1. ChuaCuavs.

Clave
FACTS:
PrivaterespondentTayTungHighSchool,Inc.isaneducationalinstitutioninBacolodCity.Petitioner
hadbeenemployedthereinasateachersince1963and,in1976whenthisdisputearose,wastheclass
adviserinthesixthgradewhereoneBobbyQuawasenrolled.Sinceitwasthepolicyoftheschoolto
extendremedialinstructionstoitsstudents,BobbyQuawasimpartedsuchinstructionsinschoolby
petitioner.Inthecoursethereof,thecouplefellinloveandonDecember24,1975,theygotmarriedina
civilceremonysolemnizedinlloiloCitybyHon.CornelioG.Lazaro,CityJudgeofIloilo.Petitioner
wasthenthirty(30)yearsofagebutBobbyQua,beingsixteen(16)yearsold,consentandadvicetothe
marriagewasgivenbyhismother,Mrs.ConcepcionOng.Theirmarriagewasratifiedinaccordance
withtheritesoftheirreligioninachurchweddingsolemnizedbyFr.NickMelicoratBacolodCityon
January10,1976.
OnFebruary4,1976,privaterespondentfiledwiththesubregionalofficeoftheDepartmentofLaborat
BacolodCityanapplicationforclearancetoterminatetheemploymentofpetitioneronthefollowing
ground:"Forabusiveandunethicalconductunbecomingofadignifiedschoolteacherandthather
continuedemploymentisinimicaltothebestinterest,andwoulddowngradethehighmoralvalues,of
theschool."
PetitionerwasplacedundersuspensionwithoutpayonMarch12,1976.
ExecutiveLaborArbiterJoseY.Aguirre,Jr.oftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission,Bacolod
City,towhomthecasewascertifiedforresolution,requiredthepartiestosubmittheirpositionpapers
andsupportingevidence.
Affidavits7weresubmittedbyprivaterespondenttobolsteritscontentionthatpetitioner,"defyingall
standardsofdecency,recklesslytookadvantageofherpositionasschoolteacher,luredaGradeVIboy
under heradvisorysection and15years her juniorinto anamorous relation." 8Morespecifically,
privaterespondentraisedissuesonthefactthatpetitionerstayedalonewithBobbyQuaintheclassroom
after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other
slightlyopen.
OnSeptember17,1976,ExecutiveLaborArbiterJoseY.Aguirre,Jr.,withoutconductinganyformal
hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the
clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that "The affidavits . . .
althoughselfservingbutwereneverdisputedbytherespondentpointedoutthatbeforethemarriageof
respondenttoBobbyQua,fourteen(14)yearsherjuniorandduringheremploymentwithpetitioner,an
amorousrelationshipexistedbetweenthem.Intheabsenceofevidencetothecontrary,theundisputed
written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which such
amorousrelationshipwasmanifestedwithinthepremisesoftheschool,insidetheclassroom,andwithin
thesightofsomeemployees.Whilenodirectevidenceshavebeenintroducedtoshowthatimmoralacts
werecommittedduringthesetimes,itishoweverenoughforasaneandcrediblemindtoimagineand
concludewhattranspiredandtookplaceduringthesetimes."
Petitioner,however,deniedhavingreceivedanycopyoftheaffidavitsreferredto.
OnOctober7,1976,petitionerappealedtotheNationalLaborRelationsCommissionclaimingdenialof
dueprocessfornothavingbeenfurnishedcopiesoftheaforesaidaffidavitsreliedonbythelaborarbiter.

She further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct
unbecomingofadignifiedschoolteacher,forateachertoenterintolawfulwedlockwithherstudent.
OnDecember27,1976,theNationalLaborRelationsCommissionunanimouslyreversedtheLabor
Arbiter'sdecisionandorderedpetitioner'sreinstatementwithbackwages.
ThecasewaselevatedbyprivaterespondenttotheMinisterofLaborwho,onMarch30,1977,reversed
thedecisionoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission.Thepetitionerwas,however,awardedsix(6)
monthssalaryasfinancialassistance.
OnMay20,1977,petitionerappealedthesaiddecisiontotheOfficeofthePresidentofthePhilippines.
Afterthecorrespondingexchanges,onSeptember1,1978saidoffice,throughPresidentialExecutive
AssistantJacoboC.Clave,rendereditsdecisionreversingtheappealeddecision.
Privaterespondentwasorderedtoreinstatepetitionertoherformerpositionwithoutlossofseniority
rightsandotherprivilegesandwithfullbackwagesfromthetimeshewasnotallowedtoworkuntilthe
dateofheractualreinstatement.
Havingrunthegamutofthreeprioradjudicationsofthecasewithalternatingreversals,onewouldthink
thatthisdecisionofpublicrespondentwrotefinistopetitioner'scalvary.However,inaresolutiondated
December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration of herein private
respondentanddespiteoppositionthereto,reconsideredandmodifiedtheaforesaiddecision,thistime
giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of
petitionerasclassroomteacherbutgivingherseparationpayequivalenttohersix(6)monthssalary.
Petitionerfiledcertiorarionthefollowinggrounds:terminationwasillegal,violationofrightofdue
processandinsufficiencyofproofs.
ISSUE:WONtheterminationwasillegal.
RULING:Yes.Theterminationwasillegalbecauseinordertodismissedanemployeetherehastobe
substantial evidence to that effect that must be adduced by the employer that the antecedent facts
constitutedimmoralityandorgravemisconduct.
2. Santosvs.NLRC
FACTS:
PetitionerHermenegildoL.SantoswasemployedasproductmanagerbyrespondentJohnson&Johnson
(Phils.),Inc.onNovember1,1979.Lessthantwoyearslater,oronJuly1,1981,hewastransferredto
thesalesdepartmentofthecompanyasitssalesadministrationmanager.Petitionermusthavecreditably
performedhisassignedjobsthatinrecognitionthereof,hewasgivenmeritincreasesinhismonthly
basicsalary.Thus,fromP5,500,hisbasicmonthlysalarysteadilyrose,suchthatbyJanuary1,1983,he
wasreceivingP8,200.00.Assalesadministrationmanager,healsoenjoyedbenefits,includingacarplan
intheamountoffiftythousandpesos(P50,000)only70%ofwhichwasshoulderedinterestfreeby
petitioner with no downpayment and payable in seventytwo (72) equal monthly installments.
Furthermore,inSeptember,1981,petitionerwassentbyrespondentcompanytoSydneyandMelbourne,
Australiaforatwoweektrainingcourseinsalesforecastingandservicingoffieldrequirements.
Oneofpetitioner'sthreechildren,Guillermo(Sonny),isavictimofcerebralpalsy.Afflictedwiththe

ailmentsincebirth,Sonny,whowaseightyearsoldwhenthelaborcasearose,hadbeenundergoing
medicaltreatmentandrehabilitationintheUnitedStatessince1982.AsitwasimperativeforSonny's
parentstoactivelyparticipateinhistreatmentandrehabilitation,petitionerandhiswifehadtoleave
annuallyfortheUnitedStates.
Hence,inApril,1983,petitionerrequestedfromthecompanyaleaveofabsenceoftwomonths
fromApril7,1983tomidJune,1983.However,thecompanyauthorizedhimaleaveofabsencefrom
April7toMay8,1983orforonemonthonly.Nonetheless,petitionerleftfortheUnitedStates.
AshisonemonthleaveofabsencewasabouttoexpireorduringthefirstweekofMay,Sonny'steacher
askedpetitionerandhiswifetocometoherofficeonMay20,1983todiscusstheimprovementsin
Sonny'scondition,toreviewtheaccomplishmentsinSonny'streatmentandtodevelopappropriategoals
forthenewschoolyear.Thus,onMay5,1983,petitionersentatelextorespondentJaimeV.Castro,
thenhisimmediatesuperiorinthecompany,informingCastroofhisinabilitytoreturnonmay9dueto
"doctorandteacherconferenceevaluation"andofhisdefinitereturnonorbeforeJune13.
Inreply,Castrosentatelexstatingthat"urgentbusinessrequirements"madepetitioner'srequestto
returnonJune13,unacceptabletothecompanyandthatpetitionershouldreturnonMay16"atthelatest
to report back to office" otherwise his position would be filled up. Reacting to Castro's directive,
petitionersentanothertelexstatingthat"duetobudgetfarelimitation,"hisearliestflighttoManila
wouldbeonMay31andhewouldreporttoworkonJune2.Throughanothertelex,thecompany
advisedpetitionerthathisreturntoworkonJune2wasunacceptabletothecompany.
Petitionerreceivedyetanothertelex,thistimefromVirgilioCaparroso,whowasactingforandinbehalf
of Castro, stating that for his failure to report for work on May 16, 1983, his employment was
consideredterminatedasofsaiddate"forabandonmentofworkandforrefusingorneglectingtoobey
theorderofmanagement."SaidtelexwasconfirmedthroughCaparroso'sletterdatedJune8,1983.
UponhisarrivalfromtheUnitedStates,petitionerreceivedatelegramfromthecompanydemandingthe
paymentofhisremainingcarplanbalanceofP29,861.24orthesurrenderofhiscarplanunitonor
beforeJune30,1983.Petitionerobligedbysurrenderinghiscar.
Aggrievedbytheactiontakenagainsthimbythecompany,petitionerfiledacomplaintforillegal
dismissalanddamagesinthethenMinistryofLaborandEmployment'sarbitrationbranchinEspaa,
Manila.Fullarbitrationproceedingswereconductedand,inhisdecisionofAugust15,1985,thelabor
arbiterdismissedpetitioner'scomplaint,upheldhisdismissal,anddismissedforlackofactualandlegal
baseshisclaimsfordamages.PetitionerappealedtotheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)
butitaffirmedthelaborarbiter'sdecision.Hence,theinstantpetition.
ISSUE:WONthedismissalwasillegalonthegroundsofabandonmentofwork.
RULING:No.Inorderforabandonmenttoattachifitshownthatthereisaclearanddeliberateintenton
thepartoftheemployeetodiscontinuehisemploymentwithoutanyintentionofreturningbacktowork.
Theemployeesdeliberateunjustifiedrefusaltocontinuehisemploymentmustbeclearlyevidencedby
theovertactsunerringlypointingtothefactthattheemployeesimplydoesnotwanttoworkanymore.
Respondentsallegationofabandonmentisfurtherbeliedbythefactthatafterlearningthathisservices
have been terminated, petitioner filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. Abandonment of work is
inconsistentwiththefilingofthesaidcomplaint.
3. Lagaticvs.NLRC

FACTS:
PetitionerwasemployedinMay1986byCityland,firstasaprobationarysalesagentandlateronasa
marketingspecialist.Hewastaskedwithsolicitingsalesforthecompany,withthecorrespondingduities
ofacceptingcallinns.Referralsandmakingclientcallsandcoldcalls.
Coldcallsreferstothepracticeofprospectingforclientsthroughthetelephonedirectory.Cityland,
believing that the same is an effective and cost efficient method of finding clients, requires all its
marketingspecialiststomakecoldcallsandsubmitdailyprogressreportsofthesame.
OnOct.1991,Citylandissuedawrittenreprimandtopet.Forhisfailuretosubmitcoldcallsreportsfor
manytimes.Pet.Wasrequiredtoexplainhisinactionwithawarningthatfurthernoncompliancewill
resulttoterminationfromthecompany.
Inreply,pet.Claimedthatthesamewasanhonestomissionbroughtaboutbyhisconcentrationonother
aspectsofhisjob.
Citylandsaiditisinadequateexcuseleadinghimtobesuspendedfor3days.Notwithstanding,pet.
Failedagaintosubmitcoldcallsreports.Hewasverballyremindedtosubmitthesameandwaseven
givenuptoFeb.17,1993todoso.
Insteadofcomplyingwiththedirectives,pet.WroteanotTOHELLWITHCOLDCALLS!WHO
CARES?andexhibitedthesametohiscoemployees.Toworsenmatters,heleftthesamelyingonhis
deskwhereeveryonecouldseeit.
OnFeb.1993,pet.ReceivedamemorandumrequiringhimtoexplainwhyCitylandshouldnotmake
gooditspreviouswarningforhisfailuretosubmitcoldcallsreports,aswellasissuingthewritten
statementaforementioned.
Findingpet.Guiltyofgrossinsubordination,Citylandservedanoticeofdismissaluponhim.
Aggrived,pet.Filedillegaldismissalcases,illegaldeduction,underpayment,overtimeandrestdaypay,
damagesandatoorneysfees.
LAdismissedthecaseforlackofmerit.
NLRCaffirmed.
Pet.FiledpetitionforcertiorariunderRule65.
ISSUE:WONNLRCgravelyabusedindiscretioninnotfindingthatpetitionerwasillegallydismissed.
RULING:No.NLRCdidnotcommitanygraveabuseofdiscretion.
Toconstituteavaliddismissalfromemployment,2requisitesmustbemet:
1. theemployeemustbeaffordeddueprocess
2. dismissalmustbeforavalidcause.
Alltheelementsarepresentinthecase,therebyconstitutingavaliddismissal.
4. Dimabayaovs.NLRC
FACTS:
DANILODIMABAYAOseekstosetasidethroughthispetitionforcertiorariunderRule65ofthe1997
RulesofCivilProcedurethe15March1995Decisionand23June1995ResolutionoftheNational

LaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)whichmodifiedtheDecisionoftheLaborArbiterfindingprivate
respondents guilty of having illegally dismissed petitioner from their employer. Private respondent
IslandBiscuit,Inc.,isengagedinthemanufactureofbiscuitswithprivaterespondentChengSuyEhas
itsGeneralManager. On5April1983itemployedpetitionerwiththespecifictaskofoperatingthe
roller,cuttingbiscuits,sortingoutrejects,mashingflourandfeedingtheflourmassintoitsthinning
machine.On30July1992,whilepetitionerwasassignedtosortoutrejects,withpriorpermissionfirst
obtainedfromhischecker,hewenttothecomfortroomtoanswerthecallofnatureandrelievehimself,
afterwhichhereturnedtohisworkplace.ButprivaterespondentChengSuyEhwasunhappyseeing
petitioner away from his workstation and immediately demanded from him a written explanation
allegedly for abandoning his work. As a matter of policy, respondent company discourages its
employeesfromgoingtothecomfortroomduringworkinghoursforsanitaryorhygienicpurposesas
thecompanyisengagedinthefoodbusiness.
The following day, 31 July 1992, Marcela Lok, respondent company's Personnel Manager, handed
petitioneraletteraskinghimtoexplaininwritingwhyhelefthisworkstationon17and30July1992.
Petitionerverballyexplainedthatheneverlefthisstationon17Julywhileon30Julyheonlywenttothe
comfortroomforashortwhiletoanswerthecallofnature.[2]Believingthatthisdenialwasenoughhe
didnotanymoresubmitanywrittenexplanation.But,forhisinabilitytosubmitawrittenexplanation,
petitionerwassuspendedforfifteen(15)dayswhichhecontestedbeforetheArbitrationBranchofthe
NLRC.On20October1992petitionerrequestedafellowworkertoreplacehiminhisworkstationso
hecouldgotothecomfortroomtorelievehimself.AgainprivaterespondentChengSuyEhnoticed
petitioner'sbriefabsenceandso,uponhisreturn,hismanagerberatedhimagainandrequiredhimto
submitoncemoreawrittenexplanationforallegedlyabandoninghiswork.Petitionercomplied.
Finding petitioner's explanation not satisfactory, respondent company through its Personnel Officer
MarcelaLokservedpetitioneranoticeoftermination. Petitionerthereafteramendedhiscomplaint
beforetheNLRCtoincludeillegaldismissalamonghiscausesofactioninviewofhisterminationfrom
theservice.On21September1994theLaborArbiterdeclaredthesuspensionofpetitionervalidand
legalnotbecausehelefthisproductionareatorelievehimselfbutforhisutterdisregardofthedirective
ofthemanagertosubmithiswrittenexplanation.Hisdismissalhoweverwasfoundillegal,butbecause
ofthestrainedrelationshipbetweentheparties,theLaborArbiterfurtherheldthatreinstatementwasno
longer feasible and thereafter awarded petitioner a limited back wages for six (6) months without
reinstatement.Thusprivaterespondentswereinadditionrequiredtopaypetitionerserviceincentive
leavepayofP615.00,proportionatethirteenthmonthpayofP2,132.00,separationpayofP14,391.00,
and10%attorney'sfeesofP3,632.60.
ISSUE:WhetherornottheactsofDimabayaoconstitutewillfulneglectofduties.
RULING:No.Whileitmaybetruethatcomplainanthasbeenleavinghisworkareawithoutpermission,
this Arbitration Board finds that complainant's habit of going to the toilet in the morning during
productionismerelyacallofnatureandbyforceofhabithehadtorelievehimself.Whetherornotthe
complainantrelievedhimselfisnottheissue.Thecallofnatureisareasonablereasonforhimtoleave
his work area. Although complainant is not entirely without fault since he has been leaving his
workplacewithoutpermissionfromhissupervisorandhisdisrespecttowardshissuperiorsasborneout
bythereportsofhissupervisorandguards,theinfractioncommittedbythecomplainantisnotsograve
thatwouldwarranttheultimatepenaltyofdismissal...TheLaborArbiter,ineffect,opinedthatagrave
injusticewouldbecommittedagainsttheemployeeifthepenaltyimposedwasgrosslydisproportionate
tothewronghecommitted.[12]Atmost,a7daysuspensionwithoutpayfornotaskingpermission
fromhissupervisorbeforeansweringacallofnature,ifthatbeconsideredaninfractionatall!should

havebeensufficientpenaltyforpetitioner.TheNLRCalsoendeavoredtojustifyitsdecisionbytaking
into account offenses allegedly committed by petitioner way back in 1990. These offenses as
enumeratedintheNLRCdecisionwereinfractionsimputedtopetitionerpriortothe17July,30Julyand
20 October 1992incidents. As such, they should have been outrightly ignored by the NLRC in
determining andupholding the validity ofpetitioner's dismissal since, as may be gleaned from the
terminationletter,petitioner'sdismissalwasbasedmerelyonthe17July,30Julyand20October1992
allegedincidents,withoutreferencetoanyinfractioncommittedbeforethen.Thisonlyshowsthatthe
offensesattributedtopetitionerbefore17July1992weremereafterthoughtsconceivedinthecourseof
thetrialtofurtherjustifyhisdismissal.Torefertothoseallegedearlierviolationsasfurthergroundsfor
dismissalisundoubtedlyprejudicialtopetitioner.Significantly,itwouldalsobedoublyprejudicialto
himtopenalizehimforthosecommittedon17and30July1992ashewasalreadysuspendedforfifteen
(15)daysforthoseinfractions.This,obviously,deniedpetitionerproceduraldueprocessanddeprived
himofhisrighttobeheard,torefuteandpresentevidencetocontrovertsuchaccusationspriortohis
actualdismissalfromemployment.Asaconsequence,petitionerisentitledtoreinstatement.[13]The
postulateadvancedbytheLaborArbiterthatthereexisted"strainedrelationship"betweenthe
parties,thusbarringreinstatementofpetitioner,doesnotholdwater.Strainedrelationshipmaybe
invokedonlyagainstemployeeswhosepositionsdemandtrustandconfidence,orwhosedifferences
withtheiremployerareofsuchnatureordegreeastoprecludereinstatement. Intheinstantcase,
however,therelationshipbetweenpetitioner,anordinaryemployee,andmanagementwasclearlyonan
impersonallevel. Petitionerdidnotoccupysuchasensitivepositionaswouldrequirecompletetrust
and confidence, and where personal ill will would foreclose his reinstatement. But, interestingly,
petitionerhimselfwasprayingforhisreinstatement.
5. PhilippinesAeolusAutoMotivevs.NLRC
FACTS:
PetitionerPhilippineAeolusAutomotiveUnitedCorporation(PAAUC)isacorporationdulyorganized
andexistingunderPhilippinelaws,petitionerFrancisChuaisitsPresidentwhileprivaterespondent
RosalindaC.Cortezwasacompanynurseofpetitionercorporationuntilherterminationon7November
1994.
On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of
petitionercorporation,addressedtoprivaterespondentRosalindaC.Cortezrequiringhertoexplain
withinfortyeight(48)hourswhynodisciplinaryactionshouldbetakenagainsther(a)forthrowinga
stapleratPlantManagerWilliamChua,hersuperior,andutteringinvectivesagainsthimon2August
1994;(b)forlosingtheamountofP1,488.00entrustedtoherbyPlantManagerChuatobegiventoMr.
FangoftheCLMCDepartmenton23August1994;and,(c)foraskingacoemployeetopunchinher
timecardthusmakingitappearthatshewasintheofficeinthemorningof6September1994whenin
factshewasnot.Thememorandumhoweverwasrefusedbyprivaterespondentalthoughitwasreadto
heranddiscussedwithherbyacoemployee.Shedidnotalsosubmittherequiredexplanation,sothat
whilehercasewaspendinginvestigationthecompanyplacedherunderpreventivesuspensionforthirty
(30)dayseffective9October1994to7November1994.
On20October1994,whileCortezwasstillunderpreventivesuspension,anothermemorandumwas
issuedbypetitionercorporationgivingherseventytwo(72)hourstoexplainwhynodisciplinaryaction
shouldbetakenagainstherforallegedlyfailingtoprocesstheATMapplicationsofhernine(9)co
employeeswiththeAlliedBankingCorporation.On21October1994privaterespondentalsorefusedto
receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a coemployee. A copy of the
memorandumwasalsosentbythePersonnelManagertoprivaterespondentatherlastknownaddress

byregisteredmail.
Meanwhile,privaterespondentsubmittedawrittenexplanationwithrespecttothelossoftheP1,488.00
andthepunchinginofhertimecardbyacoemployee.
On3November1994athirdmemorandumwasissuedtoprivaterespondent,thistimeinformingherof
herterminationfromtheserviceeffective7November1994ongroundsofgrossandhabitualneglectof
duties,seriousmisconductandfraudorwillfulbreachoftrust.
On6December1994privaterespondentfiledwiththeLaborArbiteracomplaintforillegaldismissal,
nonpaymentofannualserviceincentiveleavepay,13thmonthpayanddamagesagainstPAAUCand
itspresidentFrancisChua.
LArenderedadecisionholdingtheterminationofCortezasvalidandlegal,atthesametimedismissing
herclaimfordamagesforlackofmerit.
NLRCreversedthedecisionoftheLAandfoundpetitionercorporationguiltyofillegaldismissalof
privaterespondentCortez.
ISSUES:1.WONtheNLRCgravelyabuseditsdiscretioninholdingasillegalthedismissalofprivate
respondent. 2. WON she is entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is
sustained.
RULING: 1. NO. Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant Manager,
WilliamChua,alreadymanifestedaspeciallikingforher,somuchsothatshewasreceivingspecial
treatmentfromhimwhowouldoftentimesinviteher"foradate,"whichshewouldasoftenrefuse.On
manyoccasions,hewouldmakesexualadvancestouchingherhands,puttinghisarmsaroundher
shoulders,runninghisfingersonherarmsandtellinghershelookedbeautiful.Thespecialtreatment
andsexualadvancescontinuedduringheremploymentforfour(4)yearsbutsheneverreciprocatedhis
flirtations,untilfinally,shenoticedthathisattitudetowardsherchanged.Hemadeherunderstandthatif
shewouldnotgiveintohissexualadvanceshewouldcauseherterminationfromtheservice;andhe
madegoodhisthreatwhenhestartedharassingher.Shejustfoundoutonedaythathertablewhichwas
equippedwithtelephoneandintercomunitsandcontainingherpersonalbelongingswastransferred
withoutherknowledgetoaplacewithneithertelephonenorintercom,forwhichreason,anargument
ensuedwhensheconfrontedWilliamChuaresultinginherbeingchargedwithgrossdisrespect.
TheSupremeCourt,inalitanyofdecisionsonseriousmisconductwarrantingdismissalofanemployee,
hasruledthatformisconductorimproperbehaviortobeajustcausefordismissal(a)itmustbeserious;
(b)mustrelatetotheperformanceoftheemployeesduties;and,(c)mustshowthattheemployeehas
becomeunfittocontinueworkingfortheemployer.Theactofprivaterespondentinthrowingastapler
andutteringabusivelanguageuponthepersonoftheplantmanagermaybeconsidered,fromalayman's
perspective,asaseriousmisconduct.However,inordertoconsideritaseriousmisconductthatwould
justifydismissalunderthelaw,itmusthavebeendoneinrelationtotheperformanceofherdutiesas
wouldshowhertobeunfittocontinueworkingforheremployer.Theactscomplainedof,underthe
circumstancestheyweredone,didnotinanywaypertaintoherdutiesasanurse.Heremployment
identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no other. Also, the
memoranduminformingherthatshewasbeingpreventivelysuspendedpendinginvestigationofher
casewasaddressedtoherasanurse.
2. YES. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's
sexualitybuttheabuseofpowerbytheemployer.Anyemployee,maleorfemale,mayrightfullycry

"foul"providedtheclaimiswellsubstantiated.Strictlyspeaking,thereisnotimeperiodwithinwhichhe
orsheisexpectedtocomplainthroughtheproperchannels.Thetimetodosomayvarydependingupon
theneeds,circumstances,andmoreimportantly,theemotionalthresholdoftheemployee.
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her
employer'ssexualimpositions.Notmanywomen,especiallyinthiscountry,aremadeofthestuffthat
canenduretheagonyandtraumaofapublic,evencorporate,scandal.Ifpetitionercorporationhadnot
issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only
speculatehowmuchlongershewouldkeephersilence.Moreover,fewpersonsareprivilegedindeedto
transferfromoneemployertoanother.Thedearthofqualityemploymenthasbecomeadaily"monster"
roamingthestreetsthatonemaynotbeexpectedtogiveupone'semploymenteasilybuttohangontoit,
sotospeak,byalltolerablemeans.Perhaps,toprivaterespondent'smind,foraslongasshecouldoutwit
heremployer'sploysshewouldcontinueonherjobandconsiderthemasmereoccupationalhazards.
Thisuneasinessinherplaceofworkthrivedinanatmosphereoftoleranceforfour(4)years,andone
couldonlyimaginetheprevailinganxietyandresentment,ifnotbitterness,thatbesetherallthattime.
ButWilliamChuafacedrealitysoonenough.Sincehehadnoplaceinprivaterespondent'sheart,so
mustshehavenoplaceinhisoffice.So,heprovokedher,harassedher,andfinallydislodgedher;and
forfinallyventingherpentupangerforyears,he"found"theperfectreasontoterminateher.
Indeterminingentitlementtomoralandexemplarydamages,werestatethebasestherefor.Inmoral
damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputationandsocialhumiliationbyreasonoftheactcomplainedof.22[Art.2217,NewCivilCodeof
thePhilippines.]Exemplarydamages,ontheotherhand,aregrantedinadditionto,interalia,moral
damages"bywayofexampleorcorrectionforthepublicgood"23[Art.2229,id.]iftheemployer"acted
inawanton,fraudulent,reckless,oppressiveormalevolentmanner."24[Art.2232,id.]
Anxietywasgradualinprivaterespondent'sfive(5)yearemployment.Itbeganwhenherplantmanager
showedanobviouspartialityforherwhichwentoutofhandwhenhestartedtomakeitclearthathe
wouldterminateherservicesifshewouldnotgiveintohissexualadvances.Sexualharassmentisan
impositionofmisplaced"superiority"whichisenoughtodampenanemployee'sspiritinhercapacity
foradvancement.Itaffectshersenseofjudgment;itchangesherlife.Ifforthisaloneprivaterespondent
shouldbeadequatelycompensated.Thus,fortheanxiety,theseenandunseenhurtthatshesuffered,
petitionersshouldalsobemadetopayhermoraldamages,plusexemplarydamages,fortheoppressive
mannerwithwhichpetitionerseffectedherdismissalfromtheservice,andtoserveasaforewarningto
lecherousofficersandemployerswhotakeundueadvantageoftheirascendancyovertheiremployees.
Disposition Decision of NLRC finding the dismissal of private respondent without just cause and
orderingpetitionerstopayherbackwagescomputedfromthetimeofherdismissal,whichshouldbe
fullbackwages,isAFFIRMED.However,inviewofthestrainedrelationsbetweentheadverseparties,
instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent, petitioners should pay private respondent
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service until finality of this
judgment.Inaddition,petitionersareorderedtopayprivaterespondentP25,000.00formoraldamages
andP10,000.00forexemplarydamages.
6. Yrasueguivs.PAL
FACTS:
Thiscaseportraysthepeculiarstoryofaninternationalflightstewardwhowasdismissedbecauseofhis
failuretoadheretotheweightstandardsoftheairlinecompany.

Theproperweightforamanofhisheightandbodystructureisfrom147to166pounds,theideal
weightbeing166pounds,asmandatedbytheCabinandCrewAdministrationManualofPAL.
In1984,theweightproblemstarted,whichpromptedPALtosendhimtoanextendedvacationuntil
November1985.Hewasallowedtoreturntoworkoncehelostalltheexcessweight.Buttheproblem
recurred.HeagainwentonleavewithoutpayfromOctober17,1988toFebruary1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninetyday period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight.OnJanuary3,1990,hewasinformedofthePALdecisionforhimtoremaingroundeduntil
suchtimethathesatisfactorilycomplieswiththeweightstandards.Again,hewasdirectedtoreport
everytwoweeksforweightchecks,whichhefailedtocomplywith.
OnApril17,1990,petitionerwasformallywarnedthatarepeatedrefusaltoreportforweightcheck
wouldbedealtwithaccordingly.Hewasgivenanothersetofweightcheckdates,whichhedidnot
reportto.
OnNovember13,1992,PALfinallyservedpetitioneraNoticeofAdministrativeChargeforviolation
ofcompanystandardsonweightrequirements.Petitionerinsiststhatheisbeingdiscriminatedasthose
similarlysituatedwerenottreatedthesame.
OnJune15,1993,petitionerwasformallyinformedbyPALthatduetohisinabilitytoattainhisideal
weight,andconsideringtheutmostleniencyextendedtohimwhichspannedaperiodcoveringatotal
ofalmostfive(5)years,hisserviceswereconsideredterminatedeffectiveimmediately.
LABORARBITER:heldthattheweightstandardsofPALarereasonableinviewofthenatureofthe
jobofpetitioner.However,theweightstandardsneednotbecompliedwithunderpainofdismissal
sincehisweightdidnothampertheperformanceofhisduties.
NLRCaffirmed.
CA:theweightstandardsofPALarereasonable.Thus,petitionerwaslegallydismissedbecausehe
repeatedlyfailedtomeettheprescribedweightstandards.Itisobviousthattheissueofdiscrimination
wasonlyinvokedbypetitionerforpurposesofescapingtheresultofhisdismissalforbeingoverweight.
ISSUE:WONhewasvalidlydismissed.
RULING:YES.AreadingoftheweightstandardsofPALwouldleadtonootherconclusionthanthat
theyconstituteacontinuingqualificationofanemployeeinordertokeepthejob.Thedismissalofthe
employeewouldthusfallunderArticle282(e)oftheLaborCode.
Inthecaseatbar,theevidenceonrecordmilitatesagainstpetitionersclaimsthatobesityisadisease.
Thathewasabletoreducehisweightfrom1984to1992clearlyshowsthatitispossibleforhimtolose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and selfdiscipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearingonDecember8,1992,petitionerhimselfclaimedthat[t]heissueiscouldIbringmyweight
downtoidealweightwhichis172,thentheanswerisyes.Icandoitnow.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician,pertheadviceofPAL.

Infine,weholdthattheobesityofpetitioner,whenplacedinthecontextofhisworkasflightattendant,
becomesananalogouscauseunderArticle282(e)oftheLaborCodethatjustifieshisdismissalfromthe
service.Hisobesitymaynotbeunintended,butisnonethelessvoluntary.AstheCAcorrectlyputsit,
[v]oluntarinessbasicallymeansthatthejustcauseissolelyattributabletotheemployeewithoutany
externalforceinfluencingorcontrollinghisactions.Thiselementrunsthroughalljustcausesunder
Article282,whethertheybeinthenatureofawrongfulactionoromission.Grossandhabitualneglect,
arecognizedjustcause,isconsideredvoluntaryalthoughitlackstheelementofintentfoundinArticle
282(a),(c),and(d).
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employmentinparticularjobsmaynotbelimitedtopersonsofaparticularsex,religion,ornational
originunlesstheemployercanshowthatsex,religion,ornationaloriginisanactualqualificationfor
performingthejob.Thequalificationiscalledabonafideoccupationalqualification(BFOQ).Inshort,
thetestofreasonablenessofthecompanypolicyisusedbecauseitisparalleltoBFOQ.BFOQisvalid
provideditreflectsaninherentqualityreasonablynecessaryforsatisfactoryjobperformance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers.Inordertoachievethis,itmustnecessarilyrelyonitsemployees,mostparticularlythecabin
flightdeckcrewwhoareonboardtheaircraft.TheweightstandardsofPALshouldbeviewedas
imposingstrictnormsofdisciplineuponitsemployees.
TheprimaryobjectiveofPALintheimpositionoftheweightstandardsforcabincrewisflightsafety.
Separationpay,however,shouldbeawardedinfavoroftheemployeeasanactofsocialjusticeorbased
onequity.Thisissobecausehisdismissalisnotforseriousmisconduct.Neitherisitreflectiveofhis
moralcharacter.
7. Franciscovs.NLRC
FACTS:
In1995,petitionerAngelinaFranciscowashiredbyKaseiCorporation(Kasei)duringitsincorporation
stage.ShewasdesignatedasAccountant,CorporateSecretaryandLiaisonOfficerofthecompany.In
1996,FranciscowasdesignatedActingManagertohandlerecruitmentofallemployeesandperform
managementadministrationfunctions,representthecompanyinalldealingswithgovernmentagencies,
andtoadministerallothermatterspertainingtotheoperationofKaseiRestaurantwhichisownedand
operatedbyKasei.
Forfiveyears,petitionerperformedthedutiesofActingManager.AsofDecember31,2000hersalary
wasP27,500.00plusP3,000.00housingallowanceanda10%shareintheprofitofKaseiCorporation.
In January 2001, Francisco was replaced as Manager. She alleged that she was required to sign a
preparedresolutionforherreplacementbutshewasassuredthatshewouldstillbeconnectedwith
Kasei.TheTreasurerconvenedameetingofallemployees andannouncedthatFranciscowasstill
connectedwithKaseiCorporationasTechnicalAssistanttoSeijiKamuraandinchargeofallBIR
matters.
Thereafter,KaseireducedhersalarybyP2,500.00amonthbeginningJanuaryuptoSeptember2001for
atotalreductionofP22,500.00asofSeptember2001.Shewasnotpaidhermidyearbonusallegedly
becausethecompanywasnotearningwell.InOctober2001,shedidnotreceivehersalaryfromthe

company,maderepeatedfollowupswiththecashierbutwasadvisedthatthecompanywasnotearning
well. On October 15, 2001, she asked for her salary, but she was informed that she is no longer
connectedwiththecompany.
Sinceshewasnolongerpaidhersalary,petitionerdidnotreportforworkandfiledanactionfor
constructivedismissalbeforethelaborarbiter.
KaseiCorporationclaimedthatFranciscowasnottheiremployee,havingbeendesignatedastechnical
consultant who performed work at her own discretion without the control and supervision of the
Corporation,andthatherconsultancymaybeterminatedanytimeconsideringthatherserviceswere
onlytemporaryinnatureanddependentontheneedsofthecorporation.
Toprovethatpetitionerwasnotanemployeeofthecorporation,privaterespondentssubmittedalistof
employeesfortheyears1999and2000dulyreceivedbytheBIRshowingthatpetitionerwasnotamong
theemployeesreportedtotheBIR,aswellasalistofpayeessubjecttoexpandedwithholdingtaxwhich
includedpetitioner.SSSrecordswerealsosubmittedshowingthatpetitionerslatestemployerwasSeiji
Corporation.
ISSUES:WhetherornottherewasanemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenFranciscoandKasei
Corporation;andwhetherFranciscowasillegallydismissed.
RULING:Generally,courtshavereliedonthesocalledrightofcontroltestwherethepersonforwhom
theservicesareperformedreservesarighttocontrolnotonlytheendtobeachievedbutalsothemeans
tobeusedinreachingsuchend.Inadditiontothestandardofrightofcontrol,theexistingeconomic
conditionsprevailingbetweentheparties,liketheinclusionoftheemployeeinthepayrolls,canhelpin
determiningtheexistenceofanemployeremployeerelationship.
However,incertaincasesthecontroltestisnotsufficienttogiveacompletepictureoftherelationship
betweentheparties,owingtothecomplexityofsucharelationshipwhereseveralpositionshavebeen
heldbytheworker.Thereareinstanceswhen,asidefromtheemployerspowertocontroltheemployee
withrespecttothemeansandmethodsbywhichtheworkistobeaccomplished,economicrealitiesof
the employment relations help provide a comprehensive analysis of the true classification of the
individual,whetherasemployee,independentcontractor,corporateofficerorsomeothercapacity.
Thebetterapproachwouldthereforebetoadoptatwotieredtestinvolving:(1)theputativeemployers
powertocontroltheemployeewithrespecttothemeansandmethodsbywhichtheworkistobe
accomplished;and(2)theunderlyingeconomicrealitiesoftheactivityorrelationship.
Thistwotieredtestwouldprovideuswithaframeworkofanalysis,whichwouldtakeintoconsideration
thetotalityofcircumstancessurroundingthetruenatureoftherelationshipbetweentheparties.Thisis
especiallyappropriateinthiscasewherethereisnowrittenagreementortermsofreferencetobasethe
relationship on; and due to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and
responsibilitiesgiventotheworkerovertheperiodofthelattersemployment.
Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the
circumstancesofthewholeeconomicactivity,suchas:(1)theextenttowhichtheservicesperformed
areanintegralpartoftheemployersbusiness;(2)theextentoftheworkersinvestmentinequipment
and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the workers
opportunityforprofitandloss;(5)theamountofinitiative,skill,judgmentorforesightrequiredforthe
success ofthe claimedindependent enterprise;(6)the permanencyanddurationofthe relationship

between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the
employerforhiscontinuedemploymentinthatlineofbusiness.
Byapplyingthecontroltest,thereisnodoubtthatpetitionerisanemployeeofKaseiCorporation
becauseshewasunderthedirectcontrolandsupervisionofSeijiKamura,thecorporationsTechnical
Consultant.ShereportedforworkregularlyandservedinvariouscapacitiesasAccountant,Liaison
Officer,TechnicalConsultant,ActingManagerandCorporateSecretary,withsubstantiallythesamejob
functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing functions
necessaryanddesirablefortheproperoperationofthecorporationsuchassecuringbusinesspermits
andotherlicensesoveranindefiniteperiodofengagement.
Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of
respondentcorporationbecauseshehadservedthecompanyforsixyearsbeforeherdismissal,receiving
checkvouchersindicatinghersalaries/wages,benefits,13thmonthpay,bonusesandallowances,aswell
asdeductionsandSocialSecuritycontributionsfromAugust1,1999toDecember18,2000.When
petitionerwasdesignatedGeneralManager,respondentcorporationmadeareporttotheSSSsignedby
IreneBallesteros.PetitionersmembershipintheSSSasmanifestedbyacopyoftheSSSspecimen
signaturecardwhichwassignedbythePresidentofKaseiCorporationandtheinclusionofhernamein
the online inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence of an employeremployee relationship
betweenpetitionerandrespondentcorporation.
Itisthereforeapparentthatpetitioneriseconomicallydependentonrespondentcorporationforher
continued employment in the latters line of business. The corporation constructively dismissed
petitionerwhenitreducedhersalarybyP2,500amonthfromJanuarytoSeptember2001.Thisamounts
toanillegalterminationofemployment,wherethepetitionerisentitledtofullbackwages.Sincethe
positionofpetitionerasaccountantisoneoftrustandconfidence,andundertheprincipleofstrained
relations,petitionerisfurtherentitledtoseparationpay,inlieuofreinstatement.
Adiminutionofpayisprejudicialtotheemployeeandamountstoconstructivedismissal.Constructive
dismissal is an involuntary resignation resulting in cessation of work resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable orunlikely; when there is ademotion in rank ora
diminutioninpay;orwhenacleardiscrimination,insensibilityordisdainbyanemployerbecomes
unbearabletoanemployee.
Inaffordingfullprotectiontolabor,thisCourtmustensureequalworkopportunitiesregardlessofsex,
raceorcreed.Evenaswe,ineverycase,attempttocarefullybalancethefragilerelationshipbetween
employeesandemployers,wearemindfulofthefactthatthepolicyofthelawistoapplytheLabor
Codetoagreaternumberofemployees.Thiswouldenableemployeestoavailofthebenefitsaccorded
tothembylaw,inlinewiththeconstitutionalmandategivingmaximumaidandprotectiontolabor,
promotingtheirwelfareandreaffirmingitasaprimarysocialeconomicforceinfurtheranceofsocial
justiceandnationaldevelopment.