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A.B.C.LaminartPvt.Ltd.&AnrvsA.P.Agencies,Salemon13March,1989
PattnaikIndustriesPvt.Ltd.vsKalingaIronWorksAndAnr.on1May,1984
MetroMarins&AnrvsBonusWatchCo.Pvt.Ltd.&Orson10September,2004
DorabCawasjiWardenvsCoomiSorabWarden&Orson13February,1990
IndianRareEarthsLtd.AndOrs.vsUniqueBuildersLtd.on9April,1986
Citedby1docs
DrMukeshAghivsSteriaLtd&Orson8March,2016

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relievingandrelieved

DelhiHighCourt

relievingletter

VishalGuptavsL&TFinanceLimitedon9September,2009

email

Author:S.Muralidhar

noticeperiod
email
ouster

INTHEHIGHCOURTOFDELHIATNEWDELHI

ousterclause
vishalgupta

CS(OS)2309of2008&IANo.13399/08

mandatoryinjunction
interiminjunction

Reservedon:September2,2009
Decisionon:September9,2009

commercialcontract
ahluwalia
laminart

VISHALGUPTA.....Plaintiff
ThroughMr.AshishMohan,Advocate
versus
L&TFINANCELIMITED....Defendant
ThroughMs.InduMalhotra,Senior
AdvocatewithMr.VikasMehtaand
Mr.PraveenPahwa,Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLEDR.JUSTICES.MURALIDHAR
1.Whetherreportersofthelocalnewspapers
beallowedtoseethejudgment?No
2.TobereferredtotheReporterornot?Yes
3.WhetherthejudgmentshouldbereportedintheDigest?Yes
JUDGMENT

09.09.2009S.Muralidhar,J.
1. By this order, the preliminary issue in the suit concerning the territorial jurisdiction of this
Courttotrythesuitaswellasthequestionofgrantofanadinteriminjunctionarebeingdealt

kalra
appointmentletter
laminartpvt.ltd
jaspalsingh
territorialjurisdiction
basicsalary
interimmandatoryinjunction

with.
2. The Plaintiff was appointed by the Defendant L & T Finance Limited by a letter dated 19th
June2006asanAssistantManagerintheirCorporateProductFinancingDivisionatNewDelhi.
Significantamongthetermsandconditionsofemploymentwerefollowing:
"PlaceofWork:
YouwillbeassignedtoworkatourofficeinNewDelhiatpresent.However,youwill
beliabletobetransferredtoanyofthecompanysestablishmentinIndiaoroutside,
asandwhenrequiredbythemanagement.
TerminationofEmployment:
The above offer of employment is for continuous employment. However it may be
terminatedatanypointoftimebyeitherpartygivingtwomonthsnoticeinwriting.
The company has right to pay two months salary in lieu of such notice to you. The
companyshallalsohavetherighttoadjustanyleaveduetoyouand/orrecoverfrom
yousuchamountstowardsnoticepayfortheshortfallintheperiodofnotice.
DisputeAnydisputebetweenyourselfandthecompanyconcerningwithorrelatingto
or arising out of this employment, shall be subject to the jurisdiction in Greater
Mumbaionly."
3.ThesaidletterwasissuedfromtheCorporateProductFinancingDivisionoftheDefendantat
Bandra(East),Mumbai.Atthefootofthefirstpageoftheappointmentletter,theaddressofthe
registeredofficeoftheDefendantatBallardEstate,Mumbaiwasindicated.
4.On12thFebruary2007,thePlaintiffwasinformedoftheconfirmationofhisappointmentwith
the Defendant with effect from 3 rd January 2007. The updated Human Resource Manual &
Procedure of the Defendant as on 13th October 2008 has been filed by learned counsel for the
Defendant.Thetwoclausesrelevantforthepurposeofpresentcasearefollows:
"AbandonmentIfunauthorizedabsenceexceedseightworkingdays(consecutive),the
managementatitssolediscretion,strikeoffthenameoftheemployeefromtherolls
of the company on ground of abandonment of employment and advise him/her
accordingly. If within 15 days from receipt of such advise, the employee presents
himself/herselfandoffersanexplanation/reasonsofabsence,themanagementhasan
optiontoreviewthematterandconfirmorotherwisestandbyitsearlierdecisions.
ExitPolicyAnemployeewhowishestoresignfromtheservicesofthecompanywillbe
requiredtogivethenoticeofresignationaspertermsofappointmentorsubsequent
amendmentsthereof.Anemployeewillhavetoserveaminimumperiodof2monthas
noticeperiodoragreedasperthetermofemployment.
Iftheemployeedesirestoberelievedearlierthanthenoticeperiod,managementatits
sole discretion may decide to waive the notice period or otherwise the employee is
required to surrender the equivalent salary (Basic Salary) applicable for the notice
periodwaived.Ifthecompanyaskstheconcernedindividualtoleavebeforethenotice
period, then the company will pay the equivalent salary (Basic salary) for the
remainingnoticeperiod.
Managementatitssolediscretionmaysanctionleavetotheemployeeduringhis/her
noticeperiodprovidedsuchleaveexiststothecreditoftheindividual.
Incaseanemployeeleaveswithin1yearofservice,nounclaimedleavewillbeeither
encashedorcompensatedagainstthesettlementofnoticeperiod.However,incaseof

anemployeeleavingaftercompletionof1yearofservice,theunclaimedleavemaybe
either encashed or compensated or settled against notice period at the discretion of
thearrangement.TheencashmentwouldbeasperleaveRules(i.e.onlyBasicsalary).
The company may at its sole discretion terminate the employment without notice
and/or salary in lieu of notice, if in the opinion of the company, the continuance of
his/heremploymentisdetrimentaltotheinterestofthecompany.Intheeventofsuch
termination,allbenefits/perquisites/allowancesshallstandforfeited.
Alltheloansavailedbytheemployeearetobesettledbeforethedateofresignation
takes effect. Necessary clearances on handing over the company assets should be
obtainedfromtherespectiveauthorities."
5.On4thAugust2008,thePlaintiffresignedfromtheservicesoftheDefendantbysendingane
mailaddressedtoMr.JaspalSinghAhluwalia.Thesaidemailreadsasunder:
"From:GuptaVishalSent:Monday,August04,200811:27AMTo:AhluwaliaJaspal
Singh CC: Kalra Anil Ramesh V Samant Biswajit D. Singh Niraj Kumar Subject:
Letter of Resignation Dear Sir, This is to formally inform that I will not be able to
continuemyserviceforL&TFinanceLimitedasAssistantManagerTEG,forDelhi
NCRregion.ForpersonalreasonsIwouldliketoresignfromtheaforesaidpost.Iwish
toberelievedbyclosinghoursof5/8/2008.
Iwouldliketothankthisorganizationforgivingmeanopportunitytoworktogether
andimpartingagoodexposureinSalesfield.
I would request you to please relieve me of my official duties on 5/8/2008. I am
willing to compensate the organisation as per policy in lieu of my notice period.
Thanking you, Yours truly, Vishal Gupta Employee N.735310 Assistant Manager
TEGL&TFinanceLtdNewDelhi."
6.Inresponsetotheaboveemailwhichwassentat11.27amMr.JaspalSinghAhluwaliareplied
byemailtothePlaintiffonthesamedayat11.42amtothefollowingeffect:
"RE:LetterofResignationAhluwaliaJaspalSinghSent:Monday,August04,2008at
11.42AMTo:GuptaVishalCC:KalraAnilRameshVSamantBiswajitDSingNiraj
Kumar Vishal, you are required to resolve the Non Starter Cases done by you after
whichonlyyouwillberelievedfromtheservicesoftheOrganisation.Regards,Jaspal
Ahluwalia"
7. On 5th August 2008, the Plaintiff received an email at 5.59 pm from another employee Ms.
ManjuSachinChowreattachinganExitInterviewForm, Clearance Form and the details of the
amounttoberecoveredfromthePlaintiff.AccordingtothePlaintiff,hefilledouttheseforms.As
farastheclearanceformisconcernedunderthecolumnDuesifanyitwasindicatedNo"byhis
owndepartment,bytheAdmin.DepartmentandOperationsDepartment.AsregardstheFin.&
Accts Department the aforementioned column was left blank. As regards the recovery of the
amountduefortwomonthssalaryinlieuofnotice,theLTARecoveryandtheGeneralPurpose
LoanRecovery,atotalsumofRs.2,20,318/wasindicated.
8.Itrequirestobenoticedthatinresponsetotheemaildated4thAugust2008fromMr.Jaspal
SinghAhluwaliathePlaintiffsentanemailon5thAugust2008at11.53AMstatingthat"asper
thereportfromthesystem,twocasesarebeenshownasnonstartercasesinwhichlegalaction
hasbeenalreadyinitiated."On6thAugust2008at11.41amMr.JaspalAhluwaliasentanemail
tohimthat"Vishal,youarerequiredtoresolvethese cases and ensure No Loss is incurred, till
thattimeyourreleasefromtheorganisationiswithheld."ThePlaintiffhasplacedonrecordthe
report of non starter cases as on 15th October 2008 which shows that there were two cases of

commercial vehicles financing pertaining to one Birender Singh and the other Sanjay Singh.
BirenderSinghhadgivensomepostdatedcheques,someofwhichhadbeenencashedandsome
dishonoured.Itisstatedthatlegalactionhasbeeninitiatedasregardsthedishonouredcheques.
9.Itisnotindisputethaton14stAugust2008thePlaintiffissuedtotheDefendantachequein
the sum of Rs.2,20,318/ and this was encashed by the Defendant on 21st August 2008. It is,
however,contendedbytheDefendantthatthisamounthasbeenplacedinasundryaccount.
10.ThecontroversyinthepresentcaseisthatthePlaintiffhasnotbeenissuedarelievingletter
by the Defendant as a result of which he is unable to take up employment with any other
organization.AccordingtothePlaintiff,hereceivedanofferforappointmentfromAxisBankbut
wasunabletojoinashecouldnotproducetherelievingletterfromtheDefendant.
11. Faced with a difficult situation where the Defendant refused to issue a letter relieving him
fromitsservice,despitehisclearingthedues,thePlaintiffwrotetoMr.AnilKalra,Head(HR)of
theDefendanton2ndSeptember2008anemailasfollows:
"From Gupta Vishal Sent : 02 September 2008 11:27 To: Kalra Anil CC:
vishal_gupta1978@rediffmaill.comSub:Re:Letterofresignation_VishalGuptaDear
Sir,Thisisinreferencetomymailsenttoyouon25/8/2008inwhichIintimatedthat
the cheque of Rs.2,20,318/ in the name of L&T FINANCE LTD as my settlement
amountisclearedfrommybankaccount,buttilldateIhavenotbeenrelievedfrom
theorganisation.Iforganisationisnotrelievingme,Iamreadytojointheservicesof
the organisation (L&T Finance Ltd) and also I request you to kindly refund the
settlementamountrecoveredfrommethroughchequeno.233075ofUTIBankLTD.
Waitingforyourreplyattheearliest.
Thankingyou,Regards,VishalGupta"(emphasissupplied)
12.Inresponsetotheaboveemail,Mr.AnilKalrawrotetothePlaintiffon18thSeptember2008
asfollows:
"ToVishalGuptaAsstManagerEPGTEGP.S.No.735310Location:NewDelhiDear
Vishal,Referstoyourrequestof2ndSeptember2008forresignation,wewouldliketo
putthefollowingonrecord:
1. You have already been informed that you have done irregular lending in 2 cases
wherenorepaymenthascomesofarandcustomersandassetsarenottraceable.
2. We hereby give you a months time i.e. upto 30 th October 2008 to find out the
customerstowhomyouhavedonethelendingandalsotheassetsforwhichyouhave
donethelending.
Pleasenotethatiftheaboveisnotorganizedby30thOctober2008thecompanywill
initiatetheappropriatecivil/criminalactionagainstyou.
For:L&TFinanceLtd.
AnilKalraHeadHRL&TFinancialServices."(emphasissupplied)
13.ThePlaintiffthensentanemailon15thOctober2008toMr.AnilKalra,Head(HR)ofthe
Defendanttracingthedevelopmentstillthen.Hepointedoutthathisrequiringtoresolvethenon
starter cases was not a condition mentioned in the offer letter. He maintained that his
employment stood terminated when he paid two months salary in lieu of notice which was
acceptedbytheDefendant.Asregardsthedocumentscollectedbyhimfromtheborrowersinthe
two nonstarter cases, he mentioned that the current address proof and photo proof in both

caseswere duly forwarded to the Defendant. He further informed that Birender Singhwasstill
available at the same place mentioned in his loan application. In the same email, the Plaintiff
informed the Defendant of the other address of Sanjay Singh He called upon the Defendant to
immediatelyissuehimarelievingletter.
14.Thereafter,on4thNovember2008,thepresentsuitwasfiled.Theprayers,interalia,arefora
declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to a letter relieving him from the Defendant with effect
from4thAugust2008forapermanentmandatoryinjunctiondirectingtheCompanytoissuea
relievingletterandotherreliefsincludingrefundofanamountofRs.32,890/paidbythePlaintiff
to the Defendant as salary in lieu of notice reimburse his out of pocket expenses and
compensationforthelossofjobwithAxisbank.Healsosoughtdamagesforthelossofmental
peaceandforthemalafideactionsoftheDefendant.
15. The suit was listed for hearing on 5th November 2008. The Defendants 2 and 3 who are
officers of Defendant No.1 were not found to be necessary parties and were struck off from the
arrayoftheparties.On28thApril2009,thefollowingorderwaspassedbythisCourt:
"Thesuitisripeforframingofissues.However,thereappearto be some element of
settlementanditisdeemedexpedienttogivethepartiesanopportunityforthesame.
List on 15th May, 2009. If no settlement is arrived at by the parties, issues shall be
framed.
IA.No.13399/2008(of the plaintiff u/O 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC) The plaintiff seeks
interimorderdirectingthedefendanttoissuetheemploymentrelievingcertificateto
the plaintiff. It is stated that the said certificate is necessary for the plaintiff to take
employmentelsewhere.Thecounselforthedefendanthasstatedthattheplaintiffhad,
infact, abandoned the employment of the defendant and contrary to the agreement
with the defendant and has otherwise not given all the information required to be
submittedastothebusinesstransactedbytheplaintiffonbehalfofthedefendantand
owing to which the defendant is suffering losses. The counsel for the defendant has
statedthatiftheplaintiffweretocooperatewiththedefendantandgivetherequisite
information to the defendant, the defendant would consider issuing the relieving
certificatewithoutprejudicetoitsrightsandcontentions.
The counsel for the defendant has also contended that this court does not have the
territorialjurisdictiontoentertainthesuit.Toexplorethepossibilityofthesettlement
it has been agreed that the plaintiff shall visit the office of the defendant at Moti
Nagar, Delhi at 11.00 a.m. on 29th April, 2009 and meet Mr Neeraj Singh of the
defendant and give all the information which is in his power and possession and as
requiredbythesaidMrNeerajSingh.Iftheplaintiffisrequiredtogototheofficeof
thedefendantonsubsequentdatesalso,theplaintiffshalldoso.
List on 15th May, 2009 for further consideration. If no settlement is arrived at, the
argumentsontheapplicationshallbeheardonthatdate."
16.Pursuanttothesaidorder,thePlaintiffwentovertotheDefendantsofficeontwodatesi.e.
29th April 2009 and 5th May 2009. What happened during those meetings is differently
described by the Defendant and the Plaintiff. According to the Plaintiff, instead of asking him
about the two nonstarter cases, the Defendant asked him about various other cases and
therefore, they were not acting fairly. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff was not
cooperating with them and declined to give them the details regarding the nine loan defaulters
whomhehadintroduced.TheDefendanthasplacedonrecordthecopyofaletterdated11thMay
2009addressedbyittothePlaintifflistingoutthe15casesofdefaultingpartiestowhomloans
wereadvancedbytheDefendantontherecommendationofthePlaintiff.

17.Despitelearnedcounselforthepartiestakingadjournmentsforexploringthepossibilityofa
settlement,itwasreportedfinallythatnosettlementwaspossible.TheDefendantwasprepared
togivealetterstatingthatthePlaintiffhadceasedtobeanemployeeoftheDefendantonaccount
ofabandonmentofservicesthathisnamestoodstruckofffromtherollsandthatthecertificate
wasbeingissuedwithoutprejudicetotherightsandcontentionsoftheDefendantinthepresent
suit. This kind of a qualified relieving letter was of course not acceptable to the Plaintiff. The
partieswerethereforeheardatlengthontheapplicationforadinteriminjunctionaswellasthe
question of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to try the suit. Mr. Ashish Mohan, learned
Advocate appeared for the Plaintiff and Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned Senior Advocate and Mr.
VikasMehta,learnedAdvocateappearedfortheDefendant.
18. As regards the preliminary issue of territorial jurisdiction, it is submitted on behalf of the
Defendantthatifthesuititselfwasnotmaintainablethenthequestionofgrantofanadinterim
injunctionwouldnotarise.ItissubmittedbylearnedSeniorAdvocatefortheDefendantthatin
viewofthespecificclauseintheappointmentletterthatanydisputebetweenthePlaintiffandthe
Defendant"concerningwithorrelatingtoorarisingoutof"theemploymentwas"subjecttothe
jurisdiction in Greater Mumbai only", the suit filed by the Plaintiff in this court was not
maintainable.ItisfurtherpointedoutthatevenforthepurposeofSection20(a)and(c)CPC,the
corporateofficeoftheDefendantwhichissuedtheappointmentletterwasinMumbai,therefusal
oftheacceptanceoftheresignationletterwasalsoatMumbaiandtherefore,thecauseofaction
aroseonlywithinthejurisdictionoftheCourtinMumbai.Relianceisplaceduponthejudgments
in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Limited v. A.P. Agencies, Salem AIR 1989 SC 1239, Shree Subhlaxmi
FabricsPvt.Ltdv.ChandMalBaradiaAIR2005SC2161.Itisfurthersubmittedthatthegranting
of any relief of mandatory injunction directing the Defendant to issue a relieving letter to the
Plaintiff would tantamount to granting the final relief itself and this was impermissible in law.
RelianceisplaceduponthejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinMetroMarinsv.BonusWatchCo.
Pvt.Ltd.AIR2005SC1444.
19. It is then submitted on behalf of the Defendant that when the employee had a poor track
record and had abandoned its services, the Court could not compel it to issue a relieving letter
simpliciter.Itisrepeatedlypointedoutthatatleast15oftheborrowerswhomthePlaintiffhad
recommendedforloanhaddefaulted.Thefulldetailsoftheborrowerswerenotavailablewiththe
Defendant. Considerable losses were suffered by it on account of the conduct of the Plaintiff.
Therewasnoquestion,therefore,oftheDefendantbeingaskedtoissuearelievinglettertothe
Plaintiffunconditionally.Itissubmittedthatinanyeventadecisiononthisaspectwouldrequire
thecasetogofortrial.Atthesametime,itwascontendedby the Defendant that there was no
questionofthePlaintiffbeingtakenbackinitsserviceparticularlywhentheDefendanthadlost
confidence in the Plaintiff. Therefore, this was a case where no relief could be granted at this
stageevenbyaskingtheDefendanttotakethePlaintiffbackinservice.
20. On the other hand, it is contended by the Plaintiff that the observations made in A.B.C.
LaminartPvt.Ltdv.A.P.Agencies(supra)donotcategoricallyholdthattheousterclausewould
alsoapplyinthecontractsofemploymentandthatthesaidjudgmentwasgiveninthecontextof
acommercial contract. Reliance has also been placed on certain decision of the High Courts in
M/s.SnehalkumarSarabhaiv.M/s.EconomicTransportOrganizationAIR1975Gujarat72,M/s.
PatnaikIndustriesPvt.Ltdv.KalingaIronWorksAIR1984Orissa182andIndianRareEarths
Limited v. M/s. Unique Builders Limited AIR 1987 Orissa 30 . It is submitted that there are
instanceswhereamandatorytemporaryinjunctioncanbegrantedandthisisonesuchinstance.
RelianceisalsoplacedonthejudgmentofDorab Caswaji Warden v. Coomi Sorab WardenAIR
1990SCC867andSukermaRaniKapoorv.OmPrakashKapoor(2002)2AD(Del)860.
21.AsregardsthesubmissionregardingtheterritorialjurisdictionofthisCourt,thereisanouster
clause in the contract in terms of which only the courts in Greater Mumbai would have
jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the Defendant clarified that Bandra (E) is in Greater Mumbai

andinanyeventgiventheclaimmadeinthepresentsuit,itwouldhavetobefiledontheoriginal
side of the Bombay High Court. According to them, therefore, the Court in Delhi has no
jurisdiction.
22.ThedecisionsoftheSupremeCourtinregardtoousterclausehaveinvariably been in the
contextofcommercialcontracts.InA.B.C.LaminartPvt.Ltdv.A.P.Agencies,theDefendantwas
located in Gujarat whereas the Plaintiff was in Salem (Tamil Nadu). The objection by the
DefendantastothejurisdictionoftheCourtinTamilNaduwasnegativedbytheHighCourt.The
Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court. The ouster clause in that case did not use the
wordonlyorexclusively.Inthatcontextitwasheldtherefore,thattheousterclausedidnot
manifest the intention of the parties to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court at Tamil Nadu.
Accordingly, the order of the High Court was not interfered with. However, the following
observationsinthesaidjudgmentappeartoindicatethattheconvenienceofthepartiesisalsoa
factorthatwouldhavetobeborneinmind,andthatthejurisdictionofthecourtcannotbesaidto
becompletelyexcluded:
"16.SolongasthepartiestoacontractdonotoustthejurisdictionofalltheCourts
whichwouldotherwisehavejurisdictiontodecidethecauseofactionunderthelawit
cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the
Court. If under the law several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have
agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or others of them it
cannot be said that there is total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the
parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a particular
jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their
agreementtotheextenttheyagreednottosubmittootherjurisdictionscannotbesaid
tobevoidasagainstpublicpolicy.Ifontheotherhandthejurisdictiontheyagreedto
submittowouldnototherwisebeproperjurisdictiontodecidedisputesarisingoutof
the contract it must be declared void being against public policy. Would this be the
positionintheinstantcase?"
23.InShreeSubhlaxmiFabricsPvt.LtdvChandMalBaradia(supra)againthequestionwasof
interpretationofacommercialcontract.AgainfollowingthelistofjudgmentsfromABCLaminart
Pvt.Ltdv.A.P.Agencies,itwasheldinAngileInsulationv.DavyAshmoreIndiaLimited(1995)4
SCC 153 that the ouster clause using the words only or exclusively would in fact decide the
jurisdiction of other courts. While the earlier decisions of the High Courts taking a different
approachevenincommercialcontracts(fore.g.,seeM/s.PatnaikIndustriesPvt.Ltdv.Kalinga
Iron Works) could be distinguished on the basis that they were delivered at a time when the
decisioninABCLaminartPvt.Ltdv.A.P.AgencieshadnotbeenrenderedbytheSupremeCourt,
noneofthedecisionsdealwithacontractofemployment.
24. In the considered view of this Court the decisions on the ouster clause in the context of a
commercial contract have to be held to be distinguishable in their application to a case of a
contract of employment. In the employment contract, an employee would not be able to insist
that the disputes, if any, are to be referred only to one court and not the other. The employee
usuallyacceptstheemploymentwithalltheattendanttermsandconditionsornotatall.Inthe
present case, the letter of employment no doubt states that it is a transferable job. Still, the
PlaintiffwastoworkprimarilyfortheDelhiofficeoftheDefendant.He,infact,renderedservices
onlyinDelhioffice.HesubmittedhisresignationatDelhi.Foranemployeenolongerinservice
to be asked to go to Mumbai for instituting and pursuing litigation would render the remedy
expensiveandinefficaciousforsuchemployee.Itwouldworkharshlyagainsthim.Moreover,ina
situationlikethepresentonewheretheprayerisessentiallyforadirectiontotheDefendantto
issuearelievingletter,todirecttheemployeetogotoadifferentcityonlybecauseoftheouster
clause seems to be unfair and unjust. Although in commercial contracts, it has been held that
suchanousterclausewouldnotbeopposedtopublicpolicy(seetheobservationsinpara18of

thedecisioninABCLaminart),inacontractofemploymentsuchaclausecouldwellbeheldtobe
opposedtopublicpolicy.Torepeat,thecourtshavethusfarhadnooccasiontoexaminehowa
strict application of the exclusion clause would work for an employee who is out of service. As
regards the comparative hardship, the Defendant has an office in Delhi and there will be no
difficultyforittoappearbeforethisCourtanddefenditself.
25.AsfarasSection20CPCisconcerned,intermsofclause(b)thereof,the Defendant has an
office in Delhi. The letter of appointment was received in Delhi. The email correspondence
referredtohereinbeforeshowsthatthePlaintiffsresignationletterwassentfromDelhiandthe
refusal of the relieving letter was communicated to the Plaintiff in Delhi. The result is that the
CourtsinMumbai(becauseoftheclauseintheappointmentletter)andthiscourt,onaccountof
thesubstantialpartofthecauseofactionhavingarisenhere,havejurisdictiontotrythecase.The
observationinABCLaminartinpara21thattheintentionofthepartiestocompletely oust the
jurisdictionofthecourtinDelhiwillhavetobetestedintheabovebackground.Theuseofthe
word"only"intheinstantcasetoqualifytheousterclausecannotbereadasconferringexclusive
jurisdictiononthecourtinMumbai.
26. For the above reasons, it is held that the ouster clause in the letter of appointment of the
PlaintiffcannotprecludethisCourtfromentertainingthepresentsuit.Thepreliminaryobjection
oftheDefendanttothemaintainabilityofthissuitonthesaidgroundisherebyoverruled.
27.Turningtotheapplicationforanadinterimmandatoryinjunction,itisseenthattherewas
noconditionintheletterofemploymentthatthePlaintiffhastofirstensurethatthenonstarter
casesareresolvedbeforehisletterofresignationcouldbeaccepted.Further,theconductofthe
Defendant in refusing to take the Plaintiff back into service becomes relevant. When on 2nd
September 2009 the Plaintiff offered that in the event the defendant does not issue a relieving
letter,heispreparedtojoinbacktheservice,therewasnopositiveresponsebytheDefendant.
Duringthecourseofarguments,thelearnedSeniorAdvocatefortheDefendantrepeatedlystated
thatsinceithadlostconfidenceinthePlaintiffitwouldnotpermithimtojoinduties.Asfaras
theDefendantwasconcerned,thePlaintiffwasnolongerintheirserviceandyet,theywouldnot
issue him a relieving letter simpliciter. To this Court, it appears that the point of refusal ofthe
DefendanttotakebackthePlaintiffintoservicewhileatthesametimerefusingtogranthima
relievingletterisnotlegallytenable.IfthePlaintiffwasindeedresponsibleforthenonstarter
cases,thenconsistentwithsuchpleatheDefendantoughttohaveproceededtoholdaninquiry
againstthePlaintiffwhilehewasstillinservice.Atnopointintimewhilehewasinservice,did
theDefendantinitiateanydisciplinaryproceedingsagainstthePlaintiff.
28.EventhereasonofthePlaintiffhavingtofirstresolvethetwononstartercasesappearsto
have been a ruse to somehow deny him the relieving letter. It transpired subsequently that the
Defendant did not confine its understanding of the Plaintiffs obligation to the two nonstarter
cases.TheDefendanthasbeeninsistingthatthePlaintiffshouldhelpitresolve15casesofdefault
whereasonlytwoareshowntobenonstartercases.TheDefendantis,therefore,tryingtobuilda
new case which it ought not be permitted to do. Even as regards the nonstarter cases, the
Plaintiff appears to have given the information to the Defendant. In one of the cases, the
paymentshavebeenmadeinpartand,therefore,inastrictsenseitisnotanonstartercase.Ifin
fact the Defendant has initiated legal proceedings to recover the amounts due from both the
borrowers,thePlaintiffcannotbeputonholdindefinitelytoawaittheresolutionofthesecases.
29.ThestandoftheDefendantisnotconsistentwiththetermsofthecontractofemployment.It
accepted the payment made by the Plaintiff for two months notice period as well as the
outstandingloanamountwhichwasaconditionofthePlaintiffbeingrelievedfromservice.Itis
notindisputethatthischeque,whichincludestheloanamount,wasencashed.Therefore,there
are no monetary dues as far as the Plaintiff is concerned. There being no other term of service
that requires to be fulfilled for issuing a relieving letter, the refusal by the Defendant to do so

seems unjustified. The stand of the Defendant that the Plaintiff has abandoned his service is
also not borne out by the correspondence. In fact, the Plaintiffs offer to join back service has
beenrefusedbytheDefendant.
30.TheonlyquestionthatremainsiswhetheramandatoryinteriminjunctionbythisCourtcan
beissuedatthisstagetotheDefendant.TherulethataCourtcannotgrantaninterimreliefthat
would amount to grant of the final relief at the interlocutory stage is not an inflexible one. It
would depend on the facts of every case. The decision relied upon by the Defendant in Metro
Marinsv.BonusWatchCo.Pvt.Ltd.wasinadifferentsetofcircumstances.Thatcasedealtwitha
commercialcontract.Itcannotipsofactobeappliedtotheinstantcasewherethedisputearises
out of a contract of employment, and where the dispute is limited to the employer refusing to
issuetotheemployee,whohasresigned,arelievingletter/certificate.If,fortherelievingletter,
thePlaintiffhastowaitfortheconclusionofthetrial,thewholepurposeofthePlaintiffcomingto
thecourtwouldbedefeated.ThedenialofarelievingletterbytheDefendantintheinstantcase
hasalreadypreventedthePlaintifffromacceptinganyotherofferofemployment.
31.ItwasobservedinDorabCawasjiWardenv.CoomiSorabWardenAIR1990SC867asunder
(AIR,p.87374):
"14. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to
preserveorrestorethestatusquoofthelastnoncontestedstatuswhichprecededthe
pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to
compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of
thatwhichwaswrongfullytakenfromthepartycomplaining.Butsincethegrantingof
suchaninjunctiontoapartywhofailsorwouldfailtoestablishhisrightatthetrial
may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was
granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed
may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain
guidelines.Generallystatedtheseguidelinesare:
(1)Theplaintiffhasastrongcasefortrail.Thatis,itshallbeofahigherstandardthan
aprimafaciecasethatisnormallyrequiredforaprohibitoryinjunction.
(2)Itisnecessary to prevent irreparable orseriousinjurywhichnormallycannotbe
compensatedintermsofmoney.
(3)Thebalanceofconvenienceisinfavouroftheoneseekingsuchrelief.
15. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory
mandatoryinjunctionshallultimatelyrestinthesoundjudicialdiscretionoftheCourt
to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the
aboveguidelinesareneitherexhaustiveorcompleteorabsoluterules,andthere may
be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the
grantorrefusalofsuchinjunctionswouldbeasoundexerciseofajudicialdiscretion."
32. Also relevant are the following observations of the Bombay High Court in Baba Narayan
Landgev.MahaduBhikajiToncharAIR1989Bom247asunder(AIR,p.247)"......Thesubjectof
temporaryinjunctionismainlycoveredbyO.39,Rr.1and2,C.P.CIncasesnotcoveredbythose
provisions, an appropriate temporary injunction can be granted also in exercise of inherent
power of a Court under S. 151, C.P.C. After all O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 are not exhaustive of the
circumstancesunderwhichinteriminjunctioncanbegranted.Thecontroversyonthataspectof
the matter is set at rest by a majority decision of the Supreme Court in the leading case of
Manoharlalv.SethHiralal(AIR1962SC527).Butthatapartthelanguageemployedinthosetwo
Rules is clearly wide enough to include an order in the form of a mandatory injunction and
admitsofnoexceptionwithreferencetoapointoftimetowhichitcanbemade.Injunctionsarea

formofequitablereliefandtheyhavetobeadjustedormouldedinaidofenquiryandjusticeto
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Jurisdiction is thus undoubted even under
S.39,Rr.1and2.EvenIfitcannotbegrantedunderthesaidRules,S.151,isthesourceofsuch
jurisdiction. I see no reason to lay down an absolute proposition and forge unnecessary and
unjustifiedfetters on the power of the enquiry Courts to grant appropriate relief even in a well
deserving case and reduce its position only to a willing but helpless spectator a situation not
warrantedbyourenquiryjurisprudence.
Undoubtedly,powertoissuemandatoryinjunctionataninterlocutorystageisnottobeexercised
lightlyorcommonly.Orderingmaintenanceofstatuesquoasonthedateofthesuitasaninterim
measureisrateandrarerstillistheorderofmaintenanceofstatusquoasonthedateanteriorto
theinstitutionofsuit.Butexistenceofjurisdictionanditsproperexercisearetwodistincttopics."
33.Intheinstantcase,adirectiontotheDefendanttoissuearelievingletterisnottheonlyrelief
beingsoughtbythePlaintiffinthesuit.Therefore,inissuingsuchadirection,thesuititselfdoes
notbecomeinfructuous.AllthattheDefendantisrequiredtodoistoissuethePlaintiffaletter
stating that he is no longer in their service. Any other qualification to such statement might
render the cessation of the services of the Plaintiff stigmatic. In such an event, the resort to a
clauseofterminationsimpliciterbytheDefendantwouldbefutileandtheDefendantwillhaveto
acknowledgethatthePlaintiffisstillintheirserviceandproceedagainsthimdisciplinarily.This
it refuses to do. Viewed from any angle, therefore, a case is made out for issuing an interim
mandatory injunction to the Defendant to issue to the Plaintiff a simple relieving letter stating
that he is no longer in their service. The balance of convenience in issuing such an interim
injunctionisclearlyinfavourofthePlaintiff.
34.Accordingly,aninterimmandatoryinjunctionisissueddirectingtheDefendanttoissuetothe
Plaintiffarelievingletterwithinaperiodofsevendaysstatingthatheisnolongerintheirservice.
ThesaidletterwillnotstatethatthePlaintiffhasabandonedtheserviceoranyotherqualification
thatpreventsthePlaintifffromtakinganyotheremployment.
35.Withtheabovedirections,theinterlocutoryapplicationisdisposedof.CS(OS)2309of2008
36.Pleadingsarecomplete.
37.ThesuitbelistedbeforetheJointRegistraron11thNovember2009foradmission/denialof
thedocuments.
38.Itismadeclearthatthepartiesshouldcompletetheadmission/denialofdocumentsonthe
datefixedbythelearnedJointRegistrarforthatpurpose.If,forsomereason,theyareunableto
doso,then each party will file anaffidavit within two weeks thereafter indicating in a separate
column alongside the index of documents filed by the other party, which of the documents is
admittedordenied.
39.ListbeforeCourton9thDecember2009forframingofissues.
S.MURALIDHAR,J.
SEPTEMBER9,2009rk