B2017 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof.

Aguiling-Pangalangan | 1
Yu v. Santiago
In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu, Willie Yu, petitioner v. Miriam DefensorSantiago, Bienvenido P. Alano, Jr., Major Pabalan, Deleo
Hernandez, Bloddy Hernandez, Benny Reyes and Jun Eespiritu Santo, respondents

Doctrine:Loss or renunciation of citizenship.

Keywords: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship
Nature: In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu
Date: January 24, 1989
Ponente: Justice Padilla
Short version:The petitioner was naturalized as a Filipino on February 10, 1978. Despite this, he applied for and received
a Portuguese passport in 1981 which expired in 1986. While still technically a Filipino citizen, he wrote his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents in Hong Kong sometime in 1980. The respondent had the petitioner detained in
order to later have him deported upon the request for extradition by the Hong Kong government and so the petitioner
herein sought a writ of habeas corpus.
Facts:
The petitioner was a Portuguese national who was naturalized February 10, 1978.
April 1980 the petitioner declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed while in Hong
Kong (The Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd).
July 21, 1981 the petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo which would expire in 1986.
Subsequently, on June 24, 1988, Yu was arrested by Immigration agents for being a Portuguese citizen wanted by
Interpol and the Hong Kong police for alleged involvement in several fraud cases.
July 4, 1988 the petitioner filed for habeas corpus seeking for his release from detainment.
In its 10 November 1988 the Court released the resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus.
On November 28, 1988 the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Notwithstanding said
denial petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Following an exchange of motions and urgent motions from the petitioner for a Temporary Restraining Order and
petitions from the Respondent Commissioner for the lifting of said TROs the Court gave Willie Yu three days to
justify why he should still be considered a Filipino citizen.
In his reply he affirmed the aforementioned facts pertaining his naturalization and the details pertaining his
Portuguese citizenship.
Issue:
1.
Has the petitioner expressly renounced his Filipino citizenship by applying for a Portuguese passport and
declaring his citizenship to be Portuguese in a business document?
Held:
Yes. The acts when examined together constitute an express renunciation of the petitioners citizenship and therefore the
petition for the writ of habeas corpus and all other are denied.
Ratio:
Petitioners Contention

Supreme Court

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The petitioner contends that he had never made an express Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
renunciation of his Filipino citizenship and despite applying having
renounced
Portuguese
citizenship
upon
for and possessing a Portuguese passport, never used it for naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired
traveling to and from the Philippines.
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a
renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself
as such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to
the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions
mentioned.

Chief Justice Fernan, dissent:

Petitioner is being denied Filipino citizenship with unsubstantial and insufficient documentary evidence.

The proceedings should have been a full blown trial applying more rigid rules of evidence.
o And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement.
Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of
the wellrecognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.

Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.
-digest by Ms. Mora