Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.

Rojas and Deputy Director

Reynaldo O. Esmeralda vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula
G.R. No. 204528
February 19, 2013
FACTS: From the records, it appears that, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau
of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. to cease
and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing
bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the
alleged ambush incident. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the
judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the
case for hearing. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary
protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases. In an order,
Judge Pampilo insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required
pleading but answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in
Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and
thus required an Answer. The RTC rendered a Decision granting the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary
protection, production and inspection orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules on Summary Procedure are applicable in petitions for
the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
HELD: The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that
serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a
speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge
Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court
has devised for the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiffs claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is
not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.

SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD vs. VICTOR ANG

G.R. No. 192898.
January 31, 2011.
FACTS: On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued
a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against the petitioners. Petitioners filed with the DOJ a petition for review
challenging this Resolution.
On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter
affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings
and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying, among others, for the
deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before
the DOJ.
The MTCC granted the motion, "subject . . . to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered
this order, and set the petitioners' arraignment on September 10, 2009.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC which was denied. The
petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied their motion.
The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the
petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were
decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the
amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day
limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with
the DOJ.
Petitioners a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on
suspension of arraignment is only a general rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 60 day limit on suspension of arraignment applies to cases
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
HELD: The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound

mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the
President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not
exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for
review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on
October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10,
2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60day limit provided for by the Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners were all decided prior to the amendment to
Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December
1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the
suspension of arraignment.
The Court resolves to GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE
the petition for review on certiorari; and nevertheless DENY the said petition for
petitioners failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC order.