Planas v.

Comelec
Planas vs. Commission on Elections Case Digest (Consti-1)
Planas vs. Commission on Elections
[GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs.
Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National
Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs.
Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec
[GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979]
Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs
as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions
Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which
was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said
Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said
Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was
in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing
the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention
approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,
30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7
December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the
grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law
because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of
the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are,
by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical
actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued
an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose
of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the
President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until

7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite
scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said
General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17
December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the
events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled
to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to
Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority
to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds there for, which Congress unquestionably
could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative
to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal
Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided
"as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in
said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of
Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted
on certain public questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the
Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms
instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new
Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of
the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4]
The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the
existing Constitution despite Martial Law."
Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential
Decree 73.
Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a
legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one,
on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon
the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less
than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which
expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving
said issue.
Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the
People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.
Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for
the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said
Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be

held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the
circumstances may justify.
Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the
people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.
Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not
been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases
having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners
in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to
the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental
Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately
argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve
such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible
under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering
the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and
academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which
to move in the premises.
Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court,
the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the
legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of
the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic,
whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said
Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the
proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the
petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine
that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4)
Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the
proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold
the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law
affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar
as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion
that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the
1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the
petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra
are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the
factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of
the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly
raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b]
Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No.

1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the
"purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum
among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the
requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances,
the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as
legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice
Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any
judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a
question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be
dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions.
Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case
No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable
period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest
the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of
said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he
believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits
everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are
dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Jus cogens
That body of peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted;
those norms recognized by the international community as a whole as being
fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order.
Elementary rules that concern the safeguarding of peace and notably those that
prohibit recourse to force or the threat of force. Norms of a humanitarian nature are
included, such as prohibitions against Genocide, Slavery, and racial discrimination.
Jus cogens may, therefore, operate to invalidate a treaty or agreement between
states to the extent of the inconsistency with any such principles or norms.

Lambino v. Comelec
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling
what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987

constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by
adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential
form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due
to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.
Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC
did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed
at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment
and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the
constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the
legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with
the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

Imbong v. Comelec
Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970
RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention
Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2
delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November,
1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be
composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts
according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2
delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their
candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the
election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final
adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving
support/representing a delegate to the convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related
petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention
assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity
of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether
the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a

Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners
are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose
amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were
attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the
basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is
not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less
population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates
I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify
members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a
safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow
them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure
candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual
merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create
discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Tolentino v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of
the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After
election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE
TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of
the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial
elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently
approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the
Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
violative to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted
to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context,
where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.

Defensor v. Comelec
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift
the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,
Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for
hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.
Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable
by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin
filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on
peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is
outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on
the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing
legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that
what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other
provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee
of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision
cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue
of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.