Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Souter, Associate Justice,*
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
dismiss
the
indictment.
The
first
challenged
the
No hearing was
requested and none was held for 344 days, until after the second
motion requested dismissal of the charges for violation of the
speedy trial requirement.
We affirm.
I
His
that
SORNA
was
unconstitutional
(the
SORNA
motion).
the SORNA motion acknowledged that all of its arguments had been
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report, noting that, under the Speedy Trial Act (STA), 18 U.S.C.
3161, seventy days remained for the case to be tried.
On December 5, Ibrahim filed a second dismissal motion,
this one asserting a violation of the STA on the ground that 270
days of unexcluded time had elapsed (the STA motion).1
The
As Ibrahim
the
district
court's
rejection
of
the
constitutional
(1st Cir. 2015). The STA requires that a defendant be tried within
seventy days of the later of the indictment or initial appearance.
See 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1).
3161(h)(1)(D)2
however,
pretrial
motion,
from
the
excludes
filing
"delay
of
the
resulting
motion
from
any
through
the
elapsed since January 9, when Ibrahim filed the SORNA motion, was
excluded for purposes of the STA, and with this 344-day exclusion
there was no STA violation.3
Neither argument
is persuasive.
A
Assuming that the 3161(h)(1)(D) exclusion is limited
to
instances
where
hearings
are
required,
we
reiterate
the
In
United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1999),
after a hiatus of some two-and-half years between the filing of a
motion and a hearing, the appellant contended that the trial court
erred in determining that a hearing was required.
The district
court had specifically found that the motion was of a type for
which, in its view, hearings should be held and had noted its
regular practice of holding hearings on them.
Id.
"This is a
Id.
time "[e]ven though it took the court eight months to state on the
record," just before the filing of an STA motion, its decision
that the previously filed motion to sever required a hearing.
at 39.
Id.
Id.
"[A]ppellate
United States v.
Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted)
(citing, inter alia, United States v. Tannehill, 49 F.3d 1049,
1052 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Smith, 569
F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Even if the motions were weak
on the merits . . . there was no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's decision to have a hearing on them. . . .
Perhaps a
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Id. at
68 n.1 (quoting United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 602 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1996)); see also Maxwell, 351 F.3d at 39 (same).
not see that here.
But we do
So we cannot say
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at
most,
exclusion.
See
have
18
deserved
U.S.C.
3161(h)(1)(H)'s
3161(h)(1)(H)
thirty-day
(excluding
"delay
But we have
or legal rulings."
Id.
Here,
the
district
court
began
the
on-the-record
They're intertwined."
sufficient, but reported that she had researched the case law in
advance of the hearing and confirmed that the state of the law as
represented in her brief had not changed.
Turning to the other side, the district court heard from
the Government on the SORNA motion when the prosecutor explained
that "no one disputes that these [constitutional] issues have been
decided by the First Circuit."
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Id.
Contrary to Ibrahim's