5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

ATTY.FRANKLING.
GACAL,
Complainant,

versus

JUDGEJAIMEI.INFANTE,
REGIONALTRIALCOURT,
BRANCH38,INALABEL,
SARANGANI,
Respondent.

A.M.No.RTJ041845

[FormerlyA.M.No.IPINo.031831RTJ]

Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,and
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.

Promulgated:

October5,2011

xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

Itisaxiomaticthatbailcannotbeallowedtoapersonchargedwithacapitaloffense,oran
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon
noticetotheProsecution.Anyjudgewhosoallowsbailisguiltyofgrossignoranceofthe
lawandtherules,andissubjecttoappropriateadministrativesanctions.

Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 113603 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta, a
prosecution for murder arising from the killing of Felomino O. Occasion, charges Judge
JaimeI.Infante,PresidingJudgeofBranch38oftheRTCtowhoseBranchCriminalCase
No. 113603 was raffled for arraignment and trial, with gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, and evident partiality, for the latters failure to set a hearing before granting
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

1/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

bailtotheaccusedandforreleasinghimimmediatelyafterallowingbail.

Antecedents

On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial
CourtofKiambaMaitum,SaranganiissuedawarrantforthearrestofFaustinoAnchetain
connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail.Ancheta, who had
meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, acting throughAssistant Provincial ProsecutorAlfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed
the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and
accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder onApril 21, 2003 (Criminal Case
No.113603),butwitharecommendationforbailintheamountofP400,000.00.Criminal
CaseNo.113603wasraffledtoJudgeInfantesBranch.

On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and
anotherreleasingAnchetafromcustody.

On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge
Infante, filed a socalled Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel
BailbondWithPrayerToEnforceWarrantOfArrestOrIssueWarrantOfArrestAnewOrIn
TheAlternativeVeryUrgentMotionForThisCourtToMotuProp[r]ioCorrectAnApparent
AndPatentError(veryurgentmotion).

In the hearing of the very urgent motion on April 29, 2003, only Atty. Gacal and his
collaborating counsel appeared in court. Judge Infante directed the public prosecutor to
comment on the very urgent motion within five days from notice, after which the motion
wouldbesubmittedforresolutionwithorwithoutthecomment.Ancheta,throughcounsel,
opposed,statingthatthemotiondidnotbeartheconformityofthepublicprosecutor.

At the arraignment of Ancheta set on May 15, 2003, the parties and their counsel
appeared,butAssistantProvincialProsecutorBarcelona,Jr.,theassignedpublicprosecutor,
didnotappearbecausehewasthenfollowinguphisregularappointmentastheProvincial
ProsecutorofSaranganiProvince.Accordingly,thearraignmentwasresettoMay29,2003.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

2/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

OnMay21,2003,JudgeInfantedeniedAtty.Gacalsveryurgentmotionontheground
thatthemotionwasproformafornotbearingtheconformityofthepublicprosecutor,andon
thefurthergroundthattheprivateprosecutorhadnotbeenauthorizedtoactassuchpursuant
toSection5,Rule110,oftheRulesofCourt.JudgeInfantedirectedthattheconsiderationof
thebailissuebeheldinabeyanceuntilafterthepublicprosecutorhadsubmittedacomment,
becausehewantedtoknowthepositionofthepublicprosecutoronAtty.Gacalsveryurgent
[1]

motionhavingbeenfiledwithouttheapprovalofthepublicprosecutor.

OnMay29,2003,thepublicprosecutorappeared,butdidnotfileanycomment.Thereupon,
Atty.Gacalsoughtauthoritytoappearasaprivateprosecutor.Thepublicprosecutordidnot
oppose Atty. Gacals request. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the reconsideration of the
grantofbailtoAncheta.Inresponse,JudgeInfanterequiredthepublicprosecutortofilehis
commentonAtty.Gacalsmotionforreconsideration,andagainresetthearraignmentofthe
[2]

accusedtoJune20,2003.

On June 4, 2003, the public prosecutor filed a comment, stating that he had recommended
bail as a matter of course that the orders dated April 23, 2003 approving bail upon his
recommendationandreleasingtheaccusedwereproperandthathisrecommendationofbail
wasineffectawaiverofthepublicprosecutorsrighttoabailhearing.
ByJune20,2003,whennoorderregardingthematterofbailwasissued,Atty.Gacal
soughttheinhibitionofJudgeInfanteonthegroundofhisgrossincompetencemanifestedby
hisfailuretoexercisejudicialpowertoresolvetheissueofbail.

[3]

In his motion for inhibition, Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently
required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a
judicial function that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should
haveacteduponitwithdispatch,becauseitwasunusualthatseveralpersonschargedwith
murder were being detained while Ancheta was let free on bail even without his filing a
petition for bail that such event also put the integrity of Judge Infantes court in peril and
thatalthoughhismotionforreconsiderationincludedthealternativereliefforJudgeInfante
to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time
constitutedgrossignoranceoflaw.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

3/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a judge either
because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all
knowhowtoexercisehisjudicialpowerthathislackofjudicialwillrenderedhimutterly
incompetenttoperformthefunctionsofajudgethatatonetime,heorderedthebailissueto
be submitted for resolution, with or without the comment of the public prosecutor, but at
anothertime,hedirectedthatthebailissuebesubmittedforresolution,withhislaterorder
denoting that he would resolve the issue only after receiving the comment from the public
prosecutor that he should not be too dependent on the public prosecutors comment
consideringthattheresolutionofthematterofbailwasentirelywithinhisdiscretionasthe
[4]
judge andthatthegrantingofbailwithoutapetitionforbailbeingfiledbytheaccusedor
[5]

ahearingbeingheldforthatpurposeconstitutedgrossignoranceofthelawandtherules.

Finally,Atty.GacalstatedthatJudgeInfanteandthepublicprosecutorwerebothguiltyof
[6]

violatingtheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct forgivingundueadvantagetoAncheta
byallowinghimbailwithouthisfilingapetitionforbailandwithoutahearingbeingfirst
[7]

conducted.

OnJuly9,2003,JudgeInfantedefinitivelydeniedAtty.Gacalsveryurgentmotion.

OnAugust5,2003,theOfficeoftheCourtAdministrator(OCAd)receivedfromtheOffice
of the Ombudsman the indorsement of the administrative complaintAtty. Gacal had filed
against Judge Infante (CPLM030581 entitled Gacal v. Infante, et al.), forwarding the
records of the administrative case for appropriate action to the Supreme Court as the
[8]

exclusiveadministrativeauthorityoverallcourts,theirjudgesandtheirpersonnel.

OnAugust21,2003,thenCourtAdministratorPrebiteroJ.Velasco,Jr.(nowaMemberofthe
Court)requiredJudgeInfantetocommentontheadministrativecomplaintagainsthim,and
to show cause within 10 days from receipt why he should not be suspended, disbarred, or
otherwisedisciplinarilysanctionedasamemberoftheBarforviolationofCanon10,Rule
10.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitypursuanttotheresolutionoftheCourtEn
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

4/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

[9]

BancinA.M.No.02902SCdatedSeptember17,2002.

OnOctober6,2003,theOCAdreceivedJudgeInfantescommentdatedSeptember22,2003,
by which he denied any transgression in the granting of bail to Ancheta, stating the
following:

2. At the outset, as a clarificatory note, accused FaustinoAncheta is out on bail, not

becauseheappliedforbaildulygrantedbythecourtbutbecausehepostedtherequiredbail
sinceinthefirstplacetheFiscalrecommendedbail,dulyapprovedbytheUndersigned,inthe
amount of P400,000.00. Underscoring is made to stress the fact that accusedAncheta had
actuallyneverfiledanapplicationforbail.Perforce,thecourthadnothingtohear,grantor
denyanapplication/motion/petitionforbailsincenonewasfiledbytheaccused.

3.Thus,thetwinOrdersdatedApril23,2003areexactlymeantasanapprovalofthe
bailbond(property)postedbyaccusedAncheta,itbeingfoundtobecompleteandsufficient.
They are not orders granting an application for bail, as misconstrued by private prosecutor.
(CertifiedtruemachinecopyofthetwinOrdersdatedApril23markedasAnnex2and2a
areheretoattached)

4.OnApril25,2003,privatecomplainantinthecitedcriminalcase,thrucounsel(the
Gacal, Gacal and Gacal Law Office), filed aVery Urgent Motion for Reconsideration or in
thealternativeVeryUrgentMotionforthisCourttoMotoPropioCorrectanApparentError,
prayingthatthetwinOrdersdatedApril23,2003bereconsidered.(Certifiedmachinecopyof
thesaidurgentmotionmarkedasAnnex3isheretoattached)

5. OnApril 29, 2003, during the hearing on motion, the private complainant and his
counsel (private prosecutor) appeared. The Fiscal was not present. The court nonetheless
orderedtheFiscaltofilehiscomment/sonthesaidmotion.Theaccusedthruprivatecounsel
in an open court hearing opposed the subject motion inasmuch as the same bears no
conformity of the Fiscal. In that hearing, the court advised the private prosecutor to
coordinate and secure the conformity of the Fiscal in filing his motion. (Certified machine
copyoftheOrderdatedApril29,2003,markedasAnnex4isheretoattached.)

6.On May 15, 2003, the scheduled date for the arraignment of accusedAncheta, the
parties and private prosecutor appeared. Again, the 1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, Alfredo
Barcelona, Jr., failed to appear who, being the next highest in rank in their Office, was
processinghisapplicationforregularappointmentasProvincialFiscalofSaranganiProvince.
He was then theActing Provincial Fiscal Designate in view of the appointment of former
ProvincialFiscalLaureanoT.AlzateasRTCJudgeinKoronadalCity.Duetotheabsenceof
the Fiscal and the motion for reconsideration then pending for resolution, the scheduled
arraignment was reset to May 29, 2003, per Order dated May 15, 2003, (certified machine
copyofwhichmarkedasAnnex5isheretoattached).

7.OnMay21,2003,theUndersignedresolvedtodenyforbeingproformathepending
motion for reconsideration. As held in the Order of denial, it was found that the private
prosecutor was not duly authorized in writing by the provincial prosecutor to prosecute the
said criminal case, nor was he judicially approved to act as such in violation of Section 5,
Rule110oftheRevisedRulesonCriminalProcedure.Thebailissue,however,washeldin
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

5/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

abeyance until submission of the comment thereon by the Fiscal as this Presiding Judge
would like then to know the position of the Fiscal anent to the cited motion without his
approval. The arraignment was reset to June 20, 2003. Again, the private prosecutor was
orally advised to coordinate and secure the approval of the Fiscal in filing his
motions/pleadings. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated May 21, 2003 marked as
Annex6heretoattached)

8.OnJune4,2003,theFiscalfinallyfiledhisCommentontheVeryUrgentMotionfor
Reconsiderationfiledbyprivatecomplainantthrucounsel(privateprosecutor).Consistently,
theFiscalinhiscommentrecommendedbailasamatterofcourseandthatheclaimedthat
OrdersdatedApril23,2003approvingbailuponhisrecommendationareproper,waivingin
effect his right for a bail hearing. (Certified true machine copy of the Fiscals comment
[10]
markedasAnnex7isheretoattached).

UnderdateofFebruary16,2004,theOCAdrecommendedafterinvestigationthatthecase
be redocketed as a regular administrative matter, and that Judge Infante be fined in the
[11]

amountofP20,000.00,

viz:

EVALUATION:The1987Constitutionprovidesthat,allpersons,exceptthosecharged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall
beforeconviction,bebailablebysufficientsuretiesorbereleasedonrecognizanceasmaybe
providedbylaw(Sec.13,Art.III).

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with a
capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be
admitted to bail when the evidence is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution(Sec.7,Rule114).

With the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal
Procedureasabackdrop,thequestionis:Canrespondentjudgeingrantingbailtotheaccused
dispensewiththehearingofApplicationforBail?

ThepreliminaryinvestigationofCriminalCaseNo.0361,entitledBenitoM.Occasion
vs. Faustino Ancheta for Murder was conducted by Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr., of
MCTC,KiambaMaitum,Sarangani.Findingtheexistenceofprobablecausethatanoffense
of Murder was committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, he transmitted his
resolution to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, together with the records of the case,
withNoBailRecommended.Uponreviewoftheresolutionoftheinvestigatingjudgebythe
OIC of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani, he filed the information for
MurderagainstaccusedFaustinoAnchetabutabailofP400,000.00fortheprovisionalliberty
of the latter was recommended. Relying on the recommendation of the Fiscal, respondent
judgegrantedtheApplicationforBailoftheaccused.

The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to

death (Art. 248, RPC).By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is considered a
capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by
respondentjudgeaftertheevidenceissubmittedinahearing.Hearingoftheapplicationfor
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

6/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the
prosecutionsevidenceisweakorstrong(Peoplevs.Dacudao,170SCRA489).It becomes,
therefore,aministerialdutyofajudgetoconducthearingthemomentanapplicationforbail
isfiledifthe accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishablebyreclusion
perpetuaorlifeimprisonment.Ifdoubtcanbeentertained,itfollowsthattheevidenceofguilt
isweakandbailshallberecommended.Ontheotherhand,iftheevidenceisclearandstrong,
nobailshallbegranted.

Verily,respondentjudgeerredwhenheissuedanordergrantingtheapplicationforbail
filed by the accused (Annex C) based merely on the order issued by the Fiscal (AnnexA)
recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused without even
botheringtoreadtheaffidavitsofthewitnessesfortheprosecution.Respondentjudgecannot
abdicatehisrightandauthoritytodeterminewhethertheevidenceagainsttheaccusedwhois
chargedwithcapitaloffenseisstrongornot.

Aftertherespondentjudgehasapprovedthepropertybondpostedbytheaccused,the
complainant,asprivateprosecutorfiledaMotionforReconsiderationand/orCancelBailbond
orinthealternative,VeryUrgentMotiontoMotoPropriocorrectanApparentError.Onthe
hearingoftheMotionon29April2003,theFiscalwasabsentbuthe(theFiscal)wasgiven
five(5)daysfromreceiptoftheorderwithinwhichtofilehiscommentand,withorwithout
commenttheincidentisdeemedsubmittedforresolutionand,hearingoftheMotionwasreset
toMay15,2003.ButtheFiscalagainfailedtoappearonsaiddateand,thearraignmentofthe
accusedwasseton29May2003.On21May2003,respondentjudgeresolvedtodenythe
MotiononthegroundthattheprivateprosecutorwasnotauthorizedinwritingbytheChief
oftheProsecutionsOfficeortheRegionalStateProsecutortoprosecutethecase,subjectto
theapprovalofthecourt,pursuanttoSect.5,Rule110RevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure.

The need for an authority in writing from the Chief of the Prosecutions Office or
Regional State Prosecutor to the Private Prosecutor to prosecute the case, subject to the
approval of the court, contemplates of a situation wherein there is no regular prosecutor
assignedthecourt,ortheprosecutorassigned,duetoheavyworkschedule,cannotattendto
theprosecutionofpendingcriminalcasestoexpeditedispositionofthecase.Thisprovision
oftheRulesofCriminalProceduredoesnotpreventtheoffendedpartywhodidnotreserve,
waive nor institute separate civil action, from intervening in the case through a private
prosecutor.

Intervention of the offended party in Criminal Action Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 11, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense (Sec. 16, Rule
110[Supra]).

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arisingfromtheoffensechargedshallbedeemedinstitutedwiththecriminalactionunless
the offended party waives civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutesthecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction(Sec.1(a),Rule111[Supra]).

TheoffendedpartyinCriminalCaseNo.113603didnotreservehisrighttoinstitute
separate civil action, he did not waive such right and did not file civil action prior to the
criminalaction,sotheoffendedpartymayunderthelawinterveneasamatterofright.

TheauthoritytointerveneincludesactualconductoftrialunderthecontroloftheFiscal
which includes the right to file pleadings. According to respondent judge, he advised the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

7/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

private prosecutor to coordinate with the fiscal and secure his approval in accord with the
mandateofSection,5,Rule110oftheRevisedRuleofCriminalProcedure:On this point,
respondentjudgeagainerred.Therightoftheoffendedpartytointerveneisconferredbylaw
and the approval of the Fiscal or even the court is not all necessary (Sec. 1 (a), Rule 111,
[Supra]).RespondentJudge,however,iscorrectwhenhestatedthatthemotionsfiledbythe
privateprosecutorshouldbewiththeconformityoftheFiscal.

Respondentjudgeserrorsarebasicsuchthathisactsconstitutesgrossignoranceofthe
law.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully recommended for the consideration of the

Honorable Court is the recommendation that the instant I.P.I. be redocketed as a regular
administrativematterandrespondentJudgebeheldorderedtopayafineofP20,000.00.

[12]

On March 31, 2004,

the Court directed that the administrative case be docketed as a

regularadministrativematter.

[13]

On December 01, 2004,

the Court denied Atty. Gacals ancillary prayer to

disqualifyJudgeInfantefromtryingCriminalCaseNo.113803pendingresolutionofthis
administrativematter.

Ruling

WeapproveandadoptthefindingsandrecommendationoftheOCAd,consideringthatthey
arewellsubstantiatedbytherecords.WenotethatJudgeInfantedidnotdenythathegranted
bailfortheprovisionalreleaseofAnchetainCriminalCaseNo.113803withoutconducting
therequisitebailhearing.

I
Bailhearingwasmandatory
inCriminalCaseNo.113803

JudgeInfantewouldexcusehimselffromblameandresponsibilitybyinsistingthatthe
hearingwasnolongernecessaryconsideringthattheaccusedhadnotfiledapetitionforbail
that inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed by the accused, his twin orders of
April23,2003werenotordersgrantinganapplicationforbail,butwereinsteadhisapproval
of the bail bond posted and thatAtty. Gacals very urgent motion and other motions and
written submissions lacked the requisite written conformity of the public prosecutor,
renderingthemnullandvoid.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

8/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

WecannotrelieveJudgeInfantefromblameandresponsibility.

The willingness of Judge Infante to rely on the mere representation of the public
prosecutor that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutors recommendation had been
proper,andthathis(publicprosecutor)recommendationofbailhadineffectwaivedtheneed
forabailhearingperplexestheCourt.Hetherebybetrayedanuncommonreadinesstotrust
moreinthepublicprosecutorsjudgmentthaninhisownjudiciousdiscretionasatrialjudge.
Heshouldnotdoso.

JudgeInfantemadethesituationworsebybrushingasidethevalidremonstrationsexpressed
inAtty.Gacalsveryurgentmotionthusly:

ThisCourtisnotunawarethatthechargeofmurderbeingacapitaloffenseisnotbailablexxx
xxxx
The phrase xxx application for admission to bail xxx is not an irrelevant but a significant
infusioninthecitedrule(section8),theplainimportofwhichisthatbailhearingispreceded
byamotion/petitionforadmissiontobailfiledbyadetainedaccusedhimselforthrucounsel.
The peculiar feature of the instant case, however, is the absence of a
petition/motionforadmissiontobailfiledbythehereinaccused.Onthecontrary,itis
the consistent position of the fiscal to recommend bail since the prosecution evidence
being merely circumstantial, is not strong for the purpose of granting bail. xxx. This
court believes that bail hearing, albeit necessary in the grant of bail involving capital
offense,isnotatalltimesandinallinstancesessentialtoaffordthepartytherightto
dueprocessespeciallyso,whenthefiscalinthiscasewasgivenreasonableopportunity
toexplainhisside,andyethemaintainedtheproprietyofgrantofbailwithoutneedof
hearingsincetheprosecutionevidenceisnotstrongforthepurposeofgrantingbail.

Further,whileitispreponderantofjudicialexperiencetoadoptthefiscalsrecommendationin
bailfixing,thiscourt,however,hadinadditionandinaccordwithSection6(a)oftheRevised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, evaluated the record of the case, and only upon being
convincedandsatisfiedthattheprosecutionevidenceascontainedintheaffidavitsofallthe
prosecutionwitnesses,noonebeinganeyewitnessaremerelycircumstantialevidence,that
thiscourtintheexerciseofsounddiscretionallowedtheaccusedtopostbail.
xxxx
Theconvergenceoftheforegoingfactorsabsenceofmotionforadmissiontobailfiled
bytheaccused,therecommendationofthefiscaltograntbail,theproformamotionofthe
privateprosecutorforlackofpriorapprovalfromthefiscalandthiscourtsevaluationofthe
[14]
recordssufficientlywarrantsthegrantofbailtohereinaccused.

JudgeInfantespecificallycitedjudicialexperienceassanctioninghisadoptionandapproval
of the public prosecutors recommendation on the fixing of bail.Yet, it was not concealed
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

9/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

from him that the public prosecutors recommendation had been mainly based on the
[15]

documentaryevidenceadduced,

andonthepublicprosecutorsmisguidedpositionthatthe

evidence of guilt was weak because only circumstantial evidence had been presented. As
such, Judge Infantes unquestioning echoing of the public prosecutors conclusion about the
evidenceofguiltnotbeingsufficienttodenybaildidnotjustifyhisdispensingwiththebail
hearing.

JudgeInfanteapparentlyactedasiftherequirementforthebailhearingwasamerely
minorruletobedispensedwith.Although,intheory,theonlyfunctionofbailistoensurethe
appearanceoftheaccusedatthetimesetforthearraignmentandtrialand,inpractice,bail
servesthefurtherpurposeofpreventingthereleaseofanaccusedwhomaybedangerousto
[16]

societyorwhomthejudgemaynotwanttorelease,

ahearinguponnoticeismandatory
[17]

beforethegrantofbail,whetherbailisamatterofrightordiscretion.

Withmorereason

is this true in criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended,statesthat:Nopersonchargedwithacapitaloffense,oranoffensepunishableby
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admittedtobailregardlessofthestageofcriminalaction.

[18]

In Cortes v. Catral,

therefore, the Court has outlined the following duties of the judge

onceanapplicationforbailisfiled,towit:

1. Inallcaseswhetherbailisamatterofrightordiscretion,notifytheprosecutorof
thehearingoftheapplicationforbailorrequirehimtosubmithisrecommendation
(Section18,Rule114oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,asamended)

2. Wherebailisamatterofdiscretion,conductahearingoftheapplicationforbail
regardlessorwhetherornottheprosecutionrefusestopresentevidencetoshowthat
theguiltoftheaccusedisstrongforthepurposeofenablingthecourttoexerciseits
sounddiscretion(Sections7and8,id)
3.Decidewhethertheguiltoftheaccusedisstrongbasedonthesummaryofevidence
oftheprosecution

4. Iftheguiltoftheaccusedisnotstrong,dischargetheaccusedupontheapprovalofthe
bailbond(Section19,id)otherwise,thepetitionshouldbedenied.[emphasissupplied]

II
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

10/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

JudgeInfantedisregardedrulesandguidelines
inCriminalCaseNo.113803

Ostensibly,JudgeInfantedisregardedbasicbutwellknownrulesandguidelinesonthe
matterofbail.

1.
Incasenoapplicationforbailisfiled,
bailhearingwasnotdispensable

Judge Infante contends that a bail hearing in Criminal Case No. 113803 was not
necessary because the accused did not file an application for bail and because the public
prosecutorhadrecommendedbail.

JudgeInfantescontentionisunwarranted.
EvenwherethereisnopetitionforbailinacaselikeCriminalCaseNo.113803,ahearing
shouldstillbeheld.Thishearingisseparateanddistinctfromtheinitialhearingtodetermine
the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is
sufficientgroundtoengenderawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehasbeencommittedandthat
theaccusedisprobablyguiltyofthecrime.TheProsecutionmustbegivenachancetoshow
[19]

thestrengthofitsevidenceotherwise,aviolationofdueprocessoccurs.

The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant
dispensingwiththehearing.Thepublicprosecutorsrecommendationofbailwasnotmaterial
indecidingwhethertoconductthemandatoryhearingornot.Forone,thepublicprosecutors
[20]

recommendation, albeit persuasive, did not necessarily bind the trial judge,

in whom

alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or not was vested. Whatever the
public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was nonbinding. Nor did
suchrecommendationconstituteashowingthattheevidenceofguiltwasnotstrong.Ifitwas
otherwise,thetrialjudgecouldbecomeunavoidablycontrolledbytheProsecution.

Beingthetrialjudge,JudgeInfantehadtobeawareoftheprecedentslaiddownbythe
SupremeCourtregardingthebailhearingbeing mandatory and indispensable. He ought to
have remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

11/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

[21]

position to determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak or strong.

Hence,hisdispensingwiththehearingmanifestedagrossignoranceofthelawandtherules.

2.
Publicprosecutorsfailuretooppose
applicationforbailortoadduceevidence
didnotdispensewithhearing

That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it
recommendedbail,andthattheProsecutiondidnotwanttoadduceevidencewereirrelevant,
anddidnotdispensewiththebailhearing.ThegravityofthechargeinCriminalCaseNo.
113803madeitstillmandatoryforJudgeInfantetoconductabailhearinginwhichhecould
havemadeonhisownsearchingandclarificatoryquestionsfromwhichtoinferthestrength
orweaknessoftheevidenceofguilt.Heshouldnothavereadilyandeasilygonealongwith
thepublicprosecutorsopinionthattheevidenceofguilt,beingcircumstantial,wasnotstrong
enoughtodenybailelse,hemightberegardedashavingabdicatedfromaresponsibilitythat
washisaloneasthetrialjudge.

JudgeInfantesholdingthatcircumstantialevidenceofguiltwasofalesserweightthan
directevidenceintheestablishmentofguiltwasalsosurprising.Histrainingandexperience
shouldhavecautionedhimenoughonthepointthatthelackorabsenceofdirectevidence
didnotnecessarilymeanthattheguiltoftheaccusedcouldnotanymorebeproved,because
[22]

circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, could supplant the absence of direct evidence.

In

short,evidenceofguiltwasnotnecessarilyweakbecauseitwascircumstantial.
Instead, Judge Infante should have assiduously determined why the Prosecution
refusedtosatisfyitsburdenofproofintheadmissionoftheaccusedtobail.Shouldhehave
found that the public prosecutors refusal was not justified, he could have then himself
inquiredonthenatureandextentoftheevidenceofguiltforthepurposeofenablinghimself
to ascertain whether or not such evidence was strong. He could not have ignored the
possibilitythatthepublicprosecutormighthaveerredinassessingtheevidenceofguiltas
[23]

weak.

At any rate, if he found the Prosecution to be uncooperative, he could still have

[24]

endeavoredtodetermineonhisowntheexistenceofsuchevidence,

withtheassistanceof

theprivateprosecutor.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

12/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

3.
JudgeInfantesgrantingofbailwithoutahearingwas
censurableforgrossignoranceofthelawandtherules

[25]

Everyjudgeshouldbefaithfultothelawandshouldmaintainprofessionalcompetence.

His role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and
jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and
[26]

irresponsibleconduct.

Inthatlight,thefailureofJudgeInfantetoconductahearingpriortothegrantofbail
incapitaloffenseswasinexcusableandreflectedgrossignoranceofthelawandtherulesas
[27]

well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.

He well knew that the determination of

[28]

whetherornottheevidenceofguiltisstrongwasamatterofjudicialdiscretion,

andthat

thediscretionlaynotinthedeterminationofwhetherornotahearingshouldbeheld,butin
the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against
[29]

the accused.

His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a
[30]

petitionforbailfromtheaccused.

Consequently,anyorderheissuedintheabsenceofthe

requisiteevidencewasnotaproductofsoundjudicialdiscretionbutofwhimandcapriceand
[31]

outrightarbitrariness.

III
ImposablePenalty

WenextdeterminethepenaltyimposableonJudgeInfanteforhisgrossignoranceofthelaw
andtherules.

TheCourtimposedafineofP20,000.00ontherespondentjudgeinDocenaCaspe v.
[32]

Bugtas.

Inthatcase,therespondentjudgegrantedbailtothetwoaccusedwhohadbeen
[33]

chargedwithmurderwithoutfirstconductingahearing.Likewise,inLoyolav.Gabo,

the

CourtfinedtherespondentjudgeinthesimilaramountofP20,000.00forgrantingbailtothe
accusedinamurdercasewithouttherequisitebailhearing.Toaccordwithsuchprecedents,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

13/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

the Court prescribes a fine of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a
repetitionoftheoffenseorthecommissionofanotherseriousoffensewillbemoreseverely
dealtwith.

WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross

ignoranceofthelawandtherulesand,accordingly,FINEhimintheamountofP20,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of another serious
offensewillbemoreseverelydealtwith.

LetacopyofthisDecisionbefurnishedtotheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratorforproper
disseminationtoalltrialjudges.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:
RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice
Chairperson

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROMARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

14/15

5/28/2016

A.M.No.RTJ041845

[1]
Rollo,pp.4445.
[2]
Id.,p.4.
[3]
Id.,pp.121123.
[4]
Rollo,pp18,6.
[5]
Id.,pp.6770,70.
[6]
Id.,p.70.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id.,p.67.
[9]
Id.,p.90.
[10]
Id.,pp.94103(boldemphasisisintheoriginaltext).
[11]
Id.,pp.205212.
[12]
Id.,p.213.
[13]
Id.,p.224.
[14]
Id.,pp.2223(boldemphasissupplied).
[15]
Id.,pp.101102.
[16]
Bascov.Rapatalo,A.M.No.RTJ961335,March5,1997,269SCRA220.
[17]
Tev.Perez,A.M. No. MTJ001286, January 21, 2002, 374 SCRA 130 Bangayan v. Butacan,A.M. No. MTJ001320,
November22,2000,345SCRA301,306.
[18]
A.M.No.RTJ97138,September10,1997,279SCRA1,18.
[19]
Directov.Bautista,A.M.No.MTJ991205,November29,2000,346SCRA223.
[20]
MarzanGelaciov.Flores,A.M.No.RTJ991488,June20,2000,334SCRA1,9.
[21]
MarzanGelaciov.Flores,supra.
[22]
Ganv.People,G.R.No.165884,April23,2007,521SCRA550.
[23]
MarzanGelaciov.Flores,supra,Note20.
[24]
Tev.Perez,AMNo.MTJ001286,January21,2002,374SCRA130.
[25]
Rule3.01,CodeofJudicialConduct.
[26]
Taboritev.Sollesta,A.M.No.MTJ021388,August12,2003,408SCRA602.
[27]
Bantuasv.Pangadapun,RTJ981407,July20,1998,292SCRA622.
[28]
Aleria,Jr.v.Velez,G.R.No.127400,November16,1998,298SCRA611
[29]
Gimenov.Arcueno,Sr.,A.M.No.MTJ94981,November29,1995,250SCRA376.
[30]
DelosSantosReyesv.Montesa,Jr.,A.M.No.RTJ93983,August7,1995,247SCRA85.
[31]
Baylonv.Sison,AMNo.9273600,April6,1995,243SCRA284.
[32]
AMRTJ031767,March28,2003,400SCRA37.
[33]
A.M.No.RTJ001524,January26,2000,323SCRA348.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/RTJ%20041845.htm

15/15