G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance

before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more
lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers
do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in
the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for
the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid.,
p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than
in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are
both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some

lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and
other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors,
the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject
of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of
the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "bigtime" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first
hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international
law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by
many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced

attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable
to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews
the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding
both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of
flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the
cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of
the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate
counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of
the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next
is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and
risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took
his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in
the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to
the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman
of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such
as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law
for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise
of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua
non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has
no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has
no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson
v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once
or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which
really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the
definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising
others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising
law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII,
Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission,
and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in
front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any
blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 5210767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June
7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
(2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation
of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by
it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems,
just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it
offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented
as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers
legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between
"legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public
policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public
of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which
contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question,
or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing
or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession
of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only
for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted
before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession,
but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform
to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court,
but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them
to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent
are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to
answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it
is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding
foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising
of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who
gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for
under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but

immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And
to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country
for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot
nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public
to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids.
It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with
broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct
not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute.
Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in
the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances
and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may
use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate
sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a
licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may
lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such
as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A"
and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of
action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to
say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material
or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce
and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is
a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles
not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice
of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we
agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is nonadvisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was
given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the CunetaConcepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do
also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this
were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and
named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state
for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also
stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect
of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate
from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies
and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as
the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA,
some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but
such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their
legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known
his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons,
of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a
quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by
herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers
after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind
used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be
passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted
by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter,
in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

[A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004]

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law
is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in
accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[1] to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. [2]
In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment
of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was
docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the
other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and
their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent
constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their
children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their
Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted
that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two
lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,[6] to support the allegations in herAffidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married[7] and
lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged
in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8] October 14,
1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents
extra-marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had
failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just
compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another
woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, [12] all surnamed
Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour [13] to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs
with two different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.[14]
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear
during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence
with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings[15] onAugust 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was
denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence
on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed aMotion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied
for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August
4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of
the complaint for support with alimonypendente lite[18] filed against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City,[19] the instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.

On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD
Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct
has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[24]
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member
of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect
the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26]
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.[27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[28]
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the
complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction
with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.[29]
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a
child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. [33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. [34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court
to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the
Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal
and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality
of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case,"
this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims
that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that
he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio,
which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared
in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever
in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict
in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the
other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D.
Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the
theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that
"no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member
of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother
and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested
the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong
Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and
Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case
for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue
to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the
contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the
complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case
filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial
brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: [8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning
that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. [9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only
to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v.

Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that
provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF

PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.
This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of
which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite
scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor
and members of thesangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong
barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They
should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage
in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the law itself
grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any
need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the
presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW

MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the
private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. [17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the
end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between
his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to
obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect
for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. [18] Every
lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers oath [20] and/or for breach
of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1
and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The
Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of this town for parties like
attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable information also says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he
collects fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be
stopped for a good government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would instigate persons, especially in
his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself and his men. He
incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons being
ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is
using his supposed influences to urge persons to commit crimes.
3 CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI. Even he has been out
practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent days.
This can be checked with time record he has submitted and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by
submitting application for leave but this should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao
we are sure has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were
so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of
Civil Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we
believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge, Court of First
Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the
undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in
the first indorsement, which absence has also been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by
the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of
law, but for respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also checked the miscarriage
of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of a pleading
submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan
versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits',
as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court
of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his
report pertinent parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a resident of
Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with his complaint against Felicisimo
Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita,
Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.

Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent appeared as counsel for
Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case
No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17,
1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal
Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26,
1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant in civil case No.
318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17,
1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the following entries in his daily time
record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his daily time records,
he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office although according to the
testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again
according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear
in his daily time record that he was present with an undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible
explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the evidence, he had made it appear that he was
present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in
the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry.
The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended, again the evidence
shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in violation of
the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by the evidence, particularly
the documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that
respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules
and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in
the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We,
therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in
court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on
the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was
doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that of
reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI,
Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

JUAN DULALIA, JR.,

Complainant,

A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]

Present:

- versus -

ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,

Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
April 27, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation
Rules 1.01,[1] 6.02,[2] and 7.03[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance
with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote
a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows,
quoted verbatim:
xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva
Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the abovenamed person has
started and that the undersigned and his family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners of the
residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no
need to mention theunbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred
to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and with standard height
building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation
already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds residential house in particular, which readily poses danger
to their residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and for the protection of the
safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your
earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its
Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is
inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under construction with
therequirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office,
your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-compliance with said Sections 301, 302,
303 and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided
in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)

x x x x[4] (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)

By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who
objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.[5]

To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit[6] he filed against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3 (e)[7] of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)[8] of Republic
Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).[9]

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,[10] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the application of his wife for a building permit
for the construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in
favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not authorized
to represent his neighbors in opposing the construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of
complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of
evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the
complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs.
Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

Hence, the present Petition for Review[13] filed by complainant.

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17,
1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for
building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated
Rule 7.03.

To his Comment,[14] respondent attached the July 29, 2005[15]Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing
complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution
reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building
official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainants building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an
inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the
Building Official after conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code for constructing
without a building permit committed by herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued.

Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building
permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of
the Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in the private
practice of his law profession despite being employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the
undersigned has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable and
meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
against the respondent.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.

Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against
complainant and his wife.

As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired
whether complainants wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about
the danger and damages to their properties, health and safety occasioned by the construction of the building.

Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28, 2004,[17] whereas the questioned letter of
respondent was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an
inspection and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that [f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal
action against you.[18]

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005[19] from the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed, complainants wife eventually
withdrew the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building
was to be constructed.

Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal
Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private
practice is not prohibited.[20]

It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that this
Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,[21] when the Family Code of
the Philippines had already taken effect.[22]He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at
the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code.[23] For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there
is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.[24] Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.[25]

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz, [26] this Court declared that the therein respondents act of contracting a second marriage
while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following
circumstances were considered:
a.
After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he
has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described to be
very intelligent person;
c.
He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e.
After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went
to Australia;
f.
Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[27]

In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the
Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an
allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any
woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community in which they have been living in
fact elected him and served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.
Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he contracted his second marriage and the
seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place as being
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[28]

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from
1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:[29]
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply
with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse,
they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the
country.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of
their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is
found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,

and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the
Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant
of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by
the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to
such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing
in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed
and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of
its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting
from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to
sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.