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Adrien Deloro
Spring 2009
Contents
0
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Syntax
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.1.1
0.1.2
Well-Formed Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.1.3
Unique Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.2.1
Truth Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.2.2
0.2.3
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
12
0.3.1
13
0.3.2
16
0.3.3
. . . . . . .
18
0.3.4
25
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
0.4.1
27
0.4.2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
0.5.1
Compactness
29
0.5.2
Applications to Decidability*
0.5.3
A Topological Proof* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
33
0.6.1
Semantics*
33
0.6.2
Proof Theory*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
0.6.3
Completeness*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2
28
Syntax
30
39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
1.1.1
First-order Languages
1.1.2
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
41
1.1.3
Formulas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
1.2.1
Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
1.2.2
45
1.2.3
45
. . . . . . . . . .
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
1.3.1
Substitutability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
1.3.2
A Renaming Algorithm
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48
1.3.3
49
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
1.4.1
Deductions
1.4.2
1.4.3
Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
1.5.0
57
1.5.1
1.5.2
1.5.3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
58
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60
62
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
1.6.1
Decidability*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
1.6.2
Compactness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
1.6.3
Non-Standard Analysis* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
66
68
1.7.1
68
1.7.2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
70
1.7.3
72
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
73
2.1
Compactness fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
2.2
Peano Arithmetic
75
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
77
79
80
1'.1.2 Inclusion
81
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
84
1'.2.1 Morphisms
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
84
86
1'.2.3 Categoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
87
. . . . . . . . . . .
87
89
90
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-isomorphisms
92
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
91
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-Saturation .
96
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
1'.5.2
-Saturated
1'.5.3 Examples
Models
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Indices
111
List of Lectures
115
Chapter 0
They bring
their own notion of consequence; the main result of this chapter which serves
as a training area for more expressive logics, is that in propositional logic, both
notions coincide.
In this chapter:
0.1 Syntax
We rst deal with the familiar syntax of propositional logic. The expressions are
(nite) sequences of well-known symbols (0.1.1), but not all such expressions
may be given a meaning.
(0.1.2).
Denition 0.1.1
ve connectives
a set
, , , ,
of sentence symbols
A1 , . . . , A n , . . . .
and
other three connectives. This unformal idea will be given a precise meaning in
0.3.3.
Denition 0.1.2
(expression)
Remark 0.1.3.
The set
A1
Denition 0.1.4
(well-formed formula)
The collection
WFF
of well-formed
each
if
An
and
is a w;
Remark 0.1.5.
(), ( ), ( ), ( ),
and
( ).
Denition 0.1.6
(theory)
As this is a
Notation 0.1.7.
C :
E
E
7
()
C :
E2
(, ) 7
E
( )
C :
E2
(, ) 7
C :
E2
(, ) 7
E
( )
C :
E2
E
(, ) 7 ( )
Notation 0.1.8.
WFFn+1
WFF
(resp.
E
( )
WFF2 )
to
WFF.
It is clear that for all n N, WFFn is countable. It is also clear that WFF =
nN WFFn . This proves that WFF is a set, and even a countable set. More
generally, if A is innite (but perhaps uncountable), then Card WFF = Card A.
and
Corollary 0.1.10.
position of
Let
The restrictions to
be a w of length
> 1.
(1 2 ),
(1 ),
(1 2 ),
(1 2 ),
(1 2 )
(This means that the connective and the composing propositions are unique.)
E1
of
E2
with
E = E1 E2
is an expression
E1
E1 6= E .
Lemma 0.1.11
(balanced parenthesing)
Proof .
(i). We show the property by induction on (the length of )
scription of
If
WFF
WFF0 ,
then
= ()
is of the form
with
WFF0 ,
then
WFF.
WFFn .
WFFn .
show that 1
Let
be of the form
('s
than
(),
of :
for
we
)'s.
If
If
is (1 where
If
has as many
('s
as
)'s
by (i).
a similar vein.
(iii). A consequence of (i) and (ii) (the empty expression is not a w anyway).
Assume that
C (1 , 1 ) = C (2 , 2 ),
(1 1 ) = (2
for well-formed formulas
1 , 1 , 2 , 2
2 )
and connectives
1 1 ) = 2
2 )
and
that is:
Then
1 or 2
1 is an
generality
the w
2 ,
2 .
If
can't be
a w, a contradiction.
So
1 = 2 ,
1 ) =
At this point it is clear that
=
2 )
we derive
1 = 2
Of course the case of
everything is proved.
Such a quick proof of the Unique Readability Theorem is the reason why we
have introduced so many parentheses, in spite of the disgusting redundancies
they create. From now on we freely omit parentheses when there is no ambiguity,
i.e. we write
instead of
(() ).
End of Lecture 1.
0.2 Semantics
We briey escape the claws of syntax, and give sense to our symbols.
So far
they bore no meaning; at no point yet did we agree on what they stand for.
truth value.
Denition 0.2.1
(truth values)
).
Notice that everything from now on could be dened with more truth values;
for instance continuous logic investigates the case where the set of truth values
is
[0, 1].
v:A
{F, T }.
Once the sentence symbols have been given a truth value, the natural truth
value of every w is known.
Proposition 0.2.3.
Let v be a truth
v : WFF {F, T } such that:
tension
v(An ) = v(An )
v() = T
i
for each
n N;
v() = F ;
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = T
and
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = T
or
v(2 ) = T ;
v(2 ) = T ;
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = F
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = v(2 ).
Proof .
This extension
or
v(2 ) = T ;
Example 0.2.4.
If v(A1 ) = v(A2 ) = T
v((A1 A2 ) (A3 A4 )) = T .
and
v(A3 ) = v(A4 ) = F ,
to is extension
v.
satises
if for all
Example 0.2.6.
v(A1 ) = F , v(A2 ) = T
v(An ) = T
for all
Denition 0.2.7
satises
nN
(A1 A2 ).
satises
(satisability)
Let
{A1 , A1 A2 , . . . , A1 An , . . .}.
be a theory.
is satisable if there is
Example 0.2.8.
{A1 , A1 A2 , A1 A3 } is satisable
assignment v(A1 ) = v(A2 ) = F , v(A3 ) = T ).
{A1 A1 }
is not satisable.
{A1 , A2 , A1 A2 }
is not satisable.
Denition 0.2.9
entails
denoted
(semantic consequence)
|= ,
Let
be a theory and
a w.
satises
Lemma 0.2.10. {}
Proof .
Suppose that
is satisable i
{}
6|= .
satisfying
and
Theorem 0.2.11.
Proof .
In
0 {},
Then there is an
nitely many) truth tables involving them. If all truth tables satisfying
satisfy
also
Question.
This question will nd an answer when we can reduce the innite to the nite
(Compactness, Theorem 0.5.2). The answer is exactly half as good (Corollary
0.5.14). This is far from obvious, as
in case
However
of
is a
would
does.
the example
= A1 , = {A2 , A2 , A3 , . . . , An1
either because
|= ,
about it;
or simply because
6|= ,
We
, ,
connectives, and not abbreviations. We show that considering them as abbreviations is harmless.
connectives, and checking that this new setting is equivalent to the previous
one.
10
Notation 0.2.12.
each
if
An
and
WFF0
is a w;
WFF0
The set
The collection
and
(Theorem 0.1.9), which may be regarded as a special case of the previous one,
since
WFF0 WFF.
Notation 0.2.13.
using only
An
is
()0
is
and
for each
and
(using ve
A0n
into a formula
which
n N;
(0 );
( )0
is
(0 0 );
( )0
is
(0 0 );
( )0
is
(0 0 );
( )0
is
((0 0 ) ( 0 0 )).
the translation
Example 0.2.14.
0
(A3 A1 ) ),
Let
which is
The issue is that this new notion of formula gives rise to another extension
of truth assignment, and therefore to a new notion of entailment.
We must
check that these new notions do coincide with their original ve connectives
analogues.
Notation 0.2.15.
extension of
v : WFF {F, T },
v 0 () = T
i
for each
n N;
i
v(1 ) = F
or
v(2 ) = T .
Lemma 0.2.16.
using only
be the
v() = F ;
v 0 (1 2 ) = T
v 0 ()
v0
dened by:
v 0 (An ) = v(An )
and that
let
Let
(Proposition 0.2.3),
WFF0 .
be a truth assignment,
0
0
and . Then v() = v ( ).
11
a w, and
its translation
Proof .
By induction on
If
Suppose that
is
Suppose that
i
v 0 (10 ) = F
Then
by induction equivalent to
v() = v() = v 0 (0 ).
is
or
and
i
Any modication, even apparently harmless, of the notion of truth assignment, induces a modcation of the notion of semantic consequence (Denition
0.2.9).
Notation 0.2.17.
0
|=
Let
if whenever
Corollary 0.2.18. |=
Proof .
and
WFF0 .
Write
i
0 |=0 0 .
From now on, we know that the semantics induced by two connectives is the
same as that induced by ve. In particular we happily forget about
(We are not entirely done with
v0
and
|=0 .
v.
End of Lecture 2.
Lecture 3 (Natural Deduction in Classical Logic)
12
there are other logics (for instance, intuitionistic logic, which does not allow
contradiction proofs). They all yield dierent notions of deduction. We made
the choices which best reect a normal mathematician's thought.
After a couple of examples (0.3.2), we shall proceed in 0.3.3 to reducing
the language to two connectives.
observed (Corollary 0.2.18). We shall show that one may restrict the language
and
deduction.
Denition 0.3.1
(deduction)
Denition 0.3.2
a theorem of
says that
If
= ,
(syntactic consequence)
denoted
proves
Let
be a theory and
if there is a deduction of
under
a w. is
. One also
one writes
Example 0.3.3.
` ,
` ,
(( )) should be a theorem.
We now explain the basic steps of deduction. Bear in mind that we chose
the most natural setting (natural deduction), but there are many other possible
settings, and not all are equivalent. A characteristic feature of natural deduction
is that connectives may be introduced and eliminated. Describing the deduction
rules amounts to explaining how connectives are proved and used.
follows,
, ,
In what
There is only one axiom (so far). In natural deduction for propositional
logic, the only way to start a proof is by assuming something.
Axiom:
{} `
Ax
`
{} `
13
Wk
The case of negation is very subtle. We have a way to introduce a negation provided we deduced an inconsistency (i ), but we also have a way
of removing double-negations (e ). This is a characteristic feature of classical logic, which is actually equivalent to admitting reductio ad absurdum. Keep in mind that this is only one among the possible treatments of
absurdum. Only
is.
{} ` {} `
`
in classical logic :
`
`
use a conjunction.
Introduction and elimination rules for
` `
`
`
`
e1
`
`
e2
`
`
i1
`
`
i2
and
` 1 2
{1 } `
`
{2 } `
14
is essential.
{} `
`
It is clear that
` `
`
` `
`
:
`
`
e1
`
`
e2
We shall start using quantiers in the next chapters and introduce adequate
rules; for the moment they won't appear, as we work in Propositional Logic.
Remark 0.3.4.
but at each step we have only one conclusion. This is another typical feature of
Natural Deduction which supposedly reects the way we mathematicians work.
But there are other, more complex, deduction systems (for instance, Gentzen's
Sequent Calculus).
A formalization of deduction yields the following essential notion.
Denition 0.3.5
such that
(consistency)
and
A theory
is consistent if there is no w
` .
In other words, a theory is consistent if it is not possible to deduce a contradiction from it. There is a symbol for inconsistency (or contradiction), which
we shall not use.
Lemma 0.3.6.
Proof .
Hence
Suppose
is inconsistent i
for all w
such that
`
`
Wk
{} `
{} `
`
e
`
15
Wk
i
and
` .
Example 0.3.7.
For w 's
, ,
one has
` ( ) (( ) ( ))
Ax
Ax
`
`
e
`
`
` ( ) ( )
i
` ( ) (( ) ( ))
e
i
Ax
( ) ( ) ` (( ) ( ))
e
( ) ( ) `
(( ) ( )) `
` (( ) ( )) ( )
(1 )
where
and
and
(2 )
(1 )
(2 )
Ax
e
i
i ,
we nd
` ( ) (( ) ( ))
Theorem 0.3.8
(Contraposition)
Proof .
` .
Suppose
. `
i
` .
Then
Ax
{} `
`
Ax
Wk
Wk
{, } `
{, } `
{} `
e
{, } `
{, } `
{} `
i
`
Suppose
` .
` .
Therefore
Ax
Ax
{} `
{} `
Wk
Wk
{, } `
{, } `
i
{} `
`
Wk
{} `
{} `
{} `
e
{} `
i
`
16
Wk
i
WK
e
Lemma 0.3.9
Proof .
Suppose
{}
is not inconsistent i
{}
. {}
{} `
` .
Then
6` .
{} `
6` .
6` , and {} is inconsistent. By inconsistency , there
is be such that {} ` and {} ` . Then by i , ` , against
the assumption. So {} is not inconsistent.
is inconsistent, against the assumption. So
Suppose that
Notice that the latter proof did not involve a semantic analog of the elimination of double negation (e ), but only
believe in
e ,
i ;
Theorem 0.3.10
(Reductio ad Absurdum)
If
{}
is inconsistent then
` .
Proof .
Suppose
{}
` .
By
(e ),
` .
Still not impressed?
Excluded middle
a priori which of
Proof .
or
Ax
{} `
Ax
Wk
{( ), } `
{( )} ` ( )
i
Wk
{( ), } `
{( ), } ` ( )
( ) `
i
( ) `
|
{z
}
()
()
( ) ` (()
( ) `
` ( )
e
`
17
Ax
i
(, )
and proving
Lemma 0.3.12
Proof .
,
setting.
By induction on
. {} ` 0
and
{0 } ` .
`
` 0
induction
.
.
. induction
.
{} ` 0
i
` 0
Wk
` ` 0
e
` 0
Of course
` 0
`
induction
Suppose that
is a sentence symbol.
Then
0 = ,
obvious.
Suppose that
is
Then
0 = ( 0 ).
Now
{ 0 } ` 0
{} `
{, 0 } ` 0
Wk
{, 0 } `
{, 0 } `
{} ` 0
|{z}
Ax
=0
18
Ax
Wk
induction
i
and
Ax
{} `
0
{ } `
{0 , } `
Wk
{0 , } ` 0
{0 , } ` 0
{} `
|{z}
0 Ax
Wk
induction
i
=0
Suppose that
is
(1 2 ).
Then
{10 } ` 10
{, 10 } ` 10
{, 10 } ` 1
Ax
{} `
Wk
{, 10 } `
{, 10 } ` 2
{, 10 } ` 20
i
{} ` 0
Ax
Wk
induction
e
induction
Ax
{1 } ` 1
{0 , 1 } ` 1
{0 , 1 } ` 10
Ax
{0 } ` 0
Wk
{0 , 1 } ` 0
{0 , 1 } ` 20
{0 , 1 } ` 2
i
{0 } `
Of course the case of
Suppose that
and
= 1 2 ,
Wk
induction
e
induction
so that
0 = ((10 20 )).
One has
Ax
{} `
Wk
0
{, 1 20 } `
e
Ax
{, 10 20 } ` 1
{10 20 } ` 10 20
Wk
induction
{, 10 20 } ` 10
{, 10 20 } ` 10 20
e
{, 10 20 } ` 20
|
{z
}
()
Hence
Ax
{} `
Wk
{, 10 20 } `
{, 10 20 } ` 2
()
induction
{, 10 20 } ` 20 {, 10 20 } ` 20
{} ` (10 20 )
19
Ax
{10 } ` 10
0
{1 } ` 1
{ , 1 , 10 , 20 } ` 10
Wk
{0 , 1 , 10 , 20 } ` 1
{0 , 1 , 10 , 20 } ` 1
0
0
{ , 1 , 1 } ` 20
i
{0 , 1 } ` 10 20
|
{z
Ax
Wk
induction
i
()
Therefore
Ax
{0 } ` (10 20 )
()
{0 , 1 } ` 10 2 {0 , 1 } ` (10 20 )
{0 } ` 1
e
{0 } ` 1
Wk
i
Moreover
Ax
{20 } ` 20
Ax
Wk
0
{ , 10 , 20 } ` 20
{0 } ` 0
i
Wk
{0 , 20 } ` 10 20
{0 , 20 } ` 0
i
{0 } ` 20
e
{0 } ` 20
induction
{0 } ` 2
Combining both threes, we nd
Suppose that
= 1 2 ,
{1 , 10 }
0 = (10 20 ).
{1 , 10 } ` 20
and
so that
{0 } ` .
{1 } ` 0 .
{2 , 10 } ` 20
By Lemma 0.3.6,
by induction, so
{2 } ` 0 .
we nd
Ax
{10 } ` 10
induction
{10 } ` 1
Ax
Wk
{, 10 } ` 1
{} `
i
Wk
{, 10 } ` 1 2
{, 10 } `
i
{} ` 10
{z
}
|
(1 )
{} ` 20 (2 ).
20
Therefore
(1 )
Ax
{} ` 10
{0 } ` 10 20
(2 )
0
0 Wk
0
0
0 Wk
{} ` 20
{ , } ` 1
{ , } ` 1 2
e
0
0
{ , } ` 2
{0 , } ` 20
{0 } `
e
{0 } `
The case of
Hence
a deduction of
associated to
Notation 0.3.13.
Wk
0.3.12
Let
from
and
Corollary 0.3.14
`
i
Proof .
Let
` .
1 , . . . , n
pose
0 `0 0 .
be a theory and
0 `0 0
implies
a w. Then
` .
Sup-
{10 , . . . , n0 } `0 0 .
Using
`0 10 (20 . . . (n0 0 ). . . )
As all the rules in
`0
are in
`,
` 10 (20 . . . (n0 0 ). . . )
Now one sees that
(1 (2 . . . (n ). . . ))
is
10 (20 . . . (n0 0 ). . . )
` 1 (2 . . . (n ). . . )
In particular,
{1 , . . . , n } ` ,
and
` .
21
0 `0 0
i :
{} ` {} `
`
By induction, one has
`,
it follows
And therefore
0 { 0 } `0 0
`0 ).
and
0 { 0 } `0 0 .
0 { 0 } `0 0 0 { 0 } `0 0
0 `0 0
As
is in
e , i , and e
i ,
that is
` 1 ` 2
` 1 2
We aim at proving
0 `0 (1 2 )0 ;
By induction, we know
0 `0 10
recall that
(1 2 )0
0 ` 20 .
Therefore
and
is
.
.
. induction
.
(10 20 ).
Ax
{10 20 } `0 10 20
0 `0 10
0 {10 20 } `0 10
0 {10 20 } `0 10 20
0
0
{1 20 } `0 20
{z
|
Wk
e
()
and
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 20
()
0 {10 20 } `0 20 0 {10 20 } `0 20
0 `0 (10 20 )
0 `0 0 .
` im-
e1 :
` 1 2
` 1
22
e1
Wk
i
By induction,
0 `0 (10 20 ).
Clearly
0 {10 } `0 10 20 ().
Hence
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 (10 20 )
()
0 {10 } `0 10 20 0 {10 } `0 (10 20 )
0 `0 10
e
0 `0 10
0 `0 (10 20 ).
By induction,
e2 :
` 1 2
` 2
Wk
e2
Of course
0 {20 } `0 10 20 ().
Thus
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 (10 20 )
()
0 {20 } `0 10 20 0 {20 } `0 (10 20 )
0 `0 20
e
0 `0 20
Wk
i
i1 :
` 1
` 1 2
i1
i2
` 1 2
By induction,
{1 } ` {2 } `
`
0 `0 10 20 , 0 {10 } `0 0 ,
and
23
0 {20 } `0 0 . By
`0 ), we easily nd:
and
0 {0 } `0 10 (1 )
0 {0 } `0 20 (2 )
Therefore
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 10 20
(1 )
0
0
0
0
0
0
{ } ` 1 2
{0 } `0 10
(2 )
e
0
0
0 0
0 {0 } `0 20
{ } ` 2
0 `0 0
e
0 `0 0
The
and
`0
and
0 .
From now on
said that before? It is very important to say it again, and above all, it is crucial
that a redundant connective should be regarded a an abbreviation of the same
, ,
and
and
but whenever
that these are harmless shortcuts, which preserve the notions of truth and of
deduction.
We now aim at simplifying the presentation of deductions.
Notation 0.3.15.
(via
Whenever an assumption
` .
{} ` . . .
.
.
.
{} `
`
we now write:
.
.
.
and then
.
.
.
As
, we
is eliminated
write
` .
Similarly,
{} ` {} `
`
24
Instead of
becomes:
which means
` .
Example 0.3.16.
6 6
then
( )
( )
1.
( ) 6
i
( ) 6
i
i
3.
( 6 ) 6
i
i
( )
i
i
5.
i
2.
4.
( 6 ) 6
i
i
( )
e
i
i
6.
Completeness Theorems (Theorems 0.3.17 and 0.4.1), all will be well that ends
well: they do coincide. The easier part comes rst.
Theorem 0.3.17
be a w. If
Proof .
` ,
then
Let
{} `
Clearly
be a theory and
|= .
Ax
{} |= .
25
and
i ;
that is,
because
{}
`
`
|= . Let v be a
v() = v() = T , we are done.
Thus
Then
truth assignment
Suppose that the last step of the deduction is the modus ponens:
` `
`
Hence
Let
Suppose that the last step of the deduction is the modus tollens:
{} `
`
|= . Let v be
then v satises
by denition. If v does satisfy then v satises {}; we then
know that v satises , and therefore v satises again. In any case
v satises . This implies that |= .
By induction,
{} |= ;
we aim at showing
If
etc.
|= ,
then
` .
26
Let
be a theory and
Lemma 0.4.2.
Proof .
be a consistent theory.
such that 6` . By
completeness, this implies 6|= . It follows from Lemma 0.2.10 that {}
is satisable; let v be a truth assignment satisfying {}. In particular, v
satises !
Suppose that every consistent theory is satisable. Let 6` . Then {}
is consistent by Lemma 0.3.9. In particular, {} is satisable. So there is
a truth assignment v satisfying {}: v satises but does not satisfy ,
so 6|= .
As
Let
Denition 0.4.3
,
either
or
(complete)
is in
A consistent theory
Remark 0.4.4.
If
Verication: Suppose
and
` ,
is complete, then
` ,
but
.
6
i
By completeness,
against consistency.
So
Lemma 0.4.5.
{}
Proof .
w
If
is a w, then
{}
or
is consistent.
Assume that
such that
one cannot
0.3.10.
Lemma 0.4.6.
theory
Let
containing
be a consistent theory.
.
27
Proof . Recall that WFF is countable (Remark 0.1.3, for instance); enumerate
WFF = {n : n N}. We shall extend recursively. Let 0 = . Assume n
has been constructed. By Lemma 0.4.5, n {n } or n {n } is consistent.
If n {n } is consistent, let n+1 be it; otherwise let n+1 = n {n }. So
th
the n
w n has been taken into account, and n+1 is still consistent.
= nN n . Clearly
is consistent, and for any w , = n for
Let
. (It is also clear by consistency
some n, so n or its negation is in n+1
An ,
either
An
An
or
is in
.
the truth assignment v : A {F, T } such that v(An ) = T i An
any w , v() = T i .
Proof .
pleteness of
Let
Assume
the case
v() = T .
Then for
We show
Consider
is
1 2 .
. By completeness of
, 1
.
v(1 ) = F , then by induction 1 6
. Therefore
` 1 2 ; by
If v(2 ) = T , then by induction 2
completeness (1 2 ) .
If
Assume
We show
v() = T .
Otherwise,
of
),
this shows
Induction completes the proof. Notice however that proving the theorem with
ve connectives would be essentially as hard, though longer.
Due to Lemma
satises
In particular
satises
Let
be a
to a complete consistent
induced by
By Lemma 0.4.7,
is satisable.
End of Lecture 6.
28
0 , 0
Let
is satisable.
A theory is satisable i
it is nitely satisable.
Proof .
An implication is trivial: if
So
is satisable,
is nitely consistent.
Corollary 0.5.3.
Proof .
If
|= ,
such that
0 |= .
By Lemma 0.2.10,
Denition 0.5.4.
of vertices to
A graph is
{1, . . . , k}
k -colorable
{x, y}
such that if
c from
c(x) 6= c(y).
if there is a function
is an edge, then
the set
Theorem 0.5.5
subgraphs are
Proof .
(Erds)
A countable graph is
k -colorable
k -colorable.
sentence symbols
vertices.
We add
Cv,1 Cv,k
for each
vV
for each
vV
v, v 0
By compactness (Theorem
29
Denition 0.5.6
(decidable)
Example 0.5.7.
Denition 0.5.8
(semi-decidable)
rithmic way to write a list such that sooner or later, every element of the set
will appear on the list.
One also says eectively enumerable for semi-decidable. This does not assert
that there is an algorithm deciding whether or not an object is in the set; all you
can get is an algorithm which will answer yes if the object lies in it. Otherwise,
the algorithm doesn't stop, as it scans through an innite list without nding
an answer.
Example 0.5.9.
If the phone book is in alphabetical order, you start reading. If you reach
Byron without passing through Borges, then Jorge Luis Borges is not
in the phone book. If you reach Borges, Julio without passing through
Borges, Jorge, then Jorge Luis Borges is not in the phone book. Other-
wise you have reached Jorge Luis Borges. The phone book is decidable.
But now suppose that the phone book is not in alphabetical order. The
only way to nd out if Borges is in the phone book is to read through. If
you reach the name Borges, Jorge Luis, then he is in the phone book.
Otherwise, you cannot know whether he is not in the directory, or he is
but you haven't found his name yet. The phone book is semi-decidable.
Remark 0.5.10.
decidable.
We now are ready to explain what a readable theory is.
Denition 0.5.11
set
such that
Denition 0.5.12
(axiomatization)
0 |=
and
is a
|= 0 .
30
Proposition 0.5.13.
of
If
Proof .
assume that
Corollary 0.5.14.
Let
Proof .
If
|= ,
a w.
|= .
In other words, if
itself,
Remark 0.5.15.
is decidably axiomatizable.
6|=
is
only semi-decidable (as opposed to the nite case, Theorem 0.2.11, where it is
decidable). However, if the theory is maximal in some sense, there is more.
Corollary 0.5.16.
Let
, either |=
|= or not.
or
|= .
Then there is an
Proof .
one for
and
31
Informally
speaking, a space is compact if whenever one can always nd an element meeting a nite number of requirements (lying in the intersection of nitely many
members), then there is an element meeting all requirements simultaneously.
And this is exactly what Theorem 0.5.2 says; it actually states the compactness of a certain topological space. We therefore give an alternate proof of the
compactness theorem.
Denition 0.5.17
A family
is
nonempty.
Denition 0.5.18
(compactness)
A topological space
F 6= .
Theorem 0.5.19
(Tychono )
product topology.
Notation 0.5.21.
Let
S = {F, T }N
For every w
Let
O = {v S : v() = T }.
Proposition 0.5.22.
O 's.
O 's
S. S
is Hausdor, compact,
S;
they form
a Boole algebra.
In particular, there is a correspondence between sets of w 's and closed sets:
7 C =
Remark 0.5.23.
{} and {} dene
the same closed set), but it is surjective since any closed set is an intersection
of clopen subsets.
Lemma 0.5.24.
i
satises
Let
be a theory and
32
v C
Proof .
v C
i
i
i
Corollary 0.5.25.
, v O
, v() = T
v satises .
for all
for all
is satisable i
C 6= .
Let be a nitely
F = {O : }, a family of closed subsetes
of S . As is nitely satisable, F has the nite intersection property. By
compactness of S , F 6= . So C 6= and is satisable.
satisable set of w 's. Consider
Remark 0.5.26.
as opposed to the one relying on the completeness theorem. But on the other
hand, it is free of references to a proof theory.
End of Lecture 7.
Lecture 8 (Modal Logic*)
WFF
.
under and
,
WFFmod .
A2 ) is a w of modal logic, which reads It is necA1 implies the necessity of A2 . Similarly,
contingent; reads is impossible.
0.6.1 Semantics*
The semantics is of course a little more complex than before. As mentioned, we
need a whole collection of worlds, accessible by imagination from each other.
Denition 0.6.2
(Kripke model)
33
(W, R, v)
where
W
R
v
AW
is a function from
Caution!
W ; w1 Rw2
to
means that
is conceivable in
w1 ;
{T, F }.
Remark 0.6.3.
w2
v()
is now meaningless.
accessibility relation
Notation 0.6.4.
We extend
v(An , w) = v(An , w)
v(, w) = T
if
inductively to
for each
nN
WFFmod W :
v(, w) = F
v( , w) = T
if
v(, w) = F
w0
v(, w) = T
v(, w) = T
if there is a world
v(, w) = T
or
such that
w0
wRw0 ,
such that
one has
wRw0
and
v(, w0 ) = T
v(, w0 ) = T .
w,
is a conceivable world
w0
in which
if for any
( is possible) holds in
if there
stands for
;
.
Example 0.6.6.
One has
W,
W.
{} |= .
|= ,
|= .
Kripke's Rule:
` ( )
`
34
We then
Necessitation Rule:
Caution!
`
`
N,
{} `
{} `
i
`
i.e.
{} |= ; in particular, we shall not have full com |= will be stronger than ` . Completeness
Remark 0.6.7.
= .
Notice that if we have made specic requirements on the ac-
cessibility relation
extra rules.
Example 0.6.8.
be reexive. Then
|= () .
`
`
Theorem 0.6.9
Proof .
` ,
If
then
|= .
A quick induction.
{} `
`
{w
in
W : v(, w) = F },
W1 = {w
in
W : v(, w) = T }
and
W2 =
`
`
of
W,
we have
As
satises
for any
:
w0
w0
wRw
in
, one
|= .
35
` ( )
`
We show
|= .
(W, R, v)
.
So let
suppose
By induction, we know
with
|= .
0.6.3 Completeness*
Theorem 0.6.10
Counter-example 0.6.11.
tions, as
{} |= ,
but
Let
Write
Let
Wun
Claim
|= ,
` .
wRun w0
i
{ : w} w0 .
be such that
vun (An , w) = T
i
w An .
For any
w, vun (, w) = T
i
WFFmod
w.
then
Notice that
If
{} 6` .
= .
w.
Let
36
vun (, w) = T ;
We now suppose
{ : w}.
If
w. Consider Nw =
= Nw {}.
we show that
theory
w0 .
Hence
assumption,
By
1 , . . . , n
{1 , . . . , n } `
i
` 1 (2 (. . . (n )...)
N
` (1 (2 (. . . (n )...))
K
` 1 (2 (. . . (n )...)
w and w is maximal consistent, we see w.
As 1 , . . . , n are in
T;
Wun
containing
Suppose
6` .
So there is a
vun (, w) =
In particular,
Hence
6|= .
Remark 0.6.12.
Of course if we have made restrictions the accessibility relations (and cleverly added the corresponding deduction rules), we need to prove completeness accordingly, that is we must show that the accessibility relation
on the universal model
Wun
6|=
(see
We
6` ,
extensions of
of course
Run
W Wun ,
then
of maximal consistent
ity relation and truth assignment. When trying to prove the truth lemma
for
W ,
we shall form
= Nw {};
0.6.10.
Theorem 0.6.13
|= ,
then
Let
be a modal
` .
37
Theorem 0.6.14
is consistent, then
Let
be a modal
is satisable.
Notice that the resulting compactness phenomenon does not require closure
under .
Let
be a modal theory.
Then
Proof .
Suppose
be the closure of
under :
38
Chapter 1
In this chapter:
1.1 Syntax
First-order is essentially more expressive than Propositional Logic:
tually introduce elements.
we even-
39
Denition 1.1.1
(rst-order language)
A rst-order language
consists of
( and )
the connectives and
a set V of variables v1 , v2 , . . . , vn , . . .
the quantiers and
the symbol =, which is a binary relation symbol
Specic symbols, which depend on the language (these form what is called
the signature of the language):
a set
of constant symbols
for each
n 1,
a set
of
n-ary
relation symbols
for each
n 1,
a set
of
n-ary
function symbols
Remark 1.1.2.
L.
Remark 1.1.3.
signature:
n-ary
function symbols by
n + 1-ary
relations (the
Notation 1.1.4.
E1 E2
stands for
(E1 E2 );
E1 E2
stands for
(E1 ) E2 ;
E1 E2
stands for
E2
E1 6= E2
stands for
(= (E1 , E2 )).
This should save us precious amounts of time later, though one could introduce ve connectives (as we clumsily did for Propositional Logic before the
verications of 0.2.3 and 0.3.3).
Remark 1.1.5.
By arguments
ressembling those of 0.2.3 and 0.3.3 (see Corollaries 0.2.18 and 0.3.14), we will
get rid of
Example 1.1.6.
The empty language, or language of pure sets, contains the equality as its
only relation symbol.
=).
Lgrps = {1, ,1 }
+, ,
where
is a constant symbol,
1.1.2 Terms
We have dened expressions, but only well-formed formulas are of interest. Yet
before we can dene them, we need to explain which combinations of elements
are meaningful.
Denition 1.1.7
(term)
The collection of
L-terms
that:
if
t1 , . . . , tn
is a
n-ary
f (t1 , . . . , tn )
is a term.
Notation 1.1.8
set
Var(t)
of variables occuring in
if
is a constant symbol
if
is a variable
if
is
x,
then
c,
For an
L-term t,
we dene the
t:
then
Var(t) = ;
Var(t) = {x};
symbol, then
41
is a
n-ary
function
occurs in a term
i the symbol
appears
t.
in the expression
Example 1.1.9.
(1, (v1 , 1)) is a term of Lgrps , which is more conveniently written 1(v1 1).
Only v1 occurs in it.
2 v12 3 v2
is a term of
abbreviations:
The variables
1.1.3 Formulas
Denition 1.1.10
of the form
are
L-terms.
Example 1.1.11.
v1 = v2
x2 + 1 = 0
Lrings .
is an atomic formula of
The collection
WFFL
of well-formed
if
and
if
is a w and
and
is a variable, then
and
are w 's.
Example 1.1.13.
v1 v2 (v1 v2 = 1 v2 v1 = 1)
v1 1 = 0
is a w of
v1 v1 v1 = v1
Theorem 1.1.14
Proof .
is (short-hand for) a w of
Lgrps .
Lrings .
(unique readability)
42
This re-
Notation 1.1.15
the set
Var()
if
if
is
if
is
1 2 ,
if
is
is an
Var(tn );
atomic formula
then
or
L-w ,
For an
we dene
of variables occuring in
R(t1 , . . . , tn ),
then
Var() = Var(t1 )
Var() = Var();
then
x ,
x V,
then
occurs in a formula
i the symbol
It is clear from Example 1.1.13 that when working syntactically we will have
to be extremely cautious with variables. This will give rise to several painful
technicalities, such as the notion of substitutability, to which the entire 1.3 is
unfortunately devoted.
Notice however that no one is stupid enough to make such mistakes at the
semantic level.
Denition 1.1.16
If
Let
be a w and
if
is atomic, then
if
is
occurs free in
if it occurs free in
if
is
1 2 , x
occurs free in
if it occurs free in
if
is
occurs in
then
or
occurs free in
y , x
occurs free in
if it occurs in
if
a variable.
or in
occurs free in
and
x 6= y .
Example 1.1.17.
In
v1 v1 = v2 , v1
In
is bound and
v2
v1 v1 v1 = v2
is free.
(which is unfortunately a w ).
(v1 v2 = v3 ) (v1 = v2 ), v1 , v2
and
v3
occur free.
Hence free means: we're still missing something to know what it is about.
Notation 1.1.18.
variables in
For a formula
we let
FreeVar()
Denition 1.1.19
Remark 1.1.20.
(sentence)
Denition 1.1.21
(theory)
43
This denition is the most natural one (we do not want unexplained variables), but we shall need to be very careful.
We shall dene
|=
and
Example 1.1.22.
Lsets )
is
{v1 . . . vn i6=j vi 6= vj : n N}
Lord )
is
Lgrps )
v1 v2 v3 v1 (v2 v3 ) = (v1 v2 ) v3
v1 (v1 1 = v1 1 v1 = 1)
v1 (v1 v11 = 1 v11 v1 = 1)
Lrings -theory
1.2 Semantics
Let us turn our attention to the meaning a rst-order formula should convey.
This is a matter of interpreting the non-logical symbols (the signature of the
language), but also if necessary the free variables. This section is less clumsy
but more important than 1.1.
1.2.1 Structures
Denition 1.2.1 (L-structure).
for each
n-ary
we require that
An
consists of:
of
L,
relation symbol
=M
L-structure M
a specic element
of
L,
a subset
44
cM
RM
of
of
M;
M n;
for each
n-ary
relation function
of
L,
a function
fM
from
Mn
to
M.
L.
All?
No!
We have
forgotten the meaning of the variables, which prevent the terms from having a
meaning, which prevent the formulas from having a meaning! So one must also
specify the value of the variables.
Let
be an
L-structure. An
s from V to
M.
An assignment is merely a choice of parameters (it species what the variables stand for).
Denition 1.2.3
L-structure
interpretation
s(c) = cM
s(x)
if
s : V M be
in M of a term t
and
f (t1 , . . . , tn ),
Lemma 1.2.4
then
be an
s,
denoted
s(t).
c;
x;
(univocity of interpretation)
s, s0 : V M
s(t) = s (t).
term and
0
Proof .
with parameters
is
Let
Let
L-structure, t
s| Var(t) = s0| Var(t) .
be an
an
L-
Then
Clear by induction.
(satisfaction)
Let
M |= [s].
is atomic,
if
say
R(t1 , . . . , tn ),
if
is
if
is
if
then
M |= [s]
then
be an
then
and
s:V M
if
be
with parameters
s,
M ).
M 6|= [s].
M |= [s]
if
M 6|= [s]
L-structure
of a formula
is
45
or
M |= [s].
is an assignment
s0
such that
and
if
is
such
y 6= x
to
s(y)
but
s.
The
s0
such that
m M,
M.
Lemma 1.2.6
(univocity of satisfaction). Let M be an L-structure, an Ls, s0 : V M two assignments such that s| FreeVar = s0| FreeVar .
0
Then M |= [s] i M |= [s ].
In particular, if is a sentence, then M |= [s] does not depend on s.
formula, and
Proof .
A clear induction.
We naturally write
M |= [s].
If is a
M |= [s]
is a model of
if
M |= [s]
s;
in this case
Denition 1.2.7
there is an
(satisability)
L-structure M
Let
be a set of
and an assignment
y + 1,
and
x = y does imply x + 1 =
y are. So we do need to
Denition 1.2.8
(semantic consequence)
Let
s : V M,
be a set of formulas,
a
if
Example 1.2.9.
Let
Tgrp
n N,
n m, one
For
the sentence v1 v1 v1 = 1,
v1 v2 v1 v2 = v2 v1 . Then Tgrp {} |= .
the sentence
let
has
and
For each
1.3 Substitutions
We shall soon give deduction rules extending those of propositional logic. Before
that, we need more notions about the interplay of terms and formulas.
46
1.3.1 Substitutability
Given a formula
term
t.
deduce
x Var ,
and a variable
by a
This will typically be the case in our proof theory, when we want to
(t)
from
x (x).
examples show.
Example 1.3.1.
f (v1 ) = 1,
v1 = 1
f (v1 ).
v1 v1 = v2 .
v1 by a
1 = v1 )
If we replace
If in
v1 v1 = v2
we replace
v2
by
v1 ,
v1 v1 = v1 ,
we nd
which clearly
Similarly, if in
v1 v1 = v2
we replace
v2
v1 ,
we
that was
before.
Denition 1.3.2
for a variable
in a formula
if no variable of
by
Var t
A term
is substitutable
becomes bound in
when
t.
Example 1.3.3.
Let
be
v1 = v 2
and
Let
be
v1 v1 = v1 .
Then
Let
be
v2 ,
v1 .
For instance, if
the structure of
is substitutable for
f (v1 )
v1
in
1 ;
v3 .
is substitutable for
v1 v1 = v2 . Then any
t is substitutable
v1 in 2 ,
v2 , etc.
as there
t is substitutable for v1 in 3 . On
v2 in 3 i v1 does not occur in t.
term
for
is perfectly licit.
Let
(v1 v1 = v2 ) (v2 = v1 ) and t be a term. Then t is substiv1 in 4 . On the other hand, t is substitutable for v2 in 4 i
not occur in t.
be
tutable for
v1
does
Notation 1.3.4.
If
is substitutable for
47
in
one writes
is replaced by
t.
[t/x]
for the
( / is read for).
Example 1.3.5.
1 [t/v1 ]
is
[t/x]
if
in
t = v2 ,
2 [f (v1 )/v1 ]
is
whereas
1 [t/v3 ]
v1 v1 = v1 .
So is
v1 = v2 .
is of course
2 [f (v1 )/v2 ].
3 [f (c, v1 )/v1 ]
is
v1 v1 = v2 .
3 [f (c, v3 )/v2 ]
is
v1 v1 = f (c, v3 ).
v1
4 [f (c, v1 )/v1 ]
is
4 [f (c, v3 )/v2 ]
is
Theorem 1.3.6
there is
that
(renaming)
is substitutable for
but it will be clear in due time that the renaming procedure described below
makes
and
mutually provable.
Caution! depends on , on x,
Proof .
We construct a suitable
If
If
is
Again,
If
Suppose that
If
is
1 2 ,
in
x = y,
is
that is if
can be
Clearly
is
we take
free occurences of
If
inductively.
substitutable for
and on t.
y ,
to be
with
to smaller
1 2 .
and take
to be
y V.
no
on
48
x 6= y
If
y Var(t),
but
z
in
y in
z [z/y]
.
be
Var(t) {x}.
Var()
We claim that
[z/y]
x
occur in t.
and
is substitutable for
does not
y .
be any
Notice that if
Notice that
Var(t) {x}
Var()
makes
an eective algorithm.
Example 1.3.7.
Similarly,
for
1 .
1 .
can be
2 ,
2 .
t
is substitutable for
If
v1 6 Var(t),
then
v1 Var(t)
v1
in
3 ,
so with respect to
v2
is substitutable for
in
v1 , 3
3 ; 3
could be
3 .
can still be
3 .
t for v1 in 3 , something
t is f (v1 ), then v3 v3 = v2 will do as
3 . (In this case, 3 [t/v1 ] is v3 v3 = f (v1 ).) On the other hand if t is
g(v1 , v2 , v3 ), then the 3 given by our algorithm will be v4 v4 = v2 (and
3 [t/v1 ] will now be v4 v4 = g(v1 , v2 , v3 )).
Now if
must be done.
Notice that
If for instance
does depend on
t!
v1 Var(t),
equal to v2 .
this
4 only
and
for
x.
Lemma 1.3.8.
s
on
and a term
In what follows, we
with
Let
V \ {x},
t,
be
at variable
t.
49
Proof .
Induction on
denote
[t/x].
s( ) = s(
).
This is clear if
If
If
is
x,
then
t,
is
and
x.
s( ) = s(x) = s(t) = s(
).
f (1 , . . . , n ), then s( ) = s(f (1 , . . . , n )) = f M (
s(1 ), . . . , s(n )) =
(s(
1 ), . . . , s(
n )) = s(f (
1 , . . . , n )) = s(
).
is
Proposition 1.3.9.
in
Proof .
prove
Let
Let
be an
. For clarity
M |= [
s].
Induction on
M |= [s]
i
we let
denote
[t/x].
Hence we want to
formula
Now us-
M |= [s]
i
i
i
We suppose
First, if
y = x,
(s(
1 ), . . . , s(
n )) RM
(
s(1 ), . . . , s(n )) RM
M |= [
s]
of the form
then
y .
is exactly
(as
).
Then
M |= [s]
i
i
in
is substitutable for
M |= [s]
M |= [
s]
in
M |= [s]
; we show that M |= [
s], that is M |=
s0 be any assignment agreeing with s except on y . We
need to show that M |= [
s0 ].
. Let s0 agree
By assumption, M |= [s]
, which means M |= (y )[s]
0
0
with s except on y , and such that s (y) = s
(y). By assumption,
0 ].
M |= [s
0
We note that s and s
0 agree but on x, and s(t) = s(x) = s0 (x). Now
y does not appear in t, and s and s0 agree except on y , so by Lemma
0
0 ], it follows by induction,
1.3.8 s (t) = s(t) = s
0 (x). As M |= [s
0
0
M |= [
s ]. As s is arbitrary on y but coincides with s everywhere
else, this means M |= (y )[
s], that is M |= [
s].
Suppose that
(y )[
s].
Let
50
Now suppose M |= [
s]. We want to show that M |= [s]
, that is
. So let s0 be any assignement agreeing with s except
M |= (y )[s]
on y . Let s
0 agree with s except on y , and such that s0 (y) = s0 (y).
Notice that s
0 (x) = s(x) = s(t) = s0 (t), as y 6 Var(t), and s and s0
agree except on y .
We know M |= [
s], so M |= (y )[
s]. In particular, M |= [
s0 ].
0
0
0
0
But s
and s agree everywhere but on x, and s (x) = s (t). So
0 ]. As s0 was arbitrarily obtained from s
by induction, M |= [s
, and therefore
by changing its value on y , we nd M |= (y )[s]
M |= [s]
.
The case of
is similar.
Counter-example 1.3.10.
for
x in .
substitutable for
v1
in
t substitutable
t is v2 . Clearly t is not
sentence v2 v2 = v2 , resulting
is v2 v1 = v2
denote the
and
have
M |= [s]
.
and
In order to extend
=, ,
and
t=t
where
is a variable,
stitutable for
in
is a w,
t, t1 , t2
t1
and
t2
sub-
51
`
` x
if
` x
` [t/x]
if
is substitutable for
in
` [t/x]
` x
if
` x
is substitutable for
in
if
{} `
`
is not free in
{}
1.4.2).
One could now nish the proof of the renaming algorithm (Theorem 1.3.6)
by showing that
Remark 1.4.1.
Consider
{} `
and
{}
` .
{(x = x)}.
formulas is consistent, but yields inconsistency as soon as one adds the equality
axioms (which we won't renounce anyway).
So we redene consistency as consistency when one adds the axioms of equal-
Proposition 1.4.2.
` x y (x = y y = x)
` x y z (x = y y = z x = z)
Proof .
Let
Notice that
shall replace
x=y
x = y [x/z] [y/z]
x=xy=x
y=x
x=x
` x y (x = y y = x)
Transitivity is an exercise.
52
by
x,
or
y.
Notation 1.4.3
not use
WFF0
Notation 1.4.4
a formula
Let
of
, 0
for atomic
()0
is
is
into
(0 );
( )0
(x )0
WFF0 :
(0 0 );
is
is(x
0 )
(x )0 = (x 0 )
Of course
and
as an
Notation 1.4.5
M be an L-structure, s : V M
M |=0 [s] inductively.
Let
a w. We dene
if
is atomic,
if
is
if
is
1 2 ,
if
is
say
R(t1 , . . . , tn ),
M |= [s]
then
then
if
then
M 6|= [s].
M |= [s]
if
M 6|= 1 [s]
or
M |= 2 [s].
for any assignment
s0
such that
Notation 1.4.6.
Let
an
Proof .
L-formula.
Then
By induction on
Let
M |= [s]
and
M be an L-structure, s
M |=0 0 [s].
Proof .
an assignment,
i
Corollary 1.4.8
is dened
be a consistent subset of
write
and
|=0
WFF0 .
. |=
53
i
0 |=0 0 .
is x .
Lemma 1.4.9
Proof .
x ,
. {} ` 0
and
{0 } ` .
so that
Notice that
is substitutable for
is
in
0 .
Ax,Wk
{x , , x 0 } `
.
.
. induction
.
Ax,Wk
{x , , x 0 } ` x 0
e
0
0
{x , , x } `
{x , , x 0 } ` 0
i
{x , } ` x 0
|
{z
()
so
x 0 .
is
{x } ` x
{} ` 0
()
{0 , }
is inconsistent.
{x , 0 } ` 0
Ax,Wk
.
.
. induction
.
{x , 0 } `
i
{x , 0 } ` x
{x , 0 } ` x
{x } ` 0
{z
|
Ax,Wk
i
()
Now as
{x } ` 0
{x } ` x 0
It follows that
{, 0 }
is inconsistent, whence
{0 } ` .
Of course the real problem is to show that one may drop the
rules without
Notation 1.4.10
Corollary 1.4.11
`
i
Write
Let
`0
if there is a deduction
rules.
0 `0 0 .
54
be a theory and
a w. Then
Proof .
The implication
0 `0 0 `
implies
0 `0 0
-rule.
possibilities.
` [t/x]
` x
where
is substitutable for
in
Then
.
.
. induction
.
Ax
{x 0 } `0 x 0
Wk
0 `0 0 [t/x]
0 {x 0 } `0 x 0
e
Wk
0 {x 0 } `0 0 [t/x]
0 {x 0 } `0 0 [t/x]
i
0 `0 x 0
| {z }
=0
so
0 `0 0 .
` x {} `
`
where
{}. By induction, 0 { 0 } `0 0 ;
0 {0 } `0 0 .
0 {0 } `0 0
{0 } `0 x 0
0
since
By induction again,
0 `0 0
0 {0 }.
0 `0 x 0 .
So
0 {0 }
is inconsistent, and
as a deduction rule,
is not equivalent to
.
End of Lecture 13.
55
1.4.3 Soundness
Theorem 1.4.12
Proof .
If
` ,
then
|= .
sitional logic, so weakening, negation, and implication have been dealt with
in the proof of the propositional logic version (Theorem 0.3.17).
Axioms of
equality are easily dealt with. It remains to consider the case of quantication.
By Corollaries 1.4.8 and 1.4.11, only
need be examined:
is now a mere
abbreviation.
`
` x
where
induction,
Let
[s]
|= .
We show
s : V M an
M |= (x )[s].
be a structure and
Then
and by
|= x .
assignment. We assume
M |=
` x
` [t/x]
where
Let M be
M |= [s].
an
L-structure, s : V M
M |= [s]
.
for
in
We shall show
|=
We have to prove
We know
harder.
1.5 Completeness
Soundness (Theorem 1.4.12) was the easy part.
Theorem 0.4.1 for rst-order logic; informally speaking, it expresses that if it
56
is true, then there is a deduction of it" (in rst-order classical logic for natural
deduction).
This theorem is due to Kurt Gdel (in his PhD).
Theorem 1.5.1
If
|= ,
then
` .
We adopt the same strategy as for the case of propositional logic (Theorem
0.4.1). It suces to show the following:
Theorem 1.5.2
,
then
If
|=
` .
Remark 1.5.3.
a feeling that it would suce to show Theorem 1.5.2 for theories, there will
be a point in the proof (the fairly technical Lemma 1.5.28 below) in which all
Remark 1.5.4.
L-structure
L-structure
It is not unrealistic to think that the collection of terms will provide the
base set. (Actually we shall need to factor out an equivalence relation, that is
work with a set of equivalence classes; pay no attention now to this slight detail
which will be explained in 1.5.3.) We shall then dene an ad hoc structure on
the base set, ensuring that relations and functions behave as required.
c and a unary
f , we shall have terms c, f (c), f (f (c)), etc., and we know how
to interpret c and f . But the issue is that we also have quantiers; for example,
the sentence v1 f (v1 ) = c, which expresses that f (v1 ) = c has a solution, might
For instance, if in the language there are a constant symbol
function symbol
cx,
x ,
if
by
such that
(x ) [cx, /x]
57
cx,
precisely.
But this will require extending the language with new constants (1.5.1),
and extending the collection of formulas to force this phenomenon (1.5.2).
This strategy of adding witnesses is due to Leon Henkin.
Remark 1.5.5.
We shall only treat the countable case, but some remarks will
be a consistent set of
x .
This raises
rules. Will
still be consistent?
We deal with the rst issue. The intuitive idea is that for any formula of
the form
x ,
cx, .
Lemma 1.5.6.
0
0
There is a countable extension L of L by a set C of new
0
constant symbols cx, , such that C is in bijection with the set of pairs (x, )
0
where x V and is a L -formula.
Proof .
L0 = L
and
Card Ln
remains countable, so
Card L0 = Card L.
remain consistent in
one can deduce a contradiction in L0 ,
then the deduction has used new constant symbols; L says nothing about these,
We now deal with the second possible issue - why does
L0 ?
so they behave like free variables. This is expressed by the following theorem.
the constant
no
and suppose
not occuring
Let c be a constant symbol occur ` where c does not occur in . Then there is a
in such that ` z [z/c].
58
Example 1.5.8.
If
`c=0
and
We write
D:`
c,
then
to say that
D : 0 ` .
Let z be
` x x = 0.
D is a deduction
0 such that
D[z/c].
We show that
for
remains an axiom
of equality!
0 `
then by induction
[z/c] [z/c].
0 `
`
0 ` [z/c]
and
0 ` ( )[z/c]
0 ` [z/c]
0 ` ( )[z/c]
0 ` [z/c]
which completes the step. The
which is
0 `
Hence
i , e , i
0 `
0 ` x
x does not
x ([z/c]). It
where
occur free in
is
follows
0 .
z , (x )[z/c]
.
.
. induction
.
0 ` [z/c]
0 ` (x )[z/c]
0 ` x
0 ` [t/x]
t is substitutable for x in .
([t/x])[z/c] is ([z/c])[t/x].
where
By choice of
and
It follows
z , (x )[z/c] is x ([z/c])
.
.
. induction
.
0 ` x [z/c]
0 ` ([t/x])[z/c]
59
0 ` [z/c].
` z [z/c] too.
Hence
As
0 ,
one has
0 ` z [z/c].
So
Remark 1.5.9. 0 appears just to make sure that we can provide a new variable
z:
perhaps
did mention all variable names... but we used only nitely many
Corollary 1.5.10.
Proof .
L,
and
write
`0
L0 .
`0
implies
L. We
` .
L0 -consistency of .
So we suppose ` , and we assume nite. Working inductively, for
0
every new constant symbol ci C which appears in the deduction, there is
by Theorem 1.5.7 a variable xi such that ` xi [xi /ci ]; in particular `
[xi /ci ]. As the ci 's don't appear in , we thus have ` .
Yes! We have found a reasonable language to work in: it has enough witnesses, and
remains consistent.
Remark 1.5.11.
L0
The construction of
able
by
N;
at each stage,
Card Ln =
L -axioms
as a consistent set of
L0 -formulas
which contains
of equality.
C 0 . Let {(xn , n : n
x V is a variable and
N} be an enumeration
is an L0 -formula.
Notation 1.5.12
(Henkin axioms)
Let
(x, ),
n
where
be the formula:
where
rst element of
C0
simplicity, we write
cn
instead of
cxn ,n
{0 , . . . , n }
(there is no risk of
means: if
xn 's,
Notation 1.5.13.
Let
0 = {n : n N}.
60
is consistent.
Suppose that
L0 -formulas.
We now maximize the set of requirements (see 0.4.1). Unfortunately, as observed at the beginning of the proof of completeness (see Remark 1.5.3), we
cannot limit ourselves to sentences, but must take all possible formulas into
account.
Caution!
(for:
is
V -complete
either
or
is in
V -complete
variables (v1
= v2
is in it, or
v1 6= v2
i
If
axioms.
Lemma 1.5.17
{}
{}
or
Proof .
Lemma 1.5.18
there is a
Proof .
V -complete
If
is consistent and
is a w, then
is consistent.
set
Let
containing
Remark 1.5.19.
If
L0
induction. If you know about ordinals, you should see that taking unions at
limit stages preserves consistency. The construction is exactly the same.
61
L,
of
L0 -formulas
by new con-
stant symbols, and the Henkin axioms (Notation 1.5.12), which explain their
behaviours.
Notation 1.5.20.
Let
T0
L0 .
This looks like a very clever base set, but here is a minor complication. If
in the language there are a constant symbol
then
c, f (c),
f,
in
f (f (c))
and
f (f (c)) = c
is in
Notation 1.5.21.
Let
be the relation on
t t0
Lemma 1.5.22.
Notation 1.5.23.
brackets
[.]
T 0:
` t = t0
if
is an equivalence relation.
Let
M = T 0/
modulo
We use
Notation 1.5.24.
We turn
into an
L0 -structure M
L0 .
terpretation:
c L0 ,
For
For an
let
n-ary
cM = [c].
relation symbol
of
L0 ,
let
` R(t1 , . . . , tn )}
RM = {([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) M n :
For an
n-ary
relation symbol
of
L0 ,
let
Lemma 1.5.25.
Proof .
This is well-dened.
62
We have an
L-structure,
as they are terms, they already have been taken care of.
Notation 1.5.26.
Lemma 1.5.27.
Proof .
M |= [s]
Proof .
map
to
i
Suppose
i
.
` !
is
t1 = t2 .
i
i
i
Suppose
is
R(t1 , . . . , tn ).
M |= [s]
i
i
Suppose
is
i
i
is
i
i
i
for any
s(t1 ) = s(t2 )
[t1 ] = [t2 ]
` t1 = t2
M 6|= [s]
( )
V -completeness
of
.)
Then
M |= [s]
of
Then
i
Suppose
V -completeness
one
(s(t1 ), . . . , s(tn )) RM
([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) RM
` R(t1 , . . . , tn )
M |= [s]
L0 -formula ,
Then
i
For any
Then
M |= [s]
[x].
For any
Induction on
formula,
s:VM
Lemma 1.5.28
has
Let
here.
(x, )
is some pair
. By assumption, M |=
M |= [s]; we show that
0
(xn n )[s]; let s agree with s except on xn and such that s0 (xn ) =
cn . By denition of satisfaction, M |= n [s0 ]. Proposition 1.3.9 then
. As n
63
Assume
M 6|= [s];
there is an assignment
s0
. By assumption,
6
s except on xn and such
M |= (n )[s0 ].
0
By construction of M , s (xn ) is some class [t] for a term t. We would
like to use Proposition 1.3.9 and say that M |= (n [t/xn ])[s]; the
issue is that perhaps t is not sustitutable for xn in n , so the above
that
for xn in
n ), xn n 6 either. We are done with substitutions;
. So 6
.
as
n and n prove each other, we nd xn n 6
The reader should have another look at remark 1.5.3; it is now clear that we
had to work with all formulas, and not only sentences.
We rst expand
We then extend
to a language
to a
V -complete
L0
L-formulas .
Fix a
We nd an
L-
.
having many witnesses (Lemma 1.5.6).
set of
,
L0 -formulas
L0 -structure M
M |= [s]:
In particular,
is satisable.
End of Lecture 15.
Corollary 1.6.1
Let
Proof .
|= .
contains all the axioms. There is an algorithm which produces all theorems of
n,
` .
|= .
64
n + 1,
We want to generalize Corollary 0.5.16 to rst-order logic; this requires dening some maximality condition for a theory.
V -completeness
(Denition 1.5.15,
an ad hoc notion for the proof of the completeness theorem) is obviously too
strong, as one should care only for sentences. The good notion is the following.
Denition 1.6.2
sentence
either
Notice that
(complete)
or
A rst-order theory
` .
is the same as the one we gave when proving completeness of propositional logic,
Denition 0.4.3.
Caution!
Corollary 1.6.3
|=
Let
be a semi-decidable theory in
or not.
1.6.2 Compactness
Theorem 1.6.4
formulas. Then
Proof .
If
is satisable i
Let
be a set of rst-order
is nitely satisable.
As it is consistent, it is
Caution!
Example 1.6.5.
Consider an innite set A, and let the language contain conca (a A). The set of formulas = {v1 6= ca : a A} is clearly nitely
satisable in A, as it suces to take an assignment with s(v1 ) not one of the
nitely many mentioned a's. But of course no assignment to A will satisfy all
of simultaneously.
stants
Corollary 1.6.6.
Proof .
If
|= ,
such that
0 |= .
One may want to have another look at the notion of nite axiomatizability
(Denition 0.5.12).
Example 1.6.7.
65
zation
It is
in my opinion a result way more essential, primordial (and thus also less
sophisticated) than Gdel's Completeness Theorem, which states that one
can formalize deduction in a certain way in Number Theory, and it is a
methodological error to deduce the former from the latter.
th
century. In short, are there numbers which are smaller than all
positive reals? (Of course such numbers could not be real numbers themselves.)
Can one introduce such convenient ctions, and work with them? Is what we
show about real numbers using innitesimals true or do we create inconcisten-
th
cies? We provide a xx
as a eld
R,
66
in a nice
manner.
behave.
all
LR -sentences
the formulas
R;
cr 's
are elements
cr 's
numbers they stand for (in particular, some sentences express that we are talking
about an ordered eld); the extra formulas say that
is a positive element
Lemma 1.6.8.
Proof .
is satisable.
pret in
A nite fragment of
Notation 1.6.9
R
(non-standard reals)
contains an interpretation of
pretation of the
cr 's,
Lemma 1.6.10. R
Proof .
Map
to
Let
be an
L0 -structure
satisfying
R .
cR
r
(the interpretation of
r 6= s R,
then
R .
Notation 1.6.11
of
R.
6 R:
R ,
The
it is an innitesimal!
R :
b = {x R :
R R .
there is
67
o = {x R :
b
for all
a better picture of
o,
R . b
and
0).
Of course
o R = {0}.
embeds into
R. o
are
L0 .
Lemma 1.6.12. b
Proof .
is a ring, and
is an ideal of
b.
Easy computations.
b/o ' R.
only the commensurable part and factors out the thickness, one retrieves the
standard line
R.
Denition 1.6.13
(standard part)
{r R : r < x}.
(We dene
st x
x b,
let
st x be the
x b by
for negative
st x = st(x)).
R is Dedekind-complete. Let x b be non-negative;
A = {r R : r < x} of R is non-empty and bounded above
A has a least upper bound in R; st is well-dened. A little more
x b.
So
Lemma 1.6.14. st
Now as
st
is clearly onto
R (it
b/o ' R.
induces an isomorphism
is the identity on
o.
R),
we deduce that
o.
st x
x b
st
can be
R \ b,
is continuous at real
aR
, f (a + ) f (a)
is innitesimal.
End of Lecture 16.
Lecture 17 (Proof of Compactness by Ultraproducts*)
(lter)
Let
X 6=
be a set.
68
F P (X)
is a lter on
if:
6 F ;
if
AF
if
A, B F ,
and
Example 1.7.2.
A B,
then
then
B F;
A B F.
Remark 1.7.3.
Let
be a family of subsets of
such that
B F.
Verication: Let
Bn Y } ,
Recall that
i.e.
conite in
Example 1.7.4.
Y
means that
X \Y
is nite.
F r
e = {Y X :
X}.
is conite in
Remark 1.7.5.
IF
Assume
Let
be a lter on
Denition 1.7.6
Lemma 1.7.7.
P (X), A U
Proof .
Let
(ultralter)
U be a lter
X \ A U.
Let
or
A maximal lter on
on
X.
Then
is called an ultralter.
in
sections.
If for all
a contradiction.
A P (X), A U or X \ A U . Let U
. Let Y U. If Y U we are done.
extending U : we show U = U
X \ Y U U , so = Y (X \ Y ) U, a contradiction.
Suppose that for all
be a lter
Otherwise
Denition 1.7.8
on
is
(principal ultralter)
Pa = {Y X : a Y }.
69
Let
a X.
Remark 1.7.9.
If
is principal.
In the interesting case (X innite), do non-principal ultralters exist? Assuming AC (or Zorn's Lemma), they do; AC is actually slightly stronger than
necessary to show this.
pendent of ZF (and weaker than AC) saying that every lter is included in an
ultralter.
Lemma 1.7.10
ultralter.
Remark 1.7.11. F
IF
is an ultralter i
is a maximal ideal.
In particular,
Remark 1.7.12.
on
if it is in the ultralter,
{0, 1}
measure
otherwise). This
1.
Lemma 1.7.13
ultralter
Proof .
As
. If B
B U.
(AC)
such that
Remark 1.7.14.
There are
Card X
22
ultralters on
X.
extending
by
F.
Hausdor, is non-trivial.)
Mi 's
M .
iI
(with respect
The base of
(ultraproduct)
let
Mi
(mi ) (ni )
if
{i I : mi = ni } U
by:
is the set
We interpret constants in
cM = (cMi )iI
We interpret relations by:
RM
(m1i ) , . . . , (mki )
if
70
i I : RMi (m1i , . . . , mki ) U
fM
(m1i ) , . . . , (mki ) = (mk+1
)
i
if
iI:f
Mi
m1i , . . . , mki
= mk+1
U
i
Checking that these are well-dened is very similar to showing the transitivity of the equivalence relation: if we have two equivalent sequences, then they
must agree on a set in
Theorem 1.7.16
Then M |= [s ] i {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U .
(o)
Proof .
By induction on
If
Let
M .
. If M |= [s ], then M 6|= [s ]. By
that {i I : Mi |= [si ]} 6 U , and since U is an
is
ultralter (so it always contains a set or its complement), this means that
i
i
i
i
is
{i I : Mi |= [si ]} U .
Hence
Then:
M |= ( )[s ]
M |= [s ] and M |= [s ]
{i I : Mi |= [si ]}, {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U
{i I : Mi |= [si ]} {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U
{i I : Mi |= ( )[si ]} U
that
U
is
If
is an ultralter here.)
x .
0
0
except on x, and such that M |= [(s ) ]. Say (s ) (x) = [(ni )] for
0
a family (ni ) i Mi , and for each i I let si agree with si except
0
0
on x, where si (x) = ni . By induction {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U ,
which implies {i I : Mi |= (x )[si ]} U .
J = {i I : Mi |= (x )[si ]} is in U . For
ni Mi and s0i agree with si on V \ {x} where s0i (x) = ni
0
0
be such that Mi |= [si ]. For i I \ J , let si = si . We nd a
0
let
71
i I,
I be the collection
Mi satisfying i by
Let
there is a structure
Fix a nitely
of nite subsets of
satisability.
For each
let
A = {i I : Mi |= }.
family corresponds to
A1 n ,
to
{A :
M =
Mi /U
(i.e.
is nitely
{A : }.
Mi 's
with respect
U ).
Let
M |=
{i I : Mi |= } U
Remark 1.7.17.
A U,
M |= .
R:
x a non-principal ultralter
Theorem,
on
N,
and let
R =
Q
N
R/U .
By o'
U,
of the sequence
( n1 )nN :
it is positive, and
72
Chapter 2
and
2 .
The
In this chapter:
for each
k 1,
the quantiers
a set of
and
k -ary
predicate variables
Caution!
2 and 2 indicates
73
innite.
Proof .
saying that
Y1
X 1:
is a subset of
subset(Y
, X 1) :
Y1
propersubset(Y 1 , X 1 ) :
There is a formula saying that
functional(2 ) :
x Y 1 (x) X 1 (x)
is a proper subset of
subset(X
is injective:
a1 a2 b 2 (a1 , b) 2 (a2 , b) a1 = a2
function(2 , X 1 , Y 1 ) :
, Y 1 ) (x X 1 (x) Y 1 (x))
injective(2 ) :
X1
to
Y 1:
injection(2 , X 1 , Y 1 ) :
There is a formula saying that
X1
injects(X 1 , Y 1 ) :
X1
injective(2 ) function(2 , X 1 , Y 1 )
injects into
Y:
2 2 injection(2 , X 1 , Y 1 )
infinite(X 1 ) :
X 1:
X1
is innite:
2 Y 1 propersubset(Y 1 , X 1 ) injects(X 1 , Y 1 )
74
to
Y 1:
One should compare this to rst-order logic, in which innite is not a single
formula, but an innite theory not nitely axiomatizable (Example 1.6.7).
Corollary 2.1.2.
Proof .
For
No compactness theorem.
n N,
let
v1 . . . vn i6=j vi 6= vj ,
elements. Let be the
T = {: n N} {2 X 1 (X 1 )}
Then
In particular, regardless of what our proof theory would have been, completeness would have failed.
Denition 2.2.1
(Peano Arithmetic)
{0, s}
Let
PA
Let
is an injective function
is in the image of
the axiom:
x |s {z
s}(x)x
n
2 Y 1
Y 1 (0) (y Y 1 (y) Y 1 (s(y)) x Y 1 (x)
Like stands for isomorphic, which we do not wish to dene now (this will
be done in model theory, Denition 1'.2.6).
preserves the language; that up to names, the objects are exactly the same.
This result will be referred to as absolute categoricity of
PA,
a terminology
which will become clearer after the denition of categoricity in model theory
(Denition 1'.2.14).
75
Caution!
PA.
is a model of
But the integers existed before we started doing logic, and the fact that we
have found a nice description of their behaviour does not change it!
There is no reason to stop. One may quantify over collections of collections
of elements and introduce
nth -order
76
Chapter 1'
-saturated
Our
77
(tuple notation)
a (n
(a1 , . . . , an )
a).
is
We shall often abuse notation of Cartesian powers in order to avoid mentioning lengths. For instance, if
instead of
a1 , . . . , an M ,
aM
a M n.
From now on we assume that every formula we consider has been suitably
constructed or renamed (for instance by the algorithm of Theorem 1.3.6); that
Notation 1'.0.2
(x)
means
We write
(x)
to indicate that
FreeVar x;
x are not used.
(x)
(with no
x.
even if some
x)
denotes a
Notation 1'.0.3
variables among
same length as
x,
x.
and
an
We write
a set.
symbols
ca
LA
for elements
of
i
L be a rst-order language,
L new constant
A.
(a)
Let
ca
by
a.
M |=
M |= (ca1 , . . . , can ).
1'.0.2 Quantications
We rehabilitate poor
Denition 1'.0.5
(quantier-free formula)
A formula is quantier-free if it
has no quantiers.
where
Denition 1'.0.7
form
(existential formula)
v1 . . . vn 0 ,
where
Denition 1'.0.8
a formula
is quantier-free.
is quantier-free.
v1 v2 . . .
(quantication rank)
.
78
if
is atomic, then
if
is
if
is
1 2 ,
if
is
x ,
then
qrk = qrk + 1.
if
is
x ,
then
qrk = qrk + 1.
then
qrk = 0;
qrk = qrk ;
then
L-formulas
is satisable i the
L0 -structure:
L0 -theory 0 = {0 : }
is satisable.
Let
M be an L-structure and T
T.
be an
L-theory.
If
is a model of
is consistent for
plicitely dening a theory to be consistent. This leads to questions like: is this
theory a theory?
arises in practice.
Also, we freely identify any theory with the set of its consequences (since
there is no ambiguity on the notion of consequence).
79
L-theory
of
M,
or the theory of
Let
for short, is
L-sentences
of
Denition 1'.1.3
structure and
over
is
Remark 1'.1.4.
If
Let
be an
L-
over
is
is quantier-free}.
In particular, Th M = Th(M, ).
Th(M, A) { LA : qrk() = 0}.
complete
(Notation 1'.0.4).
The theory of
and
if one wants
is the expansion
a set of parameters.
M |= (a)
LA
AM
M;
is an
L-structure
and
A M,
then
Th0 (M, A) =
Th(M, A)
is a
LA -theory.
Verication: In
M, (a)
As far as rst-
order properties are concerned, being the same amounts to satisfying the same
sentences. This is captured by the following, central notion.
Denition 1'.1.5
and
. Let M, N be L-structures. M
M N , if Th M = Th N .
(elementary equivalence)
L-structures
is not, set-theoretically
speaking, a set.
Lemma 1'.1.6.
A theory
M, N
of
T,
one has
M N.
Proof .
has
So the running question: is this theory complete? Has a partial answer: can
one show that any two of its models are elementarily equivalent?
80
1'.1.2 Inclusion
We now turn our attention to substructures; the naive notion (Denition 1'.1.7)
is not very useful, the interesting form will be elementary inclusion (Denition
1'.1.13). As noted in Remark 1'.1.1, terminology might be a bit confusing, as
elementary will not exactly mean the same thing as in elementary equivalence
(Denition 1'.1.5).
But let us begin with the naive, not-so-useful, notion of inclusion.
Denition 1'.1.7
substructure of
(substructure)
N,
written
Let
M N,
M, N
be
L-structures.
Then
is a
M N;
cM = cN
RM = RN M n
for all
f M = f N M n+1
(f
of
In a word,
of
for all
relation symbols
n-ary
R L;
function symbols
R L.
N |M
may also be written f
, the restriction and corestriction
|M n
n+1
to
n-ary
c L;
M)
M
to the base
bears the
M.
L-structure
M and N in the
M N as L-structures,
M N
Example 1'.1.8.
Remark 1'.1.9.
Then
Let
be an
L-structure and M N
L-structure M N
c, cN M
f, M
The structure
is closed under
be a non-empty subset.
i the following hold:
fN .
Remark 1'.1.10.
Let
L-substructures,
an L-structure M
of
that is
such
M.
81
Let
MN
be an
L-structure.
Let
(i). If
is quantier-free, then
(ii). If
is existential, then
(iii). If
is universal, then
M |= (m) N |= (m).
M |= (m) N |= (m).
N |= (m) M |= (m).
Proof .
(i). The case of an atomic formula is by denition. Then a quick induction on
the complexity.
(ii). Induction again. If there are no quantiers, then this is known. Suppose
that
is
there is
Counter-example 1'.1.12.
ZQ
as ring-structures, but
Q |= x x + x = 1
QR
as ring-structures, but
R |= x x2 = 1 + 1
RC
as ring-structures, but
C |= x x2 = 1
though
though
though
doesn't.
doesn't.
doesn't.
One sees that this notion of inclusion is therefore not very interesting to us.
Elementary inclusions (Denition 1'.1.13) will be more relevant.
End of Lecture 20.
Lecture 21 (Elementary Inclusion; Morphisms)
sense, only elements of the small structure can be taken into account.
Denition 1'.1.13
(elementary substructure)
L-structures. M is an
Th(M, M ) = Th(N , M ).
of
Let
M N be an inclusion
N , written M N , if
elementary substructure of
Example 1'.1.14.
(N, <) 6 (Z, <), as N |= x x 0
0 as a parameter.)
but
82
Z |= x x < 0.
Let
M N.
ZQRC
QC
is elementary.
As rings,
Th(R, R),
R R
to be
elementary.
In other words, M N i M and N have the same LM -theory, i N |=
Th(M, M ). This is also equivalent to: for any LM formula (m) with parameters in M , M |= (m) i N |= (n).
In particular M N implies M N , but the converse need not hold.
Counter-example 1'.1.15.
Consider
N = (Z, <)
and
M = (2Z, <) N .
As
they are clearly isomorphic (Denition 1'.2.6 below), it is clear that they are
Lemma 1'.1.16.
ementary chain of
iI Mi .
Proof .
Then for
I be a non-empty
L-substructures, that
all i I , Mi M.
Let
set and
is
is an elementary
substructure. (This will typically be the case in 1'.3.2). The statement is more
subtle than it rst seems.
Theorem 1'.1.17
Then
MN
if
Proof .
(Tarksi's test)
N |= x (x, m)
Suppose
Suppose that
m M.
atomic. Clearly,
Suppose that
s.t.
L-structures.
M,
N |= (, m)
We show
We show
M |= (m)
i
be a
N |= (m).
be an inclusion of
with parameters in
then there is
is clear by denition.
MN
Let
(m)
is
x .
83
's
idea to try to put Tarski's test in a nutshell, as there are some subtleties.
Remark 1'.1.18.
N ).
isfaction:
in
N.
in
N.
One should be very careful that in Tarski's test (Theorem 1'.1.17), one
considers all formulas of the form
x ,
where
Counter-example 1'.1.19.
Consider
(N, <)
and
(N {}, <),
deN {}
where
Then
N doesn't: clearly
N 6 N {}. But for a purely existential formula , one has N |= (n) i
N {} |= (n). (This need not be entirely clear yet, as a proof would rely on
back-and-forth methods.)
1'.2.1 Morphisms
Notation 1'.2.1.
we write
(m)
If
is an
(cM ) = cN
m RM
is a function,
i
L-morphism
Let
M, N
(m) RN
(f M (m)) = f N ((m))
be
L-structures
if:
c;
R;
f.
84
and
:M N
In short, an
tions of
in
L-morphism
M and N .
LL-embedding.
morphism is always injective. This is the reason why one also says
Remark 1'.2.3.
morphism;
IdM
is always an
L-morphisms
is of course an
L-
L-morphism.
Example 1'.2.4.
Let
and
be orderings. Then
:M N
is an
{<}-morphism
i it
Lgrp -morphism.
Lrng -morphism.
Remark 1'.2.5.
If
M N,
lying sets).
Then
M N
is an
L-morphism.
L-morphism.
M, N
Let
be
L-structures.
Then there is an
Th0 (M, M )
L-embedding M N i N
M with no quanti-
(theory of
M ).
L-morphism
is an
L-isomorphism
if it is surjective.
and
is an
(Recall that an
Remark 1'.2.7.
ping of an
L-morphism
is always injective!)
L-isomorphisms,
L-isomorphisms.
L-isomorphism,
are
Example 1'.2.8. (Z, <) and (2Z, <) are clearly isomorphic.
Remark 1'.2.5 however suggested that we did not take the good denition in
the rst place: morphisms reduce to inclusions, which in general have but little
interest. So we look for something more reminiscent of the notion of elementary
inclusion.
85
(elementary morphism)
(m)
M |= (m)
An
L-morphism : M N
M:
is
with parameters in
N |= ((m))
i
Remark 1'.2.10.
IdM
is always elementary.
Remark 1'.2.11.
If
M N,
Let
MN
be two
L-structures.
M N
Then
is elementary.
MN
elementary.
M0 N such
Th(M, M ).
As for
that
L-isomorphisms,
Proposition 1'.2.12.
Proof .
Let
mentary.
An
: M N
M ' M0
i
M N
i there is
L-isomorphism
be a bijective
By induction on a formula
M |= (m) i N |= ((m)).
If is atomic, this is clear
is elementary.
L-morphism.
We show that
is elem M,
(, m).
= x .
If
By induction,
Corollary 1'.2.13.
If
M ' N,
then
M N.
86
M |=
i
As there is
N |= .
1'.2.3 Categoricity
Denition 1'.2.14
models and
nality
(categoricity)
Caution!
Let
an innite cardinal.
of
is
PA.
First-
order theories cannot capture cardinalities as second-order logic does (this will
become clear with the Lwenheim-Skolem theorems, in 1'.3); absolute categoricity is impossible for a rst-order theory with innite models. One therefore
compares only models of the same cardinality.
Example 1'.2.15.
facts):
0 -categorical
1 (harder).
-categorical
for any
(Theorem 1'.4.4
The theory of vector spaces over a nite eld is categorical in any cardinal.
0 -categorical,
but it is
-categorical
for any
(hint: transcendence
bases).
Categoricity will provide a criterion for completeness of a theory (Corollary
1'.3.14). But let us briey leave the syllabus.
Theorem 1'.2.16
some
is categorical in any
A theory categorical in
L.
Micahel Morley actually proved the countable language case in 1965; Saharon
Shelah extended it to any language in 1974.
End of Lecture 21.
Lecture 22 (Lwenheim-Skolem Theorems)
If
is nite, we write
87
Card L = 0
anyway.
in any case,
Card L
actually denotes
the constants) under the functions of the language; the resulting substructure
has cardinality at most
Card A + Card L.
Example 1'.3.2.
Lemma 1'.3.3.
be a rst-order structure,
smallest
of
Let M
L-structure hAi
containing
A.
A M . Then there is a
CardhAi Card A +
Moreover,
Card L.
Proof .
L
A0 = A {cM : c
a constant symbol}.
We now write the set of function symbols of the language
where
Fn
A1 = A0
[ [
n.
F =
nN
Fn ,
Let
f M (An0 )
nN f Fn
(The idea is clear.
L.
functions of
Unfortunately
f (A0 )
A0
through
A1 we
hAi = nN
From
set
build
A2
contains
A,
hAi
L-structure
M ), getting
M.
most Card A + Card L; at each stage, we
are 0 Card L stages, and this proves
which is a substructure of
A0 has cardinality at
Card L elements; there
CardhAi Card A + Card L.
Notice that
add at most
Example 1'.3.4.
S0 = S {1}, S1 = S0 S01 S0 S0 ,
AM
Let
substructure of
containing
A.
It coincides with
G again. Then
hSi = nN Sn .
of a group
We interpret relation
hAi
M be an L-structure
in M is the smallest
containing
A.
It follows that
hAi
88
is a
a construction
hAi
is canonical, and
hAi
interested in. So Lemma 1'.3.3 and Denition 1'.3.5 are not that useful.
A,
then by Tarski's
Test (Theorem 1'.1.17) we ought to add existential witnesses for all formulas.
Recall how existential witnesses played an essential role in the proof of the
completeness of rst-order logic. We now deal with them in a more semantic
fashion, adding to the language functions which choose them (this construction
is of course not canonical, and heavily relies on the axiom of choice).
Caution!
canonical.
f ,
LSk = L {f : (x, y)
Denition 1'.3.7
of
is the
an
L-formula}.
L-theory.
T and the
y x (x, y) (f (y), y)
(Skolemization)
Let
be an
The Skolemization
axioms
The meaning is clear: our new axioms say that witnesses are explicitely given
by our new function symbols.
Lemma 1'.3.8.
Let
be a model of
T . Then
TSk .
a model of
Proof .
With heavy use of the axiom of choice (we perform innitely many choices),
we thus dene functions
fM ,
M |= y x (x, y) (f (y), y)
AM
under all
Theorem 1'.3.9
a cardinal with
that
89
Proof .
which satises
(Theorem 1'.1.17).
Let
M |= x (x, m0 ).
construction, the
As
Remark 1'.3.10.
M0 M
as
L-structures,
not necessarily as
M0 M
as
LSk ,
LSk -structures.
LSk -structures,
L-structures
However an inclusion of
guage
LSk
This is
LSk,Sk ,
etc.
A:
hAi
Corollary 1'.3.11
(Skolem's paradox)
Proof .
{}.
Start with
U0
and
P (N),
U0 is so small that
P (N) and N.]
Theorem 1'.3.12
nite
that
90
M be an inM M such
Let
Proof .
Let
L = LM
trivially satisable in
that there are at least
one has M M ; on the other hand, the constants of C say that M has at
least elements.
Hence any nite fragment of
Proof .
L.
Proof .
and
Corollary 1'.3.14
guage
with
If there is
Let
(o-Vaught test)
Card L
M, N |= T .
Let
is
such that
-categorical,
then
is complete.
M N.
We aim at showing
M0 and N 0
N and N 0 . But
of cardinal
in any case
Example 1'.3.15.
by cate-
0 -
91
is a binary function around, it is not very likely that one will understand any
kind of back-and-forth.
Denition 1'.4.1
(DLO)
{<}
of
orderings:
x (x < x)
xy (x < y x = y y < x)
xyz (x < y y < z x < z)
xyz x < y (x < z z < x)
xyz y < x x < z
DLO denotes either this theory, or a model of the theory (this is harmless as
the theory will turn out to be complete).
Remark 1'.4.2.
<
fourth (density) says that between any two points there is another point; the
fth (no endpoints) states that there is no least, nor largest element). In spite
Example 1'.4.3.
( B is pasted after
A).
B, A
< B denotes
A lies below any element
and
<
and
Theorem 1'.4.4
Proof .
Let
(Cantor)
M, N
N = {nk : k N}.
M = {mk : k N}
dened on all of
92
is dened everywhere on
M;
N.
0 (m0 ) = n0 .
n0 .
m0 = m0 ,
such that
mk+1
mk+1
there is certainly
hand,
mk+1
a,
We let
2k+1
(stage
2k + 2)
extend
2k
a, mk+1
by
Suppose that
a.
and
N.
b,
a,
b.
If
N,
If on the other
then as
N is dense,
N such
2k+1 (mk+1 ) = .
2k+1
2k+1
in such a
a0
M
b0 .
does for
2k+2 () = nk+1 .
= kN k .
domain, so
It follows
nk+1
at even stages,
im = N .
Bearing in mind Denition 1'.2.14, one sees that Theorem 1'.4.4 says that
DLO is
0 -categorical.
Remark 1'.4.5.
If you can always extend a partial function, then at the limit something
nice will happen. Proposition 1'.4.14 below will generalize this idea.
It is however dicult to understand at rst in what measure exactly countability is needed. Many constructions in model theory rely on induction
beyond
and this is why the limiting process can't go further than the rst innite. For instance, there are two non-isomorphic DLO's of cardinality
Above all, the proof relies on this bootstrap construction, arguing that
any nite conguration on one hand can be reected on the other hand.
This is worth a general denition (Denition 1'.4.10 hereafter).
93
1'.4.2 -isomorphisms
Denition 1'.4.6
(local isomorphism,
A local isomorphism, or
function
M N
0-isomorphism).
0-isomorphism, : M N
is a local isomorphism i
Two tuples
aM
and
bN
Two structures
M, N
are locally, or
is an injective partial
mapping
0-isomorphic,
to b.
and
dom
and
im
respectively).
written
written
a '0 b,
M '0 N ,
Remark 1'.4.7.
is always
0-isomorphic
N.
1 + 1 = 0,
Z/3Z
doesn't.
Z/2Z
saties
M '0 N
i
free theories, no parameters: this boils down to atomic formulas using terms
built from constants).
Example 1'.4.8.
`
(Z, <) and`(Z < Z, <); we denote by 0 the 0 of
Z; there are two copies of 0 in Z < Z, which we denote respectively by
01 and 02 . Clearly '0 . Clearly too, 0 '0 01 . Also, (0, 2) '0 (01 , 02 )
(as 0 < 2 and 01 < 02 ).
`
Consider the successor function and the structures (Z, s) and (Z Z, s).
Clearly '0 and 0 '0 01 . But it is no longer the case that (0, 2) '0
(01 , 02 ). Indeed, M |= 2 = s(s(0)), whereas N |= 02 6= s(s(01 )).
Example 1'.4.9.
two
L-structures. M
and
is a
non-empty family
are
of local
94
forth:
for all
and
M , there is F
back:
for all
and
M,
there is
extending
extending
such that
im
-isomorphisms.
Remark 1'.4.11.
If there is a Karp family, there is a largest one (take the union of all).
M'N
implies
M ' N
and
don't even
Proposition 1'.4.12.
-isomorphic.
More specically,
Proof .
support bijections (which do exist: the family is not empty!). The back-andforth property is the core of the proof of Theorem 1'.4.4.
We emphasize that
-isomorphic
Counter-example 1'.4.13.
-isomorphic,
are
but of course
(Q, <)
and
(R, <).
They
Q 6' R.
Proposition 1'.4.14.
Proof .
If
M ' N
M ' N.
orem 1'.4.4.
Propositions 1'.4.12 and 1'.4.14 together yield the proof of Theorem 1'.4.4.
Counter-example 1'.4.15.
The notions of
-isomorphism
and of a Karp
family (Denition 1'.4.10) are about arbitrarily large nite congurations; one
should therefore not expect to generalize Proposition 1'.4.14 past
and
0 ,
even if
N =
1 (Q {}) (Q
M=
(copies of
1 .
They are
-isomorphic
(Proposition
1'.4.12), and yet they are not isomorphic. The latter is a non-trivial exercise.
Back-and forth arguments are especially powerful in
(dened below, Denition 1'.5.12).
algebraically closed elds are
-saturated
models
-isomorphic,
-saturated
models
(dened below, 1'.5.2) are. These are algebraically closed elds of innite transcendence degree; you may already try to establish a back-and-forth between
them. This will be done in 1'.5.3.
95
A local isomorphism
:ab
(n + 1)-isomorphism
is an
if:
for all
there is
and an
n-isomorphism : a 'n b
extending
for all
there is
and an
n-isomorphism : a 'n b
extending
a and b are (n + 1)-isomorphic, written a 'n+1 b, if there exists an (n + 1)isomorphism between them.
Two structures
Remark 1'.4.17.
N
7
and
if
-isomorphism
the notion of
are
is an
simultaneously.
Here begin the funny games: given two structures, how isomorphic are they?
Remark 1'.4.18.
and
N.
two steps:
player
player
tions similar.
M and N
are
Example 1'.4.19.
Consider
M = (Z, s)
and
N = (Z
Consider
Z1
and
Z2
Z's
96
Player
player
player
picks a
Player
2
2
2
will identify
with
rounds!
is an
-isomorphic
et
are
-isomorphism
if for all
if there is an
-isomorphic
if
it is an
n-isomorphism.
-isomorphism
is an
between them.
-isomorphism.
Remark 1'.4.21.
A beginner's mistake:
In particular,
-isomorphisms
always has a
-isomorphisms
guage.
-isomorphism
tries to
that our formulas are always about nite tuples, of arbitrary length.
Proposition 1'.4.22.
If
M ' N ,
then
M N.
Denition 1'.4.23
(type of a tuple)
Let
L-structure
and
The type of
be an
a M
M is
in
Bearing in mind the denition of the quantication rank of a formula (Denition 1'.0.8), one can even dene
Lemma 1'.4.24.
M, N
Let
respectively. If
tpM
n (a) = {(x) : qrk() n
M, N be L-structures and a, b
a 'n b, then tpn (a) = tpn (b).
97
and
M |= (a)}.
Proof .
b,
then
and
a '0
satisfy the same relations, hence the same atomic formulas; the
claim is proved.
a 'n+1 b
be two
Remark 1'.4.25.
We insist that if
n > 0,
Lemma
1'.4.24 doesn't.
Counter-example 1'.4.26.
Then
and
01 clearly satisfy
1-isomorphic.
Remark 1'.4.27.
`
(Z, s) and (Z Z, s) again.
of qrk 1, but as observed,
M ' N
i
M N!
'
'
'
< m)
'm
'n
Counter-example 1'.4.28.
(R, <) ' (Q, <) but they are not isomorphic (Counter-example 1'.4.13)
`
(Z, <) ' (Z < Z, <) but they are not -isomorphic (Remark 1'.4.21).
`
(Z, s) (Z Z, s) but they are not -isomorphic (Example 1'.4.19).
`
(Z, s) '1 (Z Z, s) but they are not 2-isomorphic (Example 1'.4.19).
In special cases, converses do hold:
98
If
M ' N
M'N
(Proposition 1'.4.14).
M ' N
MN
implies
M ' N .
does imply
N ' N .
This was typically the case when in high school, you realized
x ax2 + bx + c = 0
i
b2 4ac 0
(over
Th(R)
as an ordered ring). We
Denition 1'.5.1
(quantier elimination)
(x)
A rst-order theory
eliminates
T |= x (x) (x).
such that
(x)
T ; this
T {(x)} |= (x).)
equivalent modulo
and
amounts to
Example 1'.5.2.
formulas. Then
Let
and
(elimination theorem)
Let E be a set of
of L is equivalent
E.
be a theory.
if every formula
Theorem 1'.5.4
of
(elimination set)
Let
be a theory and
E a set of
M and N
and
extracted from
and
same formulas.
99
E,
respectively,
Proof .
E
that
One implication is trivial. For the other one, we may clearly assume
is closed under Boolean operations.
tradiction.) Let
(x)
be an
L-formula.
E.
(modulo
T)
Step 1.
to a formula of
} {(c) (d)}
and
T {(c) (d) :
is inconsistent.
c, d be tuples
L = L {c, d}. Let
Verication: Let
0
x)
(In particular,
L0 -theory T
with interpretations
same formulas from
m = c and n = d
E , but disagree on :
Notice that
and
M |= T 0
satisfy the
T0
is not
Step 2.
For every
M |= T ,
there is a formula
M (x) E
equivalent to
(x).
Verication: Let
n
dened by
is equivalent to
Step 3.
Let M |= T . There is a
T {M } |= x ((x) M (x)).
Verication: Let
sentence
M = { E : M |= }
M E
(this is
true in
E Th(M))
and
T 0 = { : M } { : 6 M } {x ((x) M (x))}
If
T0
100
satises the
M |= x ((x) M (x)),
assumption,
Step 4.
Finitely many
same formulas in
a contradiction. So
M 's
T 0 = T {M : M |= T }
Verication: Let
T.
model
N |= T
in which
By compactness,
nite set
Step 5.
There is
of
M 's
Verication: Let
T0
such that
(x) E
T |= M .
such that
T |= x (x) (x).
Consider
Notice that
Suppose
Remark 1'.5.5.
Corollary 1'.5.6.
els
and
if
of
and
A theory
and
extracted from
and
respectively,
same formulas.
The question is now: how do we prove that two tuples do satisfy the same
formulas? In practice, this often results from a back-and-forth construction.
Corollary 1'.5.7.
101
Proof .
Let
m, n
be drawn from
M, N
respectively
and satisfy the same quantier-free formulas; we show that they satisfy the
same formulas. As
and
it follows
same
-isomorphic.
m
1'.4.25). Hence
So
m ' n, and
n satisfy the
and
Remark 1'.5.8.
T,
there is a language
L L0
and an
L0 -theory T T 0
such that
T0
L-theory
eliminates
quantiers.
's,
replacing them by
relation symbol
T1
R (x)
T = n Tn
After
L0 = n Ln
to a quantier-free formula of
L1
need not
L.
-back-and-forth ( -back-and-forth
more subtle:
constructions.
For instance, if one tries to show that
should start with algebraically closed elds
isomorphic tuples
b.
The conclusion of this algebraic discussion is that some models are richer
than others, and that presumably back-and-forth is easier to manage in rich
models.
-saturation
This requires the following denition, which generalizes the notion of a system
n variables.
x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) of
of equations in
variables
length
n.
102
and a tuple of
LA (x)
extending
n-type
is merely a
Th(M, A).
This generalizes the case of the type of a tuple (Denition 1'.4.23), which is
called realized. But any type is the type of a tuple which hasn't appeared yet:
every type is realized somewhere.
Remark 1'.5.10.
n N such
of M.)
that
If
p(x)
realizes
is a type over
p.
(Of course
A M , then
N will tend to
there is
N M
and
be a proper extension
Types are amazingly important and interesting (they come with nice topological methods), and students should refrain the teacher from going to deep
into this matter.
Example 1'.5.11.
If
A M and b M ,
n-type over A.
then
is
an
Consider
(N, <).
is not realized in
Then
N,
{x > n : n N}
1-type
over
N.
Notice that it
1-type
over
R,
namely
is a
Consider
1-types
over
Z.
and then
kinds:
with coecients in
P (x) = 0
for a poly-
Z.
{P (x) 6= 0 : P Z[X]}.
p(x, y)
over
Z.
down to
{P1 (x) =
x
x
P2 .
for some
103
the type is
p(x, y) =
An
L-structure M
M.
is
-saturated
if any
1-
Example 1'.5.13.
Any DLO is
-saturated,
-saturated.
(N, s) is not -saturated. Let n (x) be the formula x 6= sn (0). Then the
1-type p(x) = {n (x) : n N} uses 0 as its only parameter, and is not
realized in N.
(N, <) is not -saturated. Let n (x) be the formula x1 . . . xn x1 <
< xn < x. Then the 1-type {n (x) : n N} uses no parameters and is
not realized in N.
The ring
a sum of
uses no
Theorem 1'.5.14.
tary extension
Proof .
This proof relies on ordinal induction, and may be omitted freely; the
of elements of
very understandable.
M0 = M.
For each i,
i+1
M M1 . By construction,
M1 .
M1 need not be -saturated, as we
says that
all
1-types
are
realized in
is
-saturated,
104
M2 .
After
Remark 1'.5.15.
mentary extension
M ,
Dealing with
1-types
or
n-types
Proof .
M.
n-type with nitely many parameters is realp(x, y) be an n + 1-type with nitely many parameters a (x
th
still stands for (x1 , . . . , xn ); the n+1
variable is y ).
Let q(x) = {y (x, y, a) : (x, y, a) p}. This is clearly an n-type over a;
by induction, it is realized by an n-uple b M .
We now let r(y) = {(b, y, a) : (x, y, a) p}. This is clearly a 1-type over
b, a, which is again a nite tuple. So r is realized in M: there is c M realizing
it. It is clear that b, c realizes p.
ized in
M,
and let
Remark 1'.5.17.
p,
s(y) = {x (x, y, a) : (x, y, a) p}.
of s, (a, c) has no reason to realize p!
q,
then
is a realization
check completeness of a theory, one may focus on them, which are presumably
nicer than the general models.
weaker assumptions.
Lemma 1'.5.18. T
-saturated
equivalent.
Proof .
Let
M, N
be models of
T;
Theorem 1'.5.19.
models
Then
Proof .
let
M, N |= T ,
Let
and
-saturated
eliminates quantiers.
We use the elimination theorem, Theorem 1'.5.4. Let
m M, n N
M, N |= T ;
we
105
there are
-saturated
and
are
elementary extensions
-saturated
elementary
extensions always exist, and form a good ground on which to study a theory
(the details are not too important).
End of Lecture 25.
Lecture 26 (Examples)
1'.5.3 Examples
We eventually shed light on all notions by studying examples.
DLO's
The theory of dense linear ordering has already been dened and studied in
1'.4.1. We put the existing pieces together.
Proposition 1'.5.20
(DLO's)
Proof .
-saturated
0 -categorical
but not
1 -categorical. Moreover,
-isomorphisms.
any
We know everything, but here is how a study could go. Past the two
-saturated.
-isomorphism.
is a local isomorphism.
-isomorphic.
It follows
(iv). As a consequence of (iii) and with Proposition 1'.4.14, any two countable
models are isomorphic; the theory is
0 -categorical.
(v). One may uses the o-Vaught criterion (Corollary 1'.3.14 to argue that
the theory is complete.
(vi). It would be as simple to say that any two models are elementary equivalent
by (iii); so the theory is complete, again.
(vii). As the theory is clearly eectively presented (nitely many axioms!), and
complete, it is decidable (Corollary 1.6.3).
106
(viii). Turning back to categoricity questions, one would see that the theory is
not
1 -categorical
(Counter-example 1'.4.15).
-categorical
in any
1 .
(ix). It follows from (ii) that DLO eliminates quantiers (Theorem 1'.5.19).
Let
for each
n N.
It is not 0 embeds elementarily
-categorical
1 .
in any
Moreover
Proof .
-saturated
models. In
which has no cycles. There are therefore two kinds of orbits: the orbit of
0,
which starts and never ends, and other orbits, which have no starting
(Z, s).
Z-like
Mi = N
``
Z,
where
orbits.
(ii). Local isomorphisms are easily understood; one would however fail to establish back-and-forth between any two models.
are not
-isomorphic
It is clear that
and
by Proposition 1'.4.14).
(iii). In particular, the theory is not
0 -categorical.
is obviously
-categorical
I,
which bears no
in any uncountable
(and
-saturated models,
the better.
(v). The
107
not realized in
Z.
` ` 0
Z Z.
And so on.
We then understand that a model is
for an innite set
-saturated
i of the form
``
I.
-saturated models do
-saturated
want to nd such that
a '0 b
side as a.
suppose that
be on the same
a, '0 b, .
lies in
= sn (bi ).
If
a '0 b,
ai ,
say
= sn (ai )
n N,
for
in a new orbit
is innite!
0 is
-saturated
(vii). Any two models are clearly locally isomorphic (the orbit of
in either model).
are
-isomorphic.
we let
similar
models
quantiers.
(viii). In particular, any inclusion of structures is elementary. As
embeds into
The Ordering
Proposition 1'.5.22 (N, 0, <).
Let
be the theory:
x (x < x)
xy (x < y x = y y < x)
xyz x < y y < z x < z
(y 0 y) (xy x y x = 0)
xyz y > x (x < z y z)
(There is an element lying immediately above
x)
is not
0,
dn
dn (x, y) :
x).
to
is at least
108
n)
Proof .
(ii). One must be very careful that local isomorphisms do not form a Karp
family between
-saturated
models.
Indeed, pairs
(x, x+ )
and
(x, x++ )
-isomorphic,
-isomorphisms
Fix
-saturated, I
must
a < b in I , and consider the 1-type q(x) = {x1 . . . xn1 a < x1 <
xn1 < x : n N} {x1 . . . xn1 x < x1 < xn1 < b : n N} over
(a, b): it expresses that the orbit of x contains neither a nor b, that x lives
in a copy of Z which lies between that of a and that of b. This is density
of the ordering I !
Fix
MI
is
-saturated
i
is a DLO.
1 -categorical,
0 -categorical
-
MI
and
MJ
whence isomorphic.
identifying copies of
be such models.
and
MI ' MJ
by
Z.
-saturated
Let N
elementary substructure
into a countable DLO
follows that
N ' N1 ,
-saturated
109
(vi). We let
In particular, a model of
description of
-saturation
L0 -local
is
-saturated
in
i
-saturated
in
L0 :
our
-saturated
models are
L --isomorphisms.
L0 is immediate.
nds N MI .
L -structures,
an inclusion of
one
As
N MI
is also
(ACF)
for each
n N,
{0, 1, +, , }
the axiom
of rings:
an . . . a0 x an 6= 0 an xn + + a0 = 0.
We let
Denition 1'.5.24
For
(ACFq )
p P , an algebraically closed
ACF {1 + + 1 = 0}
| {z }
eld of characteristic
is a model of
the theory
p times
ACF {1 + + 1 6= 0 : p P}.
uncountable
qP
kappa-categorical in any
is complete. It is not
0 -categorical,
but is
Proof .
one has
K '0 L
-saturated
K, L
are
-saturated
L. ACFq
K, L,
Moreover, an ACF is
any tuple, so
ACF
eliminates quantiers.
As for categoricity,
and
Q(X)
110
ACFq
is
-categorical
in any
Corollary 1'.5.26
eld,
Proof .
ity,
is a maximal ideal
K L.
K.
ACF
K[X]/m;
clearly
K L.
As
m in Ln
Kn
m of the tuple X );
too.
More interesting results hold, but one unfortunately has to stop some day.
End of Lecture 26.
111
Index of Notions
Inclusion . . . . . . . . . see Inclusion
Elimination Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
ACFq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Assignment
Truth Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . 8
of the Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Filter* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Axiom
Formula
Axioms of Equality . . . . . . . . . 51
Atomic Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Deduction Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Existential Formula . . . . . . . . 78
Axiomatization of a Theory . . . . . 30
Quantier-Free Formula . . . . 78
Universal Formula . . . . . . . . . . 78
Back-and-Forth
Finitary* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
of Height
* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Innite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Elementary Inclusion . . . . . . . 82
Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Categoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
0-Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Absolute Categoricity . . . . . . 75
n-Isomorphism* . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Compactness
-Isomorphism* . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
-Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
in Topology* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Complete Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 65
V -Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Consequence
Karp Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Semantic Consequence . . . 9, 46
Kripke Model* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 52
Language
of Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 5
Decidable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Semi-Decidable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
First-Order Language . . . . . . 40
Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 51
Second-Order Language . . . . 73
Local Isomorphism . . . . . . . see Isom.
D. Rules
for Connectives . . . . . . . . . . 13
for
and
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46, 79
Modus Ponens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Elementary
Modus Tollens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Morphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
112
Elementary Morphism . . . . . . 86
Weakening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Well-Formed Formula
Non-Standard Reals* . . . . . . . . . . . 67
in Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 5
in First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 42
Witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Peano Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Q
Quantication Rank . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Quantier Elimination . . . . . . . . . . 99
S
Satisfaction
in Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 9
in Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
in First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 45
Satisability
in Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 9
in First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 46
-Saturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Sentence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Skolem Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Standard Part* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Substitutable Term . . . . . . see Term
Substructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Elementary Substructure . . . 82
T
Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Substitutable Term . . . . . . . . . 47
Theory
in Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 6
in First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 43
of a First-Order Structure . . 80
Truth Assignment . see Assignment
Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
of a Tuple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
U
Ultralter* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Ultraproduct* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
V
Variable, Free or Bound . . . . . . . . . 43
113
Index of Results
O
-Saturated
Categoricity
Absolute C. of
PA . . . . . . . . . . 75
QE
Morley's C. Theorem* . . . . . . 87
1 -C.
0 -C.
1 -C.
of
of
of
of
ACF* . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
DLO . . . . . . . . . 92, 106
Th(N, 0, s) . . . . . . . 107
of
of
Compactness
of
DLO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Th(N, 0, <) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Th(N, 0, s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
ACF* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
of Propositional Logic . . . . . . 29
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Renaming Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
of First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 65
fails in Higher Logic . . . . . . . 75
Completeness
Skolem's Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
of Propositional Logic . . . . . . 26
Soundness
of Propositional Logic . . . . . . 25
of First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 57
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Completeness of a Theory
of First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 56
of the Ordering on
ACFq * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
U
Unique Readability . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 42
D
Decidability*
Semi-D. of a Theory . . . . 31, 64
of a Complete Theory . . 31, 65
E
Elimination Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Excluded Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
G
Generalisation Theorem . . . . . . . . . 58
L
o' Theorem* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
o-Vaught Completeness Test . . 91
Lwenheim-Skolem Theorem
Descending Version . . . . . . . . . 89
Ascending Version . . . . . . . . . . 90
Final Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
114
List of Lectures
Lecture 1 (Language and W 's; Unique Readability) . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
28
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
Lecture 9 (ME1)
. . . . . . . . .
39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
Lecture 12 (Substitutions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
51
55
60
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
64
. . . . . . . . . . .
68
73
Lecture 19 (ME2)
76
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
77
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
115