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UPDATES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Justice Magdangal M. de Leon


ACTIONS IN GENERAL
Basic rule in filing of action (Rule 2, Secs. 3-4)
1. For one cause of action (one delict or wrong), file only ONE ACTION or
suit. Generally, NO SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION. Reasons: a. to
avoid multiplicity of suits; b. to minimize expenses, inconvenience and
harassment.
2. Remedy against splitting a single cause of action (two complaints
separately filed for one action) - defendant may file:
a. motion to dismiss on the ground of
(1) litis pendentia, if first complaint is still pending (Rule 16, Sec. 1 [e])
(2) res judicata, if first complaint is terminated by final judgment (Rule 16,
Sec. 1 [f])
b. answer alleging either of above grounds as affirmative defense (Rule
16, Sec. 6)
If defendant fails to raise ground on time, he is deemed to have WAIVED
them. Splitting must be questioned in the trial court; cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
The requisites of litis pendentia are the following: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other. ( Romullo vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan
Compound Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 180687, October 6,
2010)
What are the requisites for joinder of causes of action? (Rule 2, Sec. 5)
1. Compliance with the rules on joinder of parties under Rule 3, Sec. 6.
2. A party cannot join in an ordinary action any of the special civil actions.
Reason: special civil actions are governed by special rules.
3. Where the causes of action are between the SAME PARTIES but pertain
to DIFFERENT VENUES OR JURISDICTIONS, the joinder may be allowed in
the RTC, provided ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the venue lies therein.

Exception: Ejectment case may not be joined with an action within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as the same comes within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the MTC.
However, if a party invokes the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot
thereafter challenge the courts jurisdiction in the same case. He is barred
by estoppel from doing so. (Hinog vs. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12,
2005)
N.B. As to joinder in the MTC, it must have jurisdiction over ALL THE
CAUSES OF ACTION and must have common venue.
4. Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery
of money, jurisdiction is determined by the AGGREGATE OR TOTAL
AMOUNT claimed (totality rule).
N.B. The totality rule applies only to the MTC totality of claims cannot
exceed the jurisdictional amount of the MTC.
There is no totality rule for the RTC because its jurisdictional amount is
without limit. Exc. In tax cases where the limit is below P1 million.
Amounts of P1 million or more fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA.
Lack of legal capacity to sue plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as
on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of a party.
Plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for motion to dismiss
(Rule 16, Sec. 1[d]).
Ex. A foreign corporation doing business without a license lacks legal
capacity to sue.
Lack of personality to sue the fact that plaintiff is not the real party in
interest.
Plaintiffs lack of personality to sue is a ground for a motion to dismiss
based on the fact that the complaint, on its face, states no cause of action
(Rule 16, Sec. 1 [g]) (Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744 [2005])
A suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. The original
petition was instituted by Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation. It
filed a collection of sum of money suit which involved a construction
contract entered into by petitioner and Multi-Rich, a sole proprietorship.
The counsel of Win wanted to change the name of the plaintiff in the suit
to Multi-Rich. The change cannot be countenanced. The plaintiff in the
collection suit is a corporation. The name cannot be changed to that of a
sole proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is not vested with
juridical personality to file or defend an action. (Excellent Quality Apparel,
Inc. vs. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 175048, February 10, 2009)

In a case involving constitutional issues, standing or locus standi means


a personal interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustained DIRECT INJURY as a result of the government act that is being
challenged.
To have legal standing, the petitioner must have DIRECT, PERSONAL and
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST to protect. Here, petitioners, retired COA
Chairmen and Commissioners, have not shown any direct and personal
interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no
indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. Clearly,
they have no legal standing to file the instant suit (Domingo vs. Carague,
456 SCRA 450 [2005]).
Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No.
141538, March 23, 2004).
Procedure for dismissal if indispensable party is not impleaded
Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of
the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may
dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by the trial
court. (Limos vs. Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010)
Whenever it appears to the court in the course of the proceeding that an
indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to STOP
THE TRIAL and to ORDER THE INCLUSION of such party. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court NULL
and VOID, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties,
but even as to those present (Uy vs. CA, 494 SCRA 535 [July 11, 2006]).
Intervention (Rule 19, Sec. 1)
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the
parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R.
No. 165987, March 31, 2006).
Requirements: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original

parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights


may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.
Legal interest must be of such DIRECT and IMMEDIATE character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not
simply contingent and expectant. (Perez vs. CA, G.R. No. 162580. January
27, 2006)
What is the effect of non-substitution of a deceased party?
Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the
proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court
acquires NO JURISDICTION over the persons of the legal representatives or
of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by
any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or that
he did not authorize Atty. Petalcorin to represent him.
No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from
date of death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is
the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure
that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the
suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. (Hinog
vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 [2005])
The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be
substituted as parties to a litigation. This requirement is necessitated by
due process. Thus, when the rights of the legal representatives of a
decedent are actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of the
promulgated decision. After all, due process had thereby been satisfied.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,
the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure
is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3. (Dela Cruz vs. Joaquin,
G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005).
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the
court of the death of his client and no substitution of such party is
effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if
the action survives the death of such party. Moreover, the decision
rendered shall bind his successor-in-interest. The instant action for
unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real property, is a real
action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have
taken his place and now represent his interests in the instant petition.
(Limbauan vs. Acosta, G.R. No. 148606, June 30, 2008)

SELECTION OF COURT
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed
his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions. (Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No.
168785, February 5, 2010)
The arbitration clause is a commitment on the part of the parties to
submit to arbitration the disputes covered since that clause is binding,
and they are expected to abide by it in good faith. Clearly, the RTC should
not have taken cognizance of the collection suit. The presence of the
arbitration clause vested jurisdiction on the CIAC over all construction
disputes between Petitioner and Multi-Rich. The RTC does not have
jurisdiction. (Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs. Win Multi Rich Builders,
Inc., represented by its president, Wilson G. Chua, G.R. No. 175048,
February 10, 2009)
What is hierarchy of courts?
Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy
cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
Rationale: (a) to prevent inordinate demands upon the SCs time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and (b) to prevent further overcrowding of the SCs docket.
Thus, although the SC, CA and the RTC have CONCURRRENT jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
The SC will NOT ENTERTAIN DIRECT RESORT to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and EXCEPTIONAL
AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES, such as cases of national interest and
of serious implications, justify the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. (Hinog vs.
Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 [2005])
VENUE
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is
properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together
with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. The venue of real
actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by
the SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the transactions involving said parcels
of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the same

transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a


parcel of land is situated (United Overseas Bank Phils. (formerly
Westmont Bank) vs. Rosemoore Mining & Development Corp.,G.R. Nos.
159669 & 163521, March 12, 2007).
Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general
rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an
agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. (Pacific Consutants International Asia, Inc. vs. Schonfeld, G.R.
No. 166920, February 19, 2007)
ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is not applicable when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. (Municipality of
Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010)
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon
a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of
failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on
an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must
be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document
will be deemed admitted. (Casent Realty Development Corp. vs.
Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007)
SUMMONS
Service of summons on resident defendant in an action in personam:
If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8 of
Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3)
service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner
the court may deem sufficient. (Belen vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March
26, 2008)
Section 16 of Rule 14 regarding service of summons on residents
temporarily out of the Philippines uses the words may and also. Thus,
extraterritorial service is not mandatory. Other methods of service of
summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant-seaman. The normal method of service of summons
on one temporarily absent is by substituted service because personal
service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of
summoning defendants. (Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.165016, June
17, 2008)
Substituted service on resident defendant temporarily out of the country.
The Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the

country; Thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with
her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place
and,therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondent's behalf. The RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the
person of private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his
appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and
without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even
filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. (Palma vs. Galvez ,
G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010)
Pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 14, summons by publication applies in any
action. The rule does not distinquish whether the action is in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem. It authorizes summons by publication whatever the
action may be as long as the identity of the defendant is unknown or his
whereabouts are unknown. (Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation, G.R.
No. 170943, September 23, 2008)
For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must
be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the
party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a competent
person in charge of the partys office or place of business. Failure to do so
would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the
spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs. In his
Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security
guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner
prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence
whenever she is out. It was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or
substituted service of summons upon petitioner. Considering her strict
instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus,
summons has been properly served upon petitioner and it has acquired
jurisdiction over her. ( Robinson vs. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December
12, 2006)
In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was one with
whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons. Here, petitioner failed to show that
the security guard who received the summons in respondents behalf
shared such relation of confidence that respondent would surely receive
the summons. Hence, we are unable to accept petitioners contention
that service on the security guard constituted substantial compliance with
the requirements of substituted service. (Orion Security Corporation vs.
Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007)

General rule: filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes


voluntary appearance and the consequent submission of ones person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Exceptions:Pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction, which only leads to a special appearance. (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure
to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it
is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest. (Miranda vs. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006)
Defendants filing of a motion for resetting of the hearing effectively cured
the defect of the substituted service of summons. Although the
substituted service of summons on defendant is patently defective as the
sheriffs return does not contain any statement with regard to the
impossibility of personal service, said defect was cured by his voluntary
appearance. After plaintiff moved for the execution of the trial courts
decision, defendant filed a motion for a re-setting of the courts hearing
thereon. An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent.
(Cezar vs. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415,. October 31, 2006)
Under Section 15, Rule 14, there are only four instances wherein a
defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the Philippines may
be served with summons by extraterritorial service : (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to,
or the subject of which ia property, within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the
relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located within the Philippines;
and (4) when the defendant non-residents property has been attached
within the Philippines.
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with
leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Extraterritorial service of summons applies only when the action is in rem
or quasi in rem and not when the action is in personam. The case for
collection of sum of money and damages filed by the respondent against
the petitioner being an action in personam, then personal service of
summons upon the petitioner within the Philippines is essential for the

RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.


Having failed to do so, the RTC can never subject petitioner to its
jurisdiction.
The mere allegation made by the respondent that the petitioner had
shares of stock within the Philippines was not enough to convert the
action from one in personam to one that was quasi in rem, for petitioners
purported personal property was never attached (Perkin Elmer Singapore
Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14,
2007).
Non-forum shopping certification signed by counsel and not by the
principal party is a defective certification
This is because it is the principal party who has actual knowledge whether
he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or tribunals (Go
vs. Rico, G.R. No. 140682, April 25, 2006)
Not fatal defect when only one petitioner signed the certification of nonforum shopping
Such fact is not fatal to the petition because it satisifies the requirement
that the petition be signed by a principal party (Bases Conversion
Development Authority vs. Uy, G.R. No. 144062, November 2, 2006)
Effect of forum shopping
1. If the forum shopping is NOT considered WILFUL and DELIBERATE, the
subsequent cases shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on one of the
two grounds mentioned above
2. If the forum shopping is WILFUL and DELIBERATE, both (or all, if there
are more than two actions) shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Ao-As vs.
CA, 491 SCRA 353 [2006])
What are the requirements of forum shopping certificate for a
corporation?
Only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign
the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In
addition, the Court has required that proof of said authority must be
attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is
sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject
to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of
the signatory's authority. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Flight Attendants
and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), G.R. No. 143088.
January 24, 2006)
However, subsequent submission of Secretarys Certificate is substantial
compliance with the requirement that a Board Resolution must authorize
the officer executing the non-forum certification on behalf of the

corporation. (International Construction Inc. vs. Feb Leasing and Financing


Corp., G.R. No. 157195, April 22, 2005)
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable
by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5 of Rule
45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping
signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by
proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the
corporation. In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has
allowed the belated filing of the certification. (Mediserv, inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (special former 13th division) and Landheights Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010)
Litis pendentia is not present between a petition for writ of possession
and action for annulment of foreclosure. The issuance of the writ of
possession being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot
be said to be a judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in the
transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata. Thus,
insofar as Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D and Civil Case No. 99-03169-D
pending before different branches of RTC Dagupan City are concerned,
there is no litis pendentia. (Yu vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 147902. March 17, 2006)
The pendency of a SEC case may be invoked as posing a prejudicial
question to an RTC civil case. Since the determination of the SEC as to
which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the
resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings.
(Abacan, Jr., et. al. vs. Northwestern University, Inc., G.R. No. 140777,
April 8, 2005)
What is judicial courtesy?
There are instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be
proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on
the precept of judicial courtesy. As the Supreme Court explained in Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 421, 427-428
(1988):
Due respect for the Supreme Courtand practical and ethical
considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the
final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case
and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court x x x. This
Court explained, however, that the rule on judicial courtesy applies
where there is a STRONG PROBABILITY that the issues before the higher

court would be rendered MOOT AND MORIBUND as a result of the


continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.
(Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, June 26, 2006)
Effect of amendment of Rule 65, Section 7 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
December 12, 2007 on the principle of judicial courtesy . Judicial courtesy
can no longer be used as an excuse by courts or tribunals not to proceed
with the principal case.
Section 7.Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which
the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it
may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10)
days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with
the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum
shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
The Rule distinctly provides that the required certification against forum
shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an
"incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief." Respondent
bank's Answer with Counterclaim is not a responsive pleading, filed
merely to counter petitioners' complaint that initiates the civil action. In
other words, the rule requiring such certification does not contemplate a
defendant's/ respondent's claim for relief that is derived only from, or is
necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint. In fact, upon
failure by the plaintiff to comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted
above, directs the "dismissal of the case without prejudice," not the
dismissal of respondent's counterclaim. (Carpio vs. Rural Bank of Sto.
Tomas (Batangas), Inc., G.R. No. 153171. May 4, 2006)
What are the tests or criteria to determine compulsory or permissive
nature of specific counterclaims?
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule?

3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim


as well as defendants counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
The evidence of the petitioner on its claim in its complaint, and that of the
respondents on their counterclaims are thus different. There is, likewise,
no logical relation between the claim of the petitioner and the
counterclaim of the respondents. Hence, the counterclaim of the
respondents is an initiatory pleading, which requires the respondents to
append thereto a certificate of non-forum shopping. Their failure to do so
results to the dismissal of their counterclaim without prejudice. (Korea
Exchange Bank vs. Hon. Gonzales, et. al., G.R. Nos. 142286-87, April 15,
2005)
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on
which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be presented by the defendant. (Heirs of Tomas Dolleton
vs. Fil Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009)
When a motion to dismiss is premised on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action (Rule 16, Section 1 (g)), the ruling thereon
should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court
must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them
to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint. However, there is no hypothetical admission of
the veracity of the allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear
unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation
of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case. (Heirs
of Loreto Maramag vs. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, 2009 June 5, 2009)
A ground raised in a motion to dismiss may not be the subject of
preliminary hearing as special and affirmative defense in the answer,
except when there are several defendants but only one filed a motion to
dismiss.

Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the defendant may


reiterate any of the grounds for dismissal provided under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court as affirmative defenses but a preliminary hearing may no
longer be had thereon if a motion to dismiss had already been filed. This
section, however, does not recontemplate a situation, such as the one
obtaining in this case, where there are several defendants but only one
filed a motion to dismiss. (Abrajano vs. Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895.
February 16, 2006)
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINTunder Rule 17, Sec. 1
The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since
dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a
matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most
ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to
consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such
dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground (O.B. Jovenir
Construction and Development Corp. vs. Macamir Realty and CA, G.R. No.
135803, March 28, 2006).
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT DUE TO PLAINTIFFS FAULT under Rule 17,
Sec. 3.
Sec. 3, Rule 17 enumerates the instances where the complaint may be
dismissed due to plaintiffs fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for
the presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with
the rules or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to
prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there
be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the
dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with
prejudice. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006)
In situations contemplated in Section 3, Rule 17, where a complaint is
dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to comply with a lawful order of the
court, such dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. A
dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the
merits, and operates as res judicata, particularly when the court did not
direct that the dismissal was without prejudice. (Court of Appeals vs.
Alvarez, G.R. No. 142439, December 3, 2006)
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily
carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise.
In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
defendants to prosecute the counterclaim. (Pinga vs. Santiago, G.R. No.
170354, June 30, 2006).

Pinga vs. Santiago which refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17


on dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff also applies
where the dismissal of the complaint was upon the instance of the
petitioner who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person.
Petitioners counterclaim against respondent is for damages and
attorneys fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondents
complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have
very well already incurred damages and litigation expenses such as
attorneys fees since it was forced to engage legal representation in the
Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction of the
courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon
it. Hence, the cause of action of petitioners counterclaim is not
eliminated by the mere dismissal of respondents complaint. (Perkin Elmer
Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242,
August 14, 2007)
Remedy from order of dismissal for failure to prosecute ordinary appeal.
An order of dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. Petitioners counsel should have filed a notice
of appeal with the appellate court within the reglementary period. Instead
of filing a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper recourse
was an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41. (Ko vs.
PNB, 479 SCRA 298, January 20, 2006)
Effect of declaration of default.
The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not
automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the
latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be
required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not
deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present
evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a
judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the
defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any
countervailing evidence (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098,
March 21, 2006).
A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order
of default (Martinez vs. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006).
Procedure trial court must take when a defendant fails to file an answer.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 9, the court "shall proceed to render judgment
granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to
the courts discretion on whether to require the presentation of evidence

ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and
extent of the relief that may be granted. In particular, the courts
judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal
Bank, supra)
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
The importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It
approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the
guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the
conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties
to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 and request for
admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use
of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28
within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise
required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs,
containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having
availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or
referral to commissioners. (Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Ley
Construction and Development Corp., G.R. No. 147143, March 10, 2006)
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that a judgment on the
pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. The
essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.
A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the
party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to
obtain a declaratory relief. (Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 156304, October 23, 2006)
Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint
tenders several issues. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the
truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and
the judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such
other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. It is proper when an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading. However, when it appears that
not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the
answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the
defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would
have the effect of nullifying plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment on
the pleadings cannot be rendered. (Municipality of Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R.
No. 171873, July 9, 2010)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur: (1)
there must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (2) the moving party must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
When, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary
judgment is not proper. An issue is genuine if it requires the
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. The trial courts decision was merely
denominated as summary judgment. But in essence, it is actually
equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary
judgment inapplicable in this case. (Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R. No. 159224,
January 20, 2006).
When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there
is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of
fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so
as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial (Asian Construction and
Development Corp. vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 153827, April 25, 2006).
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a fullblown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues,
when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are
not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must
ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion
for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as
to any material fact. (Philippine Bank Of Communications vs. Spouses Go ,
G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011)
The trial court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an
action is in order.Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending
party or the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke the rule on
summary judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party must be notified
of the motion for summary judgment and furnished with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions before hearing is conducted. More
importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. (Pineda vs. Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14,
2007).
TRIAL

Lack of cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the


trial and amendments to conform to the evidence.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be
determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without
regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case
may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of
suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within
the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the
trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently
amended on motion of a party. (Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. vs. CA, G.R.
No. 161135, April 8, 2005).
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed
admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer
to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Sweet Lines, Inc. that [w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an
instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse partys failure to
make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
(Casent Realty Development Corp. vs. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No.
150731, September 14, 2007)
Upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant
loses the right to present his evidenceand the appellate court shall then
proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs
evidence. The rule, however, imposes the condition that if his demurrer is
granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on
appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he
shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of
plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the
merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence (Republic vs. Tuvera, G.R. No.
148246, February 16, 2007).
Distinction between motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action
and motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action.
The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (g) before a
responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the
allegations of the pleading and not from evidentiary matters. The second
is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has
rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he
has presented in support of his claim (The Manila Banking Corp. vs.
University of Baguio, Inc., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007)

APPEAL AND REVIEW


The Supreme Court may review factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals
The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are factual. Under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, for the simple
reason that the Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA are conclusive on this Court, absent proof of any of
the recognized exceptional circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which
the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the
CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA
are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) the findings are contrary to
the admissions of both parties. (Asian Construction & Devt. Corp. vs.
Tulabut, G.R. No. 161904, April 26, 2005)
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court viz., on the basis either of
the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province
of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of
law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the proper remedy. Vios
vs. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009)
Regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of
ownership or accion reivindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case brought on
appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the instant case, the MTC
of Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of
jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a
decision based on the findings of the MTC. (Provost vs. CA, G.R. No.
160406, June 26, 2006).
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on
the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the

merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in
the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. (Encarnacion
vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006).
Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership
whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession in an
ejectment case.
The RTC erred when it agreed with the MTCs decision to dismiss the case.
At first glance, it appears that based on the P13,300.00 assessed value of
the subject property as declared by respondents, the RTC would have no
jurisdiction over the case. But the above-quoted provision refers to the
original jurisdiction of the RTC. Section 22 of BP 129 vests upon the RTC
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the
amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTCs appellate
jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the
RTC irrespective of the amount involved (Serrano vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No.
162366, November 10, 2006).
Appeal from RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction petition for review under Rule 42.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by
the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court
of Appeals under Rule 42 and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a
matter of right, before the filing of the appellees brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed
as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. (Ross Rica
Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005)
No petition for relief in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
While Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. The procedure in the CA
and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules
of Court. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition
for rellief applicable in the CA or this Court. (Purcon vs. MRM Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008)
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a
Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of where "the

ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other


appropriate remedies
arenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofthepetitioner." A petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by
law. Such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a partys own
neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses De Castro , G.R. No.
189724, February 7, 2011)
Rule 47 applies only to annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil cases of Regional Trial Courts it does
not apply to criminal actions (People vs. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June 26
2007); final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or
administrative bodies such as the National Labor Relations Commission,
the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the Office of the President,
and the PARAD (Fraginal vs. Paranal, G.R. No. 150207, February 223,
2007).; or to nullification of decisions of the Court of Appeals (Grande vs.
University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148456, September 15, 2006).
Although the RTC has the authority to annul final judgments, such
authority pertains only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts and
quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior courts. Given that
DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is
that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are
beyond the RTCs control (Springfield Development Corp. vs. Presiding
Judge of RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 40, G.R. No. 142628, February 6,
2007).
EXECUTION
Execution pending appeal applies to election cases. Despite the silence of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application
of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. (Balajonda
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005).
When title has been consolidated in name of mortgagee, writ of
possession is a matter of right.Once a mortgaged estate is extrajudicially
sold, and is not redeemed within the reglementary period, no separate
and independent action is necessary to obtain possession of the
property. The purchaser at the public auction has only to file a petition
for issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 33 of Rule 39 of

the Rules of Court. (DBP vs. Spouses Gatal, G.R. No. 138567, March 4,
2005).
Execution of money judgments under Rule 39, Sec. 9 promissory note not
allowed.
The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the
judgment debtor shall pay either in cash, certified bank check payable to
the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the
latter. Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a form of
payment. The only exception is when such form of payment is acceptable
to the judgment debtor. But it was obviously not acceptable to
complainant, otherwise she would not have filed this case against
respondent sheriff. In fact, she objected to it because the promissory
notes of the defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her favor.
(Dagooc vs. Erlina, A.M. No. P-04-1857 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-P),
March 16, 2005)
Venue of action for revival of judgment
If the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with
the court of the place where the real property is located. (Infante vs. Aran
Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007)
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Improper issuance and service of writ of attachment
A distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the
writ of attachment. This is necessary to determine when jurisdiction over
the defendant should be acquired to validly implement the writ.
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ
of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third,
the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained, but once
the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant (Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125027, August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 162).
Preference of levy on attachment duly registered over a prior unregistered
sale
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale. The preference created by the
levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration
of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in
rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached

property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very


dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus,
in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the
nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The
effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the right
of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien (Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, G.R. No.
133303, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 664, 670).
Judge's authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction only within
his/her territorial jurisdiction
As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that
Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction
insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section
21 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise
original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions (Gomos vs. Adiong, A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1863, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 162).
Original action for injunction outside the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals
What petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for
preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extraordinary remedy
calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed
of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be
heard. An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, however.
Under B.P. 129, the appellate courts jurisdiction to grant a writ of
preliminary injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before
it (Section 2 of Rule 58) or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus (Section 7 of Rule 65). In the case at bar, petitioners
complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before
Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate court.
(Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc., vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,
Honorable N. C. Perello, G.R. No. 159296 , February 10, 2006).
Injunction to restrain extrajudicial foreclosure involving several parcels
located in different provinces
Separate injunction suits may be filed for breach of mortgage contract
with injunction to restrain extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of
mortgaged properties located in different provinces without violating the
rule against forum shopping since injunction is enforceable only within the

territorial limits of the trial court, thus the mortgagor is left without
remedy as to the properties located outside the jurisdiction of the issuing
court unless an application for injunction is made with another court which
has jurisdiction over the latter court (Benguet Management Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 347).
CHANGE IN THE RULE
The last paragraph which was added to Section 5, Rule 58 states that a
higher court (RTC, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals)
which issues a writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board,
officer or quasi-judicial agency must decide the main case or petition
within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ. (AM 07-7-12,
effective December 27, 2007).
Purpose: in order not to unduly delay the main case lodged in the lower
court.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A petition for declaratory relief should be brought in the appropriate
regional trial court. The purpose of the petition is to ask the court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising from the sujbect
matter thereof , and for the declaration of rights and duties thereunder.
Hence, the subject matter of such petition raises issues which are not
capable of pecuniary estimation and must be filed in the RTC (Sec. 19 [1],
BP 129; Sec. 1, Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition the petition
with the Supreme Court which has no original jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for declaratory relief (Ortega vs. Quezon City Government, G.R.
No. 161400, September 2, 2005).
However, where the action is for quieting of title which is a similar remedy
under the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63, the jurisdiction will
depend upon the assessed value of the property.
Re-filing of petition for certiorari should be done within the 60-day
period.Where the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 69744 for non-submission of a non-forum
shopping certification was without prejudice and petitioner could have refiled such petition, such re-filing should still be done within the prescribed
period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, or
not later than sixty days from notice of the assailed Order of the RTC.
(Estrera vs. CA, G.R. No. 154235-36, August 16, 2006)
CHANGES IN THE RULE
Period to file petition for certiorari now inextendible. Last paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 65: No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding fifteen
(15) days has been DELETED by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December

27, 2007. Hence, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply
meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari. (Laguna Metts Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009)
A. M. No. 07-7-12 has also amended the second paragraph of Sec.
4:
If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or with the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or regional
trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
Following the hierarchy of courts, no certiorari against the RTC shall be
filed with the Supreme Court. This will help prevent the clogging of the
Supreme Courts dockets as litigants will be discouraged from filing
petitions directly with the Supreme Court.
Section 7.
Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in
which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings,
and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10)
days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with
the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge

Unless there is a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction


issued by a higher court, the main or principal case should proceed
despite the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning an act or omission
of a court or tribunal
Judicial courtesy, therefore, can no longer be used as an excuse by courts
or tribunals not to proceed with the principal case.
Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. - After the comment or
other pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing
thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to
submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or the
expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of
the petition are true, it shall render judgment for such relief to which the
petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently
without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the
court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against
the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to
administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on rep ipsa loquitur, other
disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory
and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
Thewrit of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207,
the National Government Administration Committee was not exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a
petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright. Where
the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. (Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association vs. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006).
A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use
CNG is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an
act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290
in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates
of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on
the results of the DOTC surveys (Henares, Jr. vs. Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 158290, October 23, 2006).

Actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a


corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the
courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule
66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto
cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation (Calleja
vs. Panday, G.R. No. 168696. February 28, 2006).
EXPROPRIATION
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just
compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
the government. RA 8974 requires that the government make a direct
payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Such payment
is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of
the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, or if
no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the
proffered value of the property to be seized. It is the plain intent of RA
8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of
immediate payment in cases involving national government
infrastructure projects (Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166249, December
19, 2005).
Section 9 of Rule 67 empowers the court to order payment to itself of the
proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to
be settled. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even
where the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal,
i.e., the DARAB. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Bases Conversion
Development Authority, G.R. No. 173085, January 19, 2011)
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
Awrit of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to
enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the
judgment.
A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) in
land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial
foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened;
(3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section
7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) in execution sales
(last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).
The present case falls under the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, a writ of possession may be issued
either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a
bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a

bond. (PNB vs. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29,
2005
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent an extrajudicial
foreclosure, only upon a clear showing of a violation of the mortgagors
unmistakable right. Unsubstantiated allegations of denial of due process
and prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagees
unmistakable right to an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Selegna Management
and Development Corporation vs. UCPB, G.R. No. 165662, May 31, 2006)
An action to invalidate the mortgage or the foreclosure sale is not a valid
ground to oppose issuance of writ of possession .
As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is
entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of said case. (Sps. Arquiza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 160479, June 8, 2005)
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
In forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that the
only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence,
the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could
have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use
and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession. (Teraa vs. Hon. De Sagun, G.R. No. 152131, April 29,
2009;Dumo vs. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006)
The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment
would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land or building. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession. (Roberts vs. Papio, G.R. No. 166714, February 9,
2007)
Accion publicianais one for the recovery of possession of the right to
possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from

the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. (Hilario, etc., et. al.
vs. Salvador, et. al., G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005)
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved?
NO. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion
publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must
be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within
(Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155179. August 24, 2007)
Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction
"in all civil actions which involve possession of real property." However, if
the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed
P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover
possession of real property (Atuel vs. Valdez, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA
517, 528).
All cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, fall under the
original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. (Aliabo v. Carampatan,
G.R. No. 128922, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 548, 552).
A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of
the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief
prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein. (Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November
11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156; Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29,
2005, 457 SCRA 815).
A complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land which involves title to or
interest in real property should allege the assessed value of the land .
The complaint specified only the market value or estimated value which is
P15,000.00. In the absence of an assessed value, or in lieu thereof, the
estimated value may be alleged.
Sec. 22 of BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691 (where the assessed value
of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila) grants the MTC exclusive jurisdiction over subject case.The nature
of an action is determined not by what is stated in the caption of the
complaint but its allegations and the reliefs prayed for. Where the
ultimate objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real property, it

should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed
value of the property subject thereof. (Barangay Piapi vs. Talip, 469 SCRA
409 [2005]).
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reivindicatoria is, as
RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For
properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value
exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below . An
assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality
where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. It is
the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other
kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case,
therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the
property is located, and not the court a quo. . (Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R.
No. 160384. April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815)
The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions (Secs. 19 and 33. BP
129, as amended by RA 7691) are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon.The complaint does not contain any allegation of the
assessed value of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no
showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.
Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to the
respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00.
Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the
Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the
action of the respondent. Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including
its decision, are null and void (Laresma vs. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973,
November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156; Aliabo vs. Carampatan, G.R. No.
128922, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 548).; Ouano vs. PGTT Int'l. Investment
Corporation, G.R. No. 134230, July 17, 2002, 384 SCRA 589) .
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year (Canlas vs. Tubil, G.R.
No. 184285, September 25, 2009).
Mandatory allegations for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over forcible entry
First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the
property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. If the
alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these means, the proper
recourse is to file not an action for forcible entry but a plenary action to

recover possession with the Regional Trial Court (Benguet Corporation vs.
Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., G.R. No.155343, September 2, 2005)..
What determines jurisdiction in unlawful detainer?
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without
resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When
the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
(Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 132424, May 4, 2006)
Possession by tolerance becomes unlawful from the time of demand to
vacate.
Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from
respondents failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand
sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6,
1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful
when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by
the owner. (Santos vs. Sps. Ayon, G.R. No. 137013, May 6, 2005)
Where the period of the lease has expired and several demands were sent
to the lessee to vacate, when should the one year period to file unlawful
detainer be reckoned? From the date of the original demand or from the
date of the last demand?
From the date of the original demand if the subsequent demands are
merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand.
Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the
action is based on the expiration of the lease.. The law requires notice to
be served only when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay or the
failure to comply with the conditions of the lease. The one-year period is
thus counted from the date of first dispossession. The allegation that the
lease was on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to saying that the
lease expired every month. Since the lease already expired mid-year in
1995, as communicated in petitioners letter dated July 1, 1995, it was at
that time that respondents occupancy became unlawful. (Racaza vs.
Gozum, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 313)

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the


mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising
ownership of the property as an issue . As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of
equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result
from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment
(Amagan vs. Marayag, G.R. No. 138377, February 28, 2000).
Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately
executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be
clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed violate said right. In this case, we
note that the petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals raises
substantial issues meriting serious consideration. Chuas putative right to
continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if the adverse
judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete
execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ
of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy
(Benedicto vs. CA, G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005)
CONTEMPT
Respondent Judges blunder was compounded when she immediately cited
complainant in contempt of court and issued the bench warrant without
requiring the latter to explain the reason for his non-appearance and noncompliance with a standing order. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
complainants alleged disobedience is an indirect contempt the
punishment for which requires that a respondent should be first asked to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was
guilty of indirect contempt and not direct contempt. For not affording
complainant the opportunity to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
(Tabujara vs. Judge Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.
08-2896-RTJ], January 20, 2009 Jan 20, En Banc)
Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be
compliance with the following requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be
filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by
himself or by counsel . (Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Inc.
vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008).
Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes indirect contempt not
direct contempt (Judge Dolores Espanol vs. Atty. Benjamin Formoso, G.R.
No. 150949, June 21, 2007).

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