Constitution

Is there a right to privacy in online social networking?

Francisco Ed. Lim
November 13, 2014
A social phenomenon nowadays is online social networking (OSN). This is exemplified by
Facebook which, according to one case, has created a worldwide forum enabling friends to
share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another (H v. W, Case No.
12/10142, Jan. 30, 2013).
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating their purpose, OSN sites use different
privacy tools. For example, while the default setting of Facebook profiles is public (where the
online information may be viewed by everyone on Facebook), a user can limit access to his or
her information to: Friends of Friends where only the users Facebook friends and their friends
can view the information; Friends where only the users Facebook friends can view the
information; Custom where the information is made visible only to designated individuals, and
Only Me where the information can be viewed only by the user.
When a user limits accessibility of his or her online information or data to friends (or other
similar privacy tools in other OSN sites), does such restriction legally protect the privacy of the
user?
This question was answered by the Supreme Court in Vivares vs. St. Theresas College (G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014).
Before answering the question, the high court, citing former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, said
that there are three strands of the right to privacy, viz: locational or situational privacy;
informational privacy, and decisional privacy.
The right to informational privacy refers to the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.
In the Vivares case, several high school students of the St. Theresas College were not allowed to
graduate because they were seen drinking liquor in public places and wearing revealing outfit in
public places in violation of the schools rules. The evidence consisted of photos shown by the
friends of the students to the school authorities. They claimed that their right to privacy was
violated, pointing out that they limited access to their photos to their Friends.
The Supreme Court ruled against the students, stating that setting a posts or profile details
privacy to Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The users own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a

person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at Friends.
The court added: To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are
not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As post, which is set at Friends, the
initial audience of 100 (As own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As 100
friends plus Bs 200 friends or the public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
But what if the students limited access to their photos only to themselves (Only Me) or
designated individuals (Custom), would they have been considered as having lost their right to
privacy?
The Vivares case did not answer the question as it was not directly in issue. However, according
to my two Ateneo law student sons who are online fanatics, the Supreme Court made some
pronouncements that should be welcome news to the online community. While the court cited
comments that reasonable expectations to informational privacy as wishful thinking nowadays
given the millions of OSN users the court categorically stated that having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities,
including those that occur in OSNs. They also point out to me the following statement: with
the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to
mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individuals right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Indeed, according to them, court stated that the utilization of privacy tools is the manifestation,
in cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Otherwise,
using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads
a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at
Only Me or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would
still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function
but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within
the confines of his or her private space.
So there you are. The highest court of the land has given some guidance on what you can do to
safeguard your right to privacy in this online social networking environment.
Ultimately, the choice is yours but, as my two lawyers wannabes point out, be ready to suffer the
consequences of your choice.
The Fair Election Act: Size isn't everything or why large posters may have to yield to
free

Genie Celini D. Nuevo

November 05, 2015

In the midst of the 2013 elections, a tarpaulin was posted within the front walls of a cathedral in
Bacolod City. The tarpaulin, measuring approximately 6 feet x 10 feet, had the words Team
Patay (Dead) with an X mark, and Team Buhay (Alive) with a ? mark. Certain electoral
candidates were then classified to either Team Patay or Team Buhay, depending on their vote on
the Reproductive Health Law.
Citing violations on size limitations prescribed by the implementing rules and regulations of
Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) ordered the removal of the tarpaulin.
The Fair Election Act, it must be noted, was enacted consistent with the Constitutional provision
of ensuring equal opportunity for public service, including access to media, time, and space, and
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. It was likewise passed to ensure
that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination. The law accordingly provides, among others, limitations on the use and display
of election propaganda. In this case, the lawful size for election propaganda should not exceed 2
feet x 3 feet. Because the tarpaulin did exceed the prescribed size, its removal was ordered.
Elsewise, the tarpaulins proponents would run the risk of prosecution for an election offense.
Essential to the Comelecs resolution is its treatment of the tarpaulin as election propaganda, a
campaign material, which is within its purview to regulate in the conduct of elections. True, the
State through Comelec as one of its arms has the power to limit electoral advertisements in order
to achieve what is envisioned by the law. There are some things worth noting in the Comelecs
order, however. The tarpaulin sought to be removed was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. It was placed on private property and involved an expression of a private groups
advocacy on the Reproductive Health Law, although given an apparent electoral slant. Lastly,
while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean that it is election propaganda. These considerations are
worth mentioning because they affect two related fundamental rights of an individual under our
Constitution, the freedom of speech and the freedom of expression, which do not only cover
vocal speech but also include other symbolic manners of communication.
In this case, the tarpaulin contained speech on a matter of public concern, particularly to express
the proponents advocacy and view on the votes made in passing the Reproductive Health Law,
albeit incidentally promoting or not promoting an electoral candidate. On the other hand, the
Comelecs order is anchored on the fact that the manner by which the opinion is expressed does
not conform to the size requirements of the law and that if such will not be regulated, the same
may be abused by some electoral candidates who could then solicit the help of private
individuals to skirt the constitutional provision on equal opportunities for all candidates.

The Supreme Court, when this matter was brought before it, recognized that the form of
expression is just as important as the information conveyed, that it forms part of the expression.
It said that size does matter. This is because the size -- a larger tarpaulin, that is -- enhances
efficiency in communication, underscores the importance of the message to the reader and allows
for more inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute to a more educated
and reasoned electorate. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the guarantee of freedom of
expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not be held
hostage to the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It held that no unreasonable
restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during a
political contest, no matter how seemingly benign, will be tolerated.
Indeed, democracy will never be one without free speech and expression. After all, the sovereign
people ought to have a say on matters affecting the State, especially in the context of an election.
It is amazing how one oversized tarpaulin can stir the sensibilities of people and start a debate on
the entitlement to freedom of speech and expression. But perhaps when the tarpaulin, along with
other media by which ideas and advocacies are conveyed, have served their purpose, a more
mature and better informed electorate will emerge, one not so much influenced by dimensional
presentations but by the substance of the idea that is sought to be conveyed. That, in true essence,
is the bedrock upon which free speech and expression rest.
Health information privacy in the workplace

Emmallaine Leonille V. Loreto

October 07, 2015
Privacy is the right to be let alone. As an inherent concept of liberty, it includes our right to go
about our lives unobserved, and to express or disclose information about ourselves only as we
please.
In todays so-called digital information age, the concept of privacy has shifted, and the disclosure
of personal information has increasingly become part of everyday life.
Whether deliberately, such as when we voluntarily disclose personal data, or unintentionally,
such as when behavior is tracked through websites, our personal information is constantly
collected, stored and utilized by various entities through increasingly complex technology.
Among these entities are banks, schools, service providers, and of course, our employers. In
particular, employers collect the personal information, including health information, of their
employees for a number of reasons: to comply with law, to administer benefits, and to ensure
security, among others.

The laws protecting individual privacy have evolved with rapidly advancing technology.
For instance, Republic Act No. 10173, or the Data Privacy Act, imposes restrictions on the
processing of personal information, sensitive or otherwise, held by a personal information
controller, such as employers.
While the privacy expectation of employees in a regulated workplace environment is, in fine,
reduced, their data privacy is still protected by law. Indeed, it is important to maintain the
privacy of ones sensitive personal information, particularly, ones health information, because
this may include intimate details about ones life. Health records document ones physical and
mental health, and may even indicate social behaviors and personal relationships.
Under Section 13 of the Data Privacy Act, in order to lawfully process (i.e., collect, record, use)
sensitive personal information, including health information, it is not sufficient that an employee
gives prior consent to the processing of such information. He or she must also give such consent
specific to the purpose for which such information may be processed. Thus, a generally-worded
employee consent form, which does not sufficiently indicate the purpose for which an
employees sensitive personal information is to be used, does not comply with the
aforementioned condition.
The processing of sensitive personal information without compliance with the above condition is
prohibited and a violation thereof warrants criminal sanctions under Sections 25, 32 and 34 of
the Data Privacy Act.
In conjunction with the Data Privacy Act, various laws and regulations also protect the
confidentiality of an employees health records.
First, the Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control Act of 1998 directs employers to strictly
observe confidentiality in the handling of all medical information, particularly the identity and
status of persons with HIV, under pain of penal sanction.
Under Section 32 of said law, results of HIV/AIDS testing shall be released only to: (a) the
person who submitted himself/herself to such test; (b) either parent of a minor child who has
been tested; (c) a legal guardian in the case of insane persons or orphans; (d) a person authorized
in connection with the governments AIDS program; or (e) a justice of the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court. Section 31 of the same law further provides that medical confidentiality is
not considered breached only: (a) when complying with requirements under the governments
AIDS program; (b) when informing health workers directly involved in treatment or care of a
person with HIV/AIDS; or (c) upon order of a competent court.

Second, Department of Labor of Employment (DoLE) Advisory No. 05 provides that [a]ccess
to personal data relating to a workers Hepatitis B status shall be bound by the rules of
confidentiality and shall be strictly limited to medical personnel or if legally required.
Third, the Magna Carta of Disabled Persons requires, under pain of penal sanction, the preemployment medical examination results of applicants with disability to be treated as
confidential information, and to be maintained in separate forms and medical files. Such
information may only be released to supervisors and managers, first aid safety personnel, and
authorized government officials, for purposes in accordance with said law.
Fourth, DoLE Department Order No. 53-03, which provides guidelines for the implementation of
a drug-free workplace, requires an employer to maintain confidential all information relating to
drug tests or the identification of drug users in the workplace, except when required by law or
overriding public health and safety concerns, or when authorized in writing by the person
concerned.
Overall, the collection, storage and usage of personal data have become a part of everyday life in
all levels of society. In todays so-called digital information age, a diminished expectation of
privacy, and a decreasing control over what people know about us, and what they do with this
information, have become realities of modern life.
Thus, in order to protect our personal information, there is need for increased vigilance, greater
awareness of how our information is stored, adequate knowledge of our legal rights, and a
stringent implementation of the laws protecting our privacy.
How to reacquire Filipino citizenship

Felice Suzanne D. Soria

September 24, 2015
As the late Justice Isagani A. Cruz puts it, Philippine citizenship is a gift that must be deserved
to be retained. The Philippines, for all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is
a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her children.
Philippine citizenship has always been valued and treasured by our Supreme Court as it once
described it as not a cheap commodity, In the case of In Re Petition For Habeas Corpus Of
Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the Supreme Court said that Philippine citizenship is not a
commodity or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. Justice
Melencio-Herrera dubs it as a priceless heritage.

The 1987 Constitution expressly provides that Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired
in the manner provided by law. Thus, Congress can provide for specific grounds that could
result in loss of Philippine citizenship such as those provided under Commonwealth Act No. 63.
In said law, acquisition of foreign citizenship is a ground for the loss of Philippine citizenship.
However, this is modified by the enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, an Act making the
citizenship of Philippine citizens who acquire foreign citizenship permanent. This law is also
known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or, simply, the Dual
Citizenship law.
Under RA 9225, the general rule is that citizens of the Philippines who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of the law. The exceptions are: (1) when there is express renunciation of Filipino citizenship; (2)
being in the service of the armed forces of a foreign country; and (3) seeking public office in a
foreign country.
Even though Philippine citizenship is lost, it may be reacquired according to the provisions of the
law by taking an oath of allegiance under RA 9225, naturalization, repatriation, or through direct
act of law.
Repatriation is the recovery of original citizenship. Thus, if what was lost was naturalized
citizenship that is what will be reacquired. If what was lost was natural-born citizenship, that will
be reacquired. Technically, it is merely reverting back what was once your citizenship.
Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship does not take effect automatically. In the case of Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the Supreme Court enunciated that even if Frivaldo
lost his naturalized American citizenship, by actively participating in the elections in the
Philippines, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his
citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
As what the Supreme Court held in the case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC: Philippine citizenship is
not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored
only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has
abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Moreover, RA 9225 provides that natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Also, natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country, shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking of the aforesaid
oath.
Philippine citizenship will not only be reacquired by the applicant, but will also be acquired by
his unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted, who are below eighteen (18)
years of age. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under the law shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and certain conditions.
For those who lost their Philippine citizenship and want to run for office, Section 5 (2) of RA No.
9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been naturalized citizens of a foreign country,
but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that a candidates oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially
comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The Supreme Court pronounced that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is
substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No.
9225.
It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is
an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Additionally, the Supreme Court elucidated in Maquiling v. COMELEC, that the requirement of
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40 (d) of the

Local Government Code disqualifying those with dual citizenship from running for any elective
local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely
and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship to continue using a foreign passport -- which indicates the recognition of a foreign
state of the individual as its national -- even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
It stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos
are qualified to run for public office.
If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship
and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for
these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.