Transfer of Power?

Politics of Mass Mobilisation in UP

Author(s): Zoya Hasan
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 46/47 (Nov. 24-30, 2001), pp. 4401-4409
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411386
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I specialarticles

Transfer of Power? Politics of Mass

Mobilisationin UP
The recent electoral history of UP that has witnessed the growth of parties representing the
lower and middle castes speaks of a politics of more competitionand democracy. But as
this paper argues, though peasant and caste mobilisation may have challenged upper caste/
class domination, this has not necessarily promoted policies of public expenditure for
services benefiting the poor, nor has there been implementationof developmental
programmes that address their vital concerns.
ZOYA HASAN

wostoriesarebeingtoldaboutIndia. had not hithertobeen able to disturbthe Thispaperlooksatthethreecompeting,

One focuses on the changesin the
stateandthe politicalsystem.This
is a storyof the erosionof politicalinsti-
tutionsandacrisisof governance.Political
parties,parliament,the public sector are
all in a stateof declineanddisrepair.The
solutionsproposedoftenstressthe neces-
sityof strengthening therelativeweightof
civil societyvis-a-visthe state.l The sec-
ond storyline concentrateson the exten-
sion of democracy,participationand in-
clusion.This line tendsto emphasisethe
dramaticsurgeinparticipation of thelower
ordersof societysignallingthe expansion
of democracy.2The changesin the insti-
tutionalrealmthatarelinkedto the demo-
craticsurgeare, therefore,not an indica-
tion of failed modernisation;rather,they
are a pointerto the vernacularisation of
politics and the entry of the beliefs and
interestsof lower ordersof society that
could not be articulatedunderthe ideo-
logical hegemonyof the urbanand En-
glish-educatedpoliticians of the Nehru
era.3 Thus it has often been arguedthat
the new phase marksthe coming of age
of Indiandemocracy.It indicatesthe dif-
ferent characterof India's democratic
experiment fromthatof thewest.Espoused
bymanyscholars,thisaccounthasstressed
thatchangesbroughtaboutby thedissemi-
nationof the ideas of social justice and
rightsin the last two decades.4 Different
versionsof this story line note the defeat
of IndiraGandhi'semergencyregime in
the1977electionsasa turningpoint,which
broughtabouta decisive shift in the form
and contentof democracy.It established
the importanceof the vote and represen-
tative institutionsof governmentto give
voice to populardemandsof a kind that
orderand tranquilityof the corridorsof
power.Thisnotwithstanding, theinfluxof
newentrantsfromthelowerordershasnot
led to effective controlof the agendaof
elections.
In an attemptto understandthe growth
of politicaldemocratisation,thispapercriti-
cally examines the trajectoriesof mass
mobilisationin UttarPradesh(UP),which
is the site of the most recent phase of
politicaldemocratisation in India,the so-
calledseconddemocraticupsurge.5InUP,
lowercastes/classeshave been mobilised
politicallyin at leastthreedifferentways:
peasantpolitics,reservationpolitics, and
the 'socialengineering'strategyof Hindu
nationalism.The rise of the JanataDal
(1977-89), SamajwadiParty (SP) and
BahujanSamajParty(BSP) in the 1990s
has transformedthe political landscape.
Fromthe late 1980sa significantpolitical
churninghas been underway, whichhas
broughtintoplaythenumerouslowercastes
to restructurethepowerandcasteandclass
privilegesof the uppercastes. It is now
difficultto conceiveof a politicalregime
thatwill denythemrepresentation. At the
sametime,theBJP'sgrowthandits ability
to win power by exploiting divisions
betweenlower caste partieshas had pro-
foundimplicationsfor the courseof mass
politicsanddevelopmentin this keystone
state.UP sends85 MPsto theLok Sabha,
makingit politicallythe mostcrucialstate
for the formationof the centralgovern-
mentin New Delhi.Thesuccessof theBJP
in UP hasbeencentralto its realisationof
politicalpower when it formedthe coa-
litiongovernmentin 1998,anditscontinu-
ance in powerdependsto a large extent
uponits abilityto maintainsupportthere.
andattimes,intersectingstrategiesof mass
mobilisation:peasantpolitics,reservation
politics,andthe 'socialengineering'strat-
egy of Hindunationalistpolitics in order
to situatethe lower castes' challenge to
uppercastecontrolof the stateandpublic
power,andthe uppercaste counter-resis-
tanceto containtheeffectof thischallenge
to their dominance.Politicaldemocrati-
sation in UP has createda situationin
which new forms of mobilisation,while
enablingthe emergenceof new constitu-
encies, findsthoseengagedin this unable
to deal with their effects. Drawingsub-
stantiallyon studiesof politicsandsociety
in UP, I explorethe natureandcontradic-
tions of mass mobilisation,the extent of
whichis significantlyinfluencedby caste
and communityidentities,and the effect
of theseon governanceanddevelopment.
Theargument is constructedaroundabroad
questionthathas two parts:(i) can lower
castepoliticsandtheentryof lowercastes
in educationalinstitutionsandadministra-
tive services,andtheirclaimsforgrowing
shareof politicalpower,leadto socialand
politicalchange?(ii) Can greaterpartici-
pationof thelowercastesin legislatureand
governmentpush governmentpolicy to
addressthe concernsof the poor?
Theprocessof politicaldemocratisation
in Indiais historicallydiverse.Thisdiver-
sity leaves scope for several patternsof
interconnected politicalandsocialchange
withina similarframeworkof institutions
resultingin differencesin the democratic
functioningof differentstates.A contex-
tual approachwould be useful in under-
standing the regional dynamics of
democratisation,most importantly,the
timing and approach through which

Economic and Political Weekly November 24, 2001 4401

marginalised groupsareincorporated into
the politicalarena,the politicalalliances
andalignmentsthatareavailable,andthe
transformations these can work on the
patternsof stable governance.6These
configurationsdiffer across regions. In
southIndiathe mobilisationof the non-
brahmincastes happenedearlierthan in
the north.Thoughbackwardcaste move-
mentsin TamilNaduandKarnataka were
not radical,the political mobilisationof
lowercasteswas an importantvehicle for
socialtransformation and the consequent
decreasein socialindignitiesandtherapid
displacementof uppercastes from posi-
tionsof powerin the administrationand
Theestablishmentof a politi-
legislatures.
calcommunity-based on a singlelanguage
andthetransformation of its non-brahmin
ideologyinto an anti-northern Tamil na-
tionalismfacilitatedthesechanges.Lower
castepartiesin northernIndiawereunable
to adoptthis strategyand thereforethe
trajectoryof lower caste politics in the
northhad to be different.This phenom-
enon needsto be understoodin termsof
specific histories,includingthe distinct
social historiesof mass politics.7
Conditions in Uttar Pradesh
UP is India'slargeststate, and one of
themostsociallyandeconomicallyback-
wardinthenorthern heartland.Mostof the
statesin northIndia are comparableto
medium-sized countries.Indeed,thepopu,
lationof UP, which is projectedto have
crossed160 million in 1997, is equal to
themostpopulouscountriesof the world.
Onlysix countries,China,India,the US,
Indonesia,Russiaand Brazil have popu-
lationslargerthanthat of UP. The state
has laggedbehindin termsof economic
andsocialdevelopment.In the 1990s the
annualgrowth rate of gross domestic
productis estimatedto have been 3.5 per
cent,the thirdlowest amongstthe major
states,as againstthe combinedstate do-
mesticproductgrowthof 5.94 percentper
annum.
The caste and class structureof UP is
distinct.The twice-bornuppercastes ac-
countfor 20 per cent of the population,
indeed,the brahminsalone account for
over 10 per cent of the entire brahmin
categoryinIndia.Dominatedbybrahmins,
thecastehierarchyhereis the mostelabo-
rated.Castestatus,economicposition,and
politicalpoweroverlappedin most parts
of thestate.Thebackwardcastes or other
backwardclasses (OBCs) in the contem-
poraryidiom,whichaccountfor 35-40 per
centof thepopulation,spana widecultural
and structuralarch, including at one
extremethedominantlandowningpeasant
castes,andat theotherextreme,the many
4402
poorartisanandservicecasteslivingjust
abovethepollutionandpovertyline.These
includethe wealthyyadavsand the poor
servicecastes.Thepoorerjatisamongthem
aredescribedasthemostbackwardclasses
(MBCs),whichconstitute26 percent. At
the bottomof thehierarchyaretheformer
untouchables,officially known as the
scheduledcastes.They performthe most
menialandarduousjobs andthe majority
continuesto depend upon wage labour.
Lowercastepartieshave been successful
inincorporatingsomemembersof thelower
castes into government.
Thoughtherehavebeenno majorpopu-
laractionsor mobilisationof thepoor,UP
is a highlypoliticisedstatewherepolitics
means captureand controlof power.At
present, two forces wield an important
influencein state politics:Hindunation-
alismandpartiesthatrepresentthe lower
castes and classes. The Congressdomi-
natedpartycompetitionfor close to three
decades,andsince its declinein 1989 the
BJP has benefitedthe most.Eventhough
a mainstayof Hindurevivalismand the
citadelof theAyodhyamovement,theBJP
has failed to establish its political su-
premacyin UP, notwithstanding its being
in powerforthelastfive yearsandhaving
hadseveralstintsin powerin all theother
states of northIndiaexcept Bihar.
Strategies of Mass Politics
Historically,UP was a strongholdof the
uppercastes.Formingnearly20 per cent
of the population,the uppercastes were
over-representedl in the political sphere.
Theirdominationwas particularlystrong
in education, the professions, and the
Congress.In mostpartsof the state,these
castescontrolledbusiness,professional and
white-collaremployment.The politicisation
of caste identities,the increasingpartici-
pationof the lower castes in the political
process,and the dramaticdecline of the
CongressPartymarkthehistoryof demo-
cratic politics' These processes may be
tracedbacktoeconomicandpoliticalshifts
occurringsince the late 1960s. At that
time, the centralgovernmentshifted the
directionof developmentpolicy from a
state-ledmodel of industrialgrowthto a
morededicateddriveto improveagricul-
turalproduction.This was the beginning
of thegreenrevolutiontechnologiesasso-
ciated with an emphasis in increasing
agriculturalproductionthroughprice in-
centivesandtechnologicalchange.Oneof
the effects of this shift in policy was the
risingprosperityof sectionsof the peas-
antryin the fertileareasof the state.This
upwardlymobilepeasantrybelongedprin-
cipally to the intermediateandbackward
castes.The initialchangeoccurredin the
Economic and Political Weekly
1970s when these groupsbegan to enter
thelegislativeassembliesin largenumbers
with the backingof the socialists.These
groupsposedthefirstseriouschallengeto
Congresspower,questioningtoo, for the
firsttime,theuppercastemonopolyof the
public sphere.
The two principal forms of mass
mobilisation,symbolisedby peasantpoli-
tics and reservationpolitics, worked to
displacethe uppercaste urbanestablish-
mentfromits positionsof power.Thefirst,
initiatedin thelate 1960sundertheleader-
ship of CharanSingh,soughtto mobilise
the cultivatingclassesandthe secondwas
initiated by the socialist leader Ram
ManoharLohia who focused on caste
identitiesand reservationsfor the lower
castesin publicemploymentandpolitical
parties. Restructuringstate power and
institutionswas the principalconcernof
bothinitiatives.The proponentsof a rural
strategymobilised all those engaged in
cultivationprimarilyon thebasisof socio-
economic demands,while the strategists
of reservationpolitics forged an alliance
of thenon-elitegroupson thebasisof caste
quotasto dislodge uppercastes. Lohia's
line cut throughthe urban-rural sectorsas
well as thecastesystem.Thesocialgroups
targetedby both came from the ranksof
peasantsandOBCs;butsignificantlyboth
treatedthemas an economicallyundiffer-
entiatedsocial category.Initiallythe two
strategies complemented each other,
though in the end caste identitieshave
trumpedpeasantpolitics. Together,over
the pasttwo decades,thesetwo strategies
contributedto the rise of lower castes in
northIndianpolitics.9
Fromthe 1970s, the peasantryof north
Indiaemergedas a majorconstituencyin
state and nationalpolitics. Rich farmers
and surplusproducersexerted a strong
influence over governmentpolicy and
CharanSinghhimselfemployedthegrow-
ing power of the peasantlobby to great
effect in struggleswithinthe Janatacoa-
lition afterit assumedpower in 1977.10
ShortlyafterCharanSingh'sdeathin 1987,
farmer'spoliticsin northIndiawasto find
its resurgenceunderthe BharatiyaKisan
Union (BKU), a non-partyorganisation
led by MahendraSinghTikait,a ruraljat
leaderfromtheprosperouscaneandwheat
growingregionof westernUP.l Of the
variousfeaturesofCharanSingh'speasant
discourse,the one most emphasisedwas
the rural-urbandichotomy.12 This di-
chotomy was intendedto highlight the
urbanbias of developmentpolicies that
haveresultedinagapbetweenurbanpeople
whoworkforthestateandindustrial sectors
andruralpeoplewho workin the agricul-
tural sector. This duality succeeded in
combininga varietyof discontentsexpe-
November 24, 2001
riencedby differentclasses of the rural
population intoa unitaryframework.Their
actionsandagitationscauseda modifica-
tionof agricultural policiesin manystates,
andseveralof theirdemandssoon became
partof official policy.
Evenso, therewere otherfault lines in
ruralsocietythatwere ignored.The strat-
egy was not designedto include all sec-
tionsof ruralsociety,and in actualitythe
structuraltensionsand conflicts between
the richfarmersand lower classes could
not be resolved.Some of these tensions
overlapped with the conflict between
backwardcastes and dalits. Moreover,it
was not just the divide between owner-
cultivatorsandagriculturallabourersthat
causedtension.Even withinthe category
of landowners there were differences
between large farmers and small and
mediumones. Then, amongst the rich
farmersthere were differencesbetween
iats andotherbackwardcastes:the latter
saw the BKU as a meansforjat assertion
of theirpowerin thecountryside.Notwith-
standingthesecontradictions, whichwere
a commonfeatureof farmers'movements
indifferentpartsof thecountry,theywere
able to achieve some of their aims, as
rulingpartiesfoundit easy to accommo-
datesuch demandsas they madethanto
dealwithlargerissuesof structural reform.
However,thepackageof policiesincluded
priceguaranteesof outputand subsidies
forinputs,whichprincipallybenefitedrich
farmers.At the same time, it also made
them more dependentupon government
policies and programmes.
The second approach to mass
mobilisationtook shape aroundthe de-
mandfor reservedquotasin government.
Fromthe 1960s, caste and caste quotas
were seen as an instrumentfor social
equalityand self-respect.13Reservation
was seen as the only way of securing
representation forgroupswhomightother-
wise have no presence in the political
processandpublicemployment.Histori-
cally, UP has had the shortesthistoryof
caste-basedpositive discriminationpoli-
cies. A modestquota scheme was intro-
duced in 1978, but it was discontinued
owing to objectionsover the criteriafor
identification of beneficiaries.The stimu-
lus for changecame between 1989 and
1991,aconjuncture definedby threemajor
changesinIndianpolitics:Mandal,Mandir
and Market.The almost simultaneous
occurrence of thesethreeeventscongealed
thescaleandcomplexityof transitioneven
as it provided,at thesametime,an oppor-
tunityfor realignmentsin state and ra-
tionalpolitics.All threeofferedthe pros-
pectof creatinga new cleavage structure
andthusnew formsof mobilisation.14In
the end,all the threecleavagescould not
Economicand PoliticalWeekly November24, 2001
be activated and caste remained the issuesandignoredculturalandsocialones.
epicentreof politicalchange. The BSP criticisedthesefeaturesof Con-
The turningpointwas V P Singh'sde- gress politics. First, the BSP promised
cision to implementtheMandalCommis- politicalrepresentation to dalits,an aspi-
sion Report,which had in 1980 recom- rationneglectedby the Congress.Under
mended extension of the system of re- Congressrule, despitethe importanceof
servedjobs in central.governmentfrom the dalit vote, they achieved very little
only the scheduledcastes and tribesto a representation in thegovernmentandparty
broadercollection of socially and eco- organisation.In otherwords,the signifi-
nomically backwardclasses. There.was canceof thedalitvotedidnottranslateinto
littlepublicresponsein southIndiawhere perceptibleinfluencefor individualmem-
thebattleagainstreservationshadalready bers in the organisationor government.
beenfoughtandlost.15However,in north Thisapproachwasnoteworthybecauseits
India,uppercaste studentsfoughta high success was not contingent on mass
profilecampaignagainstthe extensionof mobilisation,butderivedfromcaptureof
reservationsto lowercastes.At the same state power via anti-high caste propa-
time, the studentsfearedthattheirhopes ganda, emphasising the fulfilment of
of governmentjobs wouldbe thwartedby the reserved quotaand demandingmore
a coalition of lower castes, which they positionsformembersof scheduledcastes
were largelyshapingthemselvesby pro- in government.Its aim is to capturestate
vokinga newcleavagebetweenupperand powerfortheoppressedmajoritybyoppos-
lower castes. They wantedto abolishall ing caste oppressionratherthan setting
reservationsincluding reservationsfor out social and economic policies of
scheduledcastes. They protestedagainst redistribution.
the new quotathatwoulddeprivethemof The ascentof Mayawatito the office of
governmentjobs. Employmentopportu- chief ministerin less than a decade of
nities areextremelyinadequate,andcon- scheduledcaste mobilisationchangedthe
flicts havebeen amplifiedbecauseof ris- situationfordalits.16Duringhertwostints
ing levelsof educationthataddto theforce in office, andespeciallyher secondterm,
of competition.Governmentjobs aresought Mayawatisucceeded in building a new
afteras theyprovidemuchneededsecurity politicalpresencefor them.She soughtto
and decent wages or salary.Hence, it is makegood the promiseof empowerment
considered a desirablepath of upward by filling the reservedquotaandappoint-
mobilityin an underdevelopedstate. ing membersof scheduledcastes to im-
Thealternativestrategy,associatedwith portantpositionsin government.For ex-
the second form of mobilisation,that is, ample, scheduledcaste officers replaced
caste politics, arrivedwith the growing all the uppercastesfunctionariesholding
influence of the BSP foundedin 1984, importantpositions,suchas thoseof chief
which attemptedto mobilise the lower secretaryand the chief minister'sprivate
castes by promisingthem a shareof po- secretary.This change provokedresent-
litical powerby theirown caste/commu- mentand,correlatively,thedalitassertion
nity members.Followingthe breakdown polarised the upper and lower castes.
of the Congressin the 1980s, the BSP ThroughthisstrategytheBSPhadlaunched
becamea majorpartnerin an anti-upper a new phasein the mobilisationof lower
castecoalitiongovernmentin 1992-95and castesin the region.It hadhoweverfailed
a BSP-led governmentwas establishedin in terms of its own stated objective of
1995 and 1997 underthe leadershipof creatinga widerallianceof the 'bahujan
Mayawati.By 1996,theBSPhadmanaged samaj' (majority).17It has succeededin
to win 59 seatsin thelegislativeassembly consolidatingdalitsandappearsto depend
andnotchedup an impressive20 percent excessivelyonthesupportof a singlecaste.
of the vote, whichwas muchhigherthan Nonetheless,it changedstatepolicy in
the Congressvote. a numberof otherways. The programme
At this point,it seems usefulto drawa of Ambedkarisationand introductionof
distinctionbetween elites that mobilise the Ambedkarvillage schemesto provide
supportthroughparticularistic,local or specialgovernmentassistanceto villages
regionalstrategiesandthosethatmobilise with a high proportionof dalitsappearto
a mass base in nationalsociety,eitherby have been significantpolicy initiativesin
appealingto the citizenryin.generalor to thisparticularcontext.Localstudiesof the
a particularclass.Sinceindependence, the BSP havereporteda substantialenhance-
scheduledcastes supportedthe Congress ment in the access of scheduledcastes
Party, which historicallymobilised the membersto educationandbasic services.
needs and aspirationsof the lowercastes The enrolmentratein highereducationof
withinan overarchingframeworkof phil- scheduledcastes in 1995 was higherthan
anthropic compromise such that their the generalpopulation.18Reservationfor
potentialantagonismwasneutralised. The 'scheduled castes in public employment
Congress focused on general economic has increasedlocal employmentopportu-
4403
nitiesforthepoorestcastes.19Thoughthe
BSP's stint in power did not entail any
structural changesintheeconomytobenefit
the vast numbersof rural poor, it has
improvedtheirpoliticalconfidence,living
standards,and representationof certain
scheduledcastes within local bureaucra-
cies.20 Theirefforts to marshalgovern-
ment interventionto settle disputesover
land rightsor social abuse and violence
weretakenmoreseriouslywhen they re-
negotiatedtheir relationshipwith state
officialsthrougha scheduledcasteofficer
orthepradhan21 Ithasforcedgovernment
officersto paymorethanlip serviceto the
needs of the low caste poor.
Undeniably,theriseof lowercasteshas
alteredUP's stagnantpolitics. As lower
caste leadersexpressedincreasedunhap-
pinesswiththe widespreadpracticeof not
filling reservedvacancies because there
were no 'qualifiedcandidates',govern-
mentshave had to find ways of reducing
theseblockages.Ruleswereintroducedat
the centraland state levels so that every
seventhor eighth new recruithad to be
from a scheduled caste or tribe.22Not
surprisingly,the gap between the upper
and lower castes narrowedand the share
of lowercastes shot up duringthe 1980s
and1990swhenlowercastepartiesbegan
to grow and acquirepower. This can be
seenfromthemajorincreaseinthenumber
of lowercaste legislatorsand seniorcivil
servantsin influentialgovernmentposi-
tions.The shareof uppercaste legislators
inallthelegislativeassembliesandnational
parliamenthas been decliningand thatof
the lower castes rising.23At presentthe
lower caste legislators form the single
largestgroupin thestateassembliesof UP
and Bihar.At the same time, the rise of
lowercasteshasprovokedstronghostility
of uppercastes,andto countertheirgrowth
uppercastes haveralliedbehindtheBJP.24
The BJP-ledAyodhya movement,the
greatestmass mobilisationin UP's post-
independenthistory,epitomisesthe third
form of mass politics.25The BJP is the
principalgaineratthecostof theCongress
andthe divisionsamonglowercaste par-
ties.Theriseof theBJPoccurredbetween
1989 and 1991 when the BJP projected
itself as a pro-Hindupartythatsupported
the'imaginedcommunity' of Hindus.Since
the destructionof the Ayodhyamosque,
theBJPhasshiftedits strategyfromethnic
mobilisation to'socialengineering'inorder
to mobilise broad-basedsupport. The
principaltargetsof this strategyare the
backward castesanddalits.However,even
now its core support comes from the
membersof the uppercastes,themajority
of whomhaveralliedbehindtheBJPsince
1990; its supportamong the backward
castes is comparablyweaker.
4404
Until recently, the BJP had chosen not
to use caste explicitly as an organising
category that divides Hindus. It opted for
what Christophe Jaffrelot called 'indirect
mobilisation', thatis, forging alliances with
parties representing the lower castes.26
An attempt to mobilise the lower castes
as a part of the Hindu constituency was
made during the Ayodhya movement,
which in the words of L K Advani 'suc-
ceeded in sublimating caste tensions'.
However, the supportgained then was lost
after the demolition of the Babri masjid
in December 1992. Many among the lower
castes looked at the assault as an upper
caste backlash against the Mandal move
initiated by the Janata Dal government.
This resulted in an alliance of the SP and
the BSP thatcompelled the BJP leadership
to concentrate its attention on splitting the
lowest castes. This strategy succeeded in
1995, breakingthe SP-BSP alliance forged
in the 1993 elections and bringing down
the Mulayam Singh government. The BJP
then threw its weight behind the BSP,
which allowed Mayawati to come to power
as chief minister. This proved important
in checking the consolidation of the lower
castes, as the cooperation of the backwards
and dalits presents a formidable challenge
to the BJP and can potentially prevent it
from coming to power.
Working in small town upper caste
milieus, the BJP has on the whole kept
away from caste reform. However, the
upper caste bias was a handicap in the
wake of low caste mobilisation, the party
being unable to ignore the lower caste
phenomenon that was conspicuous in its
strongholds. To endorse it would however
compromise its traditionalsupportamong
upper castes and would imply an accep-
tance of internal divisions in the Hindu
nation, which the RSS had labouredagainst
for 70 years. In the years after the Mandal
Commission, they have had to make ges-
tures of accommodation towards the lower
castes, practicing their own brand of
Mandalisation, inducting a growing num-
ber of lower caste cadres in importantparty
positions, and assigning them assembly
constituency nominations. Several OBC
leaders of the BJP have espoused social
engineering: bringing upper caste mem-
bers and backwards on a common plat-
form. While this policy has enabled the
BJP to broaden its base, the leaders of
the RSS have opposed it, even though it
helped the party to extend its support
base, but this was limited to the upper
castes. There is undoubtedly a tension
between the BJP leadership's advocacy
of.social engineering and the traditional
RSS view based on 'varna' hierarchy,
which questioned the notion of social
engineering.27
Economicand PoliticalWeekly November24, 2001
On the whole, Hindunationalistshave
been increasinglycaughtbetweengiving
a greatershareof powerto the OBCsand
emphasising Hindu unity over caste
interests.28Thoughthe BJP commands
considerable support from sections of
OBCs,it remainsa bastionof uppercastes.
Theuppercastes'votesconstantlypolarise
in favourof the BJP fromthe time when
thelowercastepartiesbecamekey players
subsequent to the Congress' terminal
decline. As a predominantlyuppercaste
party,whose leadershavelittle sympathy
forlowercasteaspirations,theinterestsof
the uppercaste middle class have been
over-representedwithin Hindunational-
ism. Since the late 1980s, the BJP has
receivedthegreatestsupportof themiddle
class who disapprovesof the reservation
system and want to defendtheircontrol
overthegovernment and,aboveall,govern-
mentjobs, which have been traditionally
held by brahminsand baniyas.Arguably
the Mandaldecision was as importantas
the Ayodhya movementin rallying the
uppercaste middleclass supportaround
theBJPin the 1990s.29Thisgroup,which
includes all the uppercastes, sharesthe
BJP'sdisquietaboutthe rise of dalitsand
OBCs: that is, its uneasewith the social
depthof democracy.The majorappealthe
BJPholds for this groupis thatit ensures
the status quo and thus their sustained
dominationovergovernmentintheface of
thestifflowercasteattackontheirsuprem-
acy. The extent of its supportfor lower
castesandcastequotashasvaried,depend-
ing uponcalculationsrelatingto maximis-
ation of supporteven thoughsome of its
local leaderswere in the forefrontof the
anti-Mandalagitations that rocked UP
townsin 1990.WhiletheBJPhasnotbeen
ableto downplaythedivisionsin its ranks,
ithasmanagedto weakenthemby winning
oversomesectionsof thelowercastesto its
side.Itis wellknownthatthekurmis,lodhs
andjats havepreviouslybackedthe party.
FacedwithtoughcompetitionfromtheSP
andtheBSP,bothof whichhavegiventhe
lowercastesa shareof powerin proportion
theBJPgovernmentin
to theirpopulation,
July 2001 proposeda quota within the
quota(15 percent)of reservationsfor the
MBCs and scheduledto win them over
with the promiseof governmentjobs.
Impact of Mass Mobilisation
Hastheriseof lowercastessignificantly
changeddemocracy?Electoralcompeti-
tion betweenpartiesandpoliticalpartici-
pationis flourishing,and politicalpower
hasmoveddownward,a developmentthat
cannotbe dismissedlightly.30As a result,
the political elite is not monolithic.In
consequence,politics and movementsof
the Rightare as active as those of lower
castes and this has counterbalancedand
defusedthegainsmadebythelowercastes.
This aspect has often been ignored in
discussionsof the dalit upsurge.
Thepoliticsof 'presence'has undoubt-
edly produceda shift in the balance of
politicalpowerin governmentsand leg-
islatures in UP.31Within this form of
representation, thepoliticalactorclaimsto
acton behalfof his own caste, religionor
linguisticgroup,or even simply for him-
self. This is distinctfromthe earlierelite
formof representation in which the elite
self-consciouslyactedonbehalfof a larger
groupof whomthey were not a partand
whose identityor intereststhey did not
share. But checkmatingthe furtherad-
vanceof this strategyand its capacityto
shapethe polity is the disunitybreaking
theirranks.CastesclassifiedasOBCscame
togetherin the early 1990s in responseto
theuppercasteoppositionagainstMandal,
but such unity has vanished.32This is
partlybecausethe rise of the OBCs has
been in effect the rise of the yadavs and
to some extentthe kurmis,as theirshare
in public employment and MPs and
MLAsbearwitness. This is not entirely
surprisingbecausethe yadavs are more
numerousand relatively more educated
thanotherOBCs,andwere also the most
favouredby the governmentof Mulayam
SinghYadav.33A numberof authorshave
notedthe abilityof yadavsto manipulate
theprocessof recruitmentin government
employment,34and severalother reports
highlightedthe yadavisationof the police
in UP in the mid-1990sand arguedthat
they were being systematicallyfavoured
in recruitment.35
Such manoeuvringwas not surprising
evenas in thepastCharanSingh's 'kisan'
strategywas perceivedby jats as a means
of promotingtheirinterests.Still, thereis
a basicdifference.Partiesandcampaigns
ledbyCharanSinghhadseentheconstruc-
tionof a farmeridentity,whichbothmade
use of andat the same time transcended
caste cleavagesto createa commonality
of ruralinterests.This was why the ideo-
logicalandintellectualdirectiongiven by
Singh'scritiqueof the dominantmodels
of developmentsucceededin mobilising
a coalitionof ruralgroupsunderan anti-
governmentpopulism.3The fundamen-
tals of this discoursepositeda sharpdif-
ferencebetweenBharatandIndia,andthis
in turnwasbuilton a critiqueof the urban
bias of development.However,the pro-
ponentsof peasantpoliticscameprimarily
fromthe ranksof rich peasantswho de-
ployedthisdiscourseto promotetheirown
interestsandheldbacklowercastes.This
edifice was weigheddown by the social
strainsthatpermeatenorthIndiansociety
Economicand PoliticalWeekly November24, 2001
andwas builton prevailingexclusionsand
intersectionof caste and class rule.37In
consequence,theseruralcoalitionsbroke
down on caste lines, and in time were
outstrippedby thequotapoliticsof social-
ists who ascribedinequalityentirely to
casteandpromotedreservationin govern-
mentjobs as the solutionto all formsof
deprivation andinequality.Toputthepoint
differently,quotapolitics succeededbe-
causepoliticalunder-representation tends
to aggravateeconomic deprivationin a
highly politicisedstate such as UP. Fur-
thermore, theJanataDalgovernment imple-
mentedthe reservationpolicy, and thus
establishedthecapacityof thesepartiesto
offerpoliticalrepresentationin contrastto
theiropponentswho wereunableto do so.
By giving lowercastes a sharein power,
caste politics addressedthe criticalissue
of the representationalblockagein politi-
cal institutions.38
However,politicalgains do not corre-
spond to the substantial caste-based
mobilisationduringthe pasttwo decades.
It has not given lowercastesthe leverage
and political advantagethat they have
gainedin southIndia.In comparisonwith
UP, the non-brahminmovementin the
south Indianstates institutionalisedpar-
ticipationat anearlystage,anddeveloped
sufficientlygraduallyto allowuppercastes
time to adjustto theirloss of power:this
smallminorityof uppercastesmovedinto
the commercial and industrialsectors,
centralgovernmentjobs, andmanyof them
migratedto US, whilethe erstwhileback-
wardsrapidlyrosetobecomethedominant
communityand the vast majorityof the
populationwere coveredby reservations.
Incontrast,inUPthemembersof theupper
castesforma fifthandthebrahminsnearly
10 per cent of the population.The large
proportionof uppercastesmadeit harder
to displacethemcompletelyandtheyhave
stayedto fight back. Furthermore, upper
castes, particularly brahmins, regard
governmentjobs as their bequest,espe-
cially since alternativeopportunitiesof
employmentin UP's sluggish economy
are limited.
Challenges of Development
and Governance
Whathasbeentheimpactof lowercaste
mobilisationon developmentand gover-
nance, especially in the area of poverty
alleviation?Theinseparable linksbetween
social and political structuresand inad-
equatedevelopmentduringthe Congress
eraIhavedetailedelsewhere.39 Principally,
Congressgovernmentsfailedto establish
a developmentalstate (an issue that de-
serves a separateanalysis).On the other
hand,thepost-Congress governments have
not been able to reverse this tendency. The
incorporation into the political system of
lower caste elites and members of the
scheduled castes has apparentlydone little
to reduce the enormous social and eco-
nomic disparities that persist in the un-
equal social order. This raises a basic
question: if there are so many lower caste
politicians and bureaucrats,why is this not
reflected in state policies to promote the
well-being of lower castes and classes?
As far as the development effort is
concerned, facts speak for themselves. UP
is the largest state where growth has been
slowest.4 A chronically disadvantaged
state, UP is home to five of India's 14 most
backward districts. It has the largest con-
centrationof poor and the worst infrastruc-
ture and social indicators of development.
UP's per capita income is below the na-
tional average: the thirdlowest ahead only
of Orissa and Bihar. Though foodgrains
production in the state has decelerated
sharply in the 1990s, UP is the largest
producer of foodgrain and oilseeds, and
grows about S0 per cent of the total sugar-
cane, with agricultureaccountingfor 40 per
cent of the state's gross domestic state pro-
ductand75 percent of its total employment.
In understandingthe question of public
policy and distribution of public goods, it
is importantto note that the persistence of
poverty is in part a consequence of UP's
poor economic performance. Economic
growth has decelerated in UP since 1991,
even as growth has accelerated in other
states. In 1950, UP's per capita income
was almost equal to the all-India average,
and since then it has declined to 65 per
cent of that of the country. According to
the World Bank, 'The gap between UP and
the rest of India widened substantially in
the 1990s as annual growth in per capita
income slowed down to less than 1 per
cent.'4 Employment and growth depends
upon factors such as the level of human
resource development, the quality of infra-
structure, and the public policy environ-
ment, all of which are poorly developed
in UP. The state government has failed to
raise the revenue to match the growing
needs of the population: development
expenditure has declined whereas non-
developmental expenditureon administra-
tive services rose from Rs 3,399 crore in
1999-2000 to Rs 4,282 crore in 2000-01.
Significantly, the administrativeexpendi-
ture in the state is equal to the combined
expenditure on agriculture and allied ac-
tivities, irrigation and flood control, rural
employment, special areas programme,
industries, minerals, water supply and
sanitation. Consequently, there is an ab-
solute reduction in expenditure on indus-
tries, irrigation, water supply, sanitation,
and urban development.
4405
 The state has made little progress in KristoffelLietenandRaviSrivastavanote envisaged distribution of food grains di-
reducingpovertysincethelate 1980s,and thatmost,if notall,thesubsidycomponent rectly to schools after being lifted from the
over41 percent of the 160 millionpopu- of the IRDP is often siphonedaway by Food Corporationof India(FCI) godowns.
lationslives below the povertyline. Bet- variousintermediaries, including'dalals', The CAG report(1999) found thatthe state
ween 1957-58and4987-88, UP achieved panchayat, andruraldevelopment andbank government introduced a middle level of
a reductionin povertyby 13.6 per cent functionaries.Micro-studiesreveal simi- stocking of food grains at transportagency
(from55 percent to 41.6 per cent). This larleakages,a lowerwage labourcompo- godowns resulting in misuse anddiversion
processsloweddownto 0.2 percent from nentthanstipulated,andpanchayatsplay- of grains.58 Poor governance, increased
1987-88to 1993-94whereastherestof the ing a negligiblerole in projectplanning corruption, declining performance, and
countryachieveda reductionin povertyby andsupervision.49 KripaShankar'sstudy lack of concern for the poor manifesting
3.2 per cent.43The acceleratedeconomic of JRYin two districtsreportsleakageto itself in ineffective public programmes
growthinsomestatesfromtheearly1990s theextentof 40 percentandthatthe wage and delivery, and inept and wasteful
has left UP lagging behind the rapidly componentwasas low as29 per centwhen public expenditure is thus one of the key
developingstatesof Gujarat,Maharashtra, it should have been 60 per cent.50 factors impinging on UP's growth and
West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Madhya It is the same story with the public development.5
Pradesh,and Rajasthan,its growthactu- distributionsystem (PDS). Conceivedof In Salman Rushdie's novel The Moor's
ally decelerating.44 As per capitaincome as a measureto ensureavailabilityof es- Last Sigh, one of the charactersoffers his
growthcontinuedto be verylow, poverty sentialcommodities,PDS 'failedto func- definition of modern Indian democracy
may not have declined at all. The low tion optimally'.In spite of the high inci- ('one man one bribe') and of what he calls
economicgrowthmeantthatemployment denceof poverty,thestategovernmentdid the Indian Theory of Relativity ('every-
didnotkeeppacewithpopulationgrowth, not fully utilisePDS on accountof tardy thing for relatives'). Like many things
wagesremainedlow, andopportunities for implementation. It does not lift even half written about India, this is an exaggera-
socialmobilityfor the lowerclasses were of all that is allocatedto it.51According tion, but it would appear that the second
limited.In general,developmentpolicies to the CAG report(1999), slum dwellers part of the definition provides a fitting
havenotsubstantially reducedinequalities in fourof the 10testcheckeddistrictswere description of UP's contemporary politi-
in termsof food, education,healthcare, not targetedthus deprivingthem of the cal culture where political representatives
and productiveassets.45 benefitof thescheme.Foodsecuritycould do everything for themselves and their
This has meantthat resourcesfor the not be ensuredbecauseof 'pooroff take supporters. Several commentators have
investmentin public goods - schools, andpoorpercapitadistribution,financial documented and criticised UP's record of
healthservices,drinkingwater- expanded mismanagement and inadequateenforce- governance. While doing fieldwork in
slowly.Thereis substantialevidencethat ment'.52It was estimatedthattherewere western UP, Akhil Gupta was struck by
publicservicesandprogrammes,particu- at least20 percentboguscards.A number how frequently the theme of corruption
larlythosemeantforthepoor,workhope- of otherinefficienciesand issues of mis- cropped up in everyday conversations of
lesslyin thisstate.TheCAGreport(1999) management arenotedin thereport,which villagers.0? He writes:
highlightsnumerousirregularitiesin the also documentsextensive losses due to Most of the storiesthe men told each other
implementation of anti-povertyprogram- storage,embezzlement,theft,andmisap- when the day's work was done and small
mes, such as the EmploymentAssurance propriation.This is confirmedby a study groupsgatheredat habitualplaces to shoot
Scheme(EAS), JawaharRozgarYojana conductedby theTataEconomicConsul- the breeze, had to do with corruptionand
(JRY)and the Million Wells Scheme.A tancy Services, which also found exten- the 'state'. Sometimesthe discussiondealt
reviewof implementation of programmes sive leakagedue to diversionof a signifi- with how someone had managedto outwit
by Audit,as well as a surveycarriedout cant portionof the subsidisedfoodgrain an official who wanted to collect a bribe,
by ORG-MARG,revealedthatthe funds to the open market.53The leakageswere at othertimes with 'the going price' to get
availablefor theprogrammeweregrossly estimatedto be 46 per cent in wheat,49 anelectricalconnectionfora new tubewell
inadequate.46 Theseirregularities include percentinriceand36 percentsugar.Some connection or to obtain a loan to buy a
diversionof funds,a lower wage compo- of these findingshave been corroborated buffalo, at still other times with which
nentthanprescribed,delayedpaymentof by otherstudies.54 official had been transferredor who was
wages. It was noted too that these were As is well known,UP rankslow with likely to be appointedto a certainposition
below the prescribedminimumwages in regardto humandevelopment.A few de- andwho replaced,with who hadwillingly
manycases therewas improperengage- mographicand developmentcharacteris- helped his caste memberswithout taking
mentof contractors,and maintenanceof tics will indicatethe natureof challenges a bribe, and so on.61
musterrolls,diversionor misutilisationof thatconfrontthe state.UP's performance Paul Brass reached the same conclusion
the grain component of EAS wages, in female literacyis abysmal,and after in his exploration of social violence: the
etc.4 The upshot of this irregularity and Rajasthanit has made the least progress increased importance of political brokers
corruptionwas lower employmentthan in narrowingthe gendergap.55 In 1991, located outside the state. Brass takes this
planned,lowerremuneration to labourers 74.7 per cent suffered the indignityof argument further in charging that:
thanjustified, and non-employmentof illiteracyin UP. If UP were treatedas a rule in the countryside is not based on
female labourers. Unsurprisingly, the separatecountryfor the genderdevelop- abstractionsbut on controlover resources
state'sperformancein the JRY is not up mentindex,it wouldrank123rdoutof the and safety. It is a Hobbesian world, in
toscratch.Provisionforruralemployment 137 countrieson the index,whichadjusts which securityandsafety arenot provided
throughschemessuch as the JRY forms for human development index.56 The by the state, but are themselves values -
only one per cent of the revenue mid-daymealschemedesignedto increase that is valued objects - integral to and
budget.48 This is clearly the case in rural enrolments and reduce dropouts failed to inseparablefrom the struggle for power
development programmes whereleakageis setanytargetforenrolment andattendance and influence.62
estimated tobebetween20 and70 percent. duringthe implementation from 1995 to Over the last 20 years the expansion of
While analysing the Integrated Rural 1999 of the NutritionalSupportfor Pri- state functions has increased bureaucratic
Development Programrie (IRDP), mary Educationscheme.5 The scheme control of the various schemes of produc-

4406 Economic and Political Weekly November 24, 2001

tion anddistribution,even as the control land,access to lucrativenon-agricultural a share of political power they have
over the IAS has gradually shifted to jobs, and ties to the state apparatus,for developeda vital stakein the democratic
politicians.63As N C Saxenamakesclear: instance,betweentheJatsandothergroups. system. Owing to the success of these
'to individualswho wantedto sharethe Meanwhile,the poorerstratafind it im- coalitionseven BJP politicianshave had
spoilsandpatronage,however,a pricehad possibleto buy police protectionor assis- to cut dealswith scheduledcastesandthe
to be paidin termsof obeisanceto political tanceor pay bribesto securegovernment OBCs by offeringthem a growingarray
bosses.Thusthisperiodwas characterised jobs. While nearly everyone feels inse- of job reservations, special economic
by both enhancedrole of the state and cure,thepoorarethemostinsecureowing programmes,andsub-quotaswithincaste
enhanced control of politicians over to their vulnerablesocial and economic quotasratherthan the mere promiseof
bureaucracy'.64 The politician-bureaucratsituation. a grandRam'templein Ayodhya.
nexus has exploitedthe state machinery Despite mountingpopularresentment Empirically, thereservations strategyhas
throughrent-seekingbehaviourfor parti- againstdismalgovernanceandcorruption worked more effectively than its critics
san ends. thereis notmuchpopularpressureormany would have expected.As in many other
Corruption andinefficiencyis rampant. movements in civil society demanding states,thereis greateremphasistodayon
Corruptionhas overrun virtually every greateraccountability. Itappearsasthough 'proportionality'in governmentemploy-
institution,includinginstitutionssuch as people have resignedthemselvesto their ment than ever it was under Congress
the police andjudiciary,which are sup- fate, preferringinsteadto approachpoli- regimesanda new emphasison enforcing
posedto takeactionagainstit. According ticiansandlegislatorsfor favours.Indeed, existingjob reservationsandproportional
to an India Todayand ORG-MARGsur- politicians are importantintermediaries allocationof governmentresourcessuch
vey, UP was perceivedto be the second between people and officials and links as the new 'Special ComponentPlans',
mostcorruptstateafterBihar.65A report with a politician can help in obtaining whichexplicitlyset aside a proportionof
submittedto the UP Academyof Admin- assistancefrom governmentofficials, or governmentexpenditurefor scheduled
istrationin 2000 foundthatUP was seen jobs or assistancefrom the constituency castesandtribes4 Largenumbersof lower
to be more prone to corruptionthan the development funds at the disposal of castes have gained government jobs
restof thecountry.66 Peopleratedthepolice membersof parliament. Thereis thusvery throughreservations,and an even larger
department andthe departmentof electric littleground-levelmobilisationoutsidethe numberhavetheopportunity to participate
supplyas the biggestproblemsfacingthe partysystemwhichcouldpushthegovern- in democraticpolitics.This is notjust due
statebecausethey were the most corrupt. ment and politicalleadersto adoptmore to thelargenumberof groupsnoweligible
Mostimportantly,corruption, citizensbeli- responsivestrategiestowardsthe power- for reservations,but also due to better
eved,beganatthetop.67Thewell-deserved less; very few initiativesfor politicalar)d enforcement. Nevertheless,initsownterms
reputationof poorgovernanceandinsidi- social reformsuch as the strugglefor the it is flawed in three respects. It is not
ous corruptionwas one of the causes for Right to Informationin Rajasthanor the workingto the advantageof lower caste
thepersistenceof backwardnessandapp- Rightto Educationcampaignin Madhya women.OBCsformthesinglelargestgroup
alling implementationof anti-poverty Pradesh. Evidently'the emergence of in the UP legislativeassembly,but there
schemes.6 This is also why the state is broadersocial solidaritiesis impededby arehardlyanyOBCfemaleMPsorMLAs
seen as an unattractivedestinationfor the absence of non-electoral social even as OBC men have greatlyincreased
capitaland investment. mobilisationand action. theirnumbersin legislatures.Second,it is
The existence of widespreadsleaze in workingto the benefitof the lowercaste
economic transactionsand recruitment Conclusion middleclasses.It is clearthatthecommu-
proceduresthatfavourthe locally domi- nitiesasa wholehavenotbenefited;rather,
nantgroupsareanimportantconsequence This paperhas advancedtwo principal the membersof some families who have
of partisangovernance.Speed money to arguments.Evenjust lookingat electoral managedto take advantageof what are,
get one's work done is so commonplace historyandthegrowthof partiesrepresent- afterall, still a verysmallnumberof jobs
thatit is not even thoughtto be a corrupt ing middle and lower castes we can see for a very large numberof aspirants.75
practice,it is money given 'to spur into thatUPpoliticshasbecomemorecompeti- Finally, it has given rise to resentment
action, a perfectly legal process that tive anddemocratic.The salienceof caste among Muslims and MBCs, who have
would not take place unless a monetary identitiesand their role in political and been excludedfromthe emphasison pro-
incentive was given'.69 Corruptionis electoral mobilisationhas been rightly portionalityin governmentemployment.
hardlynew;the new aspectis its 'brazen- recognised as a crucial element in the Althoughthe centralgovernmentandUP
nessandopenness'.70Politicshasbecome success of farmers'politics.73However, governmentresistedextendingthe prin-
increasinglydependenton the manipula- the rise of Hindu nationalismhas been ciple of proportionalityin government
tionof statepatronage,electoralmachines, seen as a powerfulforcebreakingpeasant employmentand spending to Muslims,
anddeals betweendifferentfactionsand andcastesolidarities.Morerecently,caste non-BJPgovernmentshave made some
groupswithinparties.In short, 'parallel has come to dominatepolitics; indeed, efforts to ensure that Muslims receive
authoritystructuresandmafiagangshave casteboundariesaremoreimportantthan a share, if not their 'fair share', of jobs
emerged'.7'Craig Jeffrey's researchin the Hindu-Muslimboundary(notwith- andeconomic programmes.The MBCs
the upperDoab region of westernUttar standingthepervasiveinfluenceof Hifidu have not assertedtheirclaims againstthe
Pradeshpointsto theexistenceof 'shadow nationalistpolitics)orpeasantsolidarities. upper OBCs even as the yadavs have
state'or informalnetworksof intermedi- This has been in partdue to the electoral benefitedmorethananyotherlowercaste
ariesin establishinginfluencewith poli- success of political partiesrepresenting groupfromthe policies pursuedin UP.76
ticiansandthepoliceforce,andas a result, backwardand lower castes, which have They can make gains only when they
the richerstratacoopt the local state to enlistedmembersof caste groupsas part are united on a common platform or
legitimatetheir access to state institu- of caste coalitions.To thatextent,lower whenthey unite to gain their share of
tions and employment within state caste politics has succeededin drawing poweragainstthe dominantOBCs. This
institutions.72Itrevealedcleardifferences hitherto disadvantagedgroups into,the is the major challenge ahead for the
regardingformaland informalaccess to politicalmainstream,andby giving them lowercastes.77

Economic and Political Weekly November 24, 2001 4407

 The secondargumentrelatesto regime
changeandtheimpactof massmobilisation
on governanceand development.While
the two models of peasant and caste
mobilisationhavechallengeduppercaste/
class domination,this has not necessarily
promotedpolicies or public expenditure
for servicesthatbenefitthe lower castes
or implementationof developmentpoli-
cies andprogrammes thataddressthevital
concernsof thepoor.Therearethreelikely
reasonswhyincorporation of membersof
lowercastesinto governmentsand legis-
latureshas not been accompaniedby a
corresponding increasein the welfare of
deprivedgroups.First,conflictsbetween
disadvantaged groupsandthe social frag-
mentationfollowing the collapse of the
Congresscreatedcircumstancesin which
the Congressstrategyof dominationand
accommodation basedon a 'grand-coali-
tion' thatincludedrepresentativesof all
groupsbrokedown, this was not be re-
placedby an alternativetype of middle
caste/classregimeon the lines of Andhra
Pradeshor Karnataka or alternativelypo-
liticalregimesin TamilNadu, Kerala,or
West Bengal where lower castes/classes
arestronglyrepresented.78 Morecrucially,
uppercastes, heavily representedin the
BJPstageda comeback,andcontinuedto
wieldconsiderable powerandinfluencein
statepolitics.Second,lowercastepolitics
entailedtargetingparticularcaste groups
ratherthana broad-basedmobilisationto
createa rainbowcoalitionof thedisadvan-
taged.UP's lowercastepartieshavebeen
focusedon specificgroupsandaggregated
well-establishedinterests that have as-
sumedthe form of politicalmonopolies.
Thesegroupshavenotdevelopedhorizon-
tal solidarities,as they are caughtup in
rivalriesbased on status and economic
competition.Third,theconditionsof scar-
cityhavegeneratedcut-throat competitive
politics that.is averse to structuringand
regulatingpower to serve social ends or
to sustaina largersense of politics. As a
consequence,variousgroupsand parties
lookuponthepoliticalsystemas basically
a vehiclefor servingparticular claimsand
thereforeworkfirmlywithinthe old state
project.Thus,the tendencyis to makeuse
of mobilisationas a means of winning
politicalpower,andnot as a provisionfor
intra-groupor inter-groupequality and
economic development.In brief, UP is
passing through a somewhat extreme
versionof whatSunilKhilnanihas called
'pure politics' that he suggests India is
passingthrough:thatis, intensestruggles
over the access, capture,and exercise of
powerin waysthatshowlittleconcernfor
proceduresthatregulatepower'sexercise
and much less using political power for
publicends.79Theintensecompetitionfor
4408
power and 'loaves and fishes of offices
and jobs', as Asoka Mehta once put it,
generates a politics of proximity and
conveniencewhereelectedpoliticianssee
it theirdutynotto actonbehalfof everyone
or anyone except themselves and their
supporters.8
Incomparisonto regionalparties,which
incorporated casteandlanguagewithinthe
ideaof a politicalcommunity,UP's parties
made no attemptto combinecasts with
other social categoriesto build broader
coalitions. Historically, the Dravidian
communitywas conceived primarilyin
termsof a coalitionof mega-castes,that.
is, thenon-brahmin Hindu,whowasneither
brahminnor scheduledcaste. Narendra
Subramanian's analysisshows this was a
layeredidentity,and processesof mobil-
isationledto theemergenceof aninclusive
political arenabased on a political dis-
course that transcendedcaste cleavages,
and includedall Tamils/southIndiansin
the formationof a homogeneousTamil
politicalcommunity.81 Thoughthe DMK
madenoeffortatstructural reform,despite
the sharpruralinequalitiesand income
disparities,itsubstitutedforreforma set of
social welfarepolicies which, combined
withalmost70 percentreservations
for the
backwardcastesin educationandgovern-
ment, satisfied popular aspirations.82
Social welfareprogrammes, rangingfrom
massiveurbanhousingdevelopmentsfor
the lower middle classes to rural pro-
grammesforconstruction of villageroads,
schoolbuildings,promotionof cleandrink-
ing watersupply,the installationof one
electriclight connectionin every hut and
the free midday meal scheme for eight
million children,has given substanceto
the governmentimage of generosityand
accommodation.83 Sucha publicdiscourse
is virtuallyabsentatthelevelof UP'sparty
politics,andwhereit exists,it is frequently
used to serve particularinterests.
Even as UP's democraticpolitics has
shifted from the earlier conception of
representation dominatedby an elite act-
ing on behalf of a largergroupto a nu-
mericalone, in which elected politicians
act on behalf of theirgroup,it has been
unableto deal with its effects. Anchored
in a politics of identityand intereststhat
link representationand rightschiefly to
reservations,this politics is generally
uninterestedin proceduresand policies.
Today, none of the political partiesare
committedto a change in the structures
thatgenerateclass, genderor community
inequalities.Rather,they only seek to
redistributethe spoils of office to favour
one groupover another.At best, this can
broadenthe avenuesof upwardmobility
withoutgreatlychangingthe normsand
structuresof distribution.[33
Economic and Political Weekly
Notes
[I am most grateful to N C Saxena and Ravi
Srivastava for suggestions of materials and to
Imtiaz Ahmad,John Harrisand Craig Jeffrey for
extremelyhelpfulcommentson an earlierversion
of this paperand to Adil Tyabji for his excellent
editorial advice.]
I AtulKohli,DemocracyandDiscontent:India's
Growing Crisis of Governability,Cambridge
University Press (CUP), Cambridge, 1991.
2 Yogendra Yadav, 'Electoral Politics in the
Times of Change: India's Third Electoral
System, 1989-99', Economic and Political
Weekly(EPW),August 21-28 and September
3, 1999, YogendraYadav, 'Understandingthe
Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of
BahujanParticipationin ElectoralPolitics in
the 1990s' in FrancineFrankel,Zoya Hasan,
Rajeev Bhargava and Balveer Arora (eds),
Transforming India: Social and Political
Dynamics of Democracy, OUP, New Delhi,
2000; AshutoshVarshney,'Is IndiaBecoming
More Democratic?'Journal of Asian Studies
(JAS), February2000; Atul Kohli, (ed). The
Success of India's Democracy,CUP,
Cambridge, 2001.
3 YogendraYadav, 'Understandingthe Second
DemocraticUpsurge' in FrancineFrankelet
al (eds), TransformingIndia.
4 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial
Histories,OUP,Delhi, 1993;ParthaChatterjee,
'Democracyand the Violence of the State: A
PoliticalNegotiationof Death',paperpresented
at a conferenceon Globalizationand theState,
Paris, June 2000, (mimeo); Sudipta Kaviraj,
'A Critiqueof the Passive Revolution',EPW,
23 (45,46,6), 1988and 'ModernityandPolitics
in India,Daedulus,Winter2000; Akhil Gupta,
'Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse of
Corruption,the Culture of Politics and the
ImaginedState'inZoya Hasan,(ed), Stateand
Politics inIndia,SagePublications,New Delhi,
2000.
5 The OBCs rise to power has been described
by YogendraYadav as a' second democratic
upsurge', 'Reconfigurationin IndianPolitics:
State Assembly Elections 1993-95', EPW,
January 13, 1996.
6 Francine Frankel, Introductionin Francine
Frankel et al, TransformingIndia, pp 4-5.
7 JohnHarrissprovidesaclassificationof regimes
by comparingregimedifferencesacrossstates
at both the structurallevel and that of party-
dominatedgovernment.Thereare differences
between states in termsof the organisationof
agriculture, development of capitalism, the
extent of industrialdevelopment etc. These
differences may then be reflectedin terms of
the nature of political mobilisation. See
'ComparingRegimes across IndianStates: A
PreliminaryEssay',EPW,November29,1999.
8 Estimates from Montek Singh Ahluwalia,
'Economic Performanceof States in Post-
Reforms Period', EPW, May 6, 2000.
9 Christophe Jaffrelot, 'The Rise of Other
Backward Classes in the Hindi Belt', JAS,
February2000.
10 T J Byres, 'CharanSingh (1902-1987): An
Assessment',Journalof PeasantStudies(JPS),
15 (2), 1988; Ian Duncan, 'PartyPolitics and
the North Indian Peasantry:The Rise of the
November 24, 2001
 BhartiyaKrantiDal in Uttar Pradesh', JPS,
16 (1); Ian Duncan,'AgriculturalInnovation
and Political Change in North India:The Lok
Dal in Uttar Pradesh', JPS, 24 (4).
11 See articlesin Tom Brass (ed.), New Farmers
Movements in India, Frank Cass, London,
1995.
12 Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments:
Agriculturein the Making of Modern India,
OUP, New Delhi, 1998, p 69.
13 Ram ManoharLohia, The Caste System,Ram
ManoharLohiaSamataVidyalaya,Hyderabad,
1979; Madhu Limaye, Birth of Non-
Congressism, B R Publishing Corporation,
New Delhi, 1988.
14 YogendraYadav, 'ElectoralPolitics in Times
of Change', p 2398.
15 RogerJefferyandPatriciaJeffery,Population,
Genderand Politics, CUP, Cambridge,1997.
16 Zoya Hasan,'Representation and Redistri-
bution:The New LowerCastePolitics in North
India' in Francine Frankel et al (eds),
TransformingIndia.
17 lan Duncan,'DalitsandPolitics in RuralNorth
India: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar
Pradesh',JPS, Vol 27, No 1, October 1999.
pp 54-5.
18 Governmentof India, Reportof the National
Commissionfor the Scheduled Castes and
Tribes, New Delhi, 1996, p 77.
19 Craig Jeffrey,'Democratisation without
Representation? The Power and Political
Strategiesof the Rural Elite in North India',
Political Geography, 19, 2000, p 1033.
20 Ibid, p 1033.
21 Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche, 'Stating the
Difference: State, Discourse and Class
Reproductionin UttarPradeshIndia',Develop-
ment and Change, 31 (4), pp 857-78.
22 In the 1970s and 1980s Congressgovernments
introducednew rulestoenforcejob reservations
as the governmentwas worriedthatthey were
losing the support of scheduled castes and
tribes.StevenWilkinson,'IndiaConsociational
Theory and Ethnic Violence', Asian Survey,
vol Xl, No 5, September/October2000.
23 Accordingto ChristopheJaffrelot's calculation,
64 percent of the northIndianMPs in the first
Lok Sabha came from the upper castes and
only 4.5 per cent from the OBCs; by 1996,
the share of OBC MPs had increasedto over
25 per cent. Rajasthanis the only exception
to this trend. JAS, February2000.
24 V K Rai, 'Caste, Region and Community in
Uttar Pradesh', EPW, August 21-28, 1999.
25 Shail Mayaram,Ashis Nandy, ShikhaTrivedi
and Indulal Yagnik, Creating a Nationality,
OUP, New Delhi, 1995.
26 ChristopheJaffrelot, 'The Rise of Backward
Classes in the Hindi Belt', p105.
27 Jasmine Zernini-Brotel, 'The BJP in Uttar
Pradesh: From Hindutva to Consensual
Politics?'in Thomas Blom Hansen and
ChristopheJaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the
Compulsionsof Politics in India, OUP, New
Delhi, 1998, p 72.
28 Christophe Jaffrelot,'The Sangh Parivar
between Sanskritisation and 'Social
Engineering' in Thomas Blom Hansen and
ChristopheJaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the
Compulsionsof Politics in India.
29 ChristopheJaffrelot,'Hindu Nationalism and
Democracy' in Francine Frankelet al (eds),
TransformingIndia, p 369.
Economicand PoliticalWeekly November24, 2001
30 Ashutosh Varshney makes this point about
lower caste politics in his 'Is IndiaBecoming
More Democratic?
31 Zoya Hasan, Questfor Power: Oppositional
Movements and Post-Congress Politics in
Uttar Pradesh, OUP, New Delhi, 1998.
32 ChristopheJaffrelot, 'The Rise of Backward
Classes in the Hindi Belt', p 101.
33 Of 900 teachersappointedby MulayamSingh
Yadav's secondgovernment,720 wereyadavs.
In the police, 3,151 newly selected candidates,
1,223 were yadavs, Ibid, p 102.
34 Craig Jeffrey, 'Democratisation Without
Representation',21.
35 Sunday, October 25,1994; India Today,
November 15, 1994.
36 Akhil Gupta, Post-Colonial Development,
p75.
37 Ibid, p 74.
38 This point has been emphasizedby Kanchan
Chandra, 'The Transformation of Ethnic
Politics in India:The Decline of Congressand
the RiseofBahujanSamajPartyinHoshiarpur',
JAS, February2000, pp 12-14.
39 See my Quest for Power: Oppositional
Movements and Post-Congress Politics,
especially, Chap II.
40 UttarPradeshFiscal andGovernance:Poverty
Reductionand EconomicManagement,World
Bank, ReportNo PID711. , January29, 2000.
41 World Bank Report No PID8711.
42 Informationfrom Kripa Shankar,'In a Debt
Trap', EPW, July 22, 2000.
43 Nisha Srivastava, 'Social Security in Uttar
Pradesh: Moving beyond Policy to
Governance', in MahendraVed et al (eds),
Social and EconomicSecurityin India,Institute
for Human Development, New Delhi, 2001,
p 440.
44 Montek Singh Ahluwalia, 'Economic Perfor-
mance of States in Post-Reforms Period',
p 1638.
45 Jean Dreze and HarisGazdar,'UttarPradesh:
The Burden of Inertia' in Jean Dreze and
Amartya Sen (eds), Indian Development:
Selected Regional Perspectives, OUP, New
Delhi, 1998.
46 Reportofthe ComptrollerandAuditor General
of India (CAG) for the year ended March31,
1999, No 3, (Civil), Government of Uttar
Pradesh.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid, p 2619.
49 Nisha Srivastava, 'Social Security in Uttar
Pradesh', p 445.
50 Kripa Shankar, 'Jawahar Rozgar Yojana',
EPW, Vol 29, No 29, 1994.
51 Madura Swaminathan, Public Distribution
System,,Leftword, New Delhi, 1998.
52 CAG, No 3, (Civil), p 63.
53 Ibid, pp 84-5.
54 Ravi Srivastava, 'Rural Labour in Uttar
Pradesh:Emerging Features of Subsistence,
Contradictionand Resistance; Jens Lerche,
'Politics of the Poor: AgriculturalLabourers
andPoliticalTransformations inUttarPradesh',
in T J Byres, T J K Kapadiaand Jens Lerche,
(eds) Rural LabourRelations in India, Frank
Cass, London, 1999.
55 Lori McDougall, 'GenderGap in Literacy in
Uttar Pradesh: Questions for Decentralised
EducationalPlanning',EPW, May 6, 2000, p
1650.
56 Ibid, p 1650.
57 CAG, No 3 (Civil).
58 Ibid.
59 Doubtless the past decade of post-Congress
politics with its instability and succession
of minority governments added to the pro-
blems of governance. Then again, the BJP
governmenthas had a full five-year term.This
governmenthas done very little for the poor
and the marginalised even as its period in
power has seen a further deterioration of
governance,rise in crime, and total neglect of
development.
60 Akhil Gupta, 'Blurred Boundaries: The
Discourseof Corruption: TheCultureof Politics
and the Imagined State', p 331.
61 Ibid, p 331.
62 Paul Brass, The Theft of an idol: Text and
Context in the Representationof Collective
Violence, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1997, pp. 92-3.
63 N C Saxena, 'Administrationand the People:
HigherBureaucracyNeeds RadicalReforms',
MIG, October-December2000, p 14.
64 Ibid, p 12.
65 India Today, November 24, 1997.
66 Perceptions and Experience of Corruption,
Uttar Pradesh Academy of Administration,
June 2000, p7.
67 Ibid.
68 The incidence of corruption at the top led
membersof the IAS to take up cudgels against
corruptionwith the IAS'Officers Association
in the state launching since 1996 a move to
identifythe most corruptofficers in theirranks
through a ballot, promising to undertakean
independentinquiry against corrupt-officers.
69 Ibid, p 20.
70 Ibid, p 20.
71 N C Saxena, 'Administrationand the People:
HigherBureaucracyNeeds RadicalReforms',
p 12.
72 Craig Jeffrey, 'Demqcratisation without
Representation'.
73 lan Duncan, 'Agricultural Innovation and
Political Change in North India:The Lok Dal
in Uttar Pradesh', JPS, Vol 24, July 1997.
74 Steven Wilkinson, India, Consociational
Theory and Ethnic Violence, p 782.
75 Marc Galanterestimates that between 6 and
10 per cent of all scheduledcaste families had
benefited in the first 25 years of reservations.
76 Forming8.7 per centof thepopulation,Yadavs
are the thirdlargest caste group and they had
over a quarter of the MLAs in the 1993
Assembly. ChristopheJaffrelot, 'The Rise of
BackwardClasses in the Hindi Belt', p 102.
77 Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Rise of Backward
Classes', p 106.
78 John Harriss,'ComparingRegimes', p 3371.
79 Sunil Khilnani, 'The Indian Constitutionand
Democracy' in Zoya Hasan, E Sridharanand
R Sudarshan(eds), India'sLivingConstitution,
PermanentBlack, New Delhi, forthcoming.
80 Ibid, p 7.
81 NarendraSubramanian,Ethnicityand Populist
Mobilisation: Political Parties, Citizens and
Democracy in South India, OUP, New Delhi,
1999.
82 Francine Frankel Francine Frankel, 'Middle
ClassesandCastesin India'sPolitics:Prospects
for Political Accommodation' in Atul Kohli
(ed), India'sDemocracy:AnAnalysisof State-
Society Relations, p 246.
83 Ibid, p 246.
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