Bayan v.

Executive Secretary
GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by
US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship,
both countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of
the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement both countries negotiated for
its possible extension. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the
extension of the US military bases which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security. During the term of Pres. Ramos, he approved the VFA
which was the result of a negotiation on the complementing strategic interests of
the US and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. On October 5, 1998, Pres.
Joseph Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon,
ratified the VFA. The Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the
VFA were then transmitted to the Philippine Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The necessary 2/3 votes of the members of
the Senate were gathered thus concurring with the ratification of the VFA under
Resolution No. 18. On June 1, 1999 the VFA officially entered into force. The
petitioners argue that the VFA is governed by the provision of Sec. 25, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Sec. 25, Article XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities should apply in the instant case. Being a special provision,
Sec. 25, Article XVIII will prevail over the general provision of Sec 21, Article VII of
the Constitution. Also, the argument that Sec 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since
no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in the
VFA is untenable. The clause found in Sec 25 does not refer to foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent
subjects as evidenced by the use of comma and the disjunctive word or. This
interpretation which contemplates three different situations a military treaty the
subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities and any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Sec
25 is also manifested in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on
the said section. Moreover, the establishment of military bases within the territory
of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by the new
weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea

vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning
to their home country. Therefore first requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII already satisfied
by considering the VFA as a treaty. The second condition of Sec 25 requires that the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate should be viewed in light of Sec 21
Art. VII of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 votes for treaties or international
agreements in general. The 2/3 votes is again satisfied after the approval of the VFA
by the Senate through Resolution No. 18. The third requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII is
that the other contracting party acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. The
records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines, show
that the US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Also, the deliberations
of the Consitutional Commission show that,through the words of Fr. Bernas, ...we
will accept whatever they say.If they say that we have done everything to make it a
treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.. Also through
Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
International law Commission in 1949 provides that Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. This is also
known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, the third requisite is also
satisfied.

Dario v. Mison
Dario vs. Mison (1989)
Facts:
When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the
government, upon which Mison, the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of
termination to 394 Customs officials. Some sought reinstatement from the CSC
which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went directly to the
Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also,
RA 6656 was passed, providing that all officers and employees who are found by the
Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of
this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed. The validity of this law is also
put into question.
Held:
All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question
only on its nature and extent.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to th e
new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure .At
this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of

office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by

reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the
Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to
comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not
obliged to prove anything because the Constitution allows it. Evidently, the question
is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a
license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly
done under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or
reason.
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the
service. And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the
reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers
tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted.
The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those
career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be
entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution
of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive , must concur, to wit:
1. The separation must not be for cause, and
2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional
Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2,
1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is
upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its
provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage - that inferred from the
provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document. What
must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolution ary
powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent
from Executive Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm
and ruthless propensity that accompanies reorganizations - notwithstanding the fact
that removals arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that
such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Noteworthy is the
injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the
basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a
manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as
Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would have
been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and
right.
Lastly, reorganizations must be carried out in good faith. In this case, Mison failed to
prove that the reorganization was indeed made in good faith because he hired more
people to replace those that he fired and no legitimate structural changes have

been made. To sum up, the President could have validly removed officials before the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution even without cause because it was a
revolutionary government. However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
the State did not lose its right to reorganize resulting to removals but such
reorganization must be made in good faith.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1990)

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