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1. KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,

LTD.,
vs MINORU KITAMURA G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy

firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national
permanently residing in thePhilippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru
was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned
Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog
Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion,
DPWH engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering &
construction supervision of
the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named
as the project
manger in the contract.Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its
International Division, informed Kitamaru that thecompany had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engagedby
the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted
that Kitamarus
contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific
performance &
damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD. Nippons contention:
The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese
nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for
improper pre-termination of
Kitamarus ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex
loci celebrationis was
not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity
of the written
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the
principle of lex loci
solutionis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in
civil cases for specific

performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by

foreign nationals may
be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the
state of the most significant
relationship rule, or forum non conveniens.

HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive

phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Jurisdiction & choice of
law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to
this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law w/c
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to
exercise jurisdiction does
not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex for will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do
not always provide the
necessary significant contacts for the other.
The question of whether the law of a state can be
applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of
that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue

jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects.

For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must
have jurisdiction over
the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter,
over the issues of
the case and, in cases involving property, over the
res or the thing w/c is the subject of the
litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually
referring to subject
matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matterin a judicial proceeding
is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the
court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled

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to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the
dismissal of an action
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must
show that the court or
tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the
power to adjudicate the
claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not
properly vested by law
w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific
performance & damages is
one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC
of Lipa City.What
they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of
lex loci celebrationisand lex contractusand the state of the most significant
relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationisrelates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the
law of the place where a
contract is made. The doctrine of ex contractusor Lex loci contractus
means the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed.It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most
significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute,
the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to
the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed,
and the
domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule
takes into account
several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance
with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved. Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws
make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be
applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily,
as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
only inapplicable but also not yet called for

Further, Nippons premature invocation of choice -of-law rules is exposed by

the fact that they have
not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law
should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the
application of the
conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules
for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and
proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element,
is brought before a
court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1)
dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case;
(2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum;
or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other
State or States. The
courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution
and the laws. While it
may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
foreign sovereign law
short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniensbe used to deprive
the RTC of its
jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on
the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular
case and is addressed
to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. 3rd, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

2. CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set
aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent
judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issuance must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.
x x x1
This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 the following
documents to support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest:
1. The report of the National Bureau of Investigation to Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo as regards their investigation on the complaint filed by private
complainant Manuel Dy Awiten against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and
Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated estafa. The report shows that Hao induced Dy to
invest more than a hundred million pesos in State Resources Development
Management Corporation, but when the latters investments fell due, the checks
issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were dishonored for
being drawn against insufficient funds or that the account was closed.2
2. Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.3
3. Copies of the checks issued by private complainant in favor of State Resources
Corporation.4
4. Copies of the checks issued to private complainant representing the supposed
return of his investments in State Resources.5
5. Demand letter sent by private complainant to Ma. Gracia Tan Hao.6

6. Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant to include the incorporators and

members of the board of directors of State Resources Development Management
Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated estafa.
Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya.7
7. Counter-Affidavits of Chester De Joya and the other accused, Ma. Gracia Hao and
Danny S. Hao.
Also included in the records are the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny
Nicdao finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his other co-accused for
syndicated estafa,8 and a copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources
Development Management Corporation naming petitioner as incorporator and director
of said corporation.
This Court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable
cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It bears
remembering that "in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of
which all reasonable men have an abundance."9 Thus, the standard used for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt
of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against
the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest
against him.
The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge
tend to show that therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of
money in State Resources Development Management Corporation; that he issued
several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the
corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly
representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for
insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being
incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and
transactions. These are all that need to be shown to establish probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are
indeed guilty of the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be
emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally
the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct
a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.10 In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence. In the present case, it is notable that the resolution issued by State
Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases for his findings that there is
probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689.
The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court,
which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of
arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of
the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it

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is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the
orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the
application of the exception.lavvph!l.ne+
In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from
this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit
to the courts jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the
exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such
jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the
complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the
voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the
court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction
over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of
the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the
pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or
stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the
thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or
by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or
subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or
suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident
defendant.
Justice Regalado continues to explain:
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property
in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service
of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due
process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene
in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or
administrative tribunals.11
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief
from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued
refusal to submit to the courts jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to
uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to
place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges
against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object
of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the courts
jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

3. IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.

GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of
dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock registered
in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the
recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all
others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiffs right
to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with
respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner,
Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins
and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and
excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons by publication were served
upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his
answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a
judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC
of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and
entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all the
cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the alleged judgment of the SC of the
State of New York is res judicata. Petitioners demurrer was overruled, thus this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of
New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the
respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and
of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority
specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the
respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares
of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of affirmative
reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFIManila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioners
crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the
State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New
York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by
section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court)

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and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle
and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment
annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioners
favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res judicata on all the
questions constituting the subject matter of civil case and argues on the assumption
that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause.
Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity
and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint
is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the
parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The
test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry,
not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is
erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the
question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by
that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petition denied.
4. EMILIO V. REYES, protestant-appellant,
vs.
APOLONIO R. DIAZ, protestee-appellee.
MORAN, J.:
This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the
jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first,
whether or not there is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his
certificate of candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to
pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been
challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest.
Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue."
Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue." It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in
the statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception
arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense." (15 C. J. 735; Johnson vs.
Wells, 91 Fed. 1; U. S. vs. Lee, 84 Fed. 626; Vinal vs. Continental Constr., etc. Co., 34
Fed. 228; Starnes vs. Mutual Loan etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597; 29 SE 452.) There is in our
Constitution or in the law aforecited nothing which may lend the word "jurisdiction"
therein used a broader meaning than jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the
contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law, which is to confine the
appellate jurisdiction of this court to cases of vital importance involving questions of
fundamental character, such, for instance, as the question of validity of statute, treaty
or ordinance, or the legality of any tax, import or assessment which may effect the
very existence of the government, or criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or
death penalty is imposed, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the issue of
jurisdiction which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such
question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere

construction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important
question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter as determined by law.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong (C. J. S., p. 36) and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers
(Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No.
7, 3d Sup. p. 216; Ng Si Chok vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45674). The question, therefore, of
whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and
application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the
different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching
consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system,
the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the
highest court of the land.
In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both
parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven,
the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no
question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to
law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact whether or not the
protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not the until this fact is
proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined.
Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal
provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue
raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be true
that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question my encroach upon issues
completely foreign to those defined in the pleadings, but in such case the question of
jurisdiction that may arise would not be one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but
of jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it
must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. (Banco Espaol Filipino vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216.) But in
some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue (15
C. J. 734; Hutts vs. Martin, 134 Ind. 587, 33 N. E. 676), meaning thereby that the
issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings.
But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subjectmatter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction
over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by
consent either express or implied of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.)
Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely
objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over
the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a
principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Where, for
instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot be said
to have been served with process as to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs. Domingo, 44
Phil. 680). At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is
a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this
function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.
Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the
institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all
the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and
which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their

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illegality. (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781; Cecilio vs. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689;
Cosculluela vs. Gaston, 63 Phil. 41).
Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
Avacea, C.J., Abad Santos, Diaz, Horilleno, and Ozaeta, JJ., concur.
5. VICENTA PANTALEON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO ASUNCION, defendant-appellant.
Feliciano R. Bautista for appellee.
Servando Cleto for appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by defendant Honorato Asuncion from an order denying a
petition for relief from an order declaring him in default and a judgment by default.
On June 12, 1953, plaintiff, Vicenta Pantaleon, instituted this action, in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, to recover from said Asuncion, the sum of P2,000.00,
with interest thereon, in addition to attorney's fees. The summons originally issued
was returned by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija unserved, with the statement that,
according to reliable information, Asuncion was residing in B-24 Tala Estate,
Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was issued, therefore, for service in the place last
mentioned. However, the provincial sheriff of Rizal returned it unserved, with
information that Asuncion had left the Tala Estate since February 18, 1952, and that
diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avail. On plaintiff's motion, the court ordered,
on March 9, 1955, that defendant be summoned by publication, and the summons
was published on March 21 and 28, and April 4, 1955, in the "Examiner", said to be a
newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija. Having failed to appear or answer the
complaint within the period stated in the summons, defendant was, by an order dated
July 12, 1955, declared in default. Subsequently, or on September 8, 1955, after a
hearing held in the absence of the defendant and without notice to him, the court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against said defendant, for the sum of
P2,300.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate, from October 28, 1948, and costs.
About forty-six (46) days later, or on October 24, 1955, the defendant filed a petition
for relief from said order of July 12, 1955, and from said judgment, dated September
8, 1955, and upon the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. Annexed to said
petition were defendant's affidavit and his verified answer. In the affidavit, Asuncion
stated that, on September 26, 1955, at 34 Pitimine Street, San Francisco del Monte
Quezon City, which is his residence, he received notice of a registered letter at the
Post Office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence; that he proceeded
immediately to the latter municipality to claim said letter, which he received on
September 28, 1955; that the letter contained copy of said order of July 12, 1955, and
of the judgment of September 8, 1955, much to his surprise, for he had not been
summoned or notified of the hearing of this case; that had copy of the summons and
of the order for its publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule 7, section
21, of the Rules of Court said summons and order would have reached him, "as the
judgment herein had"; and that his failure to appear before the court is excusable it
being due to the mistake of the authorities concerned in not complying with the
provisions of said section. Upon denial of said petition for relief, defendant perfected

his present appeal, which is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned
summons by publication had not been made in conformity with the Rules of Court.
More specifically, defendant maintains that copy of the summons and of the order for
the publication thereof were not deposited "in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address", in violation of
Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court, and that, had this provision been complied
with, said summons and order of publication would have reached him, as had the
decision appealed from. Said section 21 reads:
If the service has been made by publication, service may be proved by the affidavit of
the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising
manager, to which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached, and by an
affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the
post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last
known address. (Emphasis supplied.).
Plaintiff alleges, however, that the provision applicable to the case at bar is not this
section 21, but section 16, of Rule 7, of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Whenever the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever
the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effect upon him by publication in such places and
for such times as the court may order.
It is, moreover, urged by the plaintiff that the requirement, in said section 21, of an
affidavit showing that copy of the summons and of the order for its publication had
been sent by mail to defendant's last known address, refers to the extraterritorial
service of summons, provided for in section 17 of said Rule 7, pursuant to which:
When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by registered mail; or by
publication in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by ordinary mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall
not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Said section 21, however, is unqualified. It prescribes the "proof of service by
publication", regardless of whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or
not. Section 16 must be read in relation to section 21, which complements it. Then,
too, we conceive of no reason, and plaintiff has suggested none, why copy of the
summons and of the order for its publication should be mailed to non-resident
defendants, but not to resident defendants. We can not even say that defendant
herein, who, according to the return of the Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, was reportedly
residing in Rizal where he, in fact (San Francisco del Monte and Quezon City used
to be part of Rizal), was residing could reasonably be expected to read the
summons published in a newspaper said to be a general circulation in Nueva Ecija.

7
Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer
jurisdiction through service by publication (Bachrach Garage and Taxi Co. vs.
Hotchkiss and Co., 34 Phil., 506; Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921;
Mills vs. Smiley, 9 Idaho 317, 325, 76 Pac. 785; Charles vs. Marrow, 99 Mo. 638;
Sunderland, Cases on Procedure, Annotated, Trial Practice, p. 51), the conclusion is
inescapable that the lower court had no authority whatsoever to issue the order of July
12, 1955, declaring the defendant in default and to render the decision of September
8, 1955, and that both are null and void ad initio.
Apart from the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an
action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within
the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In
other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process
clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.
Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and,
when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights
and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary
appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . .
Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on its own
residents than nonresidents, it has been held that in action in personam . . . service by
publication on resident defendants, who are personally within the state and can be
found therein is not "due process of law", and a statute allowing it is unconstitutional.
(16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis ours.)
Lastly, from the viewpoint of substantial justice and equity, we are of the opinion that
defendant's petition for relief should have been granted. To begin with, it was filed well
within the periods provided in the Rules of Court. Secondly, and, this is more
important, defendant's verified answer, which was attached to said petition, contains
allegations which, if true, constitute a good defense. Thus, for instance, in paragraph
(2) of the "special denials" therein, he alleged:
That it is not true that he failed to pay the said indebtedness of his said wife, as
alleged in paragraph 3 of the complaint, for as a matter of fact, plaintiff and defendant
agreed upon a settlement of the said indebtedness of the latter's deceased wife on
December 5, 1948, whereby defendant was allowed to pay it out of his monthly salary
by instalment of P10.00 monthly beginning January, 1949, and in accordance
therewith, defendant paid unto plaintiff the following sums:
Instalment for January-February, 1948
March 1949 P30.00 paid personally
April 2, 1949 10.00 by money order 7488
May 11, 1949 10.00 by money order 7921
June 10, 1949 10.00 by money order 8230
July 11, 1949 10.00 by money order 8595
August 10, 1949 10.00 by money order 8943
September 1949 10.00 paid personally

October 1949 10.00 paid personally

November 14, 1949 10.00 by money order 9776
December 13, 1949 10.00 by money order 0076
January 10, 1950 10.00 by money order 0445
February 9, 1950 10.00 by money order 0731
March 10, 1950 10.00 by money order 1149
April 10, 1950 10.00 by money order 1387
May 11, 1950 10.00 by money order 1990
June 12, 1950 10.00 by money order 1055
July 11, 1950 10.00 by money order 8850
August 11, 1950 10.00 by money order 9293
September 6, 1950 10.00 by money order 9618
October 10, 1950 10.00 by money order 0008
November 8, 1950 10.00 by money order 0369
December 1950 10.00 paid personally
January 2, 1951 10.00 paid personally
February 10, 1951 10.00 paid personally
March 12, 1951 10.00 paid personally
April 1951 10.00 paid personally
May 1951 10.00 paid personally
June 1951 10.00 paid personally
July 1951 10.00 paid personally
August 1951 10.00 paid personally
September 1951 10.00 paid personally
November 1951 10.00 paid personally
December 1951 10.00 paid personally
September 1952 30.00 paid personally
December 1952 20.00 paid personally
January 1953 10.00 paid personally
February 1953 10.00 paid personally
March 1953 10.00 paid personally
April 1953 10.00 paid personally
May 1953 10.00
Total paid P460.00
The specification of the dates of payment, of the amounts paid each time, of the
manner in which each payment was made, and of the number of the money orders in
which eighteen (18) payments had been effected, constitutes a strong indication of the
probable veracity of said allegation, fully justifying the grant of an opportunity to prove
the same.
Wherefore, said order of July 12, 1955, and the aforementioned decision of
September 8, 1955, are hereby set aside and annulled, and let the record of this case
be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with costs against plaintiffappellee. It is so ordered.
6. WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER as her husband, defendants-appellees.

8
Gamboa & Gamboa for plaintiff-appellant.
A. R. Narvasa for defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C. J.:
Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and codefendant, Helen Schenker said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with
her as party defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the magistracy of the
Philippine courts."
The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker-hereinafter referred to as
Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof against herein
plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial
subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the
exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of
said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages.
Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be
published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent,
irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and
derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only
purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into
public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman",
Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the recovery of
P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's fees, and costs, in addition to praying
for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory
expressions". In due course, thereafter, the lower court, rendered the decision above
referred to. A reconsiderating thereof having been denied, Gemperle interposed the
present appeal.
The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower court had
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker. Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen,
residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons in the
Philippines, although the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been
served personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction
over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary appearance on his
part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his
person, and an answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by
counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint, respectfully aver", which is allegedly a
general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in
said answer; but this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including
her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative defenses, one of
which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged
waiver of this defense. Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired
jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him
upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and
attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which

apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In

other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of
her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against
him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the
action brought by her on his behalf.
Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is
premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, which
cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefore from is, likewise,
untenable.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, is hereby, reversed, and the case
remanded to the lower court for proceedings, with the costs of this instance
defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
7. BALBINO SEQUITO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ANATALIO LETRONDO,
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Hon. S. C. Moscoso,
presiding, awarding to plaintiffs Balbino Sequito, et al., ownership of a parcel of land
situated in Dagami, Leyte, and ordering defendant Anatolio Letrondo to vacate the
premises and to pay damages in the amount of P4,000.
The record discloses the following: On October 21, 1955, the complaint in this case
was filed in court and the summons was served by police sergeant Borja upon
defendant's daughter who was then 12 years old and a fourth grade pupil (p. 4
appellant's brief). Defendant failed to file an answer and so, upon plaintiffs' motion, he
was declared in default. Plaintiffs presented their evidence ex-parte; the same consists
of the testimony of plaintiff Balbino Sequito only. Upon this testimony the court on
February 7, 1956 rendered the judgment appealed from.
On March 13, 1956, the defendant, moved for new trial, alleging that he did not
receive of the summons and that he came to know about the case only when he
received a copy of the decision on February 23, 1956. He attached to his motion
affidavits of merit and a copy of a deed of sale of the land. The motion was denied,
hence this appeal.
The sole issue is, Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion for new trial.
Resolution of this question depends upon whether or not there had been a valid
substituted service of summons in accordance with Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.
The record shows that the service of the summons was irregular. It was served by one
police sergeant, Pacifico Borja, who was not a sheriff or a court officer, and who was
not authorized by the court to deliver the summons. This violates the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court. The proof of service is also not under oath as
required by Section 20 of said rule.
Moreover, even if the summons was really served upon defendant's daughter, still
there was no valid substituted service because she, being only 12 years of age and a
grade four pupil, could not have appreciated the importance of the paper delivered to

9
her. We can not say with certainty that the daughter was at the time of a suitable age
and discretion to be entrusted with so important a document as a court summons
(Section 8, Rule 7, Rules of Court).
As there is no evidence to show that defendant ever came to know about the case
before he received the decision, the irregularity in the service was not cured.
Defendant's failure to file his answer is, therefore, justified.
The record would also reveal that the defendant has a valid defense, which consists of
Annex "B" (pp. 13-15, R.O.A.), a deed of sale of the land executed by Francisco
Sequito, predecessor in-interest of the plaintiffs, in favor of Vicente Capatay, who, in
turn, sold it to the defendant (pp. 12-13, R.O.A.). Besides, the defendant claims to
have been in possession of the land from the date of purchase up to the present time.
The decision and the order appealed from are hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia
and Barrera, JJ., concurs.
8. PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
rendered in civil case No. 11206, which declared that the judgment rendered in civil
case No. 8967 of the same Court and the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
No. 2903-R reversing it on appeal are binding upon plaintiff Lili Sison Jaranilla but that
said judgments, in so far as the plaintiffs Lita Sison Kalaw, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio
Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction over
their persons by the courts rendering them; that the writ of execution in pursuance
thereof issued therein against the aforesaid plaintiffs is null and void; and that after the
judgment rendered herein shall have become final, said plaintiffs will be allowed to
present evidence in support of the second cause of action alleged in their complaint,
without costs. The judgment appealed from was rendered on a stipulation of facts
which reads, as follows:
Come now the parties in the above-entitled case and in order to simplify the
proceedings agree on the following facts:
1. That in Civil Case No. 8967 of this Court of Pangasinan, Consolacion Gonzales,
Vicenta, Carlos, Belen, Asela, Salud and Angela, all surnamed Puzon, widow and
children of the deceased Rafael Puzon, respectively, were the plaintiffs, and Lourdes
Ichon Vda. de Sison, was the original defendant.
2. That in her amended answer of June 13, 1946, in said case, the defendant therein,
Lourdes Ichon Sison, stated that "it would be necessary to include (in the complaint)
all the children of the deceased Bonifacio Sison (husband of defendant Lourdes Ichon)
in substitution of the deceased; that the legitimate children are: Lili Sison, of legal age,
married to Antonio Jaranilla, Lita Amelia Sison, 19 years, Zenaida Sison, 17 years,
Bonifacio Sison, Jr., 15 years, and Rufo Sison, 12 years, all residing with defendant
Lourdes Ichon de Sison in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and that inasmuch as the last four
are still minors, it would be necessary that a guardian ad litem be appointed for them,
and it is suggested that defendant Lourdes Ichon de Sison be appointed as such.

3. That on June 25, 1946, the plaintiffs in said case again amended their complaint by
naming therein as co-defendants the above-mentioned children of the deceased
Bonifacio Sison and requested that their mother, the original defendant, be appointed
as their guardian ad litem in the case, but Antonio Jaranilla, husband of Lili Sison
Jaranilla, however, was not included as one of the party defendants. The age and civil
status of the children as stated in paragraph 2 hereof is hereby admitted by the parties
to be true and correct at the time of the filing of the amended complaint just
mentioned.
4. That on July 1, 1946, the Court issued the following order:
No objection having been presented by the defendants to the admission of the second
amended complaint filed by plaintiffs in the above-entitled case, the same is hereby
admitted.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue the corresponding summons against the
new defendants Lili Sison and the minors Lita Amelia Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio
Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison, through their guardian ad litem Lourdes Ichon.
The plaintiffs herein agree that the above order was in fact issued without admitting
that Lourdes Ichon Sison had already then been appointed their guardian ad litem.
5. That on July 1, 1946, the Court issued summons addressed "to Lili Sison, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and the minors Lita Amelia Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio, Sison, Jr.,
and Rufo Sison, represented by their guardian ad litem, Lourdes Ichon, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan," which was served on Lourdes I. Sison on July 9, 1946, and on Lili Sison
Jaranilla on July 15, 1946, but no summons were personally ever served to each of
the minors Lita Amelia Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison. A
certified copy of said summons and its return is attached as Annex "B" of the herein
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration dated July 14, 1950, and is hereby incorporated
by references as part of this stipulation of facts.
6. That the property object of the litigation in said case was originally the conjugal
property of the spouses Bonifacio Sison and Lourdes Ichon, which the therein
plaintiffs, through Rafael Puzon, claimed to have acquired from Josefa Macasieb Vda.
de Sison.
7. That on July 17, 1946, Attorneys Perez, Gayagoy, Abenojar and Ignacio D. Castillo,
filed an answer to the amended complaint stated to be on behalf of the new
defendants Lili Sison, Lita Amelia Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio Sison, Jr., and Rufo
Sison. This stipulation is subject to the plaintiffs' reservation in paragraph 14 hereof.
8. That on September 1, 1946, Attys. Perez, Abenojar and Ignacio D. Castillo, filed an
answer, special defense and counterclaim, alleging among others, "that the defendant
Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison and the other defendants, hereby reproduce all the
allegations stated by them in the last answer dated June 13, 1946 and July 17, 1946,
filed by them in this case, as their answer to the last and second amended complaint
of the plaintiffs." This stipulation is also subject to plaintiffs' reservation in paragraph
14.
9. That Atty. Ignacio D. Castillo, appearing for the defendants, stated in an affidavit
attached to the amended answer of September 5, 1946, "that Lili Sison, Lita Amelia
Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio Sison, Jr., were only summoned last July, 1946, and
that they have so far filed only one answer." This stipulation admits as a fact that such
affidavit was filed without the herein plaintiffs admitting its materiality and competency
which they herewith question and is subject to the reservation in paragraph 14.

10
10. That upon petition filed by attorney for the plaintiffs in said case, the hearing of
Civil Case No. 8967 was set for September 12, 1946, and on said date the Court
issued the following order:
Upon petition of Atty. Ignacio D. Castillo, the petitioner herein, Lourdes Ichon Vda. de
Sison, is hereby appointed as guardian ad litem of her minor children, namely, Lita
Amelia Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison, to represent them
in this proceeding. The said petitioner is hereby required to take her oath before
discharging her duties as such guardian ad litem.
11. That the minutes of the Court on the hearing on September 12, 1946, certifies,
among other things, that "before proceeding with the hearing of the case, counsel for
the defendants, prayed that defendant Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison be appointed as
guardian ad litem ad her minor children Lita Amelia Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio
Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison to represent them in this case. The Court granted the
petition. Whereupon, defendant Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison took her oath as such
guardian ad litem before Deputy Clerk of this Court, Mr. Genaro Ferrer.
12. That on February 11, 1948, upon motion of the defendants therein, the Court of
First Instance rendered an order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 8967 after
plaintiffs had introduced all their evidence and after the defendant had presented five
witnesses, one of them being Lourdes Ichon who was still testifying but before the
defense had completed their evidence.
13. Tat the plaintiffs brought up the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
2903-R and said Court of Appeals, on September 27, 1949, reversed the order of
dismissal and rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, applying the doctrine in the
case of Arroyo vs. Azur, 43 Off. Gaz., 54.
14. That in the Court of First Instance, in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court, Attys. Perez, Santos & Abenojar, Victoriano Gayagoy, Ignacio D. Castillo,
Aquino & Allas and Porfirio V. Sison have made it appear in all their pleadings and
appearances that they were appearing for all of the defendants in the case, but the
herein plaintiffs deny that they had authorized said attorneys to represent them in any
way in said Civil Case No. 8967.
15. That copy of the motion for the execution of the judgment and copy of the writ of
execution issued pursuant thereto were served upon the attorney of record of the
defendants, but were not served personally again upon the herein plaintiffs.
16. That in accordance with the writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan
placed the herein defendants in possession of the land involved in Civil Case No.
8967.
17. The parties agree that the plaintiffs herein, except Lili Sison, will testify that they
had not known of Civil Case No. 8967 until their mother informed them about it after
the denial of the Supreme Court of the petition for certiorari, without the defendants
admitting the veracity of such fact.
18. That counsel for the plaintiffs herein married the plaintiff Lita Sison on December
16, 1948, and was practising attorney since 1945, but claims that he had no
knowledge of Civil Case No. 8967 until he was informed by his mother-in-law, Lourdes
Sison, of its defeat.
Wherefore, the parties submit the first cause of action for decision on the above
stipulation of facts, with the reservation contained in plaintiffs' motion of September 20,
1951.
Parties further pray that they be granted a period of 10 days from date to submit
simultaneous memorandum and an additional 5 days to submit reply memorandum.

Lingayen, Pangasinan, September 20, 1951.

(Sgd.) AUGUSTO KALAW
Attorney for the plaintiffs
(Sgd.) VICENTE BENGZON
Attorney for the defendants
and the following additional stipulation of facts designated as paragraph 13-a of the
stipulation:
That counsel for the defendants filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari against the decision of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-3444, and the
Supreme Court in its resolution of January 31, 1950, ordered the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit without requiring the respondents to answer it.
This stipulation is subject to the reservation in paragraph 14.
There is no doubt that plaintiff Lili Sison Jaranilla is bound by the judgment rendered in
civil case No. 8967 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and reversed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 2903-R, because her husband was not
a necessary party, the controversy therein involved being her share in the parcels of
land which she had inherited from her deceased father.
As to the second point raised and decided in favor of the rest of the plaintiffs by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, it appears that the plaintiffs who were minors
except Lili Sison Jaranilla were not summoned in the action (civil case No. 8967), as
provided for in section 10, Rule 7; that Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison, the defendant
therein, represented to the Court that as her children were necessary parties they
should be joined as defendants; that on 25 June 1946, as prayed for by the defendant
therein, the plaintiffs therein amended their complaint impleading said children who, as
the agreed statement of facts stipulates with the exception of Lili Sison who was of
age, were minors over 15 years of age and Rufo, 12 years old; that on 1 July 1946 the
Court admitted the amended complaint and ordered the new defendants to be
summoned; that the summons issued on that date by the clerk of court was served on
the 9th of that month upon Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison and on the 15th of that month
upon Lili Sison Jaranilla; that on 17 July 1946 attorneys Perez, Gayagoy, Abenojar and
Ignacio D. Castillo filed an answer to the amended complaint in behalf of the
impleaded defendants Lili Sison Jaranilla, Lita Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio Sison,
Jr., and Rufo Sison; that on 12 September 1946, as prayed for by the attorney
appearing for the defendants therein, Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison was appointed
guardian ad litem to represent her minor children and qualified as such by taking her
oath before deputy clerk of court Genaro Ferrer; and that in the Court of First Instance,
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, attorneys Perez, Gayagoy, Santos & Abenojar,
Ignacio D. Castillo, Aquino & Allas and Porfirio V. Sison represented in all their
pleadings that they were appearing for all the defendants therein. Taking into
consideration all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the
appearance of the attorneys in behalf of the minors in the action is equivalent to
service.1 The denial by the minors of having authorized said attorneys to represent
them may be conceded but such denial does not destroy the presumption that the
services of the attorneys had been engaged by the guardian ad litem not only to
represent her but also the minors.

11
If the duly appointed guardian ad litem, who is the mother of the minors, did not
consider the summons served on her alone as a summons also on her minor children,
or if she did not authorize her attorneys to represent her minor children, she should
have raised the question in the case before or during the trial or thereafter but before
judgment was rendered. The failure of the guardian ad litem and of her attorneys to
raise the point of lack of summons service upon the minors personally is a waiver on
the part of said minors represented by their mother, their guardian ad litem, to
question the lack of such service upon them personally. As already stated, the
voluntary appearance of the attorneys not only for Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison but
also for the minors is equivalent to service.
The judgment appealed from, in so far as it annuls the judgment rendered in civil case
No. 8967 and the judgement of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 2903-R reversing it
on appeal and the writ of execution issued therein, is reversed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis
pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3)
failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,
concur.

HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati

NO

9. PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

G.R. No. 103493
June 19, 1997

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several
cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this
jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem,
a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim
of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of
the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to
assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S.
court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be
rendered would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under
the principle of forum non conveniens:

FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala
International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC),
secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through
its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an
Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by
which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas,
U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of
the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note
executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the
money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness
and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to
Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by
the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc.
sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of
the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated
by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to
1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint
For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private
respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners
in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court
of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at
a price 400 percent more than its true value.

The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the
controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the
U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens, even as
it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the
principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the
ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?

First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include
forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.

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Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.