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Atty. Arceno
Adoption and Custody of Minors

-------- INSERT RAEMONDS PART HERE --------------------------------

decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the

Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree,
having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force,
no longer could be pursued.

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, Petitioner, v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

(previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), Respondent.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set

aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100
of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke
the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right
within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.

FACTS:

(2) Whether the right to rescind adoption is a vested right. NO!

Spouses Diosdado and Isabelita LAHOMs marriage was not blessed with a
child. As a result, they took into care Isabelitas nephew JOSE MELVIN
SIBULO whom they treated as their own child.

It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in

statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege
that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be
for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been
exercised.

In 1975, the petition for adoption of SIBULO was granted by the court so
the latter was legally adopted.
In 1998, RA No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) took effect and deleted
from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
However, the relationship between SPOUSES LAHOM and SIBULO soured
causing ISABELITA to commence a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption in 1999.
SIBULO moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and
lack of cause of action in view of the provisions of RA 8552.
ISABELITA, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code
and the Family Code, the laws then in force- vested right.

NOTE:
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture
of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

ISSUE/S:

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then,
the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a

Proceedings for the Hospitalization of Insane Person

CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI
YENG), widow of Chin Ah Kim, Petitioners, v. PEDRO CONCEPCION,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO, Respondents.

Page9

(1) Whether ISABELITA may pursue the petition to rescind the

decree of adoption even after the effectivity of RA 8552- NO!

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Atty. Arceno

CHAN SAM (alias Chin Ah Woo) was charged with murder.

However, on a plea of insanity, trial judge acquitted CHAN SAM, and
instead ordered his confinement for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital.
CHAN SAMs wife and father-in-law then made efforts to obtain his release
so that he might be taken to Hongkong to join his wife in that city.
The heirs of CHIN AH KIM, the victim, opposed the same, but the trial
judge sustained the courts right to make an order allowing CHAN SAM to
leave San Lazaro Hospital, pursuant to Art. 8 of the Penal Code:
"When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law
defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in
one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court."
On the other hand, the heirs of CHIN AH KIM argued that Art. 8 of the
Penal Code was superseded by Sec. 1048 of the Admin. Code, giving
authority to the DIRECTOR OF HEALTH to discharge such insane person as
follows:
"When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in
any Government hospital or other place for the insane is
temporarily or permanently cured, or may be releases without
danger, he may discharge such patient, and shall notify the
Judge of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the
patient is confined by order of the court."
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether Sec 1048 of the Admin Code impliedly repealed Art 8
of the Penal Code- NO!

also that the converse proposition is equally tenable, and is that any
person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance
with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody
in an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have
been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or
permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the
powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are complementary each
with the other.
As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to adopt all
reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as
insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be
accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of
Health in proper cases.
(2) Whether the judge exceeded his authority in ordering the
release of CHAN SAM from his confinement, without first having
before him the opinion of the Director of Health- YES!
XXX After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent Judge
acted patiently and cautiously in the matters which came before him, yet
he exceeded his authority when he issued his orders XXX without first
having before him the opinion of the Director of Health.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Habeas Data and Amparo

MONCUPA vs ENRILE
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on the
allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member.

XXX Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section
1048 of the Administrative Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and
section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that
both can stand together. XXX

After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the petitioner was
not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession
of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under
Presidential Decree No. 33.

XXX we think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion
that the Director of Health was without power to release, without
proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an
asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think

Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner,

one, for illegal possession of firearms and the other for violation of P.D. 33.
During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment

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FACTS:

SPEC PRO May 2 Case Digests

Atty. Arceno
and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's
motions for bail were denied by the lower court.

The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, Pio, the private complainant,
and her mother.

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the instant petition has become moot and academic in view
of the petitioner's temporary release
HELD: NO. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on
the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of
movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is
inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial
of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear
to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has,
in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the
privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why
the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.

CHUA y CABALLES vs CA
(Na-delay ng na-delay trial ni petitioner.)
FACTS:
Petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor. Because
the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.

The prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the
private complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad.
Petitoner filed a petition for bail. The trial did not proceed because the
petitioners counsel filed a Manifestation that his presence was required in
an execution sale in Cavite.
The trial court reset the hearing of the case and gave the prosecution ten
(10) days to file its opposition to the petitioners petition for bail. It likewise
ordered the issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require
him to attend the trial.
The petitioner filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right
to speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion
for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail.
The court issued an Order denying the petitioners motion for an earlier trial
date and denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of
guilt against the petitioner was strong.
Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the meantime, he
had been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive
thesubpoena issued to him by the court. The prosecution prayed for
continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to speedy
trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the trial.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts denying his
petition for bail. However, the petitioner preempted the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss the on the ground
that his right to speedy trial had been violated
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received
the subpoena issued by the trial court, because of which the prosecution
again failed to present him as a witness during the trial The prosecution,
again, prayed for continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected.
The court, however, granted the motion and reset the trial.
Judge Laurea issued an Order inhibiting himself from hearing the case to
avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and

Page9

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that the petitioner was

temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of
National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents
stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot
and academic as in similar cases.

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Atty. Arceno

During the hearing Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutors motion
to be given five (5) days within which to oppose the petitioners motion to
dismiss. Judge Antonio also set the date for the trial. On the latter date, the
trial court issued an Omnibus Order denying the petitioners motion to
dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the
petitioners right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could
not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted
that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the trials.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition. The CA issued a
Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of
remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith,
the petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had
chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without
prejudice to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered
the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas
corpus.
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy
trial and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b)
Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial court
committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and
(d) Judge Antonio had prejudged the case against him.
CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
assail the trial courts order denying his petition for bail, motion to dismiss
the case, and Judge Laureas order of inhibition
HELD: No. Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his
petition for bail was to file a petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the said order. If the petitioner had done so, his
petition would have been granted (because as gleaned from the assailed
order of the trial court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the
private complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is

invalid.The trial court would have had to issue another order containing the
summary of the testimonies of the private complainant and her mother,
including its findings and conclusions. However, the petitioner would still
not be entitled to be released from detention in the meantime)
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders,
or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said
processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A
writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use,
except to bring before the court a record material to be considered in
exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other
hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also
reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed
the petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ.
The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if
the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no question
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the
person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is
mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the
case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The
petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal,
and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court.
(We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution
and of his right to due process. However, the petitioner never invoked in
the trial court his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case
against him. What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule
119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time,
only in the Court of Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas corpus.)

Page9

objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of justice.

The case was re-raffled presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Judge Laureas which the
latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to
reconsider the same.

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Atty. Arceno

FACTS:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila.
A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named
Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
Respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without
notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing
Sequiera to Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court
in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain
the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not
find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija,
Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for
habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions
HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any
member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or
any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted
it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of
First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.
(One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over
the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court
of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by
the Solicitor General: That the serving officer will have to "search for the
child all over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or
unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or
difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest,
since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.)

FELIPE MADRIAN vs FRANCISCA MADRIAN

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married with three sons and a
daughter. After a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing
with him their three sons (2 are minors) to Albay and to Laguna,
subsequently. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of
Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that
petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then
to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of
their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and
produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be
returned to her custody.
Petitioner then filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was
unfit to take custody of the children because she was habitually drunk,
frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning,
spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a
mother, and that the Family Courts have jurisdiction over the case.
CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance
and ruling that under the family courts, respondent was entitled to customs
asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family
Code, respondent was entitled to custody of minors.

Page9

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf
of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON

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Atty. Arceno
ISSUE:

found for hearing and decision on the

merits.

Whether or not CA has jurisdiction on habeas corpus on the

custody of the minor children

YES. RA 8369 provides that:

The Court of Appeals should take
cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxxxxxxxx
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction overhabeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors
And was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC which likewise provides
that
In any case, whatever uncertainty there
was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ
of habeas corpus. A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region
to which the Family Court belongs.
xxxxxxxxx
The petition may likewise
be
filed
with
the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or with any
of its members and, if so granted,
the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines. The
writ may be made returnable to a
Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals

that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody
cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be
issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain
to the ancillary remedythat may be availed of in conjunction with a
petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other
words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case
pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court
to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a coequal court and judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
[11]
Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it
does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and
ancillary matters.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

SAMUEL BARREDO y GOLANI vs HON. VICENTE VINARAO

FACTS:
Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his release from the maximum
security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the
ground that he has already served the sentence imposed on him in cases
of carnapping and illegal possession of firearm, both under RTC Quezon
City.
According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he already served a
total of 18 years. He claims that, on October 9, 2001, the Board of Pardons
and Parole passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his
sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He further points out that,
based on the Bureau of Corrections revised computation table for
determining the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct while
serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:

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HELD:

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Atty. Arceno
SENTENCE

NO.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, however, the trial

court erred in imposing a straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years in
the carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial court deprived
petitioner of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.Hence, it was
void insofar as it failed to impose an indeterminate sentence.

WRIT
OF HABEAS
CORPUS WILL NOT
ISSUE
IF
DETENTION IS BY
VIRTUE OF VALID
JUDGMENT
The
writ
of
habeas
corpus
applies
to
all
cases
of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty. It was devised as
a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of
inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is
detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, the writ
may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading
to the conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional
circumstances:
(1)
there was a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person;
(2)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence
or
(3)
the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess.
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed. Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final judgment of
the Quezon City RTC convicting him for the crimes of carnapping and illegal
possession of firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of habeas
corpus.

SENTENCE IS VOID
INSOFAR
AS
IT
FAILED TO IMPOSE
AN
INDETERMINATE

Since the crime was committed by means of violence against or

intimidation of persons, the imposable penalty under the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972 was imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months and
not more than 30 years. Furthermore, pursuant to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the court should have imposed an indeterminate sentence
with a maximum term not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special
penal law and a minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same law.Therefore, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment
not for 30 years but for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4
months as minimum to 30 years as maximum.
REDUCTION
OF
PENALTY
UNDER
AMENDATORY LAW
SHOULD
BE
APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY
Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed
upon him in the illegal possession of firearms case in view of the passage
of RA 8294. The law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession of
firearms to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than P15,000. Being favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied
retroactively to benefit him. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.

PETITIONER HAS NOT YET SERVED THE PENALTIES IMPOSED ON

HIM
Per the certification issued by the Bureau of Corrections, as of
April 3, 2007, petitioner has served a total of 18 years, 4 months and 26
days, inclusive of his good conduct time allowance and preventive
imprisonment. Thus, while he has already served the minimum penalty in

Page9

HELD:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to writ of habeas corpus?

SPEC PRO May 2 Case Digests

Atty. Arceno
the carnapping case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the
illegal possession of firearms case. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled
to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole
because only prisoners who have served the minimum penalty imposed on
them may be released on parole on such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
Petitioners claim that the Board of Pardons and Parole passed a
resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence does not justify
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Commutation of sentence is a
prerogative of the Chief Executive.Hence, even if petitioners claim were
true, the recommendation of the Bureau of Pardons and Parole was just
that, a mere recommendation. Until and unless approved by the President,
there is no commutation to speak of.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR.

ASHRAF KUNTING, Petitioner.
In 2001 petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the
Malaysian Internal Security Act. In 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police turned
over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants
for his arrest issued by RTC of Isabela City, Basilan, on charges of four
counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with said
RTC. He was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNPIG at Camp Crame.
Atty. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, informed the Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was
already in the custody of the PNP-IG and requested for Kuntings
temporary detention at Camp Crame due to the high security risks
involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.

of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the
following reasons:
(1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating
that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to
recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to
the ASG; and
(2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if
he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the
municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated
Criminal Case and an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting.
Police Inspector Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with
the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order, citing, among
other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the
venue of the trial of Criminal Case against Kunting, which was allegedly
filed by the DOJ.
Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. He alleged that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12,
2003 by the PNP-IG and alleged that he was never informed of the charges
filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga
City. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident.
He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he
filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the
records as "for safekeeping purposes only."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court
PNP-IG Director Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Zuo of
DOJ, requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer

NO.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas
corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If,
however,
the
detention
is
proven
lawful,
then
the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate.

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Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request stating that the Presiding
Judge Bucoy issued an Alias Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case allowing
temporary detention. However, considering he is a high security risk he
should be brought to Isabela Basilan as soon as the necessary security
escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment order
can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by
the prosecution.

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Atty. Arceno

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that

the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued
by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of
arrest issued by Judge Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus
authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention. In accordance with the last sentence of
Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be
discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v.
Court of Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in
court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to
request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City,
Basilan to Pasig City. The OSG stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting
the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the
DOJ. In this regard, the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed
to take positive steps towards action on said motion. Petition for habeas
corpus is dismissed.

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B.

SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES,Petitioners,
vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO,
JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA
CITY, Respondents

Loran Abanilla and Marie Antonette Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners
Orlando and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private
respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes.
Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Loran in his personal
capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody. Trial court issued an order directing the mother and
in-laws to produce and bring before the Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanil
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied. They then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for
certiorari against the trial courts orders
NO.
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family
Code which provides that: no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were
compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply
an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert
that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law,
has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or
involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother.
The respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of
the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding
the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to
his right as the father to see his son asserts that the writ of habeas
corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to
see his father and vice versa.
Respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie
Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He
alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country
as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father,
should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
The Supreme Court said that: as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to

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Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not
allowed:

SPEC PRO May 2 Case Digests

Atty. Arceno
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and explain why they are restraining his liberty and that the assailed
order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial courts full inquiry
into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family
Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental
authority over their son and consequently joint custody although the
couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated
by the court absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their child
Private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
To emphasize, the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the
parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child.
Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the
court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private
respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the
father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father
from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

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The order of the trial court directing the petitioners to produce and bring
before the court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel, was affimed.