
accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should
have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, there were
letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the
counsels filing of motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of
accused-appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal
assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a
medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death!
Judgment: At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible
for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes
commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.
Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to
participate in his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the

conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a

determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

2. IN RE: WINSHIP
FACTS: At age twelve, Samuel Winship was arrested and charged as a
juvenile delinquent for breaking into a woman's locker and stealing $112 from
her pocketbook. The charge also alleged that had Winship's act been done
by an adult, it would constitute larceny. Relying on Section 744(b) of the New
York Family Court Act, which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt
be based on a preponderance of the evidence, a Family Court found Winship
guilty, despite acknowledging that the evidence did not establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship's appeal of the court's use of the lower
"preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof, was rejected in both the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and in the New York Court
of Appeals before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
ISSUE: Does the requirement that juvenile convictions rest on
"preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof, as opposed to that stricter
"beyond a reasonable doubt" threshold, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause?
CONCLUSION: Yes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court found that when
establishing guilt of criminal charges the strict "reasonable-doubt" standard
must be applied to both adults and juveniles alike. The Court noted that by
establishing guilt based only on a "preponderance of the evidence," as is
customary in civil cases, courts were denying criminal defendants a
fundamental constitutional safeguard against the possibility that their fate be
incorrectly decided due to fact-finding errors. The Court concluded that mere
variations in age among criminal defendants will not suffice to warrant the
use of different burdens of proof so long as they all face loss of liberty as a
possible sentence.

3. SCOTYS DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER (Full text)

4. OLAGUER v MC
FACTS:

June 13. 1980 -the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines 3 created the respondentMilitary Commission No 34 to try
criminal case filed against the petitioners.

July 30, 1980 - an amendedcharge sheet was filed for seven (7)
offenses, namely:

(1) Unlawful possession of explosives and incendiarydevices;

(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. ArturoTangco, Jose Roo and Onofre
Corpus;
(5) Arson of nine buildings;
(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. LeonardoPerez, Teodoro Valencia and
Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and
(7) Conspiracy and proposal tocommit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.

December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the Petition, the

respondent Military Commission No. 34 passedsentence convicting the
petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.

The thrust of petitioners arguments is that military commissions have

no jurisdiction to try civiliansfor offenses alleged to have been committed
during the period of martial law. They also maintain that theproceedings
before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of
their constitutional right todue process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
DISMISSED - the Petitions for habeas corpus are for having become moot
and academic.
GRANTED - The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL - The creation of the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 to try civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared
unconstitutional and all its proceedings are deemed null and void. The
temporary restraining order issued against the respondents enjoining them
from executing the Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is
hereby made permanent and the said respondents are permanently
prohibited from further pursuing Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the

petitioners. The sentence rendered by the respondent Military Commission

No. 34 imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for
being null and void, and all the items or properties taken from the petitioners
in relation to the said criminal case should be returned to them immediately.

the national emergency effectively divests the respondent Military

Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its supposed
authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners. The said
proclamation states:

RATIO:

"The military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon
final determination of case's pending therein which may not be transferred to
the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules
on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render prosecution of the
cases difficult, if not impossible."

(1) Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for

alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.Due process
of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands
to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among
others, a trial. Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses
under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process.
(2) Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive power to
hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of
a citizen. In Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme Court furtherstressed that
the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
(3) Following the principle of separation of powers underlyingthe existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power
and the duty of interpretingthe laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It
is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open
and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the
period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts.
(4) Respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been rendered
too hastily to the prejudice to the petitioners, and in complete disregard of
their constitutional right to adduce evidence on their behalf.Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does
have the jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed
ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the SolicitorGeneral, the said
tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed,
it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted
of jurisdiction.
(5) Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial
law in the Philippines and abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to

(6) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect because stability in
jurisprudence is desirable. Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest
demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than
anything else is that this Court should be right.
ISSUE # 2: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic
because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions
were already released from military confinement. When the release of the
persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed
is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from
their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become
moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer
(and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

5. GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was
killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport.
His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head
by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three
hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to
be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a
communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due
to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national
mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the
military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando
Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with
Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product
of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the
two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of
them.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and

ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by
nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also
granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate
comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy
of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse,
resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal
did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be
set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the
accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving
them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and
academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when
former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second
motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices
and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the
Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent
that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang
Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered
then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First
Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant
Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the
back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to
escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached,
Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on
their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group
and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had
stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also
predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos
came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino
was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was,
therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case
disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which,
at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any

suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would

be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and
subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses
shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the
case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment
was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony
of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang
personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted
may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid
itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and
make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes
"any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any
judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents
at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months
by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the
case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth,
and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By

it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all
claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition
and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the
respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not
have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be
tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents
accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people,
under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and
judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority
nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own
conscience and honor.

6. SALAZAR v PEOPLE
Doctrine: If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only
granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also
on the civil liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a
nullity as it violates the constitutional right to due process.
FACTS: In 1997, petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Jaucian Timario were
charged with stafa before the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court. The estafa
case allegedly stemmed from the payment of a check worth P214,000 to
private respondent J.Y.Brothers Marketing Corporation (JYBMC) through
Jerson Yao for the purchase of 300bags of rice. The check was dishonored
by drawee Prudential Bank as it is drawn against a closed account. Salazar
replaced said check with a new one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It is
again dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD). The
DAUD means that the account to which the check was drawn had sufficient
funds. However, the fund cannot be used because it was collected against a
deposited check which is yet to be cleared. Trial ensued. After the
prosecution presented its evidence, Salazar filed a demurrer to evidence with

leave of court, which the trial court granted. In 2002, the trial court rendered
judgment acquitting Salazar, but ordered her to remit to JYBMC P214,000.
The trial court ruled that the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish
the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner
and the issuer of the check, Timario. As a mere endorser of the check,
Salazar's breach of warranty was a good one and did not amount to estafa
under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Timario remained at
large. As a result, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil
aspect of the decision with a plea to be allowed to present evidence. The trial
court denied the motion. Because of the denial of the motion, she filed
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court alleging she was
denied due process as the trial court did not give her the opportunity to
adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.
HELD: Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to
present here vidence as regards the civil aspect of the case. The acquittal of
the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the
liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if
there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. If the accused
is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment
of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from
the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor. Under
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained the demurrer
to evidence partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the
accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, thereby waives
his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis
of the prosecution's evidence he has the right to adduce evidence not only on
the criminal aspect, but also on the civil aspect of the case of the demurrer is
denied by the court. In addition, the Court said if the demurrer is granted and
the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the
trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer

to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability,
the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it violates
the constitutional right to due process.

B. Bail
7. PEOPLE V DONATO
FACTS: In the original Information filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case
86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an
Amended Information which was filed on 24 October 1986, Rodolfo Salas,
alias "Commander Bilog" (of the New People's Army [NPA]), and his coaccused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation
to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code. At the time the Information was
filed, Salas and his co-accused were in military custody following their arrest
on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila;
he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of
P250,000.00 was offered for his capture. A day after the filing of the original
information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for Salas and
his co-accused was filed with the Supreme Court which was dismissed in the
Court's resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the
parties under which Salas "will remain in legal custody and will face trial
before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the
arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately
released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person. On 7 November 1986, Salas filed with the court below a Motion
to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute
an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished, to which the Solicitor
General filed an Opposition. In his Order of 6 March 1987, Judge Procoro J.
Donato (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila) denied
the motion to quash. Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order,
Salas filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, which the Solicitor General
opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 on the ground that since
rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of PD 1996, 942 and
1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain,
or head a rebellion, the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of
his guilt is strong. On 5 June 1987, the President issued Executive Order 187
repealing, among others, PDs 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force
and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored. Executive Order 187 was

published in the Official Gazette in its 15 June 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24)
which was officially released for circulation on 26 June 1987. In his Order of
7 July 1987 the Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order 187,
granted Salas' petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and
imposed upon Salas the additional condition that he shall report to the court
once every 2 months within the first 10 days of every period thereof. In a
motion to reconsider the above order filed on 16 July 1987, the Solicitor
General asked the court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00
alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular 10 dated 3 July 1987,
the bail for the provisional release of an accused should be in an amount
computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium
penalty imposable for the offense and explaining that it is recommending
P100,000.00 because Salas "had in the past escaped from the custody of the
military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government
through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a
foreign ideology is attained." On 17 July 1987, the Solicitor General filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny
bail to Salas and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with
this main condition of his bail to appear in court for trial." In a subsequent
Order dated 30 July 1987, the Judge granted the motion for reconsideration
of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
but denying the Solicitor General's supplemental motion for reconsideration
of 17 July 1987 which asked the court to allow the Solicitor General to
present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of
7 July 1987. The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the
Judge a Advocate General, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
a prayer for restraining order/ preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether Salas should be granted temporary liberty pursuant to his
right to bail.
HELD: Bail cannot be denied to Salas for he is charged with the crime of
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It
is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be

impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required." Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, also provides that "all persons in custody shall, before
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong." Therefore, before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Accordingly, the prosecution
does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. The 1987 Constitution strengthens
further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; overturning the
Supreme Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile.
However, Salas has waived his right to bail in GR 76009 [In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig.
Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno]. On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original
information in Criminal Case 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for
habeas corpus for Salas, and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion, was filed with the Supreme Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida
Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel
Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col.
Saldajeno praying, among others, that the petition be given due course and a
writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to produce the bodies
of Salas and his co-accused before the Court and explain by what authority
they arrested and detained them. When the parties in GR 76009 stipulated
that "Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody over his person," they simply meant that
Salas will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual
confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his
co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants
of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the
deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo
Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such
a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that
Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had the
parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to Salas and his

counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must
be remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested before the
Supreme Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a
warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against Salas and
his co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be
released, further confirmed the agreement that Salas shall remain in custody
of the law, or detention or confinement. Consequently, having agreed in GR
76009 to remain in legal custody, Salas had unequivocably waived his right
to bail. The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would
not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

8. OBOSA v CA
Facts: On 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe
charged Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two counts, by
separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime
N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August
1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila, as
Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near
the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged that
the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the
victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a
band. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was
strong. During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried
jointly, Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. At
the time of the commission of the two offenses, Obosa was a virtual
"escapee" from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a
prison term for robbery as a maximum security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of
a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya,
Quezon, Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on
the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could
inquire about the whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa was out of prison, he
was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged
against him as principal for the ambushslaying of Secretary Ferrer and his
driver. In its decision dated 25 May 1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31 May 1990, the

lower court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, Obosa
manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post
bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted Obosa's
motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa
filed a written notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby perfecting appeal
from the decision. On 4 June 1990, Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of
P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the
lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of
release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa
also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time of the commission of
the double murder, Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. On 6
September 1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion, praying for
cancellation of Obosa's bail bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to
which the People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate Court issued
its Resolution dated 19 November 1993: a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b)
nullifying the trial court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to Obosa,
and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest. Obosa's twin motions for
reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the
appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were
submitted and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second
Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit. Obosa filed the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the bailbond was validly approved by the trial court.
HELD: Since Obosa did file the written notice of appeal on 1 June 1990,
Obosa's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need of any further or other
act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. While bail was
granted by the trial court on 31 May 1990 when it had jurisdiction, the
approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the
appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction.
Needless to say, the situation would have been different had bail been
granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed. As
the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction then the
bailbond was never validly approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the
outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the petition should be
dismissed.
Nevertheless, Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that "all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be

provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required." Herein, while Obosa, though convicted of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was
nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Obosa can hardly be
unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a
substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being
affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely
more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense
originally charged. In such an instance, Obosa cannot but be sorely tempted
to flee. Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental law, set
the standard to be observed in applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In Borinaga vs. Tamin, which was
promulgated in 1993, the Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail.
However, said guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been
modified by Administrative Circular 12-94, which was issued by the Supreme
Court and which came into effect on 1 October 1994. Verily, had Obosa
made application for bail after the effectivity of said circular, the case would
have been readily and promptly resolved against Obosa. Pursuant to
amendments, not only does the conviction of Obosa for two counts of
homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and
subject his bail application to the sound discretion of the court, but more
significantly, the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e of
Paragraph 3, Section 5 of the 1994 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are
present in Obosa's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of
bail, except that a retroactive application of the said circular is barred as it
would obviously be unfavorable to Obosa. But be that as it may, the rules on
bail at the time of Obosa's conviction do not favor Obosa's cause either. The
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes
the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is
submitted for review, even factual questions may once more be weighed and
evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the
original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so
in the present case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite
conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of
resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on
whether Obosa will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While
the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the
discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending
the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for
strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and
the administration of justice. And the grave caution that must attend the

exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best

illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94 amending Rule
114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail
is discretionary in non-capital offenses nevertheless, when imprisonment has
been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of 6 years and
circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue
risk that the accused may commit another crime while his appeal is pending)
that point to a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released
on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
should be cancelled. In sum, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even
after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his
conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in
deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still
be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk
attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
The trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution
required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being
too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and
acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored
the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as
well as his prior convictions.

9. LEVISTE v CA
FACTS:Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was
convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the
RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail
pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee
or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for
bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the
Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail
must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying the application for bail of Leviste.
RULING: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction
by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more
than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it
cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction
by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion.

10. DE LA CAMARA v ENAGE

FACTS: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental was arrested on 7 November 1968 and detained at the Provincial
Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the
wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato,
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November
1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a
case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against
de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo,
resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14 January 1969, came an
application for bail filed by de la Camara with the lower court, premised on
the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of
21 August 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez

Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February
1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July 1969. The Judge, on 10
August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that
de la Camara would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount
of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00
for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. On 12 August 1970, the
Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such
order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required "is
excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or
property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration
to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained adamant. De la Camara
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de
la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail.
ISSUE: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the
amount of bail, excessive enough to discourage the accused from fleeing.
HELD: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there
were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would
have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in
the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed
in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail
is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a
higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore,
than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being 14
victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple
frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other
information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case
that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00
for the two offenses. No attempt at rationalization can give a color of validity
to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he
has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an
exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge

would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality,

such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution
was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in
the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist
thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a
state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed
out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty
would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were
informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would
have been no disappointment of expectations then. De la Camara's
subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not
entitled to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does
call for repudiation from the Supreme Court.

11. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG v OLALIA

FACTS: Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.
Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of
the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative
Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the
same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest,
with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets
be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
RULING: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and
that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United
States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR
No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply
to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in
international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is
given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the
Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may
be allowed to post bail.

12. ALEJANO v CABUAY (Full text)

Oakwood Mutiny Case writ of habeas corpus is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary. (related topic: privacy of
communication and correspondence)

13. ENRILE v SANDIGANBAYAN

Doctrines:Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13,
Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an
Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied.
On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be
reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to
his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be
convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial
and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided

it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

2. YES.

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the

international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process
and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs.
Olalia, the SC emphasized:

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or

conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment,
or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs.
Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with
notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the

appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As
such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion
to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The grant of bail is a special
accommodation for the petitioner.
The prosecution should have been given the opportunity to rebut the
allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions.
The invocation of a general human rights principle does not provide clear
legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. It is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statue or provision
of the Constitution. This sets a dangerous precedent for the granting of bail
on the basis of humanitarian conditions, which is determined by the personal
discretion of the trial judge.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous
text of the constitution.

14. QUI v PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The RTC in
Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged, and sentenced her to two equal
periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of 5 years, 4 months,
and 21 days of prison correctional in its maximum period, as minimum, to 7
years, 4 months, and 1 day of prison mayor in its minimum period, as
maximum.
Petitioner then appealed and subsequently filed an Urgent
Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal. The OSG urged for the denial of
the bail application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law
and that she is a flight-risk. The CA denied petitioners application for bail
pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the accused is entitled the right to bail?

RULING: No. Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
xxx
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
xxx
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail;
xxx
Petitioner disobeyed court processes when she lied in order to justify her
non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC. She gave the
excuse that her father was hospitalized and died days later when in fact her
father died a year ago. The RTC notice sent to petitioners bonding company
was also returned with the notation moved out while the notice sent to
petitioners given address was returned unclaimed with the notation RTS no
such person. The fact of transferring residences without informing her
bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as petitioners inclination to
evade court appearance, as indicative of flight. Consequently, the Court
agrees with the appellate courts finding of the presence of the fourth
circumstance enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also, petitioners argument that she has the
constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not
strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.
Therefore, petitioner application for bail pending appeal is denied.

C. Presumption of Innocence
15. PEOPLE v FRAGO
FACTS: The accused, Orlando Frago was charged with rape and attempted
rape docketed as criminal cases nos. 9144 and 9145. The information states
that the accused Orlando Frago committed the crime in the early morning of

26 September 1990 in the Poblacion of Quezon, Palawan.

Jicelyn Lansap, 15 years old girl, was boarding in a house which belongs to
Fortunato Moral with her relatives. Before intruding the house of Jicelyn, first
the accused who was ice cream vendor went inside the residence of Ronalyn
Pastera secretly at around three forty-five in the morning. He was about to
take Ronalyn out of the room but she suddenly woke up and shouted for
help. Then, her father immediately responded by switching the lights up.
Thus, the accused had to escape from the house. Since he fail to defile
Ronalyn, he next went to the boarding house of Jicelyn which was fifty
meters away from the house of Ronalyn. Jicelyn Lansap was bodily carried
by accused Orlando Frago to a nearby house belonging to Dado Andor. Then
at around five-thirty in the morning, she was awakened by appellant who was
already strangling her. She was hurt by the accused especially her private
part and found out that she had been raped. At the same day, Ronalyn's
father and Jicelyn reported to police authorities.
In Crim. Case No. 9145, it was acquitted due to lack of clear and convincing
evidence that the accused Frago performed the act of crime of rape against
Ronalyn Pastera. In Crim. Case No. 9144, the accused claimed that at nine
in the evening of september 25, 1990, he fell asleep with his family after his
tiring work and woke up at six on next morning. In his appeal, he imputes
error to the trial court in convicting him on the basis of an identification which
was made without the assistance of counsel. Also, according credence to the
story of Jicelyn, thereby it is denying his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The court sustains the defense on the insufficiency of the identification of
appellant Orlando Frago. With the testimony of Jicelyn, she has no reliable
basis for pointing to the accused as the person who raped her. She said that
the face was covered, and she did not have the opportunity to observe the
height of the rapist; and, that the only evidence of sexual intercourse is the
result of the medical examination. On the other hand, the Pastera sisters
may have recognized the accused positively because their room was lighted
and also he was not wearing anything on his face. They identified him on 28
September 1990, 14 whereas Jicelyn pointed him out only on 8 October
1990. Since they are neighbors, Pastera family might have shared the
identity of accused to Jicelyn. Then, the identification of appellant by Jicelyn
is doubtful.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he is guilty of rape in crim. case no. 9144?

RESOLUTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
ORLANDO FRAGO guilty of rape in Crim. Case No. 9144 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED as his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It appearing that he is detained, his immediate release
from custody is ordered unless he is held for another cause.
Costs de oficio.

16. PEOPLE v GODOY

FACTS: Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny
Codoy(Appellant) by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife
and by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with her and kidnap or
detained her, for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by
the complainant (Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was corroborated
by the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?
RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions
without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as
to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this
evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in
reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape.
These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be
severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended
by the party accused, though innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and
ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the
alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of
an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court
below made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the
totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various
rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be
accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
testimony of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently deleted the
rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed
raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony
concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the
court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual
truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the
actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty.
In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been
established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha
spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted,
several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's
evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the
Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and
prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain
untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's
mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and
escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to
weave the scenario of this rape drama.

17. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles [For

Child Abuse]- A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC
FACTS: Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is
possible to order the immediate suspension of the respondent. The matter
was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation where they
recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's
Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending
respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final
resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against

her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not
furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative
Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially
unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against
her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality.
As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence
and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a
prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation
manifesting that respondent continuously defied the courts Resolution.
Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse,
respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and
should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using
her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
ISSUES: Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the
respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case.
HELD: We resolve the issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree
with the recommendation of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of
respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her
suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction
of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same
has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption,
together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation,
proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's
guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a
judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment.
As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used
as tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse
consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other
than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered
against the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful
grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the
foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that
preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused
to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on

preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the

Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider respondent's
argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the
criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her
present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render
a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been
rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly
and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the imposition of
preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in
respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against
former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent, her
use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the standard
expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate of
the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in
language. Illustrative are the following statements: "CA Lock's hostile mindset
and his superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance and power";
"(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial
court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and misuses the full
powers of his Office to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him
to step down."
In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged CA Lock's son
into the controversy, to wit: It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile
attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the undersigned
mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a
position for his son at the RTC Library of Pasay City which was then
managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be
assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule
in reviewing for the bar examination. Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of
him, the respondent said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration readily
discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations
about the guilt of the undersigned.
Speculations, especially those that emanate from the poisonous intentions of
attention-seeking individuals, are no different from garbage that should be
rejected outright" ; and "His malicious insinuation is no less than a revelation
of his warped mindset that a person's position could cause pressure to bear
among government officials. This brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP
Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain
a favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged against him by the
undersigned? Is he afraid of his own ghost?

" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent should

exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting
language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for accepting and
occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. One final
word. The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that they
have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the
prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have
wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege must be
exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in
the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right
to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their
disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two
irresponsible children.

18. LEVISTE v CA
D. Right to be Heard and to Counsel
19. US v ASH
Brief Fact Summary. A number of informants were asked to identify a number
of suspects in connection with a bank robbery. The respondent, Ash (the
respondent), challenged the identification because counsel was not present
at what was arguably a critical stage of the prosecution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An accused does not have the right to counsel at a
post indictment photographic lineup
FACTS: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted
certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits as to the issue of whether an
accused has the right to counsel at a post indictment photographic lineup.
The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel at a display at which the
defendant himself was not entitled to be present was not embodied in the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The
Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants an accused
the right to have counsel present at a post indictment photographic
identification procedure?
HELD: The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution does not grant an accused
the right to counsel during a post indictment photographic identification

procedure because the accused himself is not entitled to be present,

rendering it impossible that the accused will be confused or overpowered by
the proceedings.
DISSENT: The dissent writes to emphasize that the photographic lineup is
indeed a critical stage of the proceedings.
Concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) concurs to emphasize the
point that any issues involved could be resolved through traditional methods
such as cross examination.
DISCUSSION: The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the
assistance of counsel during stages of the proceeding at which a defendant
is faced with either the intricacies of the law, or a zealous prosecutor. Neither
of these situations exist at a photographic display. The historical test to be
applied to the Sixth Amendment issues indicates that the right has only been
expanded when new facts have demanded it for the protection of the
defendant.

20. ROCK v ARKANSAS

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Rock (the petitioner), was charged
with manslaughter for shooting her husband, and sought to introduce her
own testimony that had been refreshed by hypnosis. An expert witness
corroborated the petitioners refreshed testimony that the gun was defective.
The trial court ruled that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible
per se and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The states legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence does not justify a per se exclusion because the evidence may be
reliable in an individual case.
FACTS: During a domestic dispute, the petitioner shot her husband.
Because she could not remember the precise details of the incident she
submitted to hypnosis by a licensed hypnotherapist. After the hypnosis, the
petitioner recalled that she did not have her finger on the trigger when the
gun fired during a scuffle. An inspection by an expert revealed that the gun
was defective. The trial court ruled that no hypnotically refreshed testimony
would be admitted. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the conviction,
ruling that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible per se.
ISSUE: Does an evidentiary rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically
refreshed testimony per se violate a defendants right to testify on her own
behalf?

HELD: Criminal defendants have a right to testify in their own behalf under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution), the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. Restrictions placed on a criminal defendants right to testify
by a states evidentiary rules, may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve.
The states legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not justify a
per se exclusion because the evidence may be unreliable in an individual
case.
Dissent. An individuals right to present evidence is always subject to
reasonable restrictions. Traditionally the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) accords the respect to the states in the establishment of
their own evidentiary rules and procedures. The Arkansas Supreme Courts
decision was a permissible response to a novel and difficult question.
Discussion. A defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness
stand and testify in his own defense. This right can be found in several
places in the Constitution. A state may not apply a rule of evidence that
permits a witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions
of his testimony. The right to present relevant testimony is not without
limitation, but a state must evaluate whether the interests served justify the
limitation imposed on the defendants constitutional right to testify. The
Arkansas Supreme Court failed to perform the constitutional analysis
necessary when a defendants right to testify is at stake. More traditional
means of assessing information such as cross-examination are effective
tools for revealing inconsistencies. A states legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be
unreliable in the individual case.

21. PEOPLE v SANTOCILDES (Full Text)

22. PEOPLE v LIWANAG (Full Text)
E. Right to be Informed
23. PECHO v PEOPLE
FACTS: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for
the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that
the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The
charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was

acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of

evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was
acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which
is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of
double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a
bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of
official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of
this charge against him in the filing of the information.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of
the crime to which he is convicted
HELD: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against

him as will enable him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not
conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines
the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual
recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows
then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the
one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the
information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the
counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both
or either of the charges.
However, by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient
evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the
crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was
deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused
was acquitted.

24. ANDAYA v PEOPLE (Full Text)

25. PEOPLE v ABULON (Full Text)