ETHICS IN MATHEMATICS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL PROOFS

1.0 Introduction
Our Public Affairs Mission at Missouri State University emphasizes three important
traits: cultural competence, community engagement, and ethical leadership. Considering my
intentions to obtain a doctorate in mathematics and to teach college mathematics, I must exhibit
ethical leadership in my position. Composing this documented research report on ethics in
mathematics has shed much light on invaluable information that will undoubtedly inform my
future employment. Certainly, it would surprise no one to assert the value of an ethical system of
communicating mathematical results; in fact, examining ethics in mathematics underscores the
necessity of viable mathematical results in sciences other than mathematics itself, such as
physics, chemistry, architecture, and more. Overall, I claim two things above all else: that proofs
in mathematics have undergone consistent changes over the course of the last two millennia and
that proofs in mathematics are by nature objective truths. Examining the history of mathematical
proofs, I will give pertinent historical information and anecdotes; I will supply relevant
definitions and terminology; and I will detail a brief introduction to mathematical logic. On the
whole, therefore, I intend with this documented research report to present my findings on the
ethical nature of mathematical proofs by examining the history of proof techniques.

2.0 Discussion
2.1 Greece and Other Ancient Societies
2.1.1. From Babylon to Euclids Elements
Even today, one of the most remarkable mathematical achievements in history is the
Babylonian discovery of more than a dozen Pythagorean triples (Eves 44). Recall that the

Pythagorean Theorem states that the sum of the squares of the legs of a right triangle x and y
equals the square of the hypotenuse z or x2 + y2 = z2. Using this, a Pythagorean triple is three
positive integers a, b, and c such that a2 + b2 = c2. On first glance, it is incredible that the
Babylonians were able to solve an equation in three variables through such elementary means,
but a deeper look reveals the most spectacular aspect of the Babylonians discoveries: they did
this before the Pythagorean Theorem was ever even conjectured, let alone proven (44).
Rather, it was not until one thousand years later that Pythagoras and his followers the
Pythagoreans established and proved their theorem on right triangles. Before the time of
Pythagoras, mathematics was conducted intuitively: if the result of a claim seemed to hold in
general, the claim was thought to be true (Krantz 10). One of the first radical thinkers in
mathematics, Pythagoras rebuked this norm, believing instead that the mathematical sciences
need be founded in strong, objective reasoning, and, further, asserting that many geometrical
results of the time could be deduced from a small list of postulates that were taken without
question to be true (10). In this way, Euclid would draw the necessary inspiration to generate the
mathematical worlds first attempt at a complete axiomatization of all geometry.
Euclid the Geometer emerged from the melting pot of ideas of his predecessor Pythagoras
two hundred years later, and he would go on to release with his Elements what remains one of
the most essential works in mathematics. Euclids most notable efforts sought a connection
between mathematics and logic in a rigorous manner, asserting that proofs follow from
definitions and axioms that are taken as fact without further question (13). Krantz points out that
Euclid began with a few undefined terms that were commonly accepted without justification and
used these to formulate his self-evident axioms, with which he introduced his logical exposition
in a very sophisticated and almost modern manner (14). Of course, Euclids famed fifth postulate

 which states that there is a unique line parallel to any given line has for the last two thousand
years caused debates concerning the soundness and independence of his axiom and, in this way,
has exposed the weaknesses in the logic of the ancients.

2.1.2. Closing the Logical Gaps

Euclids Elements remains among the most astounding mathematical works to resonate
through the halls of time, but even this masterwork of ancient Greece has been shown by our
contemporary standards to contain several flaws in logic. Commenting on this and other
mathematical follies, Dieudonn contests that the majority of insufficient or erroneous proofs
throughout history have resulted from a lack of focus on the underlying mechanics of proof
(Dieudonn 204). Before we examine this claim, let us recall the structure of a deductive proof.
Proofs in mathematics are logical sequences of conjectures made from an initial
assumption or several assumptions and ending with a conclusion (204). Each step in a proof
should follow directly from either our initial assumption or some known axiom or theorem.
Previous results have been sometimes invalidated by more recent commentators, Dieudonn
says, due to some confusion regarding the initial premise and a similar premise from which a
conclusion is drawn when in fact it is the conclusion analogous to the similar premise that
follows (204). Other instances show that, as Dieudonn observes, some proofs have employed
inferences and reasonable assumptions that had not yet been proven, resulting in falsity (204).
Likewise, Kitcher defines rigorous reasoning as a three-part process: a set of premises, a
finite sequence of statements that follow logically from the premises, and a conclusion drawn
from the last step (Kitcher 469). Even more, every step in the sequence must itself be a premise

or a conclusion drawn from previous steps. We define rigor as soundness and objectivity of an
argument, guaranteed by strict implementation of and obedience to axioms and definitions.
Kitcher argues that although some mathematical knowledge seems self-evident, it
remains necessary to prove these apparent truths in a rigorous way so as to make our
understanding more taut and objective (470). Kitcher asserts that as the study of mathematics
progresses, our notion of rigor likewise progresses, so eventually, things that we consider to be
rigorous at present will come to be considered unrigorous (470).
Overall, we demand rigor when an argument cannot be fleshed out using elementary
steps from known and factual premises and, similarly, when establishing a universal
mathematical language. We will now consider the example of Newton and Leibniz to this end,
who justified a mathematical conclusion based on its apparent success in answering previously
solved problems and therefore did not formulate calculus in a rigorous manner and whose
arguments inevitably came under scrutiny from harsh critics.

Fig. 1. A Very Informal Proof

Source: Sidney Harris <http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/index.php>

2.2 The Birth of Analysis and a Need for Rigor

2.2.1. Newton, Leibniz, and Calculus
Calculus has a very curious, inspiring, and rich history, but we will simply begin in the
middle of the seventeenth century. Legend has it that calculus was developed independe0ntly by
two brilliant minds who resided across the English Channel from each other. Sir Isaac Newton
whose laws of physics are arguably among the most common lay scientific knowledge was a
prolific and honorable member of the Royal Society in England. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on
the other hand hailed from Leipzig in present day Germany and embodied more of a
mathematician and logician than a man of the empirical sciences. Yet despite the distance, both
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Newton and Leibniz miraculously came independently to the same conclusion in what has
become one of the most important scientific discoveries ever: calculus.
Critics of calculus quickly took to disarm the phenomenal work of Newton and Leibniz,
whose arguments stemmed from the shaky foundations of geometry and the vague idea of
infinitesimals, which were essentially objects possessing both negligible and measurable size,
depending on what was convenient (Jesseph 451); however, because calculus had results that
appeared to be true time and again, the results were trusted without further justification.

2.2.2. Cauchy and His Contemporaries

Efforts to divulge the thorough foundations of calculus continued in the centuries
following the legacy of Newton and Leibniz; in fact, according to Eves, our contemporary notion
of mathematical rigor began primarily with Lagrange the first true analyst and continued
later with Gauss and Cauchy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Eves 445,
487). Coming before the latter two, Lagrange made the first significant albeit failed attempts
at establishing mathematical rigor in calculus (Saul ii); however, Eves applauds Lagranges
attention to detail and mathematical conscience, nonetheless (Eves 445). Similarly to
Lagrange, Eves describes Gausss reasoning as strongly logically founded, simple, and tireless
(478). Often, Gauss would give several different types of proofs of the same result in order to
explore the deeper relationships between the various branches of mathematics (477). But it was
not until the early nineteenth century that Cauchy and his contemporaries established a highly
sophisticated and modern approach that is still very much intact today.
Claiming that the beginnings of modernized mathematical rigor sprung about due to
efforts to prove the fundamental theorem of algebra, Noel attests that mathematicians the likes of

Cauchy, Bolzano, and Weierstrass were among the pioneers of the newly-invented branch of
mathematics called analysis (Noel 134). Cauchy and the like realized the misleading nature of
geometry and grew wary of its grasp on several fields in mathematics, according to Noel, and as
such, they sought to axiomatize calculus using a more algebraic argument (133, 134). Similarly,
Saul attests the crucial role of simple arithmetic as opposed to the early geometric and intuitive
methods in Cauchy and Bolzanos development of mathematical rigor (Saul ii). Convincingly,
Saul argues that inequalities were the fundamental tools by which the nineteenth century analysts
achieved their goal of precision, noting that until the time inequalities were studied and
developed in-depth by Cauchy, rigorous proofs of calculus were not often supplied (24, 25).
Clearly, Cauchy played an invaluable part in the development of mathematical proofs and
in the establishment of a new standard of rigor in mathematics. Cauchy is credited with
converting many of his contemporaries to forego the usual and mechanical computations and
casual intuition on which mathematics was founded at the time in favor of a universal
mathematical language based on the objectivity of axioms and definitions (Eves 489). Eves
portrays Cauchys body of work as prolific, as well as detailed and formal (488). Contemporaries
of Cauchy, on the other hand, did not all praise him with such esteem as Eves does; in fact,
Schubring establishes a more realistic view of Cauchy, lending authenticity to the
mathematicians body of work by establishing important criticisms that demonstrate why Cauchy
has become so important and highly regarded today (Schubring 432, 433).
Even though Cauchy and his contemporaries had successfully established the discrepancy
between geometry and algebra developing a highly sophisticated and formal system of
axiomatic proofs using arithmetic there was still much work to be done as history moved
toward the middle of the nineteenth century. Particularly, our notion of real numbers would begin

to cause problems, and a formal definition of infinity and classification of certain sets of numbers
would be needed to continue to progress the state of mathematics and rigor.

2.3 God Created the Integers: Cantor versus Kronecker

2.3.1. Perplexing Paradoxes of Infinity
Even today, one of the many indelible philosophical battles in history remains that
between the German mathematicians Georg Cantor and Leopold Kronecker, whose ideologies
could not have been more diametrically opposed. Cantor who ranks among the most influential
thinkers of the twentieth century thanks to his formulation of the theory of sets and his discovery
of the different cardinalities of infinities is an invaluable personality in our discussion of
mathematical proof and rigor. On the other hand, Kronecker a self-proclaimed finitist once
infamously quipped, God created the integers; all the rest is the work of man (OConnor 3).
Before the emergence of Cantors 1873 and 1874 papers, the concept of infinity was
misinformed, contradictory, and exaggerated (Schechter 2). Certain paradoxes some of which
date back as far as 400 BC seemingly reveal the enigma of infinity, challenging observable
truths and clouding known results with an air of mystery and confusion. One of the earliest
examples of the perplexing nature of infinity comes from Zeno of Elea, who famously exposed a
seemingly obvious contradiction when he observed that using the commonly accepted notion
of infinity during his time motion cannot truly exist. Before a destination is reached, he argued,
one must first travel halfway there; before traveling to this halfway mark, one must travel a
quarter of the way; and carrying on this way, one would never reach the destination because one
would first have to get halfway to the next halfway mark infinitely many times (3).

Other curious geometric paradoxes reveal themselves a bit more easily than Zenos.
Picture any straight line that extends itself indefinitely in both directions. We will stipulate that
our line does not inherently possess any breadth and, further, that this line in particular does not
inherently pass through any points. Picture also a semicircle of finite length laid down next to
this line. We require that our circle like our line must not inherently pass through any points.
But now, if we draw three line segments of finite length originating from the center of the
semicircle, passing through the semicircle at what we will designate as three points of
intersection, and ending on the line at what we will likewise designate as three points, we could
show that a semicircle of finite length possesses the same number of points as a line of infinite
length (10). On his web page, Schechter provides a similar paradox that compares two line
segments of different lengths that somehow contrarily possess the same number of points.

Fig. 2. A Bijection Between a Line and a Semi-Circle

Under the long-standing misinterpretation of the properties of infinity, even the

characteristics of certain infinite collections of numbers remained shrouded in doubt and
misunderstanding. Predating Cantor by nearly 300 years, the Italian physicist and astronomer
Galileo Galilei first observed the similarities between the cardinality or size of the set of
natural numbers and the set of squares of natural numbers. We define the natural numbers to be
positive, whole numbers. Brilliantly, Galilei observed that you can pair off a natural number and
its square for instance, (1, 1), (2, 4), (3, 9), and so on such that it appears as though there are
the same number of objects that are squares of natural numbers as there are natural numbers (8).
We refer to this pairing as a bijection because every natural number refers to a unique square
and so no two natural numbers refer to the same square and every square is uniquely
determined by a natural number, hence no square is absent from our list. Cantor would later
prove that the set of natural numbers and the set of squares of natural numbers possess the same
cardinality; that is, paradoxically, there are just as many squares of natural numbers as there are
natural numbers, even though the squares are more spread out. Later, Cantor would discover an
ingenious way to denumerate the set of integers and the set of rational numbers from the set of
natural numbers. Even more, Cantor would point out that it is not possible to denumerate the set
of real numbers. Using revolutionary proof techniques and creative logical arguments, Cantor
would lay the foundation for much of the mathematics to come in the decades after his death.

Fig. 3. A Bijection Between the Natural Numbers and Squares of Natural Numbers

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2.3.2. Cantor Discovers Set Theory

Long before Cantor confirmed the fact using what is now known as set theory, French
mathematician Joseph Liouville proved that there exist infinitely many transcendental real
numbers in any given interval (Johnson 55). We refer to transcendental numbers such as and
e as non-algebraic; hence these numbers do not comprise a solution to any polynomial in one
variable with whole number coefficients. But in 1874, Cantor established a much stronger fact
about the real numbers namely, that there are only countably many real algebraic numbers but
uncountably many transcendental numbers and, thus, that the set of real numbers is uncountable
(55). Countable sets are collections of objects numbers, in this case that can be set in one-toone correspondence to the set of positive, whole numbers, where one-to-one correspondence
refers to our method of pairing off as demonstrated in the Galilei paradox. Recall that Galilei
formulated an argument that revealed the countability of the set of squares of natural numbers.
Essentially, countable sets of numbers are collections of numbers that can be enumerated using
an infinite sequence similar to the sequence of natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on.
Cantors discoveries would prove to be even further reaching and consequential. Using a
similar formulation of power or cardinality as Jakob Steiner, Cantor was able to derive many
important and some perplexing results about several common collections of numbers (55). As
one might expect, Cantor demonstrated that any proper subset of a finite set has a smaller
cardinality than the set that contains it (56). Clearly, this can be exemplified by the sets
S = {1, 2, 3} and T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} because S contains three members that are also contained
in T hence S is a proper subset of T and T contains six members, three of which are not
contained within S and three of which comprise S fully. Curiously, this is not the case with proper
subsets of infinite sets; in fact, the property that at least one proper subset of a set possesses the

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same cardinality as the set in which it is contained is the exact property that distinguishes infinite
sets from finite sets, as Dedekind theorized in 1887 (56). Using this characterization, it is clear
that the set of natural numbers is infinite since at least one of its proper subsets namely, the set
of squares of natural numbers possesses the same size. Cantor demonstrated that the cardinality
of the natural numbers is the smallest infinite cardinality. Even the set of rational numbers
possesses the same cardinality as the set of natural numbers. With this astonishing breakthrough,
he deemed this cardinality the first transfinite number 0 , which is the Hebrew numeral aleph
null (56).
Ultimately, however, Cantors development of set theory proved itself to be paradoxical,
revealing the problematic nature of intuition and even further underscoring the misunderstanding
of the enigma of infinity. Cantors eponymous paradox characterizes many other ostensibly
contradictory results from the likes of Cesare Burali-Forti and Bertrand Russell (61). Consider
the collection of all cardinal numbers namely, the set of all infinite cardinalities. Because there
is no largest cardinal number, this collection is itself infinite, and in fact, the cardinality of this
collection is even larger than any of the cardinalities contained.

2.3.3. Kroneckers Criticism

Considering the breadth of abstraction and intricate nature of his arguments, Cantors
convoluted discoveries would come under heavy criticism from finitists the likes of Kronecker.
Even as early as 1877, Kronecker attempted to block several of Cantors publications in Crelles
Journal a famed German mathematical periodical due to a fundamental difference in
ideology: among many other of his bewildering opinions, Kronecker believed neither in the
existence of infinity nor in the existence of irrational and transcendental numbers (OConnor 3).

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Relations between Cantor and Kronecker never bettered, and when Kronecker passed in 1891,
the mathematicians remained at odds, never to settle their dispute. Cantor, however, continued to
extend warm regards and wholehearted respect to his colleague until his untimely passing (4).
Ethics in mathematics may not be better demonstrated elsewhere than in Kronecker and
Cantors infamous bickering. Cantors formalism or axiomatic mathematics based on abstract
manipulation of inherently meaningless symbols represents a powerful tool that
mathematicians use to overcome and understand the counterintuitive and extremely subtle nature
of certain mathematics, and it aids the discovery of important results such as set theory. On the
other hand, Kroneckers intuitionism or subjective mathematics that rejects the notion and
importance of axiomatic systems exemplifies a more practical aspect, restricting the
mathematicians work-space to the tangible and constructible. Later work from German
mathematicians Richard Dedekind and David Hilbert attempted to further bridge the two schools
of thought, as Dedekind constructed the real numbers from a tangible number line and Hilbert
infused the notion of intuition and creativity with much-needed objectivity.

2.4 Dedekind and Hilbert Close the Gap

2.4.1. Dedekind Defines the Set of Real Numbers
Even with the exceptional work of early- and mid-eighteenth century mathematical bigwigs, there remained severe tensions within the mathematical community regarding the
objectivity and logical foundations of calculus and its modern offspring the field of analysis.
Reck notes that the discrepancies between the inventors of calculus and the arithmetizers
stemmed from the fact that the original creators relied on appeals to infinitesimal quantities,
as opposed to the more simplistic, algebraic approach that had yet to be defined universally and

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thoroughly enough by Cauchy and his contemporaries (Reck 4). By relating the studies of
calculus and arithmetic even more closely than his predecessors, German mathematician Richard
Dedekind took it upon himself to rid analysis of its intuitive foundations entirely (4).
Oddly enough, Dedekind began his arithmetization of calculus by establishing his theory
of Dedekind cuts, which directly related the real number system with a geometric line (Reck 4).
With his eponymous cuts, Dedekind observed the similarities between the set of rational
numbers or the set of fractions and a tangible, straight line; however, it became apparent after
some consideration that rational numbers cannot be expressed on a continuous, gap-free line,
since there are numbers on a continuous line that cannot be expressed as fractions the square
root of two, for example (4). Expanding this idea further, Dedekind succeeded in expressing the
real number system in a completely original manner, finally relating rational and irrational
numbers and demonstrating that using his system proofs could then be obtained about the
real numbers that had not been possible before (5). Essentially, Dedekind had discovered the
missing link between geometry, algebra, and calculus, effectively freeing mathematics from its
intuitive upstart and advancing the systematization and rigorization of analysis.

2.4.2. Hilbert and the Objectivity of Mathematics

Like Dedekind, David Hilbert was a phenomenal and premier German mathematician
who came to prominence toward the end of the nineteenth century and proceeded to release his
most fruitful works at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ogawa supplies the following
quote directly from Hilbert: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude
of mathematical methods (Ogawa 2). Eves describes Hilbert further as a broad mathematician
[who] made highly important contributions in many areas, usually neatly completing each area

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before passing on to the next (Eves 635). One of Hilberts various accomplishments included
his work toward the axiomatization and systematization of all of mathematics on which he
worked alongside Bernays called proof theory; in 1931, however, Gdel demonstrated that
Hilberts efforts were in vain when he proved in unimpeachable style that Hilberts proof
theory could not hold in every field of mathematics (Eves 634-35).
Ogawa nevertheless emphasizes Hilberts development of deductive rigor and his belief
in the freedom of concept-formation as a means to systematize mathematics and to establish the
preeminence of mathematics as universal and objective truth that does not rely on any
epistemological assumptions (Ogawa 2, 10). One immediate consequence of Hilberts ubiquity is
his axiomatization of geometry, taking nearly two-thousand-year-old notions of Euclid and
reinvigorating them with more sophisticated, modern foundations. Importantly, this
establishment preceded some of the most groundbreaking results in physics, such as Einsteins
theory of relativity (Eves 635). Overall, Hilberts grand efforts more than anyone in history
propelled mathematics toward the ultimate goal of rigor and consistency, and as such, he remains
one of the most rightfully celebrated mathematicians of all time.

2.5 Gdels Incompleteness Theorems

2.5.1. The Impossibility of Hilberts Program
Even more than his revolutionary and deeply impactful successes, oddly enough,
Hilberts ultimate failure to establish a set of axioms that could provide a foundation for all of
mathematics remains one of the most important shortcomings in scientific history, simply
because it resulted in the invaluable and indelible Incompleteness Theorems: two elegant results
that would forever change the face of mathematics. Kurt Gdel the then twenty-five-year-old

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German logician demonstrated in 1931 with his First Incompleteness Theorem that there exist
arithmetic statements that are neither provable nor refutable in the axiomatic system of Peano
arithmetic. With his Second Incompleteness Theorem, Gdel demonstrated that there are indeed
mathematical truths that cannot be harvested using the classical axiomatic methods that had been
in development since the time of Euclid. Combining both of these conclusions, Hilberts program
which in essence aimed to establish the provability of every statement that could be
constructed in Peano arithmetic was rendered unrealizable (Nagel et al. 6).
Creative and eloquent in his arguments, Gdel challenged the ostensibly limitless
potential of the axiomatic methods in a manner that no mathematician or logician had before.
Using conventional notation and meta-mathematics, Gdel was able to manipulate the calculus
of logic or the formalized logical system consisting only of inherently meaningless marks and
strings of marks called formulas in such a way as to derive a Berry paradox in the syntax of
meta-mathematics (28). Put simply, Gdel was able to ingeniously combine empty mathematical
symbols and words into a meta-mathematical statement that, when interpreted, inherently
contradicted itself. One example of a simple Berry paradox follows.

Behold the smallest positive integer not expressible in fewer than thirteen words!

Clearly, the sentence contains fewer than thirteen words namely, it contains twelve words but
even more, these twelve words characterize the very nature of the object that the statement
claims cannot be expressed; in fact, the statement itself is the exact definition of the integer that
it claims it cannot itself define. Hence, the statement lies in self-contradiction.

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Perhaps it is unsurprising to consider the amount of cunning and imagination involved in

the aforementioned argument; however, all too frequently, mathematics is misunderstood as
blind, formal manipulation that lacks expression. Closely examined, Gdels proof reveals the
often-overlooked artistic and linguistic aspects of mathematical proofs and, as such,
demonstrates the intrinsic limitations of philosophical arguments devoid of intuition.

2.5.2. The Inherent Weaknesses of the Axiomatic Method

Of course, Gdels argument was far more convoluted and complex than demonstrated
above: as mentioned before, there is a noticeable air of narrative license and artistic liberty in the
Incompleteness Theorems. Upon publication, in fact, Gdels results remained so enigmatic and
complicated that they were incomprehensible even to many mathematicians (3). Contrarily,
Gdels arguments were astonishingly rooted in simple arithmetic involving the prime
factorization property of the integers and simple sentential variables or letters that stand in
proxy for logical statements in the calculus of logic, concatenated with the logical connectives
such as not, or, and if then as well as useful punctuation marks.
Constituting the crux of Gdels proof are his eponymous Gdel numbers. We assign the
first ten Gdel numbers 1, 2, 3, , 9, and 10 to the elementary signs of our calculus just as
Nagel and Newman do (70). Clearly, the Gdel number of any sign, formula, or proof is uniquely
determined, but to make this characteristic more obvious, we will offer an example similar to
Nagels (69, 72). We may assign a few of our first ten Gdel numbers such that
#() = 4, #(=) = 5, #(s) = 7, #[(] = 8, #[)] = 9, #(x) = 11, and #(y) = 13, where #(p) refers to the
Gdel number of the sign, variable, or statement p. Using the property that every integer n
possesses a unique prime factorization n = p1a1p2a2pkak, Gdel constructed each distinct Gdel

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number in the same manner as we construct the Gdel number of the statement, There exists an
integer x such that x is the immediate successor of y or mathematically, (x)(x = sy), where
is the existential quantifier, x and y are integer variables, and sy denotes the immediate
successor of y. Observe that the sequence of Gdel numbers of the aforementioned statement is
{8, 4, 11, 9, 8, 11, 5, 7, 13, 9}; therefore, we have the corresponding Gdel number

#[(x)(x = sy)] = 28345117911813111751972313299.

Even better, it is possible to derive a sign, variable, or statement from a given integer that is,
given a positive whole number, we can decide whether it is a Gdel number or not by checking
its prime factorization (75). Once again, we rely on an example similar to Nagels. Observe that

243000000 = (64)(243)(15625) = 263556.

Hence, the sequence of Gdel numbers in the associated statement is {6, 5, 6}, and so, it turns
out that the statement defined by this Gdel number is, 0 = 0 (76). By applying these two
simple results to the set of all statements generated using the elementary signs within the
calculus, Gdel demonstrated that every statement about the calculus can be expressed as a
Gdel number within the calculus and, therefore, that a Berry paradox is obtainable (77).
Careful and intentional in his reasoning, Gdel exposed the inherent weaknesses in the
axiomatic method many of which stem from the mechanical and distant manipulation of
symbolic logic. Curiously, Kennedy notes the cynicism that resulted from Gdels proof, quoting
von Neumann: There is no reason to reject intuitionism [because] there is no rigorous

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justification for classical mathematics (Kennedy 8). But despite the pessimism expressed by a
select few, the quest for truth in mathematics presses on in modern times an age in which our
proof techniques have become highly sophisticated and sometimes torturously complex.

2.6 Examples of Proofs and Ethics in Modern Mathematics

2.6.1. Computers in Contemporary Mathematics
Considering the fact that contemporary mathematical proofs can be hundreds of pages
and may sometimes contain more than a thousand cases, computers have become an undeniable
necessity in the modern mathematicians toolbox (Thomas 2). Often, research in mathematics
can be greatly expedited through the use of such computational mathematical software as
Mathematica, MATLAB, and Maple, but even programs such as Python can assist a
mathematician in a proof or in the exposition or demonstration of an important result. Using the
easily-obtainable Python for the sake of simplicity the following code provides an
approximation of pi to any desired degree of precision and its associated error.

number_terms = input("Please key in the number of terms you would like in the series: ")
number_terms = int(number_terms)
n=0
for m in range(0, number_terms):
m = float(m)
m = ((-1)**m)/(2*m + 1)
n = float(n + m)
n = 4*n
print("We estimate that pi = " + str(n) + " when the series of arctan(1) is expanded to n
= " + str(number_terms) + " terms.")
error = ((n - 3.1415926535897932)/3.1415926535897932)*100
error = round(error, 2)
print("The error of our approximation is " + str(error) + "%.")
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Using the language of the software and a bit of ingenuity, Python becomes an extremely valuable
artifact in the mathematicians arsenal.
Of course, the above example disregards the efficiency of the program in terms of its
use of random access memory (RAM), its time-complexity, and so on which becomes an
absolutely vital consideration when a program must loop itself hundreds of thousands of times,
as is the case with the Lucas-Lehmer primality test that is used to generate prime numbers as part
of the ongoing Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search (GIMPS) (Baxter 1).

2.6.2. The Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search

Prime numbers are defined to be positive integers or whole numbers whose only
divisors are itself and one. Consequently, the only even prime number is two, and the rest of the
primes are odd. Curiously, there are many aspects of prime numbers that are of interest to
mathematicians of all branches from analysis to algebra and beyond but of course, there are
always those select few who are simply interested in the chase. Even from the dawn of
mathematics, prime numbers have been sought after, and mathematicians have developed
countless techniques, sieves, and identities to test for primality. We will describe and compare
two tests Wilsons Theorem and the Lucas-Lehmer Theorem that make use of the notion of
modular arithmetic but contrarily exhibit two vastly different levels of complexity.
We say that two integers a and b are congruent modulo n if a and b exhibit the same
remainder when divided by n, which we stipulate must be positive. When a = 8 and b = 4, for
instance, a and b are congruent modulo 2, since two divides evenly into eight and two divides
evenly into four or, mathematically, 2|(a = 8) and 2|(b = 4) where | stands for divides. We
write accordingly the statement, 8 is congruent to 4 modulo 2, or 8 4 (mod 2). Wilsons

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Theorem employs another important mathematical symbol: the factorial operator. We define the
positive integer a factorial to be the product of the positive integer a and every integer that is
smaller than a and greater than or equal to one written symbolically as
a! = a(a 1)(a 2)(2)(1). Clearly, for instance, 5! = (5)(4)(3)(2)(1) = 120.
Broadly, Wilsons Theorem states that a positive integer p is prime if and only if
(p 1)! (-1) (mod p). Using the following code which is a strict implementation of Wilsons
Theorem in Python will generate primes in any desired domain.

import math
beg_range = input("Please enter the positive integer greater than or equal to 2 at which
you would like to beginning your prime search: ")
beg_range = int(beg_range)
end_range = input("Please enter the positive integer up and including which you would
like to find primes: ")
end_range = int(end_range)
for num in range(beg_range, end_range + 1):
if math.factorial(num - 1)%num == (num - 1)%num:
print("The integer " + str(num) + " is a prime number.")
Unfortunately, similarly to the pi approximation program detailed above, this prime-generating
program moves painstakingly slowly and gobbles up far too much RAM to be useful.
Luckily, the Lucas-Lehmer Theorem provides the standard-setting method for
discovering primes, and as such, it is implemented by those who participate in the Great Internet
Mersenne Prime Search. Working with more convenient and more easily testable primes of the
form 2p + 1 called Mersenne primes the Lucas-Lehmer Theorem runs through a list of p 1
values before arriving at the pth. If the pth value is zero, the integer 2p + 1 is prime; otherwise,

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this is not the case (Baxter 1). Put explicitly, the Lucas-Lehmer Theorem begins with the integer
s = 4; in the next step, s is renamed s2 2 (mod 2p + 1); and this step is repeated p 2 times (1).
We reiterate Baxters example. Let p = 7 and s = 4. Carrying out the Lucas-Lehmer Theorem five
(p 2 = 5) times, we have the sequences of s values {14, 67, 42, 111, 0}. Because the last
number in the sequence is zero, it follows from the Lucas-Lehmer Theorem that 27 + 1 is prime
(1). Unlike the program demonstrative of Wilsons Theorem, the Lucas-Lehmer primality test is
a viable, efficient, and extremely useful method of discovering primes. Even still, this algorithm
is theoretically capable of improvement. According to Baxter, it would take a reasonably fast
computer 12 days for the program to test a 10 million digit number, four years to test a 100
million digit number, and 500 years to test a one billion digit number (2)!
Generating prime numbers is a very clear demonstration of the power that computers
grant mathematicians; however, the theory of prime numbers has been well-developed, and
therefore, the implementation of computers to discover prime numbers does not represent much
of an ethical conundrum. On the other hand, the computer-generated proof of the infamous Four
Color Theorem raises an invaluable question in the ethics of mathematics.

2.6.3. The Four Color Theorem

Unassuming but surprisingly difficult to thoroughly demonstrate, the Four Color
Theorem remains one of the most infamous problems in mathematical history. Francis Guthrie is
credited with posing the extremely subtle problem, which presented itself to him in 1852 while
he was coloring a map of England and was stricken by the sudden realization that only four
colors were needed to differentiate each county such that no two counties sharing a common
boundary segment possessed the same color (Thomas 1). Despite a slew of erroneous proofs that

22

nonetheless provided valuable results in graph theory, an acceptable proof of Guthries

observation eluded the mathematical community for more than 120 years until the advent of
computers (1). One of the most controversial mathematical discoveries of the twentieth century,
the largely computer-supplied proof of the Four Color Theorem as the result of the work of the
University of Illinoiss Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken poses an interesting and
perplexing philosophical challenge to mathematics: if a mathematical proof cannot possibly be
checked in its entirety by a human, are its results truly constituted as mathematical truth?
Even though Appel and Hakens proof of the Four Color Theorem is not carried out
entirely by a machine, Thomas notes importantly that the parts that are computer-verified some
1476 graphs cannot possibly be checked by hand, and even further, the arguments that are
seemingly capable of hand-verification require vastly complex and meticulous computations, so
much so that no one has ever run the calculations (2).
Curiously, Thomas and his team from the Georgia Institute of Technology argue in spite
of their harsh criticisms of the Appel and Haken formulation of the proof of the Four Color
Theorem that the chances of a computer-generated proof resulting in error are even smaller
than the possibility of an erroneous human-constructed proof. On the other hand, however,
Thomas admits that it takes much more man-power to verify the correctness of a computergenerated proof than it does to verify a proof provided by a human (5).
Certainly, the Four Color Theorem has revealed a perplexing and controversial aspect of
mathematical proofs in the modern era. Following Thomas, I remain confident in the ability of
the computer systems that we have built to produce reliable, testable, uniform results.

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2.7 Why Is Rigor Important?

Of any development in history, the tireless efforts of mathematicians as far back as 300
BC to establish a threshold of mathematical rigor mark easily one of the greatest and most
essential human conquests ever endeavored.
Undoubtedly, we need rigor to create a foundation of certainty and objectivity in the
physical sciences. Rigor in mathematics ensures that our intuitive reasoning is objectively
founded. Rigor enables us to say with certainty barring human error that our hypothesized,
testable results will hold universally and every time if an experiment is conducted under the
same parameters. Rigor rules out the possibility of wild variation and chaos.
Rigor is our only defense against the inevitable entropy of the Universe.

3.0 Conclusion
Overall, based on my research, I find it apparent that our current system of mathematical
rigor is pristine, according to current standards. Considering every aspect of this documented
research report, I believe firmly that our current logical foundations allow for the most efficient
and objectively true reasoning in mathematics and science.
Commenting on the French mathematician Pierre Duhem, Joseph Jesseph observes and
empathizes with Duhems assertion that the history of mathematics has been a long, additive
process in which past results are built upon but not challenged (Jesseph 449). Contrary to
Duhems philosophy, however, Jesseph admits a flaw in Duhems conception that mathematical
rigor has been unchanging since the time of the Greeks and Babylonians. Rather, Jesseph asserts
that the laws of logic have been questioned time and again by more recent commentators and that

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the arguments such critics have made have been metaphysical in nature (450). Even more,
Jesseph states very clearly that he believes that no measure of mathematical rigor existed up to
and including the time of the mid-eighteenth century, and he further suggests that the
mathematical community give up on the idea of an immutable, unchanging standard of
mathematical rigor in favor of a more fluid foundation (452, 453).
While I support Jessephs interpretation and understanding of mathematical rigor and
confirm his observations on the history of mathematical rigor, I must disagree with his
pessimistic view of the potential of mathematical proofs. Unrelentingly, I remain most optimistic
in hope that the future will continue to unravel further the mysteries of current mathematical
conundrums and, thus, will grow upon the present strength of the system.

25

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