LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT

paid
agents
or
brokers,
constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015
YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE
MERCADO,
AND
ELITO
ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY.
SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.

A.
P.

Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to

hold respondent administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law. However, we note
that respondent had consistently and
obstinately disregarded the Courts and IBPs
orders. It is on record that respondent totally
ignored
the
Courts
June
7,
2006
Resolution18 directing
him
to
file
his
Comment. He also failed to attend the
mandatory conference before the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline despite
notice.19 Neither did he file his Position
Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter, respondent
should know that orders of the court are not
mere requests but directives which should
have been complied with promptly and
completely.20 He disregarded the oath he
took when he was accepted to the legal
profession to obey the laws and the legal
orders of the duly constituted legal
authorities. x x x His conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon
to obey court orders and processes and is
expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives as an officer of the
court.21 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit,
malpractice,
or
other
gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through

Considering that this appears to be

respondents first infraction, we find it proper
to impose on him the penalty of reprimand
with warning that commission of the same or
similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, the
Court REPRIMANDS respondent
Atty.
Salimathar V. Nambi for obstinately and
unjustifiably refusing to obey lawful orders of
the Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act or offense shall be
dealt with more severely. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and noted in Atty. Nambis record
as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson),
and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Brion,

Mendoza,

LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT; VIOLATION

OF
CODE
OF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR.
ELMAR
O.
PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG
AND
ATTY.
KAREN
E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
It has also not escaped the attention of the
Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig
knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he
wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the
added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Contracting a marriage during the
subsistence of a previous one amounts
to
a
grossly
immoral
conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence

adduced by the parties and, ironically, from
Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high
degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez
twice a wedding in the Central Methodist
Church in 1968, which was then followed by
a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths
crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his
first marriage and four children after, Atty.
Catindig claimed that his first marriage was
then already falling apart due to Gomez
serious
intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig
had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains,
obtained a divorce decree from a court in the
Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in
the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig
was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time
that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away a marriage that
has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew
that the divorce decree he obtained from the
court in the Dominican Republic was not
recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that
time. He knew that he was still validly
married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be
properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez.
The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety and
moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful
disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the
Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig

knew that his previous marriage remained

valid, the logical conclusion is that he
wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the
added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover,
assuming arguendo that
Atty.
Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that
Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity.
The fact still remains that he resorted to
various legal strategies in order to render a
faade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very
least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible
to
the
highest
degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr.
Perez, and despite the various legal actions
he resorted to in order to give their union a
semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her
and their son. It was only at that time that he
finally decided to properly seek the nullity of
his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much
younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer
employed
by
his
firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to
separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a
grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms
part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Courts finding of gross
immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of his previous marriage to
Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.37 In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is

warranted when a lawyer abandons his

lawful
wife and
maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has
borne
him
a
38
child. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws. By his own admission, Atty.
Catindig made a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, taking advantage of
his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar,
which
thus
warrant
the
penalty
of
disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that
the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court
to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to
be
the
most
appropriate
penalty.

The Court likewise agrees with the

Investigating Commissioner that there is a
dearth of evidence to prove the claimed
amorous
relationship
between
the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim
was mere allegation, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were
indeed having an affair and the purported
love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by
Atty.
Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence
required
in
suspension
or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The presentation of the anonymous letter
that was received by Dr. Perez only proves
that the latter indeed received a letter
informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove
the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all,
only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty.
Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It
does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a
relationship
with
Atty.
Catindig.

Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs

allegations against him are not credible since
they are uncorroborated and not supported
by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself
admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted.
Indubitably, such admission provides ample
basis for the Court to render disciplinary
sanction
against
him.

WHEREFORE, in
consideration
of
the
foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves
to ADOPT the recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan
A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyers
Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law.

There is insufficient evidence to prove

the affair between the respondents.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into

the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the

Office of the Bar Confidant and his name

is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty.
Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for
lack
of
evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.

LABOR LAW: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

G.R. No. 211497, March 18, 2015
HOCHENG
PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO M.
FARRALES, Respondent.
But the Court agrees with the CA that
Farrales committed no serious or willful
misconduct or disobedience to warrant his
dismissal. It is not disputed that Farrales lost
no time in returning the helmet to Reymar
the moment he was apprised of his mistake
by Eric, which proves, according to the CA,
that he was not possessed of a depravity of
conduct as would justify HPCs claimed loss
of trust in him. Farrales immediately
admitted his error to the company guard and
sought help to find the owner of the yellow
helmet, and this, the appellate court said,
only shows that Farrales did indeed
mistakenly think that the helmet he took
belonged
to
Eric.
It is not, then, difficult to surmise that when
Farrales told Andy that the yellow helmet
was his, his intent was not to put up a
pretence of ownership over it and thus
betray his intent to gain, as the NLRC held,

but rather simply to assuage Andys

reluctance to heed his passing request to
reach for the helmet for him; Andy, it will be
recalled, was at that moment already seated
in his motorbike and about to drive out when
Farrales made his request. As to Farrales
claim that he and Eric were neighbors,
suffice it to say that as the CA noted, they
resided in the same barangay, and thus,
loosely,
were
neighbors.
The CA also pointed out that although the
alleged theft occurred within its premises,
HPC was not prejudiced in any way by
Farrales conduct since the helmet did not
belong to it but to Reymar. In light of Article
69, Class A, Item No. 29 of the HPC Code of
Discipline,
this
observation
may
be
irrelevant, although it may be that the LA
regarded it as proving HPCs bad faith.
Theft committed by an employee against a
person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to
serious misconduct.34 Misconduct is improper
or wrong conduct, it is the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful
in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment. The misconduct
to be serious must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial
or unimportant. Such misconduct, however
serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection
with the employees work to constitute just
cause
for
his
separation.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
But where there is no showing of a clear,
valid and legal cause for termination of
employment, the law considers the case a
matter of illegal dismissal.36 If doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the
employer and that of the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
latter. The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal
was
for
a
justifiable
cause.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the CAs

dismissal of the award of moral and
exemplary damages for lack of merit. There
is no satisfactory proof that the concerned
officers of HPC acted in bad faith or with
malice
in
terminating
Farrales.
Notwithstanding the LAs assertion to this
effect, Farrales bare allegations of bad faith
deserve no credence, and neither is the mere
fact that he was illegally dismissed sufficient
to prove bad faith on the part of HPCs
officers.38 But concerning the award of
attorneys fees, Farrales was dismissed for a
flimsy charge, and he was compelled to
litigate to secure what is due him which HPC
unjustifiably
withheld.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
petition
for
review
is DENIED.
SO

ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama,

Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
LABOR LAW: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015
ONOFRE V. MONTERO, EDGARDO N.
ESTRAERO, RENING P. PADRE, GABRIEL
A. MADERA, HERMINIO T. TACLA,
NELSON C. VILORIA, DEMETRIO Q.
PAJARILLO,
ALFREDO
R.
AGANON,
REYNALDO AVILA, ALBERT T. RUIZ,
NESTOR Y. YAGO, HARTY M. TUPASI,
AGUSTIN R. AVILA, JR. OR MARCOS R.
AVILA, BONIFACIO B. GAANO, JOSELITO
D.
CUENTA,
JONAS
P.
ESTILONG,
DOMINADOR C. CANARIA, GENARO C.
RONDARIS,
HERARDO
M.
DULAY,
FRANKLIN A. RAVINA, JR., AND RUBEN
C.
CABELLO, Petitioners, v. TIMES
TRANSPORTATION
CO.,
INC.,
AND
SANTIAGO
RONDARIS,
MENCORP
TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R.
MENDOZA
AND
REYNALDO
MENDOZA, Respondents

The petitioners contend that the period when

they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but
withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be
excluded from the computation of the fouryear prescriptive period for illegal dismissal
cases. However, the Court had already ruled
that the prescriptive period continues even
after the withdrawal of the case as though no
action has been filed at all. The applicability
of Article 115537of the Civil Code in labor
cases
was
upheld
in
the
case
of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation
v. Panganiban38 where the Court held that
although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or
voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves
the parties in exactly the same position as
though no action had been commenced at
all.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In like manner, while the filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA
interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, its voluntary withdrawal left the
petitioners in exactly the same position as
though no complaint had been filed at all.
The withdrawal of their complaint effectively
erased the tolling of the reglementary
period.
A prudent review of the antecedents of the
claim reveals that it has in fact prescribed
due to the petitioners withdrawal of their
labor case docketed as NLRC RAB-I-011007.40 Hence, while the filing of the said
case could have interrupted the running of
the four-year prescriptive period, the
voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners
effectively cancelled the tolling of the
prescriptive period within which to file their
illegal dismissal case, leaving them in exactly
the same position as though no labor case
had been filed at all. The running of the fouryear prescriptive period not having been
interrupted by the filing of NLRC RAB-I-011007, the petitioners cause of action had

already prescribed in four years after their

cessation of employment on October 26,
1997 and November 24, 1997. Consequently,
when the petitioners filed their complaint for
illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement
benefits, and damages in 2002, their claim,
clearly, had already been barred by
prescription.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sadly, the petitioners have no one but
themselves to blame for their own
predicament. By their own allegations in
their respective complaints, they have barred
their remedy and extinguished their right of
action.
Although
the
Constitution
is
committed to the policy of social justice and
the protection of the working class, it does
not necessary follow that every labor dispute
will be automatically decided in favor of
labor. The management also has its own
rights. Out of concern for the less privileged
in life, this Court, has more often than not
inclined, to uphold the cause of the worker in
his conflict with the employer. Such leaning,
however, does not blind the Court to the rule
that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and
doctrine.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August
28, 2009 and Resolution dated December 11,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No.
106260
are AFFIRMED.
SO
Velasco,
Jr.,
*
Castillo, Villarama,
concur

ORDERED.
(Chairperson),
Del
Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ.,

LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY.

CARMELITA
BAUTISTALOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION

Suffice it to say that practice of law

embraces "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure,
knowledge,
training
and
experience." It includes "[performing] acts
which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any
degree
of
legal
knowledge
or
skill.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is
undisputed. Based on the records, there is no
doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is,
in appearing and signing as counsel for and
in behalf of her husband, conducting or
offering
stipulation/admission
of
facts,
conducting direct and cross-examination, all
constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such
actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July
2007 were done within the period of her two
(2)-year suspension considering that she was
suspended from the practice of law by this
Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear
that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot
practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is
clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for
and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No.
101-V-07 and actively participated in the
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or
within the two (2)-year suspension, she,
therefore, engaged in the unauthorized
practice
of
law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to
convince. She knew very well that at the
time she represented her husband, she is
still serving her two (2)-year suspension
order. Yet, she failed to inform the court
about it. Neither did she seek any clearance
or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband. While we understand
her devotion and desire to defend her
husband whom she believed has suffered
grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not

forget that she is first and foremost, an

officer of the court who is bound to obey the
lawful
order
of
the
Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension
from
the
practice
of
law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit,
malpractice,
or
other
gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher
penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid
an adversity, families will always look out
and extend a helping hand to a family
member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.
Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to
her husband and that in essence, she was
not representing a client but rather a spouse,
we deem it proper to mitigate the
severeness
of
her
penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan
v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga,16 citingMolina v. Atty. Magat,17 where
this Court suspended further respondents
from the practice of law for six (6) months for
practicing their profession despite this
court's previous order of suspension, we,
thus, impose the same penalty on Atty.
Lozada for representing her husband as

counsel despite lack of authority to practice

law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that
aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to
preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession. While the Supreme Court has the
plenary power to discipline erring lawyers
through this kind of proceedings, it does so
in the most vigilant manner so as not to
frustrate its preservative principle. The
Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe
punishment if, through it, the end desire of
reforming
the
errant
lawyer
is
18
possible. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty.
Carmelita
S.
Bautista-Lozada
is
19
found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, and is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months from the practice of law, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all
courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the
Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a
copy of this Decision to respondents record
as
member
of
the
Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the
Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, so that we can determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall
take
effect.
This
SO

Decision

is

immediately

executory.
ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama,

Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur

Jr.,

certainty.
COMMERCIAL LAW: VESSEL CIVIL LAW:
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195661, March 11, 2015
UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V
CHINA JOY, SAMSUN SHIPPING LTD., AND
INTER-ASIA
MARINE
TRANSPORT,
INC., Petitioners, v. ASIAN
TERMINALS,
INC., Respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the CA that the
petitioners are liable to ATI for the damage
sustained by the latters unloader. However,
the Court finds the petitioners liability to be
based on quasi-delict and not on a contract
of carriage. The Court likewise deems it
proper to modify the rate of interests on the
amount of damages imposed by the CA upon
the
petitioners.
The Court notes that the shipowner and
shipowners agent, Samsun, are all juridical
entities not registered and not doing
business in the Philippines. It was the
charterers
agent,
Inter-Asia,
a
dulyregistered domestic corporation, which had
filed the instant petition for itself and on
behalf of the shipowner and Samsun. 25 In the
course of the proceedings too, none of the
parties had raised issues anent the validity of
the service of summons and the courts
acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of
the
petitioners.
The petitioners present two issues for the
Courts resolution, to wit: (a) the applicability
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case
at bar; and (b) who participated and should
thus assume liability for the loading of the
soybean
meal
cargo.
In its Decision dated January 30, 2009, the
RTC declared that while ATI indeed sustained
damages to its unloader, liability therefor
cannot, however, be established with

In the assailed decision, the CA, on the other

hand, discussed in detail why and how the
three requisites to the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are found to be
attendant in the case at bar. First, the comingling of the two foreign metal objects
with the soybean meal cargo and the
consequent damage to ATIs unloader is an
accident which ordinarily does not occur in
the
absence
of
someones
negligence. Second,
the
foreign
metal
objects were found in the vessels Hold No. 2,
which is within the exclusive control of the
petitioners. Third, records do not show that
ATIs negligence had in any way contributed
to the damage caused to its unloader.
The Court agrees with the CA anent ATIs
entitlement to the payment of damages from
the petitioners and the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, the
Court finds as misplaced the CAs application
of the laws on maritime commerce and
contracts of carriage for reasons discussed
below.
There is no
between the

contract of carriage
petitioners and ATI.

There is no contract of carriage between ATI,

on one hand, and the shipowner, Samsun,
ContiQuincyBunge L.L.C., and Inter-Asia, on
the other. It likewise bears stressing that the
subject of the complaint, from which the
instant petition arose, is not the damage
caused to the cargo, but to the equipment of
an
arrastre
operator.
Further,
ATIs
contractual relation is not with the
petitioners, but with the consignee and with
the
Philippine
Ports
Authority
(PPA).
In Delgado Brothers, Inc. v. Home Insurance
Company and Court of Appeals,26 the Court
discusses the functions of an arrastre
operator, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under this provision, petitioners functions as
arrastre operator are (1) to receive, handle,
care for, and deliver all merchandise
imported and exported, upon or passing over
Government-owned wharves and piers in the
Port of Manila, (2) as well as to record or
cheek all merchandise which may be
delivered to said port at shipside, and in

general[,] (3) to furnish light and water

services and other incidental services in
order to undertake its arrastre service. Note
that there is nothing in those functions which
relate to the trade and business of
navigation x x x, nor to the use or operation
of vessels x x x. Both as to the nature of the
functions and the place of their performance
(upon
wharves
and
piers
shipside), petitioners
services
are
clearly not maritime. As we held in
the Macondray case, they are no different
from
those
of
a
depositary
or
warehouseman. Granting, arguendo, that
petitioners arrastre service depends on,
assists, or furthers maritime transportation x
x x, it may be deemed merely incidentalto its
aforementioned
functions
as
arrastre
operator and does not, thereby, make
petitioners arrastre service maritime in
character.27 (Citations omitted, italics in the
original, emphasis and underscoring ours)
The functions of an arrastre operator
involve the handling of cargo deposited on
the wharf or between the establishment of
the consignee or shipper and the ships
tackle. Being the custodian of the goods
discharged from a vessel, an arrastre
operators duty is to take good care of the
goods and to turn them over to the party
entitled
to
their
possession.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The legal relationship between an arrastre
operator and a consignee is akin to that
between a warehouseman and a depositor.
As to both the nature of the functions and
the place of their performance, an arrastre
operators services are clearly not maritime
in
character.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Insurance Company of North America v.
Asian Terminals, Inc.,30 the Court explained
that the liabilities of the arrastre operator for
losses and damages are set forth in the
contract for cargo handling services it had
executed with the PPA. Corollarily then, the
rights of an arrastre operator to be paid for
damages it sustains from handling cargoes
do not likewise spring from contracts of
carriage.
However, in the instant petition, the
contending parties make no references at all
to any provisions in the contract for cargo
handling services ATI had executed with the

PPA.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code and
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply.
Notwithstanding the above, the petitioners
cannot evade liability for the damage caused
to ATIs unloader in view of Article 2176 of
the New Civil Code, which pertinently
provides
as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.cralawred
In Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Co.,31 the Court explained that to establish a
plaintiffs right to recovery for quasi-delicts,
three elements must exist, to wit: (a)
damages to the plaintiff; (b) negligence by
act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it
must respond, was guilty; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the
negligence
and
the
damage.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Negligence, on the other hand, is defined as
the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution
and
vigilance
that
the
circumstances justly demand, whereby
another
suffers
injury.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case under consideration, the parties
do not dispute the facts of damage upon
ATIs unloader, and of such damage being
the consequence of someones negligence.
However, the petitioners deny liability
claiming that it was not established with
reasonable certainty whose negligence had
caused the co-mingling of the metal bars
with the soybean meal cargo. The Court, on
this matter, agrees with the CAs disquisition
that the petitioners should be held jointly
and severally liable to ATI. ATI cannot be
faulted for its lack of direct access to
evidence determinative as to who among the
shipowner, Samsun, ContiQuincyBunge and
Inter-Asia should assume liability. The CA had
exhaustively discussed why the doctrine

of res ipsa loquitur applies. The metal bars

which caused damage to ATIs unloader was
found co-mingled with the cargo inside Hold
No. 2 of the ship, which was then within the
exclusive control of the petitioners. Thus, the
presumption that it was the petitioners
collective negligence, which caused the
damage, stands. This is, however, without
prejudice to the petitioners rights to seek
reimbursements among themselves from the
party whose negligence primarily caused the
damage.
A modification of the interests imposed
on the damages awarded is in order.
Anent the interests imposed by the CA upon
the damages to be paid to ATI, modification
of
the
same
is
in
order.
In Nacar v. Gallery Frames,34 the
declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Court

To recapitulate and for future guidance,

the guidelines laid down in the case
ofEastern
Shipping
Lines are
accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB
Circular
No.
799,
as
follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its
source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages.
The provisions under Title XVIII on
Damages of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of
interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and
it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under

and subject to the provisions of Article

1169
of
the
Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed
at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand can
be
established
with
reasonable
certainty. Accordingly,
where
the
demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to
run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169,
Civil Code), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established
at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from
the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification
of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the
amount
finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
x x x x.35 (Citation omitted, emphasis and
italics in the original, and underscoring ours)
The Court agrees with the CA that as regards
ATIs
claim,
only
the
amount
of
US$30,300.00 is duly supported by evidence.
However, in view of Nacar, the said amount
shall be subject to legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from
the finality of this Resolution, the date when
the quantification of damages may be
deemed
to
have
been
reasonably

ascertained, until full satisfaction thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November
10, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV
No.
93164
is AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION. The petitioners, Unknown
Owner of the Vessel M/V China Joy, Samsun
Shipping Ltd. and Inter-Asia Marine Transport,
Inc.,
are
hereby
ordered
to pay the
respondent, Asian Terminals, Inc., actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of
US$30,300.00, plus legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from
the finality of this Resolution until full
satisfaction
thereof.
SO

ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama,

Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

REMEDIAL:
COMELEC

JUDGMENTS

OF

THE

POLITICAL: ELECTION MATERIALS

G.R. No. 205728
2015

January 21,

THE
DIOCESE
OF
BACOLOD,
REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY.
MAVIL
V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review
orders and decisions of COMELEC in
electoral contests despite not being
reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of
justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of

social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of
labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought
tobe set aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely
urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate
and
speedy
remedy
available.
Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in
Repoland decided that the status quo
anteorder issued by the COMELEC Division
was unconstitutional.
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and
Cayetano cited by respondents do not
operate as precedents to oust this court from
taking jurisdiction over this case. All these
cases cited involve election protests or
disqualification cases filed by the losing
candidate against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not
candidates seeking for public office. Their
petition is filed to assert their fundamental
right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by
respondents
pertained
to
COMELECs
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC
in the implementation of its regulatory
powers. When it issued the notice and letter,
the
COMELEC
was
allegedly
enforcingelection laws.
COMELECs notice and letter affect preferred
speech. Respondents acts are capable of
repetition. Under the conditions in which it
was issued and in view of the novelty of this
case,it could result in a "chilling effect" that
would affect other citizens who want their
voices heard on issues during the elections.
Other citizens who wish to express their

views regarding the election and other

related issues may choose not to, for fear of
reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC. Direct
resort to this court is allowed to avoid such
proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the
procedural platform for raising grave abuse
of discretion.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether ornot there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
56
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in
this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the
Constitution.This provision provides for this
courts original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and prohibition. This should be
read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of
the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
During elections, we have the power and the
duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion
or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on
the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. This includes actions by the
COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts
constitutional mandate to protect the people
against governments infringement of their
fundamental
rights. This constitutional
mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested
with the COMELEC.
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed
when
there
are
genuine
issues
of
constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time. A direct resort to
this court includes availing of the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition toassail the
constitutionality of actions of both legislative
and executive branches of the government
A
second
exception
is
when
the
issuesinvolved
are
of
transcendental

importance.74 In these cases, the imminence

and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity
for prudence. The doctrine relating to
constitutional issues of transcendental
importance prevents courts from the
paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly
faced with the need for substantial
protection.
Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a
direct resort to this court. In cases of first
impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that
will guide the lower courts on this matter. In
Government of the United States v.
Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of the
case as a matter of first impression that may
guide the lower courts:

The concept of a political question, however,

never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
did have the discretion to choose the manner
of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental
right to expression
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch [or in this case,
organ of government] before a court may
come into the picture."
Political speech enjoys preferred protection
within our constitutional order. In Chavez v.
Gonzales,107 Justice Carpio in a separate
opinion emphasized: "[i]f everthere is a
hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank,
and among different kinds of political
expression, the subject of fair and honest
elections would be at the top." 108 Sovereignty
resides in the people.109 Political speech is a

direct exercise of the sovereignty. The

principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies yields in order to protect this
fundamental right.
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately: (a)
when there is a violation of due process; (b)
when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (c) when the administrative action
is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is
estoppel on the part ofthe administrative
agency concerned; (e) when there is
irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is
a department secretary whose acts as
analter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when
to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i)
when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances
indicating
the
urgency
of
judicial
intervention."
Lemon test in that case, such that a
regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a
secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does
not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion

A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in
attempting to do what it thought was its duty
in this case. However, it was misdirected.

COMELECs general role includes a mandate

to ensure equal opportunities and reduce
spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to
regulate or limit the speech of the electorate
as it strives to participate inthe electoral
exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as
producing a caricature of those who are
running for public office.Their message may
be construed generalizations of very
complex
individuals
and
party-list
organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as
belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to
some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as
purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a
single issue and a complex piece of
legislation at that can easily be
interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the
candidates and party-list organizations. Not
all may agree to the way their thoughts were
expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic
dioceses that chose not to follow the
example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be
more room to consider being more broadminded and non-judgmental. Some may
have expected that the authors would give
more space to practice forgiveness and
humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our
Constitution is an enumeration of our
fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed
code that prescribes good conduct. It
provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do
to others but also in judgment of the acts of
others.

Freedom for the thought we can disagree

with can be wielded not only by those in the
minority. This can often be expressed by
dominant institutions, even religious ones.
That they made their point dramatically and
in a large way does not necessarily mean
that their statements are true, or that they
have basis, or that they have been
expressed in good taste.

MARVIC
Associate Justice

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are

opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a
specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law. It is an expression
designed to invite attention, cause debate,
and hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of petitioners
of their ecclesiastical duty, but their
parishioners actions will have very real
secular consequences. Certainly, provocative
messages do matter for the elections.

POLITICAL:
RUNNING
FOR
OFFICE AFTER CONVICTION

What is involved in this case is the most

sacred of speech forms: expression by the
electorate that tends to rouse the public to
debate contemporary issues. This is not
speechby candidates or political parties to
entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate
telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the
right to suffrage.

ATTY.
ALICIA
RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO
S.
LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.

This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality

of democracy that we should all deserve. It is
protected as a fundamental and primordial
right by our Constitution. The expression in
the medium chosen by petitioners deserves
our protection.

Before the Court are (1) a Petition for

Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court,
by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which
essentially prays for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari annulling and setting aside the
April 1, 20131 and April 23, 20132 Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Second Division and En bane, respectively, in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada" for
having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
and
(2)
a
Petition-inIntervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim),
wherein he prays to be declared the 2013
winning candidate for Mayor of the City of

WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
is
GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby made permanent.
The act of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and
letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

M.V.F.

LEONEN

SCs JURISDICTION, CERTIORARI, HIERARCHY

OF COURTS, POLITICAL QUESTION, DOCTRINE
OF
EXHAUSTION
OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

PUBLIC

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 206666
2015

January 21,

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Manila in view of private respondent former

President Joseph Ejercito Estradas (former
President Estrada) disqualification to run for
and hold public office.
The disqualification of former President
Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are
disqualified from running for any elective
local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former
President Estrada is disqualified under item
(a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for
similar prohibitions, but it provides for an
exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. x x x unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that
former President Estradas conviction for
plunder disqualifies him from running for the
elective local position of Mayor of the City of
Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC.
However, the subsequent absolute pardon
granted
to
former
President
Estrada
effectively restored his right to seek public
elective office. This is made possible by
reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation
to Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the
proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the
OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any

person who has been granted plenary pardon

or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any
public office, whether local or national
position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section
12 of the OEC to candidates running for local
elective positions is not unprecedented. In
Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 37 the
Court acknowledged the aforementioned
provision as one of the legal remedies that
may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in
a local election filed any day after the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but
not later than the date of proclamation.38 The
pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos case is quoted
as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false
material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78.
However,
since
the
false
material
representation arises from a crime penalized
by prision mayor, a petition under Section 12
ofthe Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of
the Local Government Code can also be
properly filed. The petitioner has a choice
whether to anchor his petition on Section 12
or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. The law expressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to
adopt belongs to petitioner.39 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon
did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the
third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the
conclusion that former President Estradas

rights to suffrage and to seek public elective

office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself
does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of
the term "civil and political rights"as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as
it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually
introduced
by
the
word
40
"whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language
of the statute.41 In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the
scope of the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with
approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC
Commissioner
Maria
Gracia
Padacas
separate concurring opinion in the assailed
April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the
essence of the legal effect of preambular
paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything
which the 20 January 2010 Resolution did not
conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal
raised the same argument with respect to
the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambular
paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states
that "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." On this contention, the
undersigned reiterates the ruling of the
Commission that the 3rd preambular
paragraph does not have any legal or
binding effect on the absolute nature of the
pardon extended by former President Arroyo
to herein Respondent. This ruling is
consistent with the traditional and customary

usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case

of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the
Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of
preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses
on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral
part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less
prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the
pardon to be conditional on Respondents
promise never to seek a public office again,
the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an
integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the
3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted
as a condition to the pardon extended to
former
President
Estrada.42 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former
President
Arroyos
silence
on
former
President Estradas decision torun for
President in the May 2010 elections against,
among others, the candidate of the political
party of former President Arroyo, after the
latters receipt and acceptance of the pardon
speaks volume of her intention to restore
him to his rights to suffrage and to hold
public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive
clemency extended by the President is in
issue, the Court must turn to the only
evidence available to it, and that is the
pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe
four corners of said document, nothing
therein gives an iota of intimation that the
third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation,
proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant
of the pardon, such that the breach of the

mentioned commitment not to seek public

office
will
result
ina
revocation
or
cancellation of said pardon. To the Court,
what it is simply is a statement of fact or the
prevailing situation at the time the executive
clemency was granted. It was not used as a
condition to the efficacy orto delimit the
scope of the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the
view that the third Whereas Clausewas one
of the reasons to grant the pardon, the
pardon itself does not provide for the
attendant consequence of the breach
thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern
the resultant effect of an eventual
infringement. Just like it will be hard put to
determine which civil or political rights were
restored if the Court were to take the road
suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement
"[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights" excludes the restoration of
former President Estradas rights to suffrage
and to hold public office. The aforequoted
text ofthe executive clemency granted does
not provide the Court with any guide asto
how and where to draw the line between the
included and excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the
ultimate issue for resolution is not whether
the pardon is contingent on the condition
that former President Estrada will not seek
janother elective public office, but it actually
concerns the coverage of the pardon
whether the pardon granted to former
President Estrada was so expansive as to
have restored all his political rights, inclusive
of the rights of suffrage and to hold public
office. Justice Leonen is of the view that the
pardon in question is not absolute nor
plenary in scope despite the statement that
former President Estrada is "hereby restored
to his civil and political rights," that is, the
foregoing statement restored to former
President Estrada all his civil and political
rights except the rights denied to him by the
unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification made up of, among others,

the rights of suffrage and to hold public

office. He adds that had the President chosen
to be so expansive as to include the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, she should
have been more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights," to
the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear the
pardon granted to former President Estrada
was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope,
complete and plenary in character, as the
term "political rights"adverted to has a
settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice
Leonen that the omission of the qualifying
word "full" can be construed as excluding the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office. There appears to be no
distinction as to the coverage of the term
"full political rights" and the term "political
rights" used alone without any qualification.
How to ascribe to the latter term the
meaning that it is "partial" and not "full"
defies ones understanding. More so, it will
be extremely difficult to identify which of the
political rights are restored by the pardon,
when the text of the latter is silent on this
matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon
cannot be presumed from the absence of the
qualifying word "full" when the pardon
restored the "political rights" of former
President Estrada without any exclusion or
reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion
but to say that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada was absolute in the
absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete
factual basis upon which to anchor or
support the Presidential intent to grant a
limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis
concerned, the text of the pardon can
withstand close scrutiny even under the

provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the

Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
in
issuing
the
assailed
Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the
assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a
petition for certiorariagainst actions of the
COMELEC is confined only to instances of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
patentand substantial denial of due process,
because the COMELEC is presumed to be
most competent in matters falling within its
domain.43
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of
discretion is the arbitrary exercise of power
due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive

duty enjoined by law or to act at all in

contemplation of law. For an act to be
condemned as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be
patent and gross.44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail
to adequately demonstrate any factual or
legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a
"whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law"
or were so "patent and gross" as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions,
this Court finds it unnecessary to separately
discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention, which
substantially presented the same arguments
as Risos-Vidal's petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
petition-inintervention are DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the
Commission on Elections, Second Division,
and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections, En bane, both
in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.