Swank, D. (2014) - The Political Sources of Labor Market Dualism in Post-Industrial Democracies, 1975-2011. Review of Keynesian Economics, 2 (2), 234-257.

Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2014, pp.
234257
The political sources of labor market

dualism in post-industrial democracies,
19752011
Duane Swank*
Department of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, USA
Increases in wage inequality and atypical employment have occurred across post-industrial
economies in recent decades. Technological change, globalization, the employment shift
to services, and the decentralization of collective bargaining are commonly cited as causes.
I argue that where social democratic parties govern, and where employers and labor
remain highly organized, labor market dualism is mitigated. This should hold because
the organizational scope, centralization, and policymaking integration of labor and capital
facilitates the creation of post-industrial political coalitions necessary for egalitarian
policymaking and implementation by progressive governments, and organizationally blunts
insider politics by sectorally fragmented actors and excessive rent-seeking by narrow
interest groups. I draw on 1975 to 2011 annual data from 18 post-industrial democracies
and estimate models of labor market policy and performance. Findings support the
core argument: social democratic government has significant egalitarian impacts on
policies and performance at high levels of labor and employer organization. Some conventional explanations of dualism also receive support: technological change, trade penetration by developing countries, and deindustrialization are associated with inegalitarian
outcomes.
Keywords: wage dispersion, labor market policy, labor and business organization,
partisan politics, social democracy
JEL codes: D31, D63, E24, I38, J24, J31, J51
INTRODUCTION
The growth of income inequality is a near-universal phenomenon among post-industrial

democracies. Greater wage dispersion among full-time workers and rises in low-wage
irregular employment play a substantial role in this story (OECD 2008; 2011).
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2013 Annual Meetings of the American
Political Science Association, August 29 to September 1, Chicago, IL, USA. I am grateful to
Marquette Universitys Committee on Research as well as the American Political Science
Association Small Research Grant Program for financial support of this project. I also thank
Molly Giese, Mujtaba Isani, and Darren Nah for exceptional research assistance and the journals
referees for very helpful comments. Finally, I acknowledge the debt this paper owes to my
collaborative work with Cathie Jo Martin on some of the issues addressed here.
2014 The Author
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The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies
235
Conventional social science theory places the blame at the door of post-industrialization.
Technological change, globalization, the employment shift to services, trends in family
structure, and the decline of centralized collective bargaining are commonly cited as the
causes. Yet, as Emmenegger et al. (2012) note, the processes through which structural
pressures are translated into policies and outcomes are political. Indeed, my argument
is that where social democratic parties govern, and where employers and labor are
encompassing, centralized, and routinely participate in national policymaking forums,
labor market dualism is mitigated.1
While contested, the most persuasive theory suggests that the interests of low-wage
regular and atypical workers are more likely protected where traditionally egalitarian
social democratic parties rule. Yet the changing realities surrounding feasible political
coalitions in post-industrial societies suggest that the organization of labor and capital
is crucial. Not only should high levels of labor and employer organization have direct
positive effects on outsiders interests (see below on this unconventional view), organization should facilitate the creation of post-industrial political coalitions necessary
for egalitarian policymaking and implementation by progressive governments. The
organizational scope, centralization, and policymaking integration of labor and capital
also blunts insider politics by sectorally fragmented actors and excessive rent seeking
by narrow interest groups common to pluralist political economies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I offer an overview of trends in
labor market inequalities and the conventional theories that purport to explain the
trends. In Section 3, I elaborate my argument on the foundational role played by politics in shaping policies and outcomes. In Section 4, I draw on 19752011 annual data
from 18 nations to provide empirical analyses of the impacts of partisan government,
the organization of labor and capital, and their interaction on wage inequality, atypical
employment, and two dimensions of policy that should mitigate dualism, namely
active labor market programs (hereafter ALMP) and the social wage offered to outsiders. I conclude in Section 5 by assessing the relative power of the theories and future
labor market trajectories.
2
AN OVERVIEW OF LABOR MARKET DUALISM AND ITS CAUSES
I display two familiar labor market outcomes by nation type in Table 1.2 These are the
earnings ratio of workers at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the wage distribution and
the percentage of total employment accounted for by involuntary part-time jobs. As the
OECD (2011) has noted, both high-wage and low-wage workers have been moving
away from the median earner in the majority of advanced economies and, thus, the
90/10 ratio offers a convenient summary indicator of trends. The employment share
of involuntary part-time jobs generally reflects moves toward more temporary and
part-time work and, by isolating involuntary workers, taps the extent of undesirable
irregular employment.
1. I follow Rueda (2007) and label workers in the lowest wage tiers of regular employment
and irregular jobs (disproportionately the low skilled, women, younger workers, and immigrants) outsiders; workers in middle and higher wage regular employment are called insiders.
I conventionally label this bifurcation of the labor market, dualism.
2. See Hall and Soskice (2001) and Martin and Swank (2012) on the varieties of capitalism
framework.
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236
Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2
Table 1
The rise of labor market dualism in post-industrial capitalist democraciesa

Wage inequality (90/10 ratio)
Nordic politcal
economies
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Mean
Continental Europe
and Japan
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Switzerland
Mean
Anglo-liberal
market economies
Australia
Canada
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
Mean
Involuntary part-time jobsb
198486
200508
Annual %
198486
200508
Annual %
2.19
2.49
1.95c
2.05
2.17
2.69
2.53
2.22
2.31
2.44
0.96
0.12
0.93
0.65
0.66
2.3
1.9
3.0
2.4
1.8
1.2
2.7
1.9
0.6
1.0
1.5
0.4
2.43
3.12
2.89
2.22
3.14
2.49
2.41c
2.67
2.34
2.91
3.27
2.31
3.02
2.91
2.67
2.77
0.26
0.29
0.48
0.15
0.12
0.89
0.69
0.22
0.1c
0.5
2.6c
0.7
0.8
1.2
2.3c
0.2c
1.0
1.7
2.8
3.8
4.2
4.0
4.6
1.3
1.5
3.0
13.1
3.4
3.7
9.8
8.1
11.6
2.4
16.4
7.9
2.83
4.36
4.06
2.15
3.20
4.16
3.46
3.29
3.74
3.81
2.89
3.61
4.88
3.70
0.58
0.41
0.31
1.29
0.62
0.80
0.43
4.2
0.2
2.1
1.7
2.0
4.3
1.2
3.8
2.3
2.9
0.3
2.6
4.2
3.0
3.4
Notes:
a
Table 1 reports 19841986 to 20052008 means and 1984 to 2008 average annual percentage changes.
b
Involuntary part-time employment as a percentage of total employment.
c
Mean for 19911993.
Table 1 underscores a familiar theme: earnings of full-time workers have grown

more unequal in the large majority of post-industrial economies. Yet wage dispersion
has grown noticeably more unequal in both the relatively egalitarian Nordic countries
and the relatively unequal Anglo-liberal economies; earnings inequality among regular
workers has increased less in continental coordinated economies and Japan. With
regard to atypical employment, King and Rueda (2008) point out that low-paid irregular jobs have increased significantly in coordinated market economies (hereafter
CMEs) where low-wage full-time work is still limited; the magnitude of increase in
low-quality atypical employment does, in fact, seem particularly pronounced in continental Europe and Japan (Palier 2012; Thelen 2012). Overall, the Nordic labor markets remain the least dualistic, the continental European CMEs and Japan are beset by
the rise of low-quality atypical jobs, and Anglo-liberal labor markets have become
even more unequal than in the past.
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2.1
237
Conventional explanations of dualism
A substantial literature has emerged to explain the rise of labor market inequalities.
Globalization has been central to most inquiries. As Wood (1994) famously argued,
HeckscherOhlin/StolperSamuelson models with factor price convergence suggest
that trade penetration of advanced economies by developing nations will depress the
earnings of semi- and unskilled workers in rich countries. Relatedly, Alderson and
Nielson (2002) and others have argued that the dramatic rise of capital mobility
especially the prospect of foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows has adverse
employment and wage-bargaining impacts on labor. Yet most research has questioned these inegalitarian effects of globalization (for example, IMF 2007; OECD
2008; 2011). Instead, much of the recent literature has stressed that skill-biased technological change has been at the heart of rises of wage inequality; technological
changes reward the highest skill and educational levels in the workforce and displace
middle and lower income employees engaged in routine tasks (see Kierzenkowski
and Koske 2012).
In addition, in the well-known argument by Harrison and Bluestone (1988), deindustrialization, or the employment shift from relatively equal and high-paying manufacturing jobs to unequal and excessively low-paying service sector employment,
fosters wage dispersion and irregular employment. Concomitant with globalization
and deindustrialization, the decline in the centralization and coverage of bargaining
may have weakened the institutional pressure for wage compression (Wallerstein
1999; Beramendi and Cusack 2008; OECD 2011).
Finally, scholars have acknowledged the importance of policy reforms in shaping
labor market dualism; this set of factors is central to the argument made here about
politics.3 First, most recent studies have stressed the role of human capital-promoting
policies (ALMP and education) in mitigating dualism; where human capital programs
receive resources and careful design, earnings inequality declines (Kierzenkowski and
Koske 2012; OECD 2011). In addition, an egalitarian social wage mitigates dualism.
This is so because a higher social wage raises the wage floor in labor markets (OECD
2008; 2011) and it alleviates the scarring effect of unemployment on workers skills
(Nelson and Stephens 2013). The way labor market reforms such as deregulation of
job security provisions and expansions of temporary and part-time contracts are structured also plays a crucial role in dualism; where these reforms are coupled with extensions of collective bargaining and social insurance coverage, for instance, evidence
indicates that outsiders receive higher pay and face a diminished risk of unemployment
(Koske et al. 2012).4
In sum, extant theory and evidence suggest a number of factors in all likelihood
played a role in the general rise of labor market dualism in post-industrial economies.
But what about politics?
3. Beyond globalization, technology, deindustrialization, institutional and policy changes,

scholars have suggested that socio-demographic forces such as trends in family structure, female
labor market participation, and immigration may play a role. I address some of these arguments
below.
4. The literature has also emphasized other policy factors such as public employment, programs which provide accommodations of work-care tradeoffs, and sufficient aggregate demand
(for example, Carlin and Soskice 2009; OECD 2011).
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3
3.1
THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES:

THEORY
Partisan government and labor market dualism in post-industrial
economies
In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars stressed contra the end of ideology thesis that
labor market interventions in advanced political economies were notably shaped by
government control by class-based parties (see Swank 2013 for a review of the major
works). Both social and Christian democratic parties fostered the development of
generous social insurance systems, while social democracy also promoted public
service provision and government employment (Huber and Stephens 2001). Thus,
traditional partisan theory predicts social democratic governments should be most
likely to promote human capital formation, an ample social wage, and an equitable
structure of labor market reforms. Yet in the wake of 1970s and 1980s economic
crises and post-industrialization, a new body of scholarship led by Paul Pierson
(1994; 1996) questioned partisan effects on social policies. In the view of Pierson
and similar thinkers, the new politics of social policy under post-industrial
pressures for austerity and efficiency entailed the politically challenging task of
reducing concentrated benefits to well-defined, mobilized constituencies in return
for future, diffuse benefits. Given continued political support for social transfers
and services, incumbent governments had to engage in the politics of blame avoidance where the success of reform depends on the character of program constituencies, the depth of lock-in effects of social programs, and related programmatic
factors (for instance, the degree to which constituency groups can be politically
divided).
Complementing the new politics framework, Iversen and Wren (1998) argue
that social democratic parties face a trilemma where government may foster earnings equality and employment levels in the face of post-industrialization but not
simultaneously maintain fiscal restraint (as pursuit of the first two goals adds to fiscal
imbalances). The social democratic policy regime is also challenged by international
capital mobility as capital market integration may result in a loss of economic policy
control and, hence, of state capacity to maintain the low unemployment essential to a
generous welfare state (Huber and Stephens 2001). Finally, David Rueda (2007) has
argued that the division between insiders and outsiders in post-industrial labor markets politically undercuts social democracy: insiders have an interest in the continuation of employment protection and the moderation of tax burdens on labor income,
while outsiders favor both income transfers for short-term security and active labor
market programs for reintegration into regular employment. Rueda argues that in the
absence of rises in risks to insiders, social democratic parties will maintain job protection and tax moderation but not enhanced income supports and ALMP that benefit
outsiders.
In response, Korpi and Palme (2003) argue that alternation in power of classbased parties is still highly relevant to post-industrial politics of economic and social
policy. The differential distribution of physical and human capital still influences
social policy preferences across business and labor and between strata of workers;
the post-industrial welfare state still fundamentally affects the distribution of
incomes and security. Parties still represent class-based constituencies and
reflect class-based conflicts. In fact, recent studies highlight the significance
of incomes and exposure to risks for individual preferences for social insurance
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and redistribution (Rehm 2011). In turn, preferences for transfers and taxes
notably influence citizens partisan identification in post-industrial societies
(Cusack et al. 2006).5
Yet the aforementioned work of Rueda (2007) highlights the increasingly divisive
social policy conflicts between insiders and outsiders and the political problems these
divisions create for social democracy. Similarly, Iversen and Soskice (2009) make the
important point that in the post-industrial production process, skilled and unskilled
workers heretofore closely linked within industrial enterprises and politically connected in a progressive coalition are increasingly dispersed across firms and sectors.
I argue, however, that where labor and capital remain relatively highly organized, progressive parties can nonetheless blunt dualism.
3.2
The political economic organization of capital and labor
The organization of labor unions and employers associations beyond coverage and
centralization of collective bargaining is likely to have direct political effects on
labor market inequalities; it should also play a central mediating role by facilitating
social democratic parties pursuit of enhanced human capital policies, of an egalitarian
social wage, and of an equitable structure of labor market deregulations.6 For both
labor and employers, organization is defined as the density of organization of potential
members, centralization of power in national peak associations (for instance, power
over constituent unions or employers strategies), and regularized integration of
labor and capital into public policymaking forums.
3.2.1
Employers organization and labor market dualism
A higher level of employer organization is likely to be directly related to greater

employer support for an array of policies that foster general human capital endowments of the workforce, and, in turn, mitigate inequality in labor markets (Martin
and Swank 2012). Strong employer organization is also likely to politically and institutionally facilitate social democratic party governments efforts to make and implement social and labor market policies that address the needs of outsiders. These
effects should hold for several reasons.
As Cathie Jo Martin and I have argued (Swank and Martin 2001; Martin and Swank
2012), high levels of employer organization promote among member firms a collective
orientation to the long-run interests of firms (for example, human capital) and, through
repeated exchanges with labor and the state that occur in macro-corporatist institutions,
high employer organization is associated with trust, reciprocity, and a commitment to
5. Huo et al. (2008), Iversen and Soskice (2009), and others provide additional theory and
evidence on social democratic government impacts on outsider-related policy and performance
(also see Swank 2013). While scholars recognize the movement to the center of social democratic parties in the face of post-industrial pressures (Inglehart 1990), substantial research indicates continued, systematic economic and social policy differences across left and right parties
(Adams et al. 2009; Schmidt 2010; Burgoon 2012).
6. I advance a general version of the notion that social democratic governments impacts on
social welfare are increasingly dependent on the institutions of coordinated economies in Swank
(2013); I build on that argument here.
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the public interest. Indeed, in our analyses of the policy preferences of employers in
highly organized Denmark and pluralist Britain, we found Danish employers much
more likely to assume responsibility for labor market outsiders and to participate in
the implementation of programs for training than British firms (Martin and Swank
2012, ch. 8). A comparative analysis of German employers also reveals that sectorally
organized business in Germany notably fell behind Danish firms in responsibility and
ALMP participation (Nelson unpublished).7
In addition, post-industrialization increasingly fragments employers between those
who produce for internationally competitive versus sheltered markets and between
those who employ high-, medium-, or low-skilled workers. In this context, strong
employer organization contributes to the likelihood that progressive governments
can construct a coalition of business (for instance, public sector, core manufacturing,
and low-skill service sector employers) that supports relatively equitable reforms of
social insurance and expansions of programs that enhance human capital. Moreover,
high employer organization provides social democratic governments with an institutional mechanism by which business can be mobilized in support of progressive
reforms.
As business organization declines, however, the benefits of encompassing and centralized organization are progressively lost. Thus, as Martin and I suggest, the sectoral
organization of employers tends to result in insideroutsider policies and outcomes.
That is, even where employers are well organized within industrial sectors such as chemicals, metal working, and so forth, they have little incentive to cooperate in national
coalitions to fight dualism, but only to work to protect the benefits of their own workers (Martin and Swank 2012, esp. ch. 11). Where pluralism reigns (for example, in the
United States), one is likely to see extensive rent-seeking behavior as narrow business
interest groups, and shifting coalitions of them, seek to enhance their economic positions and incomes through the political process; in the post-industrial context of market
shifts of income to high-income earners and mobile business and of the decline of
unions, the result is a pronounced increase in inegalitarian policies and outcomes
(Hacker and Pierson 2010; Stiglitz 2012).
3.2.2
Labor organization and post-industrial labor market inequalities
National trade union movements have played a seminal role in the twentieth century
welfare state development and reduction of income inequalities in industrial capitalism
(for example, Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Hicks 1999); some scholars also stress that
union organization continues to bolster national systems of social protection,
7. One might argue that under pressures of post-industrialization (for example, greater global
competition), firms pursue their immediate interests in lower unit labor costs by pushing for
labor market liberalization, tax cuts, and welfare retrenchments. Acquiescence to ALMP, itself,
simply reflects the fact that firms rationally decide to take advantage of state subsidies for wages
and training costs. The argument made in this paper recognizes that firms are likely to behave in
this manner at low levels of employer organization. At high levels of organization, however,
enterprises tend to pursue a long-term, human-capital-based strategy for greater worker productivity, recognize business responsibility to assist in programs for outsiders, and participate in
programs that require enterprises to commit significant time and resources to training the
unskilled and long-term unemployed. See Martin and Swank (2012) for extensive firm-level survey research and case studies on these points.
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employment security, and redistribution in the face of globalization and deindustrialization (for example, Garrett 1998; Swank 2002; Kwon and Pontusson 2010).
On the other hand, post-industrialization threatens the density, centralization, and
participation in policy concertation of both labor and capital.8 Some scholars have
argued that even where unions remain relatively strong, they tend to be dominated
by the interests of labor market insiders. For instance, Palier (2012), Thelen (2012),
and others note that this is the very pattern we observe in post-1970s reform politics
throughout much of continental Europe. With regard to Japan, Song (2012) points out
that a coalition of core sector unions, large firms, and conservative policymakers produced largely insider-oriented social and labor market reforms in recent decades. At
the same time, Bonoli (2006), Ebbinghaus (2006), and others point out that where
unions remain relatively encompassing (Nordic countries and Belgium), public sector
and low-wage service sector unions (and hence women, younger, and low-skilled
workers) are represented alongside industrial and white collar unions within the
union movement. All things considered, I hypothesize that union organization should
have a direct, positive impact on policies addressing new social risks and the needs of
outsiders.9
The level of union organization should also enhance social democratic parties
impacts on policies that promote human capital development, social protection for outsiders, and equitable labor market reforms. This is so for two reasons. The first
mechanism is relatively well understood: labor organization facilitates wage restraint
and related adaptive behavior by unions which, in turn, mitigates inflation and inefficiencies that are possible with social democratic spending initiatives for social protection and human and physical capital (Garrett 1998; Beramendi and Cusack 2008;
Kwon and Pontusson 2010). In addition, from the perspective of post-industrial politics, high union organization increases the likelihood that social democratic governments can build an egalitarian coalition of public and private sector unions and of
unions with relatively high- and low-skilled workers. Again, highly organized unions
are likely to represent outsiders as well as insiders in corporatist policymaking forums
and to mobilize electorally insiders and outsiders in support of more egalitarian policy
change. As such, left-wing governments have the political base to more equitably
reform social insurance and labor market regulation as well as to expand social services to blunt labor market dualism.10
In sum, politics and institutions should matter. Net of post-industrial pressures and
formal labor market institutions, social democratic governments should mitigate labor
market dualism relative to center-right incumbents and high levels of employer and
labor organization should directly promote policies that mitigate wage inequality
8. See Martin and Swank (2012, ch. 7) for a survey of the large literature on the organizational decline of labor and employers.
9. Case study evidence suggests that union organization does promote inclusiveness; yet tensions remain. For instance, Davidsson and Emmenegger (2012)note that in the face of 1990s and
2000s employer and government efforts to liberalize Swedish labor markets, the LO (Landsorganisationen) initially fought to defend both insider and outsider interests. The LO, however,
ultimately acquiesced to liberalization of temporary employment in return for continuation of
pro-insider last in, first out firing provisions.
10. As Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) have noted, construction of a durable electoral coalition of
insiders and outsiders can be difficult; for instance, social democratic parties may face significant tensions between (disproportionately male) low-skilled blue collar workers and women on
cultural issues.
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Employer
organization
Human capital
investment (training,
education)
Generosity of social
wage for outsiders
Social democratic
government
Union
organization
Figure 1
Degree of equity in
labour market reform
(coverage, legal rights
for irregular jobs)
Wage
inequality
Atypical
employment
Other policies (workcare accommodation,

aggregate demand)
The political sources of labor market dualism
and low quality atypical employment. Most important, high levels of organization of
capital and labor should politically and organizationally facilitate the construction of
political coalitions that undergird the making and implementation of pro-outsider policies by social democratic governments. The core theoretical relationships are displayed
in Figure 1.
THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES:

EMPIRICS
In empirical models, I focus, as foreshadowed above, on explaining variations in the

90/10 ratio of earnings and the employment share of involuntary part-time jobs. I also
focus on two measures of policy highlighted in the literature on labor market inequalities: ALMP and the social wage.11 ALMP is measured as total ALMP spending as a
percentage of GDP; the social wage for outsiders is measured by an indicator developed by K. Nelson (2007): minimum income protection for citizens, or the sum of
means-tested cash assistance plus family and housing allowances as a percentage of
the average production workers wage.12 (See the Appendix for details and data
sources for all variables.)
I estimate empirical models of annual variations of labor market policies
and outcomes across space and time for 18 developed capitalist democracies
(see Table 1) for the years 19752011.13 The general model of labor market policies
and outcomes is:
11. There is evidence, as noted, that ALMP and the social wage mitigate labor market inequalities. Substitution of these two policy indicators for political variables in labor market outcome
models developed below confirms this.
12. This measure taps the likely social wage available to younger and irregularly employed
workers who do not meet eligibility requirements for normal unemployment compensation. Substitution of the unemployment compensation income replacement rate of the average production
worker produced results nearly identical to those for the minimum income social wage.
13. Data series begin between 1975 and the early 1980s; Nelsons data are available for 1990
to 2009 only. For involuntary unemployment, basic models are estimated for the 11 CMEs as
suggested earlier (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden).
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Labor Market Policy=Outcomei;t 1 Trade Penetration Developing Cos:i;t1

2 FDI Outflowsi; t1
3 Technological Changei; t1
4 De-industrializationi; t1
5 Unemploymenti; t1
6 Real per capita GDPi;t1
7 Social Democratic Govt i;cum t10 to t1
8 Christian Democratic Govti;cum t10 to t1
9 Labor Organizationi;t1
10 Employer Organizationi;t1 i;t :
(1)
For policy variables, I add the ideological position of the median voter (where ideological position is constructed as a 0.0 to 100 scale with higher values indicating more
collectivist orientations); technological change is not included in the social wage equation. For wage inequality, I add collective bargaining coordination (a 0.0 to 5.0 scale of
coordination among employers and labor) and bargaining coverage and delete unemployment. I do not include bargaining and technological change variables in the models of atypical employment.14
For party government, I use mean cabinet shares of social and Christian democratic
parties over the last 10 years; I also assess partisan impacts in the short term (average
cabinet portfolio shares over the last 3 years). Long-term power in office is used as the
primary indicator because policy changes are often phased-in over several years; often
take the form of discrete, limited reforms that accumulate over time; produce changes
in policy agendas, programmatic priorities, and bureaucratic ideological dispositions
that shape policy over the long term; and establish policy constraints on newly elected
opposition parties.
The organization of labor is measured as a standard score index of union density, a
0.0 to 4.0 scale of centralization of powers in the largest national peak association
(control of affiliate appointments, over strikes, of bargaining strategy, and of conflict
funds), and a 0.0 to 1.0 scale of integration of unions into public policymaking forums.
For employers, I develop a standard score index of the presence of a national employers peak association, 0.0 to 4.0 scale of powers of the peak (control of affiliate
appointments, over lockouts, of bargaining strategy, and of conflict funds), and a
0.0 to 1.0 scale of policymaking integration of employers.
As to globalization, I control for imports and exports with (non-oil-exporting)
developing economies as a percentage of the post-industrial countrys GDP and FDI
outflows as a percentage of GDP. Technological change is measured as patents per
one million population (OECD 2011). As to structural economic change, I follow
Iversen and Cusack (2000) and measure deindustrialization as 100 minus industrial
and agricultural employment as a percentage share of the working age population.
Unemployment is measured conventionally as the percentage of the civilian workforce
unemployed (standardized across countries). As a control for economic conditions,
I examine real per-capita GDP (in international prices) and growth rates in real
14. These model specification decisions are based on theory, and justified by estimations that,
for instance, include excluded variables.
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per-capita GDP, and report levels or growth rates based on their significance in preliminary tests. All these variables are lagged 1 year.
To assess the institutionally contingent effects of partisan government, I estimate
Equation (1) with a series of interaction terms; the equation for each labor market policy or outcome for the impact of Social Democratic Government as mediated by Labor
Organization is as follows:
Labor Market Policy=Outcomei;t 1 Trade Penetration Developing Cos:i;t1
10 Employer Organizationi;t1
11 Social Democratic Govt Labor Organizationi; t1
i;t :
Similar equations are estimated for Social Democratic Government and Employer
Organization.
For estimation of all models, I use PraisWinsten regression with first-order serial
correlation and panel correct standard errors (Beck and Katz 1996). In addition, as the
time series occasionally begin after 1975 or end before 2011, I use a standard technique for unbalanced panels where elements of the variancecovariance matrix are computed with all available pairs of panels. Finally, F-tests suggest unit (country) fixed
effects might be included, and I include them for three or the four explananda. I do
not use a fixed effects estimator for the social wage, as variation in this indicator is
heavily cross-national. A model without unit effects explains nearly 80 percent in
the variation in the social wage for outsiders and, thus, omitted-variable bias due to
exclusion of unit effects should be minimal.
4.1
Findings
The results of estimation of models of labor market policy are displayed in Table 2.
With respect to control variables, deindustrialization facilitates activation in labor market policy: the decline of employment in traditional sectors is associated with greater
resource commitments to ALMP and a decrease in passive income assistance. Economic downturn bolsters spending for labor market policies: a fall in per-capita
GDP generates ALMP spending while rises in unemployment buoy the generosity
of the social wage. Finally, there exists limited evidence that a rightward shift in the
ideological orientation of the median voter is associated with activation, or more
ALMP spending and lower income replacement rates for unemployment compensation
(my unreported alternative measure of the social wage).
The bottom half of Table 2 reports core findings for the labor market policy impacts
of party government, the organization of capital and labor, and their interaction. I also
report derived marginal impacts of social democratic government at low and high
levels of labor and employer organization.15 With respect to ALMP spending, variations in social democratic government and employer organization have significant
15. Based on significance, substantive magnitude, and robustness of partisan policy impacts,
I report effects of short-term party government on ALMP spending and long-term partisan government on the social wage. For derivation of marginal effects of partisan government, I use the
level of labor and employer organization in 1990s Denmark and Sweden for high levels of
organization, and levels in 1990s Britain and New Zealand for low levels of organization.
See Kam and Franzese (2007) for an excellent synopsis of interactions.
2014 The Author

245
positive impacts on policy (although union organization does not have a direct impact).
As hypothesized, the impact of social democracy is mediated by the presence of relatively highly organized capital and labor. The effect on ALMP spending (as a percentage of GDP) of a shift from a 0.0 to 100 percent share of cabinet portfolios by social
democratic parties is roughly 0.15 at high levels of union or employer organization.16
Given that the mean of ALMP spending over the sample country years is 0.8, the substantive magnitude of this impact is not trivial.
Turning to the social wage for outsiders, Table 2 illustrates that social democratic
government and the organization of employers have direct positive impacts on the
social wage.17 Similar to ALMP, social democratic government is better able to bolster
pro-outsider policy at relatively high levels of union organization. On the other hand,
there is no mediation of social democratic government effects by employer organization. Given theory, this is not surprising: high employer organization is important to
the making and implementation of human capital policies while it is less crucial
than union organization to social democracy for promotion of income maintenance
for outsiders.
Table 3 reports the results for wage inequality and atypical employment. In column I,
I report the basic model which estimates direct partisan and labor and capital organization effects. The second and third columns present estimates of the institutionally
mediated impacts of partisan government on wage inequality. For wage inequality,
trade penetration by developing countries and technological change increase wage dispersion while bargaining coverage significantly lessens it. Bargaining coordination (or
level) is not, however, related to wage inequality. With regard to direct impacts of
political forces, the column I model suggests that union organization is the only factor
that clearly matters. When we turn to institutionally mediated impacts of social democratic government, however, there is a significant interaction between social democratic
government and union organization. The wage impacts of social democratic government
are trivial at low levels of union organization but they are marginally significant when
union organization is moderately high. With regard to capital, social democratic governments significantly reduce wage inequality where employers are relatively well organized. This result, coupled with findings on employers and ALMP, suggests that the
capacity of social democratic parties to make and implement training and related policies
to benefit outsiders employment and earnings capabilities is, indeed, contingent on well
organized employers that cooperate with public human capital initiatives. Martin and
Swanks (2012) country studies and surveys of business firms add clear corroborating
evidence on this point.
Results for involuntary part-time employment are displayed in the second set of columns. Findings indicate that increases in low quality irregular employment are, in part,
driven by deindustrialization, slow economic growth, and, with less certainty, trade
penetration by developing countries. On the other hand, FDI outflows depress the
rise of involuntary part-time workers. This somewhat unexpected finding is possibly
the result of the positive employment impact of inflows of FDI which outflows closely proxy (IMF 2007; OECD 2011). As to politics, both social and Christian democratic parties decrease involuntary part-time jobs. On the other hand, union
16. There are no significant interactions between union or capital organization and Christian
democratic governments in any of the models.
17. Estimation of the model for the income replacement rate for unemployment compensation
replicates these findings and produces a direct, positive, and significant impact of union organization on the social wage.
2014 The Author

2014 The Author
Ideological position of
median votert1
Partisan Govt and the
Organ. of Labor/Capital
Social democratic
government
Christian democratic
government
Real per capita GDPt1
Unemployment ratet1
II
0.9914
(0.8022)
0.0011
(0.0016)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0320**
(0.0101)
0.0084
(0.0103)
0.0155**
(0.0064)
0.0033**
(0.0017)
0.0006
(0.0005)
0.0003
(0.0014)
I
0.9573
(0.8081)
0.0011
(0.0016)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0311**
(0.0103)
0.0086
(0.0104)
0.0158**
(0.0066)
0.0022**
(0.0017)
0.0007*
(0.0005)
0.0007
(0.0013)
Active labor market policy
0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0014)
1.0003
(0.8089)
0.0014
(0.0016)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0357**
(0.0103)
0.0081
(0.0104)
0.0162**
(0.0065)
0.0031
(0.0067)
III
0.0242*
(0.0194)
0.0292
(0.0278
0.0268*
(0.0196)
0.0218
(0.0277)
0.9699**
(0.1939)
0.5126**
(0.1856)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.0146
(0.0366)
13.6354
(13.3924)
0.0155
(0.0311)
16.4576
(13.3556)
0.0128
(0.0309)
0.9740**
(0.1937)
0.4874**
(0.1858)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0148
(0.0367)
II
III
0.0244*
(0.0193)
0.0368*
(0.0280)
0.9814**
(0.1919)
0.4741**
(0.1863)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.0158
(0.0368)
18.8592*
(13.5109)
0.0120
(0.0311)
Social wage for outsiders
The political sources of ALMP and the social wage in 18 post-industrial democracies, 19802010
Trade penetration by developing

nationst1
Foreign direct investment
Outflowsmean t1 to t3
Technological change
(Patents per 1 million)t1
Deindustrializationt1
Table 2
246

2014 The Author
0.0016**
(0.0009)
1.1093
467
0.4851
1.0207
467
0.4712
ns
0.0612
(0.0560)
0.4471**
(0.1465)
0.0011**
(0.0005)
0.0327
(0.0526)
0.4416**
(0.4416)
1.1891
467
0.4831
0.0015**
(0.0009)
ns
0.0010a
(0.0008)
0.0258
(0.0528)
0.4246**
(0.1511)
115.5728
357
0.7650
0.6558
(0.9634)
4.0237**
(1.2400)
114.6126
357
0.7675
0.0624**
(0.0318)
ns
0.6411
(1.2006)
4.2876**
(1.1212)
0.0324**
(0.0185)
116.4497
357
0.7671
0.0267
(0.0248)
0.6148
(0.9519)
4.9091**
(1.3312)
Notes: Models are estimated with annual 19802010 (19902009 for minimum social wage) data for 18 advanced democracies by PraisWinsten regression. The table
reports unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-correct standard errors. Fixed effects, utilized for ALMP estimation, are not reported. * significance at the 0.10
level; ** significance at the 0.05 level or below. a sign. = 0.11.
Constant
Observations
R2
Marginal effect: social Dem

Govt Low labor organ
Govt High labor organ
Govt Low employers organ
Govt High employers organ
Social democratic Govt

Union organizationt1
Social democratic Govt Employer
organizationt1
Employer organizationt1

247
2014 The Author
Tripartismt1
Employer organizationt1
Partisan government and the

organization of Labor/Capital
Social democratic
governmentmean t1 to t10
Christian democratic
governmentmean t1 to t10
Bargaining coveraget1
Growth in real per capita

GDPt1
Bargaining coordinationt1
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0003
(0.0010)
0.0731**
(0.0392)
0.0320
(0.0262)
0.7263**
(0.4121)
0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0003**
(0.0001)
0.0025
(0.0072)
0.0015
(0.0019)
0.0020
(0.0062)
0.0075**
(0.0015)
0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0010)
0.0517
(0.0411)
0.0333
(0.0267)
0.7232**
(0.4113)
0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0003**
(0.0001)
0.0021
(0.0032)
0.0014
(0.0019)
0.0019
(0.0061)
0.0075**
(0.0015)
II
Wage inequality
0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0011)
0.0759**
(0.0393)
0.0778**
(0.0373)
0.6921**
(0.4119)
0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0003**
(0.0001)
0.0016
(0.0033)
0.0015
(0.0019)
0.0025
(0.0061)
0.0074**
(0.0015)
III
0.0007
(0.0059)
0.0111*
(0.0082)
0.3056
(0.3018)
0.7454*
(0.3947)
0.6416
(0.4079)
0.1882**
(0.0343)
0.0177*
(0.0122)
0.1776**
(0.0363)
0.0197**
(0.0119)
0.0072*
(0.0056)
0.0141**
(0.0083)
0.2059
(0.2915)
0.7772*
(0.4327)
3.3436
(3.1515)
0.0206**
(0.0071)
II
Involuntary part-time jobs
3.9463*
(3.1370)
0.0212**
(0.0070)
III
0.0050
(0.0089)
0.0073
(0.0095)
0.1371
(0.2961)
1.9142**
(0.7491)
0.1906**
(0.0362)
0.0217**
(0.0118)
4.0010*
(3.0582)
0.0208**
(0.0067)
The political sources of wage inequality and atypical employment in 18 post-industrial democracies, 19752011
Trade penetration by developing

nationst1
Foreign direct investment
Outflowsmean t1 to t3
Technological change
(Patents per 1 million)t1
Deindustrializationt1
Table 3
248

2014 The Author
ns
0.0008a
(0.0007)
4.1791
520
0.9127
4.2389
520
0.9129
0.0006*
(0.0004)
4.3215
520
0.9129
0.0011*
(0.0007)
ns
0.0011**
(0.0006)
12.2282
271
0.1653
11.9726
271
0.2200
0.0192**
(0.0069)
ns
0.0148**
(0.0052)
12.5000
271
0.1768
0.0137**
(0.0060)
ns
0.0171**
(0.0086)
Notes: Models are estimated with annual 19752011 data for 18 advanced democracies by PraisWinsten regression. The table reports unstandardized regression coefficients
and panel-correct standard errors. Fixed effects are included but not reported. * significance at the 0.10 level; ** significance at the 0.05 level or below. a probability = 0.13.
Constant
Observations
R2
Marginal Effect of Social

Dem Govt Low Labor Organ
Dem Govt High Labor Organ
Dem Govt Low Tripartism
Dem Govt High Tripartism
Dem Govt Low Employers
Organ
Dem Govt High Employers
Organ
Social democratic Govt

Social Democratic Govt
Tripartismt1
Social Democratic Govt
Employer Organizationt1

249
250
organization has no direct effect on irregular employment while rises in employer

organization actually increase involuntary part-time work. This latter finding may
well reflect the general tendency of business to push for labor market deregulation
in post-industrial democratic capitalist nations.18
With respect to the union mediation of social democrat governments employment
impacts, there is no significant interaction between social democracy and labor organization (equation not reported). Country-specific evidence suggests, however, qualification of this anomalous finding. For instance, in the Netherlands, where union
organization is moderate, labor, capital, and the state negotiated significant but equitable expansions of irregular employment; social insurance and legal rights were
extended to newly liberalized atypical jobs as the result of 1990s tripartite compromises (Hemerijck 2013). This suggests that tripartitism may well allow progressive
governments to blunt the harsher features of labor market deregulation and minimize
the growth of low-quality jobs. I test for such an effect (column II) and find a significant interaction between progressive government and tripartite institutions; the effect
of social democratic government on atypical employment is highly significant when
tripartism persists.19
Employer organization also significantly conditions social democratic governments effects to mitigate irregular employment (see column III): where firms are sectorally organized or pluralist in organization, social democrats have no effect on low
quality job growth; where employers are well organized, progressive governments
mitigate the expansion of low-quality irregular employment. As suggested by theory,
progressive parties are simply more likely to be successful with well-organized
employers in attempts to improve human capital and expand social and legal rights
to temporary or part-time jobs (perhaps in a compromise with employers who seek
more flexibility in labor markets).
5
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, deindustrialization, technological changes, and trade with developing nations

core features of post-industrialization contribute to inegalitarian trends in labor
markets. Robust collective bargaining coverage offsets, to a degree, rises in dualism.
Yet politics and institutions play a substantial role in shaping labor market policies and
outcomes. Findings for core theoretical propositions (see Figure 1) are summarized in
Table 4.
The central argument of this paper is that where labor and employer organization is
substantial, social democratic party governments are politically and organizationally
supported in making and implementing policies that lessen dualism. Table 4 illustrates
that we find support for this view with respect to every dimension of policy and labor
market outcome. Social democratic governments promote ALMP as well as retard
wage inequality and irregular jobs at higher levels of employer organization; social
18. It is important to note that, whether focusing on the mediation of social democratic government by employer organization or the reverse, Table 3 findings for irregular jobs suggest that
the joint presence of social democratic government and high employer organization mitigates
dualism.
19. Tripartism is measured by a standard score index of tripartite councils, bipartite labor and
employer collaborative institutions, and regular government consultation of labor and capital. Its
mediating impact holds with or without inclusion of the Netherlands in the sample.
2014 The Author

251
Table 4 Summary of principal findings on labor market policy and performance

impacts of politics and institutions
Mediation of social
democratic government
impacts by:
Union Organization
Employer Organization
Direct policy and performance impacts of:
Social Democratic
Government
Union Organization
Employer Organization
ALMP
Social
wage
Wage
inequality
Irregular
jobs
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No*
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes**
Notes:
* Substitution of tripartism for union organization results in significant interaction between social democratic
government and institutional context. (Low-quality part-time employment is reduced by social democratic
governments at high levels of tripartite policy coordination.)
** Positive and significant direct impact of employer organization on low quality part-time jobs.
democratic incumbents also have egalitarian effects on ALMP, the social wage, and
wage inequality at high levels of union organization. With the maintenance of high
levels of tripartite cooperation between labor, capital, and the state, social democratic
governments lower the growth of low-quality irregular jobs.
At the same time, there are clear signs that post-industrial political realities and the
magnitude of economic changes create severe difficulties for egalitarian actors, even
under the best of circumstances. The scope, centralization, and policymaking integration of the union movement itself does not directly promote more ALMP, a higher
social wage for outsiders, or less irregular employment; this pattern of results almost
certainly reflects insideroutsider conflicts that exist even in the more encompassing
labor movements. In addition, while well-organized employers are clearly central to
efforts to mitigate dualism, private firms everywhere push for greater labor market
flexibility and generally enhanced market efficiencies. Moreover, as Martin and I
(2012, ch. 7) have pointed out, post-industrial politico-economic changes (for instance,
the decline of unionization and greater international integration of markets) continue to
apply downward pressure on the scope and centralization of peak employer associations.20 All things considered, progressive governments, collective actors, and citizens
can point to successes in stemming and even reversing rises of labor market inequalities; they also have reason for serious concern, especially in societies whose institutions increasingly favor insider politics and extensive rent-seeking by narrowly
organized economic interests.
20. For example, in moderately well-organized countries such as Germany, the political and
organizational interests of small and medium sized enterprises have increasingly diverged
from the interests of large firms with post-industrialization. The result has been a decline in
employer organization density and centralization as well as in broader institutional coordination
(Streeck 2009; Martin and Swank 2012, ch. 11).
2014 The Author

252
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welfare states 19712009, NEUJOBS Special Report No. 2, www.neujobs.eu.
Visser, J. (2011), Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting,
State Intervention and Social Pacts, 19602010 (ICTWSS), Amsterdam Institute for
Advanced Labour Studies AIAS, University of Amsterdam, Version 3.0, May.
Volkens, A., P. Lehmann, N. Merz, S. Regel, and A. Werner (2013), The Manifesto Data
Collection: Manifesto Project, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fr Sozialforschung
(WZB), https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/.
Wallerstein, M. (1999), Wage-setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial
societies, American Journal of Political Science, 43 (3), 649680.
Wood, A. (1994), North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DETAILS AND DATA SOURCES

Labor market policies and outcomes
ALMP: Active labor market policy spending as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD
iLibrary (Social Expenditures Data Base).
Social Wage for Outsiders: Minimum social protection from means-tested cash assistance and family and housing allowances (as a percentage of the average production
workers wage). Source: social protection data from Nelson (2007); average production workers wage is from Van Vliet and Caminada (2012).
Social Wage for the Average Production Worker: Net income replacement rate from
unemployment compensation for the first year of unemployment for the typical single
production worker. Source: Scruggs et al. (2013).
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255
90/10 Ratio: Ratio of earnings for workers at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the wage
distribution. (90/50 and 50/10 ratios also computed and used for supplementary
analysis.) Source: OECD iLibrary (Earnings Data Base).
Involuntary Part-Time Employment: Involuntary part-time workers as a share of total
employment. Source: OECD iLibrary (Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data
Base).
Politics
Party Government: Percentage of cabinet portfolios held by social and Christian
democratic parties. Source for party portfolios: Browne and Dreijmanis (1982);
Political Data Yearbooks in annual issues of European Journal of Political
Research. Source for classification of parties: Castles and Mair (1984); countryspecific sources.
Union Organization: Standard score index of union density, 0.0 to 4.0 scale of centralization of powers in the largest national peak association (control of affiliate
appointments, control over strikes, collective bargaining strategy, conflict funds),
and 0.0 to 1.0 scale of integration of unions into public policymaking forums.
Source: all variables are from Visser (2011).
Employer Organization: Standard score index of presence of national employers
peak association, 0.0 to 4.0 scale of powers of the peak (affiliate appointments, control over lockouts, collective bargaining strategy, conflict funds), and 0.0 to 2.0 scale
of integration of employers organization into national policymaking forums.
Source for presence of peak national employers confederation: Data for 19551992:
Golden et al. (2009); for 19931997: Traxler et al. (2001); for late 1990s2010: Traxler and Humer (2007), country specific sources and labor and industrial relations
periodicals.
Source for powers of national peak employers confederation: Data for 19551992:
Golden et al. (2009); for 19931997: Traxler et al. (2001); for late 1990s2010: Traxler and Humer (2007), country specific sources and labor and industrial relations
periodicals.
Source for employer peak association participation in corporatist (legislative and
bureaucratic) forums for formulation and implementation of public policy (for example, corporatist boards in labor market policies, industrial policy, and related areas).
Scored on a 0.0 to 1.0 ordinal scale where 0.0 indicates limited employer peak engagement and 1.0 indicates widespread employer peak engagement. Source: for 1970s
1997, Traxler et al. (2001); for late 1990s2010: Traxler and Humer (2007), country
specific sources and labor and industrial relations periodicals.
Tripartism: Standard score index of the presence of a tripartite (labor, employers, government) social and economic policy council, bipartite employers and labor council, and
regularized government consultation of labor and employers. Source: all variables are
from Visser (2011).
Ideological Position of the Median Voter: A measure of ideological position of the
median voter developed by Kim and Fording (2003), where the median voter position
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256
is estimated from grouped party vote data, and parties ideology is given by the
26-dimension party manifesto ideological score. The median voter position is
expressed on a 0.0 to 100 scale. Source: for ideological position of parties during
the 19732003 period, unpublished updates of manifesto data were provided by HeeMin Kim, Florida State University, in 2006; 20042010 updates and extensions from
Volkens et al. (2013).
Postindustrialization, business cycle, and related variables

Trade Penetration by Developing Countries: Imports to and exports from non-oilexporting developing nations as a percentage of GDP. Source: IMF (selected
years a); GDP: OECD iLibrary.
FDI Outflows: Foreign direct investment outflows as a percentage of GDP (in current
US dollars). Source: foreign direct investment: IMF (selected years b); GDP: OECD
iLibrary.
Technological Change: Patents filed at EPO (European Patent Office) and United
States Patent Office per one million population. Source: Patents: OECD iLibrary
(Patent Statistics Database). Population: OECD iLibrary (Employment and Labor
Market Statistics Data Base).
Deindustrialization: 100 minus industrial and agricultural employment as a percentage share of the working age population. Source: employment and populations
variables are from OECD iLibrary (Employment and Labor Market Statistics
Data Base).
Unemployment: Unemployed as a percentage of the civilian workforce (standardized
scale). Source: OECD iLibrary (Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data Base).
Per Capita Real GDP in International Prices; Chain Index (levels or growth rates).
Source: Heston et al. (2012).
Bargaining Coordination: Coordination of wage bargaining: 5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on (a) enforceable agreements between the central organizations of
unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private sector, or on
(b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling; 4 = mixed industry
and economy-wide bargaining: (a) central organizations negotiate non-enforceable
central agreements (guidelines) and/or (b) key unions and employers associations
set pattern for the entire economy; 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern
setting, limited involvement of central organizations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining; 2 = mixed or alternating industry- and firm-level bargaining, with
weak enforceability of industry agreements; 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level. Source: Visser (2011).
Bargaining Level: The dominant level(s) at which wage bargaining takes place:
5 = national or central level; 4 = national or central level, with additional sectoral/
local or company bargaining; 3 = sectoral or industry level; 2 = sectoral or industry
level, with additional local or company bargaining; 1 = local or company
bargaining. Source: Visser (2011).
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Bargaining Coverage: Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, adjusted: (0100) =

employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage
and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as a percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from
the right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in
employment. Source: Visser (2011).
2014 The Author


Swank, D. (2014) - The Political Sources of Labor Market Dualism in Post-Industrial Democracies, 1975-2011. Review of Keynesian Economics, 2 (2), 234-257.

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Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2014, pp.

The political sources of labor market

Department of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, USA

The growth of income inequality is a near-universal phenomenon among post-industrial

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

via Columbia University Library

The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies

AN OVERVIEW OF LABOR MARKET DUALISM AND ITS CAUSES

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2

The rise of labor market dualism in post-industrial capitalist democraciesa

Involuntary part-time jobsb

Table 1 underscores a familiar theme: earnings of full-time workers have grown

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies

Conventional explanations of dualism

3. Beyond globalization, technology, deindustrialization, institutional and policy changes,

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2

THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES:

2014 The Author

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

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The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies

The political economic organization of capital and labor

Employers organization and labor market dualism

A higher level of employer organization is likely to be directly related to greater

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2

Labor organization and post-industrial labor market inequalities

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

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The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

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Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2

Other policies (workcare accommodation,

The political sources of labor market dualism

THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES:

In empirical models, I focus, as foreshadowed above, on explaining variations in the

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

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The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies

Labor Market Policy=Outcomei;t 1 Trade Penetration Developing Cos:i;t1

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

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Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

2014 The Author

Real per capita GDPt1

Active labor market policy

Social wage for outsiders

Trade penetration by developing

Journal compilation 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd