AFFIRMATIVE

a beautiful disaster brought to you by rikki and emma ft. shaneal, david, and pedro with
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1AC Space Pack

Space Race
The advantage is the space race:
Current US space policy reflects widespread, anti-Chinese sentiment,
blocking bilateral cooperation. This China-phobia is sustained political
officials who utilize fear mongering to write exclusion into the law from
stealing technology to weaponing space, China is depicted as a Soviet Union
the US shouldnt even consider working with.
Costa 2/8 [Rebecca D. Costa, 2/8/16, THE PRICE OF CHINA-PHOBIA MAY BE
AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP IN SPACE, http://www.rebeccacosta.com/blog/the-price-of-chinaphobia-may-be-americas-leadership-in-space-298.htm]
Space is a great stage for diplomacy. Yet, when it comes to cooperating with China's space program, the United States may have
forgotten that lesson. This week, former NASA Commander of the International Space Station, Leroy Chiao, urged leaders in
Washington DC to strongly consider the consequences of rebuking China's offer to collaborate in space. "We Americans have taken
for granted that we've been the leader in human space flight. But it's been almost five years since we gave up the ability to launch
astronauts into space ... It's much more constructive to engage (with China) than to isolate. If we don't we risk being left behind."
Chiao makes a sobering point. While NASA grapples with changing administrations in Congress and the White House, off-hand
budget cuts and shifting priorities, China has been gaining ground. In 2003, the Chinese launched their first citizen into space. In 2008,
the country conducted their first space walk. By 2013, they celebrated their longest space mission. And recently, China announced that
within two years they will begin building their own space station - a station scheduled to be fully operational by 2022. Which,
incidentally, is about the time the current International Space Station will reach the end of its life, potentially setting China up to have
the only permanent presence in space. All of which begs the question: if the U. S. is in danger of losing its leadership in space, why
not collaborate? It worked before ... In 1957, when Cold War tensions were escalating between the U.S. and Soviet Union, President
Eisenhower faced a similar dilemma. News that the Soviets launched Sputnik sent shockwaves of paranoia throughout America. The
same rocket technology that catapulted Sputnik far above the Earth's atmosphere was also capable of launching a nuclear warhead at
the U.S. within minutes. Thankfully, Eisenhower didn't recoil from the Soviet show of power. Instead, Eisenhower began sending
letters to then Prime Minister Khrushchev, suggesting the two countries "work together to secure outer space for peaceful purposes."
But Khrushchev fired back, demanding the U.S remove nuclear weapons from Turkey as a precondition for cooperation. And this
marked the beginning of connecting diplomacy on Earth to space collaboration. Sensing space exploration would play a vital role in
preserving future peace; the U.N. convened the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - which both the U.S.
and the Soviet Union quickly joined. The 1958 Space Act, permitting U.S. scientists to collaborate and share information with Soviet
scientists without fear of laws governing espionage and treason, also facilitated open dialogue between experts. In truth, Soviet

and U.S. scientists have maintained back-channel communications for over fifty years regardless
of political tensions from the U-2 incident, Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War, to President Reagan's characterization of
the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire" and more recently conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine scientists have proven they can
and do remain agnostic. Though

political tensions with China come nowhere close to those during the
Cold War era, leaders heedlessly dismiss the opportunity to work together. In 2011, Republican Frank
Wolf (R-VA) chair of the House spending committee which oversees NASA inserted a clause into the
federal spending bill prohibiting develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a
bilateral policy, program, funds from being used "to order, or contract of any kind to participate,
collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company."
The bill was so anti-Chinese it went so far as to bar Chinese journalists from attending the launch
of Endeavor's final mission. "We don't want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of
our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them," Wolf told Science Magazine. "And
frankly, it boils down to a moral issue... Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?" Wolf's paranoia continued, " China is
spying against us.... They are stealing technology from every major U.S. company. They have
taken technology from NASA, and they have hit the NSF computers. ... You name the company,
and the Chinese are trying to get its secrets." Regrettably, the Congressman's sentiment and 2011 bill
had an anti-Chinese ripple effect. In 2012, The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission prepared an extensive report warning against China's view of international space
travel. And in 2015, a report by UCSD's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, argued that

"China's efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and
technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for
U.S. interests." Sounds eerily similar to opponents who vigorously fought Eisenhower's efforts to
partner with the Soviet Union. And what do the Chinese think of the U.S reaction? According to Wang Jin, a spokesman
for the Ministry of Defense there is no rational reason for fear, "The Chinese government has always
advocated the peaceful use of outer space - it opposes space weaponization and an arms race in
outer space." To prove their intentions, the Chinese government invited former International
Space Station Commander, Chiao, to visit their Astronaut Center and speak openly with Chinese
astronauts who according to Chiao were conducting scientific work very similar to astronauts in
the U.S. He saw no evidence to support Wolf and other leader's accusations. If there's no real
evidence that working with China would be any less advantageous than collaborating with the
Soviet Union, then we are left with only one possibility: irrational fear. China-phobia. And the
regrettable possibility that China-phobia may continue to drive public policy, costing America
their leadership in space. So what it would take for diplomacy to surmount fear? For cooperation to supplant competition?
John Logsdon, of the Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. says that like other policies based on irrational fear,
it all starts at the top, "The first step is the White House working with congressional leadership to
get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked." Commander Chiao couldn't agree more.
According to Chiao, it's not too late to draw upon the hard-learned lessons of the Cold War. "It makes all the
sense in the world for the United States to lead an international effort... if we can bring in all the international partners we currently
have, plus newcomers like China, then we would retain our leadership position."

Scenario 1 is the security dilemma

This cold war mentality creates a security dilemma in the form of aggressive
space programs. As the US ramps up defense capabilities in space, China is
compelled to do the same, in order to maintain their place in the international
arena, sending the two nations spiraling into a dangerous cycle of action and
reaction.
Zhang 11 (Baohui, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia
Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, JSTOR, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military
Space Relationship, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011) (pp. 311-332),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311)
Chinas military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising
concerns in the United States. In fact, Chinas military intentions in outer space have emerged as
one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander
of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space a historical inevitability, General Kevin
Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly
advancing military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of Chinas January 2007 anti-satellite
(ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify Chinas motives. One driver of Chinas
military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by
the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition, Chinas
military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional
U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, Chinas pursuit of

counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space

policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a
considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United

States.3 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that Chinese
interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or
participating in a space arms race. Instead, they argue, Chinas military space program is
driven by a desire to counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.4
This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare,
China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this
perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or
explicitly. Chinas interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric
warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the

Chinese military space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international
relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world order, the search for security on the part
of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security
leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on .5 The military space relationship
between China and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the
current Chinese thinking on space warfare reflects Chinas response to the perceived U.S.

threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered American suspicion about
Chinas military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China
space relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures . As Joan JohnsonFreese, a scholar at the Naval War College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and
the U.S. have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or
activity.6 This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major factors
contributing to the security dilemma that is driving Chinas military space program. The first is
Chinas attempt to respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space.
Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S. militarys plan to achieve so-called fullspectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that dominance. The
second factor is Chinas concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken
Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic
missile defense system will inevitably compromise Chinas offensive nuclear forces. Chinas response
is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system that serves as the eyes and brains of
missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the integration of nuclear
war and space warfare capabilities. Because of the security dilemma, many experts in both China and
the U.S. have expressed growing pessimism about the future of arms control. However, this article
suggests that precisely because the current U.S.-China military space relationship is governed

by the security dilemma, it is amenable to changes in the strategic environment that could
extricate both from their mutual mistrust and the ongoing cycle of actions and
counteractions. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S., efforts by the Obama administration
to curb missile defense, and the fundamentally altered situation in the Taiwan Strait offer a window
of opportunity for the two countries to relax the tensions in their space relationship. With the
right strategies, China and the U.S. could slow the momentum toward a space arms race .

That results in escalation threatening global conflict, and the neglect of

worldwide structural violence.
Gagnon 10 [Brice K., Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power
in Space, in U.S. Space Technology for Controlling China and Russia, Peace Review: A Journal
of Social Justice, 22:1724]
But the

patience of the Chinese seems to be wearing thin. On November 2, the London Telegraph reported that a
high-level Chinese air force officer had urged his nation to drop its opposition to the
militarization of outer space and to begin developing orbital weapons and defense systems. As far
as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards

outer space. This is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back, Xu Qiliang told the Peoples
Liberation Army Daily. The PLA air force must establish in a timely manner the concepts of
space security, space interests and space development. We must build an outer space force that
conforms with the needs of our nations development (and) the demands of the development of
the Space Age, Xu said. A full-blown arms race in space between the United States , Russia, and China
would be a disaster for the world and would make life on Earth less secure. At the very time when
global resources are urgently needed to deal with the coming harsh realities of climate change, the
planet can hardly afford to see massive expenditures on the further militarization and
weaponization of space. Now is the time for people of the world to speak out loudly to prevent
the arms race from moving into the heavens. At this moment, space is still a new issue for most
people, even for many in the global peace movement. The space issues learning curve, and
political action that would follow, must happen quickly if we are to avert another frightening
round in humanitys war technology escalation.

Space weaponization risks miscalculation electronic jamming, nuclear

control, and ambiguity all make space the most probable scenario for conflict
Finch 15 [James P. Finch, 2015, Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth, JFQ 76, 1st
Quarter, Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, formerly the Principal Director for Space Policy, and other
space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Headquarters
U.S. Air Force]
**Note ADIZ = Air Defense Identification Zone
As potentially dangerous as the overlapping ADIZs are, they are far less destabilizing than actions in space could be during a crisis.
All contestants in the great game unfolding in Asia have fairly similar appreciations of the implications that would follow engaging
military or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting their ADIZ. These understandings have been built over 100 years of air travel and were
underscored dramatically in the miscalculation associated with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983. Such
shared understandings are largely nonexistent in space. Not only do nations have less experience operating in the domain, but the
criticality of space systems to broader operational objectives also may create a tempting target early in a crisis. Combined with the
lack of potential human casualties from engagements in space, this lack

of common understanding may create a

growing risk of miscalculation in a terrestrial political crisis . If not explicitly addressed, this instability in
space could even create a chasm that undermines the otherwise well-crafted tenets of strategic or
nuclear stability. While much has been written about how nuclear weapons contribute to, or detract from, crisis stability, space,
in some ways, is more complex than nuclear stability. First, today a clear taboo exists against the use of nuclear weapons. Crossing
that firebreak at any level has immediately recognizable and significant implications. Second, in the context of nuclear weapons,
theorists can (at least arguably) discriminate among escalatory motives based on the type of weapon strategic or tacticaland based
on the type of targetcounterforce or countervalue targeting. This was most famously sketched out in the form of an escalation ladder
in Herman Kahns 1965 book, On Escalation. This convenient heuristic method for understanding escalation based on the target and
the weapon type is arguably more complex for space. This is a byproduct of the lack of mutual understanding on the implications of
the weapon and the value of the target. These factors deserve detailed consideration because they describe the playing field on which a
terrestrial crisis could spiral into space conflict. Efforts to manage crises, therefore, must account for these complexities. To begin,
there is no taboo against many types of counterspace systems. Starting a framework with weapon type, the threshold for use of
temporary and reversible counterspace weapons appears much lower. There are documented instances of electronic jamming
happening all over the world today, and the number of actors who possess counterspace weapons such as communications jammers is
much higher. Given the low cost and relative simplicity of some counterspace weapons, even nonstate actors have found utility in
employing them. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted, Irregular warfare has come to space.8 Consequently,
this type of weapontemporary and reversiblemay appear at first glance to be less escalatory and less prone to miscalculation than
kinetic weapons. At the other end of the weapons spectrum are weapons that have permanent and irreversible effects. The extreme
version of such a weapon would be a debris-generating kinetic kill device such as the kind that was tested by the United States and
Soviet Union during the Cold War and by China in 2007. These weapons are particularly insidious because they generate large
amounts of debris that indiscriminately threatens satellites and other space systems for decades into the future. One additional
dimension to the weapons spectrum that merits consideration in the context of crisis stability relates to the survivability of a weapon.

It is commonly accepted that space is an offense-dominant domain, which is to say that holding
space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending them. This could lead to first-strike

instability by creating pressure for early action at the conventional level here on Earth before
counterspace attacks could undermine the capability for power projection. But the offense-dominant nature
of the domain has implications for both peaceful satellites as well as space-based weapons. This could also create firststrike instability regarding space-based weapons since the advantage would go to the belligerents
who use their space weapon first. In this way, space-based weapons may be uniquely
destabilizing in ways that their more survivable, ground-based relatives are not. Adding complexity to
Kahns heuristic, however, is the situational context surrounding the employment of counterspace systems. In the space context,
strategists will have to consider weapon type, the nature of the target, and also the terrestrial context. Todays

electronic
jamming has primarily been witnessed in the Middle East, where regimes have sought to deny
freedom of information to their populations by jamming commercial communications satellites.
The same weapon typea satellite communications jammerapplied against a satellite carrying
strategic nuclear command and control communications during a crisis could be perceived much
differently. In such an instance, decisionmakers might conclude that the other side is attempting
to deprive them of nuclear command and control as a prelude to escalation. Similarly, the
application of permanent, irreversible force against a commercial or third party satellite would
have a much different effect on crisis dynamics than mere jamming. Physically destroying or
otherwise rendering inoperable such assets could raise a partys stake in the conflict, by
threatening either its power projection capabilities globally or its assured ability to retaliate
against a nuclear strike. Many militaries use commercial assets to communicate with deployed forces, and a show of force
strike against a commercial satellite could inadvertently engage an adversarys vital interests. Simply put, the weapon, target, and
context all contribute to the perceived intent and effects of a counterspace attack. Unlike

in other domains, tremendous

ambiguity exists regarding the use of counterspace weapons. This means that all of these
variables would be open to interpretation in crises, and it should be remembered that an inherent
characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time is short and the
potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic, decisionmakers tend to lean toward
worst-case interpretations of an adversarys actions. This is a clear recipe for inadvertent
miscalculation.

Scenario two is the rigged game (or the military industrial complex)
The Military Industrial Complex turns public fear of China into funding;
creating a cold war economy that sustains the budget agendas of military
officials, and allows the US to pour money into weapons programs.
Sputnik News 5/16 (US Military Wants Space Arms Race to Boost Budget Former DoD
Official. May 13, 2016. International online news and radio broadcast service, primarily focused
on global politics and economics. The agency is headquartered in Moscow, with regional editorial
offices in Washington, Cairo, Beijing and London.
http://sputniknews.com/military/20160513/1039541228/us-space-arms-race.html)
US military leaders want to use their calls for enhanced space-based military systems in order to
justify renewed giant military budget increases, retired veteran Department of Defense analyst
Franklin Spinney told Sputnik. WASHINGTON (Sputnik) The Washington Post reported earlier this week that US
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Frank Rose had expressed concern over what he
alleged was the continued development by Russia and China of anti-satellite weapons. The US Army
Corps of Engineers Europe District is managing the construction of a $134 million Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Complex in
Deveselu, Romania "The

Pentagon needs a cold war for PR [public relations] reasons and hopefully to

transfer money from its out-of-control operating budgets to its investment accounts," Spinney,
who retired after 33 years as a Defense Department analyst, said on Thursday. However, the
United States continued to invest far more resources into space weapons than either Russia or
China, Spinney pointed out. "The best way to get a feel for this would be compare Russian and
Chinese weaponization efforts in space to similar US efforts. I think you will find that over the
year we have out spent them both and done more experiments." The biggest US defense
contractors needed to keep fanning American public and congressional fears of Russia and China
to maintain the political atmosphere required to justify yet more super-expensive weapons
programs, Spinney noted. "Remember, without a superpower threat or a near superpower threat (read
Russia and China), the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex (MICC) is hurting . The war on
terror is running out its string, and sooner or later, people are going to ask why it is a bust." In this political climate, the
Pentagon needs a cold war for PR reasons and hopefully to transfer money from its out-of-control
operating budgets to its investment accounts, Spinney continued. "The US has a satellite launching problem,
so the Pentagon needs support for new bigger satellite launching rockets. Relying on Russian rockets for some of our launches,
especially Space Station support is an embarrassment." The US anti-missile station Aegis Ashore Romania is pictured at the military
base in Deveselu, Romania An

arms race in space race would help sell the required support for the
massive, more than $1 trillion nuclear modernization program that the US Defense Department is
starting, Spinney maintained. "As of now, Pentagon is starting a new bomber, a new SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear
submarine], a new ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], a new ALCM [air-launched cruise missile], and an upgrade to the B-61
nuclear bomb, including a PGM [precision-guided munitions] guidance kit." Other proposed enormously US expensive armament
programs include an upgrade to the Trident II SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile], a massive upgrade to space-based battle
management (C3ISR) capabilities and the refurbishment of nuclear infrastructure, Spinney added. "I have a very cynical view the
budget ramifications could make the Anglo-German dreadnought race [before World War I] a century ago look like a Sunday School
picnic, Spinney concluded. In

2008, the Russian and Chinese governments proposed an international

agreement to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space but the US government under
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama has consistently rejected launching negotiations to
conclude such a treaty.

Two impacts:
First: The cold war economy is nothing new the US military industrial
complex necessitates public perception of threats in order to justify its
existence, and China fits the bill. This cycle of enemy creation creates a rigged
game that both requires and results in the sacrificial destruction of millions.
Clark, 06 (No Rest for 'China Threat' Lobby, Gregory Clark is vice president of Akita
International University and a former Australian diplomat. Japan Times, Jan. 7, 2006,
http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2006/JT-070106.htm).
For as long as I have been in the China-watching business (more than 40 years now), there has
always been a China "threat." It began with the 1950-53 Korean civil war , which initially had nothing to
do with China. Even so, Beijing was blamed and, as punishment, the United States decided to intervene not only in Korea but also in
China's civil war with Taiwan, and later threaten a move against China by sending troops close to China's borders with Korea. When

The next China threat

was supposed to operate via the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Coping with it meant the
West had to prop up a range of incompetent, corrupt rulers in the area , and intervene cruelly to suppress
China reacted to that move by sending in its own troops, the China-threat people moved into high gear.

revolts by local Chinese against discrimination in Malaya and then in Sarawak. It also meant that the U.S., Britain and Australia had
to work very hard and covertly to prevent the 1959 election of an intelligent Chinese, Lee Kwan Yew, to the Singapore premiership.

The China-threat lobby moved into

overdrive over Vietnam in the early 1960s. There a clearly nationalist-inspired civil war supported more by Moscow than by
Lee was then seen, amazingly, as a front for those dreaded Chinese Communists.

Beijing was denounced by Washington and Canberra as the first step in planned Chinese "aggression" into Asia. In Moscow in 1964,
I had to accompany an Australian foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, in a foolish, U.S.-instigated bid to persuade the Soviet Union to
side with the West against those aggressive Chinese. Hasluck gave up only after a bemused Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin,

told him point-blank that Moscow was doing all it could to help North Vietnam, would continue to give help, and that it would like to
see Beijing doing a lot more. In 1962, as China desk officer in Canberra, I had to witness an extraordinary attempt to label as
unprovoked aggression a very limited and justified Chinese counterattack against an Indian military thrust across the Indian-claimed
border line in the North East Frontier Area. Threat scenarios then had China seeking ocean access via the Bay of Bengal. The

Then came the allegations that China

was seeking footholds in Laos, northern Thailand and Myanmar -- all false. U.S., British and
Australian encouragement for the 1965 massacre of half a million leftwing supporters in
Indonesia was also justified as needed to prevent China from gaining a foothold there. So too
was the U.S. and Australia's 1975 approval for Indonesia's brutal takeover of East Timor. Since
then we have seen Beijing's claims against Taiwan condemned as aggressive, despite the fact that
every Western nation, including the U.S., has formally recognized or accepted China's claim to
sovereignty over Taiwan. China's efforts to assert control over Tibet are also branded as aggression even though Tibet has
never been recognized as an independent entity. And so it continues to the present day. With the alleged
Soviet threat to Japan having evaporated, we now have an army of Japanese and U.S. hawks -- Foreign Minister Aso
included -- ramping up China as an alleged threat to Japan and the Far East. Much is made of Beijing's
recent increases in military spending. But those increases began from a very low level ; until recently
London Economist even had Beijing seeking to move south via Afghanistan.

its military were more concerned with running companies and growing their own vegetables. And Beijing faces a U.S.-Japan
military buildup in East Asia that is avowedly anti-China and that spends a lot more than China does. Of course, if the Chinese
military were placing bases and sending spy planes and ships close to the U.S. coast, and were bombing U.S. embassies, the U.S. role
in that buildup might be justified. But so far that has not happened.

Tokyo's claims to be threatened by China in the

East China Sea are equally dubious.

So far, the only shots fired in anger in that area have been Japan's, in a legally
dubious huntdown and sinking of a North Korean vessel. Tokyo makes much of China's challenge to Japan's claimed EEZ (exclusive
economic zone) median line of control in the East China Sea (Beijing says the EEZ border should be based on the continental shelf
extending close to the Ryukyu islands and proposes joint development between the two claim lines). But international law on EEZ
borders still does not firmly support Japan's median line position. And the recent Australia-East Timor agreement on joint
development of continental shelf oil/gas resources in the Timor Sea, and the 1974 Japan-South Korean agreement for joint
development in the East China Sea continental shelf, both strongly suggest that Beijing's joint development proposal is not entirely

But no doubt these details will be dismissed as irrelevant. Our powers-that-be need
threats to justify their existence. As we saw during the Cold War, and more recently over Iraq,
once they declare that such and such a nation is a threat, it becomes impossible to stop the
escalation. The other side naturally has to show some reaction. The military-industrialintelligence complex then seize on this as the pretext further to expand budgets and power.
Before long the media and a raft of dubious academic and other commentators are sucked into
the vortex. Then when it is all over and the alleged threat has proved to be quite imaginary, the
threat merchants move on to find another target. But not before billions have been spent. And
millions have died.
unreasonable.

Second: Even asking the question of whether or not China is militarizing

space relies on a US-centric discourse, which posits the US agenda of space
weaponization at the forefront, and then interprets Chinese actions through
that lens. This self-other dichotomy ensures arms race and conflict.
Pomeroy 15 [Caleb. Postgraduate student at University College London. June 6, 2015.
Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: China Threat & U.S. Security. E-International
Relations. http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threatu-s-security/. SH]
There are few instances in history where an emerging power did not enter conflict with an existing power (Karabell, 2013). As China
reemerges as an international power, it is natural to question whether or not the U.S. and China will engage in conflict. However,

asking if Chinas reemergence is a threat to U.S. security interests may not be the best way to
approach this issue. In fact, even defining U.S. security interests could cause an inherent threat to

those supposed interests. This essay will argue that defining U.S. security interests can threaten the U.S.,
and this questions discursive construction increases the risk of a U.S.-China conflict . A wide range of
case studies could be used to illustrate these arguments to approach the question of U.S.-China conflict; this essay will look at the
contemporary issue of space security as it is currently receiving historically high levels of attention in Beijing and Washington.

Defining a set of U.S. security interests can bias U.S.

perception of Chinese activities. Once the U.S. outlines specific security interests, Chinese
activities are interpreted and evaluated by the U.S. relative to those outlined interests. A lucid example
Defining U.S. Security Interests Can Threaten the U.S.

of this has unfolded over the past decade; the summary of the Congressional Research Services 2014 report entitled Threats to U.S.
National Security Interests in Space: Orbital Debris Mitigation and Removal explains that the growing population of space debris
threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial. The U.S.
criticized the 2007 Chinese ASAT test; National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe states that the U.S. believes Chinas
development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space

With U.S. satellite assets defined as a security interest, it was only

natural that many American analysts interpreted this test as a deliberate step made by the Chinese
towards a counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority as well as an
attempt to force the U.S. into space arms treaty negotiations. However , Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis
(2008) conducted interviews with Chinese officials who were close to the anti-satellite program and found
American commentators tended to place too much importance on the U.S. as a driver in Chinas
test. This ASAT test, coupled with NASA Administrator Michael Griffin being denied access to the Shenzhou launch facility in 2006,
area (Kaufman & Linzer, 2007, para. 4).

caused the U.S. to sever cooperative ties with the Chinese National Space Agency. Griffin, in turn, had to resort to claiming the
prospect of competition with China to obtain U.S. Congressional support for NASAs cooperative initiatives (Kulacki and Lewis,
2008). Therefore, the U.S. defining security interests, such as its satellite assets, encourages the U.S.s interpretation of Chinas

the result was a further distancing of Washington

from Beijing and a severing of space ties between two of the most space active nations in the
world. Defining a set of U.S. security interests can bias the space security conversation towards
the U.S.; Chinas actions would be interpreted relative to the U.S.s supposed security interests,
constructing China as the aggressor. For example, with satellite assets outlined as a security interest, the U.S. interprets
actions, such as the 2007 ASAT test, as a threat. In this example,

Chinas 2007 ASAT test as threatening to that interest. Yet, space debris in low Earth orbit threatens all nations with orbital satellite
assetsnot just the U.S. In fact, the 2007 ASAT test caused debris that damaged a Russian satellite six years later (CRS, 2014).

Economy and Adam Segal (2009) stress the importance of the U.S. working with the
international community when approaching Chinese security issues, as opposed to framing the issue as U.S.China specific. They suggest the Obama administration sit down with Japan, the European Union, and other key
allies to begin coordinating their policies towards China to enjoy more policy success, emphasizing
Elizabeth

that many countries have realized their relationship with Beijing cannot be bilaterally negotiated (Economy & Segal, 2009, p. 20). An

the U.S. defining its satellite assets as a security

interest can bias the security conversation towards the U.S., making it more likely that China be
constructed as an aggressor. If the security conversation is framed as Chinese aggression towards
U.S. security interests, the U.S can monopolize an international issue, like satellite debris. This
issue like satellite debris cannot be negotiated bilaterally, and

Questions Discursive Construction Increases the Risk of Conflict The question of whether or not Chinas reemergence is threatening

The possible answers to this question lead to

conflict; answering that China is threatening could lead to a security dilemmaa situation where
the U.S.s attempts to heighten its own security could evoke similar defensive responses from
China, increasing the risk of conflict (Glaser, 1997). Defense analysts cite Chinas emerging threat in
space as a primary reason for the U.S. to weaponize space . However, Hui Zhang of Harvards Kennedy School
(2008, p. 31) asserts U.S. space weaponization plans will have disastrous consequences for
international security and the peaceful use of outer space . She concludes that this would evoke appropriate
to U.S. security interests is discursively constructed to threaten the U.S.

defense measures by China, which could lead to a space arms race (Zhang, 2008, p. 40). Given this questions discursive construction,
answering that China is a threat to U.S. security interests could cause a security dilemma that heightens the risk of conflict. On the
other hand, if one answers that China is not a threat, the U.S. risks becoming ambivalent and could face an increasing perceived threat
from China. U.S. Air Force General William Shelton explains that U.S. military satellites are effectively defenseless, and an attack
would severely limit the U.S.s civil, commercial, and military capabilities (U.S. military satellites, 2014). A report on the Peoples
Liberation Armys space strategy published by the American Enterprise Institute (Wortzel, 2007) concludes that evidence exists that
the PLA is preparing as though they might have to militarily engage the U.S. in space, citing weapons tests, legal justifications, and

PLA literature as evidence. The report argues that justifications exist for the U.S. to develop space weapons systems, whether for

If the U.S. becomes ambivalent while China

develops space arms, a U.S. perception of a China threat in space could increase as China
becomes better armed relative to the U.S. Yet, as Zhang (2008) argues, arming space will likely evoke a military
response from China. Therefore, even answering this essays question of a possible China threat in the
affirmative or negative increases the risk of conflict. This questions discursive construction
forces the use of the terms U.S. and China, creating a Self and Other paradigm which
places the two states in opposition; the debate over whether or not China is a threat to U.S. security interests is often
expressed in the U.S. by using the language of America as us and China as them. Jisheng Sun (2014)
argues that previously, when China was considered an ideological partner , such as under the Nationalist
Government of Chiang Kai-shek, U.S. policymakers used the term we to describe the two states. When
referring to Chinas rise today, China is often referred to as the Other, in comparison to the Self of the
U.S. The Other portrays the U.S.-imposed ideological dichotomy between itself and China,
identifying the latter as different and even contradictory to the U.S. (Sun, 2014, p. 87). The policy
discourse of the Self and Other simplifies and polarizes and can increase the speed and
intensity of security dilemma dynamics between the U.S. and China (Johnston, 2013). This language
creates American unipolarity where Chinas threat reputation leads to out-group status, which in
turn fuels perceptions of China as threatening. Intensifying threat perception increases a possible
security dilemma, and security-conscious Chinese political elites are acutely aware of the security
costs of dangerous foreign attributions to Chinas character (Deng, 2006, p. 187). The Self versus Other
defensive measures or offensive capabilities in future space conflicts.

paradigm distances Washington from Beijing and discursively places the two states in opposition. This questions use of the word

Threatening versus nonthreatening language forces one

to view space actions through a threatening versus nonthreatening lens. For example, an emerging amount
threat can increase U.S. perceptions of a Chinese threat.

of literature focuses on the China threat theory. Yong Deng (2006) argues that the China threat theory is foreign attributions to

analysts argue the theory helps defense

industry insiders keep power and prestige gained during the Cold War by creating an existential
threat supposedly facing the U.S. (Tiezzi, 2014). Though Beijing has disregarded this as Cold War-style power politics
China as being harmful and destabilizing in international relations. Some

while reassuring the international community of its peaceful intentions, the risk still exists that the U.S. may genuinely feel threatened

the use of threat language and the subsequent

understanding of actions as threatening or nonthreatening. This is problematic, because it risks creating a
discursively constructed security dilemma that increases the likelihood of space weaponization
(Peoples, 2008). While space weapons are only in their infancy in terms of development and deployment, the space policy
discourse of several states is already predicated, to a greater or lesser extent, on the general
probability of space weaponization, and this in turn risks premature preclusion of alternative
outcomes (Peoples, 2008, p. 503). The existence of U.S. perceptions of a China threat that arises from its use of threatening
by Chinas actions (Deng, 2006). However, one reason may be

versus nonthreatening terminology leads the U.S. to perceive Chinas increasing space power as threatening, even if it is not Chinas
intention (Gross Stein, 2013). Therefore, this questions use of threat terminology can increase the likelihood that the U.S. will
perceive a threat.

And, this self/other discourse relies on racist ideas meant to protect American
identity, and frames the boundaries of political possibility.
Turner 13 [Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the
University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy
(Routledge, forthcoming) [Threatening China and US security: the international politics of
identity, Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University
Press 2013]
In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan

argues that the threat is an imagined construction of

American observers.15 Pan does not deny the importance of the PRC's capabilities but asserts that they appear

threatening from understandings about the United States itself. [T]here is no such thing as Chinese
reality that can automatically speak for itself, Pan argues. [T]o fully understand the US China
threat argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature .16 The geographical territory of
China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those
representations.17 The analysis which follows demonstrates that China

threats to the United States have to some extent

always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Michel Foucault
described discourse as the general domain of all statements, constituting either a group of
individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements. 18 American
discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related
statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American

representations of China are discursive

constructions of truths or realities about its existence . The article draws in part from the work of David
Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings
about the self. The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, argues Campbell, the
presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible is sometimes enough to
produce the understanding of a threat.19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced
to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of
separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have
historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenthcentury racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States
largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological
discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of
discourses are shown to have constituted a specific sort of boundary producing political
performance.21 Across the history of Sino-US relations then when dangers from China have emerged, they
have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always
existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a
threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological)
deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most
commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that
identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking
circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War
containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and
institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported
restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States. It is demonstrated that, twice before,
this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of
American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of
rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the
natural identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These
moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U nited States
was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democraticcapitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today's China threat to US security is
yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of
consequences they have previously facilitated. As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities
and intentions of a rising China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by
forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and
potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable from the enactment of US China
policy. This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China have never been produced
objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power,
however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign

policy. Rather, it is to

reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred,
through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth. 24 Accordingly, this analysis
shifts from a concern with why to how questions. Why questions assume that particular
practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved .25 They assume, for
instance, the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence
of a China threat. How questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which
ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded .26 In this analysis they are
concerned with how and why China threats have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially
constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be
advanced. US

China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a bridge between two
states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings
of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational
processes, then, US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the
United States. As the case study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and
actions (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China threat
continues. In such a way it constitutes the international inscription of foreignness, protecting
American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China. 29 As Hixson asserts, [f]oreign
policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity, and

the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for
understandings about its identity.30 In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, throughout
history threats from China towards the United States have never been explicable in terms of
material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of American
discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by
processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its
intentions. Second, representations of China threats have always been key to the enactment and
justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the
boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential
alternatives could be discarded. Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of
foreignness and the identities of both China and the U nited States, functioning to protect the
American identity from which the threats have been produced .

Plan
Thus, the plan: The United States should substantially increase its diplomatic
engagement with China over outer space.

Solvency
Positive engagement provides a foundation for a stronger overall relationship
and reverses anti-Chinese sentiment amongst government planners that
allows cooperation on space weather modeling, satellite observation, and
exploration.
Weeden 15 [Brian, Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former U.S. Air
Force Officer with sixteen years of professional experience in space operations and policy, An
Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship, September 9,
2015, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602]
The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation for a stronger
overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a stabilizing element in the
relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing
national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the U.S.-China
relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation, taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to
avoiding the Thucydides trap, where an established powers fear of a rising power leads to conflict. The Role of Space in the U.S.-China Relationship

Space is a critical domain to the security of the U nited States. Space capabilities enable secure,
hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms
control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the
United States ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests
overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the
United States ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are
involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more
planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of
dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space activities. As a
result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in
physical and electromagnetic congestion and interference. Amid this change, China is rapidly
developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and
successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASAs
successes in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of
space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of Chinas new
capabilities have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or
threatening the space capabilities of the U nited States and other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and
Chinas growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space. There is growing mistrust between the two
countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as
rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by
a misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United
States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities. Recommendations for Managing Tensions and Promoting Positive
Engagement Despite these challenges and concerns, there

are concrete steps that the United States and China can
take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward positive engagement. In 2011, President Barack
Obama and then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White
House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of
space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinpings upcoming visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011
agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security. President Obama should clearly
communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the
potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space. Both countries should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations
of how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either
country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis. Second, Presidents Obama

and Xi should discuss specific ideas for

cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications
on earth. Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own

capabilities; this approach will

only ensure that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way
that advances its own national interests and goals. Space weather, scientific research,
exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are
all areas where the United States and China share joint interests and could collaborate with each
other and other interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the
military realm.

China wants cooperation now US is the only road block

Space Daily 4/26 [Staff Writers, 4/26/16, China open to Sino-US space cooperation, Space
Daily,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_open_to_Sino_US_space_cooperation_999.html]
China is open to space cooperation with all nations including the United States, the heavyweights of
China's space program said on Sunday, the anniversary of China's first satellite launch 46 years ago. "China will not
rule out cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States," said Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut. Payload has been
reserved in the Chinese space station, due to enter service around 2022, for international projects and foreign astronauts, said Yang on
the occasion of the first China Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government. Upon

request, China
will also train astronauts for other countries, and jointly train astronauts with the European space station, Yang said.
"The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. It's true for us, and for the United States
too," according to the senior astronaut. His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China's manned
space program. Zhou said, "It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space
technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development." "Cooperation
between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind," Zhou added. Citing security reasons,
the U.S. Congress passed a law in 2011 to prohibit NASA from hosting Chinese visitors at its
facilities and working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise.
Ban remains in effect The U.S.-dominated International Space Station, which unsurprisingly blocks China, is scheduled to
end its service in 2024. China's space station could be the only operational one in outer space, at least for a while. Commenting on
Sino-U.S. space relations earlier this week, Xu Dazhe, the head of China's National Space Administration, cites Hollywood sci-fi
blockbuster "The Martian," in which a U.S. astronaut gets stranded on Mars and is eventually brought back to Earth by NASA, with
help from China. Xu Dazhe noted that China and the United States established a special dialogue mechanism last year and talks
would continue this year. For chief engineer Zhou, the movie simply reflects what most people want. "Many American astronauts and
scientists that I have met said they would like to work with us, if given the freedom of choice." The China Space Day was designated
to mark the launch of China's first satellite on April 24, 1970.

Diplomatic engagement is key encourages the development common goals

and norms, transparency, and dialogue
Rose 16 [Frank A. Rose, 5/14/16, The Role of Diplomacy in Keeping Outer Space Safe,
Secure, and Sustainable, 32nd Space Symposium, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/255834.htm]
Specifically, Id like to focus on our diplomatic

efforts to enhance the security of the outer space

environment by: strengthening the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security in space
through international measures to promote safe and responsible space activities; and on
strengthening space system resilience through international cooperation. These efforts build on longstanding principles and goals of U.S. National Space Policy extending back over 50 years. The Department of State has worked
closely with our Department of Defense colleagues to implement these principles and goals, including in the Space Strategic Portfolio
Review of 2014. However, as is clear from the wide-ranging participation and presentations at this Space Symposium, the outer space
environment is very complex, with over 80 nations and numerous government consortia, scientific, and commercial firms accessing
and operating satellites for countless economic, scientific, educational, and social purposes. At the same time, threats to space systems

from debris or irresponsible activities is adding to this complexity. We are clearly concerned by Chinese and Russian pursuit of
weapons systems capable of destroying satellites in orbit, as the Director of National Intelligence noted in Congressional testimony
this past February. This complexity and the importance of space to our economy, our national security, and our everyday lives, has
heightened the international diplomatic communitys interest in space security considerably. In

this dynamic environment,

diplomacy can assist in addressing the challenges of developing guidelines for space operations
and orbital debris mitigation, and encouraging responsible behavior in space through the
development of norms and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures . Diplomatic
engagements also provide an opportunity to enhance a common understanding of the goals and
challenges related to the outer space environment , thus creating support for U.S. policy. Our diplomatic
efforts are also focused on raising international understanding of the global consequences of conflict
in outer space. Preventing or deterring such conflict is a global interest for all countries , because the
resulting impacts of that conflict would not be limited to the militaries and countries involved, but would extend to all space-farers and
all who depend upon space which is pretty much everyone on this planet. In addition, diplomacy

is an essential
element in influencing countries calculus related to the development or employment of
counterspace systems. The Department of States diplomatic efforts can be used to enhance and
complement other U.S. Government activities to increase space mission assurance and ultimately
deny an aggressor the benefits of attacks in space. Our diplomatic efforts include specific engagements
in both bilateral and multilateral fora, in bilateral space security dialogues , and in the various United Nations
organizational entities and regional fora. We are committed to using these efforts to prevent conflict from extending into space.
Bilateral Diplomatic Engagement We have made it a focal point of our diplomatic efforts to discuss space security issues with a range
of countries friends, allies, partners, and those who are interested in greater cooperation. The

State Department has

established over 15 formal space security dialogues with a number of partner s, including: the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Japan, India, South Africa and the UAE. We use these dialogues to discuss
the challenges to the space environment, multilateral diplomatic initiatives, and opportunities for
practical, bilateral cooperation. In addition to our formal space security dialogues with many governments, we have
expanded our space security discussions with a range of other partners, such as Turkey, Chile, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Additionally, we are expanding our space security-related conversations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In many
cases, our candid discussions

have given the U.S. a better appreciation for our partners perspectives,
and helped identify areas for cooperation and coordination. In addition, these diplomatic
engagements have resulted in increased interest in bilateral and multilateral space cooperation in
areas interest in bilateral and multilateral space, including: Space situational awareness; Orbital
debris mitigation; and The use of space for maritime domain awareness. I believe that most of these
nations have a similar view of a space environment that is safe, secure, and sustainable. Needless to say, there are sometimes
significant disagreements about how we get to that end-state. At the same time, we also look for opportunities

to engage
Russia and China on these issues. Doing so will underscore the detrimental impact that irresponsible
actions could have on the space environment and ensure that there are no misperceptions or
miscommunications in a potential crisis. We previously conducted Space Security Dialogues with Russia, but we have
chosen to suspend them due to Russias ongoing aggression in Ukraine. I am also in regular communication with my Chinese
counterparts and we look forward to scheduling our inaugural space security exchange in the near future in fulfillment of an outcome
from the June 2015 meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. We also are holding a series of civil space dialogues
with China, including bilateral consultations on satellite collision avoidance and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.
Multilateral Diplomatic Engagement On the multilateral front, we actively participate in, and often lead, efforts within the United
Nations, as well as at the regional level, in support of the long-term sustainability and security of outer space. The United States
remains committed to efforts in multilateral fora to pursue a range of measures to enhance space security and sustainability At the
regional level, the United States has supported the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to initiate and host space
security workshops over the past three years. These workshops have proven to be productive and informative fora for raising
awareness and understanding of space systems and space activities in the Asia-Pacific region. For the past three years, we cosponsored UN General Assembly resolutions with Russia and China that urged the international community to consider implementing
the recommendations of the 2013 consensus report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on outer space
transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). We remain optimistic that these recommendations can be implemented. In
fact, because we have such an important story to tell regarding the implementation of these TCBMs, we will prepare a comprehensive
report in the coming months to detail all we are doing to implement the GGEs recommendations and their contributions to enhancing
stability in outer space. Moreover, in the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS), the U.S. Government in close
collaboration with the private sector is taking a leadership role in international efforts to ensure the long-term sustainability of outer

space activities. Along with most other members of COPUOS, the United States supports efforts to complete clear, practicable, and
proven guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities in 2016. However, our multilateral efforts are not without
difficulties and challenges. In the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere, Russia and China continue to promote their draft
legally-binding Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty, or PPWT, which is unverifiable and does not
address the threat of terrestrially-based anti-satellite weapons, among other deficiencies. Russias No first placement of weapons in
outer space initiative is fundamentally flawed and would not reduce the possibility of mishaps, misunderstandings, or
miscalculations. These proposals typically gain a measure of support internationally because some countries are initially attracted to
the idea of preventing the weaponization of space. However, in my diplomatic engagements, while supporting the goal of ensuring
that space does not become a haven for conflict, I continue to point out the reasons why the United States cannot support these
proposals and why the United States supports voluntary and pragmatic alternatives, such as transparency and confidence building
measures. Space Sustainability and Strategic Stability Beyond our efforts

to develop broadly agreed-upon rules

of responsible behavior, we must also pursue efforts to deter terrestrial conflicts that extend to
space. This is integral to both strategic stability and space sustainability, and diplomacy has a key
role to play. Our allies and partners around the globe are investing in space systems of their own .
They bring tremendous capabilities, a shared set of values, and an eagerness to cooperate. As such, we seek to strengthen the
resiliency of our space systems through international cooperation. In a time of flat or declining defense budgets here as well as in
many other countries, such cooperation has become increasingly important. This resiliency

adds robustness to space

capabilities in the face of natural space weather events, system failures, and incidents in orbit, and
contributes to deterring attacks on space systems by minimizing or eliminating any gain from
such action. International diplomacy is a key component of creating the resiliency necessary for space mission assurance. For
example, my Department of State colleagues focused on civil space cooperation have been engaged in ongoing informal bilateral
discussions with the European Union for several years on opportunities for U.S. Government users, including the Department of
Defense, to access the secure, limited access Galileo signals known as Public Regulated Service (or PRS), in addition to the systems
open signals. As DoD contemplates the next generation of receivers for its transportation and weapons systems, the goal is to plan for
deployment of multi-GNSS receives, perhaps even developed jointly with partners in Europe. There are strong resiliency benefits
from such an approach. A second development with potentially dramatic impacts on space sustainability is the accelerating
emergence of a host of new commercial space activities that are capitalizing on advancing technologies and decreasing barriers to
entry. Already we are seeing rapid growth in the number of systems on orbit. We have already identified the need for more space
situational awareness cooperation, which our allies and partners can help with. But, this trend will take the international community
beyond the need for mere space situational awareness and could require new approaches to manage space traffic and prevent collisions
that could damage space sustainability for all. Though still emergent, international diplomacy in this area will be essential to assuring
the predictability that investors seek and to having practices that assure both long-term growth and long-term sustainability in space.
Conclusion In conclusion, I am concerned about the continued development by Russia and China of anti-satellite weapons. I want to
reiterate that the United States is committed to preventing conflict from extending into space, and our diplomatic strategy supports this
goal. The possibility of conflict in space is in no ones interest. Mission assurance and resilience is one area where international
cooperation has benefits during peacetime and deters conflict in space. Further, international diplomacy plays an important role in
preventing or reducing the impact of a conflict in outer space, which strengthens strategic stability and space sustainability. In light of
these opportunities and challenges, I am optimistic about the future of our diplomatic efforts in support of our long-standing principles
and goals of the U.S. national space policy and international space cooperation. We have made considerable progress in reaching out
not only to our allies and space partners, but also to a broad group of other established and emerging space-faring nations. We have
also helped change the international conversation in order to focus efforts on pragmatic areas of cooperation such as TCBMs and away
from unverifiable proposals such as the PPWT. And we

will need to continue these diplomatic efforts. The rapid

progress in private sector space capabilities, systems, and technologies will require thoughtful consideration, not
only at the national level, but also with allies, partners, other spacefaring nations, and industry, for new ways
of thinking about solving the shared challenges we face. Im absolutely convinced that, to successfully realize the future we seek, we
must together do the hard work of building on our existing fifty-year foundation of national space policy principles and goals.
Building on this foundation, we

must continue promoting and pursuing voluntary TCBMs, non-binding

guidelines, and norms of responsible behavior in outer space. Only then can we ensure the longterm sustainability and security of the outer space environment for generations to come.

Policy rhetoric over space shapes both space policies and their outcomes the
plan is a shift towards diplomacy instead of battle
Johnson-Freese 15 [Joan Johnson-Freese, 7/21/15, Escalating U.S.-Sino Military Space
Rhetoric. China-US Focus, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War
College, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/escalating-u-s-sino-military-spacerhetoric/#sthash.C0BZqpKP.dpuf]

Words matter. William Shakespeare knew it. In Hamlet, for example, one of the key images is that of the ear being poisoned. Literally,
Hamlets father is murdered by having poison inserted directly into his ear. Metaphorically, as the play progresses Shakespeare makes
it clear that words and language can be used to manipulate and destroy. That truism from seventeenth century is exacerbated
exponentially by the mass media. Joseph Goebbels ran the Ministry of Propaganda for Adolph Hitler specifically to spew antiSemitism. Subsequently, George Orwell published his masterpiece 1984 in 1949, in which the Ministry of Truth translates politically
unacceptable Oldspeak into politically acceptable Newspeak. Orwell would likely not be surprised that Florida Governor Rick Scotts
administration tacitly barred any official mention of climate change or global warming,[1] by state officials, given the potentially
dire consequences of those issues for the state. The United States government has dabbled into the art of words as well. In 2002, the
Pentagon created an Office of Strategic Influence intended to provide news items, including potentially false ones, to sway public
opinion abroad in the wake of terrorist attacks against the United States.[2] The effort was short-lived not because the concept was
deemed unacceptable, but due to an intra-organization turf battle with the more-powerful Pentagon Public Affairs Office. It has also
studied, reported on, instituted and then dropped an initiative toward improved strategic communication[3] because it took on a
bureaucratic life of its own rather than coordinating and streamlining government communications. That doesnt mean, however, that
the U.S. government does not have a way with words. At least in

the area military space competition with China,

government rhetoric does Shakespeare and Orwell proud. Not only has it pronounced an
environment of competition, it has also creatively crafted a carefully worded, politically
appropriate response. The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) refers to the space
environment as increasingly congested, contested and competitive.[4] Simply by virtue of the
increased number of spacecraft in orbit certain space orbits are becoming more crowded, or
congested. The United States, however, has more spacecraft creating that crowded situation than any other nation. As of January
31, 2015, the United States has 528 satellites in orbit, compared to Chinas 132, Russias 131 and all other nations combined 434.

Unless, however, it is the U.S. expectation that other countries would consider the unfettered use
of space as a U.S. entitlement, it is perhaps neither unexpected nor unreasonable that space is
increasing congested, and perhaps then by extrapolation contested and competitive. The contested and
competitive aspect of the NSSS, especially with regard to China, also flows from rapid and expansive Chinese efforts to modernize its
military to include space assets and counter clear U.S. military advantages by asymmetric means. This is where word play becomes
especially dicey. Given

that most space technology is dual-use, meaning of value to both military and
civilian communities and difficult to determine whether the military technology is for offensive or
defensive use, almost anything China does in space can be ascribed as threatening to the United
States. Missile defense technology exemplifies the dilemma, and how words can shape
perceptions. Whereas, for example, the United States has not officially tested anti-satellite
technology (ASAT) since the 1980s, the technical capabilities required for a successful ASAT
program are very similar to those of a missile defense program, and the U.S. regularly conducts
missile defense tests. In 2007, China conducted a high-altitude, kinetic-hit ASAT test against one
of its own defunct satellites, and de facto labeled it as such, a test which created massive amount of space debris and for
which it rightfully received considerable international condemnation. Subsequently, in 2008 the United States then destroyed one of its
own malfunctioning satellites, ostensibly due to public safety concerns, using modified missile defense technology. The

international lesson learned: Missile defense tests are politically acceptable while ASAT tests are
not. Consequently, China has conducted missile defense tests not ASAT tests in 2010,
2013 and 2014. Similarly India, also known to have an interest in ASATs, has also initiated a missile defense program and
Russia has raised the possibility of reinvigorating its missile defense program as well. Missile defense is defensive, and therefore
acceptable, whereas ASATs are offensive and therefore indicative of space being contested and competitive. Given

the
accepted narrative of the space environment as congested, contested and competitive, the U.S.
must have a response. In keeping with the apparent appeal of three-word catchphrases, the NSSS
states that the United States must be prepared to deter, defend and defeat challenges in space.
That provides the opportunity for the most Orwellian aspect to the space dialogue, a U.S. push for
offensive counterspace (OCS). First articulated in 2004, Air Force counterspace doctrine details the planning and
execution of operations against space systems and satellites, for both defensive and offensive purposes.[5] Offensive counterspace
infers the potential inclusion of preemptive operations. Again, however, words are important, with the terms preemption and
prevention inappropriately used as synonymous, as with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq as a preemptive action.[6] Since a 19th
century formulation known as the Caroline test, preemptive self-defense has been upheld as within the bounds of customary
international law if the necessity is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.
Prevention, however, are actions taken in the short term to fend off a longer-term, potential threat. As with Iraq, preventive actions are
frequently referred to as preemptive, for political and legal justification. Given

the ambiguous, dual-use nature of

space technology and the difficulties that come into play with determining accountability for
actions taking place hundreds, maybe thousands of miles in space, the potential for error in
determining, anticipating and reacting to the activities of others is significant. Chinese space hawks are
doing their share to up to provocative and bombastic rhetoric as well. Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Chief General Xu
Qiliang stated in 2009 that competition between military forces in space is a historical inevitability.[7] Though quickly contradicted
by then Chinese President Hu Jintao, Qiliang continued to advance through the military ranks to the vice-chairmanship of the Central
Military Committee, the first air force officer to do so. Overall, and in keeping with the government proclivity for tri-part descriptors,

the space environment between the U.S. and China is one where misunderstanding,
misinterpretation and mistrust prevail. Chinas space program is rapidly expanding, but starting from a very low on the
learning curve. Even though the United States military space budget is approximately $25 billion
annually, ten times what China spends, that is seemingly not enough to adequately meet the
challenge, and based on revelations in an April 2015 60 Minutes television broadcast the United States is in a Chicken-little, thesky-is-falling position. Air Force General Jon Hyten stated that the 2007 Chinese ASAT test was a significant wakeup call to our
entire military. Until that singular event, I dont think the broader military realized that that is something were going to have to worry
about.[8] Given

that the 2001 Space Commission (chaired by soon-to-be Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumseld) characterized space as becoming a battlefield along with land, air and the seas,
and warned of a space Pearl Harbor; the 2002 Joint Doctrine for Space stated The United States must be able to
protect its space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries; and the 2004 Air Force Counterspace Doctrine stated that,
U.S. Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains spacesuperiority, its
hard to reconcile the apparent military surprise with the 2007 Chinese event. Further, it has been almost eight years since that event
and the current policy shift. The

policy shift appears to coincide with the 2014 Chinese missile

defense/ASAT test. Rhetoric since then, as space analyst Victoria Samson at the Secure World
Foundation phrased it, has been part of an effort to prime the pump[9] to a policy heavily
skewed toward military operations. Specifically, space control, a term with a historically
military, offensive connotation, has become the buzzword in national security space discussion.
That term had been widely used by the George W. Bush administration, but put aside by the
Obama Administration in favor of strategic restraint, a policy that included a full spectrum of
policy options, including counterspace operations as well as diplomatic, multilateral approaches
to shape the space environment. The latter now seem to have been deemphasized at best, or
simply left in the dust. It is likely that the tone of space rhetoric will continue on its current
course, focusing on military answers to challenges and threats. While those solutions are a
necessary part of maintaining the space environment so it is available for all responsible space
faring nations to use, they are necessary but not sufficient answers. Rhetoric and
accompanying action must also include earnest efforts to shape the space environment.
Professor of Global Diplomacy John Stoessinger, writing about Vietnam, considered the word tragedy. He asked whether it was
an example of Greek tragedy, the tragedy of necessity, in which the feeling aroused in the spectator is What a pity it had to be this
way or of Christian tragedy, the tragedy of possibility, in which the feeling aroused is What a pity it was this way when it might have
been otherwise.[10] Space

war neednt be inevitable. It is not a Greek tragedy.

Cooperation solves arms race provides a middle ground for the two
countries
Weeden and Ziao 16 [BRIAN WEEDEN AND XIAO HE, 4/26/16, USE OUTER SPACE
TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-CHINA TIES, Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure
World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of
World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/]
With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more
important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to
take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in

national security circles, there is discussion of

a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the
United States, against the rising power of China. The United States and China have identified space as a strategic
domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable
resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and
Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and
international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of
instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The United States and China
have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued
access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based
capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with
U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States ability to
defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space

capabilities are

also a critical piece of the U.S. and the global economy. China is focused on developing its own
capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and
military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players,
especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and
securing its role as a rising power. From Chinas perspective, the most urgent problem is that the
space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in
the creation of international norms and institutions particularly because it perceives that it
must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these
differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship . Recent
testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on active
defense have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and
warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support
national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to
reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the
detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and
long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international
space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using
its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes.
Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to
undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two
sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the

United States
and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the
long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to
help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of
both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible
space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage
in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome
strong political challenges. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in
space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While
the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures
to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally,
both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing
data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.

Framing
By unmasking the flawed assumptions behind the drive for space control, the
aff unsettles a dangerous political paradigm in favor of democratic
accountability. Only challenging status quo engagement can provide impetus
for a new approach to space.
Macdonald 7 (Fraser Macdonald, Professor of Human Geography at the University of
Melbourne, 2007 Anti-Astropolitik: Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography, Online)
IV Critical astropolitics Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is
already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Secondly, the import of space to civilian,
commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and
control over Earths orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in

terms of
establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in
this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as the
study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and
military policy and strategy (Dolman, 2002: 15).It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett
Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Forces School of
Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled
Small Wars and Insurgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolmans work, I should say that his Astropolitik:
classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman,2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of
research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and
accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section I drew heavily on Dolmans description of
the astropolitical environment). My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolmans

construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military
conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in
Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (e.g.Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground.
Dolmans work is interesting for our purposes here precisely because he draws on geographys back catalogue of strategic
thinkers, most prominently Halford Mackinder, whose ideas gained particular prominence in America in the wake oft he
Russian Sputnik (Hooson, 2004: 377). But Dolman is not just re-fashioning classical geopolitics in the new garb of
astropolitics; he goes further and proposes an Astropolitik a simple but effective blueprint for space

control (p.9) modeled on Karl Hausofers Geopolitik as much as Realpolitik. Showing some discomfort with the
impeccably fascist pedigree of this theory, Dolman cautions against the misuse of Astropolitik and argues that the term is
chosen as a constant reminder of that past, and as a grim warning for the future(Dolman, 2002: 3). At the same time, however,
his book is basically a manual for achieving space dominance. Projecting Mackinders famous thesis on the geographical pivot
of history (Mackinder, 1904) onto outer space, Dolman argues that who controls the Lower Earth Orbit controls nearEarth space. Who

controls near-Earth space dominates Terra [Earth]. Who dominates Terra determines the
destiny of humankind. Dolman sees the quest for space as already having followed classically Mackinderian principles
(Dolman, 2002: 87). And like Mackinder before him, Dolman is writing in the service of his Empire. Astropolitik like
Realpolitik he writes, is hardnosed and pragmatic, it is not pretty or uplifting or a joyous sermon for the masses. But neither is
it evil. Its benevolence or malevolence become apparent only as it is applied, and by whom(Dolman, 2002: 4). Further
inspiration is drawn from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose classic volume The Influence of Seapower Upon History, has been
widely cited by space strategists (Mahan, 1890; Gray, 1996; see also Russell, 2006).Mahans discussion of the strategic value of
coasts, harbours, wellworn seapaths and chokepoints has its parallel in outer space (see France, 2000). The implication of
Mahans work, Dolman concludes, is that the United States must be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to
the defense and maintenance of these assets, or relinquish them to a state willing and able to do so (Dolman, 2002: 37). The

primary problem for those advancing Astropolitik is that space is not a lawless frontier. In
fact the legal character of space has long been enshrined in the principles of the OST and this
has, to some extent, prevented it from being subject to unbridled interstate competition. While it
is morally desirable to explore space in common with all peoples writes Dolman without conviction, even the thought of
doing so makes weary those who have the means (Dolman,2002: 135). Thus, the veneer of transcendent humanism with regard
to spacegives way to brazen self-interest. Accordingly, Dolman describes the rescommunis consensus of the OST as a tragedy
that has removed any lega lincentive for the exploitation of space (137). Only a res nulliuslegal order couldconstruct space as
proper objects for which states may compete (138). Under the paradigm of res nullius and Astropolitik, the moon and other
celestial bodies would become potential new territory for states. And here Dolman again parallels Karl Hausofers Geopolitik.
Just as Hausofer desired a break from the VersaillesTreaty ( Tuathail 1996: 45), Dolman wants to see the US withdraw from
the OST, making full speed ahead for the Moon (see also Hickman and Dolman,2002). Non-space-faring developing countries
need not worry about losing out, says Dolman, as they would own no less of the Moon than they do now (140).To his credit,

Dolman does give some attention to the divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier currents
of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic exploration, he ponders the characteristics of
those who will be first to colonise space.
They will be highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened for mental toughness and
decision-making skills, and very physically fit; the bestand brightest of our pilots, technicians and
scientists; rational, given to scientific analysis and explanation , and obsessed with their professions
(26). In other words, they are a superior subset of the larger group from which they
spring(27). As if this picture isnt vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say that colonizers of space will be
the most capably endowed (or at least the most ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia so
aptly illustrate[s]) (27; myemphasis). Duty and sacrifice will be the highest moral ideals (27). Society,
he continues, must be prepared to make heroes of those who undertake the risk of exploration (146). At the same time, the
astropolitical society must be prepared to forego expenditures on social programs to channel funds into the national space
program. It must be embued with the national spirit (146).Dolman slips from presenting what would be merely a logical
outworking of Astropolitik, to advocating that the United States adopt it as their space strategy.A long the way, he
acknowledges the full anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the

state from its citizenry: the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and
reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it . So powerful
is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services
appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait
accompli of total US domination in space. 156. Although Dolman claims that no attempt will be made to create a convincing
argument that the United States has a right to domination in space, in almost the next sentence he goes on to argue that, in this
case, might does make right, the persuasiveness of the case being based on the self-interest of the state and stability of the
system (156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik: a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power

and the permanent rightness of those who wield it. And if it sounds chillingly familiar,
Dolman hopes to reassure us with his belief that the US form of liberal democracy is admirable and
socially encompassing (156) and it is the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the
greater part of the world (158). His sunny view that the United States is willing to extend legal and
political equality to all sits awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in
Guantanamo Bay as well as invarious other spaces of exception (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben,
2005).Dolmans astropolitical project is by no means exceptional. The journal Astropolitics, of
which he is a founding editor, contains numerous papers expressing similar views. And it is easy, I think, for critical
geographers to feel so secure in the intellectual and political purchase of Tuathailian critiques (Tuathail, 1996), that we
become oblivious to the undead nature of classical geopolitics. It is comforting to think that most geography undergraduates
encountering geopolitics, in the UK at least, will in all likelihood do so through the portal of critical perspectives, perhaps
through the excellent work of Joanne Sharp or Klaus Dodds (Dodds, 2005; Sharp, 2005). But the legacies of

Mackinder and Mahan live on, and radical critique is as urgent as ever. While this is not theplace
for a thoroughgoing reappraisal of astropolitics in the manner of Gearid Tuathail, a few salient points from his critique can
be brought out.
1. Astrography and astropolitics, like geography and geopolitics, constitute apolitical domination

and cultural imagining of space ( Tuathail, 1996:28). While commentators like Colin Gray have posited an
inescapable geography (e.g. of course, physical geography is politically neutral), a critical agenda conceives of
geography not as a fixed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173;
Tuathail, 1999: 109).For geography, read astrography. We must be alert to the declarative(this is how the Outer Earth is)
and imperative (this is what we mustdo) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (
Tuathail, 1999: 107). The models of Mackinder and Mahanthat are so often applied to the space

environment are not unchanging laws; on the contrary they are themselves highly political
attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical
circumstances.
2. Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power , a
critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question.
Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinise the power politics of the expert/think-tank/tactician
as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic
accountability( Tuathail, 1999: 108).
3. Mackinders end of geography thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the
task of consolidating the world order to fit British interests (O Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolmansvision of space strategy bears
striking similarities. And like Tuathailscritique of Mackinders imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably

described as triumphalism blind to its own precariousness (O Tuathail,1996: 28). Dolman, for
instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that the United
States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovocampaign, and
stands at the forefront of history capable of presiding overthe birth of a bold New World Order. One might
argue, however, that Mackinder as the theorist of imperial decline may in this respect be
an appropriate mentor ( Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik:
there is nothing inevitable about US dominance in space, even if the US were to pursue
this imperial logic.
4. Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism. Implicit in this

ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because
they are not like us. The most ruthlessly suitable candidates for space dominance, we are told the
most capably endowed are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman,2002: 27).5. A critical

astropolitics must challenge the mythic properties ofAstropolitik and disrupt its reverie
for the timeless insights of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Tuathail, geopolitics
is mythic becauseit promises uncanny clarity in a complex world and is fetishistically
concerned with . prophecy ( Tuathail, 1999: 113). Tuathails criticalproject, by contrast,
seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of
Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized.

And, the dominance of the china threat argument makes an arms race and
war the most likely future outcome of the US-China relationship. The
affirmative scholarship disrupts the faulty realist epistemology that has
reloaded the space race so the eventuality of war can be averted.
Pan 4 [Chengxin, Department of Political Science and Professor of International Relations @
Australian National University, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The
Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,
Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July]
the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived,
primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a
particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist- based realism,
concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. selfimaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a
threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme
or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the
post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense
of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment
that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and
hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to
have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spyI have argued above that

plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment
toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of
terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." For instance, as
the United States presses ahead with a missiledefence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of

it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it

to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited
deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might
be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the
missile attacks,

the "China threat"

argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the
most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie
United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated,

Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist
"other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the
other side." And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an

to call for a halt to the vicious

circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the
current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what
is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections
with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent
themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and
less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.
estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore,

The move towards an aggressive space posture is socially constructed your

impact calculus must unsettle the structure of power that informs discourses
of security.
Grondin, 06 (David Grondin Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of
Ottawa (as of July 2006) Paper presented at the ISA Convention, San Diego March 25, 2006
Panel Reading Outer Space I: The International Politics of Outer Space - Approaches and
Themes THE (POWER) POLITICS OF SPACE: THE US ASTROPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR)
Indeed, we

have no way of knowing how other state leaders and non-state agents will react to US
spatial policy and to a path of weaponization. The security dilemma or a new global arms race in
space remain social constructions and are not automatic responses to a course of action taken by
the US state. Will it be like Roger Handberg fears: that the [w]eaponization of space is the signal for the next arms race, one that may start slow
but inevitably will speed up as other states reject the US claim to permanent dominance? (Handberg 2004: 88) Indeed, Handberg makes lots of sense to
me when he asserts that a healthy skepticism must be exercised when drastic changes in existing policy positions are considered, especially policies
which have not yet failed. Too often, in American defense debates, technology trumps mere politics with often-unanticipated consequences. The security
dilemma is not just an obscure academic concept but one that reflects real possibilities in terms of outcomes. [] There is an irony in that the analyses
assume, especially since the advent of the George W. Bush administration, that such military space activities, including weaponization, will be approved.
Approval may come but resources may not, given the administrations penchant for tax cuts. Sustaining a level of resource commitment necessary to
maintain the force levels assumed here is questionable in the absence of an explicit and very visible threat (Handberg 2004: 88). Or will it rather be like
the space warriors expect, Dolman and Lambakis especially, that there is an opportunity to be grasped by the US that will make other actors of the global
arena accept an American dominance in space? In my mind, such view is to be resisted at all costs. In fact, one

must be aware that

behind all the rhetoric for space weaponization and the threat game, other power considerations
still pull much weight and the spectre of a Cold War military-industrial complex is still very
much alive. As Lambakis bluntly puts it: Although it still must guard against the transfer of critical military technologies, capitalism ought to be
set loose to advance the development of satellite technologies and services (including imagery services), which would allow US industry to play its
strength technological innovation and application which in turn would provide the United States significant technologies advantages in the years
ahead (Lambakis 2001: 281; original emphasis). Freedom of Space, Space control, and the Technological As space is conceived as a common
medium, the principle of the freedom of space lasts as long as there is no will to take a step further which is what space warriors recommend. As they
acknowledge, many reasons may motivate a state to develop capabilities to control, if not dominate or claim ownership over, space orbits (Lambakis
2001: 86; original emphasis). This line of argument is usually linked to technological capacities. By asserting that other countries operate in Space, that
conflicts are natural between humans which brings the obvious so why would it be different in Space technologies of power take the lead and one
is left with devising what space-control strategy will be best and what one wants to control, for how long, and for what purposes?/ (Lambakis 2001:
281). And in a context where one portrays the situation as one where US aerospace industry is held back by the rest of the world only for fear of potential
not guaranteed conflicts that will evolve into Space warfighting because of a renewed arms race (Lambakis 2001: 282), the claim to let technology drive
the policy and the political is not disinterested albeit ill-advised and definitely not a sure bet. For

space warriors such as Dolmnan

and Lambakis, space weaponization then appears not to be all related to the security issue but also
very much to the maintenance of a strong defense and aerospace industry. The technological takes
over as the political is eclipsed by the military professionals . In effect, for space warriors, because of national security,
if a determination is made that space weapons would improve national security, further analysis would be required to map out a path to take to introduce
these tools in the arsenal and military strategy and a time line from which to plan (Lambakis 2001: 282). Contrary to US astropolitical analysts ,

find myself at fault with the logic of national security and securitization of space that drives US
governmentality, especially with regard to Outer Space. I do not believe that arms control is given
a fair trial by its opponents or even by some of its main defenders in US astropolitical discourse .
For me, the security game is what seems so scary; and if we consider the one assumption of an astropolitical argument such as that of Lambakis that
because of the 9/11 context, one thing is certain we will not be able to bludgeon our enemies into cooperation. For those times, the United States needs
to have in place more assertive means and doctrines to counter hostiles activities in space (Lambakis 2001: 282; my emphasis). When

people
are certain and need enemies to develop one strategy, then maybe some questions have not been raised. There are
unknowns and we cannot be sure of how the events will unfold if the US goes further along a path to
space weaponization. In any case, it gets even more problematic when security is trumped with
technology for there is no way so it seems to argue against the desire of global (read absolute)
security, especially when it comes from the strongest of power. You are brought back to the
realities of the global homeland security state. One is doomed to either accept the logic of
terror that inexorably goes with the logic of global security or reject it. I choose the latter.
CONCLUSION: THE SECURITIZATION AND AMERICANIZATION OF SPACE This paper allowed me to address how the frontiers of the US are
redefined by the War on Terror as it relates to the US strategic thinking on Outer Space. What conditions of possibility does 9/11 bring for US
astropolitical discourse that were not already there? This inquiry leads me directly to reconsider the securitization and reterritorialization project of the
last frontier, that is the attempt to secure Outer Space as an American space. It

is important to rethink the push for space

weaponization and its politics in light of the context of the US Global War on Terror (GWOT), which produced a new security thinking
towards the homeland a homeland strategy of security, a military doctrine of pre- emption/prevention and a reterritorialization of American frontiers
and global power. Outer Space concerns, apparently, the outer frontiers of national security policy, where technology and grand strategy meet (Krepon
2003). Within

the context of the War on Terror, where US strategic discourse sees a global terrorist
threat as being ever possible, it seems that there can be no exception for Space. It is even done
preventively as a secured space while Others do not exist yet in Space (in fact, they do, with the International
Space Station; but thats another story). In this spatial inscription of securitization of the American identity in
Space, the frontiers of the homeland are made global and are secured through a representation of
dangers (with the exception of debris in Space which they do not categorize as dangers). This familiar approach to territory
and space is inscribed in the identity politics of the US, a moral practice based on spatial
exclusion of Others deemed threatening to secure the American Self (Campbell 1998 [1992]; Shapiro 1999). By
focusing on the Rumsfeld 2001 Space Commission for the Management of Space in the national security strategy, one sees the application of the same
reading that would later come with the War on Terror. To that effect, a terrorist group or rogue state might try to hinder US spatial assets or those of its
allies on which the US depends militarily and economically. In its 2004 National Military Stragegy, the US thus reaffirmed with force its will to constitute
a global information grid and achieve a full spectrum-dominance in military matters. The US therefore wants to prevent any threat in Outer Space and
protect its spatial activities and that of its allies. Informed by the events of 9/11, space warriors, such as Dolman or Lambakis, criticize opponents of a US
policy for space weaponization as being stuck in a Cold War mindset. They believe a strategy of pre-emption and a resolve not to wait for the next Pearl
Harbor, whether in space, on Earth or in the cyberspace is necessary and that the US must really be prepared to defend its (global) homeland: How else
can one explain [a] statement [such as] as long as we remain vulnerable and so accessible to our adversaries, their incentives to attack us in space are
likely to remain quite low? In the post-September 11 world, events have underscored that weakness entices those who would do us harms and
vulnerability provokes those who hate us. We need fresh thinking (Lambakis 2003: 118). Space was seen as a sanctuary during the Cold War. But
because of the context of the War on Terror, the US now seems to be ready to go against the second Article of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that
stipulates that Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, orby any other means, the treaty which set out the principle that Space is to be used for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind (Article 1). In effect, since 2001,
the US wished to be the one responsible for setting new rules in Outer Space and for creating the conditions of its military dominance of Space. For
instance, the merger of the US Space Command with the Strategic Command in January 2004 stems from this logic that wishes Space operations to be
integrated in all domains of US military power. Because the US still possesses control over much of the information gathering in Space, it is interested in
securitizing and Americanizing the last frontier, especially in the context of the War on Terror. As it stands, the US neoliberal geopolitics discourse of
the Bush Administration on Space power still leads to Space weaponization. US sovereignty is placed as higher than any other forms of rule and the US
prepares itself militarily, just in case Outer Space would turn into a battlefield. In Donald Rumsfelds words: Our goal is not to bring war into space, but
rather to defend against those who would (Rumsfeld, quoted in Waldrop 2005 [2002]: 39). This participates in the discourse of a global security state
that sees Outer Space as the most global of space. Insofar as the weaponization of space represents the cutting edge and highest ambitions of military
primacy, it also represents the height of this folly (Huntley 2005: 83). If

we consider that political rhetoric creates political

reality that may serve as bases for decisions, it appears fundamental to assess how the US wishes
to securitize Outer Space with its will to achieve full-spectrum

CASE

2AC Solar Flares Add-On

*China coop solves solar flares
Johnson-Freese 15 [Joan Johnson-Freese, 10/9/15,Found in Space: Cooperation,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-space-cooperation-a-welcome-dialoguebegins, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College]
Plans for this recent U.S. China Dialogue on Civil Space was first announced last June, consequent to the seventh round of the U.S.China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. As online space-policy analyst Marcia Smith stated regarding the Sept 28 meeting, details
are scant.[1] Mainstream media coverage has been virtually non-existent. Most likely, flying under the radar has been okay with the
U.S. State Department, which chaired the Beijing meeting along with the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA).
Otherwise, critics would have undoubtedly trotted out their litany of reasonsranging from human rights and freedom of religion to
concerns, some valid and some overblown, about technology transferwhy the United States should scrap one of its most valuable
policy tools, diplomacy, and not communicate with the Chinese regarding space. Thats the kind of convoluted reasoning that resulted
in a

legislative ban since 2011 on bilateral cooperation cum communication between NASA and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) with China. Careful to stay within Congressional guidelines, that legislation left
it to the State Department to chair the recent Beijing meeting. The increasing U.S. propensity,
especially in conjunction with political campaigning, to equate diplomacy with appeasement and negotiation
with weakness has not served the U.S. well in other parts of the world, and wont with China either. The Obama
Administration has apparently decided that with nothing to lose politically, it intends to make strategic and sometimes bold foreign
policy moves before leaving office, in spite of obstructionist roadblocks: normalizing relations with Cuba, negotiating a nuclear treaty
with Iran, and talking with the Chinese about space among them. It is ironic that talking has become a bold policy move. According
to the DOS media note on the meeting, [2] the broad intent of the meeting was greater transparency, initially including an exchange of
information on each others space policies. The importance of that simple objective cannot be overstated. The

Chinese - Asian cultural propensity toward opaqueness has resulted in the U.S. assessing all things space-related
done by China from a worst-case scenario perspective. The American cultural attribute of everybody - regardless
of standing or knowledge having an opinion on every subject can result in the Chinese believing that anything said in the New York
Times or on Fox News is official U.S. policy. Clarity can serve both parties well. Apparently also, according to the media note,

space debris and satellite collision avoidance were discussed, in acknowledgement that those issues cannot be
handled solely on a national basis and are critical to maintaining the sustainability of the space
environment. Since the United States has more assets in space and is more dependent on those space assets in both civil and
military operations than any other country, it behooves the U.S. to pursue all potentially valuable avenues
available to protect the space environment. It is in U.S. interests. Given the increasing number of
Chinese assets in space, sustainability of the space environment is in Chinese interests as well.
Countries cooperate where both have a vested interest. Other topics that were discussed in
conjunction with potential cooperation were civil Earth-observation activities, space sciences, space
weather and the civil Global Navigation Satellite System. Beyond the general benefits that flow
to the U.S. from cooperation including learning Chinese standard operating procedures in
decision making and operations, establishing an internal Chinese constituency to argue against
aggressive Chinese actions that threaten cooperative programs by creating a vested interest in
continuance, and getting a closer look at Chinese capabilities cooperation in each of these areas
offers the U.S. more in benefits than associated risks. Working together on civilian-Earth observation activities
would likely involve sharing data on complex Earth-system processes relevant to everyone on the planet. There are
frequently data gaps in the models designed to address these complex processes, gaps that can be closed by sharing data. Better
models would

yield positive benefits to both countries in fields like disaster management,

environmental studies, coastal and marine planning, and sustainable land use. Everybody wins.
Space-science cooperation has long been discussed as potentially valuable and viable for two reasons. First, it can be an
area of cooperation where technology-transfer concerns can be minimized. Although it would likely begin
only with data exchanges, ideally data exchanges could lead to more extensive projects so that Americans
can learn more about Chinese decision making and foster positive constituencies within Chin a.
Further, space scientists in both countries are notoriously like stepchildren when it comes to funding allocations. Working

cooperatively could enable scientists in both countries to do more with their limited funds.
One area of space science with practical application is space weather being able to
anticipate solar flares and geomagnetic storms that are potentially damaging to satellites in
orbit and negatively affecting ground facilities and operations, and thereby be able to
protect against those effects. Space weather predictions are based on fundamental
scientific research on solar-terrestrial physics. Finally, discussions on civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSS) focus on navigation satellite systems with global coverage, including the U.S. Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), the
Russian GLONASS system, and the expanding Chinese BeiDou system. It is in U.S. interests to assure that China integrates BeiDou
with other systems rather than having BeiDou incompatible with other systems. If China were to integrate only BeiDou into the
myriad of commercial products that utilize GNSS and that China produces, thereby requiring a different receiver than currently used
by GPS, that would wield significant negative economic impacts on the U.S. Additionally, non-integration could also create a more
chaotic environment for GNSS use. Therefore, the United States is not merely doing China a favor by participating in these talks or
by considering expanded areas of space cooperation, as is sometimes characterized. It is the United States acting in its own best
interest. While ideally the U.S. could tie space cooperation to other contentious issues between the U.S. and China cyber attacks, for
example that is unlikely to happen. Expecting and waiting for that unlikely link to be made allows critical space issues to go
unaddressed. There are some fundamental questions about the U.S.-China relationship that might prove useful in guiding future
policy. Does it support or go against U.S. interests to keep its friends close and enemies closer? If the answer to that is yes, then
either way, the U.S. should pursue expanded opportunities to work with China in space. Is in the best interests of the United States to
have China stable, or imploding? If

the answer is stable, then we inherently must learn to work with China
in areas of mutual interest. Is the sustainability of the space environment in the interests of the
United States? If it is, there is no choice but to work with China on a variety of space issues. A
second meeting is scheduled for 2016 in Washington, D.C. Hopefully real progress will be made in advancing cooperation in at least
one of the areas initially broached at the recent September meeting. Space

cooperation between the U.S. and the

Soviet Union was judiciously used as a mechanism to build broader areas of trust during the Cold
War, and Post-Cold War years. The United States knows how to successfully conduct space
diplomacy. It is an aberration that today it has to be done in secret so as not to draw the sensationalist ire of politicians and
pundits. Fostering cooperation is an integral part of the Space Act that created NASA. Ironically, perhaps through the continued,
unintended help of Hollywood the public will recognize the wisdom of allowing NASA, OSTP and the State Department to do their
jobs, and begin to take an active role in demanding inclusive space cooperation.

Solar storms are inevitable and cause global meltdowns need better
forecasting to adapt
Stone 15 [Maddie Stone, 10/30/15, The US is Finally Heeding Warnings About a Monster Solar
Storm, Gizmodo, http://gizmodo.com/the-us-is-finally-heeding-warnings-about-a-monster-sola1739620903]
Were all too familiar with the dangers posed by earthquakes, droughts, and hurricanes. But theres another natural phenomena that
represents a growing threat to our tech-driven society, and thats space weather. And at long last, the US government seems to be
taking the issue seriously. Space weather scientists at the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration and NASA have warned for
years that if

a massive solar storm were to strike the Earth, the effects could be catastrophic. Think
worldwide power and telecommunications outages, lasting weeks to months. Everything that
relies on electricity, from our computers to our refrigerators to our water supply, could break down. Frankly, space
weather consultant John Kappenman told Gizmodo last month, this could be one of the most severe natural
disasters that the country, and major portions of the world, could face. Apocalypse preppers have been
stocking their EMP bunkers for years, but yesterday, the White House released the very first National Space Weather Strategy and
Action Plan. These two documents outline goals and strategies for improved space weather modeling, forecasting, and response
coordination. Ultimately, they represent a roadmap toward a future where the unfortunate arrival of a giant solar storm doesnt spell
the end of modern society. Whats Space Weather and Why Do We Care? Space weather is a fairly broad term encompassing a
bunch of stuff the Sun hurls our way, including high-energy x-rays, magnetized plasma, and charged particles. All of these can interact
with Earths magnetic field, causing geomagnetic disturbances that light up the northern and southern skies with dazzling auroras.
Most of the time, these cosmic light shows are beautiful and harmless. Sometimes, however, things can get nasty, especially when

the Sun releases a large burst of plasma known as a coronal mass ejection (CME). Large CMEs are
unusual, and its even more unusual for our planet to line up directly in their path. But when that happens, CMEs cause
geomagnetic storms that generate tremendous electric currents in the upper atmosphere.
Some of this current makes its way into the ground, where its channeled by any and all

conductive materials, including certain rocks, pipes, and electric cables. Currents from
large geomagnetic storms can ultimately feed into our grids, melting transformers at the
heart of power distribution centers. Because our power supply has become more aggregated
and interconnected over the last decades, the effects of an outage at one distribution center could
spread far and wide, impacting millions of people. In the case of electric power grids, both the manner in which
systems are operated and the accumulated design decisions engineered into present-day networks around the world have tended to
significantly enhance geomagnetic storm impacts, writes Kappenman in a report on the dangers of space weather. To illustrate his
point, Kappenman cites a geomagnetic storm that occurred across Earths northern hemisphere in March of 1989: This

[storm]
started a chain of power system disturbance events that only 92 seconds later resulted in a complete
collapse to the entire power grid in Quebec. The rapid manifestation of the storm and impacts to
the Quebec power grid allowed no time to even assess what was happening to the power system,
let alone provide any meaningful human intervention. Over the course of the next 24 hours, additional large
disturbances propagated across the continent, the only difference being that they extended much further south and came, at times,
arguably close to toppling power systems from the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions of the U.S. to the Midwest. Again,
geomagnetic storms of this magnitude are rare, but itd

be unwise to assume we wont see another in the years

to come. In fact, a CME roughly four times larger than the one that caused the 1989 Quebec outages
narrowly missed us in 2012. If it had hit, we would still be picking up the pieces, physicist
Daniel Baker of the University of Colorado told NASA two years later. A report by the National
Academies estimated that the cost of such an event could exceed 2 trillion dollarsthe economic
equivalent of 20 Hurricane Katrinas. Clearly, its high time we to start thinking about how to prepare for the possibility
of a monster solar storm. The National Space Weather Action Plan released yesterday describes how the US government will
coordinate efforts on space weather forecasting, infrastructure preparation and education. Here are some highlights. Establishing the
Godzilla Storm: On the science front, a key component of the White Houses new plan is figuring out just how big these suckers can
get. To this day, the largest solar storm recorded on Earth was the 1859 Carrington Event, a series of powerful CMEs that ignited the
northern lights as far south as Cuba, causing global telegraph outages. The Carrington Event has always been our benchmark for really
big storms, but in

recent years, observations of Sun-like stars beyond our solar system have shown
that superflares1,000 times larger than the Carrington Eventcan and do occur. In 2012, a
study published in Nature estimated that such a flare could strike the Earth every 800 to 5,000
years. Thats a pretty wide margin of uncertainty for such a potentially devastating event. Clearly,
we need to get a better handle on the upper size limit of our own Suns eruptions and the actual
risk superflares pose. Monitoring Vulnerability on the Ground: While we know that large pulses of electric current pose a
danger to power grids, experts dont agree on just how vulnerable our infrastructure is. The White House Action Plan calls for a
nationwide assessment of vulnerability that includes factors like the age and design of grid infrastructure and the underlying geology.
The DOE has also been tasked with developing a grid monitoring system that would display the status of power generation,
transmission, and distribution systems during geomagnetic storms. Real-time

monitoring tools like this could be used

by grid operators who need to make fast decisions about when to shut things off. Improved
Forecasting: A big aspect of our vulnerability to space weather is the fact that we have almost no lead-time before a large storm
strikes. If a CME is heading straight for us, our first notice comes from the space weather monitoring satellites situated at the L1
Lagrange point a million miles in front of Earth. At

best, these satellites give us about an hours notice. Theres a

lot of room to improve our forecasting, and it starts with a better understanding of when and how
large solar flares and CMEs occur. The White House Action Plan calls for more research on solar dynamics. Just as we
can use weather models to predict the onset of tropical storms, with better solar models we might be able to forecast days, or even
weeks in advance, when the Suns gearing up to punt a a giant blob of plasma our way. Cooperation: Perhaps

the most
dangerous aspect of a large geomagnetic storm is that its effects could be felt globally. This
makes space weather unique among all natural disasters humans face, and it underscores the need
for international coordination. To that end, the White House Action Plan outlines a number of goals and targets, including
1) an international meeting on the social and economic impacts of a large solar event, 2) multi-national acknowledgement of space
weather as a global challenge, 3) facilitating open-access to space weather data across agencies and countries, 4) developing
international standards for solar storm measurements and scales, and 5) developing a set of mutual-aid arrangements to facilitate
response efforts worldwide.

2AC Solar Flares Impact Extensions

Solar flares cause global meltdowns and food shortages
IBT 11 [International Business Times, Solar Flare Could Unleash Nuclear Holocaust Across
Planet Earth, Forcing Hundreds of Nuclear Power Plants Into Total Meltdowns,
http://www.naturalnews.com/033564_solar_flares_nuclear_power_plants.html#]

Forget about the 2012 Mayan calendar, comet Elenin or the Rapture. The real threat to human civilization is far more mundane, and
it's right in front of our noses. If Fukushima has taught us anything, it's that just one runaway meltdown of fissionable nuclear material
can have wide-ranging and potentially devastating consequences for life on Earth. To date, Fukushima has already released 168 times
the total radiation released from the Hiroshima nuclear bomb detonated in 1945, and the Fukushima catastrophe is now undeniably the
worst nuclear disaster in the history of human civilization. But what if human civilization faced a far greater threat than a single
tsunami destroying a nuclear power facility? What if a

global tidal wave could destroy the power generating

capacities of all the world's power plants, all at once ? Such a scenario is not merely possible, but
factually inevitable. And the global tidal wave threatening all the nuclear power plants of the
world isn't made of water but solar emissions. The sun, you see, is acting up again. NASA recently
warned that solar activity is surging, with a peak expected to happen in 2013 that could generate enormous radiation
levels that sweep across planet Earth. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has
even issued an urgent warning about solar flares due to strike in 2012 and 2013. IBtimes wrote, "With solar activity
expected to peak around 2013, the Sun is entering a particularly active time and big flares like the recent one will likely be common
during the next few years. ...A major flare in the mid-19th century blocked the nascent telegraph system, and some scientists believe
that another such event is now overdue." (http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/194166/20110...) The story goes on to explain: "Several
federal government studies suggest that this extreme

solar activity and emissions may result in complete

blackouts for years in some areas of the nation. Moreover, there may also be disruption of power
supply for years, or even decades, as geomagnetic currents attracted by the storm could debilitate
the transformers." Why does all this matter? To understand that, you have to understand how nuclear power plants function.
Or, put another way, how is nuclear material prevented from "going nuclear" every single day across our planet? Every nuclear power
plant operates in a near-meltdown state All nuclear power plants are operated in a near-meltdown status.
They operate at very high heat, relying on nuclear fission to boil water that produces steam to drive the turbines that generate
electricity. Critically, the nuclear

fuel is prevented from melting down through the steady circulation of

coolants which are pushed through the cooling system using very high powered electric pumps. If
you stop the electric pumps, the coolant stops flowing and the fuel rods go critical (and then melt
down). This is what happened in Fukushima, where the melted fuel rods dropped through the concrete floor of the
containment vessels, unleashing enormous quantities of ionizing radiation into the surrounding environment. The full extent of the
Fukushima contamination is not even known yet, as the facility is still emitting radiation. It's crucial to understand that nuclear

coolant pumps are usually driven by power from the electrical grid. They are not normally driven
by power generated locally from the nuclear power plant itself. Instead, they're connected to the grid. In other
words, even though nuclear power plants are generating megawatts of electricity for the grid, they
are also dependant on the grid to run their own coolant pumps. If the grid goes down, the coolant
pumps go down, too, which is why they are quickly switched to emergency backup power -either generators or batteries. As we learned with Fukushima, the on-site batteries can only drive
the coolant pumps for around eight hours. After that, the nuclear facility is dependent on diesel
generators (or sometimes propane) to run the pumps that circulate the coolant which prevents the whole
site from going Chernobyl. And yet, critically, this depends on something rather obvious: The delivery of diesel fuel
to the site. If diesel cannot be delivered, the generators can't be fired up and the coolant can't be
circulated. When you grasp the importance of this supply line dependency, you will instantly
understand why a single solar flare could unleash a nuclear holocaust across the planet. When the
generators fail and the coolant pumps stop pumping, nuclear fuel rods begin to melt through their containment rods, unleashing
ungodly amounts of life-destroying radiation directly into the atmosphere. This is precisely why Japanese engineers worked so hard to
reconnect the local power grid to the Fukushima facility after the tidal wave -- they needed to bring power back to the generators to

run the pumps that circulate the coolant. This effort failed, of course, which is why Fukushima became such a nuclear disaster and
released countless becquerels of radiation into the environment (with no end in sight). And yet, despite the destruction we've already
seen with Fukushima, U.S. nuclear power plants are nowhere near being prepared to handle sustained power grid failures. As IBtimes
reports: "Last month, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said U.S. plants affected by a blackout should be able to cope without
electricity for at least eight hours and should have procedures to keep the reactor and spent-fuel pool cool for 72 hours. Nuclear plants
depend on standby batteries and backup diesel generators. Most standby power systems would continue to function after a severe solar
storm, but

supplying the standby power systems with adequate fuel, when the main power grids are
offline for years, could become a very critical problem. If the spent fuel rod pools at the country's
104 nuclear power plants lose their connection to the power grid, the current regulations aren't
sufficient to guarantee those pools won't boil over -- exposing the hot, zirconium-clad rods and
sparking fires that would release deadly radiation." (http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/194166/20110...) Now, what
does all this have to do with solar flares? How the end of modern civilization will most likely occur As any sufficiently informed
scientist will readily admit, solar

flares have the potential to blow out the transformers throughout the
national power grid. That's because solar flares induce geomagnetic currents (powerful
electromagnetic impulses) which overload the transformers and cause them to explode . You've
probably witnessed this yourself during a lightning storm when lightning unleashes a powerful electromagnetic pulse that causes a
local transformer to explode. Solar flares do the same thing on a much larger scale. A global scale, in fact. The upshot of this situation
is that suddenly

and without warning, the power grid infrastructure across nearly the entire planet
could be destroyed. As a bonus, nearly all satellites will be fried, too, leaving GPS inoperable and causing millions
of clueless drivers to become forever lost in their own neighborhoods because they never paid attention to the streets and always relied
on a GPS voice to tell them, "In fifty feet, turn right." Communications satellites will be obliterated, too. This, of course, will halt
nearly all news propaganda distribution across the planet, causing tens of thousands of people to instantly die out of the sheer fear of
suddenly having to think for themselves. As another bonus, nearly all mobile phone service will be disrupted, too, meaning all the
teenage text junkies of the world will, for the first time in their lives, be forced to lay down their iPhones and interact with real people
in the real world. But the real kicker in all this is that the power grid will be destroyed nearly everywhere. What
happens when there's no electricity? Imagine a world without electricity. Even for just a week. Imagine New York City with no
electricity, or Los Angeles, or Sao Paulo. Within 72 hours, most

cities around the world will devolve into total

chaos, complete with looting, violent crime, and runaway fires. But that's not even the bad news. Even if all
the major cities of the world burned to the ground for some other reason, humanity could still recover because it has the farmlands: the
soils, the seeds, and the potential to recover, right? And yet the real crisis here stems from the realization that once

there is no
power grid, all the nuclear power plants of the world suddenly go into "emergency mode" and are
forced to rely on their on-site emergency power backups to circulate coolants and prevent nuclear
meltdowns from occurring. And yet, as we've already established, these facilities typically have
only a few hours of battery power available, followed by perhaps a few days worth of diesel fuel
to run their generators (or propane, in some cases). Did I also mention that half the people who work at nuclear power
facilities have no idea what they're doing in the first place? Most of the veterans who really know the facilities inside and out have
been forced into retirement due to reaching their lifetime limits of on-the-job radiation exposure, so most of the workers at nuclear
facilities right now are newbies who really have no clue what they're doing. There are 440 nuclear power plants operating across 30
countries around the world today. There are an additional 250 so-called "research reactors" in existence, making a total of roughly 700
nuclear reactors to be dealt with (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.html). Now imagine the scenario: You've got a massive
solar flare that knocks out the world power grid and destroys the majority of the power grid transformers, thrusting the world into
darkness. Cities collapse into chaos and rioting, martial law is quickly declared (but it hardly matters), and every nation in the world is
on full emergency. But that doesn't solve the really big problem, which is that you've got 700 nuclear reactors that can't feed power
into the grid (because all the transformers are blown up) and yet simultaneously have to be fed a steady stream of emergency fuels to
run the generators the keep the coolant pumps functioning. How long does the coolant need to circulate in these facilities to cool
the nuclear fuel? Months. This is also the lesson of Fukushima: You can't cool nuclear fuel in mere hours or days. It takes months to
bring these nuclear facilities to a state of cold shutdown. And that means in order to avoid a multitude of Fukushima-style meltdowns
from occurring around the world, you need to truck diesel fuel, generator parts and nuclear plant workers to every nuclear facility on
the planet, ON TIME, every time, without fail, for months on end. Now remember, this must

be done in the middle of the

total chaos breakdown of modern civilization, where there is no power, where law enforcement
and emergency services are totally overrun, where people are starving because food deliveries
have been disrupted, and when looting and violent crime runs rampant in the streets of every
major city in the world. Somehow, despite all this, you have to run these diesel fuel caravans to
the nuclear power plants and keep the pumps running. Except there's a problem in all this, even if you assume
you can somehow work a logistical miracle and actually deliver the diesel fuel to the backup generators on time (which you probably

can't). The

problem is this: Where do you get diesel fuel? Why refineries will be shut down, too
refineries run on electricity. Without the
power grid, the refineries don't produce a drop of diesel. With no diesel, there are no generators
keeping the coolant running in the nuclear power facilities. But wait, you say: Maybe we could just acquire
From petroleum refineries. Most people don't realize it, but petroleum

diesel from all the gas stations in the world. Pump it out of the ground, load it into trucks and use that to power the generators, right?
Except there are other problems here: How

do you pump all that fuel without electricity? How do you acquire
all the tires and spare parts needed to keep trucks running if there's no electricity to keep the
supply businesses running? How do you maintain a truck delivery infrastructure when the
electrical infrastructure is totally wiped out? Some countries might be able to pull it off with some degree of success.
With military escorts and the total government control over all fuel supplies, a few nations will be able to keep a few nuclear power
facilities from melting down. But here's the real issue: There are 700 nuclear power facilities in the world, remember? Let's suppose
that in the aftermath of a massive solar flare, the nations of the world are somehow able to control half of those facilities and nurse
them into cold shutdown status. That still leaves roughly 350 nuclear facilities at risk. Now let's suppose half of those are somehow
luckily offline and not even functioning when the solar flare hits, so they need no special attention. This is a very optimistic
assumption, but that still leaves 175 nuclear power plants where all attempts fail. Let's be outrageously optimistic and suppose that a
third of those somehow don't go into a total meltdown by some miracle of God, or some bizarre twist in the laws of physics. So we're
still left with 115 nuclear power plants that "go Chernobyl." Fukushima was one power plant.

Imagine the devastation of

100+ nuclear power plants, all going into meltdown all at once across the planet . It's not the loss of
electricity that's the real problem; it's the global tidal wave of invisible radiation that blankets the planet, permeates the topsoil,
irradiates everything that breathes and delivers the final crushing blow to human civilization as we know it today. Because if you
have 100 simultaneous global nuclear meltdowns, the

tidal wave of radiation will make farming nearly

impossible for years. That means no food production for several years in a row. And that, in turn, means a near-total collapse
of the human population on our planet. How many people can survive an entire year with no food from the farms? Not one in a
hundred people. Even beyond that, how many people can essentially live underground and be safe enough from the radiation that they
can have viable children and repopulate the planet? It's a very, very small fraction of the total population. Solar flares far more likely
to hit nuclear power plants than tidal waves or earthquakes What's the chance of all this actually happening? A report by the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory said that "...over

the standard 40-year license term of nuclear power plants, solar

flare activity enables a 33 percent chance of long-term power loss, a risk that significantly
outweighs that of major earthquakes and tsunamis." (http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/194166/20110...)

Solar storms cause disease spread and starvation

White 15 [Bill White, 11/5/15 Are We Prepared To Survive Solar Storms?, Survivopedia,
http://www.survivopedia.com/are-we-prepared-to-survive-solar-storms/]
Since we are totally unprepared for such an event, the effects of a

severe solar storm could be as bad as an EMP attack.

According to the report of the EMP commission, that would have the effect of killing off 90% of our population in
the first year, either due to illness or due to starvation. Without the full infrastructure in place,
many thousands of people wont receive critical medicines that they need. While some will be able to
survive this, many wont. Even those that can survive without those medications will have severe effects, some of which will be
debilitating. Then theres the food issue. The

American agricultural industry is the most productive in the

whole world. But it is dependent upon the transportation industry to move product from the farm to the
processing plant and from the processing plant to distributors, ultimately bringing it to the retail outlets where consumers buy it.

Without electricity to pump fuel out of underground tanks or to refine petroleum into fuel, those
trucks will come to a standstill. Farmers wont be able to get their product to market and much of what they produce will
be wasted.

1AR Solar Flares AT: Low Probability

Solar flares are real life, backed by empirics and status quo events at least a
12% probability a large one will hit in the next 10 years
Anthony 14 [Sebastian Anthony, 7/24/14, The solar storm of 2012 that almost sent us back to
a post-apocalyptic Stone Age,Senior editor at Cond Nast UK in London, and the editor of Ars
Technica UK, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/186805-the-solar-storm-of-2012-that-almostsent-us-back-to-a-post-apocalyptic-stone-age]
While you didnt see it, feel it, or even read about it in the newspapers, Earth

was almost knocked back to the Stone

Age on July 23, 2012. It wasnt some crazed dictator with his finger on the thermonuclear button or a giant asteroid that
came close to wiping out civilization as we know it, though no, what nearly ended us was a massive solar storm. Almost
two years ago to the day, our most bounteous and fantastical celestial body the Sun kicked out one of the largest
solar flares and coronal mass ejections ever recorded. And it missed Earth by a whisker. If it had
hit, we would still be picking up the pieces, says Daniel Baker, who led the research into the
massive solar storm. A solar storm is a generic term for increased activity in the Sun. In this case, the solar storm of July 2012
consisted of a massive solar flare, followed by a colossal coronal mass ejection (CME). A solar flare is initiated by the sudden release
of energy stored in the Suns corona, causing the Suns plasma to heat up to tens of millions of degrees, accelerating and kicking out
all sorts of radiation, and often creating a solar prominence or filament (eruption). In a large solar storm, the same energy from the
corona can also cause a coronal mass ejection a much slower-moving billion-ton cloud of plasma (electrons and protons). Suffice
it to say, but its bad news if the energy and plasma from a big solar flare or CME hits the Earth. Much like a man-made
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapon, the

solar energetic particles strike the Earth with such force that it
ionizes the atmosphere, creating a vast cloud of energetic electrons that bounce around inside the
atmosphere destroying electronics and fusing conductive wires everywhere. It would probably take
out a few satellites in Earth orbit, too. Prior to the July 2012 storm, the largest recorded storm was the Carrington
Event of 1859. A massive solar flare and CME struck Earth, destroying much of the Victorian telegraph
network in Europe and North America. Other solar storms have hit Earth since then, but
fortunately weve only been hit by one large storm during modern times, which caused the 1989
Quebec blackout. The July 2012 storm was roughly twice as large as the event that caused the Quebec blackout but
fortunately, thanks to the sheer expanse of space and the Earths relatively large orbital distance, we dodged the bullet. In my view
the July 2012 storm was in all respects at least as strong as the 1859 Carrington event, says Daniel Baker of the University of
Colorado. The only difference is, it missed. [Read: Finally confirmed: An asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs.] Rather luckily for
science, though, the July 2012 solar flare and CME did hit NASAs STEREO A satellite square on the nose. STEREO A and B are
solar observation satellites that have been orbiting the Sun since 2006, providing us with all sorts of delicious imagery and science.
The video above uses footage captured by the two STEREO satellites. The image at the top of the story, of a solar flare with the Earth
photoshopped in for scale, was captured by NASAs newer Solar Dynamics Observatory. Using

data from these satellites,

and from historical solar storms, if the solar storm had hit Earth back in 2012, the total economic
impact is estimated to be around $2 trillion, or 20 times the cost of Hurricane Katrina. Its not just about money,
though: As I covered in our feature story The Machine Stops, it would take time to fix up the worlds power grid.
You cant just magically replace dozens of giant transformers and substations. There are only so
many diesel generators to fill the gap. If a giant solar storm hit the Earth, large parts of society
could be without power for months or years. Pete Riley, a physicist who looked at extreme space
weather events for the last 50 years, says theres a 12% chance that a Carrington-level storm will
hit Earth in the next 10 years.

1AR Solar Flares AT: Meltdowns Good

All of their studies are flawed err on the side of radiation bad
Gorski 11 [David H. Gorski, 3/25/11, Is Radiation Good For You? Ann Coulter Got It Wrong,
Better Health, M.D. and Ph.D., American surgical oncologist, Professor of surgery at Wayne State
University School of Medicine, and a surgical oncologist at the Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer
Institute, http://getbetterhealth.com/is-radiation-good-for-you-ann-coulter-got-itwrong/2011.03.25]
Actually, the

scientific assessment of what levels of exposure to ionizing radiation are dangerous is ,

as you might imagine, a wee bit more complicated than my little sarcastic rejoinder makes it, but youd never know that from Ann
Coulters article and her interview with Bill OReilly. The reason for my sarcastic characterization of Coulters scientific nonsense is
because her article uses many of the same tactics as any denialist. Chief among these is that Coulter takes the germ of a scientific
controversy and then uses it to try to imply that the scientific consensus is fatally flawed. In this case, the scientific controversy is over
how dangerous low level exposure to radiation is used to imply that the radiation from a nuclear disaster is not potentially harmful. All
you former residents of Chernobyl, take note! Its fine to move back to your homes that you were forced to abandon 25 years ago!
Here is what Coulter claims in her article: With the terrible earthquake and resulting tsunami that have devastated Japan, the only
good news is that anyone exposed to excess radiation from the nuclear power plants is now probably much less likely to get cancer.
This only seems counterintuitive because of media hysteria for the past 20 years trying to convince Americans that radiation at any
dose is bad. There is, however, burgeoning evidence that excess radiation operates as a sort of cancer vaccine. As The New York
Times science section reported in 2001, an

increasing number of scientists believe that at some level much

is good for you. They theorize, the Times said,
that these doses protect against cancer by activating cells natural defense mechanisms. What
Coulter is referring to is the phenomenon of radiation hormesis. This is nothing more than a biphasic dose-response
higher than the minimums set by the U.S. government radiation

curve to radiation in which the curve initially goes down with increasing dose (less risk of disease with increasing radiation exposure)
and then curves upward and at some point crosses a threshold where radiation exposure is no longer beneficial but harmful with
further dose increases. Basically, its a scientific model wherein low level exposure to radiation is not only not harmful but in fact
beneficial. The reason for this effect, if it exists in humans, is hypothesized to be that low level radiation activates DNA damage repair
and other protective mechanisms that are not activated in the absence of radiation; moreover, it is further hypothesized that these
mechanisms are activated more than they need to be, so that low level radiation is actually protective against radiation-induced
diseases such as cancer. The radiation hormesis model is markedly different from the currently prevailing model that is used for
regulatory purposes by most governments, the linear no-threshold (LNT) model, which states that there is no such thing as a safe
dose of radiation and that radiation dammage accumulates in a linear fashion with dose. For completeness sake, I will note that there is
also at least one other model for the biological effects of radiation, specifically a model in which there is a threshold dose under which
radiation is not harmful. In practice, distinguishing between a threshold model and a hormesis model can be very difficult. In order to
give you an idea of what hormesis would look like in a radiation dose-response curve, I stole this graph from Wikipedia. Actually, I
didnt steal it; its public domain because its a product of a U.S. government agency. However, it illustrates the concept of hormesis
quite well: Curve A demonstrates supralinearity, in which toxic effects are actually more intense per unit of radiation at lower doses;
there is no evidence that this is indeed the case. Curve B is linear, and Curve C is linear-quadratic, in which low doses of radiation are
less harmful per unit of radiation than higher doses. Curve D represents hormesis, where low doses of radiation are actually protective
up to a certain threshold, where the curve shifts from a protective effect to a harmful effect with increasing radiation. The main
contenders for the model that best describes radiation effects are either curve B, C, or D. The key aspect of Coulters article that
makes it so irresponsible is what she leaves out. What she neglects to mention is that, even if hormesis is an accurate model for
radiation effects in humans, it only applies for very low dose exposures. (More on how low in the next section.) True, Coulter does at
one point concede that it is hardly a settled scientific fact that excess radiation is a health benefit, throughout the rest of her article
she presents the idea of hormesis as though it wereyou guessed it!a settled scientific fact. Indeed, Coulters earlier assertion that
excess radiation acts as sort of a cancer vaccine is the sheerest exaggeration, even if hormesis is an accurate model of radiation
exposure. Aside from this major exaggeration, how do Coulters assertions, which appear to be based largely on studies cited in a
single NYT article that is nearly a decade old, stack up against science? Not very well. Surprise! Surprise! As is the case with many
denialists, Coulter takes a germ of actual science and then twists and exaggerates it beyond all recognition in order to support a
preconceived notion, namely that those pointy-headed (and, of course, liberal) environmentalists are hiding the evidence that radiation
at low doses is good for you. To accomplish this, Coulter cherry picks studies, failing to put them into their proper context with
existing research, all for the purpose of advancing her ideological viewpoint. Radiation hormesis: Ann Coulters claims versus
reality Before I discuss what the data regarding radiation hormesis actually show, its essential to discuss briefly why it is that the
LNT model predominates when it comes to policy-making and setting limits on what is considered safe radiation exposure. The
reason is not that biased scientists are hiding the evidence that radiation is good for you. Rather, it boils down to a few reasons. The
first is probably that an LNT model is the simplest, most conservative model that can be fit to currently existing evidence. The
problem with the LNT model is the same as the problem with the hormesis model. While

at higher radiation doses,

effects due to radiation are, like effects due to pretty much any other high-level environmental

exposure, much more robust and reproducible, at lower radiation doses, the effects are weaker,
and the scatter in the data is much greater. In other words, at low doses the signal-to-noise ratio is
much lower due to a lot more noise and a lot less signal in the data. Moreover, the data are
more difficult to collect, and variability from system to system, organism to organism, and cancer
to cancer is likely to be much greater. As imperfect as it is, the LNT model is a reasonable
approximation for purposes of policy-making because it is conservative and safe. Admittedly, there are
problems applying such a model when the doses get really low, as in lower than the normal background radiation that we all live in,
but its a useful approximation. When it is very hard to distinguish between an LNT model and a hormesis model at very low radiation
exposures, until better data can be gathered that clearly demonstrate the superiority of one model over another, the responsible and
safe model to choose is the most conservative one that fits reasonably well .

Basing public policy on a model that, if

incorrect, has the potential to result in considerable harm in the form of increased radiationinduced disease prevalence is not wise policy at all , at least when the alternate model is not demonstrably wrong.
As far as Coulters reliance on an old NYT article, I thought Id take a look at the article itself. As an aside, I cant help but note that I
really hate it when the online version of an article doesnt include links to cited articles, and Coulter is no different in this regard.
However, I do believe I managed to find this 2001 NYT article anyway from November 27, 2001, entitled For Radiation, How Much
Is Too Much? Its by Gina Kolata and discusses the controversy that had begun to bubble up about what doses of ionizing radiation
might be considered safe. If you read it, youll see that its much more balanced than how it is portrayed by Coulter. For example, here
is what Coulter writes about two studies cited by Kolata: Among the studies mentioned by the Times was one in Canada finding that
tuberculosis patients subjected to multiple chest X-rays had much lower rates of breast cancer than the general population. Here is
what Kolata actually wrote about these studies: Now, some scientists even say low radiation doses may be beneficial. They theorize
that these doses protect against cancer by activating cells natural defense mechanisms. As evidence ,

they cite studies, like

one in Canada of tuberculosis patients who had multiple chest X-rays and one of nuclear workers
in the United States. The tuberculosis patients, some analyses said, had fewer cases of breast cancer than would be expected
and the nuclear workers had a lower mortality rate than would be expected. Dr. Boice said these studies were flawed by
statistical pitfalls, and when a committee of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurement evaluated this and other studies on beneficial effects, it was not convinced. The group,
headed by Dr. Upton of New Jersey, wrote that the data do not exclude the hypothesis. But, it added, the prevailing evidence has
generally been interpreted as insufficient to support this view. Notice how the finding in some analyses that there were fewer cases
of breast cancer than might be expected has magically morphed into tuberculosis patients subjected to multiple chest X-rays had
much lower rates of breast cancer than the general population in Coulters words. Also note that this appears to be the NCRPM report
that analyzed the data. Unfortunately, it would have cost me $40 to download the PDF; so I didnt. But what about these studies?

The first study to which Coulter refers appears to be a study from Canada that was reported in the New
England Journal of Medicine in 1989. This study examined the mortality from breast cancer in a cohort of 31,710 women who had
been treated for tuberculosis at Canadian sanatoriums between 1930 and 1952. A significant proportion (26.4%) of these women had
received radiation doses to the breast of 10 cGy or more from repeated fluoroscopic examinations during therapeutic pneumothoraxes.
It should be noted that these sorts of doses of radiation are far in excess of anything likely to be received using modern radiological
equipment, in particular given that we no longer perform fluoroscopy and therapeutic pneumothorax to treat tuberculosis.
Interestingly, this is how the abstract summarizes the results of this study: Women exposed to 10 cGy of
radiation had a relative risk of death from breast cancer of 1.36, as compared with those exposed to less than 10 cGy (95 percent
confidence interval, 1.11 to 1.67; P = 0.001). The data were most consistent with a linear doseresponse relation. The risk was greatest
among women who had been exposed to radiation when they were between 10 and 14 years of age; they had a relative risk of 4.5 per
gray, and an additive risk of 6.1 per 104 person-years per gray. With increasing age at first exposure, there was substantially less
excess risk, and the radiation effect appeared to peak approximately 25 to 34 years after the first exposure. Our

additive model
for lifetime risk predicts that exposure to 1 cGy at the age of 40 increases the number of deaths
from breast cancer by 42 per million women. Oops! Maybe I found the wrong study! On the other hand, this is a
Canadian study that looked at women with tuberculosis who received numerous chest X-rays (fluoroscopy, actually), and I cant find
another one like it. I also couldnt find other publications with other analyses. The analysis that exists in the published literature, for
better or for worse, concludes that the risk of breast cancer is elevated with exposures to radiation greater than 10 cGy. So, what are
these other analyses that purport to claim that these patients actually had a lower risk of mortality from breast cancer? I smelled a
rat. My first hint came from an article published in the Journal of the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (JPANDS) by
Bernard Cohen entitled The Cancer Risk From Low Level Radiation: A Review of Recent Evidence. Ive discussed JPANDS and how
it plays fast and loose with science for ideological reasons before, in particular its antivaccine views and its publishing studies so bad
that laughter is the only appropriate response. In his article, Cohen claims that hormesis found for breast cancer among Canadian
women exposed over longer periods of time to X-ray fluoroscopic examinations for tuberculosis (13); when appropriately evaluated,
this evidence shows a decrease in risk with increasing radiation dose at least up to 20 cSv (20 rem). Unfortunately, no

evaluation

of this evidence is included; Cohen simply asserts that this is so. Fortunately, it didnt take long for me to find

other JPANDS articles making the same argument. For example, this one by Joel M. Kauffman. In it, Kaufmann

divides up
the subjects into several radiation dose ranges, while rejecting data from Nova Scotia because
too few low radiation points were included. Conveniently he fails to define what too few is .
However, if one looks at Table I in the NEJM paper, its obvious that in the dose range between 10 and 99 cSv, the death rate in Nova
Scotia was much higher than the other provinces. One wonders if that had anything to do with leaving out the data, rather than writing
the authors for a more detailed breakdown of the data between those dose levels, one does. In

any case, what Kaufmann

appears to have done is what JPANDS writers frequently do: Cherry pick the data. He took the
lower end of the dose ranges, used eyeball fitting instead of statistical fitting to models, and left
out any hint of a statistical analysis. The authors of the NEJM article went to great lengths to demonstrate that a LNT
model was the best fit to their data; Kaufmann expects you to eyeball his graph and accept his claim of hormesis. Similarly, Jerry
Cuttler and Myron Pollycove, in another JPANDS article, plotted the Canadian data on a semilog scale to make a hormesis effect look
far more convincing than the actual data support, all the while simply claiming that a hormesis model fit the data better than an LNT
model. Unfortunately, they didnt show their work, so to speak. No discussion of how they modeled the data is included. No wonder
the NCRPM found these other analyses unconvincing. Also, while its not surprising that Coulter would have gotten her data on this
from JPANDS, its rather disappointing that Kolata didnt look deeper back in 2001. The

second study cited by Kolata

and exaggerated by Coulter was a study of U.S. nuclear industry workers. Regarding this sort of
data, the scientists at the Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory have included on their website
this analysis: The results of individual studies have been inconclusive, and to investigate the matter further
a combined analysis has been carried out of seven studiesthree for sites in the United States (Hanford, Oak Ridge, and Rocky Flats),
three for sites in the United Kingdom, and one for Canada. A total of 95,673 workers was included, of whom 60% received effective
doses above 10 mSv (1 rem). In the entire population, there were 15,825 deaths, of which 3,976 were from cancer. The

comprehensive results for all cancers taken together showed a very slight decrease in cancer rate
with increasing dose. However, this result had no statistical significance . Of possible greater statistical
significance is a slight increase with radiation dose for some types of leukemia. Overall, the statistical uncertainties were
large enough that the analysis did not rule out linearity or any of the other alternative doseresponse curves indicated in Figure 15-1although it does set an upper limit on the possible magnitude of a hypothesized supralinearity effect. The study being discussed it this one, which, by the way, concludes: These estimates, which did not differ
significantly across cohorts or between men and women, are the most comprehensive and precise direct estimates of cancer risk
associated with low-dose protracted exposures obtained to date. Although they are lower than the linear estimates obtained from
studies of atomic bomb survivors, they are compatible with a range of possibilities, from a reduction of risk at low doses, to risks
twice those on which current radiation protection recommendations are based. Overall, the results of this study do not suggest that
current radiation risk estimates for cancer at low levels of exposure are appreciably in error. Coulter

also makes much of a

study of shipyard workers from 1991: A $10 million Department of Energy study from 1991 examined 10 years of
epidemiological research by the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health on 700,000 shipyard workers, some of whom had been
exposed to 10 times more radiation than the others from their work on the ships nuclear reactors. The workers exposed to excess
radiation had a 24 percent lower death rate and a 25 percent lower cancer mortality than the non-irradiated workers. The reference for
this is: Matanoski, G. M. (1991) Health Effects of Low-Level radiation in Shipyard Workers, Final Report, DOE/EV/10095-T2,
National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia, USA. Unfortunately, I couldnt get a hold of this report online over the
weekend. I did, however, find the more recent reanalysis of the data from 2008 by Matanoski et al published in the Journal of
Radiation Research. What Matanoski found wa that most of the differences

in mortality and cancer rates found

between shipyard workers who serviced nuclear ships and shipyard workers who did not were not
significant, although there did appear to be trends towards increased risk of leukemias and other
cancers with increasing dose. Overall, as far as saying anything about the association between radiation exposure and
cancer, at best this study could be described as inconclusive. Certainly its exceedingly thin gruel to make such
definitive statements about hormesis. As for the lower all-cause mortality among the nuclear workers, that is almost certainly
due to phenomenon known as the healthy worker effect; i.e., the selective recruiting of
healthier than average persons into the industry who have continued access to better than average
health care. Similarly thin gruel is this claim by Coulter: In 1983, a series of apartment buildings in Taiwan
were accidentally constructed with massive amounts of cobalt 60 , a radioactive substance. After 16 years, the
buildings 10,000 occupants developed only five cases of cancer. The cancer rate for the same age group in the general Taiwanese
population over that time period predicted 170 cancers. The people in those buildings had been exposed to radiation nearly five times
the maximum safe level according to the U.S. government. But they ended up with a cancer rate 96 percent lower than the general
population. Not exactly. Actually, not at all. Its not even thin gruel; its misrepresentation, either intentional or through Coulters
laziness in researching the article. Coulter, as usual, is exhibiting willful ignorance by citing old data. In fact, more recent analyses of

the Taiwanese population that lived in these buildings do not support her claims at all. The most recent followup study I could find
was published in 2006 in the International Journal of Radiation Biology by Hwang et al. The results were: A total of 7271 people
were registered as the exposed population, with 101,560 person-years at risk. The average excess cumulative exposure was
approximately 47.8 mSv (range 5 1 2,363 mSv). A total of 141 exposed subjects with various cancers were observed, while 95
developed leukemia or solid cancers after more than 2 or 10 years initial residence in contaminated buildings respectively. The SIR
were significantly higher for all leukemia except chronic lymphocytic leukemia (n146, SIR143.6, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.2
7.4) in men, and marginally significant for thyroid cancers (n146, SIR 14 2.6, 95% CI 1.0 5.7) in women. On the other hand, all
cancers combined, all solid cancers combined were shown to exhibit significant exposure-dependent increased risks in individuals
with the initial exposure before the age of 30, but not beyond this age. Hwang

et al concluded: The results suggest

that prolonged low dose-rate radiation exposure appeared to increase risks of developing certain
cancers in specific subgroups of this population in Taiwan. So, basically, Coulter is completely wrong about the
Taiwan incident. There is an increased incidence of cancer in young people, at least, who lived in those apartment buildings. Science is
hard, isnt it? Coulters also on seriously dubious footing when she cites Professor Bernard L. Cohen, whose various studies of the
relationship between radon and lung cancer buck the established consensus that radon is a risk factor for lung cancer. (Yes, this is the
very same Bernard Cohen who wrote the JPANDS article I mentioned earlier in this post; to me his having published in JPANDS is to
me a huge hit on any credibility he might have had.) It turns out that Cohen probably didnt control adequately for smoking in his
studies because a reanalysis of his reported data demonstrated similar, strongly negative correlations between radon exposure and
cancers strongly linked to cigarette smoking and weaker negative correlations between radon and cancers moderately associated with
smoking. No such correlation was found for cancers not linked to smoking. These results strongly suggest that Cohen didnt
adequately control for smoking in his analysis. Another criticism points out that Cohen fell prey to the ecological fallacy and
suggested that county-level data probably do not represent the best units to detect a correlation between radon and lung cancer.
Coulters final claims center on the Chernobyl disaster and victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In particular,

she claims that only 30 people died in the plant as a direct result of the disaster and further
downplays the risk of cancer in the survivors, stating: Even the thyroid cancers in people who lived near the reactor
were attributed to low iodine in the Russian diet and consequently had no effect on the cancer rate. As is usually the case for any
scientific claims made by Coulter, this is utter rubbish. Unfortunately for Coulter, her timing in publishing her article was exquisitely
bad. On

the very next day after her article was published, the National Cancer Institute released the
most comprehensive study yet of thyroid cancer in Chernobyl survivors. The findings indicated
that radioactive iodine (131I) from the fallout from the reactor was likely responsible for thyroid
cancers that are still occurring among people who lived near the reactor and that the risk of this
cancer is not declining. In other words, no, Ann, the hugely elevated levels of thyroid cancer among people who live near
Chernobyl when the reactor disaster occurred are not due to iodine deficiency in the Russian diet. There is some evidence that iodine
deficiency might have increased the risk of 131I-induced cancers, particularly in the youngest, but thats not what Coulter said. She
implied that iodine deficiency could account for the elevated incidence of thyroid cancer among those affected by the fallout. Much
more about the health effects of the Chernobyl disaster can be found here. It should also be noted that most people who lived in the
area were not exposed to that much radiation according to the United Nations-sponsored team investigating. Most were exposed to
about 9 mSv, about 1/3 the equivalent of a CT scan of the chest, abdomen, and pelvis, once the short-term doses to the thyroid were
subtracted

Low doses of radiation are harmful, and the affs impact is much larger than
low doses
WashingtonsBlog 11 [WashingtonsBlog, 4/30/11, No, a Little Radiation Is NOT Good For
You, cites peer reviewed, scientific studies, http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2011/04/no-littleradiation-is-not-good-for-you.html]
The notion of radiation hormesis has been rejected by the National Research Councils (part of the
National Academy of Sciences) 16 year long study on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. The
scientific research base shows that there is no threshold of exposure below which low levels of
ionizing radiation can be demonstrated to be harmless or beneficial. See this, this, this and this. Most
proponents of the hormesis theory claim that data from the residents of Nagasaki and Hiroshima shows that residents exposed to low
levels of radiation (i.e. some miles from the bomb blasts) lived longer than residents who lived so far away that they were not exposed
to any radiation. However, as Reuters noted in 2000: Japanese

survivors of the atomic bomb have their life

expectancy reduced by an average about 4 months, which does not support claims that survivors exposed to low
levels of radiation live longer than comparable unexposed individuals. To clarify the question of whether atomic bomb survivors have
enhanced or reduced life expectancy, Drs. John B. Cologne and Dale L. Preston from the Radiation Effects Research Foundation,
Hiroshima, Japan, studied 120,321 survivors and estimated their radiation exposure and mortality rates after 45 years of follow up.
They report in the July 22nd issue of The Lancet that median life expectancy fell by about 1.3 years per Gy of estimated radiation

dose, and declined faster at higher doses. At doses below 1 Gy, median life expectancy fell by about 2 months, while exposures of
greater than 1 Gy resulted in a median loss of life of 2.6 years. Drs.

Cologne and Preston estimate that at a dose of

1 Gy, 60% of those exposed died from solid cancer, 30% from illnesses other than cancer, and
10% from leukemia. These results are important in light of the recent finding that radiation significantly increases mortality
rates for causes other than cancer, they write. A large study of bone cancer in survivors of Nagasaki and
Hiroshima published in March of this year also showed no hormesis, but rather increased cancer
risk even at low doses. (See this and this for more evidence that low levels of radiation can cause cancer.) Other data has also
been misinterpreted by those who advocate that a little radiation is good for you. For example, the above-quoted Wikipedia article
notes: In popular treatments of radiation hormesis, a study of the inhabitants of apartment buildings in Taiwan has received prominent
attention. The building materials had been accidentally contaminated with Cobalt-60 but the study found cancer mortality rates more
than 20 times lower than in the population as a whole. However, this study compared the relatively young irradiated population with
the much older general population of Taiwan, which is a major flaw. A subsequent study by Hwang et al. (2006) found a significant
exposure-dependent increase in cancer in the irradiated population, particularly leukemia in men and thyroid cancer in women, though
this trend is only detected amongst those who were first exposed before the age of 30. This study also found that rate of total cancer
cases was lower than expected. Even If Hormesis is Real, Weve Got Too Much of a Good Thing Even

if the accepted
scientific consensus is wrong and hormesis is real, were getting too much of a good thing. As Ive
previously noted: There Are NO Background Levels of Radioactive Caesium or Iodine Wikipedia provides some details on the
distribution of cesium-137 due to human activities: Small amounts of caesium-134 and caesium-137 were released into the
environment during nearly all nuclear weapon tests and some nuclear accidents, most notably the Chernobyl disaster. As of 2005,
caesium-137 is the principal source of radiation in the zone of alienation around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Together with
caesium-134, iodine-131, and strontium-90, caesium-137 was among the isotopes with greatest health impact distributed by the
reactor explosion. The mean contamination of caesium-137 in Germany following the Chernobyl disaster was 2000 to 4000 Bq/m2.
This corresponds to a contamination of 1 mg/km2 of caesium-137, totaling about 500 grams deposited over all of Germany.Caesium137 is unique in that it is totally anthropogenic. Unlike most other radioisotopes, caesium-137 is not produced from its non-radioactive
isotope, but from uranium. It did not occur in nature before nuclear weapons testing began. By observing the characteristic gamma
rays emitted by this isotope, it is possible to determine whether the contents of a given sealed container were made before or after the
advent of atomic bomb explosions. This procedure has been used by researchers to check the authenticity of certain rare wines, most
notably the purported Jefferson bottles. As the EPA notes: Cesium-133 is the only naturally occurring isotope and is nonradioactive; all other isotopes, including cesium-137, are produced by human activity. So there was no background radiation for
caesium-137 before above-ground nuclear testing and nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl. Similarly, Ive pointed out: The Argonne
National Laboratory notes: Essentially all the plutonium on earth has been created within the past six decades by human activities
involving fissionable materials. *** Atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, which ceased worldwide by 1980, generated most
environmental plutonium. About 10,000 kg were released to the atmosphere during these tests. Average plutonium levels in surface
soil from fallout range from about 0.01 to 0.1 picocurie per gram (pCi/g). Accidents and other releases from weapons production
facilities have caused greater localized contamination. So like radioactive cesium and iodide which I discussed yesterday

plutonium doesnt exist in nature in any significant quantity, and so background radiation is a
meaningless concept. In other words, even if a little radiation is good for us, we have already been
getting exposed to a lot more radiation from nuclear weapons tests, Chernobyl, Japan and other
sources than our ancestors were ever exposed to. Indeed, even if the studies did show that low
level exposure by the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped them live longer, background
radiation in 1945 was much lower than after above-ground nuclear tests, Chernobyl and
Fukushima. Other Toxic Exposures Its not only apologists for the safety-averse nuclear power industry which is trying to
convince us of hormesis. Apologists for all big polluters are arguing hormesis as well. Wikipedia describes the general theory:
Hormesis is the term for generally favorable biological responses to low exposures to toxins and other stressors. Even if radiation
hormesis is true, we are exposed to a wide range of toxic chemicals, including BPA in our cans, rocket fuel in our drinking water,
mercury in our fish, and many others. Even

if any toxic substances might have a hormesis effect in a

vacuum, we are not exposed to chemicals in a vacuum we are exposed to several chemicals at
the same time. Indeed, scientists long ago demonstrated the synergistic effect of toxins, where:
The combined effect of the substances acting together is greater than the sum of the effects of the
substances acting by themselves . For example, smokers are much more likely to get cancer from
exposure to radioactive radon gas than non-smokers. So even if there is hormesis from a
chemical at low doses (hormesis promoters claim that low level exposures cause our body to produce a wave of antioxidants
and other cancer-fighters), by the time we get swamped with the myriad of toxic chemicals and radiation
exposures present in modern life, our bodys defense mechanisms become so overextended that
any hormesis effect is lost.

Nuclear meltdowns kill millions

Lendman 11 [Stephen Lendmen, 3/13/11, Nuclear Meltdown in Japan, Research Associate
at the Center for Research on Globalization,
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan]
For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear
technology threatens life on our planet with extinction. If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we
drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague
humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added
military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern
Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six
meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city
and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses
(stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported three trains
missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers,
buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear
meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst
case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying:
"Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down,"
releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima
plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already
been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995
Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami
damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and
beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor
Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear
power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an
event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter.
According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and
radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it)
remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster

killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure.

In their book titled,

"Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey
Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear
power. Emissions

from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of

the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be
protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout
covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the
melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If
now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the
quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said
Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported.
Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been
caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious.
The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al
Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the
explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel
continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2.
Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist
Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If

the cooling
system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could
conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow,
impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea
and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including
far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in
Japan can occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety.
Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new
ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central
America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this

writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book
titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal
operations, nuclear power generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of
curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear plants are atom
bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to
devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power not Cleaner and Greener Just the opposite,
in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas, a vast infrastructure is
required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage exacerbates the problem, starting with
the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to dispose of mill tailings, produced in the
extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate. Moreover, other nuclear cycle steps also use
fossil fuels, including converting uranium to hexafluoride gas prior to enrichment, the enrichment process itself, and conversion of
enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to fuel pellets. In addition, nuclear power plant construction, dismantling and cleanup at the end of
their useful life require large amounts of energy. There's more, including contaminated cooling water, nuclear waste, its handling,
transportation and disposal/storage, problems so far unresolved. Moreover, nuclear power costs and risks are so enormous that the
industry couldn't exist without billions of government subsidized funding annually. The Unaddressed Human Toll from Normal
Operations Affected are uranium miners, industry workers, and potentially everyone living close to nuclear reactors that routinely emit
harmful radioactive releases daily, harming human health over time, causing illness and early death. The link between radiation
exposure and disease is irrefutable, depending only on the amount of cumulative exposure over time, Caldicott saying: "If

a
regulatory gene is biochemically altered by radiation exposure, the cell will begin to incubate
cancer, during a 'latent period of carcinogenesis,' lasting from two to sixty years." In fact, a single
gene mutation can prove fatal. No amount of radiation exposure is safe. Moreover, when
combined with about 80,000 commonly used toxic chemicals and contaminated GMO foods and
ingredients, it causes 80% of known cancers, putting everyone at risk everywhere. Further, the
combined effects of allowable radiation exposure, uranium mining, milling operations,
enrichment, and fuel fabrication can be devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste
storage/disposal problem, nuclear accidents happen and catastrophic ones are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott and other
experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown
dates unsafely. Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing operating costs, internal sabotage, or the effects of a highmagnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual catastrophe is certain. Aging plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose
unacceptable risks based on their record of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting from human error, old equipment, shoddy
maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight. However, under optimum operating conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any
machine or facility, they're vulnerable to breakdowns, that if serious enough can cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm. Add
nuclear war to the mix, also potentially inevitable according to some experts, by accident or intent, including Steven Starr saying:
"Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war," the consequences of which "would be profound,
potentially killing "tens of millions of people, and caus(ing) long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive
destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people."
Worse still is nuclear winter, the ultimate nightmare, able to end all life if it happens. It's nuclear proliferation's unacceptable risk, a
clear and present danger as long as nuclear weapons and commercial dependency exist. In 1946, Enstein knew it, saying: "Our world
faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good and evil. The unleashed power of the
atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." He envisioned two
choices - abolish all forms of nuclear power or face extinction. No one listened. The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking.

2AC Inherency Ext

Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 is currently preventing US-China diplomatic
engagement over space (this is also a ptx link)
Villasanta 5/25 [Arthur Dominic Villasanta, 5/25/16, China Topix, NASAs Bolden Makes
Brave but Pointless Appeal for U.S.-China Space Cooperation,
http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/88677/20160525/nasa-s-bolden-makes-brave-pointlessappeal-u-china-space.htm#ixzz4AdiXANtp]
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden's suggestion the United States should resume cooperation with China in space is bound to
encounter fierce opposition in Congress, especially from the Republican Party that sees China as the "New Evil Empire." Bolden, an
African-American and one of only 14 African-American astronauts to reach outer space, said Congress

should revise U.S.

laws, specifically U.S. Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 that bans any cooperative effort among the space
programs of both the U.S. and China. "We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew ApolloSoyuz. It was because leaders in both nations felt it was time," said Bolden. "That represented a great use of soft power, if you will.
Look where we are today. I think we will get there (with China). And I think it is necessary." Bolden, a retired Major General in the
U.S. Marine Corps, suggested initial steps to unfreeze the thaw such as "working on weather satellite data sharing and things like that.
Things that will make critics on China on Capitol Hill a little bit more relaxed about the idea of cooperation." The

112th
United States Congress in November 2011 banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements
and coordination with China, a ban enforced under Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539. The specific
provision states: "None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate,
implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate
bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are
specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. "The limitation in
subsection (a) shall also apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or
utilized by NASA. "The limitations described in subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to activities which NASA or OSTP have
certified pose no risk of resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other information with national security or economic security
implications to China or a Chinese-owned company." Public Law 112-55 is otherwise known as the ''Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012." The

probability of the U.S. Congress enacting a new law to overturn

Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 is remote considering China's perceived hostility towards the U.S. in
the South China Sea, the beefing-up of its military and the absence of lawmakers willing to go to
bat for China. The right wing Republican Party is patently hostile towards China and its members control the committee in the
House of Representatives responsible for NASA appropriations. The man who chairs the House of Representatives appropriations
subpanel that oversees NASA, John Culberson (R-TX), is a space geek who in 2010 urged President Barack Obama not to allow
further contact between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA). "I have grave concerns about the nature and
goals of China's space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and CNSA's human space flight programs
without Congressional authorization," he said in a letter to Obama. Bolden said he doesn't not expect the ban to be lifted during his
tenure that ends with that of Obama's.

Even if individual meetings happen, the core relations freeze remains

Teitel 13 (Amy. Oct 25 2013. NASA Repealed Its Ban on Chinese Scientists, But Houston, We
Still Have a Problem. Motherboard. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-will-allow-chinesescientists-to-attend-its-conference-after-all)
Earlier this week, NASA repealed

a ban barring Chinese scientists from attending an upcoming

meeting between international scientists working on the agency's Kepler mission . Its a bit of a strange
situation, and while allowing Chinese scientists and researchers into NASA conferences is a step in the right direction, theres still
an underlying problem. NASA announced its ban of Chinese attendees from the Kepler conference earlier this month. The
rationale was a new security law that was passed this past March. Spearheaded by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), who happens to chair of
the House appropriations subcommittee that has jurisdiction over NASA, the law was part of an aggressive counter-espionage

legislation. The

law prevents NASA from cooperating with the Chinese government and Chineseowned companies, and from hosting any Chinese visitors at any of its facilities . But Wolf says NASA
misinterpreted this new law when it banned Chinese researchers from international conferences . The law doesnt ban
individuals, but that's where the grey areas come in. Its not hard to imagine that a great number
of Chinas scientists either work for government agencies or government-run and funded
universities, and the language barring Chinese visitors to NASA sites doesnt specifically exclude
a Chinese researcher living in the United States . When the news broke that NASA would be excluding Chinese
scientists, researchers in both the United States and China were outraged. Many Americans went so far as threatening to boycott the
conference. After all, its a conference about exoplanets, a topic thats unlikely to see attendees divulging secrets on national security.
But NASA finally reversed its decision, chalking the

ban up to a misinterpretation of the law. Wolf elaborated that this law doesnt
into play if those individuals
are acting on behalf of the government in any capacity. NASA would have repealed the ban sooner, but the
restrict NASA from interacting with scientists acting as individuals. Rather, it only comes

government shut down prevented the agency from saying anything officially for over two weeks. So it looks like a conference about
exoplanets is indeed a safe place for American and Chinese scientists to swap notes and ideas. Because thats what science is about.
As Chinese spokeswoman Ms Hua said after hearing about the ban, "these academic meetings should not be politicized." Its a stance
many people would probably agree on, that meetings between scientists on non-political topics should be free of politics. But that just
isnt the case. As far as space exploration is concerned, America and China arent opponents in space like the US was with the Soviet
Union in the 1960s, but relations arent entirely friendly either. The US has banned Chinese astronauts (or taikonauts) from visiting the
International Space Station, which is slightly less international than the name suggests. The Chinese space program was born from
the same Soviet missile technology that launched Sputnik in 1957, technology gained during the 1950s while both nations were united
under the Sino-Soviet treaty. But China was slower turning their Soviet missile knowledge into spacefaring rockets, only launching
their first man in space in 2003. Now, banned from the ISS and future NASA-based missions, which will likely include the same
American, European, and Russian partnerships weve seen in recent years, China is building its own presence in space.

Experts agree no cooperation on the horizon

Jie 5/26 (Kou. The Global Times. 5/26/2016. Experts say Sino-US space collaboration is likely to
stay sci-fi. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/985361.shtml)
In the 2015 sci-fi box office smash The Martian, China and the US, supposedly space rivals, have buried the hatchet and jointly
pushed mankind deeper into outer space than ever before, a scenario which experts say is highly unlikely in the short term. At an
event hosted by the Mitchell Institute on Washington DC's Capitol Hill on Monday, Administrator

Charles Bolden of
NASA said he hopes the US can someday cooperate with China in manned space exploration,
though he himself admitted that this dream may not be realized during his tenure, as the US
government currently bans NASA from cooperating with Chinese scientists , according to Voice of
America (VOA). "We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz (a US-Soviet joint space
project)I think we will get there [with China] and I think it is necessary," Bolden was quoted as saying by the VOA. Though

the remarks do suggest the possibility of a future thaw in tensions between the two nations in
space cooperation, experts believe that the current distrust is not going anywhere soon. "Space
technologies can be used for military purposes, while astronautic and aeronautics weapons will
play a great role in future wars. Due to the countries' national interests, the US and China still
face difficulties in space cooperation," Huang Jun, a professor at the School of Aeronautic
Science and Engineering at Beihang University, told the Global Times. Cooperation stonewalled
According to a law passed by the US Congress in 2011, NASA is prohibited from engaging in
bilateral agreements and coordination with China, hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities or
working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise. "China and the US
had some space cooperation in the 1980s, but there was no substantial progress afterwards. Nowadays, even some ordinary academic
conferences can be restrained [by the law]," Huang said. The law has frustrated not only Chinese scientists, but also their US
counterparts. In 2013, NASA faced fierce backlash from US researchers after it cited the law and rejected applications from Chinese
nationals who wanted to attend a conference at the agency's Ames Research Center in California on the grounds of national security.
"Space cooperation between the US and China is still a sensitive topic. US law bans Chinese scientists from cooperating with NASA,
but NASA personnel are also not allowed to enter Beijing's aerospace town while their European counterparts can," an insider told the
Global Times. Aerospace City, one of the world's top aerospace centers, is in Beijing's northwestern outskirts. Tensions between the

US and China have pushed the latter to find other partners, which has led to the development of relatively close relations with Russia
and Europe on space cooperation in recent years. "China and Europe have been working together towards deeper space exploration
cooperation as highlighted by joint projects such as Double Star, a satellite-based space mission conducted by the China National
Space Administration and the European Space Agency, which has had a great deal of scientific achievements," Pang Zhihao, a Beijingbased aerospace expert, told the Global Times, adding that the two organizations have also cooperated in data exchange. China and
Russia have also cooperated, mainly focusing on manned space flight including spacesuit technologies, Pang said, "From the
perspective of science, mutual communication and cooperation on space technologies can help the two countries learn from each other
and push mankind deeper in the space," Huang said, adding that ideology shouldn't hinder Sino-US cooperation. Possible
approaches "One of the main reasons for US reluctance cooperate with China is because of the latter's relatively low technological
level. The US fears that China may study its technologies to close their gap," Hung said. Frank Wolf, a
former US legislator who was instrumental in passing the law to hinder the two countries' space cooperation, was quoted as saying by
Science Magazine that "the

US doesn't want to give China the opportunity to take advantage of US

technology, and the US has nothing to gain from dealing with them." "Though China has achieved a lot in
space technology in recent years, it still has a long way to catch up with the US," Huang said, adding that China should improve its
own technological level first. "The US and Russia's space cooperation can serve as an example, as both countries have advanced
space station technologies," Huang said. "As space technologies become more sophisticated and expensive in the future, international
collaboration is needed to share the load, which can also improve the utilization of the scientific achievements," Huang added.

Current policy prevents the United States from cooperating with China in space that risks
accidental escalation from inevitable space accidents
Fernholz 15 (Tim, Oct 13 2015, QZ, NASA has no choice but to refuse Chinas request for help
on a new space station, http://qz.com/523094/nasa-has-no-choice-but-to-refuse-chinas-requestfor-help-on-a-new-space-station)

The Martian has been praised as the rare science fiction movie that takes pains with scientific accuracy, but one of the more prosaic
events in the movie is actually among the least likely.

In the film, Chinese and US space agencies work together to save the day. But in fact, that kind of
international Kumbaya moment is forbidden by US lawa restriction underscored today (Oct. 13) at the
International Astronautical Congress (IAC).
The chief designer of Chinas space program, Zhou Jianping, said his country would solicit international partners for a space station it
plans to launch in 2022, with opportunities ranging from shared experiments and spacecraft visits by foreign crews to building
permanent modules to attach to the main station.
The European and Russian space agencies already have signed preliminary agreements with China, but NASA will have to snub the
project.

The ban on cooperation between NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of
conservative lawmaker Frank Wolf, who cut off any funding for work with China in protest of political repression there and for
fear of sharing advanced technology; he retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place.
And NASA is

not a fan of them.

In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said the US, for its own good, ought to dump the four-year-old
ban.
We will find ourselves on the outside looking in, because everybodywho has any hope of a human spaceflight programwill go to
whoever will fly their people, Bolden said, according to a report from Reuters.
Currently, China operates a space station called Tiangong 1 that has hosted several multi-week visits by groups of Chinese astronauts.
The US supports the International Space Station and its permanent crew of three to six astronauts alongside 15 other countries,
including Russia. Both

the US and Russia have committed to provide support to the station through 2024.

The US has a long history of space diplomacy with opponentsas with the USSR during the 1970s. With
US policy framing China as a peaceful competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current
restrictions on consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASA in a tough spot with space scientists
from outside the agency, some of whom have protested the ban by boycotting scientific conferences.
theres
also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite operators that a lack of
coordination between burgeoning space programs will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of
anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in costly, in-orbit accidents.
If the desire for manned cooperation with the Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions,

Civil space cooperation between the US and China could provide trust and lines of
communication for de-escalation as fears of space militarization increase . And its not like there isnt
some cross-pollination alreadySpaceNews notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.

2AC Solvency Ext Cooperation Good

The possibility of conflict means we have no alternative but to embrace
engagement it allows us to overcome a securitization of China and enhance
mutual cooperation and trust
Lynch 2 [Marc Lynch, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Why
Engagement? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement European Journal of
International Relations, Vol 8 No 2, p 187-230, Sage Pub]
The analysis developed here suggests that a more strategic approach to engagement will be unlikely to achieve its articulated goals.
This does not mean, of course, that such a coercive approach will be ineffective at achieving other goals. For

a United States
committed to a view of China as a potential threat to be contained, such a strategic engagement
policy makes sense. To the extent that the United States remains uncertain about Chinas
preferences, however, or seeks to shape those preferences in a cooperative direction, a tougher
policy will consolidate a strategic (rather than communicative) orientation in China. American
Chinese relations currently are characterized by the clear possibility of a spiral of conflict, as the
imperatives of strategic interaction prohibitively push towards mistrust, misrepresentation and
conflict. The costs of such a conflict, particularly if one or both sides would prefer to avoid it, make
communicative engagement at least plausible despite the trend towards confrontation in the early
days of the Bush Administration. The deterioration of relations, particularly the escalating rhetorical hostility
in the domestic arena of each side, complicate communicative engagement, but also make it more important.
It is precisely because widespread belief in the failure of engagement has built support for more
aggressive policies that this recasting of the theoretical foundations of engagement seems urgent.
To the extent that communicative engagement makes it more likely that states can effectively interpret
each others preferences, can modify those preferences in the direction of greater cooperation and
empathy towards the other, and can generate legitimate international institutions, it holds out the
potential for overcoming the security dilemma and the logic of strategic interaction under
anarchy.

Cooperation deters war

Krepon 13 [July 8 2013, Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center. He worked
previously at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, and on Capitol Hill. His areas of
expertise are reducing nuclear dangers -- with a regional specialization in South Asia -- and
improving national and international security in outer space, U.S. Space Cooperation with
China http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/36172us-space-cooperation-with-china]
Major powers compete and cooperate in space. The more they cooperate in space, the less
likely it is that their competition on Earth will result in military confrontation. The reverse is
also true. The United States and the Soviet Union jockeyed for geopolitical advantage and produced tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons. Both periodically tested anti-satellite weapons, and President Ronald Reagan once proposed to deploy a
defensive shield in space. But on the whole, the competition in space between the two nuclear superpowers was remarkably
restrained. As early as 1972, they agreed not to interfere with each others intelligence-gathering satellites, and in 1975, they
carried out a docking of their Apollo and Soyuz space capsules. Despite the ups and downs of U.S.-Russian relations, cooperation
continues in space, most visibly on the international space station. Fifty years ago, President John F. Kennedy provided an object
lesson on how major powers could shift gears from confrontation to cooperation. Less than 10 months after the harrowing Cuban
missile crisis, Kennedy went out on a different limb, seeking a treaty banning nuclear testing. Kennedy engineered this shift
through a mix of quiet, preparatory diplomacy and adept stage management. The critical public event in this choreography was
Kennedys commencement address at American University in which he called for an era of peace between ideological foes.
Kennedy challenged his fellow citizens to examine their attitudes toward peace. Too many of us think it is impossible, he said.
Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that mankind

is doomed, that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade; therefore,
they can be solved by man. Kennedy argued that we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. While
President Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev did not succeed in ending all nuclear tests, they managed to agree on a
treaty banning them in the atmosphere. This was a significant accomplishment: In the two years leading up to the 1963 Limited
Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States combined to carry out 179 atmospheric tests an average of two
mushroom clouds per week. These atmospheric tests posed hazards to spacecraft and human spaceflight, as well as to public
health. JFKs recipe for success in securing an end to atmospheric nuclear testing can also be applied to engineering an important
space cooperation initiative between Washington and Beijing. Kennedy employed these key ingredients: Convey private messages
to your competitor that you seek to change course. Make a high-profile public statement calling for a specific, notable result. Take
a calculated risk, but avoid making an offer likely to be stiffed. Dispense with oppositional rhetoric. Use a tone of respect and
empathy instead. Take a verifiable, meaningful, politically risky step as a sign of serious intent. Call for reciprocal restraint. Send
a high-profile negotiator who knows his way around both capitals to cut a deal. Seize the moment. Dont dilly-dally. President
Barack Obama has Kennedys gift for idealistic rhetoric, but he has yet to replicate Kennedys recipe for success. He has an
opportunity to do so by proposing a symbolically freighted, cooperative venture between the United States and China in space. A

joint U.S.-China space initiative faces many obstacles. Some, like the signers of the Rumsfeld
Space Commission report in 2000, believe that surprise attack and warfare in space are
inevitable, just as some experts during the Cold War thought that deterrence would fail and
that warfare between the nuclear superpowers was inevitable. Some on Capitol Hill cannot
conceive of useful bilateral discussions with China on space and climate change. They have
passed legislation prohibiting NASA and the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy
from participating, collaborating or coordinating bilateral exchanges with their Chinese
counterparts. Some worry about the loss of U.S. secrets in a collaborative, nonmilitary venture
in space. Similar worries proved to be unfounded about the Apollo-Soyuz docking. Presidents
Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping spent the better part of two days in June out of the
public glare discussing ways to successfully manage the mix of cooperation and competition
between the United States and China. Press reports of their deliberations include no mention of discussions about
space cooperation. If true, this reflects a poverty of imagination among their advisers and an agenda that is too filled with
contentious issues to include a bold cooperative venture in space. While there is no shortage of issues requiring

sound management of U.S.-Chinese relations including cyberespionage, maritime and

island disputes, and proliferation concerns this list pales in comparison with what Kennedy
and Khrushchev were up against. Or for that matter, what President Richard Nixon and Soviet
leader Leonid Brezhnev had to contend with when they agreed to the Apollo-Soyuz docking.
A joint venture in space between the United States and China does not need to be as expensive
or as high-profile as the Apollo-Soyuz docking to have significant symbolic and substantive
value. Joint efforts to monitor climate change, space weather, planetary threats from asteroids,
and other useful initiatives can be identified. As was the case during the Cold War, cooperative
ventures in space can dampen competitive pursuits on Earth. President Kennedys recipe is
waiting to be replicated.

Cooperation deters war and includes the following

Weeden and He 16 (Brian and Xiao. April 26 2016. USE OUTER SPACE TO
STRENGTHEN U.S.-CHINA TIES. Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure World
Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World
Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/)
With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more
important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to
take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is discussion of a renewed
strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the United States, against the rising power of China.

The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their
national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to
developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space
accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as

either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The United States and China have differing
goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its
security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling
communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone
of the United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United
States ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities
are also a critical piece of the U.S. and the global economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space
domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and
even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security
and securing its role as a rising power. From Chinas perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the
United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions particularly
because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these
differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing
and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on active defense have caused the United States to
openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such
capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure

to reconcile
their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment
of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable,
cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space . Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a
constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based
order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role
the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space
governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term
sustainability of space activities. Thus,

the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities

for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should
continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term
sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure
the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both
countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space
powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should
also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and
human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges. At the same
time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look to enact confidencebuilding measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While

the prospects for

legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and
bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit
significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and
increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.

Aff solves paranioa / rhetoric

Johnson-Freese 15 (Joan. August 7, 2015. US-China: Civil Space Dialogue. Joan JohnsonFreese is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-china-a-civil-space-dialogue/)
Included on the long list of outcomes at the conclusion of the seventh round of U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
meetings in June 2015 was a section on Science, Technology & Agriculture. Included in that section was a short paragraph on
space. 101. Space: The United States and China decided to establish regular bilateral government-to-government consultations on
civil space cooperation. The first U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue is to take place in China before the end of October
Separate from the Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue, the two sides also decided to have exchanges on space security matters under the
framework of the U.S.-China Security Dialogue before the next meeting of the Security Dialogue. The inclusion is remarkable given
that other agencies

of the U.S. government that deal with space, specifically NASA and the White

House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), have been legislatively banned from
using federal funds to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy,
program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any
way with China or any Chinese-owned company since 2011. That ban was also interpreted to mean that
NASA could not host official Chinese visitors at NASA facilities. Which raises the question of why one part of the U.S. government
would consider dialogue with Chinese officials regarding space important and useful, while another wants to give China the silent
treatment. The answer might well be realism versus political theater. The 2011 NASA/OSTP ban on bilaterally working with China
was the brainchild of Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), chair of the House Appropriations Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS)
subcommittee until he retired last year. The two-sentence clause imposing the ban was inserted into the NASA appropriations bill.
Referring to China as an evil empire in 1999, Congressman Wolf is a long and proud Dragon Slayer. As an evangelical Christian
he was and continues to be particularly focused on Chinese human rights and freedom of religion issues. Linking those obviously
legitimate concerns to Chinese-U.S. space relations, however, has proved problematic for several reasons. In 2013, Bo Jiang, a
Chinese national and contractor working on optics at NASA Langley, was arrested at the airport before leaving for China, on suspicion
of being in possession of classified materials. Besides porn, nothing illegal was found on Bos computer. He pled guilty to violating
NASA computer use rules, but was cleared of all espionage charges. Suspicion first fell on Bo after Rep. Wolf declared at a press
conference that anonymous NASA employees had alerted him about security concerns. At the same press conference, Wolf called on
(which equates to directed since he controlled their budget) NASA to take down all public information for a security review,
including the voluminous NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) that contains virtually the sum-total of NASAs scientific studies,
and begin a massive review of all foreign nationals at NASA NTRS came back online with almost zero changes. NASA, highly
technical administration that it is, employs and contracts a large number of foreigners, and the disruption was enormous. Besides
employing a high number of foreign nationals, NASA scientists also regularly work with scientists from other countries, including
China. Paranoia Wolfs

scrutiny of NASA was such that paranoia set in, resulting in a better safe
than sorry attitude among NASA employees about avoiding Chinese. There was a joke that if a NASA
employee was on a DC Metro car with an Asian, he or she better switch cars. But erring on the side of caution proved problematic as
well. When NASAs Ames Research Center excluded Chinese scientists from a conference and American scientists consequently
boycotted the conference in protest, Wolf chastised Ames for applying the bilateral ban to a multilateral conference, and NASA was
left to humbly apologize. Beyond

issues related to individuals are the even more-important strategic

issues that flow from a ban on U.S.-China bilateral dialogue. It has always been in the best
interests of the United States to use all tools of national power to achieve its space-related goals , as
stated in the U.S. National Space Policy, National Security Strategy, and National Security Space Strategy. Wolfs restrictions
on space cooperation constrain U.S. options. The United States could learn about how the Chinese work their
decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately
deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Though Wolf
retired in 2014, the new House CJS chairman, Rep. John Culbertson (R-TX), has said he agrees with Wolfs position. The

final
law that Wolf put in place, and which remains in effect (P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015), bans funding by NASA or OSTP to develop, design, plan, promulgate,
implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate,
collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities
are specifically authorized by law after the date of enactment of this Act. Supporting an anti-China agenda accrues
not insignificant domestic support among some voter constituencies. And so Congress continues
to act as though a bilateral snub by the U.S. will somehow change Chinese policies, deny them
technology, or perhaps just hurt their feelings. It has repeatedly been demonstrated though that sanctions, denying a
country things that it wants, only works when all countries possessing whatever the desired thing cooperate in denial. If the rationale
for snubbing China is to deny it space-related technology, it should be considered that other space-faring nations do not share U.S.
views toward China. Other Western countries have shown themselves eager to work with and sell to China, with restrictions and
enforceable controls on dual-use technology, negating the effectiveness of U.S. actions. That leaves only defending the moral high
ground the U.S. as a democracy doesnt work with communist authoritarian governments as a rationale for the Congressional
position. Sometimes, however, realism isnt pretty, as it fundamentally involves acting in your own best interests. And while the
United States would like to always work with countries sharing its values, in pursuing those interests that has not always proven
possible, witness Iraq under Saddam, Iran under the Shah, and numerous other examples. Further, as President Richard Nixon showed
with China and Ronald Reagan demonstrated during his second term with the Soviet Union, diplomacy does not equate to
appeasement, as seems currently to be the popular Washington beltway interpretation. Space Environment In space, the ultimate goal
of all U.S. strategies is for the U.S. to benefit from a sustainable space environment. Risks to the space environment stem from
congestion (the U.S. owns more 40 percent of the satellites in orbit), space debris, naturally occurring space objects, and debris
potentially created by anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. In recognition of its inability to deal with the space debris issues on its own, the
U.S. already works with China and 11 other countries on the

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee

(IADC), which has done remarkable work at the scientific and technical level in identifying

issues and suggesting mitigation approaches. Their suggestions are largely ignored, however, due
to lack of trust at the political level. Building trust takes dialogue. The rhetoric of space
competition has been escalating rapidly. Chest thumping, accusations and curious lingo such as
offensive counterspace from Congress and the Pentagon do little to build trust. Preventing that
escalating rhetoric from evolving into military confrontation that would jeopardize U.S. interests
is the job of the State Department. Therefore, it makes sense that State, with larger, strategic
objectives beyond those of individual members of Congress or military services inherently
needing threats to justify enhanced budget requests, would step in to fill the void created by the
2011 legislative action. Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, will have a challenging
task in identifying areas for civil space cooperation with China, given the dual-use nature of space technology and the domestic
Kabuki accompanying Wolfs enduring ban. But acquiescing to talk about civil space cooperation is likely the carrot required to get to
what the U.S. really wants to talk about space security. Since its irresponsible high-altitude ASAT test in 2007, China has become
politically correct when testing ASAT technology, and now says it is testing missile defense technology, like the U.S., Russia and
India, given the similarities of the required capabilities. Chinas July 2014 missile defense test has been of particular concern to the
U.S., and perhaps convinced the State Department that it was time to step in and pursue the best interests of the United States.
Notably, the usual and most vocal critics of U.S.-China space cooperation have been largely silent, perhaps indicating that while
unwilling to support the dialogue, the need is becoming recognized. The State Department has indicated that NASA and other spacerelated agencies will be invited to the dialogue, and it will be up to them to get the requisite clearances from Congress. Whether
Congress grants these will be indicative. The next meeting between the U.S. and China is scheduled for October 2015. It will take all
of Frank Roses considerable talents with China and domestic political communities to move a space agenda forward. But if
sustainability of the space environment is the ultimate goal, it is not one that can be pursued unilaterally, or without China.

2AC Solvency Ext Cooperation Possible

China has incentives for sustained cooperation but will watch the US for
deviations
Gargasz, 10 (Major Michael Gargasz, United States Air Force Weve Rattled Our Sabers
Now What? The Future of US/China Space Relations,
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_49078f96-46d1-4c32-a6924cb4002bd775/display.aspx?rs=enginespage)
Much like a negotiated ban on space-weaponry, agreed

to rules of the road for space operations would help

the USs stance in the international community. This would add norms upon which the US could base objections to
other countries actions. For example, with a negotiated keep out zone agreed to surrounding spacecraft, the US would have
international consensus for a protest if a spacecraft were to maneuver within that window. This is important because current policy and
doctrine place the US in a tough policy dilemma, unable to claim the moral high ground.25 The US cannot object to much anyone
does in space when it constantly espouses unlimited US freedom of action. For both cooperative programs and exchange programs,
the advantages and disadvantages are similar. In both cases, dialogue

between the US and China would potentially

add transparency for each side as to the others intentions, desires, and perceptions .26 It would
also help build working-level contacts that are critical to sustaining long-term trusting relations . An
often voiced concern for US and China engagements is inadvertent technology transfer to China. There is certainly precedent for this
concern (e.g. the missile technologies transfers of the 1990s27) and measures should be implemented to safeguard critical
technologies. However, the potential improvement in relationships and the possibility of stemming the suspicion-driven space arms
escalation is an undertaking worth the risk. So, if

the US were to change course and undertake a cooperative

strategy, would the Chinese participate? I contend that they would, albeit very slowly and very cautiously.
US and Chinese economies are mutually dependant and war between them would be mutually
devastating. To be successful, the US would need to dedicate itself to a decades-long strategy as it will take thousands of
interactions to lower the walls created from years of belligerent rhetoric and saber-rattling tests. A good first step toward a successful
cooperative strategy would begin in international forums. By

negotiating limitations and norms along with many

other participants, US/China relations could begin to thaw. Cooperative programs and exchanges
could follow to build a solid foundation for the future. Clearly a change of direction is needed.
The deterrent strategy pursued over the last couple decades has produced the exact opposite of
what was intended. Rather than space dominance, the US space capabilities are clearly threatened
and vulnerable in future conflicts. As stated in a joint statement after President Obama's meeting with Chinese President
Hu Jintao in November 2009, the US and China have common interests in promoting the peaceful use of outer space.28 Maybe this
is the first step away from the unilateral, deterrent path that has created so much angst in the space community.

2AC Solvency Ext Say Yes

China will accept the aff and enable effective Chinese integration
Hitchens & Chen 8 Theresa Hitchens - president of the Center for Defense Information in
Washington, and David Chen - Director of the Center for Defense Information (June, Forging a
Sino-US grand bargain in space, Science Direct, www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol)
Considering Chinese investment in its space program as a centerpiece of national prestige and as a lever for economic development,

the USA has the opportunity to link a variety of related economic incentives with opening, and
concluding, negotiations on a code of conduct in space, including Chinese abandonment of
destructive anti- satellite weapons programs. These potential bargaining chips include such

options as participation in the International Space Station (ISS), joint exploration missions,
reform in US policies restricting sales of commercial satellite hardware , and licensing of Chinese launch
services. In exchange, China might willingly restrict behaviors that could lead to strategic
miscalculation in space, as well as certain forms of counter-space capabilities. Providing what
the Chinese want in civil and commercial space arguably would cost the USA little, and in this valuecost differential
exists the potential of a mutually benecial agreement. In international prestige, no greater prize currently exists for China than to be
recognized and be admitted as a partner in the ISS. While the ISS program would benet from Chinese

investment and the potential use of Shenzhou modules for crew or cargo transport, the reality is
that China needs ISS more than ISS needs the Chinese, even with the imminent retirement of the Shuttle eet.
With the successful docking and cargo transfer of the European Space Agencys Automatic Transfer Vehicle in March 2008, the need
for a backup to Soyuz is not yet a dire urgency [10]. The approach can be gradual, with perhaps the visit of a Chinese space tourist to
the station, before the docking of a Shenzhou cargo vehicle, then perhaps the inclusion of a Chinese module to the station, culminating
in a routine rotation of Chinese personnel on the station. Indeed, ISS participation offers a stepwise schedule of

incentives in negotiations with the Chinese.

2AC Impact Ext Space Race

Space weapons arms race destroys international cooperation necessary to
solve prolif, warming, and terrorism
Union of Concerned Scientists, Space Weapons Overview, 4/18/4,
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/sp
ace-weapons-overview.html
However, this norm is being challenged. The Bush administration has been pushing to develop
weapons that could be used to deny other countries the use of space in a crisis; these include spacebased interceptors, which could be used to attack satellites. The fiscal 2008 budget included a
Pentagon request for initial funding of a "space testbed" to develop such interceptors. Meanwhile,
China's successful test of an anti-satellite weapon last January dramatically demonstrated that
satellites are already at risk. Left unchecked, the fear that controlling space may afford a decisive
military advantage threatens to trigger a space arms race. That would divert economic and

political resources from other pressing issues, and hinder international cooperation necessary
to make progress on such problems as nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, and
terrorism. In addition, increasing reliance on satellites for crucial military functions could
cause instability in a crisis. Military war games suggest that the loss of important satellites,
such as reconnaissance satellites, could spark a quick escalation in a conflict. The
international community must find ways to keep space free of orbiting weapons, to place
limits on potentially harmful or destabilizing technologiessuch as a ban on testing and use
of weapons that destroy satellitesand to develop verification measures to instill confidence
in and strengthen adherence to such agreements. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, signed by
more than 90 countries, including the United States, bans weapons of mass destruction from space and
extends the U.N. Charter to cover space operations. It states, "The exploration and use of outer
spaceshall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind[and] shall
be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance " The Outer Space Treaty lays out
the fundamental principles for governing space, which should be used to create a legal framework that
addresses today's issues and technologies. A number of other relevant treaties and international
agreements exist, but the legal framework addressing space weaponization is far from comprehensive.
International negotiations are urgently needed to extend the framework. However, a handful of
countriesincluding the United Stateshas blocked efforts to begin international negotiations on
space arms control since 1994. Given its long history in space, the United Stateswhich owns

more than half of the active satellites orbiting todayinstead should be promoting
negotiations to protect to our future in space as well as security on Earth. UCS's project on
space weapons is intended to analyze the range of technical and political issues underlying the
development, use, and control of space weapons, and to use this analysis to develop recommendations
for U.S. and international policy on these issues.

War with China goes nuclear safeguards wont prevent escalation chaos
and destruction will ensue
Wittner 11 (11/28/11, Lawrence, PhD in history from Columbia University, Emeritus
Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear
War with China Possible? http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries
national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons . The current

deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example
of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by Chinas growing
economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged Chinas claims in the South China
Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other
nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was asserting our own position as a
Pacific power. But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After
all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S.
government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later,
during the conflict over the future of Chinas offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or
anything else. Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate.
But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince
us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some

pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent

wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least not yet. But the Kargil War
of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in
that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use any
weapon in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear
missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At

the least, though, dont nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do

they? Obviously, NATO leaders didnt feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATOs strategy was to
respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western
nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed
that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing Star Wars and its modern variant,
national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensiveand probably unworkablemilitary defense systems needed if other nuclear
powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that
nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear
arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government
possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total
inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States.
Surely the United States would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail? A
nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a
great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and
radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations
would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the
nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a nuclear winter around the globe
destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Extinction- 24 hours
Takai 9-Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff
College for Japans Ground Self Defense Force [Mitsuo, U.S.-China nuclear strikes would spell
doomsday, October 7, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/uschina_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/What would happen if China launched its 20
Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S.
cities, DKP] edited for gendered language
What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a
5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the
raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In order to
avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would have to eliminate this

potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on China. But cool heads at institutions such as the
Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses in
2006, which differed from the hard-line views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving
nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in Chinas western province of Henan, and analyzed their
implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations including 20 main missile silos and
decoy silos hitting each with one W76-class, 100-kiloton multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarinelaunched ballistic missile. In order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for

maximum impact by causing ground bursts near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario,
the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed
of radioactive dirt and debris. Within 24 hours following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread

from the mushroom clouds, driven by westerly winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate
the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage. The impact of a 6megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing
not less than 4 million people. Such massive casualties among non-combatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying
the enemy's military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States ability to achieve its war aims, as it would
lose international support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia,

employing intermediate-range ballistic missiles including its DF-3, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles, based in Liaoning and
Shandong provinces, which would still be intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear
retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons,
causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of
[hu]mankind.

2AC Impact Ext Space War

Flashpoints are coming now space debris and ASAT testing all mean were
on the brink of space war
Billings 15 [Lee Billings, 8/10/15, War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever, The Scientific
American, Lee is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, Citing Michael
Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center, and James Clapper,
Director of National Intelligence, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-maybe-closer-than-ever]
-edited for languageThe worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran,
Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up
into a clear sky, to the no-mans-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The
emptiness of outer space might be the last place youd expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isnt so
empty anymore. About 1,300

active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide
communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance . For militaries
that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high
ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority
in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that
could cripple [destroy] the entire planets space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in
space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions
are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of
possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last months failure of tension-easing
talks at the United Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and
Russia are both developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict, such as those that might erupt over Chinas military activities in
the South China Sea or Russias in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated the need to interfere with, damage
and destroy U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are many ways to
disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and
spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to
temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellites components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam
or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at
least 5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space
program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the
United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to
opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed
diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely leading to years of further debate within the UNs General Assembly.
The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space, says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms
control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is
willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if
attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from
orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of
mass destruction were banned through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance
became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the
deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested space
mines, self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the
militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administrations multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to
develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear
demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in lowEarth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert
and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how
vulnerable their satellites wereparticularly the ones in geosynchronous orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites
effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could
easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth, both superpowers backed down. Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,
Krepon says. We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites,

because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too. Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and highEarth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60
different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the
growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rulesand they dont have to, because the

rules remain

as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high velocities, so the
quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as
small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite . And if a nation
uses such a kinetic method to destroy an adversarys satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading
into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China
launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived
shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a
ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the
atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was
generated at a much lower altitude. More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground-based
anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is
because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test
occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific
experimentation. But one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe
haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites.

2AC UQ Space Race Coming Now

Arms race now but this card is super right wing and contradicts No Threat
claims
Harrison 4/29/16 (Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, PhD, Allan and Malcom Lockheed and
Glenn Martin Professor of Political Science at the US Air Force Academy, The Invisible Arms
Race, 4/29/16, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/29/the-invisible-arms-race/)
An arms race is under way in spaceinsidious, invisible, and at this point probably inevitable .
The Bush Administrations dream that the United States could control access to earth orbit as the
British had once controlled sea lines of communication has been, as the bureaucrats say,
overtaken by events. So has the Obama Administrations emphasis on international cooperation
(the word appears 13 times in the first few pages of the Administrations 2010 National Space Policy document), an approach that

served chiefly to demonstrate that no international consensus on the future of space exists, and
that none is likely. Even the sensible, if vague and entirely voluntary, Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities floated by the European Union and pushed hard by the State Department for most of a decade found only
tepid support. It was easy for the Chinese and Russians to portray it all as just the latest
example of Western imperialism. Earlier this year, the Code was quietly put to rest. Leading from behind on space, the
United States has been outmaneuvered and left for dead. Not so the Chinese and Russians, who occupy the
diplomatic high ground with their Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space (PPWT), all the time working feverishly to put their own weapons in space, and anywhere
else they might do some damage, including, we can safely assume, in the cyber domain . Dean
Cheng of the Heritage Foundation describes a recent reorganization of the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) structure to emphasize information dominance, defined as the ability to exploit
battlefield information while denying the enemy that same capability. The information satellites
provide is key to power projection; there can be no pivot to Asia without satellites; so disabling
or dismantling our space infrastructure is a high priority for Beijing. Kinetic hit-to-kill weapons
like the one China tested in 2007 and again in recent years are one way of doing this, but hardly
the most efficient. Far better in an informationalized war to ensure that the data satellites gather
and transmit never makes it to the end useror that it arrives there in a form that looks reliable
but isnt. Its the perfect way for a country like China to leap over the present imbalance and
arrive as a fully fledged and dangerous adversary at the next stage of conflict in space. The key
words on this new battlefield are hack, dazzle, jam, and spoof. For their part, the Russians recently tested a
small, maneuverable Luch satellite dangerously near a commercial communication satellite operated by Intelsat Corporation in
geosynchronous orbit. Satellites that can maneuver freely in space have several legitimate functions; they can serve as space tugs,
moving satellites from orbit to orbit, or refuel, inspect, or repair them. They might also be used to shadow national security satellites,
modify their orbits, hit them with a burst of electromagnetic energy, collide with them or perhaps plant listening devices or limpet
mines on them. Ten years from now, space will be filled with small, highly mobile satellites like this, many of them put into orbit by
commercial operators for legitimate purposes, but many others by states for other, less benign reasons. Time to run up the white flag?
Some Pentagon officials dont think so, in large measure because the

White House has quietly changed course in

the face this evolving strategic challenge, first by admitting the problem (there isnt enough
international support for rules of order in space, and meanwhile the bad guys are catching up) and
then by taking steps to do something about it. The vehicle for this change was the 2014 Strategic
Portfolio Review, a bottom up reassessment of space policy that spawned dozens of action items
now in the process of implementation. The Obama Administration hopes its revamped approach to space will provide a
sound legacy for the next Administration and is working hard to build bipartisan support for its continuation and completion. The
White House has forbidden talk of space weapons or space war, so Space Command commander
John Hyten speaks instead of a more muscular defense. Particulars are highly classified, but
enough hints have leaked into the public domain to indicate that muscular defense will include

good deal of kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber offense enough, it would seem, to satisfy
congressional hawks, at least for the moment. Seismic changes are also afoot in how the Pentagon policy leadership
views possible collaborators in space. The Defense Departments key man on space policy, Deputy Assistant Secretary Doug Loverro,
argues that in our space confrontation with the Chinese and Russians we have two trump cards: our greater ability to form alliances,
and a burgeoning and innovative commercial sector that none of our likely adversaries can hope to match. Historically we have been
better at building alliances than the Chinese and Russians, but coalitions depend on trust and a common perception of the threat, which
are lacking in space. Perhaps now we have abandoned our hegemonic ambitions we will regain some of our old coalition-building
chops, but in the meantime our opponents are having some success building coalitions against us, as they did in defeating the EU Code
of Conduct. In particular, any initiatives aimed either explicitly or implicitly at the Chinese in space will have trouble garnering
support. Space-capable nations, excepting Japan and a very few others, simply dont see the Chinese threat as we do. The other
supposed trump in the U.S. hand is more promising. Loverro argues for leveraging the burgeoning and innovative commercial sector
to both multiply our capabilities and complicate the options of those who would dare try to cripple them. Two key figures in this
evolution are former NASA Director Mike Griffen, who made some NASA money available for commercial space start ups, and Elon
Musk, who used that money and a great deal of his own to bring Silicon Valley culture and entrepreneurial flare to the business of
putting things in space. (Watch the video of his Falcon 9 first stage sticking the landing on a barge in the Atlantic to see how well he
has succeeded.) In his considerable wake has come an explosion of commercial enterprises doing things in space that only
governments used to be able to do; in some cases, theyre even doing them better. The

advances in launch, surveillance,

space situational awareness, and miniaturization have been astonishing, far beyond what heritage
industry greybeards were predicting even five years ago. The Pentagon is now moving to take
advantage. Consider space situational awareness (locating and tracking objects in orbit). The gold standard had been the
governments Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB. No more. Frustrated with the lack of data shared by
JSpOC, the big commercial satellite operators formed something called the Space Data Association, which, in collaboration with the
space tracking company AGI, has created a Commercial Space Operations Center (COMsPOC) that can map the location and
movement of satellites more accurately than anyone has before. The Pentagon once tried to discourage all this. Now, like a hopeful
hippo in ballet shoes, it has pivoted to exploit it, announcing earlier this month that the Air Force has signed up to receive a year of
ComSpOC orbital data. In the long run, Air Force leaders hope to turn over responsibility for space traffic management and even GPS
responsibilities to civilian agencies. Civil military cooperation has the potential greatly to improve space situational awareness,
increase the carrying capacity of orbit, and allow the military to concentrate limited resources on the heavier strategic burden of
contested space. The Defense Department thinks public/private collaboration will also improve satellite protection. The idea is to fill
orbit with a multitude of government and commercial satellites providing communication, timing signals, images, and channels for
command and control; then add the satellites of your friends and allies, making your hardware interoperable with theirs. Its a variation
on the nuclear strategy called multiple aim point basing, which is meant to complicate an adversarys targeting options, deny them
the expectation of success, and thereby persuade them not to attack at all. It might be called, if policymakers had a better sense of
irony, the thousand-points-of-light approach to space. The Chinese and Russians can buy commercial services too, of course. In a
sense, everybody will be in the pool. But that will also add to targeting complexity. And they will be burdened by the same autarchic
impulses and corruption that retarded the old Soviet space programs and has just forced the Russian government to bail out the
bankrupt maker of the Proton launch vehicle Thats why all the energy and genius are concentrated here in the United States and, to a
lesser extent, in Europe and Japan. Once the door was opened a crack to free enterprise, it came flooding in. That evolution wont
stop. Taking advantage is no more than making virtue of a necessity. Other, secret things will have to happen too, including the
development and deployment of space and cyber weapons of our own. Captive heritage industry will have a roll to play. But,

Pentagon leaders think, the emerging entrepreneurial market gives us an edge. It would be too much to
say that all elements of the Obama Administration are on board with this new approach, or that it solves all of our problems. In
particular, there seems to be no provision in the new approach for public policy, and no strategy for getting the U.S. government off
the schneid in international forums. In the public arena we have been fumble-footed for a decade at least, searching in vain for
international consensus while the Europeans beat a faint drum for their voluntary code of conduct. Now, with that initiative come to
naught, we can liberate ourselves consensus mongering to pursue our own, more focused national interests. Were not the only ones
with an interest in cosmic order; business investmentwhether in satellite operation, mineral extraction, or space tourismdepends
on it. So does much of the civilized world. If we lead from the front, others will follow. That means insisting on a regime of law in
space, or, rather, resurrecting and updating the one that already exists. It means aggressive diplomacy to put the other guys on the
defensive. They have plenty to be defensive about. The legal basis for this effort has been hidden in plain sight. The Outer Space
Treaty will soon celebrate its fiftieth anniversary still legally untested, partly because some of the things it was intended to prohibit
(like atomic tests on the far side of the moon) were fantasies in the first place, and partly because many activities it was designed to
regulate, like potentially harmful interference in orbit, were never defined. This ambiguity

might seem a weakness,

but in fact is a potential strength: It allows for what might be called creative interpretation.
Congress recently underlined the point by passing a law allowing those who hope to mine
asteroids and the moon to enjoy legal ownership of whatever they find. No one had defined the
Outer Space Treatys ban on national appropriation of objects in space until Congress did, after
which international lawyers pondered and, for the most part, concurred. As with sovereign
appropriation, so with harmful interference . The Bush Administration didnt cite the treaty in its mildly
disapproving commentary on the 2007 Chinese ASAT test, which created the largest space debris field in history. The Obama

Administration ignored the OST in noting the Russian Luch maneuver, although a slight miscalculation could have caused a
collision that would have rendered an orbital position in GEO unusable until the end of time. If these are examples of potentially
harmful interference nothing is, and its past time we said so. We dont say so because of the fear that others will challenge our
behaviorand so they will. Eventually, however, some sort of dialogue may arise from this process of charge and counter charge, as it
did in the Cold War nuclear standoff. In any case, the transparency we have prattled about for the past decade has arrived in a form we
didnt expect but can do little about. Whether

we like it or not, in space all hearts will be open, all desires

known, and very few secrets will be hid. So its time to take advantage by evoking the Outer
Space Treaty, revealing the hypocrisy at the heart of Chinese and Russian space policy, and
reasserting the rule of law. That wont stop an arms race. History teaches that dreams of a
technological breakthrough bestowing a persistent advantage to one side or the other are as
irresistible as they are illusory. Each advance will either be matched or offset in due course.
Eventually, with much treasure sunk, perhaps we can reach some tentative agreements. In the
meantime, we have to get a lot better diplomatically at fighting out of our corner. Aggressive
diplomacy, added to more muscular defense of satellites, would make a good beginning.

2AC Framing Ext

Reps frame policy in the context of space
Grondin, 06 David Grondin Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of
Ottawa (as of July 2006) Paper presented at the ISA Convention, San Diego, March 25, 2006
Panel Reading Outer Space I: The International Politics of Outer Space - Approaches and
Themes THE (POWER) POLITICS OF SPACE: THE US ASTROPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Indeed, we

have no way of knowing how other state leaders and non-state agents will react to US
spatial policy and to a path of weaponization. The security dilemma or a new global arms race in
space remain social constructions and are not automatic responses to a course of action taken by
the US state. Will it be like Roger Handberg fears: that the [w]eaponization of space is the signal for the next arms race, one that
may start slow but inevitably will speed up as other states reject the US claim to permanent dominance? (Handberg 2004: 88)
Indeed, Handberg makes lots of sense to me when he asserts that a healthy skepticism must be exercised when drastic changes in
existing policy positions are considered, especially policies which have not yet failed. Too often, in American defense debates,
technology trumps mere politics with often-unanticipated consequences. The security dilemma is not just an obscure academic
concept but one that reflects real possibilities in terms of outcomes. [] There is an irony in that the analyses assume, especially since
the advent of the George W. Bush administration, that such military space activities, including weaponization, will be approved.
Approval may come but resources may not, given the administrations penchant for tax cuts. Sustaining a level of resource
commitment necessary to maintain the force levels assumed here is questionable in the absence of an explicit and very visible threat
(Handberg 2004: 88). Or will it rather be like the space warriors expect, Dolman and Lambakis especially, that there is an opportunity
to be grasped by the US that will make other actors of the global arena accept an American dominance in space? In my mind, such
view is to be resisted at all costs. In fact, one

must be aware that behind all the rhetoric for space

weaponization and the threat game, other power considerations still pull much weight and the
spectre of a Cold War military-industrial complex is still very much alive. As Lambakis bluntly puts it:
Although it still must guard against the transfer of critical military technologies, capitalism ought to be set loose to advance the
development of satellite technologies and services (including imagery services), which would allow US industry to play its strength
technological innovation and application which in turn would provide the United States significant technologies advantages in the
years ahead (Lambakis 2001: 281; original emphasis). Freedom of Space, Space control, and the Technological As space is
conceived as a common medium, the principle of the freedom of space lasts as long as there is no will to take a step further which is
what space warriors recommend. As they acknowledge, many reasons may motivate a state to develop capabilities to control, if not
dominate or claim ownership over, space orbits (Lambakis 2001: 86; original emphasis). This line of argument is usually linked to
technological capacities. By asserting that other countries operate in Space, that conflicts are natural between humans which
brings the obvious so why would it be different in Space technologies of power take the lead and one is left with devising what
space-control strategy will be best and what one wants to control, for how long, and for what purposes?/ (Lambakis 2001: 281). And
in a context where one portrays the situation as one where US aerospace industry is held back by the rest of the world only for fear of
potential not guaranteed conflicts that will evolve into Space warfighting because of a renewed arms race (Lambakis 2001: 282), the
claim to let technology drive the policy and the political is not disinterested albeit ill-advised and definitely not a sure bet. For

space warriors such as Dolmnan and Lambakis, space weaponization then appears not to be all
related to the security issue but also very much to the maintenance of a strong defense and
aerospace industry. The technological takes over as the political is eclipsed by the military
professionals. In effect, for space warriors, because of national security, if a determination is made that space weapons would
improve national security, further analysis would be required to map out a path to take to introduce these tools in the arsenal and
military strategy and a time line from which to plan (Lambakis 2001: 282). Contrary to US astropolitical analysts ,

I find myself
at fault with the logic of national security and securitization of space that drives US
governmentality, especially with regard to Outer Space. I do not believe that arms control is given
a fair trial by its opponents or even by some of its main defenders in US astropolitical discourse .
For me, the security game is what seems so scary; and if we consider the one assumption of an astropolitical argument such as that of
Lambakis that because of the 9/11 context, one thing is certain we will not be able to bludgeon our enemies into cooperation. For
those times, the United States needs to have in place more assertive means and doctrines to counter hostiles activities in space
(Lambakis 2001: 282; my emphasis). When

people are certain and need enemies to develop one strategy,

cannot be sure of how the events will

then maybe some questions have not been raised. There are unknowns and we

unfold if the US goes further along a path to space weaponization . In any case, it gets even more
problematic when security is trumped with technology for there is no way so it seems to argue
against the desire of global (read absolute) security, especially when it comes from the strongest
of power. You are brought back to the realities of the global homeland security state. One is
doomed to either accept the logic of terror that inexorably goes with the logic of global
security or reject it. I choose the latter. CONCLUSION: THE SECURITIZATION AND AMERICANIZATION OF
SPACE This paper allowed me to address how the frontiers of the US are redefined by the War on Terror as it relates to the US
strategic thinking on Outer Space. What conditions of possibility does 9/11 bring for US astropolitical discourse that were not already
there? This inquiry leads me directly to reconsider the securitization and reterritorialization b project of the last frontier, that is the
attempt to secure Outer Space as an American space. It

is important to rethink the push for space weaponization

and its politics in light of the context of the US Global War on Terror (GWOT), which produced a new security thinking towards
the homeland a homeland strategy of security, a military doctrine of pre- emption/prevention and a reterritorialization of American
frontiers and global power. Outer Space concerns, apparently, the outer frontiers of national security policy, where technology and
grand strategy meet (Krepon 2003). Within

the context of the War on Terror, where US strategic discourse

sees a global terrorist threat as being ever possible, it seems that there can be no exception for
Space. It is even done preventively as a secured space while Others do not exist yet in Space (in
fact, they do, with the International Space Station; but thats another story). In this spatial inscription of
securitization of the American identity in Space, the frontiers of the homeland are made global
and are secured through a representation of dangers (with the exception of debris in Space which they do not
categorize as dangers). This familiar approach to territory and space is inscribed in the identity politics
of the US, a moral practice based on spatial exclusion of Others deemed threatening to secure the
American Self (Campbell 1998 [1992]; Shapiro 1999). By focusing on the Rumsfeld 2001 Space Commission for the
Management of Space in the national security strategy, one sees the application of the same reading that would later come with the
War on Terror. To that effect, a terrorist group or rogue state might try to hinder US spatial assets or those of its allies on which the US
depends militarily and economically. In its 2004 National Military Stragegy, the US thus reaffirmed with force its will to constitute a
global information grid and achieve a full spectrum-dominance in military matters. The US therefore wants to prevent any threat in
Outer Space and protect its spatial activities and that of its allies. Informed by the events of 9/11, space warriors, such as Dolman or
Lambakis, criticize opponents of a US policy for space weaponization as being stuck in a Cold War mindset. They believe a strategy
of pre-emption and a resolve not to wait for the next Pearl Harbor, whether in space, on Earth or in the cyberspace is necessary and
that the US must really be prepared to defend its (global) homeland: How else can one explain [a] statement [such as] as long as we
remain vulnerable and so accessible to our adversaries, their incentives to attack us in space are likely to remain quite low? In the
post-September 11 world, events have underscored that weakness entices those who would do us harms and vulnerability provokes
those who hate us. We need fresh thinking (Lambakis 2003: 118). Space was seen as a sanctuary during the Cold War. But because of
the context of the War on Terror, the US now seems to be ready to go against the second Article of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that
stipulates that Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, orby any other means, the treaty which set out the principle that Space is to be used for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind (Article 1). In effect, since 2001, the US wished to be the one responsible for setting new rules in Outer
Space and for creating the conditions of its military dominance of Space. For instance, the merger of the US Space Command with the
Strategic Command in January 2004 stems from this logic that wishes Space operations to be integrated in all domains of US military
power. Because the US still possesses control over much of the information gathering in Space, it is interested in securitizing and
Americanizing the last frontier, especially in the context of the War on Terror. As it stands, the US neoliberal geopolitics discourse
of the Bush Administration on Space power still leads to Space weaponization. US sovereignty is placed as higher than any other
forms of rule and the US prepares itself militarily, just in case Outer Space would turn into a battlefield. In Donald Rumsfelds words:
Our goal is not to bring war into space, but rather to defend against those who would (Rumsfeld, quoted in Waldrop 2005 [2002]:
39). This participates in the discourse of a global security state that sees Outer Space as the most global of space. Insofar as the
weaponization of space represents the cutting edge and highest ambitions of military primacy, it also represents the height of this
folly (Huntley 2005: 83). If

we consider that political rhetoric creates political reality that may serve as
bases for decisions, it appears fundamental to assess how the US wishes to securitize Outer Space
with its will to achieve full-spectrum dominance in all battlespaces , as stated in the 2004 and 1997 National
Military Strategies. Deeply anchored in the War on Terror cartography, where 9/11 serves as the ultimate justification since one must
prepare militarily for the worst since the worst has happened (or so it goes), the

US places itself in a state of

insecurity by saying that even if no one may inflict them casualty in Space, nothing can guarantee
that it will not happen in the future. This is why they prefer to try this likelihood and securitize Outer Space as part of the
homeland security strategy. The paradox of the securitization and Americanization of Outer Space is

that it could lead to its very opposite by allowing space weaponization to still be possible, if
not inevitable.

The alternative is to rethink the ways in which we engage space. This allows
for a genuine relation to space that allows us to avoid war while engaging in
space cooperatively for the good of all
MacDonald 2007 (Fraser, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies,
University of Melbourne, Anti-Astropolitik outer space and the orbit of geography, SAGE
Publications, Online)
Stephen Graham, following Eyal Weizmann, has argued that geopolitics is a flat discourse (Weizmann, 2002; Graham, 2004: 12). It
attends to the cartographic horizontality of terrain rather than a verticality that cuts through the urban landscape from the advantage of
orbital supremacy. Just as, for Graham, a

critical geopolitics must urgently consider this new axis in order to

challenge the practices and assumptions of urbicide, so too I would argue it must lift its gaze
to the politics of the overhead. Our interest in the vertical plane must extend beyond terrestrial perspectives; we must come
to terms with the everyday realities of space exploration and domination as urgent subjects of critical geographical inquiry. A
prerequisite for this agenda is to overcome our sense of the absurdity and oddity of space, an
ambivalence that has not served human geography well. The most obvious entry point is to think systematically
about some of the more concrete expressions of outer space in the making of Earthly geographies. For instance, many of the highprofile critical commentaries on the recent war in Iraq, even those written from geographical perspectives, have been slow to address
the orbital aspects of military supremacy (see, for instance, Harvey, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Retort, 2005). Suffice

to say that, in
war as in peace, space matters on the ground, if indeed the terrestrial and the celestial can be
sensibly individuated in this way. There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the
translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of
early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces . When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a Space Pearl
Harbor, there is plainly a particular set of historicogeographical imaginaries at work that give
precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbor, most famously in the
aftermath of 11 September 2001; notably, in all these examples Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race
there

lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East.9 All of this is a reminder that the
colonization of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely
an extension of long-standing regimes of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is a
form of return: it represents a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind (Redfield, 2002: 814).
This line of argument supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earths geography (Cosgrove, 2004: 222). We can conceive
of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and
practices (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may,
when linked together, go around the world. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The space of space is
both terrestrial and extraterrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Lisa Parks and Ursula Biemann have described our
relationship with orbits as being about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and
positioning the self (Parks and Biemann, 2003).

It is precisely this relational conception of space that might

helpfully animate a revised geographical understanding of the Outer Earth. As has already been made
clear, this sort of project is by no means new. Just as astropolitics situates itself within a Mackinderian
geographical tradition, so a critical geography of outer space can draw on geographys
earlymodern cosmographical origins, as well as on more recent emancipatory perspectives that might interrogate the
workings of race, class, gender and imperialism. Space is already being produced in and through Earthly regimes of power in ways
that undoubtedly threaten social justice and democracy. A critical geography of space, then, is not some far-fetched or indulgent
distraction from the real world; rather, as critical geographers we

need to think about the contest for outer space

as being constitutive of numerous familiar operations, not only in respect of international
relations and the conduct of war, but also to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the state and
to the lives of its citizenry. Geography is already well placed to think about these things ; there are
many wellworn lines of geographical critique that have their parallel in space. For instance, there are pressing environmental

questions about the pollution of Earths orbit with space junk, a development which is seriously compromising the sustainable use of
Lower Earth Orbit. This high-speed midden, already of interest to archaeologists (see Gorman, 2005), is coming up for its 50th
anniversary in 2007, after the launch of the Russian satellite Sputnik on 4 October 1957. Since then, the sheer variety and number of
discarded objects is remarkable. From lens caps to astronaut faeces, the number of orbiting articles greater than 10 cm in diameter
currently being tracked is over 9000 (Brearley, 2005: 9). The ability to think critically about nature conservation and heritage policy
another aspect of the geographers remit may also have an extraterrestrial transference, as wilderness and fi rst contact paradigms
look set to be mobilized in space (Cockell and Horneck, 2004; Rogers, 2004; Spennemann, 2004). One might further speculate that the
economic geography of outer space would be a rich, if as yet undeveloped, avenue of inquiry. A cultural and historical geography of
space also offers numerous fl ights of fancy, from questions of astronautical embodiment to the politics of planetary representation. All
of this is to say that a

geography of outer space should be a broad undertaking, aside from the obvious
project of a critical geo/astropolitics. Lastly, a critical geography must not be overly pessimistic,
nor must it relinquish an engagement with space technology on the grounds that this has, to
date, been driven largely by military agendas. The means of our critique may require us to
adopt such technologies, or at least to ask what opportunities they present for praxis . One thinks here
of various forms of playful and subversive activism, experiment and art-event that have knowingly toyed with space hardware
(Triscott and la Frenais, 2005; Spacearts, 2006). GPS receivers can help us think refl exively about position (Parks, 2001); remote
sensing can be used to explore political conditions in the world (Parks and Biemann, 2003); amateur radio-telescopy can help us
reconceptualize space by attuning us to the sonorous qualities of its scientifi c data (Radioqualia, 2003); even rocket science can still
carry utopian freight (Chalcraft, 2006). Through such means, can space be given a truly human geography.

We must reconceptualize space politics our interpretation of events in

space is wholly dependent on our mindset
Stuart 9 Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of
Economics and Political Science (Jill, Unbundling sovereignty, territory and the state in outer
space Two approaches From Securing Outer Space, Edited by Borrman and SheeanChapter 1)
In regards to the study of sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space politics, I draw three broad conclusions based on the above
analysis. First, it

is obvious that Westphalian sovereignty as a concept is inadequate for analysing

outer space politics. The concept does not provide a language through which to understand spaces
outside of the traditional territorial state. The concept is as inflexible as the boundaries it
prescribes for states, and alternative approaches must continue to be developed to unbundle the concept itself.
As exemplified by the two approaches taken in this chapter, theoretical approaches that go beyond Westphalian
sovereignty can serve to de-link sovereignty, territory and the state from each other in various
forms. Second, I conclude that theoretical conceptions such as sovereignty precede the meaning with
which we infuse outer space politics, and conversely that outer space exploration is causing
cognitive shifts that lead to changes in our key theoretical concepts. The different visions of outer
space politics that the two theoretical approaches give exemplify how our conceptual frameworks
precede our interpretation of events occurring in outer space -that is, analysis of outer space
politics is in par dependent on our conceptual frameworks and worldviews developed in
regards to wider world politics. Yet I also argue that the unique opportunities and events that outer
space makes available to humans, and the unconventional political, legal and cognitive developments those opportunities
and events inspire, is also influencing political practice and conceptualizations in wider politics.
Thinking about outer space governance can partly be understood in the context of globalization,
as one of many contemporary developments that challenge the role of the state and our perception
of community. However outer space can also be seen as a new area that is also reinforcing changes in that perception, by
providing imagery of the planet as a whole, by providing humans with information about the status of the Earth environment, and by
"shrinking" the planet through technological developments such as satellite communications. While the governance of other global
commons such as the high seas have challenged the conceptualization of traditional sovereignty before, this chapter shows how outer
space re-introduces with some urgency those challenges, and provides new angles to that challenge. In line with the previous
conclusion, and as emphasized at earlier points in the chapter, my third conclusion is that exogenous

events and humandriven developments in outer space will continue to influence our understanding of sovereignty ,
both in space and in wider world politics, in the future. A major exogenous event or technological development could
significantly change outer space politics, and indeed something like an asteroid would then also influence world

politics more broadly conceived. However, barring such a major event, the

relationship between sovereign practice in

outer space and our understanding of that sovereignty are likely to continually and dialectically re-constitute
each other, as outer space continues to pose unique governance and conceptual challenges. Power political trends, such as
indicated by George W. Bush's space control policy, could in fact reinforce realpolitik, although likely still in the context
of increased globalization and diversification of actors in world politics. Or (and particularly in the longer term) outer space
may continue to reinforce liberal and cosmopolitan trends that more explicitly undermine
Westphalian sovereignty. The analysis of sovereignty in outer space is dependent on
conceptualizations and developments occurring on earth, in outer space, and by the dialectical relationship
between the two. The International Space Station exemplifies the complex relationship between power politics and the state on the one
hand, and cosmopolitan ideals and interdependence in outer space politics on the other. The two approaches taken here offer different
understandings (and methodologies) for interpreting where sovereignty has been in the past, for how it can be understood in the
present, and for where it is (and should be) going in the future. For the contemporary theorist, a fair understanding comes from
appreciating both, in the context of the complex and unique politics of outer space.

dominance in all battlespaces, as stated in the 2004 and 1997 National Military Strategies. Deeply anchored in the War on
Terror cartography, where 9/11 serves as the ultimate justification since one must prepare militarily for the worst since the worst has
happened (or so it goes), the

US places itself in a state of insecurity by saying that even if no one may

inflict them casualty in Space, nothing can guarantee that it will not happen in the future. This is why
they prefer to try this likelihood and securitize Outer Space as part of the homeland security strategy. The paradox of the
securitization and Americanization of Outer Space is that it could lead to its very opposite
by allowing space weaponization to still be possible, if not inevitable.

2AC AT Power = Zero sum

AT Zero sum power its not
Pan 14 [Chengxin Pan, 14 Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the Power
Shift Narrative, Asian Perspective: 38(3) pp. 387-410, Senior Lecturer in IR @ Deakin
University, pgs 65-66]
Second, power

is always relational and contextual (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Hagstrom 2005; Piven 2008; Guzzini
power instrument becomes a potential power resource only if its
control is seen to be valued by other actors in the interaction . Power comes out of this relation, not
from the power holder alone. Relational and contextual power may be best understood not in
terms of its quantifiable capabilities, but within its specific social contexts. The same amount of
2013). As Guzzini (2013, 24) notes, any

capability may not translate into the same degree of power or achieve the same effect within different relationships or domains. With
the acceleration of globalization and expansion of global production networks, even the state rarely stands still .

As the state
becomes more internationalized or globalized, its power may change in quality as well as
quantity (Cox 1987; Agnew 2003, 78-9). As a consequence, national power is not only less receptive to
objective measurement, but is also less national in nature . Certainly this does not imply the end of the nationstate, nor is the world quite as flat as Thomas Friedman (2007) has famously asserted. Nevertheless, the national boundaries
of power, if there are such things, are becoming more blurred and flattened. In short, it has become problematic to
invoke the sharp-edged notions of national economy and state power or, for that matter, the perceivedcongruence between the two. If
power has no independently verifiable quantity, then power relations are rarely zero-sum, unless
they are imagined as such and acted upon accordingly. In reality, power takes on an interdependent dimension,
which, among other things, means that [w]hat some have lost, others have not gained (Strange 1996, 14). It also means that power
cuts both ways, a phenomenon Anthony Giddens calls the dialectic of control in social systems (1986, 16). This
is true even in seemingly asymmetric relationships, such as those between landlords and tenants, state elites and voting publics,
husbands and wives, priests and their parishioners, and masters and slaves (Piven 2008). Given that power

is not always
neatly distributed in proportion to the distribution of capabilities, a shift in the latter may not
necessarily mean a corresponding shift in the former. Furthermore, a states relational power is not
merely a reflection of its position in the distribution of capabilities across states (Waltz 1979); it also
bears the imprint of global political economic structures. In this sense, a small countrys power
against potential aggression may be greater than its defense capabilities might indicate, thanks to
its intersubjectively recognized sovereignty in the international system. Meanwhile, with structurallyderived relational power also comes structural vulnerability. As we know well in domestic politics , independent members
who hold the balance of power in parliament gain power primarily because of their contingent
structural position, and by the same token, their power is susceptible to changes of that structure.
Power in the international system is no exception.

OFFCASE

2AC AT: T Diplomatic Engagement

Space cooperation is a form of diplomatic engagement
Stewart 15 (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.
2015 Space Resiliency Summit, Mary M. Gates Learning Center. Mallory Stewart, Dec 9, 2015.
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/250567.htm)
Protecting the national security of the United States and its allies by preventing conflict from
extending into space and avoiding or deterring purposeful interference with our space systems is
a major goal of our diplomatic engagements. This goal is described in the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy which
makes clear that it is not in anyones interest for armed conflict to extend into space. The 2010 Policy also states that purposeful
interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nations rights There are
two main diplomatic approaches to achieving this goal: (1) we are strengthening space cooperation and information sharing with allies
and partners to enhance collective space situational awareness and maximize the interoperability and redundancy of our space assets,
and (2) we are encouraging the development of best practices and norms of responsible behavior in the space faring community to
enhance resiliency through the prevention of mishaps, misperceptions, and the chances of miscalculation. The first category

of our diplomatic engagement strives to gain international suppor t for common ends, including
sharing space derived information to support ongoing operations. It also prepares the way for
closer military-to-military cooperation to address mutual threats and to develop capabilities with
shared compatibility standards (and thus greater redundancy in the event of a failure). One mechanism we use to
discuss cooperative approaches with our allies and space partners is through space security
dialogues. The State Department currently has 15 bilateral and multilateral dialogues around the world. These dialogues address
each sides understanding of the threat, and include discussions of our respective diplomatic and national security goals. Such
discussions are critical in developing common positions on issues such as the benefits and
challenges of transfers of dual-use technologies or on the development of common positions
related to rules of behavior in outer space. Such discussions are also a useful format for discussing further ways of
strengthening technical cooperation that could assist with the goal of increasing resiliency. That is why the Department of State works
closely with the Department of Defense to strengthen international cooperation in satellite communications and space-based maritime
domain awareness. Tomorrow, I will be co-chairing an EU space security dialogue with our EU counterparts to address space security
cooperation. These kinds of engagements, coupled with our ongoing discussions with the European Union on opportunities for U.S.
Government users to access the full range of the EUs positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services, are a great example of the
types of cooperation we seek with our allies and partners. A final example of this type of diplomatic engagem ent,

is the expansion of Space Situational

Awareness, or SSA, through SSA information sharing agreements and arrangements with foreign partners. International
for which the State Department and the Department of Defense work in tandem,

cooperation on SSA is crucial, as international partnerships multiply capabilities, expertise, and geographical advantages.

Furthermore, international cooperation enables us to improve our space object databases and
pursue common international data standards and data integrity measures. To date, the United States has
signed 11 bilateral SSA agreements and arrangements with national governments and international intergovernmental organizations,
and 51 with commercial entities. And we will continue to pursue opportunities for cooperation on SSA with other nations and
nongovernmental space operators around the world. The more we can establish a collective picture of what is happening in space, the
more secure we can be in the safety of our own assets. The second category of the State Departments

diplomatic engagement includes the promotion of the responsible use of outer space. Specifically,
we aim to further enhance space resiliency through the multilateral development and
implementation of voluntary guidelines for space activities. These guidelines can include, for example,
establishing appropriate communication and consultation mechanisms and national
regulatory frameworks, providing contact information for information exchanges among
space owners and operators, and implementing practical measures to eliminate harmful
radiofrequency interference.

2AC AT: CP
Cooperation in the lens of conflict prevention guarantees war and
containment
Pan 4prof school of international and political studies, Deakin U. PhD in pol sci and IR
(Chengxin, The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of
other as power politics, 1 June 2004, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asiachina/796470-1.html)
the real problem is that, so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization
security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough . For instance, Iain Johnston views the constructive development of
China's arms-control policy as a kind of "realpolitik adaptation," rather than "genuine learning." (92) From this perspective, however China has changed, it would
remain a fundamentally threatening other, which the United States cannot live with but has to take full control of. I have argued above that the "China
threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction
of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a
positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these
frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly
into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not
only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a
policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line
stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001
spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it
And yet,

of absolute

did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93)

Military dialogue fails China not willing to budge on issues despite dialogue
Neill and Choong 16 [Alexander Neill and William Choong, 6/14/16, China is sailing solo
on South China Sea issues, despite its claims to the contrary, Insight and Opinion, writers for the
South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1975001/china-sailing-solo-south-china-sea-issues-despite-its-claims]
Inevitably, however, the dialogues debate focused on the South China Sea. As tension increases in both the South and East China
seas, the escalation-management protocols between China and the US and its allies will be tested. China recently sailed a navy
warship for the first time into the waters surrounding Japans disputed Senkaku islands. In the skies above the East China Sea, the US
and Japanese air patrols have been harassed recently at close quarters by Chinese jet fighters. Worryingly, it appears that China, facing
increasing international isolation, is prepared to escalate the dispute to unprecedented levels. This does not bode well for Chinas
reaction to a case that the Philippines has brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning Manilas territorial dispute
with China in the South China Sea. The ruling is expected to be announced in late July or August, and many believe the findings will
largely fall in Manilas favour. The

Chinese military delegation came to the dialogue with no flexibility in

their position on the South China Sea. Admiral Sun Jianguo (), the deputy chief of the
joint staff of the Peoples Liberation Army, gave a disturbingly loud and defiant speech in a
delivery targeted as much at a domestic audience as at an international one. The American message
delivered by US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter was designed to rebut Chinas accusations of cold war mentality, and give
assurance that the US would remain the pre-eminent guarantor of regional security. Recently, for example, US President Barack
Obama said the US would lift a long-standing ban on weapons exports to Vietnam. In the same vein, Carter called for China to avoid
building a great wall of self-isolation. Such language is in tune with recent statements elsewhere by the US leadership describing
how Chinas coercion has driven regional players into Americas embrace Carter used the term principled 37 times to describe a
regional security network consisting of like-minded countries. Adding weight to his message, defence ministers from countries such as
Britain, Canada, France, South Korea and Singapore also echoed variations of his principled security network theme. Past

clashes between China and the US at the dialogue have revolved around issues such as the PLAs
lack of transparency and US arms sales to Taiwan. But the current Sino-US tension over the
South China Sea underscores a deeper dynamic an ongoing contest for power and influence in

the Asia-Pacific and a nascent security dilemma. Chinese arguments over its position in the South
China Sea have some merit. Contrary to American fears about Chinas reclamation and military
build-up in the South China Sea, PLA Major General Yao Yunzhu (), speaking at the dialogue, said that freedom of
navigation for commercial vessels there has not been challenged and would not be challenged. This is true; as she argues, China
and the US have different views regarding the movement of military vessels within exclusive
economic zones and territorial seas, but this does not affect commercial navigation.

The CP cant solve broader cooperation earthly issues are

compartmentalized proven by recent economic talks
Nash 6/18 [Rafael Nash, 6/18/16,Annual dialogue moves China-US ties forward, Sacred
Heart, http://sacredheartspectrum.com/2016/06/annual-dialogue-moves-china-us-ties-forward/]
Speaking after high-level talks between U.S. and Chinese officials in Beijing, Lew told Reuters:
"China has committed to ensure that its central government policies and support do not target net
expansion of steel capacity; and to actively and appropriately wind down "zombie enterprises"
through a range of efforts, including restructuring and bankruptcy". But the two sides failed to reach
consensus on what to do about China's aluminum producers, which are among the industries exporting its products too cheaply to
sustain fair competition. In

his address, Kerry referred to concerns over nuclear proliferation specially

relating to North Korea. Kerry, meanwhile, said the countries' relationship was "absolutely vital".
He called the dialogue an opportunity to "seek creative ways to narrow them, or eliminate them
altogether".

The CP cant solve broader cooperation earthly issues are

compartmentalized recent cyber security dialogues prove
Bin 16 [Luo Bin, 6/14/16, China, US to Sit for Second Dialogue on Cybercrime Fight,
CriEngligh, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/06/14/3746s930734.htm]
Chinese and U.S. officials will meet in Beijing on Tuesday for a second high-level joint dialogue
on cybercrime. The dialogue will involve cybersecurity desktop maneuvers, a hot line and law enforcement exchange, the
Ministry of Public Security said on Monday. The first dialogue was held in Washington in December,
following agreement between Chinese President Xi Jinping with his U.S. counterpart Barack
Obama during Xi's state visit to the U.S. in September. At the first dialogue, the two sides reached
agreement on cooperation guidelines, experience sharing and the establishment of a hot line. Law
enforcement authorities jointly resolved a child pornography case in February following the dialogue. China is one of the biggest
victims of cybercrime and must improve its capabilities through International cooperation, said Zhao Liang, an Internet technology
expert. With

more cooperation with the United States and other countries, China can foster an
Internet governance system that protects the interests of all and respects national sovereignty, said
Prof. Shen Yang of Tsinghua University.

2AC AT: Tech Transfer DA

Tech Transfers are empirically denied and are a 2 way street
Day 08 [Dwayne, Writer for the Space Review, The China Gambit
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1042/2, 1/21/08]
With regards to technology transfer this issue can be managed. It has been managed before.
During the lead-up to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in the early 1970s, the intelligence
community and the Department of Defense conducted several studies of the dangers of
technology transfer to the Soviet Union. They concluded that the risks were minimal and could
be controlled. Those studies have been declassified and could serve as a guide for an
approach to China. Certainly the situation is somewhat different, as there is a greater disparity
between American and Chinese space technology today than there was between the United States and
the Soviet Union in the 1970s. But we do not have to give the Chinese blueprints to the Space

Shuttle or ballistic missile guidance technology in order to allow them to rendezvous with
the ISS. All foreign visitors to NASA facilities are escorted anyway, so Chinese engineers
will not be wandering the halls of the Johnson Space Center, bugging the telephones and
cracking the safes. Besides, technology transfer is a two-way street: it will also give the
United States insight into Chinese space technology; we will learn more about what they are
doing when we are actually talking to their scientists and engineers.

China wont steal tech this fear causes the arms race
Johnson-Freese 15 (Joan. Feb 18, 2015. Johnson-Freese is Professor of National Security Affairs
at the Naval War College, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review
Commission. Chinas Space & Counterspace Programs, February 18, 2015)
While missile defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since 2007, the potential threat to the space
environment in non-test circumstances has become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the frightening
realization by all countries of the fragility of the space environment. With

regard to China specifically, since this

2007 test China has done nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside
the norms set by the United States. Mankinds dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best interests of all
spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that environment. China was scheduled to host an international meeting of the InterAgency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) only days after its 2007 ASAT test that significantly worsened space debris,
resulting in China cancelling the meeting out of embarrassment. There is a certain (understandable) glee in the U.S. military, which
has the most sophisticated government space tracking abilities, at being able to warn China of potential collisions between its own
space junk and its own satellites.44 More recent constructive Chinese involvement with the IADC indicates recognition of

need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant issues, particularly the space debris issue.45 These
are the type of common ground issues that provide opportunities to work with all spacefaring nations to protect the
congested, contested and competitive space environment. U.S. emphasis on counterspace is often

presented as in response to actions and intentions of other countries , specifically China, presumably recent.
Increasingly, however, it seems speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material not publically
shared, making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to
assess. For example, to my knowledge China has done nothing since its admittedly irresponsible
2007 ASAT test that goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible
behavior. Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency, confidence-building measures, toward
identifying common ground among all space-faring nations, and resiliency for military systems
(NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same energy and commitment as counterspace operations.
Otherwise, just as efforts to isolate Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas
such as export control, the unintended consequences of a principally deter, defend, defeat

strategy could trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at
significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security. With regard to the resilience, specifically the purview
of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), resilience has faced
resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms control, just too
difficult.46 The Air Force appears to be taking the time honored approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as a lack of interest on the part of
Pentagon leaders. He stated, While

everyone recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at

all levels of conflict, from low to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal
on a target. So it doesnt attract much interest from senior leader s.47 Counterspace, however, offers that sexy
option.

China can match US tech without cooperation

Turner 15 (Ronald E. May 6, 2015. Turner is a Distinguished Analyst at Analytic Services Inc.,
Should the United States Cooperate with China in Space?,, http://www.anser.org/babrief-uschina-space-coop)
The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly makes sense to carefully restrict access to
technologies that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military threat, but
excessive efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of the United States. Denying

the Chinese access to

U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat of Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese will
continue to acquire the necessary capabilities either from the international space community or
by developing the capabilities themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral to whether the
application is overtly military or civilian.) This path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded
over the past decade and the advances we anticipate in the decades ahead . Indeed, by developing
their own space manufacturing infrastructure, the Chinese can become increasingly competitive
in the world market. China is increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and
European nations. This supports the technological advancements and economies of those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry,
which is hurt in two ways: it cannot compete for bilateral U.S.-Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to international missions
are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese participation in or access to those missions. As the Chinese increase their reliance on
space systems, they will be less inclined to employ counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military space
systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other means) will also take out their own systems. The Chinese
may be less inclined to develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this could lead to a
counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.

2AC AT: Prolif DA - General

Fear of proliferation invokes orientalist tropes that legitimize mass violence--vote negative to problematize their simplistic accounts of nuclear history
Shampa Biswas 8, prof of IR @ Whitman, Nuclear Apartheid As Political Position: Race As A
Postcolonial Resource?, http://asrudiancenter.wordpress.com/2008/11/07/nuclear-apartheid-aspolitical-position-race-as-a-postcolonial-resource/
Nuclear Apartheid: Race in the Global Order The nuclear-apartheid argument has been invoked fairly regularly in the public speeches of Indian political leaders and

the division between nuclear haves and nuclear havenots within a discriminatory and flawed nonproliferation regime that sets differentiated standards of national security creates a
a sort of international nuclear apartheid. (36) To use the word apartheid is clearly to use a racial signifier, and one that carries with it a certain
policymakers. As is pointed out by external-affairs minister Jaswant Singh,

contemporary political resonance, given the very recent shameful history of the complicity of many First World states with the racist regime in South Africa. Under very different
circumstances no doubt, the nuclear-apartheid argument is in one sense an attempt then to point to the continuing exclusions and marginalizations faced by people of color in Third
World countries in a global order dominated and controlled by privileged whites in First World countries. Now it is clear that this black/white distinction is problematic. Not only
can China, as one of the nuclear five, clearly not be categorized in the latter category, but it is also problematic, for reasons that will become clearer later, to conflate state
boundaries with racial boundaries, despite the racial implications of all boundary-making exercises. However, the articulation of whiteness with power is deep and compelling
for many and draws on a particular postcolonial logic. Let us, for instance, hear the words of a scholar on Indian security writing just before the Indian tests: There continues to
exist three White nuclear weapons states as part of the Western alliance to which in all likelihood a fourth one, Russia, may be added when its Partnership for Peace merges
into NATO. It may be recalled that following the Indian atomic test of 1974, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan had reportedly said that there was a Christian bomb (US,
Britain and France), a Marxist bomb (Soviet Union and China), a Jewish bomb (Israels bombs-in-the-basement) and now a Hindu bomb (India), but no Muslim bomb. Likewise,
India could possibly complain now that there were four White bombs, one Yellow or Beige bomb, but no Brown or Black bombs, an unfair and unacceptable situation. While
China may continue to show some defiance against the policies of the West on occasion, the nuclear distribution indicated the continuing domination of the traditional White
imperialists in an overwhelmingly non-White world. (37) Similarly, J. Mohan Malik, in reference to the nuclear-apartheid position says that an unstated reason behind Indias
nuclear ambivalence had been the belief that the possession of nuclear weapons by white nations implied their racial and technological superiority that could not go
unchallenged. (38) It is this sense of racial discrimination in a postcolonial world that is invoked by a BJP spokesman when he says, We dont want to be blackmailed and treated

Nuclear apartheid, as deployed by

Indian leaders, quite simply points to not just the existence of an unequal global distribution of nuclear resources, but the legitimization and
institutionalization of that inequality through the terms of contemporary international treaties such as the
as oriental blackies. (39) Let us examine more closely what discrimination the nuclear apartheid position precisely points to.

NPT and the CTBT. Let us hear Jaswant Singh on this issue: If the permanent fives possession of nuclear weapons increases security, why would Indias possession of nuclear
weapons be dangerous? If the permanent five continue to employ nuclear weapons as an international currency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its own
state power and national security? Why admonish India after the fact for not falling in line behind a new international agenda of discriminatory nonproliferation pursued largely
due to the internal agendas or political debates of the nuclear club? If deterrence works in the Westas it so obviously appears to, since Western nations insist on continuing to
possess nuclear weaponsby what reasoning will it not work in India? (40) On the face of it, such an argument is hard to dispute. Clearly, both treaties recognize a clear

the unequal burdens placed on those two groups to contribute to a

makes one wonder about the criteria that makes any particular group of countries more
worthy of or more capable of or more responsible in possessing weapons that seem dangerous when they
proliferate to others. Within a national-security problematic, the pressures that impinge on France to acquire nuclear weapons to ward off the dangers of an
distinction between those able to possess nuclear weapons and those that are not. Further,
nuclear-free world

anarchic world are surely not in any demonstrably clear fashion any greater than those that impinge on India. (41) In the words of the Indian minister for external affairs, It cannot
be argued that the security of a few countries depends on their having nuclear weapons, and that of the rest depends on their not. (42) If security is indeed high politics, then the
question of the affordability of nuclear weapons by an underdeveloped country like India should also be moot. If being secure is always the foremost priority, then a poor
Indias expensive nuclear program should make senseunless the life of poor people is cheap. Moreover, if deterrence is the product of state rationality, then the horrific calculus
of mutual destruction should operate as smoothly to prevent nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent (where contiguous territory only magnifies the horror) as it does in the

The creeping suspicion that the accentuated fear of nuclear disaster in South Asia,
expressed in different versions of the South Asian Tinderbox argument, are reflections of more deepseated prejudices about the irrationality of barbaric peoples in the Third World is hard to
avoid. Hence, Pratap Bhanu Mehta attributes the popularity of the tests for Indians to the politics of cultural representationa general perception of the unstated
assumption in global nuclear discourse that the subcontinent is full of unstable people with deep
historical resentments, incapable of acting rationally or managing a technologically sophisticated arsenal. (44) However, this is
not to discount the significance of issues such as the historical relations between India and Pakistan or the underdevelopment of a command,
control, communications, and intelligence system in either countrywhich add new and important dimensions to the possibility of a South Asian nuclear conflict but to
problematize the manner in which they function within a particular discourse to create certain
kinds of possibilities and foreclose others. For instance, I believe that the historical relationship between India and Pakistan is certainly pivotal to
understanding the nuclear dynamic between these two states, but it is also important to point out that the dominant historical narrative of the US
role in World War II has imparted a certain aura of responsibility to the US decision to use an atomic bomb, so that the United States
unique position as the only country ever to have used a nuclear weapon is rendered beyond ethical
reproach, while Indias mere possession of it becomes questionable. Why, after all, does the
European theater. (43)

possession of around one hundred or so nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan cause the kind of stir that
the more than ten thousand nuclear warheads, many on active alert, in the United States hardly ever
invoke? If such a sense of (un)safety is not simply a product of the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also has to do with whom these weapons proliferate to (hence,
the much greater focus on horizontal, rather than vertical, proliferation in these treaties), then what prejudiced criteria make the P-5 unthreatening to, and indeed in some renditions
the guarantors of, safety in a way not deemed possible for other countries? (45) Why, if it is not about a certain kind of racism, do treaties like the NPT and CTBT that do
legitimize both structural inequities and the presuppositions that make those possible, not appear preposterous to scholars, commentators, and activists who find progress in the

the strategic objectives of treaties like the NPT and CTBT have
less to do with peace and more with maintaining a monopoly of nuclear violence, a monopoly that is
not just fundamental to the undemocratic nature of the world order but can be used to sustain
and maintain the hegemony of a few states ? (46) In this sense, then, the nuclear-apartheid argument does need to be taken
seriously. Not only does it point to the hypocrisy inherent in the disarmament position taken by powerful countries
but it also points to orientalist assumptions that underlie both such positions and the responses generated by
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Third World countries . The argument also indicates the existence of an international
institutionalization of international norms? Is it not possible to argue that

hierarchy that, even when it is recognized, is accepted somewhat unproblematically by those within NWSs quick to condemn India and Pakistan without simultaneously
condemning the P-5. (47) Even if one accepts that there is a middle ground between what is seen as the impossibility of complete global disarmament and the horror of

the nuclearapartheid argument does call on us to interrogate how indeed what becomes realistic within this
terrain of the middle ground is produced through the workings of power in the international
realm. This is one sense in which the nuclear-apartheid argument does make it possible to unsettle some of the taken-forgranted in accounts of international relations. While its political-strategic use by Indian leaders is largely directed at a domestic constituency that can find a
unrestricted proliferation, and that this middle ground of some kind of realistic arms-control arrangement is certainly more attractive than its absence,

compelling postcolonial logic in this symbol of discrimination and racial condescension, (48) it behooves IR scholars to take seriously and pay close attention to the claims made in
and through this symbol. Is it precisely the silence on race within IR that both enables its use as a postcolonial resource by Indian political leaders and constrains scholars from
interrogating critically (without dismissing it or accepting it at its face value) the claims of that position?

Tech transfers non unique and unlikely-cooperation with Russia proves and
oversight prevents transfer
Johnson 14 [Andrew M. Andrew M. Johnson writes on cybersecurity, sensitive technology and the aerospace industry.
March 24, 2014. Time for U.S. To Collaborate with China in Space. Space News. http://spacenews.com/39961time-for-us-tocollaborate-with-china-in-space/. SH]

There are several inconsistencies inherent in the threat-based rationale on which the restrictions
have been predicated. The existence of significant risk associated with sensitive technology
transfer during NASA-CNSA collaboration embodies the assumption that the Chinese government itself
would use CNSA as a vehicle for carrying out activities to nefarious ends . But by making this assumption
about the NASA-CNSA relationship, Congress is implicitly making the same assumption about other
technology-intensive agencies of the federal government like the Department of Energy (DoE) and National
Institutes of Health (NIH). Curiously, Congress doesnt seem to care about the supposed sensitive technology risk when it comes to

the DoE and NIH, which both cooperate bilaterally with their Chinese counterparts. If sensitive
technology transfer is the concern, the potential theft of the commercial applications of
proprietary technologies in development by these two government agencies dwarf those in
development at NASA. As for the cyberespionage concern, adequate security against Chinese hackers is
the responsibility of the U.S. intelligence community. As such, cyberespionage remains a significant
threat whether or not NASA is ever permitted to collaborate with China, and it remains to be seen
how the vulnerability of U.S. networks would be intensified under a collaborative effort with
China. The voices that have tirelessly echoed these concerns blatantly ignore the possibility of the
establishment of a third-party regulatory body that could bring enhanced transparency and
oversight to NASA-CNSA collaboration. This arm of the government could effortlessly be created and
immediately be put in place to address the concerns of those opposed to cooperation for whatever
reason. It should be pointed out that the risks of bilateral cooperation with China (assuming they exist) would
differ very little from those that must also be implicit in bilateral cooperation with Russia. U.S.Russia collaboration in space exists and flourishes and is for the most part decoupled from the
political divide that differentiates the two countries in general politics . Obviously, human rights concerns,

the threat of cyberespionage and disagreements over how to handle tensions in Syria, Iran and Ukraine have not prevented us from
collaborating with the Russian space agency, Roscosmos, and rightly so. Both parties recognize that our mutual interests on
everything from nuclear proliferation to terrorism and space exploration are worth making the painful compromises that we must
on issues where we disagree. In the same way, a similar approach can and should be taken with China.

2AC AT: Prolif DA - Iran

Irans not aggressive.
Pillar 15 (6/8, Paul, PhD, non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for
Security Studies, nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century
Security and Intelligence, 28 year veteran of the CIA, No, Iran Isnt Destabilizing the Middle
East, http://www.lobelog.com/no-iran-isnt-destabilizing-the-middle-east/)
Focus instead on the
image of an Iran whose current regional policy supposedly is already an assortment of destructive
activities. This image has become the kind of conventional wisdom that repeatedly gets invoked (even, in this instance, by supporters of the nuclear
agreement) without any felt need by those who invoke it to provide any supporting facts or analysis because it is
taken for granted that everyone knows it to be true. The references to the image are almost always vague and
general, couched in terms of Iran supposedly destabilizing the Middle East or seeking to
dominate it or exercise hegemony over it, or that it is on the march to take over the region. Often there are references to
terrorism and subversion without anything more specific being offered. Often the names of
conflict-ridden countries in the region are recited, but again without any specifics as to who is
doing what in those countries.
But set aside for the moment all the logical inconsistencies and other reasons to reject the notion of an Iranian regional marauder as a reason to oppose the nuclear agreement.

what exactly is Iran doing in the Middle East that is of concern; and (2)
how does what Iran is doing differ from what other states are doing in the same places? A careful
comparison of this sort leads to the conclusion that Iran, contrary to the conventional wisdom, does not stand out
in doing aggressive, destabilizing, or hegemonic things.
To get away from such uselessly general accusations, ask: (1)

Iran is one of the largest states in the Middle East and naturally, as with any such state, competes for influence in its
region. To try to keep any such state, be it Iran or any other, from competing for such influence would be futile and
damaging in its own right. To label Iranian policy as seeking hegemony or domination is only
thati.e., applying a labelwhen others are using more forceful and destructive ways of trying to extend their own influence in the same places. Iran, unlike others, has not
launched wars or invaded neighboring territory (except in counterattacking during the war with Iraq that Saddam Hussein started). Nor has
Iran drawn, China-like, any nine-dash lines and asserted unsupported domination over swaths of its own
region.
he assumption that just about anything Iran does in the Middle East is contrary to U.S. interests
keeps getting made despite what should be the glaringly obvious counterexample of the war in
Iraq. Iran and the United States are on the same side there. They both are supporting the government of Iraq in trying to push back the radical group
generally known as ISIS. Why should Irans part of this effort be called part of regional trouble-making, while
the U.S. part of it is given some more benign description? Those in the United States who would rather not face that
counterexample are usually quick to mutter something like, Yes, but the Iranians are doing this for their own
malign purposes of spreading their influence in Iraq. The first thing to note in response to such muttering is that if we are worried
about increased Iranian influence in Iraq, that increase is due chiefly not to anything the Iranians
have done but rather to a war of choice that the United States initiated.
T

The preeminent Iranian objective

regarding Iraq is to avoid anything resembling the incredibly costly Iran-Iraq War, and to have a
regime in Baghdadpreferably friendly to Iran, but at least not hostile to itthat would not launch such a conflict again. Iran
also does not want endless instability along its long western border, and its leaders are smart enough to
realize that narrowly prejudicial sectarian politics are not a prescription for stability . These
lines of thinking are consistent with U.S. interests; it is not only in the current fight against ISIS that U.S. and Iranian interests converge.
The next thing is to ask on behalf of what interests the Iranians would use their influence in Iraq, and how that relates to U.S. interests.

the
United States probably has as much explaining to do as to why it has taken the side it hasthe same side
as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most capable and threatening Al-Qaeda branch
operating todayas Iran does. Iran has become identified with the side of the rebellious Houthi movement,
Look carefully also at another conflict-ridden Middle Eastern state whose name often gets casually invoked: Yemen. Iran and the United States are not on the same side of this civil war, although

although the most prominent Yemeni leader on the same side as the Houthis is Ali Abdullah Saleh, who as the Yemeni president for more than thirty years was seen as our guy in Yemen, not the Iranians guy.

Iran did not instigate the Houthi rebellion, nor are the Houthis accurately described as clients of
Iran much less proxies, as they often inaccurately are. Instead Iran was probably a source of
restraint in advising the Houthis not to capture the capital of Sanaa , although the Houthis went ahead and did it anyway. The
Iranians probably are glad to see the Saudis bleed some in Yemen, and whatever aid Tehran has given to the Houthis was given with that in mind. But any such aid pales in
comparison to the extent and destructiveness of the Saudis intervention in Yemen, which has included aerial
assaults that have caused many hundreds of civilian casualties.
In the same vein consider Bahrain, which is an interesting case given historical Iranian claims to Bahrain and past Iranian activity there. Despite that background and despite Bahraini government accusations, there is
an absence of reliable evidence of anything in recent years that could accurately be described as Iranian subversion in Bahrain. Instead it is again the Saudis who have used forceful methods to exert their influence on
a neighbor, and in this case to prop up an unpopular Sunni regime in a Shia majority country. The principal Saudi military intervention in Bahrain came a few years ago, but it was an early shot in a campaign that has
taken fuller shape under King Salman to use any available means, including military force, to expand Saudi influence in the region. If there is a Persian Gulf power that has been using damaging methods to try to
become a regional hegemon, it is Saudi Arabia, not Iran.
The Saudis could claim to be acting on behalf of a status quo in Bahrain and Yemen, but then what about Syria, where it is Iran that is backing the existing regime? And as perhaps the most germane question,

how can any one of the outside players that have mucked into that incredibly complicated civil
war be singled out as a destabilizing regional marauder while the others (some of whom, such as the United States and Israel,
have conducted their own airstrikes in the country) be given the benefit of more benign labeling? Iran did not start the Syrian
war. And each of the most significant sides fighting that war are dominated by what we normally would consider certifiable
bad guys: the Assad regime, ISIS, and an Islamist coalition led by the local Al-Qaeda branch. It is hard to see a clear and convincing basis for
parceling out benign and malign labeling here when it comes to the outside players .
Then of course there is the rest of the Levantine part of the region , including Palestine; the aid relationships that Iran has had with the H
groupsHezbollah and Hamasare continually invoked in any litany of Iranian regional activity. Lebanese Hezbollah certainly is still an important ally of Iran, although it has long since become strong enough to
outgrow any Iranian hand-holding. We should never forget that prior to 9/11 Hezbollah was the group that had more U.S. blood on its hands through terrorism than any other group. We also should understand that
Hezbollah has become a major player in Lebanese politics in a way in which many in the region, including its immediate political opponents, accept it as a legitimate political actor. Right now as a military actor it is
deeply involved in the effort to support the Syrian regime, and it is not looking to stir up any new wars or instability anywhere else.
Hamas has never been anything remotely resembling a proxy of Iran, although it has accepted, somewhat reluctantly, Iranian aid in the absence of other help. To Iran, Hamas represents Palestinian resistance to Israeli
occupation of (or blockading and subjugation of) Palestinian territory, without being an accessory to that occupation, which is how the Palestinian Authority is widely seen. Hamas is the winner of the last free
Palestinian election, and it has repeatedly made clear that its ambition is to hold political power among Palestinians and that it is willing to maintain a long-term truce with Israel. Right now Hamas is trying,

none of this is a conflict that Iran

has instigated or that Iran is stirring up or escalating. Iran is not the cause of the instability that
already reigns. And the broader opposition to continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is opposition that Iran shares with many others, including the whole Arab world.
unfortunately with only partial success, to keep small groups from overturning the current cease-fire with rocket firings into Israel. Again,

it is impossible to escape notice that Iran does not hold a candle to Israel
when it comes to forcefully throwing weight around in the neighborhood in damaging and
destabilizing ways, even without considering the occupation of the West Bank. This has included multiple armed invasions of neighboring
As long as we are looking at this part of the region,

territory as well as other actions, such as the attack on Iraq years ago that stimulated Iraq to speed up its program to develop nuclear weapons.

it also is impossible to escape notice that the single most destabilizing

action in the region over the past couple of decades was the U.S. launch of a war of aggression in
Iraq in 2003. Iran certainly has done nothing like that.
And before we leave the Middle East as a whole,

The ritualistically repeated notion that Iran is wreaking instability all over the region is a badly
mistaken myth. There are important respects in which Iranian policies and actions do offend U.S. interests, but protection of those interests is not
helped by perpetuating myths.
Perpetuation of this particular myth has several deleterious effects . The most immediate and obvious one is to corrupt debate over the
nuclear deal. Another is to foster broader misunderstanding about Iranian behavior and intentions that threatens
to corrupt debate over other issues as well.
Yet another consequence involves a failure to understand fully that every state competes for
influence. Such efforts to compete are called foreign policy. It would be in our own interests for other states to wage that competition through
peaceful and legitimate means. By misrepresenting who is doing what , and through what means, in the Middle East today, the myth about

Iranian behavior maintains a constituency for isolating and ostracizing Iran which makes it
less, not more, likely that Iran, so ostracized, will use peaceful and legitimate means to
pursue its interests in the future.

Iranian Prolif unlikely- political and financial costs too high

Miklos 2013
(Timothy Miklos- is a 2nd year M.A. student at the Elliott School of International Affairs in
Security Policy Studies with a focus on nuclear weapons. He holds a bachelors degree in
Political Science from the University of Michigan. Prior to his undergraduate studies he served
honorably in the United States Marine Corps for 8 years. He is fluent in Russian., 3-3-2013, "Iran
Proliferation Triggering a Nuclear Domino Effect in the Middle East: An Unrealistic Scenario,"
No Publication,Accessed July 15th 2015 http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/468)
President Obama has stated that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon will spark an arms race in the Middle East. This view is a
status quo dogma among policymakers of both the Republican and Democratic parties, and dissenting views are generally ignored. Ari
Shavit of Haaretz identifies the most at-risk states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, a nuclear

arms race in the

Middle East in response to an Iranian weapon is highly unlikely. For those countries most likely
to proliferate, the political and financial costs are too high . The nuclear domino scenario has been an accepted
doctrine since 1962 when President Kennedy warned that by the 1970s there would be around 25 nuclear
weapon states. Yet, today there are only nine. According to a recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
report, Cairo does not see Irans nuclear ambitions as an existential threat . Egypts true enemy is Israel,
which has defeated Egypt in four consecutive wars. If Egypt did not pursue a nuclear option to deter its nuclear-armed enemy Israel,
then it will not do so against Iran.

Egypt simply does not have the financial resources, nuclear

infrastructure, or motive to build a successful clandestine nuclear program, as its facilities are under IAEA
safeguards. As a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Egypt has remained
committed to non-proliferation since the Treatys inception and would be unlikely to withdraw .
Even if Egypt had the capability and intention to pursue nuclear weapons, its security would not be enhanced. An attempted breakout
would likely be destroyed in a preemptive strike by Israel, which has proven the credibility of this threat twice by destroying the
Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Al Kibar reactor in Syria in 2007. Unlike Iran, Egypt does not have long distances, deep
reactors, and strong air defenses to protect itself from Israeli preemption. Iran poses the largest threat to Saudi Arabia and, as such, the
Kingdom would have the strongest security motive to pursue a deterrent. Riyadh has called on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
(NWFZ) in the Middle East, yet has

repeatedly warned that an Iranian nuclear weapon may compel it to

follow suit. This is not credible and is likely an attempt to pressure the United States to take
greater action against Tehran.

Proliferation is exaggerated- nuclear weapons have decreased and capable

nations refuse to obtain wmds
Pashakhanlou 2015
(Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou-Postdoctoral Teaching Fellow in Politics & International Relations at University of
Bath., July 14th 2015 "Nuclear Proliferation Is a Myth," New Republic,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122301/nuclear-proliferation-myth)
After nearly two years of incremental and painstaking negotiations ,

a full deal on Irans nuclear program has at last

been struck. In a feat of diplomacy and patience, Iran and the P5+1the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Russia and China
have managed to construct a deal that limits Irans nuclear activity and the sanctions imposed on
it. Early reactions deemed this a new chapter of hope in more ways than one; not just a victory for diplomacy, but a major victory in
the efforts against nuclear weapons proliferation. This is somewhat misguided. In reality, however, even a nuclear-armed
Iran would not have meant that a nuclear weapons proliferation among states was underway.

Proliferation, after all, means rapid spread. And

whereas nuclear weapons have proliferated vertically, with

existing nuclear states adding to their existing nuclear arsenals, there has not been a horizontal
nuclear weapons proliferationthat is, a fast spread of these weapons to new nations. On the
contrary, nuclear weapons have spread slowly across the world, even though academics, politicians, and the media frequently discuss
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation as if it was a matter of fact. Reality check Currently,

there are only nine states in

the world with nuclear weapons among the UNs 193 members: the U.S. (since 1945), Russia (since 1949), the UK (since
1952), France (since 1960), China (since 1964), India (since 1974), Israel (since 1979, unofficial), Pakistan (since 1998), and North
Korea (since 2006). Other countries have dropped off the list . South Africa joined the nuclear club in the 1980s, but
dismantled its weapons in the early 1990s. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union when
they became independent states after the Cold War, but they transferred their nuclear arsenal to Russia in the 1990s. In other words,
only a handful of countries in Europe, Asia, and North America possess these weapons, while Africa, Australasia, and Latin America
are devoid of nuclear weapons states. In fact,

the number of nuclear weapons states has actually decreased

ever since the 1990s. And even though the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confirmed the existence of
a global nuclear black market which purportedly provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to various countries, including
Libya, no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place . Libya eventually voluntarily renounced its
secret nuclear weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan have also shelved their nuclear
weapons programs. As of now, there are 31 countries with nuclear power plant units in operation; countries such as Australia,
Canada, and Japan are widely believed

to have the technological sophistication to become nuclear weapons states in

not pursued that path. In other words, even
though there have been opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation across a range of new
states, such a development has not materialised. All of the available evidence thus unanimously suggests that no
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place throughout the 70 years that these
weapons have existed. Claims to the contrary lack basis, whether they are made for political or economic reasons, sheer
relatively short amount of time should they want tobut they have

ignorance, or for any other purposes. Horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a bogeyman that does not exist. If we are to devise
sound strategies and policies regarding nuclear weapons we have to ground them in existing reality. Recognizing that there is no
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a good place to start.

Iran wont launch a nukeonly interested for defensive purposes

Shanahan 15 (Roger Shanahan; Jan. 8th 2015; ANUs National Security College and is a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy; Would Iran Start a Nuclear War?;
National Interest; http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-iran-start-nuclear-war-11995 )
The language is dramatic but the posts lack much by the way of reasoned argument . Dont get me
wrong, Im a devoted counter-proliferator and think that a nuclear-armed Iran should be stopped simply to avoid other states seeking
to do the same. But I disagree with the view advocated by Andy Nikolic and others that a nuclear-armed Iran will seek to use those
weapons to become more regionally influential or to launch them against Israel. (Recommended: 5 Iranian Weapons of War Israel

Should Fear) The main reason I oppose such views is because they lack intellectual rigour. Firstly, simply

having nuclear
weapons doesnt make anyone more influential. Pakistan and India are no more influential
following their acquisition of a nuclear capability than they were before it. Influence comes
through a range of media, and Iran has always understood that in many ways its an outsider in the
regionethnically, linguistically and religiously different from its Arab and Turkic neighbours. Hence its
reliance on allies and proxies to exert influenceand that wouldnt change if it became a nuclearcapable country. Second, Andys argument is predicated on Irans seeing a nuclear weapon as simply an offensive weapon. The
reality is that nuclear weapons are often the ultimate defensive weapon . Tehran could look east and see how
Islamabads nuclear capability has stopped it from going to war with India, and it could look west and see how Tel Avivs undeclared
capability has deterred its neighbours from invading it. Its nuclear capability hasnt stopped conflict or guaranteed military success for
Israel, as it has faced two intifadas, invaded Gaza, had to withdraw from southern Lebanon and fought a short but bloody war against
Hizbullah in 2006. But none of those have been existential threats. (Recommended: Five Israeli Weapons of War Iran Should Fear)
The argument follows that Tehran sees a nuclear capability as the ultimate shield, rather than as a
potential sword. Having been invaded by the British and the Soviets in World War II, and then suffering through eight years of a

war with Iraq backed by its Arab neighbours and some in the West that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, its easy to see the logic of

Tehran viewing a nuclear weapon as the ultimate shield. In

order to protect the Islamic Revolution the

leadership seeks to guarantee its survival from external attack first and foremost and a nuclear
weapon would do that. Any preemptive use of such weapons would be nearly guaranteed to
receive more in return and hence end the rule of those charged with ruling in accordance with
Gods will. Again, there seems to be no reason why the Supreme Leader would seek to do such a thing. Some have argued that a
strain of Shia millenarianism would see Iran loose off volleys of nuclear weapons in order to set the conditions to hasten the arrival of
the Awaited Imam. Theres no explanation of how that would follow, nor evidence of any support for such a concept by the Supreme
Leader, who is in charge of Irans nuclear file. (Recommended: 5 Israeli Weapons of War ISIS Should Fear) Andy claims that
Iran exhibits a determination to leverage the anticipated benefits of that [nuclear] investment and that it seeks a nuclear capability
because of the prestige, power and authority which Iran believes such weapons would give it, both regionally and beyond. What he
doesnt do is explain exactly what he sees those benefits to be, nor how he sees Tehran achieving power and authority as a nuclear
state. I agree that Tehran seeks regional influence commensurate with how it views its rightful place in the international system. But I
dont see how having a nuclear capability achieves that other than by safeguarding it from existential threats. Rather, Id argue that
Iranian national power, and hence that of the Islamic Revolution, will be furthered by leveraging its enormous potential economic and
human capabilities. In many ways thats what its Gulf neighbours truly fear.

Iran will be weak even with the bomb no impact

Zakaria 9 [Fareed, Editor of Newsweek International, Containing a Nuclear Iran,

Newsweek, Oct 3rd,

http://www.newsweek.com/id/173014]
So what does that leave? In fact, we

are already moving toward a robust, workable response to the dangers of

an Iranian nuclear programone that involves sustained containment and deterrence. Iran's rise has
aroused suspicion in the Arab world. Many countries in the region are developing closer ties with the United
States, including military ones. In the West, European nations worry about nuclear proliferation
and are irritated with Iran's deception and obstructionism. They have gotten tougher over the years in combating Iran and
its proxies, and they are getting tougher at implementing some of the financial sanctions that target Iran's elites. Even Russia and China, which have tried
to maintain their ties with Iran, are conscious that they cannot be seen to be utterly unconcerned about proliferation and the defiance of U.N. resolutions.
So they've allowed for some actions against the Iranian regime (and according to some reports were critical to the outcome of last week's talks in
Geneva). All this means that Iran has become something of an international pariah, unable to operate with great latitude around the world. The country is
in a box and, if well handled, can be kept there until the regime becomes much more transparent and cooperative on the nuclear issue. To do so, we
should maintain the current sanctions but should not add broad new ones like an embargo on refined-gasoline imports. Any new measures should target
the leadership and factions like the Revolutionary Guards specifically. And we should think more broadly about other ways to pressure the regime. There
should be a structure within which those countries that are worried about the threat posed by Iran can meet and strategize. We should work to further align
the interests of moderate Arab states with those of Israel, which could be one of the strategic boons of the circumstance. It's clear that Iran fears this
potential alliance, which is why Ahmadinejad has worked so hard to present himself as the chief spokesman for the great Arab cause of Palestine. By
spouting his nonsense about the Holocaust and professing his support for the Palestinians, he's trying to make it harder for leaders in Saudi Arabia to
effectively take Israel's side in opposition to Tehran. At the same time, we

must stop exaggerating the Iranian threat. By hyping

it, we only provide Iran with "free power," in Leslie Gelb's apt phrase. This is an insecure Third World country with a GDP
that is one 40th the size of America's, a dysfunctional economy, a divided political class, and a
government facing mass unrest at home. It has alienated most of its neighboring states and cuts a
sorry figure on the world stage, with an international embarrassment for a president. Its forays in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza have had mixed results, with the locals often growing
weary of the Iranian thugs who try to control them. The country does not yet have even one
nuclear weapon, and if and when it gets onesomething that is far from certainthe world will not end. The
Middle East has been home to nuclear weapons for decades. If Israel's estimated -arsenal of 200
warheads, including a "second-strike capacity," has not prompted Egypt to develop its own nukes,
it's not clear that one Iranian bomb would do so. (Recall that Egypt has fought and lost three wars against Israel, so it should
be far more concerned about an Israeli bomb than an Iranian one.) More crucially, Israel's massive nuclear force will deter
Iran from ever contemplating using or giving away its own (hypothetical) weapon. Deterrence
worked with madmen like Mao, and with thugs like Stalin, and it will work with the calculating
autocrats of Tehran. The Iranian regime has amply demonstrated over the past four months that it is interested in hanging on to power at all
costs, jailing mullahs and ignoring its own clerical elite. These are not the actions of religious rulers about to commit mass suicide. We should not fear to

negotiate with these rulers. We talked to the Soviet Union even as we implemented a far more extensive policy of containment toward Moscow. But talks
should not involve a final normalization or sanctification of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unless there is a Gorbachev-like reversal of Iran's basic
approach to the worlda Persian glasnost and perestroikathere should be no reciprocal integration into the Western world.

Lack of capacity and US influence prevent Middle East Prolif

Bergenas 10 [Johan, Research Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, The Nuclear Domino Myth, Foreign Affairs, Aug
31st, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/66700?page=show]
But there's one problem with

this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record does not support it .
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, many have feared rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years
later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first
nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964. The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear countries: India, Israel,
South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. After

Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, no regional nuclear
chain reaction followed, even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a two-country
nuclear arms race in the region. Similarly, it has now been four years since North Korea became a nuclear weapons state ,
yet South Korea and Japan have not followed suit, despite the fact that they have a latent nuclear weapons capability
-- access to the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons. These countries' decisions to not go nuclear are largely thanks to extensive U.S. efforts to
dissuade them. Both South Korea and Japan enjoy firm and long-standing security assurances from Washington, including protection under the U.S.
strategic nuclear umbrella, obviating the need for their own deterrents. Following North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, U.S. President George W. Bush

The fruit of these efforts

to prevent rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation, then, is the very reason a nuclear domino effect remains
a myth. In the Middle East, there are no signs that the nuclear dominos will fall anytime soon.
Although many governments believe that Iran could be one to three years away from developing a nuclear bomb, all other Middle Eastern
countries (besides Israel) are at least 10 to 15 years away from reaching such a capability. This time frame
gives Washington ample opportunity to establish or reaffirm security pacts with countries that might
be tempted to develop their own nuclear weapons programs in reaction to a potential Iranian bomb. In fact, that work has
already begun. In July 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the possibility of the United States extending a
"defense umbrella" over the Gulf region and shoring up those countries' military capabilities if Iran goes nuclear. More generally, the
United States is trying to reinforce a culture of nonproliferation in the Middle East. In late 2009,
Washington concluded an agreement with the United Arab Emirates to forego the enrichment and reprocessing
immediately assured South Korea and Japan that the United States was unequivocally committed to protecting them.

of nuclear fuel -- crucial steps in the development of nuclear weapons. (In return, the United Arab Emirates will receive help developing a civilian
nuclear-energy program.) Similar

overtures are being made to both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, states that are pursuing
civilian nuclear-power programs to diversify their energy supplies. Another achievement came during the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty Review Conference, when the United States endorsed the convening of a regional meeting on establishing a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East . The summit is due to be held in 2012 and, although Israel's nuclear weapons
complicate matters, could serve as another step toward cementing a nonproliferation culture in the region.

Iran bomb goodno prolif or terrorism, and prevents escalatory war with
Israel and other states
Waltz 12 (Kenneth N. Waltz; July/Aug 2015; Political Science prof at Columbia and one of the
single most influential international relations scholars; Why Iran Should Get the Bomb; Foreign
Affairs https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb )
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon .

U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a
uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have
historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time
another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have
always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military
power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less. Israel's

regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled
instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state
exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current
crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential
balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it
is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear
monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran . But the very
acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an
imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear
rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel
from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a
relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East
nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the
danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been
distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international
system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately
irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by
perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders
indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a
grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli
officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not
apply to the Islamic Republic. If

Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it
in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk
destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear . Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions,
it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own
security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in
the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close
the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned
oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what
would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some
observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worr y that a nuclear weapon would
embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and
increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists
with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every
other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they
feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential
target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and
aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear
weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear . There
is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer
nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a
serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover,

countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor.
Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full
control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product
of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the
bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear
age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded .

Properly defined, the term "proliferation"

means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has

occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states .
There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern
nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the
bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to
the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race
then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now . REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India
and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized
that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by
challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace.
Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers
always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once

Iran crosses the nuclear

threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other
country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the
current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is
today.

China is actively working to ensure no iranian nuclearlization

Pachios 15 [Harold Pachios, 8/21/15, Lets look at Chinas role in the Iran nuclear deal, The
Hill, former associate White House press secretary under President Lyndon B. Johnson. former
chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission of Public Diplomacy that advised the president,
secretary of State, and Congress on public diplomacy programs carried out by the U.S. State
Department, currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations,
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/251657-lets-look-at-chinas-role-in-the-irannuclear-deal]
In order to establish an effective sanctions regime, the U.S. had to secure the participation of the U.N. and the E.U. The sanctions
would have been far less effective without these other parties. And, we should remember, any continuation of American sanctions,
resulting from U.S. Congressional action in opposition to the agreement, will be far less effective without the committed participation
of other countries. Acting alone is not a very effective option for the U.S. The concerted effort of many countries brought Iran to the
table. Once Iran was at the table, the resulting agreement could not have been achieved without the participation of China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom and Germany. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany found a way to
remain united and to use their different interests and differing histories with Iran to move the negotiations forward at critical

moments. Chinas

role in helping to resolve the issue of the Arak reactor is a case in point.
Chinas unique status with Iran among the negotiators the two have no history of conflicts or
animosities-- gave it the opportunity to play an honest-broker role. The talks appeared on the verge of a
breakdown over the future of the Arak heavy-water reactor, a facility now under construction that has the potential to produce
plutonium needed to build atomic weapons. To resolve this deadlock, China

put forward a redesign plan to modify

the reactor so as to disable its potential for making weapons-grade nuclear materials. This idea
provided a way out of the impasse and greatly eased helped clear a path to a final deal . Its a fresh
reminder of the potential to resolve knotty international problems when the U.S. unites with other partners around common interests
and uses the strengths and advantages that those partners bring to the table. China cannot be considered an ally of the United
States, but that did not stand in the way of joint achievement. Certainly, there is much room for cooperation with
states that are neither allies nor enemies, and we need to seek ways to work in harmony.

No Iranian nuclearization Iran deal proves

Rosenberg and Sullivan 15 [Elizabeth Rosenberg and Alexander Sullivan, 7/31/15, Why
China likes the Iran deal, CNN, Elizabeth Rosenberg is director of the Energy, Economics and
Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander Sullivan is an
associate fellow in the center's Asia-Pacific Security Program,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/opinions/rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/]

(CNN)As

members of Congress debate whether to back the deal over Iran's nuclear program, one
source of support seems guaranteed -- China. It's one of the biggest winners in the agreement, with the lifting of
sanctions as Iran pulls back key elements of its enrichment program set to allow Beijing to deepen its historic partnership with Tehran.
While China is undoubtedly eyeing the potential economic benefits, Beijing also likely sees an opportunity to challenge U.S. influence
in the Middle East. China

has been an important critic of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and a

supporter of nuclear diplomacy. It is therefore likely to hold ranks with the United States and other international partners
during the hard work and political turbulence involved in implementing the accord. And if Iran cheats, Beijing can be
relied upon to at least join in a strong statement of condemnation -- and may go along with the
reimposition of sanctions on Iran.

Iran already has nukes plan doesnt change anything

Corsi 15 [JEROME R. CORSI, 08/24/2015, MILITARY EXPERTS: IRAN ALREADY HAS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WND, Harvard Ph.D., WND staff writer,
http://www.wnd.com/2015/08/military-experts-iran-already-has-nuclearweapons/#Kxxm5t0XJF5Qpvyu.99]
Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Paul Vallely and U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Dennis B. Haney assert that
since 1979, a cabal of nations has aided and abetted Iran in its efforts to develop a robust nuclear program under the guise of
generating a nuclear-energy system. And they believe the White House is fully aware. In an interview, Vallely told

WND that
President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and chief White House adviser Valerie Jarrett are treading
on treason under the U.S. Constitution for aiding and abetting Iran, a known enemy of the United States, while throwing
Israel, a longtime U.S. ally, to the wolves. They charge the cabal is mainly comprised of Russia, China and
North Korea, which have worked behind the scenes in collaboration with Iran to put all the parts
in place. Jerome Corsis and Michael Evans Showdown with Nuclear Iran uncovers the apocalyptic beliefs of Irans Islamic
leaders that help fuel the drive to acquire nuclear weapons The assistance includes providing the material needed to make a bomb.
Vallely and Haney believe Iran can make a bomb now, and a breakout nuclear test detonation is
imminent. Treading on treason Vallely told WND that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows that Israel has little
option but to launch a pre-emptive military strike on Iran, and I suspect Saudi Arabia will assist Israel militarily when the attack
occurs. Signing a nuclear agreement legitimizes Irans nuclear weapons future, while removing sanctions that gives Iran access to
billions of dollars that can be diverted to advancing Irans terrorist goals against the United States and Israel, Vallely said. Haney
agreed. President Obama has given the green light to the potential destruction of Israel by signing this agreement while Iran swears
death to Israel, Haney told WND. President Obama knows Iran has the bomb, and he knows Iran plans a nuclear attack on Israel.
Obama has never liked Israel; he does not see Israel in the future of the Middle East that he sees dominated by radical Islam. Haney
said Obama is simply covering his tracks with this nuclear agreement with Iran. The point is that Obama already knows Iran has
the bomb and the entire negotiation has been nothing more than a charade, a smoke screen to cover up that Iran already has the bomb,
he said. The White House and Secretary of State Kerry know that Iran already has nuclear weapons capability and, to protect
Obamas legacy, the White House does not want it known Iran was allowed to develop nuclear weapons on Obamas watch, he
explained. This way, a pathway for Iran to get the bomb has been created and put in place, so when Iran finally announces it has a
nuclear weapon, Obama can argue that Iran simply got the bomb quicker than anybody anticipated, but not in violation of the
agreement. He declared: Iran is a nuclear weapons power now! In a joint statement, Vallely and Haney say an

accumulation
of available evidence shows a coalition of Russia, China and North Korea have assisted Iran since
1979 in achieving a nuclear weapon, despite sanctions, under the guise of a domestic nuclear
energy program. Vallely explained to WND that he and Haney have taken a systematic approach to evaluating each component
needed to deliver a nuclear weapon, from the development and testing of a ballistic missile system, to the design of a nuclear weapons
warhead, to the development of the weapons-grade uranium needed to produce a bomb. To come

to our conclusion that

Iran is a nuclear weapons power right now, we supplemented publicly available research, plus
information from intelligence sources, including Iranian resistance groups such as the National
Council of Resistance of IRAN, NCRI, Vallely explained. With the assistance of Russia, China
and North Korea, Iran has developed and tested every component needed to develop and deliver a
nuclear weapon against Israel. WND reported in February that the NCRI, in a Washington, D.C., press conference,
added to a series of disclosures it made regarding Irans secret nuclear weapons program more than a decade ago. NCRI has claimed
Tehran is operating a secret uranium-enrichment site northeast of the capital city that was not disclosed during the recent negotiations
to the United States or to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Vallely and Haney made clear in their

statement their conclusion that Iran will soon detonate its first nuclear device. Iranian

government observers, research

scientists and senior military officials have been on-site in North Korea for all their tests of
nuclear component systems, they said. In essence, Iran has had the benefit of North Korea doing their
development and testing for them.
.

Iran already has nuclear weapons president confirms

Hobbus 15 [R. HOBBUS J.D., 8/3/15, Real News Right Now, President Rouhani: Iran Already
Has Nukes, internationally critically acclaimed independent journalist, has three Nobel Peace
Prize nominations, one Pulitzer in Investigative Reporting (1998), and two Pulitzer Prizes in
Commentary (1996, 2008), http://realnewsrightnow.com/2015/09/president-rouhani-iran-alreadyhas-nukes/]
TEHRAN, Ir. Iranian

President Hassan Rouhani announced today that his countrys military is

currently in possession of a small number of nuclear weapons. Rouhani made the statement during a press
conference in response to a reporter who asked whether or not the Iran nuclear deal would bring increased risk to the region. The
president further stated that Iran has no plans to use the weapons against Israel for at least five years. Iran is committed to
enriching the lives of its people through the use of nuclear power, Rouhani said. When

asked exactly how many

nuclear weapons Iran is in control of, Rouhani said he believed there to be more than five but
less than ten in the militarys possession. The president reaffirmed Irans devotion to the destruction of Israel but said
the needs of Iran must come before the needs of the region. This negates every single argument raised thus far against the deal
with Iran, said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry who, on Wednesday, sent a letter to U.S. lawmakers assuring them that Americas
allies in the Persian Gulf would be taken care of, in the form of economic aid packages, following the deal. Rouhani dispelled fears
held by many in the United States that with the passing of the nuclear deal, Iran could have the means to create a nuclear weapon
capable of reaching the U.S. within a few years. We already have the bombs, he said. But what do we have to gain by
attacking the Americans? Rouhani said the only offensive military action the world can expect from Iran in the next five to seven
years is a series of surgical strikes on Israeli air defenses. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who strongly opposes the
Iran nuclear deal, said he has already ordered the Israeli Defense Forces to relocate their air defense capabilities to the Gaza Strip and
West Bank in anticipation of an Iranian attack.

2AC AT: Prolif DA North Korea

No Korean war---laundry list---(rational regime, empirics, military
inferiority, and its all just domestic propaganda)
Fisher 13 Max, Foreign Policy Writer @ Washington Post & Former Editor at the Atlantic,
Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably wont follow through)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/12/why-north-korea-loves-tothreaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont-follow-through/
North Korea is indeed a dangerous rogue state that has, in the recent past, staged small-scale but
deadly attacks on South Korea without provocation. In March 2010, a South Korean navy ship was attacked by a ship of
unknown origin, killing 46 on board; though North Korea denied responsibility, an investigation concluded it was likely responsible. A
few months later, North Korea fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and wounding 19. But

is
North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching all-out war, a mad dog of East Asia?
Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime , for all its cruelty, has
also shown itself to be shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own selfpreservation . The regimes past behavior suggests pretty strongly that these threats are empty .
But they still matter. For years, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent
readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We cant read
Kim Jong Euns mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics ,
with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of
preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war. Starting

World War III or a second Korean War would

not serve any of Pyongyangs interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North
Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North
Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldnt last long against a U.S.-led counterattack.
No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost
certainly end with the regimes total destruction. Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyangs interests,
even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the
leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so
hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing
at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Ils death that Kim had made up for North Koreas weakness with canny belligerence: The
shtick of apparent madness flowed from his countrys fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and
bluff big. Kim

adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul
into a sea of flames. And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions:
fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones. At the risk of
insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Koreas provocations as somewhat akin to a
child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top
declarations (I hate my sister, Im never going back to school again) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the
child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, not because you think the threats are real
or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop.

No Korean war---tensions are just rhetoric and the regime is focused on selfpreservation
Fisher 13 Max, Foreign Policy Writer @ Washington Post & Former Editor at the Atlantic,
Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably wont follow through)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/12/why-north-korea-loves-tothreaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont-follow-through/

North Korea is indeed a dangerous rogue state that has, in the recent past, staged small-scale but
deadly attacks on South Korea without provocation. In March 2010, a South Korean navy ship was attacked by a ship of
unknown origin, killing 46 on board; though North Korea denied responsibility, an investigation concluded it was likely responsible. A
few months later, North Korea fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and wounding 19. But

is

North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching all-out war, a mad dog of East Asia?
Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has
also shown itself to be shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own selfpreservation . The regimes past behavior suggests pretty strongly that these threats are empty .
But they still matter. For years, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent
readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We cant read
Kim Jong Euns mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics ,
with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of
preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war. Starting

World War III or a second Korean War would

not serve any of Pyongyangs interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North
Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North
Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldnt last long against a U.S.-led counterattack.
No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost
certainly end with the regimes total destruction. Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyangs interests,
even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the
leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so
hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing
at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Ils death that Kim had made up for North Koreas weakness with canny belligerence: The
shtick of apparent madness flowed from his countrys fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and
bluff big. Kim

adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul
into a sea of flames. And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions:
fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones. At the risk of
insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Koreas provocations as somewhat akin to a
child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top
declarations (I hate my sister, Im never going back to school again) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the
child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, not because you think the threats are real
or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop.

Any war would end quickly---North Korea would rely exclusively on

conventional forces and get crushed
Larry Niksch 10, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Senior Adviser for East Asia with the Political Risk Services Group, formerly Specialist in Asian
Affairs with the Congressional Research Service, 3/24/10, The Opcon Military Command Issue
Amidst a Changing Security Environment on
the Korean Peninsula, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/NikschOPCON100324.pdf
The second contention of the critics is part of a long-standing problem in both South Korea and the United States:
exaggerating the North Korean military threat to South Korea. The critics emphasize
Pyongyangs nuclear weapons, missiles, and artillery on the demilitarized zone (DMZ), so-called asymmetric forces.
However, I do not think that a case can be made that these asymmetric capabilities compensate
North Korea for the substantial deterioration of its conventional military forces since the early 1990s
which went largely unacknowledged until the middle 2000s. North Koreas conventional forces always have been
Pyongyangs main instrument for achieving its supreme politicalstrategic objective on the Korean peninsula

toppling the South Korean Government and achieving political dominance over the South Korea.
Pyongyang could seek militarily to realize this supreme political-strategic objective only through a
second massive invasion of South Korea that at least would capture Seoul and inflict debilitating damage on South
Korean and U.S. military forces. In the 1980s, the Pentagon conducted numerous war games focused on whether R.O.K. and U.S.
forces could repel a North Korean invasion and keep the North Korean army out of Seoul (I participated in several of these). Today,

North Korean conventional forces have no capability or sustainability to attack across the
DMZ with any hope of seizing and/or holding territory, including Seoul. Their weaponry is
obsolete mostly vintage 1960s. Fuel supplies are marginal and do not allow for sustained military training; the North
Korean air force is largely grounded because of lack of fuel. Food supplies for North Korean rank and file forces are
marginal even in peacetime. Food requirements for an army at war grow considerably above
peacetime requirements. For North Korea, this would mean immediate, debilitating food shortages for the civilian population that
always lives on the margin of malnutrition and starvation. The

bulk of North Korean rank and file soldiers are

physically weak and undoubtedly mentally deficient as the products of years of malnutrition. Neither China nor Russia
would support a North Korean attack on South Korea with a re-supply of weaponry. The U.S. Air
Force and Navys counter-attack on North Korea would be massive and militarily debilitating
[devastating] within a few days. North Koreas ability to sustain an invasion of South Korea no
doubt would deteriorate within a very few days , probably less than a week.

No war Deterrence works Kim is rational and empirically backs down

Gause, August 2015 (Ken E. Gause, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies Program of
the Center for Strategic Studies, CNA Corporation, in Alexandria, VA, North Koreas
Provocation and Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime,
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2015-U-011060.pdf, CMR)
An early

assessment of Kim Jong-un portrayed him as a leader who was growing in self-confidence and would

likely see provocations as a policy tool . This assessment also portrayed Kim as someone who was bolstered by the outcome of the
2013 crisis and, therefore, less willing to forgo confro ntation, confident that his will would win out in the end. Not endowed with his fathers deep
knowledge of escalation dynamics on the peninsula, this

assessment continued, Kim Jong-un was more prone to

miscalculation. His growing self-assurance would deter his advisers from providing advice that contradicted his worldview. The events of
the last couple of years suggest that this assessment may not be entirely correct. It is most likely applicable to
inter- crisis periods, as opposed to the period leading up to a provocation. In other words, during periods of increasing tension on th e
peninsula, Kim Jong-un may be willing to push strategies that appear bold and aggressive. But during this period,
his decision- making is still informed by advisers and calibrated depending on external stimuli .
After a provocation occurs and the escalatory ladder is engaged (if the 2013 crisis is any indication) his
decision-making changes. Decisions are heavily weighted toward the implications for his own position and legitimacy within the wider
leadership. His self-perceived ability to de-escalate (and risk showing weakness) is diminished. How far he is willing to move up the escalatory ladder is
unknown. If

this model of a leader (and by extension, a regime) going through a power consolidation is placed in the context
of decision-making on future provocations, certain assumptions can be made that comport with how North
Korea has acted since Kim Jong-un took over. It is a regime that will engage in non-violent demonstrations where
escalation can be managed. On one hand, even in the face of warnings from the United States, South Korea, and China, North Korea
conducted two missile tests in 2012 and a nuclear test in 2013. Such demonstrations feed the requirements for Kims power consolidation process. But, on
the other hand, as

international pressure has grown and the Sino-North Korean relationship has become
more strained, Pyongyang has not engaged in another demonstration although it has apparently engaged in a
high profile (yet covert) cyber-attack. According to some sources, the economic pressures on the regime (especially from China) may
not have deterred other tests, but may have slowed the pace of testing. If true, it suggests that Kim Jong-un, while eager to move
forward with these programs, has been influenced by external pressure and has likely listened to those within
the regime who caution against moving too quickly. Despite its aggressive rhetoric, which has reached a
new level of animosity under Kim Jong-un, the regime has not yet engaged in violent provocation. Even during the
Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises in 2013, 2014, and 2015 when the regime could have justified

aggressive actions as a way of bolstering its own deterrent and responding to the aggressive actions of the United States
and South Korea, it chose to confine its actions to rhetorical fusillades and Scud launches into the Sea of Japan.
It made no attacks on South Korean territory or ships at sea. This suggests that the cost somehow outweighed the
benefits that could have been gained from undertaking such actions. According to some reports, the pressure from China and the
threats of retaliation from the Blue House and the South Korean Joint Staff, including decapitation strikes, may have figured into
the North Korean calculus. The U.S. decision to forgo the testing of the Minuteman missile in 2013, as well as the U.S.-South Korean
decision to downplay the 2014 and 2015 exercises, may have also provided needed off-ramps and a more deliberative decision-making process to occur
inside Pyongyang. Contrary

to the port rait of an impetuous leader who makes emotional decisions and
lashes out at perceived threats, to date, Kim Jong-un has proven to be a pragmatic decision-maker
someone who may be able to be deterred at the upper end of the escalation scale . If, as the above suggests, North Korea
can be deterred but only within certain boundaries and under specific circumstances, what can be done? First, it is important to understand that North
Koreas provocations can be categorized into four types, each driven by different motivations and po tentially deterred by different strategies or
combinations of strategies. As shown in Figure 5, provocations can be either kinetic or non-kinetic and they can be of low or high intensity. At the lower
end of the escalation scale, there are a few levers that the United States, South Korea, and China can use to try to di ssuade and deter North Korea, such as
the threat of sanctions or cutting off or curtai ling fuel. However, Pyongyang can forecast the blowback from a non-kinetic provocation or a
demonstration of one of its weapon systems. It recognizes that neither

Seoul nor Washington is ready to escalate in

response to a non-kinetic event. The risk is low and the benefits internal to the regime may outweigh the pain North Ko rea will suffer
from the international community. Therefore, as the chart shows, deterrence at the lower end of the escalation scale is difficult. Even if North Korea is
persuaded to delay a provocation, it might not remove it from its near-term calculus. Moving up the escalation scale to kinetic provocations opens the
way for more deterrence levers and pressures that the United States and South Korea can bring to bear on North Korea. Deterrence through denial and
deterrence through punishment become viable strategies in an environment where lives are at stake. Key to affecting North Koreas calculus is making
these levers visible. It is only when both sides move up to the upper end of the escalation ladder that North Koreas calculus may change as Kim Jong-un
may feel compelled to conduct a provocation in order to underscore his legitimacy and maintain the support among the hardline elements within the Party
and armed forces. Short of that, U.S./South

Korean strategic messaging, demonstrations of capabilities, and enhanced

surveillance (some of it visible) should act to deter North Korea from more violen t provocations . Below are some
examples of deterrence measures. Make it abundantly clear that the United States and South Korea are united in their commitment to deterrence and will
re spond forcefully to any provocation. Policy-makers must avoid public disagreements regarding the issue of how and when to respond to North
Korean provocations. U.S.

policy-makers and military commanders must take every opportunity to

reinforce U.S. support of South Korea and the defense of its people. Make it clear that the Alliance is able to respond in a
proportional way to a range of North Korean provocations. Conduct combined maritime exercises close to the NLL, where the meaning cannot be
missed. Train and conduct demonstrations to show the South Korean Navys ability to conduct anti-submari ne warfare (ASW). Make defense

investments and doctrine toward a forward, active defense that preserves stability and maximizes
the safety of South Korean military and civilian assets from a sudden, small-scale attack from the North. 57 On land,
invest in the construction and hardening of modern shelters within civilian population centers, as well as increased training of police and emergency
responders to rapidly identify and mitigate North Korean incursions. 58 At sea, invest in advanced maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine
warfare capabilities (e.g., helicopters to defend against small-boat special forces incursions, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol the DMZ and
vulnerable areas of coastline). 59 When North Korean rhetoric and military movements warrant, make it clear that the Alliance is ready for any
eventuality. 60 Incorporate within strategic messaging that South Korea is willing to engage in decapitation strikes if it believes that North Korea is
about to conduct a provocation on the Korean Peninsula. 61

China currently fighting North Korea nuclearization means they wouldnt

proliferate
Sengupta 16 [SOMINI SENGUPTA, 2/25/16, U.S. and China Agree on Proposal for Tougher
North Korea Sanctions, The New York Times, covers the United Nations, previously The Times
bureau chief in Dakar and New Delhi, recipient of the 2004 George Polk Award for foreign
reporting, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/world/asia/north-korea-sanctions.html]
UNITED NATIONS

The United States and China reached an agreement to impose tougher

sanctions against North Korea, in what appeared to be a diplomatic shift by Beijing regarding its intransigent ally. The
proposed resolution is the product of intense negotiations between the two nations over the last seven weeks, since Pyongyang tested a
nuclear weapon it claimed was a hydrogen bomb. It was circulated to members of the United Nations Security Council on Thursday,
and diplomats said it could come up for a vote in the coming days. Diplomats said the fact that Washington and Beijing had agreed on
a set of measures increased the international pressure on the North Koreans. In the past, after previous nuclear tests condemned by the
Security Council, China

agreed only to banning weapons transfers and limited sanctions against those
linked to the nuclear program.

Their evidence is old China knows proliferation isnt in its best interest
Han 15 [Hua Han, The EU, China and Non-Proliferation: From Iran to North Korea?, EU
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference 2015 Special Session 4, professor at Peking
University and director at the Center for Arms Control and Disarmament,
https://www.iiss.org/en/events/eu%20conference/sections/eu-conference-2015-6aba/specialsession-1-a350/special-session-4-7122]
So, let me start with Chinese interest in non-proliferation; it seems to me since 1990s, China

has dramatically changed its

view and non-proliferation policy as it has increasingly recognised that WMD-related
proliferation is against its national interest. Because we talk about the two WMD rights that China whereas the world
is facing. For China, more nuclear states are emerging in Asia in general, and Chinas border, in particular, and nuclear
terrorism, and as a result of the nuclear-security challenges is also something China has to face in recent
years. So, what I want to say is that non-proliferation is Chinese interest. Chinese non-proliferation policies are also
sincere, not for some trade-off with other countries for other purpose, but is really in deep in the
national-security interest. What China has done from diplomatic and also in the implementation practice, first of all I want to
say the regimes participation has been increasingly recognised in the world. Let me start with NPT and NSG, especially NSG;

China has already shown its willingness to follow the list of the group, but unfortunately, so far, China is not a
member of MTCR, but China has already shown its following of the guidelines in terms of 2002 guidelines of MTCR. In
diplomatic front, China is a proactive player in the key nuclear issues , Six-Party Talks, for example, even
now it is not in the active way as many people already notice that. But China is the key player if I am not using the
leading player to tackle the proliferation or the nuclear programme in North Korea. But China has
done, as many people have already recognised, to prevent the even further nuclearisation in the
Korean peninsula. China is also engaging in the negotiation in terms of the Iran nuclear deal. And
also when they talk about chemical-weapons verification and abolition in Syria, China is also
participating proactively.

Link turn-antagonism with the US fuels Chinese support for North Korea
Metzl 2/9/16 [Jamie. Jamie Metzl is a Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council. He has served in the U.S. National
Security Council, State Department and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Changing China's North Korea Calculus.
The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/changing-chinas-north-korea-calculus-15148. SH]

For China, North Koreas nuclear weapons program seems designed to limit Beijing's influence
over Pyongyang and threatens China with nuclear fallout from a potential accident. Given this
alignment of negative consequences for pretty much everyone other than a small number of North Korean leaders, its unfortunate that
China continues to undermine international efforts to reverse North Koreas nuclear weapons program through its support for and
protection of the North Korean regime. In addition to providing political cover in the UN, China provides Pyongyang with 90 percent

Beijing continues this

policy because it sees North Korea not as an issue in itself but as a strategic asset in its broader relations
with Washington. As unhappy as Chinas leaders are with the nuclear tests, they have remained
unwilling to take any action that could potentially undermine the stability of North Koreas
regime and bring U.S. troops to Chinas border in case of collapse and Korean reunification .
of its energy imports and most of the food going to its military. Despite its anger with North Korea,

North Korea already has nukes and the missiles to use them
Almasy and McKirdy 3/10 [Steve Almasy and Euan McKirdy, 3/10/16, North Korea
claims to have nuclear warheads that can fit on missiles, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/08/asia/north-korea-nuclear-warheads/]
(CNN)North

Korea claims to have miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on ballistic missiles, the
state-run Korean Central News Agency reported. The report comes after the country reported a
successful test of what it said was a hydrogen bomb in February and as tensions on the peninsula
remain high as joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises take place. State media reported Wednesday that
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with nuclear scientists and technicians who briefed him on "research conducted to tip various
type tactical and strategic ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads." The

agency also published photographs that

appeared to show Kim visiting a facility where the warheads have been made to fit on ballistic
missiles -- the first time state media has released images showing its miniaturized weapons
technology. CNN cannot independently confirm the photos' veracity or the claims of the KCNA. David Albright of the
Institute for Science and International Security told CNN's Brian Todd on Monday that his group
thinks the North Koreans had probably already miniaturized a warhead. A South Korean Defense
White Paper from 2014 also noted that its neighbor's ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons
seemed, at the time, "to have reached a considerable level." North Korean state media released photographs that
it claims shows Kim Jong Un inspecting a miniaturized warhead. CNN cannot independently confirm the images. North Korean state
media released photographs that it claims shows Kim Jong Un inspecting a miniaturized warhead. CNN cannot independently confirm
the images. Expert: Could be nuclear bomb, not a hydrogen one Karl

Dewey, a proliferation expert with IHS

Jane's, a military, security and intelligence analysis organization, said the photos suggest that
North Korea fit something onto a KN-08 ballistic missile.

North Korea definitely already has nukes and can use them the plan doesnt
make a difference
Pry and Huessy 2/29 [Peter Pry and Peter Huessy, 2/29/16, North Korea's Nuclear Missile
Threat: Very Bad News, Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is Executive Director of the EMP Task Force on
National and Homeland Security, a Congressional Advisory Board, and served in the
Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House
Armed Services Committee, and the CIA, Peter Huessy is President of Geostrategic Analysis,
Senior Defense Consultant to the Mitchell Institute of the Air Force Association, and teaches
nuclear deterrent policy at the US Naval Academy, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7512/northkorea-nuclear-missiles]
The mainstream media and their stable of "experts" consistently underestimate North Korea's
missile and nuclear weapon capabilities. The gap between how the media report on the North Korean nuclear missile
threat and the reality of the threat has become so wide as to be dangerous. In the aftermath of North Korea's latest
nuclear test on January 6, 2016, for instance, and its launch of a mock satellite on February 7, 2016, the American people
were told that North Korea has not miniaturized a nuclear warhead for delivery by missile nor
could the missile strike the U.S. with any accuracy. Mirren Gidda, for example, writing in Newsweek,
inexplicably claims "International experts doubt that North Korea has manufactured nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a
missile." Yet this

commonplace assertion that North Korea does not have nuclear-armed missiles is
simply untrue. Eight years ago, in 2008, the CIA's top East Asia analyst publicly stated that North
Korea had successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads for delivery on its Nodong medium-range
missile. This capability indicates that the Nodong is able to strike South Korea and Japan, or, if
launched off a freighter, even the United States.[1] In 2009, European intelligence agencies at
NATO headquarters also told the media that North Korea's Nodong missiles were armed with
nuclear warheads.[2] In 2011, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. General

Ronald Burgess, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea has
weaponized its nuclear devices into warheads for arming ballistic missiles.[3] And as it turned out,
North Korea achieved a long-range missile capability to strike the U.S. at least as early as 2012,
according to testimony of administration officials before Congress . North Korea's accomplishment occurred a
bare two years outside of the fifteen-year "safe" window promised by the CIA in 1995. In February and March of 2015, former
senior national security officials of the Reagan and Clinton administrations warned that North
Korea and Iran should be regarded as capable of delivering by satellite a small nuclear warhead to
make an EMP attack against the United States. In numerous articles that should have made media
headlines -- by Dr. William Graham (President Reagan's Science Advisor, Administrator of NASA, and Chairman of the
Congressional EMP Commission), Ambassador R. James Woolsey (President Clinton's Director of Central Intelligence), Ambassador
Henry Cooper (former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative), and Fritz Ermarth (former Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council) -- have gone largely ignored by much of the media .[4] On April 7, 2015, at a Pentagon press conference,
Admiral William Gortney, Commander of North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD), responsible for protecting the U.S. from
long-range missiles, warned that the intelligence community assesses North Korea's KN-08 mobile ICBM could strike the U.S. with a
nuclear warhead. And on October 8, 2015, Gortney again warned the Atlantic Council: "I agree with the intelligence community that
we assess that they [North Koreans] have the ability, they have the weapons, and they have the ability to miniaturize those weapons,
and they have the ability to put them on a rocket that can range the [U.S.] homeland."[5] Given this overwhelming evidence of North
Korea's ability to strike the U.S., how strange that network and cable television and most major news outlets have never informed the
American public that North Korea already has nuclear-armed missiles that can strike the United States.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA

Terrorism not existentialthreats inflated, wont go nuclear
Mearsheimer 11-R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science @ University of Chicago, member
of the Committee of International Relations @ U. of Chicago, PhD in government/international relations @ Cornell, M.A. in
International Relations @ USC, fellow @ Harvards Center for International Affairs, Whitney H. Shepardson fellow @ The Council
on Foreign Relations, On the advisory council of The National Interest, prominent International relations theorist, [John, The National
Interest, Imperial By Design January-February 2011 issue, http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=3, DKP]

In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism was described as an existential threat. President Bush emphasized that
virtually every terrorist group on the planetincluding those that had no beef with Washingtonwas our enemy and had to be
eliminated if we hoped to win what became known as the global war on terror (GWOT). The administration also maintained that states
like Iran, Iraq and Syria were not only actively supporting terrorist organizations but were also likely to provide terrorists with
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, it was imperative for the United States to target these rogue states if it hoped to win the
GWOTor what some neoconservatives like Norman Podhoretz called World War IV. Indeed, Bush said that any country which
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Finally, the

administration
claimed that it was relatively easy for groups like al-Qaeda to infiltrate and strike the homeland,
and that we should expect more disasters like 9/11 in the near future. The greatest danger for sure
would be a WMD attack against a major American city. This assessment of Americas terrorism
problem was flawed on every count. It was threat inflation of the highest order. It made no sense
to declare war against groups that were not trying to harm the United States. They were not our enemies; and going after all terrorist
organizations would greatly complicate the daunting task of eliminating those groups that did have us in their crosshairs. In addition,
there was no alliance between the so-called rogue states and al-Qaeda. In fact, Iran and Syria cooperated with Washington after 9/11 to
help quash Osama bin Laden and his cohorts. Although the Bush administration and the neoconservatives repeatedly asserted that
there was a genuine connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, they never produced evidence to back up their claim for the
simple reason that it did not exist. The fact is that states

have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups ,

in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what
terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble.
This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to
terrorists. That regimes leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished
for a terrorist groups actions. Nor could they be certain that the U nited States or Israel would not
incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the
ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get
down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most
likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take
advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then,

there are additional obstacles to

overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it
would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have
powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should
work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the

ability of

terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years
since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another
major attack on American soil is probableeven imminent. But this is simply not the case. 3 The
only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like
the shoe bomber, who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the
underwear bomber, who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we
do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat.
Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Muellers telling comment that the
number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the
same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by
severe allergic reactions to peanuts.

0 risk
Mueller 8-Department of Political Science @ Ohio State University [John, The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,
January 1, 2008, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]

Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists

would have to set up a large and well-equipped machine

shop to manufacture a bomb and then populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists,
technicians, and machinists. They would have to be assembled and retained for the task while no consequential
suspicions are generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence
from normal pursuits back home. They would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause , of course. And, in
addition, they would have to be willing to risk their lives, and certainly their careers, because after their
bomb was discovered, or exploded, they would likely become the targets in an intense worldwide
dragnet operation facilitated by the fact that their skills would not be common ones.12 Applying jargon
that emerged in the aftermath of an earlier brutal conspiracy, their names would become Mudd. More than a decade ago Allison boldly
insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material (Allison et al. 1996,
12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of safety can at any time be
proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists would face in
constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz

and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the task
"could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise
blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they
"would most certainly be forced to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more
(Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 62), and in distinct contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is
difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields
verge on the unfeasible." They conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of
nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2).
These problems are also emphasized in an earlier report by five Los Alamos scientists: although schematic drawings
showing the principles of bomb design in a qualitative way are widely available, the detailed design
drawings and specifications that are essential before it is possible to plan the fabrication of actual
parts are not available. The preparation of these drawings requires a large number of man-hours
and the direct participation of individuals thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the
physical, chemical, and metallurgical properties of the various materials to be used, as well as the characteristics affecting their
fabrication; neutronic properties; radiation effects, both nuclear and biological; technology concerning high explosives and/or
chemical propellants; some hydrodynamics; electrical circuitry; and others (Mark et al. 1987, 58).14 Moreover, stresses physicist
David Albright, the

process would also require "good managers and organization people " (Keller 2002).
design and building would require a base or installation at
which experiments could be carried out over many months , results could be assessed, and, as necessary, the
The Los Alamos scientists additionally point out that the

effects of corrections or improvements could be observed in follow-on experiments. Similar considerations would apply with respect
to the chemical, fabrication, and other aspects of the program (Mark et al. 1987, 64-65). Although they think the problems can be dealt
with "provided adequate provisions have been made," they also stress that "there are a number of obvious potential hazards in any
such operation, among them those arising in the handling of a high explosive; the possibility of inadvertently inducing a critical
configuration of the fissile material at some stage in the procedure; and the chemical toxicity or radiological hazards inherent in the
materials used. Failure to foresee all the needs on these points," they conclude laconically, "could bring the operation to a close" (Mark
et al. 1987, 62, emphasis added; see also Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 64). Or, as Gary Milhollin puts it, "a single mistake in design
could wreck the whole project" (2002, 48). Younger has more recently made a similar argument : it would be wrong to assume that
nuclear weapons are now easy to make....I am constantly amazed when self-declared "nuclear weapons experts," many of whom have
never seen a real nuclear weapon, hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive....While it is true that one can
obtain the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive from articles on the Internet, none of these sources has enough detail to
enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive (2007, 86, 88).15 Although he remains concerned that a terrorist group could
buy or steal a nuclear device or be given one by an established nuclear country (2007, 93), Younger is quick to enumerate the
difficulties the group would confront when trying to fabricate one on their own. He stresses that uranium is "exceptionally difficult to
machine" while "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to

Others
contend the crudest type of bomb would be "simple and robust" and "very simple" to detonate
(Bunn and Wier 2006, 140). Younger disagrees: Another challenge...is how to choose the right tolerances.
"Just put a slug uranium into a gun barrel and shoot it into another slug of uranium" is one
deception of how easy it is to make a nuclear explosive . However, if the gap between the barrel and
the slug is too tight, then the slug may stick as it is accelerated down the barrel. If the gap is too big, then
other more complex, issues may arise. All of these problems can be solved by experimentation, but this
experimentation requires a level of technical resources that , until recently, few countries had. How do you
exactly how it is processed. Both need special machining technology that has evolved through a process of trial and error."

measure the progress of an explosive detonation without destroying the equipment doing the measurement? How do you perform
precision measurements on something that only lasts a fraction of a millionth of a second? (2007, 89) All

this work would

have to be carried out in utter secret, of course, even while local and international security police are
likely to be on the intense prowl. "In addition to all the usual intelligence methods," note the Los Alamos scientists, "the
most sensitive technical detection equipment available would be at their disposal," and effective
airborne detectors used to prospect for uranium have been around for decades and "great
improvement in such equipment have been realized since " (Mark et al. 1987, 60). As Milhollin presents the
terrorists problem, "the theft of the uranium would probably be discovered soon enough, and it might be only a short
matter of time before the whole world showed up on their doorstep" (2002, 48).16 Moreover, points out Langewiesche, people in
the area may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of
technicians unlikely to be locals (2007, 65-69).17 In addition, the bombmakers would not be able to test
the product to be sure they were on the right track (Linzer 2004; Mark et al. 1987, 64). The process of fabricating an IND requires,
then, the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. This
is not an impossible task--some of the terrorists who tried to commit mayhem in Britain in 2007 had medical degrees--but it certainly
vastly complicates the problem. In addition, corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable, no curious
outsider must get wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off, and international and local security services
must be kept perpetually in the dark.

2AC AT: Elections DA

China policy wont affect the election other foreign policy is more
important, GOP wont challenge Clinton on China
Moreshead 15 (Colin Moreshead is a freelance writer living and working in Tokyo. His
research focuses primarily on East Asian trade relations and exchange rate policy. Will ChinaBashing Subside in 2016? Nov 03, 2015. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/willchina-bashing-subside-in-2016/)
That isnt to say, however, that things wont heat up in the general election. In

advance of the 2008 election, then-Senator

Barack Obama was relatively mum on Chinese issues as a primary candidate. By during his third
debate with Republican nominee John McCain, Obama made three separate mentions of China to his
opponents two, focusing on the growing trade deficit. At the third 2012 debate between Obama and Romney,
China was mentioned no fewer than 32 times, this time as an adversary in need of a trade rules refresher course. The
coming general election will almost certainly diverge from this pattern because of the footing
Democrats find themselves on near the end of the Obama presidency. If Hillary Clinton secures the
Democratic nomination as projected, the Republican challenger will be faced with a seasoned
veteran of recent Chinese diplomacy. As an architect and executor of the Obama administrations
pivot to Asia, Clinton has the bona fides necessary to head off most foreign policy attacks.
Republicans will likely push her on Iran, Russia, ISIS and Libya, carefully avoiding East Asian
policy discussions. Chinas striking absence from charged campaign rhetoric this year can be
partially attributed to a decrease in perceived threat to America as Chinese economic growth
slows and stock markets tumble. However, diplomatic victories shared by the Obama and Xi administrations should not be
overlooked. Most notably, the two presidents have reached agreements on the issues of climate change and cyber-attacks within the
past year, ushering in an era of cooperation between the two countries on a range of issues. The remainder of election season could
play out any number of ways, but it appears a safe bet that Beijing will be spared the vitriol it witnessed in recent American political
contests. Whether

the result of a cooling Chinese economy or meaningful advances in the bilateral

relationship under presidents Obama and Xi, China policy will likely make fewer appearances on
the campaign trail during the next year than it did at any time over the past decade. Rather than to take
this as an indication of apathy, Beijing should celebrate this development as a sign that American politicians are finally ready to leave
diplomacy to the diplomats. If true, the next American president has the chance to hit the ground running with his or her Chinese
counterpart, and that would constitute a real victory.

Elections link turn the public loves space cooperation with China
Martina 16 [MICHAEL MARTINA, 4/22/16, China official says film 'The Martian' shows
Americans want space cooperation, Reuters, Reuters correspondent,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-space-idUSKCN0XJ1C2]
A senior Chinese space official said the Hollywood blockbuster "The

Martian" is proof that Americans want to see

the United States and China cooperate in space , but lamented Washington's ban on collaboration between the two
countries. Advancing China's space program is a priority for Beijing, with President Xi Jinping calling for the country to establish
itself as a space power. China insists its program is for peaceful purposes, but the U.S. Defense Department has highlighted its
increasing space capabilities, saying it was pursuing activities aimed to prevent adversaries from using space-based assets in a crisis.
Apart from its civilian ambitions, Beijing has tested anti-satellite missiles, and the U.S. Congress has banned NASA from engaging in
cooperation with its Chinese counterpart due to security concerns. Xu Dazhe, the chief of the China National Space Administration,
promised China's space plans would become "increasingly transparent". "When I saw the U.S. film 'The

Martian', which
envisages China-U.S. cooperation on a Mars rescue mission under emergency circumstances, it shows that our
U.S. counterparts very much hope to cooperate with us," Xu told reporters at a briefing. "However, it's very
regrettable that, for reasons everyone is aware of, there are currently some impediments to cooperation," Xu said. China's space
program would continue to serve national security and economic interests, in what Beijing calls a "military-civil" development
strategy, Xu said, but added that such efforts would be used in support of "world peace". "I believe that on this matter, China is more
and more open, and I hope our American friends can take note," Xu said. China's space budget was still only about one-tenth of the

United States' outlays, Xu said, but he did not elaborate. According to Chinese state media, China spends about $2 billion a year on its
space program, though details are vague. Despite Washington's ban on cooperation, the two governments held their first civil space
talks in September to discuss each other's plans and policies. China said this week that it would launch a "core module" for its first
space station some time around 2018, part of a plan to have a permanent manned space station in service around 2022. China was
also preparing to launch a Mars probe in 2020, which would reach the planet in 2021, the official Xinhua news agency has said.
"The

Martian", which depicts China supplying a rocket to launch a NASA rescue package into
orbit as part of a harrowing mission to save a U.S. astronaut stranded on Mars, was a big success
at the Chinese box office.

2AC AT: Politics DA

The bulk of the plan is not congressional only negotiating the repeal of the
Wolf Amendment goes through congress
David 15 [Leonard David, Space.com's Space Insider Columnist, US-China Cooperation in
Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?, June 16, 2015, http://www.space.com/29671-chinanasa-space-station-cooperation.html#sthash.xuOfRk7T.dpuf]
There's a growing debate over whether China and the United States should cooperate in space , and
the dialogue now appears to focus on how to create an "open-door" policy in orbit for Chinese
astronauts to make trips to the International Space Station (ISS). Discussion between the two space powers has
reached the White House, but progress seems stymied by Washington, D.C., politics. Specifically at question is how to handle a 2011
decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China regarding space.
Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own
space station in the 2020s. Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China collaboration in space.
Presidential leadership It

will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese

space cooperation, said John Logsdon, professor emeritus of political science and international affairs at The George
Washington University's Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. "The first step is the White House working with
congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked ," Logsdon
told Space.com. "Then, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and
other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human spaceflight."
Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a
history lesson. "A similar initiative bringing the United States and China together in orbit would
be a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work together on
Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said. While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens
into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50
years ago, Logsdon noted. "China

has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight
than the converse," Logsdon said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation
with China is political, not technical."

Congress wouldnt hate the plan

Berger 15 [Eric Berger, 8/3/15, For the first time Chinese research to fly on NASA's space
station, Houston Chronicle, journalist for the Houston Chronicle,
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/For-the-first-time-Chineseresearch-to-fly-on-6422696.php]
A Houston company has negotiated a historic agreement to fly a Chinese experiment on the International Space Station, a small but
symbolic maneuver around a law that bans any scientific cooperation between NASA and the communist country. Over a conference
table adorned with an American and a Chinese flag, Jeff Manber last week agreed to take a DNA experiment into space next year.
Manber's Houston-based company, NanoRacks, helps scientists do research on board the station. Because of decades of suspicion
about Chinese motives and the country's regime, Congress

prohibits NASA from working with the country in

any capacity. But the new deal, which is apparently legal, could begin to change that. "It's
symbolic, and it's meaningful," Manber said Monday, after returning from Beijing. "But let's not get ahead of ourselves."
Chinese scientists from the Beijing Institute of Technology, led by Professor Deng Yulin, will pay about $200,000 to NanoRacks for
its services. This includes delivery of the experiment to the American side of the station in a SpaceX Dragon spacecraft and a berth in
NanoRacks' orbiting laboratory facilities. In turn the company will send data back to the Chinese researchers. Congress' prohibition
was crafted in 2011 as an amendment by then U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf to block any scientific activity between the United States and
China that involves NASA. He was concerned about the Chinese stealing U.S. spaceflight secrets, and about the country's human
rights record. Manber said the deal is purely commercial, and was negotiated with NASA's blessing.
Indeed, NASA administrator Charles Bolden has chafed at the Wolf amendment restrictions, arguing that his space agency should be
allowed to at least communicate with Chinese space officials. "It won't happen under my watch, but some future NASA administrator

will be sitting down and having a conversation with his or her Chinese counterpart," Bolden said in an earlier interview. It's unclear
whether Republicans in Congress will attempt to block the NanoRacks deal. U.S. Rep. John Culberson, a
who assumed Wolf's chairmanship of the House budget committee that oversees NASA, said

Houston Republican
he wanted to study it in

more detail. However, one space policy expert familiar with the deal, Scott Pace of George Washington University, said he
believes this agreement was crafted in such a way as to create minimal controversy. "It's hard to predict what Congress will do, but
given this is a commercial arrangement with a U.S. company, complies with the Wolf amendment, and does not involve the transfer of
sensitive technology, I don't believe there will be any formal objections," Pace said. Symbolically, flying Chinese
research could signal the beginning of a potential relationship between the two countries in space, said Leroy Chiao, a former NASA
astronaut and commander of the space station. "I think it is of critical importance that the U.S. bring China into future space
exploration plans," Chiao said. "The ISS would be a great place to start."

2AC AT: K
Space provides an opportunity to challenge sovereignty the way we study
and understand space is key
Stuart 9 Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science
(Jill, Unbundling sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space Two approaches From Securing Outer Space, Edited by Borrman
and SheeanChapter 1)
As well as considering ongoing events in outer space politics (such as cooperation, militarization and commercialization), this text
explores the ways in which we continue to evaluate and develop conceptual frameworks to help us understand outer space politics.
This chapter furthers the engagement with how political ideas are reconceptualized in relation to outer space, and also how

outer

space has implications for our understanding of those political ideas. The ways in which we
approach the study of outer space politics helps to construct the meanings by which it is imbued,
and to suggest ways of developing our theoretical approaches. One area in which outer space both challenges traditional
political notions and also political and legal practice is in the definition and practice of sovereignty. This chapter argues
that Westphalian sovereignty (also "modern" or "classical" sovereignty), which delineates a clear relationship between sovereignty,
territory and the state, does not conceptually grasp sovereignty in outer space (and by a normative account, how sovereignty should
and could be transforming). As such I argue that sovereignty has been "unbundled" in ourer space, both practically
through legal approaches which allow for a different relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state, and also theoretically in
terms of leaving

open the potential to reconceptualize sovereignty in a way that better embraces

sovereignty in a globalized world (and indeed, going one step further, in a world where not all politics even occur within
the "globe", i.e. in outer space). The challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty can be seen partly as a product of (and
reconstitutive of) globalization, whereby transterritorial issues and the "shrinking" of the planet challenge the straightforward
relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state.! The

reality of space exploration can be seen as another

rad ical and unique issue-area in which theoretical approaches to "global" politics must be
reconceived. This chapter explores the ways in which outer space poses unique challenges to conceptual and
legal approaches to governance. I also argue that there may also be a dialectical relationship between territorially-based
politics and outer space politics, whereby notions of sovereignty are mutually reconstituting globalization and its conceptual challenge
to classical notions of sovereignty.

2AC AT: Cap K

Their attempt to control orbital space constructs it as a zone of inclusive
exclusion ripe for economic and political exploitationthe affirmative is
nothing more than a form of primitive accumulation which serves to solidify
the formation of a global capitalist sovereignty.
Duvall 8 (Raymond Duvall, Political ScienceUniversity of Minnesota, and Jonathan
Havercroft, Political ScienceUniversity of Oklahoma, 2008 Taking sovereignty out of this
world: space weapons and empire of the future, Review of International Studies, 34, 755775)
The doctrine of space control has emerged out of the belief that assets in space represent a
potential target for enemies of the US.38 There are two kinds of vulnerable US assets: private-commercial; and military.
One concern is that rivals may attack commercial satellites, thereby disrupting the flow of information and inflicting significant harm
on global markets.39 Militarily, the concern is that, through increasing reliance on satellites for Earth-based military operations, the
US has created an asymmetrical vulnerability. An adversary (including a non-state, terrorist organisation) could effectively
immobilise US forces by disabling the satellites that provide communication, command, and control capabilities. Consequently, the

project of space control is designed to protect commercial and military satellites from potential
attacks. Its broader purpose, however, is to prevent rivals from having any access to space for
activities antithetical to US interests; this is the imperative for denial of the use of space to
adversaries. Thus space control has dual functions it is both a privatising of the commons of
orbital space and a military exclusion in a form of inclusive exclusion .40 Space control
represents the extension of US sovereignty into orbital space. Its implementation would reinforce
the constitutive effect identified in the previous section on missile defence, namely to reinscribe
the hard shell border of the US, now extended to include the territory of orbital space. US
sovereignty is projected out of this world and into orbit. Under Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Outer
Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
or occupation, or by any other means. The

US project of space control would entail a clear violation of this article.41 In

a second constitutive
effect of importance, namely to produce a distinctly capitalist sovereignty . In Volume One of Capital,
addition to expanding the scope of US sovereignty, however, this violation of international law has

Marx chided classical political economists for their inability to explain how workers became separated from the means of production.
Whereas political economists such as Adam Smith argued that a previous accumulation of capital was necessary for a division of
labour, Marx argued that this doctrine was absurd. Division of labour existed in pre-capitalist societies where workers were not
alienated from their labour. Instead, Marx argued that the actual historical process of primitive accumulation of capital was carried out
through colonial relations of appropriation by force.42 While not a perfect analogy, because of the lack of material labour, the value of
which is to be forcibly appropriated in orbital space, space

control is like such primitive accumulation in

constituting a global capitalist order through the colonisation of space as previously common
property. One of the purposes of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was to preserve a commons where all states, regardless of technical
ability or economic or military power, could participate in the potential benefits space has to offer. In the years since this treaty was
signed, the primary economic use of space has been for commercial communications satellites. This industry has expanded
dramatically in the last two decades. Total revenues for commercial space-related industries in 1980 were $2.1 bn; by 2003 this figure
had expanded to $91 bn and it was expected to increase at least as rapidly into the foreseeable future.43 Space control is about
determining who has access to this new economy. Positions

in orbit for satellites are a new form of real estate.

By controlling access to orbital space the US would be forcibly appropriating the orbits, in effect
turning them into primitively accumulated private property.44 In this way, the US becomes even
more than it is now the sovereign state for global capitalism, the global capitalist state.

NEGATIVE

Non-Space CP

1NC
The United States should offer substantially expanded high-level dialogue
with the Peoples Republic of China concerning non-space military
modernization, crisis management, and escalation control.
Dialogue solves escalation allows the two countries to understand their
differences in a non-hostile manner.
Michael OHanlon 12, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; and James Steinberg, deputy
secretary of state in the Obama administration, dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse
University, 8/23/12, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: A military concept that challenges policymakers,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/beyond-air-sea-battle-a-military-concept-thatchallenges-policymakers/2012/08/23/8fd4f8fa-ed31-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_story.html
The new concept of American overseas military operations known as Air-Sea Battle has come under scrutiny and criticism. Popular
with the Air Force and Navy, it has been construed as an aggressive policy, and some in the Pentagon see it as a way for those two
services to grab budget share away from the Army. Across Asia, especially in China, many view it as a way for the United States to
challenge a rising Peoples Republic. In fact, as a military concept, Air-Sea Battle reflects some needed rethinking in response to
global changes in weaponry and military strategy in the Middle East and especially East Asia. The

challenge for
policymakers is not to discard it and replace it with something more seemingly benign but to place it within a broader
security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region that preserves stability and protects U.S. interests
without becoming unduly confrontational. Chinas military budget is almost $200 billion a year, according to the
Defense Department, which makes it the worlds No. 2 military power. With those considerable funds, China is building and
purchasing advanced submarines, more and increasingly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, homing munitions on antiship ballistic
missiles, satellites, antisatellite weapons and modern stealthy combat aircraft. American

analysts often label these

innovations as part of an anti-access/area denial strategy that could be employed against U.S.
forces in the region. The Chinese would try to push U.S. forces back from areas near China or seek greater ability to dominate
waters near Taiwan as well as the South China and East China seas. In response, the Air-Sea Battle concept seeks to use new
technologies to counter these perceived Chinese initiatives as well as similar if more modest efforts by Iran to challenge U.S.
capabilities in the Persian Gulf. Air-Sea Battle rightly emphasizes improved command-and-control, precision strike, advanced missile
defenses, robotics, submarine operations, and the use of air and space domains. So far, it has not involved big new weapons platforms.

The challenge for policymakers is that each country tends to see the others efforts to defend its
interests as threatening or even provocative what political scientists call the security
dilemma. Chinese strategists are acutely aware of their countrys history of being attacked by sea,
so they want to reduce their vulnerability to foreign forces. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force and Navy argue that
the Air-Sea concept is not directed at China but, rather, is about preserving U.S. military access and perhaps most important
sustaining the credibility of U.S. security commitments to allies. Because

of their size and capabilities, China and

the United States represent a central element in each others major strategic planning. Denials of
this lack credibility and feed distrust which is all the more reason policymakers must put this
military doctrine into perspective and not let it become a prescription for unfettered rivalry. While
U.S. defense spending and capabilities still appear astronomical to China and U.S. alliance
partners themselves formidable officials in Beijing should keep in mind that perhaps half of
U.S. defense capability is intended for other parts of the world and that the turbulence in the broader Middle
East suggests it will continue to be. The United States is no declining superpower, but the country is nonetheless war-weary and
financially strapped. U.S. leaders are cutting military spending even as they speak of rebalancing toward Asia. Moreover, the
international order that U.S. military force has upheld for decades is serving both countries core economic interests. For

the
United States, Chinas rise is impressive and in some ways foreboding. But China is still a developing
country: It ranks roughly in the middle of all nations in per capita gross domestic product, at less than $10,000 a year, according to the
World Bank. In coming years it will also face enormous demographic, environmental, economic and governance challenges. Although
its military budget is growing fast, such spending is just 2 percent of Chinas GDP, or less than half of the U.S. level (more than 4
percent). The stock of modern U.S. military equipment is worth $3trillion; despite its spending, China is at perhaps 10 percent that
figure. Nor does Chinas military have experience in modern combat operations. None of this attempts to justify every Chinese or

American modernization. But the

main challenge for those worried about the risks of rivalry and war is to
place military innovation efforts in a broader political strategy that recognizes the benefits of
Chinese-U.S. cooperation as well as the mutual risks if competition turns into rivalry or conflict.
As we continue necessary military modernizations, enhanced dialogue with Chinas military and
foreign policy actors will become all the more important, as will sober crisis management when
problems arise. Our current approach seems well-balanced, but the task will require active management on both sides for
decades to come. Air-Sea Battle is not the problem, but neither can it be the entirety of the solution.

Its reverse causal military dialogue and escalation control allow for
broader US-China cooperation
Li 14 [Li Xiaoyu, China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, MA in Global Studies @
U Denver, Intl Affairs Coordinator @ UN China Institute of International Studies,
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/13/content_6606656.htm]
Zero-Sum World: A second possible

trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more competitive

and dangerous zero-sum world, in which nations pursue narrow national interests . For example, the
world could experience intense monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking
geopolitical advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good. It could
see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering cooperation on global challenges
nearly impossible as global governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized . In this
scenario, the impact of megatrends and critical challenges on global developments is overwhelmingly negative. The world economy is
in a tailspin, brought on, perhaps, by

a deepening European recession followed by a new meltdown of the

global financial system and then a worse recession than that sparked by the 2008 financial crisis. Regional conflicts
and disputes in East Asia intensify suspicions and threaten to ignite conflict among the major
powers. The United States and China not only fail to cooperate on longer-term global issues but
also fail to work together to resolve immediate regional tensions which spin out of control,
leading to military conflict that threatens to drag the US and China into direct confrontation .
Global Revitalization and Cooperation: A third possible trajectory could lead to a world in which sustained and effective cooperation
builds/rebuilds key institutions to address old and emerging challenges as well as black swans. Globalization and global integration
continue apace with more successful efforts to mitigate or prepare for negative consequences. This scenario is characterized by greater
strategic stability among major powers and by sustained prosperity and economic growth in China, the United States, and most other
countries. Through cooperative development and deployment of new technologies countries implement effective measures to manage
energy, water, governance, and other challenges. The result would be a wide range of win-win outcomes for all nations. It

is
difficult to find any credible path to such global revitalization and cooperation that does not
include a cooperative US-China relationship. This makes efforts to achieve such an outcome
imperative for the leaders of both countries, despite the differences and suspicions between them.
Many variants of these scenarios are possible, but the dangers of a fragmented, competitive, or adversarial
world are as clear as the advantages of cooperation. Consultations with experts in China, the United States, and
many other countries indicate widespread recognition that failure to address megatrends and looming challenges cooperatively will
lead to suboptimal and even catastrophic outcomes. But general recognition is insufficient to establish priorities, identify critical
linkages, and develop concrete proposals for collective action. The stakes are too high to rely on chance and informal procedures.
VI. Recommendations Do Not Allow Bilateral Differences and Suspicions to Derail Cooperation This report is not intended as a
guide to improving China-US bilateral relations. The Joint Working Group is concerned, however, that developments

in
bilateral relations could impede the ability of the two countries to work together to meet common
global challenges, thus imperiling each countrys long-run prosperity and security. Consequently, it is
the responsibility of the leaderships of the two countries to step back from the current dynamic of
US-China relations and begin an earnest search for a balance of interests that could underpin a
long-term relationship that is largely cooperative. This report points to a number of trends in US-China relations
that could imperil the prospects for cooperation on global issues. Although we strongly believe that the United States and China do not
need to repeat the history of conflict between major powers, we are concerned that the narrative about the inevitability of such
conflict has become popular, especially among realists, on both sides of the Pacific. There is substantial danger that this could

become a self-fulfilling prophecy. China and the United States could come to regard each other as strategic adversaries or even
enemies and thus devote increasing resources to unnecessary and counter-productive geopolitical and military competition. This
danger is compounded by the unsettled

territorial disputes, aggravated by historical grievances that

threaten prolonged tension if not conflict in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. These disputes
involve US allies and friends in the region as well as China, thus threatening to embroil both
Washington and Beijing in regional crises. Failure to manage these disputes effectively will not
only impede US-China cooperation and deepen mutual suspicions but also make global
cooperation more difficult as Asian nations will be unable to overcome mistrust. While providing
solutions to this set of problems is outside the scope of this report, military competition between the United States
and China can have no positive outcome for either country. The deepening strategic mistrust
produced by such a strategically unnecessary competition will further aggravate suspicions of
each others intentions, which could impede the ability of the two countries, including their
militaries, to cooperate effectively to meet global challenges. Thus, it is imperative for China and
the United States to develop an understanding of their respective interests in the Asia-Pacific
region, de-escalate their military competition, and to further develop their nascent military-tomilitary cooperation.

China welcomes dialogue about military conflict solves cooperation and

threat construction
Gan and Liu 6/6 [Nectar Gan and Zhen Liu, 6/6/16, Xi Jinping holds out his hand to
Washington as China-US talks begin, South China Morning Post, backgrounds in reporting on
Chinese news, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1966766/xi-jinpingholds-out-his-hand-washington-china-us-talks]
President Xi Jinping on Monday called on China and the United States to prevent their differences from turning into confrontation. With ties between the powers strained over a series
of issues, Xi took a conciliatory tone in his opening statement to the annual China-US Strategic
and Economic Dialogue in Beijing. Xi said the nations should cultivate mutual trust and cooper ation and take part in regular talks. The fundamental thing is the two sides should stick to the principles of no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, he said. Officials
from both nations are using the dialogue to press each other on economic issues. Washington has added overcapacity in the Chinese
steel industry to its concern list, which includes long-standing issues such as exchange rate controls and intellectual property
violations. China has highlighted the difficulties arising from interest-rate rises in the US. US Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew
warned at the opening of the dialogue that Chinas excess steel and aluminium production had a distorting and damaging effect on
global markets, while Finance Minister Lou Jiwei defended Beijings position in a briefing. Your quick guide to the US-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue Vice-Premier Wang Yang said China would next week submit a negative list of sectors that
would remain off-limits to US investment in China. The two nations have gone through 24 rounds of talks on a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) since 2008, but a deal has not been reached. The ministerial meeting involving more than 100 high-ranking officials
comes as ties between the two countries become increasingly strained over strategic and economic issues. President Xi pictured
making his remarks at the start of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing. Photo: Reuters Tensions in the South
China Sea have continued to rise, with top military officials making tit-for-tat claims at a security summit in Singapore over the
weekend. US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter said China was erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation, while Sun Jianguo, deputy
chief of the PLAs Joint Staff Department, said any attempt to isolate China would fail. China, US cooperation on climate change a
model of how two nations can resolve differences, says Chinese negotiator Washington

has criticised China for

increasing its military presence in the disputed waters , and pressed China to accept the ruling of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague over a case brought by the Philippines regarding the disputes. Beijing has blamed the
militarisation of the region on frequent military activity by the US, and has vowed to ignore the court ruling.
Xi acknowledged inevitable differences and sensitive issues between the two major powers, citing contrasting histories, societies
and cultures. There

is no reason to be scared of having differences, the key is not to adopt a

confrontational attitude towards any differences, he said. China must cut excess steel production, US Treasury
Secretary says at opening of top-level talks between two nations Some differences can be solved through endeavour and both sides

should work harder to solve them, he said. Some differences cannot be solved at the moment and both sides should take each others
actual situations into consideration and take a constructive approach. Xi said the

Asia-Pacific region should be an

inclusive big platform for cooperation instead of an arena for countries to leverage and called for
China and the US to cultivate a mutual circle of friends. China and the US have extensive mutual interests in
the Asia-Pacific region. [We] should hold regular dialogues, cooperate, cope with various
challenges and work hard to cultivate a mutual, instead of exclusive, circle of friends between the
two countries, he said. China takes veiled shot at destabilising US presence in the Asia-Pacific US Secretary of State John Kerry said Washington took no position on the claims of various parties in the maritime disputes. The only position weve taken is:
lets not resolve this by unilateral action; lets resolve this through rule of law, through diplomacy, through negotiation. We urge all
nations to find a diplomatic solution, rooted in international standards and rule of law, he said. At one of the talks held alongside the
dialogue, Kerry said China and the US were working together on issues concerning Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria. North Korea is
expected to be a focus of the dialogue, after a visit to Beijing last week by a Pyongyang envoy who said it would continue with its
nuclear programme. China eases off Philippine fishing boats in overture to incoming president Duterte The SED also involves talks
on climate change, the internet, non-proliferation, military exchange and law enforcement. Shi Yinhong, an international relations
professor at Renmin University, said on major issues such as the South China Sea, BIT and North Korea, the differences between
China and the US were too big to overcome. Overall the situation is grim, he said. I wouldnt think we should expect any major
breakthrough. The SED was initiated by the Obama administration in 2009. Many expect it to be phased out after the US election
this year. Zhao Minghao, a researcher at the China Centre for Contemporary World Studies, said: Beijing

and Washington
should set up a new mechanism for risk control as soon as possible in case of emergencies that
could upset the entire world.

2NC Say Yes Ext

China thinks the CP is cool
CFR 6/6 [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/6/16, Chinese Officials Call for Cooperation at U.S.China Strategic Dialogue, http://www.cfr.org/about/newsletters/archive/newsletter/n3826]
Chinese President Xi Jinping called on the United States and China to "not to adopt a
confrontational attitude" toward the countries' differences as the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
opened in Beijing (IBT). The two countries should cultivate "common circles of friends" rather than
"exclusive circles of friends," Xi said (Xinhua). U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew
(SCMP) are attending the two-day conference, which will include discussions on maritime disputes in the South
China Sea, monetary policy, and a proposed U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty. The conference comes as tensions
escalate in the South China Sea, with a Chinese admiral blaming the United States for "openly showing its military
muscle" and backing "allies that are confronting China" during an Asian defense summit in Singapore this weekend (FT).

2NC Solvency Ext

Talks are good
Ying 15 [Fu Ying, 6/9/15, Here Is the Way Forward for Troubled China-U.S. Relations, The
World Post, Chairperson of Foreign Affairs Committee, National Peoples Congress,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fu-ying/china-us-relations-future_b_7540932.html]
First, it is incumbent upon the two countries to communicate more effectively. At present, neither side can convince the other as to the
validity of one anothers points when disagreements arise. We need to exploit the opportunities presented by such occasions to explain
our respective policies and strategies at different levels in a calm and reasonable manner. I have participated in some of the dialogues
and feel that in addition to demonstrating their respective stances, both sides should be good listeners to the others opinions. The bestcase scenario would be that the two could reach some form of consensus every time and adhere to it thereafter. As

China-U.S.
relations have gone far beyond bilateral issues, any discussion between the two sides should also
touch on regional and global issues to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation. The
understanding and support by the two peoples of the content and outcomes of these dialogues is
also vital to the stability of bilateral relations. If the two peoples and their respective media
continue to express antagonistic sentiments, ongoing negotiations will inevitably suffer. Secondly,
the two countries should avoid goading each other and should have a good sense of risk
management in bilateral relations to prevent matters from spinning out of control. As Chinese
Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai recently remarked, the United States is obviously attempting to draw Chinas ire by
flying a reconnaissance aircraft close to the Chinese construction side in the sea carrying a CNN news crew. Such brinkmanship

style provocations will only make matters worse. While the United States remains skeptical about Chinas
intentions in the South China Sea, in the eyes of the Chinese, the U.S. behavior on this matter is like a flamboyant
eagle which has flown into a china shop shattering the delicate and nuanced process for shelving disputes
and addressing differences through dialogue that China and its neighbors worked so hard to
create. The United States has refused to concede that tension in the region might be related to its
rebalancing in Asia and the Pacific. The U.S. behavior on this matter is like a flamboyant eagle which has flown
into a china shop. In the post-Cold War era, this U.S. approach of resolving regional confrontations
through coercive means has led, after all, to more violence and poverty in different parts of the
world. The U.S. government has in recent years drawn lessons from past failures, and tends now to refrain from using force when
their vital interests are not at stake. But many U.S. scholars have expressed doubt concerning this approach, maintaining the country
should return to its past hard-line tactics. I cant help but wonder: Why are they trying to

introduce tactics that have so

resoundingly failed in the Middle East into the Asia Pacific? Shouldnt they think, for just one minute, of new
ways to communicate with other major powers, including China? China and the United States need some serious discussion, including
between academics, on this matter.

Cooperation is a cool idea (this card is really vauge and not very good)
Hong Seok-hyun 2/29/16 (Hong Seok-hyun, chairman of the JoongAng Media Network and
a former Korean ambassador to the United States, Feb 29,2016
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3015579 )
Honorable Ambassador Don Gregg, Chairman of the Pacific Century Institute Board of Directors;
Mr. Kenneth Tuggle, President of the PCI Board of Directors; Mr. Don Evans, Treasurer of the
PCI; PCI Co-founder and CBOL Group Chairman Spencer Kim; members of the PCI Board of
Directors; ladies and gentlemen: Please allow me to begin my remarks with my deep thanks to all for the tremendous
honor of receiving the Building Bridges Award and for presenting me with this wonderful opportunity to speak before you. I spent a
total of 12 years living in the United States, as a graduate student, later as an economist working at the World Bank, and then as the
Korean Ambassador to the United States. I believe that my experiences in the United States, and the lessons that I learned during my
time here, have played a critical role in my career and that I have many Americans to thank for helping me to reach the point in my
career at which I am honored with such an award. I laud the founders of the PCI for the wisdom and the foresight they displayed in

anticipating the profound changes that America would face in the Asia-Pacific age when they launched the Institute 26 years ago.
The PCI has made a tremendous contribution to the deepening of exchange and the increase in understanding throughout the region. I
would like to take this opportunity to share with you my views on the topic of The Rise of China and the Future of the American Role
in Asia. As you well know, the rise of China is a new development in East Asia which has altered the accepted geopolitical reality of
a relatively weak China that has been true since the Opium Wars in the 19th century, if not before. The unexpectedly rapid rise of
China not only poses challenges for China itself, which often lacks the expertise to support its new global role, but also poses many
challenges for the future development of other nations in East Asia, specifically for Korea and Japan. The

challenge of
engaging China is also very real for the United States. In the case of Korea, a country which finds itself in close
geographical proximity to China while it remains a staunch U.S. ally, the rise of China is a matter of vital concern and how that rise
will unfold will have profound impact on Koreas future and on its potential. There is a Chinese proverb, One mountain cannot
accommodate two tigers (il shan bu rong ho ). This saying suggests that there can only be one dominant power in a
region. If this saying applies to East Asia, then we can assume that China and the United States will inevitably get into various
irresolvable conflicts in East Asia because each country will strive to be the dominant power. But is that saying really applicable to
the situation in East Asia, which has its own unique characteristics? More importantly, what steps can we take to make sure that the
inevitable differences in perspective that arise between the two tigers do not result in a serious geopolitical struggle? How can we
make sure that the two tigers coexist without fighting for dominance over a mountain? I would like to explore this fascinating topic
with you and to consider what positive role the United States should play in East Asia. But I also want to talk about what China must
do and consider what Korea, as a country deeply engaged with both superpowers, can do to help in this complex geopolitical dance.
Of course the proverb about the tigers is an apt analogy for the political process in China in which a victor who establishes a unified
dynasty after long years of vying for dominance between rivals, must establish his unquestioned authority. In traditional Chinese
political thought, there can only be one lord of the realm, and of the state. If there is no singular force to establish order (zhi()) the
realm will descend into chaos (luan()). The Chinese consider a unifying singular force as essential to an orderly political system.
This perspective was extended outward in Chinas external relations. The Chinese geopolitical order assumed that there should be
one singularly powerful kingdom that occupied the top of the hierarchy, and that this hierarchy wherein tributary states paid honor to
the Chinese dynasty, was essential to maintaining peace and stability in the realm. According to this view, there will be a high
likelihood of turbulent times in East Asia if the realm is not authoritatively unified under one hegemonic power. This traditional Sinocentric view of external affairs was subject to a tremendous challenge after the incursions of imperialism in the 19th century. Suddenly
the unquestioned master of the realm was humiliated at the hands of the British during the Opium Wars and eventually reduced to a
state of semi-colonialism. The supreme power of East Asia was humbled by the technology and the financial instruments employed
by the imperialists who ruthlessly pursued national prosperity through military might and an economic system based on the law of the
jungle. The Chinese to this day are deeply aware of the century of humiliations as a semi-colonized state that they suffered through.
The drive for economic development in China is a direct result of the passions stirred up by that humiliation. China has focused its
energy on achieving a national revival and on regaining the global dominance it enjoyed for most of its history. The devastation and
humiliation resulting from the imperialist conquest of China in the 19th century, first by Britain, France and Germany and then by
Japan, have made the Chinese feel acutely that they cannot afford to be perceived as the loser in any contest for supremacy. This
awareness is in line with the traditional Chinese view of Chinas appropriate place in the world and its relations with its neighbors.
Behind this Chinese perspective on international relations lurks that concept that two tigers cannot co-exist on one mountain. This
perception of international relations made sense to the Chinese in the context of the Chinese experience of imperialism and
colonialism. But the world has undergone tremendous change over the last two centuries, which suggests that we are looking at a
very different game today. Imperialism has found its place in the dust bin of history after the debacles of the First and Second World
Wars showed its limitations. In place of that vertical order, a new Western, international order has been established that holds up
equality among sovereign nations and territorial integrity in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. That new, complex
and multilateral world, which has its origins in the Treaty of Westphalia and was fulfilled at the San Francisco Conference of 1945
with the founding of the United Nations, has been transplanted into East Asia. During

the 20th century, relations

between countries gradually evolved beyond the imperialist hegemonic struggle for survival of
the fittest that dominated the nineteenth century and we have embraced a new model of
maximization of mutual benefit through exchange and cooperation. This new paradigm for a world order
based on exchange and cooperation not only continues on, but it is expanding in the 21st century as dramatic breakthroughs in science
and technology increase economic integration. Deepening

mutual dependence in economic and trade

relations have become the key to peace and prosperity in our world. It is true, of course, that there remain
significant gaps in development depending on the region. But the emergence of a new system is unmistakable. The forefront of this
shift can be observed in Europe, the region that has embraced global economic systems for the longest period of time. In Europe
today, the supremacy of one particular state is no longer a significant concern. Instead, the main concern of nations which form a
community is the pursuit of co-prosperity and mutual benefit. The stakeholders have clear roles and responsibilities in the resolution
of common problems and that process assures stability and predictability. East Asia may not have reached that degree of institutional
and cultural integration yet. Nevertheless, the development of shared financial institutions and the launch of the Trilateral
Cooperation Secretariat (Korea, China and Japan) in 2011 suggest that East Asia is heading in the same direction as Europe, following
the course set down in the pan-global progression of history. That said, the unique historical legacy of East Asia, and certain cultural
characteristics, make the current situation in East Asia a confusing mix of new trends and past vestiges. A stable and peaceful order
may well emerge in Northeast Asia, but it will be culturally and structurally distinct from Europe. Therefore, the essential question
we need to ask when we consider Chinas rise and the continuing role of the United States in East Asia is this: How can we
orchestrate in a smooth manner this profound shift in the order of East Asia to a horizontal order based on reciprocal relations granted

in the historical vestiges of the old order? We must guard against a struggle between the nations of the realm for supremacy, a
struggle that will not only undermine the global trend towards reciprocal relations, but will be ultimately detrimental to all nations in
East Asia. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my sincere wish that East Asia will not revert to outmoded models of the past. We can make
real progress if we envision and establish a new order in East Asia based on mutual respect, co-existence and co-prosperity.

Relations between nations should be horizontal and our perspective should be future-oriented,
moving forward by embracing new innovations. I believe that there are many in China, Korea and Japan who are
ready to embrace such a vision. To realize this goal, I believe that the United States must take on new and
innovative roles in East Asia to present a powerful vision. And I believe that we must include China
in that vision and that we should make clear what contributions China should make. If we look at the
history of the past century in East Asia, we see many precedents for cooperation between the United States
and China and they provide concrete suggestions as to what the foundations for a stable East Asian
order might be. When China was in decline and subject to exploitation at the hands of Western imperialism, U.S. policies with
regard to China were clearly different from those of the imperialist powers. At the time, the United States promoted the open door
policy for free trade with China based on Secretary of State John Hays demand (1899) that all European powers allow for free trade
with China and not show favoritism in economic affairs. In addition, the United States was practically the only superpower with no
territorial ambitions for expansion into China. Quite the opposite, the U.S.

played a major role in the Second World

War, in which it was allied with China, in defeating Imperial Japan and freeing China from the state of semicolonialism it had suffered for a century. Of course, there were profound changes in the relationship of the United States and China
after the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949 and Washington ultimately backed the Kuomintang party which had fled to
Taiwan. The resulting Cold War created a new geopolitical order wherein America intervened and engaged more deeply in East
Asian affairs, often with a positive effect, but also with the assumption that there was a threat from communist China that had to be
countered. The United States and China even clashed militarily on the Korean Peninsula, and a continued state of tension and
confrontation haunted a divided East Asia for decades. But a welcome shift began in the 1970s when the United States improved
relations with China and encouraged Beijing to become an active member of the international community. Encouraged by the new
opportunity for trade and for economic growth, China made the historic decision to set out on the road of economic and political
reform and achieved remarkable economic growth by joining the international trading order and entering the U.S. market in earnest.
For its part, America actively engaged with China to set up programs and implement policies for significant bilateral and multilateral
cooperation. China seized the opportunity and emerged as a major economic force after concentrating on domestic politics in the
1960s and 1970s. For its part, the U.S. made strides politically, diplomatically and economically in bringing China into the
international community, culminating in Chinas joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. In short, Americas role in Chinas
rise has in general been amicable and positive. The experience of history strongly suggests that it is possible for the United States and
China to maintain mutual cooperation during Chinas rise, and thereafter, granted that there will inevitably be disagreements and
misunderstandings concerning specific issues. Overall, the actions of America, as the dominant outside force in East Asia over the
past century, have contributed to peace, stability and prosperity in the region as it witnessed a war led by Imperial Japan, the Cold War,
the rapprochement with China and then entered the post-Cold War era. The United States offered an international order which was
not imperialist in nature and which encouraged self-determination in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson. The precedents for a positive
role for the United States hint at the potential for a new order that fully integrates China, engaging it as a major power with clear rights
and responsibilities. That is to say, there is a way for two tigers to work together for peace, stability and co-prosperity in the realm.
Frankly speaking, I am skeptical that the countries in East Asia can create a new geopolitical order all on their own. Not only do East
Asian countries not have the experience with modern international relations and regional cooperation that we have witnessed in
Europe over the last 300 years, there are serious concerns that past conflicts over history and territory may reignite at any time. What
we have seen over the last century, starting with the Open Door policy for trade is that when an outside force, in this case the U.S.,
plays the role of an honest broker, it becomes easier to build a stable and reciprocal order in East Asia. If

we consider the
larger geopolitical need to create a stable system that undergirds all bilateral relations, the United
States has a clear and urgent task in front of it in East Asia to encourage China to participate in a
constructive manner as we work together, as equals, to establish a reciprocal and cooperative
order in East Asia. That order will be similar to what we have witnessed in Europe, but it will have unique features dictated
by the specifics of East Asia. And I believe that the U.S. has the maturity and the experience to engage China in that process and
assure China that it too will have a clear stake in the new order. The U.S. has responded to Chinas rise with a policy of Asian
rebalancing, or what is known as the pivot to Asia. I believe this policy is an important one and that the new economic importance
of East Asia in the world demands that Washington focus its resources more on responding to the emergence of East Asia. But China,
because of its painful experience with colonialism, has displayed a tendency to misread any moves to increase U.S. engagement in
Asia as a ploy to contain and encircle China. Granted the two centuries of humiliation that China experienced, we can find in
Beijings psychology an odd mixture of smarting wounds from the past and pride in todays achievements. We can

understand, even if we disagree, why the Chinese tend to harbor skepticism towards the United
States intentions and retain a sense of victimization vis-a-vis external powers. Also, behind the
obvious pride the Chinese take in their achievements, there remain concerns about domestic challenges produced by rapid economic
growth. The

combination of wariness about the intentions of outside forces and concerns over

domestic issues are fanning nationalism in China. America also needs to make sure it does not
give the impression that its legitimate concerns for a stable and reciprocal order in East Asia are
an attempt to subvert Chinas rise. We know that most Americans want strong engagement with China and that many
see opportunities for the United States if China becomes a true stakeholder. But if the U.S. gives the impression that it is trying to
contain and encircle China through its actions, China will feel compelled to exert itself and push back. There is another ancient
Chinese proverb that I would like to share with you. This proverb suggests another paradigm for imagining the future of East Asia.
The proverb is The cypress tree is happiest in a lush pine forest. (in Chinese S?ng mao b?i yue (), or in Korean Song mu
baek yeol. If the international community wants to encourage China to cooperate with other nations and to contribute more to
creating an open community in East Asia, the U.S. should take the lead in welcoming Chinas rise and continuing to engage China
through dialog in diverse fields, and on different levels, from elementary students to college professors, from local government
officials to CEOs of major corporations. If the U.S. welcomes a flourishing China, I believe that Beijing will respond to that
encouragement and play a more responsible role. China has shown it is capable of such growth before and it shows signs now that it
will move toward a new order in the region based on mutual respect, co-existence and co-prosperity. We can convince the Chinese
that it is the trees on the mountain which grow together in a symbiotic manner, and not the hungry tigers that wander over the
mountain that should be our model. Let us talk a bit more concretely about what Americas role in East Asia should be. The

U.S.
must play a leadership role in encouraging a common agenda for collaboration in East Asia and
checking narrow-minded nationalism and chauvinism. Also the United States should continue to play a leading role in
addressing in a multilateral format potential trouble spots such as North Koreas nuclear program. In order to encourage
collaboration and draw attention to common concerns in East Asia, the U.S. needs to pursue
diverse engagement policies in the fields of business, finance and trade. I hope that the U.S. will
continue to advocate for mutual benefits to be realized through the encouragement of
competition, efficiency and rationality. The United States should encourage opportunities for individual participation
in economic exchange and demand compliance with rules and the upholding of high standards for transparency. Anti-colonial
nationalism remains a powerful force in East Asia today and it can disrupt many valuable efforts for multilateral cooperation.
Because America took a stance against imperialism during the colonial period and actively tried to counter the ambitions of the
imperialists, even going to war against Japan for that reason, East Asia was able to recover its freedom and its sovereignty. Many
Koreans, myself included, are deeply grateful for the sacrifices made by Americans to end the reign of imperialist exploitation. The
disputes over history issues in East Asia, if they expand and flame emotions, can create barriers in the region at a time when we should
all be coming together. I hope that the United States will rise to the occasion and demonstrate leadership so that past wrongs do not
create present day problems. The best way to build a new order in East Asia in both name and in reality is to establish successful
precedents for cooperation. I believe that resolving the controversy over North Koreas nuclear program could be such a model case.
North Koreas recent nuclear test, the fourth, demands a speedy and unified response from all the nations of East Asia. If we want a
meaningful resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue, and I believe it is possible, we must not let ourselves be sidetracked by
geopolitical strategies. Rather, we should focus on the core values of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security, and we should
engage closely with each other, while speaking seriously with the North Koreans. Although the agenda of the Six-Party Talks so far
has been limited to the question of North Korean denuclearization, it nonetheless has served as an unprecedented venue for
negotiations that include the major countries of Northeast Asia. If our joint efforts bear fruit this time around, the Six-Party Talks
could serve as a precedent for meaningful multilateral governance. If the United States can address serious issues together with
Northeast Asian countries in the case of North Korea, it will be a dramatic example of cooperation between two giants in the region:
the U.S. and China. We can build on that collaboration, and other previous agreements for cooperation in the response to climate
change and military exchanges, to set up a stable long-term vision for the relationship. The agreement between the United States and
China for a joint response to security threats will be a critical precedent for trust building and economic cooperation that will result in
closer ties between the nations of East Asia as a whole. Such a universal shift will be the only way to induce North Korea, the only
isolated country in East Asia, to join the common current of our times. The reality of geography makes it inevitable that America and
China are here to stay in East Asia. We expect that China will search for constructive ways to support co-existence and co-prosperity
in the region and that such an effort will include a pragmatic acceptance of the U.S. presence in the region as a constant and stabilizing
element. I hope that China will welcome Americas role in East Asia and take the cypress and pine tree approach to the
engagement of the two nations in the region and with each other. Rather than using its new-found political and economic might to
project its influence outwards in an assertive manner, I hope to see China exert its efforts towards domestic and regional
development that is aimed at increasing prosperity and to demonstrate far-sighted leadership by cooperating with the U.S. to create a
future-oriented order. The United States should increasingly focus its attention on the nations of East Asia which have reached a high
level of sophistication. It should openly recognize that China can be a good partner for many efforts to promote peace and prosperity.
China should understand that in this globalized world there is no way to go back to a traditional order. Both parties should recognize
this reality and find an ideal balance with benefits for all. As a middle power in Northeast Asia which has developed close
multilateral relations with all its neighbors, Korea is a threat to no one. An ally of the United States, with deep-rooted relations with
Japan, and a significant partnership with China and Russia, Korea is in the unique position to push forward the establishment of a
community based on mutual respect, co-prosperity and interdependence among countries in the region. I also believe that Korea can
function as a facilitator to create a new order built on common ground between the U.S. and China and East Asia as a whole. As a
nation with no history of colonialism or imperialism, that role on the part of Korea would be welcomed by East Asian nations. It
would raise Koreas stature and create a favorable environment in the region to support for efforts toward unification on the Korean
peninsula. In conclusion, the U.S. presence in East Asia over the last century is a geopolitical constant in East Asia and venturing an

East Asian order without such an honest broker as a stakeholder runs the risk of returning to the old patterns of rivalry and conflict.
The rise of China has also become a geopolitical constant. Therefore, the U.S. and China should embrace the zeitgeist of a highly
networked global village in the 21st century and join forces to usher in a future-oriented order in East Asia based on true reciprocity.
The key to success is a constructive and positive approach to international relations that takes into consideration the needs and
perspectives of the partner. Both the United States and China should adopt a realistic perspective that assumes mutual respect and
cooperation on multiple fronts to realize common benefits. New developments, from the internet to new global trade regimes make
such unprecedented cooperation not only possible, but required. But how smooth that process will be depends on the wisdom and the
creativity shown by U.S. leadership and the sense of responsibility and vision on the part of China. As a citizen of Korea, the middle
power in East Asia that is so deeply committed to a multilateral cooperative future, it is my sincere wish to see a new order of mutual
respect and co-existence like that which we have seen flower in Europe take root in East Asia. We can create a new order in East
Asia wherein nations, big and small, like trees, entangle their roots together beneath the earth and mingle their branches together
above our heads to form a green and peaceful canopy. Tigers of all stripes will be welcome to come and go as they please in that
luxuriant green. Thank you for your attention.

AT Nash
End of article concludes military conflict hurts broader cooperation proves
the CP results in broader coop
Nash 6/18 [Rafael Nash, 6/18/16,Annual dialogue moves China-US ties forward, Sacred
Heart, http://sacredheartspectrum.com/2016/06/annual-dialogue-moves-china-us-ties-forward/]
China claims almost all of the strategically vital sea despite competing claims by several of its Southeast Asian neighbours, and has
rapidly built artificial islands suitable for military use. Just last weekend, Beijing said it would ignore an upcoming worldwide
arbitration decision in a dispute with the Philippines. The

timing combined with tensions over the South China

Sea-where the U.S.is challenging Beijing's sharp-elbowed assertion of sovereignty over islands,
reefs and surrounding waters claimed by other countries-limited prospects for breakthroughs on
issues such as trade and investment barriers and China's currency policy.

AT Aff solves the CP

US China military rivalry is unique and cant be solved by other dialogues
Wei 16 [Da Wei, 6/17/16, China, US tensions over South China Sea persist despite dialogue,
director of the Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR), Sino-US.com, http://sino-us.com/419/11131792978.html]
Just on the second day after the 8th China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the 7th China-US High-Level
Consultation on People-to-People Exchange, Chinese and Russian warships appeared in the vicinity of the Diaoyu Islands, which has
led to speculations among different parties.Because it was unclear if it was a joint patrol, or the warships happened to be there together
by accident, it could not be considered as a counter measure to Japanese or US actions on South China Sea. China

and the US

have gained significant achievements in the economic field in this years S&ED, such as the agreements on
renminbi and trade, compared with the results in the strategic field.This is due to the essence of the two different
fields. Both sides talked about the issues of common concern in the dialogue areas, such as the South
China Sea dispute and North Koreas nuclear issue, which could not be solved in one meeting. Little progress was made on
the South China Sea dispute, and the key reason is that the South China Sea issue is complex and
sensitive. The complexity is due to a host of issues, such as military, law and law enforcement.Meanwhile, the
sensitivity also means that the issue could not be solved at a ministry-level dialogue, and significant progress can be expected when
the leaders of both countries talk about the issue.The S&ED was held just before an impending ruling by an international arbitration
initiated by the Philippines, which is also an important reason for both sides to not achieve any progress on the South China Sea.Some
American participants said that both sides have made some progress. Though Chinese leaders reiterated the stance on South China
Sea, it still helped allay American doubts.But generally, both

sides still have deep suspicions on the issue, and

concrete achievements can only be made through dialogue between leaders of the two sides. Some
said that when S&ED was held, the military confrontation in the South China Sea did not abate, but escalated.But it is hard to judge if
the confrontation escalated or not. The confrontation has no direct connection to the few achievements made at the S&ED.China and
the US have cooperation in some fields and they also have contradictions. The co-existence of conflict and cooperation just shows the
complex relationship between China and the US. Having conflicts does not mean they could not cooperate, and the cooperation also
does not mean no conflict the exists in bilateral ties.The US will hold its presidential election, and the South China Sea will be raised
as a hot topic. It also depends on how both sides handle issue, as proper handling would help cool down the issue.But in any case, the
South China Sea issue would not change due to the US election, because the two have no causal link.

Tech Transfer DA

1NC
China space cooperation leads to tech transfers that fuel illicit tech sales to
Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan - S.Q. levels of cooperation are sufficient
Sterner 09 [Eric R. Sterner, 2009, Viewpoint: Be Wary Of China Space Ties, fellow at the
George C. Marshall Institute, held senior staff positions on the House Armed Services and
Science committees, served in the Defense Dept. and was NASA associate deputy administrator
for policy and planning, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?
channel=awst&id=news/Vwpt112309.xml&headline=U.S.%20Wary%20Of%20Space
%20Cooperation%20With%20China//sb)\
This autumn, China and the U.S. began moving toward greater cooperation in space. As China lifted a little more of the veil covering
its space program, U.S. officials expressed a greater desire to work together in exploring space. Presidential science adviser John
Holdren floated the idea of increased cooperation in human spaceflight last spring. The Augustine committee raised the idea again, and
Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao pledged to deepen space cooperation last week (see p. 33). Unfortunately, there are ample
reasons for the U.S. to keep its distance. While the U.S. explicitly decided to separate its space exploration activities from the military,

Chinas human spaceflight program is a subsidiary of the Peoples Liberation Army. In that
context, the risks of illicit technology transfer are considerable. Closer relations create greater
opportunities for China to acquire sensitive technology. In 2007, the U.S. launched the interagency National Export Enforcement Initiative, designed to combat illegal trafficking in sensitive
technologies. Within a year, charges were filed against 145 criminal defendants. Iran and China
were the intended destinations for most of the known illegal exports. The Justice Dept. noted, The
illegal exports to China have involved rocket launch data, space shuttle technology, missile
technology, naval warship data, [UAV] technology, thermal imaging systems, military nightvision systems and other materials. This is consistent with other Chinese activities, including a
massive 2005 cyber-raid on NASAs computers that exfiltrated data about the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiters
propulsion system, solar panels and fuel tanks. The U.S. should be concerned about such transfers for two
reasons. First, they will aid Chinese military modernization, particularly in areas where the U.S.
holds an advantage (see p. 29). The Defense Dept.s 2009 annual report on the Chinese military concludes, The pace and
scope of Chinas military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of
advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and
science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the
armed forces. China has already lased U.S. satellites, demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic anti-satellite weapon, and is working
on advanced microsatellites and formation flying. Collectively, these present a significant threat to the space systems upon which the
U.S. depends for its conventional and strategic military advantagesadvantages that Chinese theorists clearly want to hold at risk.
Chinese access to advanced U.S. civil and commercial space technologies and experience, whether illicit or approved, reduces the cost
and increases the speed at which China can climb the military research and development learning curve. Second, China

is a
serial proliferator. Some technologies could make their way to countries of even greater concern,
including Iran and North Korea. The deputy director of national intelligence for analysis submits
an unclassified annual proliferation report to Congress, known as the 721 Report. The most
recent report states, Chinese companies have been associated with nuclear and missile programs
in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran; Chinese entitieswhich include private companies,
individuals and state-owned military export firms?continue to engage in [weapons of mass
destruction]-related proliferation activities. Remaining wary of Chinas intentions does not mean the
U.S. should opt for isolation, but it does argue against close space cooperation . Instead, the U.S. should seek to increase
transparency about Chinas intentions and capabilities through military channels, share scientific data about the solar system (but not
the technology that collected the data), establish standards (such as limiting orbital debris creation) that serve mutual interests, and
possibly coordinate some activities such as lunar or Earth science missions. Existing international frameworks enable all of this, but
China has resisted accepting the responsibilities that come with membership as a great space power. Aerospace technologies are high
on Chinas illegal shopping list. Until Chinas intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and persistently changed, close
cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits.

Iran proliferation causes nuclear war

Edelman et al., distinguished fellow Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 11 (Eric S, Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments President, Evan Braden Montgomery, Research Fellow, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran, Foreign Affairs, January/February,
ebsco, accessed 11-14-13)
The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have

highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran

could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably,
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates all signatories to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these
states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in
nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The
npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural
uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched
uranium and plutoniumthe very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons
remains a slow, expensive, and dicult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain
aspiring nuclear states access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a
nuclear weapons capability within a decade. There is, however, at

least one state that could receive significant outside

support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi
Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form
to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense
that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a
nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it
might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to
the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several
dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly
brokered the deal, and it may have also oered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver
conventional warheads eectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving
nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This Islamabad option could develop in one of several
dierent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the
infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or
longer. Not

only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more
heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent
nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially
expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery
systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly
appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their
own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim
forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part,
would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how
India would respond. Would it target Pakistans weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or
nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis
in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of Indias reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek
out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of
other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do
so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation : each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the
nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. n-player competition Were Saudi
Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the

Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more
before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based
on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or

more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar
systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift
quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the
Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear
exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state
can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging

nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or
submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the
very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled
to launch on warning of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments
might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of
miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the
risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a
nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state
survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure
to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would

regional nuclear war.

retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a

2NC UQ Extension
No US and China tech transfer now limited cooperation
Rutkowski 9 (Ryan, Johns Hopkins University International Studies Masters candidate, 9 221-9, "US-China Cooperation in Manned-Space Exploration
http://rrutkows.blogspot.com/2009/02/us-china-cooperation-in-manned-space.html, accessed 7-111)
Despite the U.S. efforts to engage with the international community more in manned-space
exploration, U.S. and China collaboration remains limited. Indeed, U.S.-China space
cooperation has been poor since the mid-1990s when several U.S. companies were accused of
transferring potentially sensitive military information to China. The primary problem with U.SChina space cooperation continues to be concerns about inadvertent technology transfers.
Certain U.S. officials fear that dual-use space technology could easily be transferred to China.
This is encompassed in the U.S ban on sale of military technology and export restrictions of certain
sensitive technologies to China. Nonetheless, in 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited
China to begun a limited dialogue on cooperation. However, any progress towards cooperation on

space technology was halted when China tested its first successful anti-Satellite weapons
technology heightening security tensions between the U.S and China.

2NC Link Extension

China space coop leads to iran prolif
Jeff Foust, Editor and publisher of the Space Review online journal, 11/30/0 9, Caution about
US-China space cooperation, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2009/11/30/caution-about-us-chinaspace-cooperation/
When President Obama visited China earlier this month, the

US and China issued a joint statement that included

a passage about space cooperation, including starting a dialogue on human space flight and space exploration.
Cooperation would be a good thing, right? Not necessarily, according to some. In an Aviation Week oped last week, Eric Sterner warns cooperation could lead to more technology transfer, something that,
in the 1990s, led to stiffened export control regulations that transferred commercial satellites and
their components to the US Munitions List. Such transfer is worrisome, he argues, not only
because it could aid Chinese military modernization but also because China is a serial
proliferator who could then transfer such technologies to places like Iran and North
Korea. Until Chinas intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and persistently changed, he concludes, close
cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits . In this weeks issue of The Space Review,
Taylor Dinerman raises concerns about the appearance of cooperation between the US and China. If the US looks like its trying too
hard to cooperate with China (or other countries, for that matter), it could give the appearance of weakness. He also notes that
previous models for international cooperation, such as Apollo-Soyuz and ISS, dont fit the current situation, in part because of the lack
of knowledge about what is motivating Chinas human spaceflight program. If the US presents itself as too eager for partnership
agreements or too weak to explore the solar system without assistance, then the world and the American people will only see
softness.

2NC Internal Link Extension General

China prolif spreads to North Korea and Iran-theyre a primary supplier
Kan 15 [Shirley A. Kan. Specialist in Asian Security Affairs. China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Missiles: Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf. SH]

China is not a member of the MTCR or the Australia Group (AG) (on chemical and biological
weapons). (In June 2004, China expressed willingness to join the MTCR.) China did not join the 93 countries in
signing the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in The Hague on
November 25, 2002. China has not joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush
on May 31, 2003. PRC weapons proliferation has persisted, aggravating trends that result in more
ambiguous technical assistance (vs. transfers of hardware), longer range missiles, more indigenous
capabilities, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
noted that, for July-December 1996, China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and
technology to foreign countries . As required by Section 721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 104293), the intelligence communitys report to Congress , or Section 721 Report, Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, named
entities in China (plus North Korea and Russia) as key suppliers of dangerous technology that could
contribute to WMD and missile programs. Chinas entities, including state-owned defense
industrial corporations, reportedly were associated with Pakistans nuclear and missile programs
and Irans missile programs. Original legislation required a semi-annual report. The FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act
(P.L. 108- 177) changed the requirement to an annual report. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) submitted to Congress the
latest unclassified Section 721 Report to cover the year of 2011. The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2013 (P.L. 112-277)

In 2014, a State Department official stated that Chinas economy

continued to be the primary source of supply of high technology and materials for programs in
Iran and North Korea.
repealed this reporting requirement.

China prolif fuels prolif in Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran-direct contacts
and uncontrolled illicit channels
Kazi 4/22/16 [Reshmi. Reshmi Kazi is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
China Remains a Proliferation Concern in the Indian Subcontinent. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/china-proliferation-concern-in-the-indian-subcontinent_rkazi_220416. SH]

Recently, a mineral smuggling operation involving export of several tonnes of beryl1 an atomic
mineral ore of beryllium2 reportedly to China, was jointly thwarted by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE),
the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Rajasthan Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) in Kanakpura, Rajasthan.3 By the end of January this
year, Rajasthan ATS had reportedly arrested six men.

This incident highlighted two important issues.

First, that an

The
prime beneficiary of this racket is reportedly China and it could possibly involve Pakistan too,
given the history of clandestine nuclear trade between the two all weather friends. Second, though
illicit racket involved in smuggling of valuable minerals like berylllium with atomic applications is flourishing in the region.

India has a robust nuclear security system in place, capable of providing effective physical protection to sensitive materials housed at
its nuclear facilities, still the security system needs to be constantly evaluated and upgraded at various levels. The mining department
too needs to be more vigilant against any illegal movement of regulated items from within the country. To that extent, India has
already established a national-level institutional mechanism in the form of a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team, basically part of a
coordinated multi-agency approach to deal with the threat of individuals or group of individuals acquiring nuclear or radioactive
material for malicious purposes.4 It is said that China, apart from the US, Canada, Russia and Brazil, is known to extract beryllium
from the mineral ore for use in nuclear power plants, space technology and scanning purposes.5 Hence, it can be assumed that China

Chinas
proliferation trends have remained a source of concern for the international community . Despite being
a member of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), China remains a proliferator, and is
known for exporting sensitive items that could be used for malicious purposes. As regards the recent
has a steady demand for beryllium. But what is worrisome is Chinas resort to illegal means for acquiring beryllium.

smuggling incident, it is known that beryllium and its alloys fall under Category II Item 4 of the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR) Guidelines, which include a wide range of equipment, material and technologies, most of which have uses other than for
missiles capable of delivering WMD. Though there is greater flexibility in the treatment of Category II transfer applications of the
MTCR Guidelines (as against Category I), the member countries and those adhering unilaterally to the Guidelines have
unanimously agreed to exercise utmost restraint in the import and export of these items.6 The objective is to limit the risk of

China has
consistently fallen short on its commitments and continues to remain a proliferation concern
given the assistance it has rendered to countries such as Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Chinas
continued proliferation by way of missile technology transfer has imparted Pakistan with knowhow to develop its domestic missile programme. China has been a key supplier of technology,
with entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and Iran.7 The United States
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in its Section 721 Report for 2011, had noted that Chinese entities, including
state-owned defence industrial corporations, were reported to be associated with Pakistans
nuclear and missile programmes as well as Irans missile programmes.8 China is also suspected
of providing North Korea with sensitive items for its ballistic missile programme. Chinas serial
proliferation acts were also evident from its export of sensitive materials to Iran. Recently, China has
accelerated its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan that involves setting up of at least six nuclear
power projects in Islamabad.9 The China-Pakistan nuclear commerce is alleged to have been
arranged without the sanction of the NSG. Chinas argument that its actions are in compliance
with NSG guidelines is far from credible as the agreement lacks adequate transparency. Chinas
export policies too have intensified apprehensions over proliferation trends that encourage illegal
commerce in sensitive materials and technologies to countries of concern. The interception of the
illegal beryl exports, reportedly destined for China, avers that there are loopholes that constitute serious
weak links within the global nuclear security system. These weak links are also being used for
malicious purposes by terrorists and other elements posing serious security threat to India and the
rest of the global community.10 Thus, it is important that the international community reinforces its efforts aimed at
proliferation of controlled items or their technology falling into the hands of terrorist networks. However,

mitigating the threat to nuclear security. Greater international cooperation would make the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) more effective in unravelling nuclear black markets and smuggling networks. It is equally important that nuclear weapon
states like China act responsibly in preventing unlawful nuclear trade activities. As a state with advanced nuclear technology, India too
would have to make consistent efforts to constantly upgrade its nuclear security system.

2NC Internal Link Extension Iran

China provides key supplies for uranium enrichment in Iran

Kan 15

[Shirley A. Kan. Specialist in Asian Security Affairs. China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Missiles: Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf. SH]

In 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed that Iranian front companies

procured materials from China (and other countries) for secret nuclear weapons facilities, while experts
from China worked at a uranium mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium enrichment) near
Uranium Enrichment

Isfahan, reported the Washington Post (December 19, 2002, and February 20, 2003). Moreover, Nucleonics Week (February 27 and
March 6, 2003) reported that Iran, since 2000, was

building a secret uranium enrichment plant at Natanz with

technology for gas centrifuge enrichment from Pakistan (Khan Research Laboratories), a country that has
received nuclear cooperation from China . Also, the IAEA found out in 2003 that, in 1991, China supplied
Iran with 1.8 metric tons of natural uranium, reported Nucleonics Week (June 12, 2003). The head of the Iranian
Atomic Organization reported an Iranian-PRC contract to extract uranium ore in Yazd.15 The DCIs Section 721 Report (issued in
November 2004) confirmed that the Iranian opposition group, beginning in August of 2002, revealed several previously undisclosed
Iranian nuclear facilities. Testifying to Congress on February 11, 2003, DCI George Tenet pointed to Chinas firms (rather than the
government) and warned that they may be backing away from Beijings 1997 bilateral commitment to forego any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran. The DCIs Section 721 Report of November 2003 reported that some interactions of concern between PRC

Jacoby testified to the Senate Intelligence

on February 24, 2004, that PRC entities remained involved with nuclear and missile
programs in Pakistan and Iran , while, in some cases, the entities were involved without the PRC governments
and Iranian entities continued in the first half of 2003. DIA Director Lowell
Committee

knowledge. Then, in April 2004, the Administration imposed sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Assistant Secretary of
State John Wolf testified to the House International Relations Committee on May 18, 2004, that most of the sanctions related to non-

Iran had
used uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) from China to accelerate Irans uranium enrichment
program. An Iranian news agency acknowledged that hexafluoride from China was used in initial uranium enrichment, after which
domestic supplies were applied.16 Chinas companies reportedly have helped Iran to procure nuclearrelated hardware. In 2007, a PRC company in Dalian supplied Iran with sensitive materials for its
nuclear program, including graphite, tungsten copper, tungsten powder, and high-strength
aluminum alloys and maraging steel . In March 2009, the Shanghai-based Roc-Master Manufacture
and Supply Company ordered 108 pressure gauges that could be used in centrifuges to enrich
uranium for transfer to Iran from an agent in Taiwan (Heli-Ocean Technology Company) for Inficon Holding, the
manufacturer in Switzerland. In 2010, under an IAEA investigation, Chinas Zhejiang Ouhai Trade Corporation , a
subsidiary of Jinzhou Group, supplied to Iran sensitive valves and vacuum gauges useful for uranium
enrichment and made by KD Valves-Descote in France. The reported recipient in Iran was Javedan Mehr Toos, a firm procuring
nuclear transfers, but there were concerns in the nuclear area as well. In May 2006, diplomatic sources revealed that

nuclear-related items for Kalaye Electric Company that is part of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The French firm denied
selling its sensitive products to China, and the PRC company denied the story.17 On June 16, 2010, the Department of the Treasury
imposed sanctions on Javedan Mehr Toos among Irans entities, individuals, and ships subject to U.S. sanctions under Executive Order
13382 for WMD proliferation.

China illicitly supports Iranian proliferation-uses private proxies

Kittrie 15 [Orde. Orde Kittrie is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and professor of law at
the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University. The China-Iran Nuclear Pipeline: How to Shut It
Down. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/orde-kittrie-the-china-iran-nuclearpipeline/. SH]

The fourth pathway, in contrast, would include Iran creating a secret, parallel new nuclear program
with technology and materials covertly procured from foreign suppliers . Even with the nuclear
deals managed access arrangements and dedicated procurement channels, both the United States and the IAEA will
have limited capacity to detect either secret nuclear facilities within Iran or the covert receipt by
Iran of nuclear-related materials . It is therefore critical to be able to deter or prevent foreign suppliers from sending

nuclear-related materials to Iran. Despite this, little

attention has been paid to the longtime leading suppliers of

Irans nuclear program: ostensibly private brokers based in China. Foremost among them appear
to be Karl Lee (also known as Li Fangwei) and Sihai Cheng, who, according to U.S. federal and state prosecutors, have
shipped vast quantities of key nuclear materials to Iran. Even at the peak of international
sanctions against Iran, China has reportedly made little to no effort to stop these or other such
brokers. Although China claims otherwise, it seems likely that the Chinese government uses these so-called
private brokers as proxies to assist Irans nuclear program . In that way, Beijing can both benefit from
the illicit transactions with Iran and appear an adherent of various nonproliferation agreements.
The massive scale of Irans nuclear and missile program procurement from China in recent years ,
and the United States remarkable inability to halt it, even with stringent UN Security Council sanctions in place, is a sign that
China serves as a potentially pivotal back door source of nuclear materials for Iran . If a nuclear deal is
to succeed, its implementation will require both intense monitoring of Iran and also much more cooperation from Beijing than it has

Iran currently lacks the capacity to produce several key items for its nuclear and
missile programs. Tehran has therefore sought to acquire them from overseas. For example, Irans
nuclear program still depends on the import of specialized materials and technology necessary to
build and maintain gas centrifuge facilities for enriching uranium . The June 2014 report of the UN Panel of
Experts on implementing sanctions against Iran noted that Iran continues to seek key items abroad, preferably
from established, high-quality suppliers. Pressure transducers are crucial to the operation of a
gas centrifuge plant. Since Iran has been unable to manufacture them domestically, it has had to acquire them
overseas. The transducers have a lifespan of only about three years, so Iran needs to continually
find suppliers. Even under the relatively stringent sanctions placed on Iran prior to the nuclear negotiations, Tehrans illicit
procurement efforts have met with considerable success. This is largely due to China. One recent
analysis by experts closely tied to the U.K. Defense Ministry concluded, China continues to be
the key source of goods and technology for the prohibited nuclear and missile programs of Iran
and North Korea, with some officials estimating that China is used as a transit route for up to 90
percent of goods destined for those programs. In fact, within the last few years, Cheng shipped
from China to Iran over 1,000 pressure transducers manufactured in the United States by MKS, a
Massachusetts-based company, according to the U.S. Justice Department. The transfer to Iran of U.S.-origin pressure
transducers violated U.S. export control laws . Publicly available photographs of then-President Mahmoud
provided thus far.

Ahmadinejad at the Natanz Nuclear Facility show numerous U.S.-origin MKS transducers attached to Irans gas centrifuge cascades.

Cheng was eventually arrested(when he entered the United Kingdom from China to attend a soccer tournament) and is now
is not the only Chinese broker who has diverted U.S.-origin pressure transducers to
Iran. According to a recent study by the Institute for Science and International Security, it appears that Chinese authorities
took no enforcement action in this [Cheng] case or against illicit exporters of pressure transducers
more generally that have been operating from its territory in recent years.
While

in U.S. custody, he

2NC Iran Prolif Impact Extension

Iran prolif snowballs and causes nuke war
Matthew Kroenig 12 (1-24, Stanton Nuclear Security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Five reasons to attack Iran http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0124/Fivereasons-to-attack-Iran/A-strike-is-the-least-bad-option
Iran currently restrains its foreign policy
because it fears US and Israeli retaliation. With nuclear weapons, Tehran will be emboldened by
the confidence that it can engage in provocation and use its nuclear weapons to deter the worst
forms of retaliation. A more aggressive Iran will increase its support to terrorists and engage in tougher
coercive diplomacy. Nuclear weapons in Tehran will cause global nuclear proliferation, as other
states in the Middle East seek their own nuclear weapons in response, and as Iran provides uranium
enrichment technology to US enemies. The global nonproliferation regime would be weakened.
A nuclear Iran could threaten nuclear war to stop developments contrary to its interests, giving
the world a nuclear scare every few years . And given that the nuclear balance between Iran and its
adversaries would be less stable than the one that held between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the cold war, these future crises could very well spiral out of control resulting in a nuclear
exchange between Iran and Israel or even Iran and the United States.
1. A nuclear-armed Iran poses a grave threat to international peace and security

Nuclear Iran creates instability and insecurity in the Middle East

Kahl 12 (Colin H.,an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses on
international relations, international security, the geopolitics of the Middle East, American foreign
policy, and civil and ethnic conflict. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS), a Washington, DC-based think tank. Current research projects include
assessments of the geopolitical implications of Iranian nuclearization and a separate study of the
evolution of U.S. counterinsurgency practices during the Iraq war, Iran and the Bomb Would a
Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure? ,September/October, Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-07-17/iran-and-bomb, LS)
Kenneth Waltz is probably right that a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred from deliberately using nuclear weapons or transferring a nuclear
device to terrorists ("Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," July/August 2012). But he is dead wrong that the Islamic Republic would likely become a more
responsible international actor if it crossed the nuclear threshold. In making that argument, Waltz mischaracterizes

Iranian

motivations and badly misreads history. And despite the fact that Waltz is one of the world's most respected international relations
theorists, he ignores important political science research into the effects of nuclear weapons ,
including recent findings that suggest that new nuclear states are often more reckless and
aggressive at lower levels of conflict. RATIONAL BUT DANGEROUS Waltz correctly notes that Iran's leaders, despite their
fanatical rhetoric, are fundamentally rational. Because Iran's leadership is not suicidal, it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed Iran would deliberately
use a nuclear device or transfer one to terrorists. Yet even though the

Islamic Republic is rational, it is still dangerous, and it is

likely to become even more so if it develops nuclear weapons. Iran's government currently
sponsors terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East , in part to demonstrate a capability
to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests. If the Iranian leadership's sole concern was
its own survival and it believed that a nuclear deterrent alone could give it enough protection, then as a nuclear state, it might curtail its support for
proxies in order to avoid needless disputes with other nuclear powers. But

Iran is not a status quo state, and its support for terrorists and
militants is intended to be for more than just defense and retaliation . Such support is an offensive tool , designed to pressure
and intimidate other states, indirectly expand Iran's influence, and advance its revisionist agenda, which
seeks to make Iran the preeminent power in the Middle East , champion resistance to Israel and "arrogant powers" in the
West, promote its brand of revolutionary Islamist ideology, and assert its leadership in the wider Islamic world. Tehran

currently calibrates its support for militants and sponsorship of terrorism to

minimize the risks of a direct confrontation with

more powerful states. But if Iranian leaders perceived that a nuclear arsenal provided a substantially
more robust deterrent against retaliation, they would likely pursue their regional goals more
aggressively. Specifically, a nuclear-armed Tehran would likely provide Hezbollah and Palestinian
militants with more sophisticated, longer-range, and more accurate conventional weaponry for
use against Israel. In an effort to bolster the deterrent capabilities of such allies, Iran might consider giving them "dualcapable" weapons, leaving Israel to guess whether these systems were conventional or armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear material. A
nuclear-armed Iran might also give its proxies permission to use advanced weapons systems
instead of keeping them in reserve, as Tehran reportedly instructed Hezbollah to do during the militant group's 2006 war with Israel.
A nuclear-armed Iran, believing that it possessed a powerful deterrent and could thus commit violence abroad with near impunity, might
also increase the frequency and scale of the terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets
carried out by Hezbollah and the Quds Force, the covert operations wing of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
And a bolder Iran might increase the number of Revolutionary Guard forces it deployed to Lebanon ,
allow its navy to engage in more frequent shows of force in the Mediterranean, and assert itself
more aggressively in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. To further enhance its image in the eyes of domestic
and regional audiences as the leader of an anti-Western resistance bloc, a nuclear-armed Iran might respond to regional
crises by threatening to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the survival of the Assad regime
in Syria, Hezbollah, or Palestinian groups. And Iran might be emboldened to play the spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process by encouraging large-scale militant attacks and might try to destabilize its neighbors through
more coercive diplomacy and subversion in Iraq and the Gulf states. The growing influence of
"principlist" hard-liners in Tehran makes those possibilities even more likely. The principlists' view of the
world is shaped by their ideological belief in the inevitability of U.S. decline, Israeli defeat, and Iranian
ascendance. They see the competition with the United States and Israel as a zero-sum game. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon,
the principlists will see it as a confirmation of their convictions and push the Iranian government
further in the direction of risk and provocation. To be sure, a nonnuclear Iran already engages in many destabilizing activities.
But equipped with nuclear weapons, Tehran would likely dial up its trouble-making and capitalize
on its deterrent to limit the response options available to threatened states. THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY
PARADOX "History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons
make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers," Waltz argues. "This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action." In
writing this, Waltz ignores a long history of emerging nuclear powers behaving provocatively. In 1950, for
example, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin gave North Korea the green light to invade South Korea, thus beginning the Korean War. Stalin apparently assumed
(incorrectly) that the United States was unlikely to respond because the Soviets had by then developed their own nuclear weapons. Waltz

also
claims that China became less aggressive after going nuclear in 1964. But in 1969, Mao Zedong
authorized Chinese troops to attack Soviet forces on the Chinese-Soviet border. The attack was meant to
warn Moscow against border provocations and to mobilize domestic Chinese support for Mao's revolution. Like Stalin before him, Mao was probably
confident that China's recently acquired nuclear capabilities would limit the resulting conflict. (In the end, the border clashes produced a larger crisis than
Mao had expected, raising the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike, and China backed down.) Waltz also asserts

that "India and Pakistan

have both become more cautious since going nuclear." But Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons has in fact
facilitated its strategy of engaging in low-intensity conflict against India, making the subcontinent more crisis-prone. As the political scientist S. Paul
Kapur has shown, as

Islamabad's nuclear capabilities have increased, so has the volatility of the IndianPakistani rivalry. Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan openly tested nuclear devices, Islamabad has appeared more willing to back militant
groups fighting in disputed Kashmir and to support groups that have conducted terrorist attacks elsewhere in India. Furthermore, in 1999, Pakistan sent
conventional forces disguised as insurgents across the Line of Control in the Kargil district of Kashmir, triggering a limited war with India. This move
was encouraged by the Pakistanis' belief that their nuclear deterrent placed clear limits on India's ability to retaliate with conventional weapons.
Additionally, over the past decade, Pakistani-backed militants have engaged in high-profile terrorist attacks inside India itself, including the 2001 attack
on the New Delhi parliament complex and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and
the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the

historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal
adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," in which the
supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making
provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War , for example,

nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the

superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in
Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere . A recent statistical analysis by
the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone
than other types of states, and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are
more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less
likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a
major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear
weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to more frequent and intense crises in the
Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident,
or an unauthorized use -- a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial
period after Iran joined the nuclear club . Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the
number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were
involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable
deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisisprone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control, the residual risk of
inadvertent escalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would
be nontrivial -- and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating. A VERY REAL THREAT Because Waltz is sanguine about
the effects of Iranian nuclearization, he concludes that "the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a
nuclear weapon." Waltz believes that the only utility of continued diplomacy is to maintain "open lines of communication," which "will make the Western
countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran," and he argues that "the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped." Waltz

is wrong. The
threat from a nuclear-armed Iran might not be as grave as some suggest, but it would make an already volatile
Middle East even more conflict-prone. Preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold should
therefore remain a top U.S. priority. Because a preventive military attack on Iran's nuclear
infrastructure could itself set off a series of unpredictable and destabilizing consequences, the best and
most sustainable solution to Iran's nuclear challenge is to seek a negotiated solution through a combination of economic pressure and diplomacy. It is
possible to oppose a rush to war with Iran without arguing, as Waltz does, that a nuclear-armed Iran would make the world a better place. COLIN H.
KAHL is an Associate Professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for the Middle East. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a co-author of its report Risk and Rivalry: Iran,
Israel, and the Bomb, from which this response is adapted.

Middle East prolif causes global nuclear war

Bar 11 [Dr. Shmuel Bar, Director of Studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel. He served for thirty years in
the Israeli intelligence community and since 2002 has headed research projects many of them for U.S. government agencies on
issues such as Iranian defense doctrine, negotiating behavior and susceptibility to signaling, command and control culture in the
Middle East, potential paradigms of command and control over nuclear weapons in Middle Eastern regimes, deterrence of terrorism,
the influence of religion on deterrence, and implications of a polynuclear Middle East, among others, Can Cold War Deterrence
Apply to a Nuclear Iran?, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2011]

A nuclear Middle East will be very different from the Cold War in a wide range of aspects. True, we may safely
assume that the leaders and peoples of the region have no desire to be the targets of nuclear weapons. However, the inherent
instability of the region and its regimes, the difficulty in managing multilateral nuclear tensions,
the weight of religious, emotional, and internal pressures, and the proclivity of many of the regimes in
the region toward military adventurism and brinkmanship do not bode well for the future of this
region once it enters the nuclear age. Nuclear war need not erupt as a result of a conscious decision by a leadership
to use nuclear weapons. It is more likely to result from escalation scenarios, misinterpretation of
intentions of the other side due to poor intelligence and lack of communication between antagonists,
inadvertent use, poor command and control constraints, and underestimation of the other partys
response to nuclear brinkmanship. Such behavior in a polynuclear environment would be tantamount to lighting a match in a gas
depot. The countries of the region will probably be more predisposed than the Cold War
protagonists to brandish their nuclear weapons not only rhetorically but through nuclear alerts or
nuclear tests in order to deter their enemies, leading to situations of multilateral nuclear
escalation. Once one country has taken such measures, the other nuclear countries of the region
would probably feel forced to adopt defensive measures, and multilateral escalation will result .

However, such multilateral escalation will not be mitigated by Cold War-type hotlines and means of signaling, and none of the parties
involved will have escalation dominance. This and the

absence of a credible second strike capability may well

strengthen the tendency to opt for a first strike.

Iran prolif leads to middle east war

Lindsay 10, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the
Council on Foreign Relations (James, After Iran Gets the Bomb, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr, Vol.
89, Issue 2)
The dangers of Iran's entry into the nuclear club are well known: emboldened by this
development, Tehran might multiply its attempts at subverting its neighbors and encouraging
terrorism against the United States and Israel; the risk of both conventional and nuclear war in the
Middle East would escalate; more states in the region might also want to become nuclear powers;
the geopolitical balance in the Middle East would be reordered; and broader efforts to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons would be undermined. The advent of a nuclear Iran--even one that is satisfied with
having only the materials and infrastructure necessary to assemble a bomb on short notice rather than a nuclear arsenal--would be seen
as a major diplomatic defeat for the United States. Friends

and foes would openly question the U.S.

government's power and resolve to shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing
themselves from Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively. Such a scenario can be avoided, however. Even if
Washington fails to prevent Iran from going nuclear, it can contain and mitigate the consequences of Iran's nuclear defiance. It should
make clear to Tehran that acquiring the bomb will not produce the benefits it anticipates but isolate and weaken the regime.
Washington will need to lay down clear "redlines" defining what it considers to be unacceptable behavior--and be willing to use
military force if Tehran crosses them. It will also need to reassure its friends and allies in the Middle East that it remains firmly
committed to preserving the balance of power in the region. Containing a nuclear Iran would not be easy. It would require
considerable diplomatic skill and political will on the part of the United States. And it could fail. A nuclear Iran may choose to flex its
muscles and test U.S. resolve. Even under the best circumstances, the opaque nature of decision-making in Tehran could complicate
Washington's efforts to deter it. Thus, it would be far preferable if Iran stopped--or were stopped--before it became a nuclear power.
Current efforts to limit Iran's nuclear program must be pursued with vigor. Economic pressure on Tehran must be maintained. Military
options to prevent Iran from going nuclear must not be taken off the table. But these steps may not be enough. If Iran's recalcitrant
mullahs cross the nuclear threshold, the challenge for the United States will be to make sure that an abhorrent outcome does not
become a catastrophic one. This will require understanding how a nuclear Iran is likely to behave, how its neighbors are likely to
respond, and what Washington can do to shape the perceptions and actions of all these players. MESSIANIC AND PRAGMATIC
IRAN IS a peculiarity: it is a modern-day theocracy that pursues revolutionary ideals while safeguarding its practical interests. After
three decades of experimentation, Iran has not outgrown its ideological compunctions. The founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, bequeathed to his successors a clerical cosmology that divides the world between oppressors and oppressed and
invests Iran with the mission of redeeming the Middle East for the forces of righteousness. But the political imperative of staying in
power has pulled Iran's leaders in a different direction, too: they have had to manage Iran's economy, meet the demands of the
country's growing population, and advance Iran's interests in a turbulent region. The clerical rulers have been forced to strike
agreements with their rivals and their enemies, occasionally softening the hard edges of their creed. The task of governing has required
them to make concessions to often unpalatable realities and has sapped their revolutionary energies. Often, the clash of ideology and
pragmatism has put Iran in the paradoxical position of having to secure its objectives within a regional order that it has pledged to
undermine. To satisfy their revolutionary impulses, Iran's leaders have turned anti-Americanism and a strident opposition to Israel into
pillars of the state. Tehran supports extremist groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamist militias opposing U.S. forces in Iraq.
The mullahs have sporadically attempted to subvert the U.S.-allied sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. But the regime has survived
because its rulers have recognized the limits of their power and have thus mixed revolutionary agitation with pragmatic adjustment.
Although it has denounced the United States as the Great Satan and called for Israel's obliteration, Iran has avoided direct military
confrontation with either state. It has vociferously defended the Palestinians, but it has stood by as the Russians have slaughtered
Chechens and the Chinese have suppressed Muslim Uighurs. Ideological purity, it seems, has been less important than seeking
diplomatic cover from Russia and commercial activity with China. Despite their Islamist compulsions, the mullahs like power too
much to be martyrs. Iran's nuclear program has emerged not just as an important aspect of the country's foreign relations but
increasingly as a defining element of its national identity. And the reasons for pursuing the program have changed as it has matured.
During the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami, nuclear weapons were seen as tools of deterrence against
the United States and Saddam Hussein's regime, among others. The more conservative current ruling elite, including President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards, sees them as a critical means of ensuring Iran's preeminence in the region. A
powerful Iran, in other words, requires a robust and extensive nuclear infrastructure. And this may be all the more the case now that
Iran is engulfed in the worst domestic turmoil it has known in years: these days, the regime seems to be viewing its quest for nuclear
self-sufficiency as a way to revive its own political fortunes. Going nuclear would empower Iran, but far less than Tehran hopes. Iran's
entry into the nuclear club would initially put Tehran in a euphoric mood and likely encourage it to be more aggressive. The mullahs
would feel themselves to be in possession of a strategic weapon that would enhance Iran's clout in the region. They might feel less
restrained in instigating Shiite uprisings against the Arab sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. But any efforts to destabilize their Sunni

neighbors would meet the same unsuccessful fate as have similar campaigns in the past. Iran's revolutionary message has traditionally
appealed to only a narrow segment of Shiites in the Persian Gulf. Sporadic demonstrations in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have not
sought to emulate Iran's revolution; rather, they have been an outlet for Shiites to express their economic and political
disenfranchisement. A nuclear Iran might also be tempted to challenge its neighbors in the Persian Gulf to reduce their oil production
and limit the presence of U.S. troops on their territories. However, obtaining nuclear weapons is unlikely to help Iran achieve these
aims, because nuclear weapons, by definition, are such a narrow category of arms that they can accomplish only a limited set of
objectives. They do offer a deterrent capability: unlike Saddam's Iraq, a nuclear Iran would not be invaded, and its leaders would not
be deposed. But regime security and power projection are two very different propositions. It is difficult to imagine Sunni regimes
yielding to a resurgent Shiite state, nuclear or not; more likely, the Persian Gulf states would take even more refuge under the U.S.
security umbrella. Paradoxically, a weapon that was designed to ensure Iran's regional preeminence could further alienate it from its
neighbors and prolong indefinitely the presence of U.S. troops on its periphery. In other words, nuclear empowerment could well
thwart Iran's hegemonic ambitions. Like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that
nuclear bombs are simply not good for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement. Likewise, although the protection of a nuclear
Iran might allow Hamas, Hezbollah, and other militant groups in the Middle East to become both more strident in their demands and
bolder in their actions, Israel's nuclear arsenal and considerable conventional military power, as well as the United States' support for
Israel, would keep those actors in check. To be sure, Tehran will rattle its sabers and pledge its solidarity with Hamas and Hezbollah,
but it will not risk a nuclear confrontation with Israel to assist these groups' activities. Hamas and Hezbollah learned from their recent
confrontations with Israel that waging war against the Jewish state is a lonely struggle. The prospect that Iran might transfer a crude
nuclear device to its terrorist protgs is another danger, but it, too, is unlikely. Such a move would place Tehran squarely in the cross
hairs of the United States and Israel. Despite its messianic pretensions, Iran has observed clear limits when supporting militias and
terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Iran has not provided Hezbollah with chemical or biological weapons or Iraqi militias with
the means to shoot down U.S. aircraft. Iran's rulers understand that such provocative actions could imperil their rule by inviting
retaliation. On the other hand, by coupling strident rhetoric with only limited support in practice, the clerical establishment is able to at
once garner popular acclaim for defying the West and oppose the United States and Israel without exposing itself to severe retribution.
A nuclear

Iran would likely act no differently, at least given the possibility of robust U.S.
retaliation. Nor is it likely that Iran would become the new Pakistan, selling nuclear fuel and
materials to other states. The prospects of additional sanctions and a military confrontation with
the United States are likely to deter Iran from acting impetuously. A nuclear Iran would
undeniably pose new dangers in the Middle East, especially at first, when it would likely be at its
most reckless. It might thrash about the Middle East, as it tried to press the presumed advantages of its newfound capability, and
it might test the United States' limits. But the mullahs will find it difficult to translate Iran's nuclear status into a tangible political
advantage. And if Washington makes clear that rash actions on their part will come at a high cost, they will be far less likely to take
any. THE RIPPLES IN THE REGION IN ASSESSING the consequences of Iran's nuclearization, it is important to consider not only
how Iran is likely to act but also how other states will react to this outcome--and what the United States could do to influence their
responses. Iran's nuclearization would not reduce Washington to passively observing events in the region. Washington would retain
considerable ability to shape what Iran's neighbors do and do not do. The nightmare scenario that could be unleashed by Iran's
nuclearization is easy to sketch. Israel would go on a hair-trigger alert--ready to launch a nuclear weapon at a moment's notice--putting
both countries minutes away from annihilation. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would scramble to join the nuclear club. The
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would collapse, unleashing a wave of nuclear proliferation around the globe. Such a doomsday
scenario could pan out. Whether it did would depend greatly on how the United States and others, starting with Israel, responded to
Iran's nuclearization. Whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forgoes a preventive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities
or opts for launching an attack and it fails, the Israeli government will continue to regard the Iranian regime as an existential threat to
Israel that must be countered by any means possible, including the use of nuclear weapons. Given Israel's unique history and
Ahmadinejad's contemptible denials of the Holocaust, no Israeli prime minister can afford to think otherwise.

Prolif is an existential risk

Wilson 15 (Valerie Plame Wilson; May 13 2015; former CIA covert nonproliferation officer;
Looking Forward, Nuclear Proliferation Is Still Greatest Existential Threat We Face; Huffington
Post; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/valerie-plame-wilson/nuclear-proliferation-existentialthreat_b_7118460.html )
As a former covert CIA operative, specializing in counter-proliferation, I still believe that the

spread of nuclear weapons

and the risk of their use is the greatest existential threat we face . Twenty-six years after the end of the Cold
War, the world still has more than 15,000 nuclear weapons. Whatever other issues people care about -- poverty, the environment,
inequality and so many others -- if

we don't get this one right, and soon, nothing else will matter. We are
at a crossroads on this issue and the decisions we make over the next 10 years will set us on a course either toward the
elimination of all nuclear weapons or toward expanding arsenals and proliferation. There are some disturbing trends. All of the

nuclear countries are investing heavily, or planning to do so, in modernizing their forces and/or
expanding their arsenals. President Obama is proposing a massive overhaul of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates will cost $1 trillion over the next 30 years. Russia

has already begun a major upgrade of its

arsenal. China is ramping up each leg of its nuclear triad, India is close to having a full nuclear
triad with the addition of a nuclear submarine to its forces, and North Korea continues to develop
its nuclear capability. Perhaps most worrisome is Pakistan, which has the fastest-growing nuclear
arsenal and is plagued by persistent political instability and extremist elements. In addition to
developing new types of weapons, nuclear weapons countries also appear to be taking steps toward establishing the dangerous nuclear
high-alert posture that the United States and Soviet Union adopted during the Cold War (and still maintain) -- shortening the decision
time for launch and increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in conflict, by accident or through unauthorized launch.
Longstanding regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed countries remain unresolved and tensions high,
including on the South Asian Peninsula, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East. Relations between Russia and the West have
spiraled dangerously downward; Russia has even threatened to use nuclear force to defend its annexation of Crimea. Meanwhile,
terrorists are working to get their hands on the bomb. This

danger has risen as states have failed and ungoverned

zones have spread, especially in the Middle East and Africa. In the last two decades there have been dozens of
incidents of nuclear explosive materials being lost or stolen. The so-called "Islamic State" group has already seized low-grade nuclear
material from a facility in Mosul. These are very difficult challenges. But there are also significant factors that could provide
opportunities for progress. A final agreement with Iran would verifiably prevent it from developing a nuclear bomb. It would negate a
long-standing leading argument of opponents to Global Zero -- that Iran and countries like it would never agree to forgo nuclear
weapons. And it provides a model -- multilateral negotiations and intrusive verification -- for pursuing global reductions in nuclear
arsenals.

AT: Prolif K
Our scholarship is sound most qualified sources err neg based on thousands
of studies
Blackman 9 [Christine, Chance of nuclear war is greater than you think: Stanford engineer makes risk analysis, Science &
Technology News July 20]

**Hellman is prof emeritus @ Stanford and nuclear expert

Nuclear tensions in Iran and North Korea are increasing the need to take a long look at how the United
States handles weapons of mass destruction, Hellman said. Auto manufacturers assess the risk of injury to drivers, and
engineers assess potential risks of a new nuclear power plant. So why havent we assessed the risk of nuclear conflict based on our
current arms strategy? Hellman

and a group of defense experts, Nobel laureates and Stanford

professors are calling for an in-depth analysis . With more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in existence
and the ability to build many times more, the choice is between creating a safer world and having no world at all,
Hellman wrote in his paper Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence. Weapons from the Cold War still remain, but public concern for
nuclear strategy has dissipated, Hellman said. Many of those who do think about it, such as political leaders, say the fantasy of nuclear
disarmament is too risky for national defense, he explained. People who are saying change is too risky are implicitly

assuming that the current approach is risk free , but no one really knows what the risk is if we dont change, Hellman
said. Hellmans story Hellman first became concerned about nuclear war in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan became president. Reagan
brought the nuclear threat into clearer focus by being honest about fighting plans, Hellman said. Also, a fellow Stanford professor,
Harry Rathbun, started a group to convince people that nuclear weapons represented more than just scientific progress, but a real
threat of global destruction. Hellman credited his wife, Dorothie, for getting him to join the group: I never would have gotten
involved if it wasnt for her. In 1982, Hellman took an 18-month, unpaid leave from Stanford to work as a volunteer for the group
started by Rathbun. During this time, Hellman became convinced that nuclear destruction not only could happen, but would happen
unless we changed some of our fundamental beliefs about national security and war. Hellmans numbers About fifteen years after
Hellman became convinced of impending destruction, he began punching numbers to calculate the probability

of such a catastrophe based on events focused around the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. According to
Hellmans numbers, the risk of a person not living out his or her natural life because of nuclear war is
at least 10 percent. Hellman gives another analogy: The risk that each one of us dies as a result of failed
deterrence is thousands of times greater than the risk you would bear if a nuclear power plant
were built right next to your home. Determining such a risk seems a little like predicting the future, but Hellman is
confident about his numbers. He justifies his probability by breaking down a catastrophe into a sequence
of smaller failures, incorporating expert opinions, examining history and estimating within a
range of numbers. Hellmans path to risk assessment Before returning to Stanford from his volunteer leave,
Hellman started a project with the Soviet Academy of Sciences through a committee led by Evgeny Velikhov,
who later became Mikhail Gorbachevs science advisor. In 1984, Hellman and his wife traveled to the Soviet Union to create dialog
and build relationships with the Soviet scientists. Soviet restrictions on free speech prevented totally open discussion, but by 1986,
Gorbachev lifted censorship, and the project became possible, Hellman explained. The fruit of their labor came a year later in the form
of a book called Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking. It had the radical thesis that either humanity would end war or war would
end humanity. But the cold war faded, along with public support, and Hellman focused his work on easing ethnic tension on campus
(for which he won three awards) before retiring in 1995. After a few years of attending to family responsibilities, he returned to his
work on risk assessment. Hellmans method Hellman used a risk analysis approach, which breaks down a catastrophic event into a
sequence of smaller failures. He further simplified the analysis by only considering failures triggered by a crisis involving Cuba. He
began by evaluating three events that could have initiated a conflict: deploying American missiles in Turkey (which began in 1961),
re-imposing a naval blockade around Cuba (which was threatened in the 1980s) and installing a missile defense system in eastern
Europe, a current project that has drawn objections from Russia. Based on the outcomes of these events, Hellman estimated
these numbers: Rate

of initiating events: six percent per year Probability that an initiating event leads to a
major crisis: 33 percent Probability that a major crisis leads to the use of a nuclear weapon: 10 to
50 percent The third probability is hardest to estimate because we have yet to drop a bomb on Russia (or vice versa). Hellman used
the 10 to 50 percent range based on studying what transpired in the Cuban Missile Crisis and on statements by the participants. People
can make irrational decisions when under the gun, he explained. Once a major crisis erupts, it becomes a question of who will back
down first; like a game of nuclear chicken, he said. Iran and North Korea Irans nuclear program and North Koreas

nuclear testing add complexity to the assessment , Hellman explained. Nuclear terrorism was not
included in the preliminary analysis, which makes Hellmans probability more conservative.
Factoring in nuclear terrorism adds a scary new dimension with additional risk, he said. A country

with nuclear weapons and a terrorist presence could trigger a nuclear war , especially if the terrorist
hostility is directed at a United States or Russian city, Hellman explained. If New York or Moscow went up in smoke, as horrendous
as that would be, it could be a catalyst for an even worse catastrophe . Conflict could arise as United States and
Russian troops meet in the terrorist country to secure any remaining weapons, he explained.

AT: Iran already has nukes

No iran nukes now-lacks ICBMs
Thielmann 15

[Greg. 7/24/15. Greg Thielmann is a senior fellow of the Arms Control Association, and former office

director for strategic, proliferation, and military affairs in the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Its
Official: There Will Be No Iranian ICBM in 2015. The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-official-there-willbe-no-iranian-icbm-2015-14424. SH]
But sometime during the past few months,

the long-standing official estimate of Irans potential

intercontinental missile capability was significantly revised.

Northern Command, answered

Adm.

for the record a question on the issue from a

William Gortney, chief of

March 19 congressional

hearing with this new conclusion: Iran will not be able to deploy an operational ICBM until
later this decade at the earliest.

The official abandonment of 2015 as the year of an Iranian ICBM should lead U.S.

policymakers to reshape certain U.S. missile defense programs and security policies. The now-outdated 2015 projection emerged
publicly for the first time with the release of an

unclassified version of a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on

foreign missile threats. The estimate concluded that, after North Korea, Iran was the hostile country most capable of testing an ICBM
by 2015. The 1999 NIE described analysts as being divided on the likely timing of Irans first test flight of an ICBM that could
threaten the United Statesfrom likely before 2010 to less than an even chance by 2015but implied that most believed it would
happen within the estimates fifteen-year timeframe. This projection has been exploited by many members of Congress to try to
accelerate costly projects to defend against long-range missiles. Although the 1999 NIE focused on the first flight-test development
milestone rather than the traditional criterion of operational capability, this distinction was often ignored, heightening the apparent
imminence of the threat. In a letter last year to President Obama,

28 Republican senators protested the lack of specific

limits on ballistic missiles in the Iran nuclear deal, citing the U.S. intelligence community's belief that Iran could have
intercontinental capability as early as 2015. Such statements were already misleading at the time.

Independent experts, like

Michael Elleman of the International Institute of Strategic Studies andDavid Wright of the Union
of Concerned Scientists, had been arguing for some time that Iran would not be likely to field an
ICBM before 2020. But the intelligence community appeared reluctant to rule out an Iranian
ICBM flight test before years end.

On July 29 of this year, Secretary of Defense

Ashton Carter provided

evidence in congressional testimony that the governments Iranian ICBM estimate had been
revised. But it was little noticedperhaps because it came in the form of a warning about the Iranian threat: I wouldnt rule

out that in

10 years, Iran could progress to an ICBM.

Adm. Gortneys

written response to the House

Armed Services Committee is more precise . It is also more striking, given the four-star flag officers prudent, worstcase threat perspective as the military commander charged with aerospace defense of the U.S. homeland. That he is more likely to err
on the side of caution was evident when he characterized North Korean KN-08 ICBMs as already operational, even though these
systems have never been flight-tested. Gortneys

implicit acknowledgement that an Iranian ICBM is years

rather than months away is, therefore, especially significant.

2NC North Korea Prolif Scenario

(Link evidence was the link from the 1NC)
North Korean nuclearization leads to extinction
Hayes and Hamel-Green 09 [Peter Hayes, 12/14/9 The Path Not Taken, The Way Still
Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia, The Asia-Pacific Journal,
Professor of International Relations @ RMIT University, http://www.japanfocus.org/-PeterHayes/3267]
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and
economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the
possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War
hostilities. On

the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium
range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range.
Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and
Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the
catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in
the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws
attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt
bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is,
individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the

soot from the fires

produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of
6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in
temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents
would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the
continents would also followThe period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease
in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people
will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere
would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone .4 These, of course, are not the only consequences.
Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects,
superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would
flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food
insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons
states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or

There could be many unanticipated impacts on

regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical
turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of
nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The
Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants
priority consideration from the international community
break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes.

2NC North Korea Prolif Internal Link

China provides key supplies for North Korean missiles- sparks secondary proliferation that goes
global

Kan 15

[Shirley A. Kan. Specialist in Asian Security Affairs. China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Missiles: Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf. SH]

Since 1998, there have been public reports about and U.S. government confirmation of PRC
assistance to North Koreas missile program . There were questions about whether the PRC had interests in North
Koreas missile advances. Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, a Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA), visited North Korea in early August 1998, before the surprising launch of a medium-range Taepo Dong-1 missile on August
31, 1998. However, increased worries about North Koreas missile program spurred U.S. and Japanese support for missile defenses

the
China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) was working with North Korea on its
space program (closely related to missiles) to develop satellites, but that cooperation was not confirmed to be linked to
the Taepo Dong-1 MRBM program, the Washington Times reported (February 23, 1999). An NSA report dated March 8,
1999, suggested that China sold specialty steel for use in North Koreas missile program , reported the
Washington Times (April 15, 1999). In June 1999, U.S. intelligence reportedly found that PRC entities
transferred accelerometers, gyroscopes, and precision grinding machinery to North Korea , according
opposed by China. Some said PRC entities acted on their own. The National Security Agency (NSA) suspected in late 1998 that

to the Washington Times (July 20, 1999). Another official report dated October 20, 1999, said that Chinas Changda Corporation
sought to buy Russian gyroscopes that were more of the same that China supplied to the North Korean missile program earlier that

In December 1999, the NSA discovered an alleged

PRC deal to supply unspecified PRC-made missile-related items to North Korea through a Hong
Kong company, said the Washington Times (January 1, 2000). The DCI first publicly confirmed PRC supplies
to North Korea, or Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), in July 1999. The DCIs April 2003 Section 721 Report
said that, in the first half of 2002, North Korea continued to procure missile-related raw materials
and components from foreign sources , but it dropped a previous reference about those foreign supplies as especially
year, reported the Washington Times (November 19, 1999).

going through DPRK firms in China. There were direct implications for U.S. national security, because of North Koreas nuclear

PRC technology transfers have further implications

for secondary, or retransferred, proliferation, since North Korea reportedly supplied technology to
Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen . The DNIs Section 721 Report of May 2007 told Congress that
PRC entities continued in 2005 to assist North Koreas ballistic missile program. There were
indications that some sensitive exports from China continued to North Korea . Taiwan raided in July 2010
Ho Li Enterprises that received orders since March 2007 from Dandong Fang Lian Trading Company in Dandong, PRC, with
an alleged association with the DPRKs military, for two dual-use, high-technology machine tools
that ended up in North Korea earlier in 2010.42 By early 2011, the DPRK reportedly built a new facility to launch longrange ballistic missiles, located close to China.43 Further, the Section 721 Report for 2011 noted that the DPRK continued to
procure missile-related materials and components from foreign sources. This ability still raised
questions about Chinas control of trade at the PRC-DPRK border and compliance with UNSC
resolutions that imposed sanctions on North Koreas missile and nuclear programs. After the DPRKs failed launch of a Taepo
Dong-2 missile on April 13, 2012, a military parade two days later in Pyongyang showed an apparent
KN-08 ICBM on a 16-wheel transportererector-launcher (TEL) that reportedly originated from the PRC.
The suspected PRC TEL raised concerns that included implications for threats to U.S. security ,
weapons and nuclear programs as well as delivery systems.

violations of UNSC sanctions, Chinas credibility as a UNSC Member that committed to and then undermined UNSC resolutions,
U.S.-PRC cooperation, and whether U.S. sanctions would apply. Representative Michael Turner sent a letter on April 17 to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton and DNI James Clapper, asking about the suspected transfer of the TEL. At a hearing of the House Armed

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who testified that the

that the PRC provided help for the DPRKs missile

Services Committee two days later, Representative Turner asked

DPRKs missile and nuclear capabilities posed threats and

program, though he did not specify the assistance. On April 19, the Foreign Ministry claimed that the PRC has implemented UNSC
resolutions and PRC nonproliferation policies and export controls, and the State Department said at a news conference it took China at
its word on the allegations. Still, in diplomatic channels, the State Department raised the alleged transfer with the PRC as a weapons

proliferation concern. Meanwhile, an unnamed official of the Obama White House downplayed the PRCs help for the DPRKs
missile program as poor performance in implementing sanctions (not willful proliferation) and not a clear violation of UNSC
sanctions, because the transfer supposedly entailed the chassis (not a complete TEL) and that could have been sold for civilian use
by a DPRK front company.44 The Obama Administration did not impose sanctions for the PRC transfer. Nonetheless, the suspected
WS51200 TEL in the DPRK was produced as a 122-ton vehicle by the Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company,
which is a part of the China Space Sanjiang Group under the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). They
belong to the PRCs state-owned aerospace defense industry, producing products for the PLA. The Wuhan Sanjiang Import and Export
Company shipped (on the Harmony Wish) four WS51200 vehicles from Shanghai to North Korea in August 2011, marking them on a
shipping document as off-road trucks.45 Moreover, the PRC has controls at its border with the DPRK. Further, UNSC Resolution
1695 of 2006 required all States to prevent transfers of missile and missile-related items, materials, goods, and technology to the
DPRKs missile or WMD programs. Also adopted in 2006, UNSC Resolution 1718, inter alia, required all States to prevent the direct
or indirect transfer to the DPRK of missiles, missile systems, or related materiel, determined by the UNSC or a special committee.
UNSC Resolution 1874 of 2009 expanded that ban to cover all arms (except for small arms) and related materiel as well as financial
transactions, technical training, advice, services, or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, or use of such arms.
Visiting Beijing on May 22, Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies acknowledged to reporters that he raised the
issue of how to reinforce UNSC-approved sanctions and take them seriously, though he insisted that the United States and China share
interests of peace, stability, and denuclearization. Further, at the press briefing on June 13, the State Department confirmed concerns

A U.N.
panel found that many of the violations of sanctions involved Chinas entities, and China resisted
releasing the report. Also, South Korea suspected that, in December 2012, China exported bauxite
(aluminum ore), a material that could be used to manufacture missiles, to a weapons plant in
North Korea.46
that PRC entities assisted the DPRKs missile program and the U.S. expectation that China enforce the U.N.s sanctions.

Sanctions and official rhetoric are lipservice-China continues illicit

trafficking
Feith 2/25/16 [David. David Feith is an editorial page writer for The Wall Street Journal Asia in Hong Kong. He was
previously an assistant editorial features editor and a Robert L. Bartley Fellow at The Journal in New York. He has also been
an assistant editor at Foreign Affairs magazine. Chinas Proliferation Rap Sheet. The Wall Street Journal.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-proliferation-rap-sheet-1456420110. SH]

China agreed to new multilateral

sanctions against North Koreas nuclear program. A vote at the United Nations Security Council could come as soon as next week.
If the past is any guide, officials will treat this as a breakthrough in U.S.-Chinese cooperation,
glossing over the sorry history of previous supposed breakthroughs in 2006, 2009 and 2013. But its worth
With Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Washington on Wednesday, the U.S. and

reviewing the record to know what to look for this time. Though details of the new deal havent emerged, U.S. National Security
Adviser Susan Rice last week predicted that Beijing will back significant new sanctions. The reason: I think it unlikely that China
wants to be seen by the international community as the protector of North Korea given its recent outrageous behavior. The problem is

only to underestimate Beijings enduring

commitment to helping Pyongyang access everything from iPhones to ballistic-missile launchers.
North Korea will be subject to some of the toughest sanctions imposed by the United Nations,
Ms. Rice promised in 2013, as ambassador to the U.N., after finalizing terms with China. This is not about the words, it is
that Ms. Rice and others have applied the same logic in the past,

about the music, said former U.S. envoy Christopher Hill, who cited Chinas co-sponsorship of the sanctions resolution as evidence
that the screws are beginning to turn. Others argued that even Chinese leader Xi Jinping had signaled a desire to abandon Kim Jong
Un by fuming that no one is entitled to risk global chaos for selfish gain. So Ms. Rice promised that these sanctions will bite, and
bite hard. Then China made sure they didnt. The U.N.s own expert auditing panel reported this month that there are
serious questions about the efficacy of the current United Nations sanctions regime. Sanctions have not prevented the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea from gradually improving and expanding its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, the panel wrote,
and a low level of implementation by member states is to blame. In typical U.N. fashion, though, the panel includes a Chinese
representative, so it didnt specify China among the worst sanctions-busters. This recalls 2011, when Chinas rep tried to veto the

North Korea exchanged prohibited missile

components with Iran aboard regular commercial flights through a neighboring third country
that diplomats confirmed was China. In 21 of 38 cases of illicit trafficking in weapons parts and
luxury goods, Beijing was involved. Chinese leaders proclaim innocence to this day. Beijing has
similarly never come clean about its 2011 sale of rugged trucks called transporter-erectorlaunchers, or TELs, which quickly became the core of Pyongyangs road-mobile ballistic-missile
force. The 16-wheel vehicles were produced by state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, which also makes
annual report entirely. It soon leaked, revealing evidence that

missiles for Chinas military and had never before exported TELs. Chinese claims that North Korea was supposed to use them for
hauling timber are implausible, as experts note they are too big for North Koreas forest roads.

Lax Chinese sanctions enforcement supports North Koreas nuclear program

Rivers 3/31/16 [Matt. North Korea sanctions: Is China enforcing them? CNN.
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/31/asia/china-north-korea-border-dandong/. SH]

China is the only

country left that is willing to do significant trade with Kim Jong Un's regime. And that relationship is
under more scrutiny than ever, since new sanctions on the regime were implemented by the U.N.
Security Council in March. The sanctions are aimed at curbing North Korea's nuclear program following an
international uproar after North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb and long-range missiles. The sanctions include
universal inspections of all cargo to and from North Korea, and a ban on buying North Korean
coal and raw mineral exports if any profits might go to sanctioned programs. China helped draft the
tougher new guidelines, and says it will vigorously implement them. But China has been criticized in the past for not
enforcing previous sanctions. Sinuiju is the North Korea border town opposite Dandong Sinuiju is the North Korea border
town opposite Dandong Experts agree that if the sanctions are to be at all effective, China must uphold them
stringently. China is North Korea's only major ally, and accounts for more than 70% of the
country's total trade volume. It's in border cities like Dandong that these sanctions will be enforced. On the Chinese side of
The trucks, and more specifically the goods within them, represent North Korea's economic lifeline.

the border, you can see the small customs area situated just before the only bridge that goes in and out, called the "Friendship Bridge."

it's difficult to see if inspections are taking place. CNN contacted

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provincial officials in Liaoning, where Dandong is located, to
ask how inspections were being conducted. Both declined to provide details.
All truck traffic passes through there, but

China fuels North Korean prolif-theyre a strategic interest and means China
ignores sanctions
Metzl 2/9/16 [Jamie. Jamie Metzl is a Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council. He has served in the U.S. National
Security Council, State Department and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Changing China's North Korea Calculus.
The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/changing-chinas-north-korea-calculus-15148. SH]
Given this alignment of negative consequences for pretty much everyone other than a small number of North Korean leaders, its

China continues to undermine international efforts to reverse North Koreas nuclear

weapons program through its support for and protection of the North Korean regime. In addition
to providing political cover in the UN, China provides Pyongyang with 90 percent of its energy
imports and most of the food going to its military. Despite its anger with North Korea, Beijing continues
this policy because it sees North Korea not as an issue in itself but as a strategic asset in its broader
relations with Washington. As unhappy as Chinas leaders are with the nuclear tests, they have remained
unwilling to take any action that could potentially undermine the stability of North Koreas
regime and bring U.S. troops to Chinas border in case of collapse and Korean reunification. That is
why, despite China paying lip service to a UN resolution condemning North Koreas nuclear tests,
it resolutely opposes the imposition of new and tougher sanctions that might change Pyongyangs
behavior. This leaves the United States and the international community with essentially three options.
unfortunate that

AT: North Korea already has nukes

North Korea doesnt have full capabilities yet-lacks effective ICBM tech
Moon 3/4/16 [Katharine HS. Katharine HS Moon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and professor of
political science at Wellesley College. North Korean threats against the US: how worried should you be? The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/04/north-korean-nuclear-threats-united-states-vulnerability. SH]
Yes and No. North

Korea may be able to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (5,500km), but lacks
key technical requirements for a successful missile attack such as re-entry into the Earths
atmosphere and accuracy of targeting . Its missile technology has improved considerably since 2009, including
progressive efforts to miniaturize warheads and increase payloads (explosive power). Its long-range missiles can
hypothetically hit the west coast of the US, but successful flight-testing of such a weapon system
has not occurred. The rocket launch in February 2016 used the Taepodong-2, but the rockets later stages did
not reach the altitude required for an ICBM , climbing to 466-500km above the Earth; a peak altitude of more than
1,000km is needed for a successful attack. Even if the range and altitude were sufficient, a re-entry vehicle
would have to survive hitting the atmosphere at roughly 16,000 miles per hour in order to do
damage. As of yet, there is no evidence that North Korea has such capabilities.

No nukes yet-lacks miniaturization and ICBM tech

Ditz 2/14/16 [Jason. Pentagon: North Korea Lacks Technology

to

Nuke

US.

Anti

War.

http://news.antiwar.com/2016/02/14/pentagon-north-korea-lacks-technology-to-nuke-us/. SH]

the nation
lacks the technology to actually make such an attack. North Korea has made some successful test
explosions of atomic weapons, but is believed to be incapable of the miniaturization needed to
create a deliverable warhead, and is even further away from developing an ICBM capable of
reliably hitting the US. The Pentagon report warned that the KN-08 might theoretically be capable of striking
parts of the continental US, but the missile system doesnt actually exist yet and is just something
North Korea has been struggling to get a handle on.
A new Pentagon report to Congress downplays the risk of a near-term North Korean nuclear attack on the United States, noting that

North Korea lacks strike capabilities now-tech transfers are key

AFP 2/14/16 [Agence France-Presse. Pentagon: North Korea Lacks Technology For Anti-US Nuclear Strike. Defense
News.
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/02/14/pentagon-north-korea-lacks-technology-anti-us-nuclearstrike/80380298/. SH]

North Korea is committed to striking the United States with a nuclear-armed

missile, but it cant do so without outside help, due to shortfalls in its own technology , the Pentagon
WASHINGTON

said Friday. The report to Congress was written prior to a fourth nuclear test conducted by Pyongyang last month and the launch of a

North Koreas KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile likely

would be capable of striking the continental US if successfully designed and developed , said the
report. However, North Korea has not been able to conduct flight tests on the highly complex system,
and its current reliability as a weapon system would be low. The pace of its progress will also
depend, in part, on how much technology and other aid it can acquire from other countries , it said.
Pyongyang is testing a separate type of technology to strike the US with intercontinental ballistic
missiles launched into space but lacks a re-entry vehicle , the report added. A test to launch a ballistic missile from
satellite-bearing rocket earlier this month.

a submarine in November ended in failure.

Politics DA

1NC Link
Repealing Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 makes republicans mad
Villasanta 5/25 [Arthur Dominic Villasanta, 5/25/16, China Topix, NASAs Bolden Makes
Brave but Pointless Appeal for U.S.-China Space Cooperation,
http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/88677/20160525/nasa-s-bolden-makes-brave-pointlessappeal-u-china-space.htm#ixzz4AdiXANtp]
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden's suggestion the United States should resume cooperation
with China in space is bound to encounter fierce opposition in Congress, especially from the
Republican Party that sees China as the "New Evil Empire. " Bolden, an African-American and one of only 14
African-American astronauts to reach outer space, said Congress should revise U.S. laws, specifically U.S. Public Law 112-55, Sec.
539 that bans any cooperative effort among the space programs of both the U.S. and China. "We were in an incredible Cold War with
the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz. It was because leaders in both nations felt it was time," said Bolden. "That represented
a great use of soft power, if you will. Look where we are today. I think we will get there (with China). And I think it is necessary."
Bolden, a retired Major General in the U.S. Marine Corps, suggested initial steps to unfreeze the thaw such as "working on weather
satellite data sharing and things like that. Things that will make critics on China on Capitol Hill a little bit more relaxed about the idea
of cooperation." The 112th United States Congress in November 2011 banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and
coordination with China, a ban enforced under Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539. The specific provision states: "None of the funds made
available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract
of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such
activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. "The limitation in subsection (a) shall
also apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA. "The
limitations described in subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to activities which NASA or OSTP have certified pose no risk of
resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other information with national security or economic security implications to China or a
Chinese-owned company." Public Law 112-55 is otherwise known as the ''Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2012." The

probability of the U.S. Congress enacting a new law to overturn Public Law 112-55,
Sec. 539 is remote considering China's perceived hostility towards the U.S. in the South China
Sea, the beefing-up of its military and the absence of lawmakers willing to go to bat for China.
The right wing Republican Party is patently hostile towards China and its members control the
committee in the House of Representatives responsible for NASA appropriations. The man who
chairs the House of Representatives appropriations subpanel that oversees NASA, John
Culberson (R-TX), is a space geek who in 2010 urged President Barack Obama not to allow
further contact between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA). "I have
grave concerns about the nature and goals of China's space program and strongly oppose any
cooperation between NASA and CNSA's human space flight programs without Congressional
authorization," he said in a letter to Obama. Bolden said he doesn't not expect the ban to be lifted
during his tenure that ends with that of Obama's.

Case Frontlines

1NC Solvency
Cooperation fails China wont follow through
Gurtov 6/16 [Mel Gurtov, 6/16/16,US-China Maritime Disputes: Too Close for Comfort,
Foreign Policy In Focus, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University
(Oregon) and Editor-in-Chief of Asian Perspective, an international affairs quarterly,
http://fpif.org/us-china-maritime-disputes-close-comfort/]
Both the US and China must bear responsibility for the ratcheting up of tension in the SCS and ECS.
Washington clings to freedom of navigation as its principal reason for challenging Chinese claims even though unencumbered
passage has not been denied US ships or those of any other country. US show the flag maneuvers are a clear provocation that the
Chinese cannot but answer. The PRC foreign ministry and various Chinese officials have issued reassurances about freedom of
navigation, which China pledges to protect as the regions main riparian state as well as in conformity with international law.
Moreover, although the US takes no official stand on sovereignty, its increasingly close military ties with the Philippines, Vietnam,
Japan, and India are defining a much wider US security interest than previously existed. Finally, as the Chinese are quick to remind
everyone, the US, unlike China, has failed to sign and ratify the UNCLOS, which dilutes the frequent American argument on behalf of
a common rules-based approach to the dispute. On the Chinese side, the

stubborn insistence on an unassailable

historic right to the islands, and an absolute refusal to adhere to whatever decision the arbitration
court reaches, are weak positions at best. The insistence that Chinas strategic purpose in building runways, ports, and supply
facilities in the SCS is defensive no doubt refers to the Yulin nuclear submarines and other submarines and surface ships based on the
southern end of Hainan Island. US spy planes do keep watch on Chinese activities there, but pose no credible threat to the base, at
least so long as it is not used for offensive operations. So that leaves open the question of how far China intends to go with its SCS
buildup. One

prominent Chinese analyst notes that when Xi Jinping promised President Obama that
China would not militarize the SCS when Xi visited Washington in September 2015, he really
meant small and limited military facilities that are simply for defensive purposes. But what we
are witnessing, and what is distressing Chinas neighbors, is a buildup that looks increasingly
aimed at creating permanent bases. Beijing should be consistent in recognizing that a legitimate dispute exists, just as it
demands that Japan acknowledge a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands. China should give up its insistence on
bilateral talks with the ASEAN countries as the only acceptable format for peaceful resolution. And China

should recognize
the contradiction in its argument that it protects freedom of navigation but insists that continued
land reclamation and military construction are perfectly legitimate.

Chinese has no incentive to cooperate; US military dominance has backed them into a
corner and they see space as our Achilles Heel.

Tellis 7 [Ashley Tellis, 2007, Survival, Autumn, Chinas Military Space Strategy, Senior
Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]
To assert in the face of this evidence that the Chinese civilian leadership could have been wholly unaware of the armys anti-satellite
weapons pro- gramme would be tantamount to claiming that the Chinese armed forces have been conducting a major military research
and development effort with grave international implications without the authorisation of, and perhaps even in opposition to, the
Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Such a contention would undercut much of what is known
about partymilitary relations in China and would be difficult to uphold against a weaker alternative explanation, perhaps grounded in
bureaucratic politics.17 And it would certainly be peculiar, given that the resource allocations asso- ciated with Chinas diverse
counterspace activities are considerable and that these initiatives have been part of the public record in the West, and hence knowable
to the civilian leadership in Beijing, for at least a decade. Finally, and most importantly, the

inference that the military

might be pursuing a covert counterspace programme unauthorised by the civilian leadership is
incredible precisely because the effort is consistent with the other sophisticated anti-access and
battlespace-denial programmes that have been authorised and have been underway for several
years.18 The brute reality of these anti-access and battlespace-denial programmes undermines the
notion advanced by other commentators that the Chinese anti- satellite test was, in Michael Krepons
words, a predictable and unfortunate response to U.S. space policies .19 This explanation asserts that

Beijings deci- sion to display its emerging counterspace capabilities owes less to blundering or
malevolent internal bureaucratic politics and more to the long-standing American opposition
toward negotiating a space arms-control regime. By declin-ing to negotiate an agreement
governing the peaceful uses of space, the United States may have compelled Chinas leaders to
conclude that only a display of Beijings power to launch an arms race would bring
Washington to the table to hear their concerns.20 In other words, the Chinese anti- satellite test was a
cri de coeur designed to force a recalcitrant Washington to reverse the positions articulated in its
National Space Policy and move with alacrity to arrest the creeping weaponisation of space. 21
Concerns about an arms race in space ought to be taken seriously, as a threat to both American and global security, but there is,
unfortunately, no arms-control solution to this problem. Chinas

pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven

fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration
in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of
the United States, grounded in Beijings military weakness at a time when China considers war
with the United States to be possible. The weapons China seeks to blunt through its emerging space-denial capability are
not based in space: they are US naval and air forces that operate in Chinas immediate or extended vicinity. What are in space
are the sensory organs, which find and fix targets for these forces, and the nervous system, which
connects the combatant elements and permits them to operate cohesively. These assets permit American
forces to detect and identify different kinds of targets; exchange vast and diverse militarily relevant informa- tion and data streams;
and contribute to the success of combat operations by providing everything from meteorological assessment, through navigation and
guidance, to different platforms, weapon systems, and early warning and situ- ational awareness. There

is simply no way to
ban or control the use of space for such military purposes. Beijings diplomats , who repeatedly call for
negotiations to assure the peaceful use of space, clearly understand this. And the Chinese military appreciates better
than most that its best chance of countering the massive con-ventional superiority of the United
States lies in an ability to attack the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears and voice of American power .
The lure of undermining Americas warfighting strengths in this way prompts Beijing to systematically pursue a
variety of counterspace programmes even as it persists in histrionic calls for the demilitarisation
of space.22 Chinas Janus-faced policy suggests it is driven less by bureaucratic accident or
policy confusion than by a compelling and well-founded strategic judgement about how to
counter the military supe-riority of its opponents, especially the United States.

Cooperation wont work China and US have different goals

Cheng 9 [Dean B. Cheng, Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation, Space Defense:
Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academys, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009,
p.10-11, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 200,
http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vo
l_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf]
In this regard, American and Chinese negotiators tend to take very different approaches.

Chinese negotiators in general seek first to establish sets of principles that will then govern all
subsequent interactions. 22 For example, in many international negotiations, the Chinese emphasize
the importance of both sides starting from the five principles of peaceful co-existence: Mutual
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty Mutual non-aggression Mutual non-interference in
internal affairs Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence 23 This is in direct contrast to
the American approach, in which negotiations begin by establishing specifics, avoiding debates
about generalities which can easily become entangled in political or philosophical differences. 24 In
essence, Chinese negotiators tend to adopt a top-down approach, with senior leaders focusing

on broad principles, whereas American negotiators more frequently adopt a bottom-up

approach, with working level officials focusing on concrete measures. The first two factors listed by
Ambassador Matano indicate, again, that American and Chinese negotiators hold very different
perceptions of the significance of negotiations. In general, the Chinese, unlike their American

counterparts, do not see political negotiations as a highly technical process of haggling over
details in which the two sides move to a point of convergence from their original positions through
incremental compromises. 26 Instead, they are viewed an attempt to reconcile (or impose)
principles and objectives of the two sides and the testing of their interlocutors commitment to
a relationship with the PRC. 27 Rather than getting to Yes, for the Chinese the purposeis to size
the opposition to draw out the US position with minimum exposure of Chinas. 28

U.S.-China cooperation fails China is too technologically behind and the U.S. would not
gain anything from co-operation.
Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009
Cheng 9 [Dean B. Cheng, Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation, Space Defense:
Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academys, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009,
p.10-11, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 200,
http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vo
l_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf]
At the most basic level, one of the key obstacles to increased Sino-American space cooperation

is the disparity in space-related experience. The United States has placed over a thousand
objects into orbit; by contrast, the PRC has only orbited a hundred. In the realm of human
spaceflight, the disparity is even greater. The United States has nearly fifty years of experience
with manned missions; the PRC, as of 2008, had thus far engaged in only three actual crewed
flights. Paralleling the differences in experience, there are also differences in technological
capability. Chinese systems often have a shorter lifespan than their Western counterparts. The
Chinese Fengyun-2 geostationary weather satellites, for example, had projected lifespans of only two
years; by contrast, the US GOES (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite) has a projected
lifespan of 5 years, but often exceeds that (GOES-10, for example, was launched in 1997, and
exhausted its fuel in 2006). Chinese literature does suggest that the latest generation Fengyun weather
satellite and Dongfanghong-4 communications satellite will have life-spans approaching those of their
Western counterparts. These differences complicate any effort at cooperation, since it is not clear

what the United States would necessarily gain from cooperating with the PRC, at least in
terms of technology and experience.

2NC Solvency
Cooperation with China is impossible empirics prove
Pollpeter 8 (Kevin specialist on China policy specialist on China policy and former member of
the RAND think tank, BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINAS PROGRESS IN SPACE
TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE, March
2008, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub852.pdf)

Increasing trust in regards to space activities appears to be difficult when space operations, in
particular counterspace operations, may figure prominently in Chinese efforts to strike
asymmetrically at the United States in the event of an armed conflict. 100 In the past,
cooperative efforts with Chinas military have been difficult . The Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA), designed to reduce the risk of accidents and miscommunication in the
air and on the sea, has been bogged down since the collision of a Chinese fighter with a U.S.
reconnaissance plane due to Chinese insistence on using the venue to claim sovereignty over
its exclusive economic zone. Even when the United States transferred military technology to
China during the 1980s, the Chinese were reluctant to provide the United States with the basic
motivations for certain technologies. 101 and normally only divulge information that has already
come out in the Chinese press. Chinas space experts also appear to function as a conduit for
disinformation. One prominent Chinese space expert concludes in an English language publication
that It is obvious that assertions judging Chinas manned spacecraft program as a military threat are
baseless. 102 Yet, in an internal military publication the same author argues that human
spaceflight technology can carry a large amount of effective military payload and can be used
for information support missions as well as function as a weapon or as a weapons platform. 103

1NC Inherency
No space race now
Handberg 15 [Roger Handberg, 2/18/15, Implications for the United States, Submission to
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Professor of Political Science at the
University of Central Florida, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Handberg_Written
%20Statement_2%209%2015.pdf]
Assessing whether there exists a space race between the US and China is simple: no. A space
race implies there are at least two parties involved in the competition. The United States does not
directly responded to the Chinese space programs expanding activities especially human space
activities. Instead, the US posture has been of isolating China in terms of participation in the
International Space Station (ISS). For the United States, domestic considerations dominate the
development of our space program. Budget concerns for example come in two forms: one is a concern with the
federal deficit which leads to a statist position as demonstrated by the NASA budget over the past decades (see attached Table 1); and
two, a

continuing political-technical disagreement over where the next NASA human launch
vehicle, the Space Launch System, should go. The disagreement boils down to the Moon first position and the
flexible path as embodied in some variant in a crewed mission to an asteroid. These factors reduce any competitive response to
Chinas space program with the recognition that there appears little political interest in engaging in such a competition. Furthermore,

the U.S. is committed to a significant commercial engagement in outer space initially in Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) and eventually farther out. So, the U.S. space program may look less capable than Chinas program
in certain aspects because some has been farmed out to the private sector. Chinas space program is an instrument for
achieving and sustaining international prestige, as a symbol of military power, and an instrument
for economic development. International prestige is critical for China as it strives to assume what they perceive as their
proper role in world affairs as one of the dominant powers. Regionally, space activities become an instrument for signaling their
superiority to Japan, its major regional rival. The

result from Chinas perspective is a twofer: equality with the

United States and superiority in the Asia-Pacific realm. All of this creates tensions with others both globally and
especially regionally but for domestic political reasons that is an acceptable cost. Launching satellites, space stations, and crewed
vehicles to space are important symbols of Chinese military and economic power. In a manner similar to the Soviet Union in the
earliest days after Sputnik, launching peaceful space payloads symbolically is the equivalent to launching 3 ballistic missiles. Its
signals that China possesses significant military capabilities. S o,

for China, a space race is underway one in

which China races to accomplish the same space firsts achieved by the Soviet Union and
United States in the first decade and a half of the space age. The race is to acquire international
attention and respect, the military aspect remains more muted but present in the background. One should point out that Chinas
race to space is much more leisurely than occurred across the 1960s. In one sense, their margins for failure are much narrower, for
China failure is not an option unlike the early space age when failure was expected as new technologies came on line. Prestige wise,
China benefits from its successes but that is always fragile given the possibilities that a flight failure may occur especially in human
spaceflight.

1NC China Says No

Problems prevent coop between China and the US
Richburg 11 (Keith B. The Washington Post, Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation, 122, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html,
7-1-11)
The Obama administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary
Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with
cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu
Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the
field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far
found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most
sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness of
China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology exports, makes
cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the
one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with
suspicion on both sides.
China has no interest in cooperation its inviting everyone but America to the party.
Laxman, journalist for Asian Scientist, 6/27/11
(Srinivas, AsianScientist, Chinas Space Mission: The Long March To The Moon And Mars
Home, http://www.asianscientist.com/features/chinas-space-mission-moon-mars/, 6.30.11)

On the 50th anniversary of the first human space flight by Yuri Gagarin, the Chinese government made
an announcement which was extremely appropriate for the occasion: it will launch its own space
station. This project was already on the cards, but it was formally confirmed during the 50th anniversary
celebrations. Called Tiangong () or Heavenly Palace, the 60-ton space station will be constructed
in orbit from a series of modules launched over the next few years. After the initial trials in docking and
rendezvous, it will be manned by a three-man crew. The present International Space Station (ISS)
weighs 419 tons and generally has a six-man crew or more. For quite some time, the US has been

trying its best to include China in the ISS program, but the Chinese response has been
lukewarm. The Chinese space station program envisages two spacecraft Shenzhou-9 and Shenzhou10 being launched in 2012, which will dock with the Tiangong-1 module. The Chinese have invited
scientists from all over the world to participate in the project, and speculation is rife that a
Pakistani scientist could perhaps be one of the earliest guests. Apart from the scientific
significance, space scientists feel that the Chinese space station project is endowed with a lot
of political and geopolitical ramifications, and is being viewed as a clear challenge to US
dominance in space. Chinas Space Flight Program: Codenamed Project 921 The space station
project is a part of Chinas ambitious human space flight program, codenamed Project 921,
which incorporates a number of Russian technologies. China already has many launch complexes;
some of the important ones are the Jiaquan Launch Center, Taiyuan Launch Center, Xianchang Launch
Center, and Newchang Launch Center. China also has a variety of rockets, and the Long March rocket
has several versions. The country has laid out a clear and precise trajectory for Project 921. It launched
its first manned space flight, Shenzhou-5, in October 2003 with Yang Liwei. The mission was an
astounding success. This was followed by Shenzhou-6 in 2005 with a two-man crew, and a third one in
2008 with a three taikonauts (Chinese name for astronauts or cosmonauts), both equally successful. The
importance of the third mission was that it included a spacewalk for 14 minutes. Though China is a late
entrant to the human space flight program compared to the US and Russia, it has mastered the critical

technologies in a short period of time. Experts believe that more taikonauts will be flying to space in the
days ahead, and training is already in full progress. 2030: A Chinese Taikonaut On The Moon? Apart
from the space station, China is also laying considerable emphasis on missions to the moon, with the
ultimate aim of a manned lunar landing around 2030. Named after the Chinese goddess of the moon,
China launched its first mission to the moon, Change-1, on October 24, 2007. The mission ended on
March 1, 2009 when it was taken out of orbit and impacted on the moons surface. Change-1 helped to
create an accurate and a high resolution map of the moons surface. Only a year later on October 22,
2008, India launched its first mission to the moon, Chandrayaan-1. Asked if India and China were

on a race to the moon, ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) officials dismiss any
suggestions that both the countries were competing with each other. There is absolutely no
rivalry and in fact we would like to collaborate, remarked an ISRO official who declined to
be identified.
No cooperation with China strained economy and China is not interested
Wolf, Defense Technology Correspondent at Reuters, 2011
(Jim, Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102,
January 2, Accessed July 3, 2011, )
(Reuters) - The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are
fading even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy
relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and
symbolic "feel good" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts
have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security

tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu
Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance
when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on Jan. 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its
currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter North Korea and
Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks , among other matters. Hu's
state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global
issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to

U.S. fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in
any event, reckoning it does not need U.S. expertise for its space program.

1NC Threat Con

For the latest generation of Chinese military leadership, the United States is
the enemy. Threat construction goes both ways.
Wines 10 [Michael Wines, 10/11/10, U.S. Alarmed by Harsh Tone of Chinas Military, New
York Times, China bureau chief for The New York Times]
The Pentagon is worried that its increasingly tense relationship with the Chinese military owes itself in part to the rising leaders of
Commander Caos generation, who, much more than the countrys military elders, view the United States as the enemy. Older Chinese
officers remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 set relations back, when American and Chinese forces made
common cause against the Soviet Union. The

younger officers have known only an anti-American ideology,

which casts the United States as bent on thwarting Chinas rise. All militaries need a straw man,
a perceived enemy, for solidarity, said Huang Jing, a scholar of Chinas military and leadership at the National University
of Singapore. And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to
maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up
to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy .

Threat construction between the US and china is a product of a new

generation of military leaders interpreting US action as a threat, not the other
way around. US behavior hasnt changed, just the Chinese interpretation of
it.
Wines 10 [Michael Wines, 10/11/10, U.S. Alarmed by Harsh Tone of Chinas Military, New
York Times, China bureau chief for The New York Times]
The

P.L.A. combines an odd combination of deep admiration for the U.S. armed forces as a
military, but equally harbors a deep suspicion of U.S. military deployments and intentions
towards China, David Shambaugh, a leading expert on the Chinese military at George Washington University, said in an e-mail
exchange, referring to the Peoples Liberation Army. Unfortunately, the two militaries are locked in a classic security
dilemma, whereby each sides supposedly defensive measures are taken as aggressive action by
the other, triggering similar countermeasures in an inexorable cycle, he wrote. This is very dangerous, and
unnecessary. From the Chinese militarys view, this year has offered ample evidence of American ill will. The Chinese
effectively suspended official military relations early this year after President Obama met with
the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader, and approved a $6.7 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which China regards as its
territory. Since then, the Chinese military has bristled as the State Department has offered to mediate
disputes between China and its neighbors over ownership of Pacific islands and valuable seabed
mineral rights. And when the American Navy conducted war games with South Korea last month in the Yellow Sea, less than 400
miles from Beijing, younger Chinese officers detected an encroaching threat. The United States is engaging in an
increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging Chinas core interests , Rear
Adm. Yang Yi, former head of strategic studies at the Chinese Armys National Defense University, wrote in August in the Peoples
Liberation Army Daily, the military newspaper. Washington

will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled

decision. In truth, little in the American actions is new. Mr. Obamas predecessors also hosted the
Dalai Lama. American arms sales to Taiwan were mandated by Congress in 1979, and have occurred regularly since then.
American warships regularly ply the waters off Chinas coast and practice with South Korean
ships. But Chinese military leaders seem less inclined to tolerate such old practices now that they
have the resources and the confidence to say no.

1NC AT Space War

No impact to space weaponsMAD
Shixiu 2007 (Bao, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the
Institute for Military Thought Studies Deterrence Revisited: Space China Security, Issue No. 5,
p. 2-3, Winter, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8)
At a fundamental level, space weapons like nuclear weapons will not alter the essential
nature of war. Throughout history, there has been much ink spilled over new weapons that have the
unique power and ability to change the underlying quality of war. For example, military theorists once
exaggerated the tanks role in deciding the wars outcome during World War I.11 The atom bomb itself
is probably the most salient example, as many analysts and politicians described the weapon as the
unique ultimate weapon.12 But this was a fundamental misunderstanding of war and its

implements. Nuclear weapons crossed a threshold in terms of their immense capacity for
destruction. But deterrence, mutual assured destruction and the nuclear taboo evolved to
consign the use of nuclear weapons to a near impossibility, negating its utility as a tool of warfighting. Weapons to change the nature of war have not emerged in the past and will not
emerge in the future. As such, space weapons will not be the ultimate weapon nor will they be
able to decide the outcome of war, even if they are used as a first strike.

The Chinese are committed to a peaceful space program, even if the US were
to directly weaponize space, the Chinese would continue a peaceful mission
Xianqi 6 (Maj. Gen. professor at the Institute of Command and Technology, and Junqin, PhD
candidate at the Institute of Command and Technology Chang and Maj. Sui Active Exploration
and Peaceful Use of Outer Space accessed: 6-30-11 http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=244)
In regard to the U.S. missile defense program, China opposes an arms race in any form. This

position is evident in its consistent and strong support for the non-weaponization of space.
China is willing to work with other nations to prevent the deployment of weapons in space by any
country or region. If the United States ultimately chooses to deploy weapons in space, it will be

profoundly regrettable; however, it will have no impact on Chinas space program, particularly
its manned space program. Regardless of circumstance, China will continue to resolutely
uphold its defense-oriented national defense policy, and continue to explore and utilize outer
space for peaceful purposes.

No space war
Dowdall 11 (Jonathan, 27 October 2011, Star Wars Will Space Weaponization Become a
National Security Issue?, http://www.policymic.com/articles/2154/star-wars-will-spaceweaponization-become-a-national-security-issue. Freelance defence and security affairs
journalist)
One of the threats feared is the so-called weaponization of space. This theory, as well as ground-to-space
missiles for destroying satellites, tested by both China and the U.S. in recent years, predicts an expansion of space-borne
weapons designed to take down valuable systems. While perhaps fitting the logic of conventional weapons escalation, this
theory ignores two key characteristics unique to space that make it an unlikely candidate for an

arms race. Firstly, unlike other global commons such as the sea and air, the majority of platforms in
space are shared between global actors. Projects like Galileo are a classic example; the system
will carry geo-positioning for Europe, but also emergency navigation services for international
shipping, including for China and the U.S. Given that such platforms are shared, it would be very
difficult to track down a satellite whose destruction would benefit one nation alone . For example,
everyone has something to lose if GPS goes down. Secondly, space is an incredibly fragile
environment. Space debris from destroyed or merely malfunctioning satellites make areas of Earths orbit
unavailable for exploitation for decades at a time . Chinas single missile test alone created the largest space debris
cloud in recorded history. A few more explosions of this kind and large areas of orbit will be too dangerous for satellites to enter. In
short, you

cant destroy enemy satellites without destroying your own. These factors would
seem to indicate that the chances of violent conflict in space are low, as everyone stands to
lose. However, this analysis does not consider so-called soft kill techniques such as hacking into or jamming a satellite.

2NC No Space War

No space war
Lambakis 1 (Steven Lambakis is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public
Policy and the author of On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (University
Press of Kentucky, 2001). Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612, Donnie)
In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for
example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the
context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces
are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves . Other
means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or
compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what
transpires in space is growing so we are not always in the dark.

No miscalcaccidents dont cause all-out war

Mueller 10 Woody Hayes chair of national security studies at Ohio State University (John,
Atomic Obsession, p. 100-101)

It is a plausible argument that, all other things equal, if the number of nuclear weapons in existence increases, the likelihood one will go off by accident
will also increase. In fact, all things haven't been equal. As

nuclear weapons have increased in numbers and

sophistication, so have safety devices and procedures. Precisely because the weapons are so
dangerous, extraordinary efforts to keep them from going off by accident or by an unauthorized
deliberate act have been instituted, and these measures have, so far, been effective : no one has been killed
in a nuclear explosion since Nagasaki. Extrapolating further from disasters that have not occurred, many have been led to a concern that, triggered by a
nuclear weapons accident, a war could somehow be started through an act of desperation or of consummate sloppiness. Before the invention of nuclear
weapons, such possibilities were not perhaps of great concern, because no weapon or small set of weapons could do enough damage to be truly
significant. Each nuclear weapon, however, is capable of destroying in an instant more people than have been killed in an average war, and the weapons
continue to exist in the tens of thousands. However, even

if a bomb, or a few bombs, were to go off, it does not

necessarily follow that war would result. For that to happen, it is assumed, the accident would have to take place at a time of warreadiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps be triggered or panicked into major action by an
explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the prelude to, a full attack. This

means that the unlikely happening a nuclear

accident would have to coincide precisely with an event, a militarized international crisis,
something that is rare to begin with, became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise.
Furthermore, even if the accident takes place during a crisis, it does not follow that escalation or hasty
response is inevitable, or even very likely. As Bernard Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a
well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a deal of ground-in automaticity of response and counterresponse." None of this was in evidence

during the Cuban missile crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was
shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew
threateningly over the Soviet Union. As if that werent enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message,
apparently on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack.31 None of these remarkable events triggered
anything in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored. Robert Jervis points out that "when critics talk
of the impact of irrationality, they imply that all such deviations will be in the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking
actions that are terribly risky. But irrationality

could also lead a state to passive acquiescence." In moments of

high stress and threat, people can be said to have three psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm
and rational, (2) to refuse to believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or to panic, lashing out frantically and
incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways. In her classic study of disaster
behavior, Martha Wolfenstein concludes, The usual reaction is one of being unworried. In

addition, the historical record suggests that wars simply do not begin by accident. In his extensive
survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a
single case in which it can be said that a war started accidentally ; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out,
the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have
discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a war which on investigation fits this description." Or, as Henry
Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, large military units do not fight by accident."

No miscalc, over-reaction, or accidental war

Quinlan 9 (Sir Michael, Consulting Senior Fellow International Institute for Strategic
Studies and Former Permanent Under-Secretary of State UK Ministry of Defense, Thinking
About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, p. 63-69)
the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange,
with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decision-makers would
really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking
for signs that the other was ready to call a halt . Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which drive modern delivery platforms and vehicles can
Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting,

possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be
immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side
can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of
highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear
armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon
destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgment that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacker possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressors own
first use, this judgment would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial probability of the aggressor leaders concluding that their initial judgment had been mistakenthat the risks
were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own countrys survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to
preventing the initial misjudgment and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was
certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed,
as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the
political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternativeit can be only surrender. But a more hopeful answer
lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the Cold War, for example, was one of defending vital
interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an
asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was
plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defused in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary; a credible basis has been laid for the
likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear
warfare particularly difficulties of communication and controlwould drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every
possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle When in doubt, lash out, the nuclear revolution
creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is if this goes on to the end, we are all ruined. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both,
it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to
launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALS incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication
and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level at strategic exchangewhich was only one of many
possible levels of conflict an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a
general tail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in
some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption.
The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be
uniquely fixedit would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to
weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between
nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options
for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a
substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armory of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable
burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcomethe only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and
holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working nut of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for
example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and
more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. The customary shorthand fur this desirable posture used to be escalation
dominance.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be riskfree and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences.

Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most

seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so
taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of
accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario
are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosiona technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery
system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some eventperhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems
initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just
as at an opposite extremer it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over
sixty years.) But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh the reality and implications against other

There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving
nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature
factors, in security planning as in everyday life

of readiness arrangements it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material.

None however has entailed a nuclear

detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years.

A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident
triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further nested that the mechanisms needed to set of such an explosion are technically demanding, and
that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after
the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation
have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon
numbers were larger, deployments immure widespread arid diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis

Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial
steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon , or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In
of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm.

none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launchextraordinary good fortune
again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events
stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial
misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear
weapon processor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps,
and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was
prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like
asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets.
History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the
nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase of caution . In was occasion conjectured that nuclear war might be
triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred
in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low . But even if it did happen, the further
hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched . It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages
63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

1NC Weaponization Turn

Plan increases Chinese militarization China cooperation undercuts US military advantages
Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 09
(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits, 830-9, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-coststhan-benefits, 6-29-11)
Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be

addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is
also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a
cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China ,
therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages.
Cooperation leads to space war
Logan 8 (Jeffrey, Specialist in energy policy, Congressional Research Service 9-29-08 .has a M.S.
in environmental science and Master in Public Administration,1995, Indiana University, School
of Public and Environmental Affairs B.S. in aerospace engineering and B.A. in general arts and
sciences, 1985, Pennsylvania State University http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf
Chinas Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperationpg 5 accessed: 6-28-11)
Inadvertent technology transfer. From this perspective, increased space cooperation with China
should be avoided until Chinese intentions are clearer. Joint space activities could lead to more
rapid (dual-use)technology transfer to China, and in a worst-case scenario, result in aspace
Pearl Harbor, as postulated by a congressionally appointed commission led by Donald
Rumsfeld in 2001.22

2NC Weaponization Turn Ext

Coop puts US space edge in jeopardy
Wolf 11 (Jim, Defense Technology Correspondent at Reuters, 2011 Analysis: Space: a frontier
too far for U.S.-China cooperation, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/uschina-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102, January 2, Accessed July 3, 2011,)

Possible U.S.-Chinese cooperation became more controversial after Beijing carried out a
watershed anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to knock out one of its
inactive weather satellites in high polar orbit. No advance notice of the test was given. Thirteen
months later, the United States destroyed a malfunctioning U.S. spy satellite using a ship-launched
Raytheon Co (RTN.N) Standard Missile 3 after a high-profile buildup to the event. The U.S.
interception was just outside the atmosphere so that debris would burn up promptly. U.S. officials say

China's capabilities could threaten U.S. space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created
a large cloud of orbital debris that may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned
spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two dozen countries.China's
work on anti-satellite weapons is "destabilizing," Wallace Gregson, assistant U.S. secretary of
defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in
anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines, surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare
techniques. "It has become increasingly evident that China is pursuing a long-term,
comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional security balance ," Gregson told a
forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a
conservative think tank, called on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space
cooperation with China on the grounds it could bolster Beijing's knowledge and harm U.S. security.

"Congress should reject (the Obama) administration attempts to curry favor with the
international community while placing U.S. advantages in space at risk ," Dean Cheng, a
Heritage research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a Dec. 15
memo to lawmakers.

A PLA space program is violent multiple attacks on the US prove

Wolf 11 (Frank R., chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the
budgets of NASA, Wolf: U.S. Should Not Help China With Its Space Program, Congressional
Documents and Publications (U.S. House Of Representatives Documents), May 11, Lexis,
accessed July 6, 2011)
"What concerns me most about the Chinese space program is that unlike the U.S., it is being led by the
People's Liberation Army (PLA). There is no reason to believe that the PLA's space program will
be any more benign than the PLA's recent military posture. "For example, according to the
Congressional Research Service, 'on March 9, 2009, the Pentagon reported that PRC ships and aircraft
operating in the South China Sea had been acting in increasingly aggressive ways toward two U.S.
Navy ocean surveillance ships operating in the area...' "China is taking a more assertive posture
globally, and their interests rarely intersect with ours . Consider the 2008 Senate testimony of thendirector of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: 'China continues to develop and field
conventional theater range ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that will put US forces and regional
bases throughout the Western Pacific and Asia at greater risk.... China's arms sales in the Middle

East are also destabilizing and a threat to US forces, while missile sales to Iran pose a threat to
US forces in the Persian Gulf.'"The U.S. intelligence community notes that China's attempts to
penetrate U.S. agencies are the most aggressive of all foreign intelligence organizations. The
Chinese regime has launched some of the most aggressive and widespread espionage and
cybersecurity attacks against U.S. agencies and contractors . Several years ago, the Chinese
attacked my office computers and those of many other members of Congress and committees. China's
aerospace industry for decades has provided missile technologies and equipment to rogue regimes such
as Iran and North Korea. "China's aims globally are often directly at odds with those of the U.S.

According to the Pentagon, weapons that PRC entities supplied to Iran were 'found to have
been transferred to terrorist organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan.'"China has failed to use its
influence to bring about a peaceful resolution to the multiple crises in Sudan. It is a major
arms supplier and source of economic strength to President Bashir's government in
Khartoum."China has been no friend in our engagement with Iran either. U.S. efforts to exert
diplomatic pressure against Iran's nuclear weapons program have been thwarted by China's
opposition to U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran. In a column last year, Robert Samuelson
summed it up this way, 'China's worldview threatens America's geopolitical and economic
interests.'

Cooperation with China risks proliferation

Sterner, 09 (Eric R, NASA, Associate Deputy Administrator, Policy and Planning and
Acting Chief of Strategic Communications 11/23/2009, Aviation Week & Space Technology
00052175, 11/23/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 19 Dragon in Sheeps Clothing? EBSCOhost 7/1/11)

Second, China

is a serial proliferator. Some technologies could make their way to countries of

even greater concern, including Iran and North Korea. The deputy director of national
intelligence for analysis submits an unclassified annual proliferation report to Congress,
known as the "721 Report." The most recent report states, "Chinese companies have been associated
with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran; Chinese entities-which include private companies, individuals and state-owned military export firms--continue
to engage in [weapons of mass destruction]-related proliferation activities." Remaining wary

of China's intentions does not mean the U.S. should opt for isolation, but it does argue against
close space cooperation. Instead, the U.S. should seek to increase transparency about China's
intentions and capabilities through military channels, share scientific data about the solar
system (but not the technology that collected the data), establish standards (such as limiting
orbital debris creation) that serve mutual interests, and possibly coordinate some activities
such as lunar or Earth science missions. Existing international frameworks enable all of this, but China has resisted
accepting the responsibilities that come with membership as a great space power. Aerospace technologies are high on China's
illegal shopping list. Until

China's intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and
persistently changed, close cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits.

AT Solar Flares Add-On

Squo Solves
AT Stone The White House Plan for Action means the squo solves the adv
Stone 15 [Maddie Stone, 10/30/15, The US is Finally Heeding Warnings About a Monster Solar
Storm, Gizmodo, http://gizmodo.com/the-us-is-finally-heeding-warnings-about-a-monster-sola1739620903]
Clearly, its high time we to start thinking about how to prepare for the possibility of a monster solar storm. The

National
Space Weather Action Plan released yesterday describes how the US government will coordinate
efforts on space weather forecasting, infrastructure preparation and education . Here are some highlights.
Establishing the Godzilla Storm: On the science front, a key component of the White Houses new plan is figuring out just how big
these suckers can get. To this day, the largest solar storm recorded on Earth was the 1859 Carrington Event, a series of powerful CMEs
that ignited the northern lights as far south as Cuba, causing global telegraph outages. The Carrington Event has always been our
benchmark for really big storms, but in recent years, observations of Sun-like stars beyond our solar system have shown that
superflares1,000 times larger than the Carrington Eventcan and do occur. In 2012, a study published in Nature estimated that
such a flare could strike the Earth every 800 to 5,000 years. Thats a pretty wide margin of uncertainty for such a potentially
devastating event. Clearly, we need

to get a better handle on the upper size limit of our own Suns
eruptions and the actual risk superflares pose. Monitoring Vulnerability on the Ground: While we know that large
pulses of electric current pose a danger to power grids, experts dont agree on just how vulnerable our infrastructure is. The White
House Action Plan calls for a nationwide assessment of vulnerability that includes factors like the
age and design of grid infrastructure and the underlying geology. The DOE has also been tasked
with developing a grid monitoring system that would display the status of power generation,
transmission, and distribution systems during geomagnetic storms. Real-time monitoring tools like this
could be used by grid operators who need to make fast decisions about when to shut things off. Improved Forecasting: A big aspect of
our vulnerability to space weather is the fact that we have almost no lead-time before a large storm strikes. If a CME is heading
straight for us, our first notice comes from the space weather monitoring satellites situated at the L1 Lagrange point a million miles in
front of Earth. At best, these satellites give us about an hours notice. Theres a lot of room to improve our forecasting, and it starts
with a better understanding of when and how large solar flares and CMEs occur. The

White House Action Plan calls for

more research on solar dynamics. Just as we can use weather models to predict the onset of tropical storms, with better
solar models we might be able to forecast days, or even weeks in advance, when the Suns gearing up to punt a a giant blob of plasma
our way. Cooperation: Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of a large geomagnetic storm is that its effects could be felt globally. This
makes space weather unique among all natural disasters humans face, and it underscores the need for international coordination. To
that end, the

White House Action Plan outlines a number of goals and targets, including 1) an
international meeting on the social and economic impacts of a large solar event, 2) multi-national
acknowledgement of space weather as a global challenge, 3) facilitating open-access to space
weather data across agencies and countries, 4) developing international standards for solar storm
measurements and scales, and 5) developing a set of mutual-aid arrangements to facilitate
response efforts worldwide.

Preperation for solar storms already happening now across multiple

government agencies
Regan 16 [Tracey Regan, 4/6/16, Solar storm researchers prepare for the 'big one' with new
urgency,Phys Org, http://phys.org/news/2016-04-solar-storm-big-urgency.html#jCp]
Setting Benchmarks to Assess Risks to Critical Infrastructure Dickinson said the government is "at a "fundamental turning point" in
its approach to space weather planning and prepared to "take decisive action to address this risk." Ralph

Stoffler, the
director of weather, deputy chief of staff for operations at U.S. Air Force headquarters in
Washington, said the Air Force was currently expanding its network of sensors to monitor space
weather, including placing them on all of its satellites. "We need data to support particular military operations,"
Stoffler said, adding that the Air Force relies on GPS for missions such as piloting remote aircraft in Afghanistan from the U.S. "If we
can predict space weather, we can have other operations in place or delay." The

Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) has recently added space weather to its daily operations briefings. "We know

there is a gap in our ability to assess vulnerability and consequences," said Jack Anderson , a senior
analyst at DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate, adding that while there is currently no scale for
predicting the magnitude of a storm as exists for hurricanes, for example, "we need to develop
that at FEMA." William Lapenta, director of the National Centers for Environmental Prediction
at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) said his agency's goal was to
track solar storms "from sun to mud," to predict where conditions following a coronal mass
ejection, for example, would be most intense in the ionosphere and on Earth in the form of
underground electrical currents, and to calculate impacts on a variety of systems. One of the near-term
challenges for policymakers will be to set benchmarks for assessing the vulnerability of various technology systems and establishing
thresholds that would trigger protective or recovery responses, said William Murtagh, the assistant director for the space weather,
energy and environment division at the OSTP. There

are currently working groups focused on these

benchmark amid efforts to reach out to other countries to establish international protocols for
aviation conditions, mitigation strategies and data sharing, among other areas.

NASA forecasting solves solar flares

Montalbano 11 [Elizabeth Montalbano, 8/22/11, NASA Improves Solar Storm Forecasting,
InformationWeek, http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/enterpriseapps/231500464]
NASA is using new data-processing techniques aboard a solar observational spacecraft to better
predict when solar storms may hit Earth, providing new forecasting ability that could help
determine their effects. NASA has been observing solar storms --called coronal mass ejections (CMEs)--from
its twin Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO) spacecrafts since their launch in 2006. Solar storms--billion-ton
clouds of solar plasma launched by the same sun explosions that spark solar flares--can be dangerous because they can damage
satellites, disrupt communications, and cause power grid failures on Earth, according to NASA. Because of this, scientists

have
been working to try to predict their occurrence and their behavior. New image-processing
techniques scientists are using on STEREO are allowing them to see how solar eruptions develop
into space storms on Earth, providing better information for space weather models to improve
storm forecasting, according to Lika Guhathakurta, STEREO program scientist at NASA
headquarters in Washington. Previously, STEREO could not clearly show an image of the structure of a solar storm as it
traveled toward Earth. This meant forecasters had to estimate when storms arrived without knowing the details of how they might
grow and the effect they might have, according to NASA. New

images from cameras on one of the spacecraft

reveal detailed features of a large CME in late 2008 that was directed toward Earth. The images
connect the original magnetized structure in the sun's corona to the anatomy of the storm as it hit
the planet three days later. The spacecraft's wide-angle cameras made the images possible by
detecting ordinary sunlight scattered by free-floating electrons in plasma clouds, according to
NASA. The clouds are bright and easy to see when they first leave the sun, but become more difficult to detect as they expand into
the void. "Separating these faint signals from the star field behind them proved especially challenging, but it paid off," said Craig
DeForest, scientist at the Southwest Research Institute in Boulder, Colo. Through

these observations, NASA

scientists not only can predict the arrival time of a CME on Earth, but also its mass, according to
NASA. The brightness of the cloud enabled researchers to calculate the cloud's gas density
throughout the structure and compare it to direct measurements by other NASA spacecraft. In the
future, scientists can use this same technique to determine whether the Earth will be hit by a small
or large cloud, and where on the sun the material originated, according to NASA. STEREO consists of
two observatories that orbit the sun, one ahead of Earth and one behind. The observatories are a part of NASA's Solar
Terrestrial Probes program, which seeks to understand the fundamental physical processes of the
space environment.

No solar strike
Large solar flares only happen once every 350 years, and even then, still have
to hit the earth
Millner 15 [Jack Millner, 8/14/15, Is the Earth about to be hit by a SUPERFLARE?,
DailyMail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3198285/Is-Earth-hit-SUPERFLAREScientists-calculate-massive-solar-outburst-due.html]
While this might seem like good news for us as the last superflare was just 156 years ago, in theory a superflare could strike at any
time. Even a weaker solar flare was able to cut the power to the entire Canadian province of Quebec in 1989. Astronomers

at
the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics in Cambridge, Massachusetts, studied 84 sunlike stars, observing 29 solar flares of similar magnitude over a period of four years, according to
the journal Science. A star like our sun should expect to experience a solar flare once every 250
to 480 years, with the 350 year scenario the most likely, according to astronomers.

No solar maximum their data is flawed

ONeill 8 [Ian ONeill, 6/21/08, 2012: No Killer Solar Flare, founder and editor of
Astroengine (a space science blog), published solar physics doctor and space science producer,
editor and writer for Discovery News, http://www.universetoday.com/14645/2012-no-killer-solarflare/]
Killer solar flares have been observed on other stars. In 2006, NASAs Swift observatory saw the largest stellar flare ever observed
135 light-years away. Estimated to have unleashed an energy of 50 million trillion atomic bombs, the II Pegasi flare will have wiped
out most life on Earth if our Sun fired X-rays from a flare of that energy at us. However, our

Sun is not II Pegasi. II Pegasi is a

violent red giant star with a binary partner in a very close orbit. It is believed the gravitational interaction with
its binary partner and the fact II Pegasi is a red giant is the root cause behind this energetic flare event . Doomsayers point to
the Sun as a possible Earth-killer source, but the fact remains that our Sun is a very stable star. It
does not have a binary partner (like II Pegasi), it has a predictable cycle (of approximately 11 years) and there
is no evidence that our Sun contributed to any mass extinction event in the past via a huge Earthdirected flare. Very large solar flares have been observed (such as the 1859 Carrington white light flare) but
we are still here. In an added twist, solar physicists are surprised by the lack of solar activity at
the start of this 24th solar cycle, leading to some scientists to speculate we might be on the verge
of another Maunder minimum and Little Ice Age. This is in stark contrast to NASA solar physicists 2006
prediction that this cycle will be a doozy. This leads me to conclude that we still have a long way to go when predicting solar flare
events. Although space weather prediction is improving, it will be a few years yet until we can read the Sun accurately enough to say

there is no
physical way to say that the Earth will be hit by any flare, let alone a big one in 2012. Even if a
big flare did hit us, it will not be an extinction event.
with any certainty just how active a solar cycle is going to be. So, regardless of prophecy, prediction or myth,

No impact to solar storms

Solar flares dont cause mass deaths at worst the blackouts last a few days
CNN 11 [CNN 11/14/11 Solar flares wont kill Earth, NASA says,
http://lightyears.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/14/solar-flares-won%E2%80%99t-kill-earth-nasa-says/]
Solar flare activity is increasing and is expected to peak between 2012 and 2014 around the time some believe the Mayan calendar
ends. This has some people linking the flares to the End Times. But NASA scientists

assure us that solar flares wont

destroy the Earth. We have a very long record that shows that even the strongest flares cant blow out the
atmosphere, said Antti Pulkkinen, a research scientist at NASA 's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt,
Maryland. There is really no way that even the largest disruption can end the world. Solar flares happen
when a very large amount of electromagnetic energy is quickly released from the suns atmosphere. The sun also can kick out
something called a coronal mass ejection, or CME, which carries billions of tons of charged particles into space. When these
mammoth clouds hit Earth's upper atmosphere, they cause beautiful auroras. They also can

disrupt satellites, cause

power grids to go down and scramble electronic gadgets. The most intense CME on record, the
Carrington Event in 1859, caused colorful auroras, even in the tropics, according to NASA. The storm also caused telegraphs
the high-tech electronic systems of the day to go haywire. Nowadays, many of us are carrying around technology far more
sophisticated than a telegraph. Should you worry that a solar flare will kill the iPhones virtual assistant Siri or fry
your smartphone? Pulkkinen says probably not, but CMEs have caused blackouts and can disrupt
GPS satellites. They also interfere with radio waves, making trouble for airline pilots, who rely on them to communicate with the
ground. But even with all that power, NASA says the sun doesnt have enough energy to hurl a fireball 93 million miles to destroy
Earth. And Pulkkinen says scientists

have made a lot of progress in predicting solar flares and CMEs,

giving time for operators to power down their satellites and for you to buy a hand-crank
emergency battery charger for your smartphone.

Their impacts are hype solar storms only cause very temporary damage
Millner 15 [Jack Millner, 8/14/15, Is the Earth about to be hit by a SUPERFLARE?,
DailyMail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3198285/Is-Earth-hit-SUPERFLAREScientists-calculate-massive-solar-outburst-due.html]
But last month, the British government issued a report warning that if a large solar storm were to erupt, we would have only 12 hours
warning before it hit. It said that a

massive solar phenomenon would disrupt transport networks, cause

blackouts and disrupt satellites. The report warned that GPS systems could go down for up to three
days at a time, leaving train networks and shipping badly affected. While mobile phones and landlines are
expected to be unaffected, satellite communication and high frequency radio communication used by shipping and
aircraft, could also go down for several days. Power grids could also be effected, leading to black
outs in some areas.

Solar storms only hurt people in space

LaMonica 12 [Martin LaMonica, 3/8/12, Solar storms: Five facts you should know, senior
writer covering green tech and cutting-edge technologies, previously executive editor of IT
publication InfoWorld, http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57393186-76/solar-storms-five-factsyou-should-know/]
First, are

these solar storms dangerous? In general, the physical danger is low and controllable.
The biological hazard inherent in solar and geomagnetic storms comes from the exposure to
radiation, which is mainly a concern for astronauts and people flying at high altitudes, according
to NOAA's ranking of storm severity.

Warnings protect the grid local blackouts are worst case scenario
Lovett 12 [Richard Lovett, 3/9/12, Solar Flare: What If Biggest Known Sun Storm Hit
Today?, National Geographic News, quoting Tom Bogdan, Ph.D. in Physics from UChicago,
Director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrations Space Environment Center,
and Rodney Viereck, Leader of the Data and Instrumentation Group Research Division NOAA
Space Environment Center, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/03/120308-solarflare-storm-sun-space-weather-science-aurora/]
Even now, the center's Bogdan said, the

most damaging emissions from big storms travel slowly enough to

be detected by sun-watching satellites well before the particles strike Earth. "That gives us
[about] 20 hours to determine what actions we need to take," Viereck said. In a pinch, power companies
could protect valuable transformers by taking them offline before the storm strikes. That would
produce local blackouts, but they wouldn't last for long. "The good news is that these storms tend
to pass after a couple of hours," Bogdan added. Meanwhile, scientists are scrambling to learn everything
they can about the sun in an effort to produce even longer-range forecasts.

Solar storms cause local blackouts at worst

Stuart 10 [Gary Stuart, 8/27/10, ABC Sciences, 2010, Solar max claims 'overstated': expert,
ABC journalist, http://www.abc.net.au/science/articles/2010/08/27/2995543.htm]
Australia's leading body responsible for monitoring space weather has dismissed claims that a massive solar storm could "wipe out the
Earth's entire power grid". One report quotes an Australian astronomer as saying "the storm is likely to come sooner rather than later".
But Dr

Phil Wilkinson, assistant director with the Australian Bureau of Meteorology's Ionospheric
Prediction Service, says claims that this coming solar maximum will be the most violent in 100
years are not factual. "All this talk about gloom and doom has selling power, but I'm certain it's
overstated," says Wilkinson. "[It's] going far beyond what's realistic and could be worrying or
concerning for people who don't really understand the underlying science behind it all." "The real
message should be that the coming solar maximum period could be equally as hazardous as any other solar maximum." 11-year cycle
The Sun goes through an 11-year solar cycle moving from a period of low activity called solar minimum to a time of heightened
activity called solar maximum. During solar maximum there's an increase in sun spot activity, which are dark patches on the Sun's
surface caused by magnetic field lines breaking through from deep below. Because the Sun isn't a solid object like the Earth, different
parts of the Sun rotate at different speeds, which cause these field lines to twist and stretch, eventually snapping like elastic bands.
When they snap they produce an eruption of electromagnetic energy called a solar flare, which can be accompanied by a coronal mass
ejection (CME). If directed at Earth, charged particles within the CME slam into the magnetosphere, resulting in the northern and
southern auroral lights. Previous CME events have damaged spacecraft, interfered with communications systems and overloaded
ground-based power grids. Aware of the problems Despite the potential threat, Wilkinson says

authorities are aware of

issues and are taking precautions. "We monitor solar activity and give out warnings if something
is heading our way," says Wilkinson. "That will be at least a few hours [in advance], enough time to
prepare." He says while some satellites could be damaged by a future CME, others could be
protected by being placed in 'safe mode'. Wilkinson adds the impact on power grids would be
minimal. "At worst, it's a regional thing, not a global thing as these reports imply." He says high
frequency communications may also be affected, but it would be temporary. Low maximum According to
Wilkinson, the Sun has been through a long solar minimum and appears to be heading into a low solar maximum. Previous
observations have shown this could result in high spikes of CME activity. "It means we could see auroral activity over all of Australia
rather than just the higher latitudes," says Wilkinson. "It's unusual, but not unprecedented. James Cook made mention of just such an
event off Timor."

Cant Adapt
Cooperation cant solve solar flares it would take trillions of dollars to
upgrade the grid
White 15 [Bill White, 11/5/15 Are We Prepared To Survive Solar Storms?, Survivopedia,
http://www.survivopedia.com/are-we-prepared-to-survive-solar-storms/]
There is virtually no protection for the three power grids that serve the United States. Estimates of
the cost of adding that protection are over one trillion dollars, making it impractical from a
financial standpoint. Even buying and stockpiling spare transformers to deal with such an event
is deemed impractical. These are custom-built transformers and they take more than a year a
piece to build. Apparently, there arent standard designs which are used throughout the system, but
rather each one is more or less an individual. So, a spare transformer for one sub-station probably
wont work for another. Should the grid get hit, chances are, it will go down. There is one
advantage with a solar storm, when we compare it to an EMP; thats the warning we will have. Scientists know
about 12 hours before these storms strike. So, if a reasonable means of spreading the word could be developed, those 12 hours would
give people time to disconnect equipment and store it in Faraday Cages before the storm hits. Of course, that wouldnt be as easy for
businesses and industry; but measures could be developed, which would allow those businesses to prepare for the solar storm and
protect their computers and other sensitive electronics. Alas, this probably wont happen. Developing such a system is the type of
thing that was popular in the 1950s, but would

be looked at with scorn today. Few would truly accept the

gravity of the situation and make proper preparations. Amongst those who did, all it would take is
one or two false warnings and theyd stop listening to the warnings all together. But then, this
wouldnt do a thing to help the power grid. So, even if individuals and businesses were to invest
in developing the necessary protections to keep their equipment from being damaged in the case
of a solar storm, without power from the grid, that investment would be useless. The key to
everything is to have readily available electrical power that we can use. Thats going to require
major investments and major changes to the grid.

Cooperation cant solve adaptation shielding is too expensive

Choi 11 [Charles Q. Choi, 9/27/11, New Forecast: Sun's 'Superstorms' Could Doom Satellites,
Editor of Space.com, Masters and Bachelors in Arts, journalist published in papers such as the
New York Times, http://www.space.com/13095-solar-storms-satellites-risk-geomagneticsuperstorms.html]
The study focused on the possible effects of a particularly strong magnetic storm on the Van Allen radiation belts, the dangerous rings
of high-energy particles that girdle the Earth. The

belts are split into two distinct zones. The outer belt , which is
inner

made up of electrons, reaches from about 15,800 to 31,600 miles (25,500 to 51,000 kilometers) above the surface, while the

belt, which consists of a mix of electrons and protons, reaches from about 4,000 to 8,000 miles (6,400 to 12,800 km) above.
[Stunning Photos of Solar Flares & Sun Storms] Scientists had known the outer belt could become far more
intense during geomagnetic storms caused by high-energy particles spewed by the sun, such as
the storm that supercharged Earth's northern lights display Monday night (Sept. 26). However,
they have long thought such storms do not affect the inner belt. Now computer simulations
suggest that during a "superstorm" which has occurred in the past and is likely to recur in the
future ? the electrons in the inner belt, too, could become energized. Near-Earth radiation could
then remain dramatically more intense for several years afterward. "The increase in radiation in
the inner zone may last for up to a decade and continue damaging satellites for years after a very
strong storm," study lead author Yuri Shprits, a space physicist at the University of California, Los Angeles, told SPACE.com.
This radiation would damage satellites in that zone and potentially cut their lifetimes by fivesixths or more. [Related: Space Radiation to Rise for Astronauts, Airline Passengers] "It would not destroy all satellites at once,"

Shprits said. "However, at least according to our calculations, a very strong storm can increase the radiation dose in the inner zone by
a factor of 10, and within a few years we may lose a significant portion of the satellites that traverse the inner zone." In terms of new
strategies that might be needed to protect satellite systems, "it's hard to say," Shprits said. "First of all, we need to estimate risks and
estimate cost. If cost is too high, we may want to accept the risks and start getting ready to replenish the fleet in the case of such
event." "There

are a number of rather expensive strategies that can be used to mitigate the risk,
including redundancy in electronics and increased shielding ," he added. "Zero risk means infinite cost."

Meltdowns good - Hormesis

Lol this is ethical

Nuclear meltdowns solve cancer and improve immune responses Chernobyl

and Hiroshima prove
Kamar and Venugopal 5 [Shri R.V. and Dr. V. Venugopal, April-June 2015, NUCLEAR
POWER IS FINE - RADIATION IS GOOD FOR YOU, Indian Nuclear Society News, Vice
President of the Indian Nuclear Society]
Unfortunately, far from safeguarding our health, current safety standards will almost certainly increase the incidence of cancer. The
evidence shows that the effect of radiation on human health is not a linear one, but is a J-shaped curve. Exposure

starts by
being beneficial at low doses and only becomes harmful at higher doses. This effect is known as hormesis. A low dose
of ionising radiation seems to stimulate DNA repair and the immune system, so providing a
measure of protection against cancer. The benefit of low doses of radiation in treating cancer have
been known for some time and are confirmed by a mass of evidence, particularly from Japan
where it has been studied in detail as a result of Hiroshima and Nagasaki . Many other examples of the
hormesis effect are well known. A bit of sunshine does you good; too much may cause skin cancer. Small doses of aspirin have many
beneficial effects; too much will kill you. It also appears to apply to arsenic, cadmium, dioxins and residues of synthetic pesticides, but
that is another story. Epidemiological evidence confirms the hormesis effect of radiation. The

prediction that there would

be terrible after-effects from the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the
survivors and their children was proved wrong. Japanese studies of the life expectancy of
survivors who suffered relatively low amounts of radiation show that their life expectancy turned
out to be higher than those of the control group and no unusual genetic defects have been found in their children. Again, a
follow-up study of Japanese fishermen who were contaminated with plutonium after the nuclear
tests at Bikini found 25 years later that none of them had died from cancer. After the Chernobyl disaster, it
was also predicted that the incidence of cancer among those affected by fallout would greatly increase and there would be huge
genetic damage to future generations. It was about as bad an accident to a nuclear power station (a badly constructed one) as is likely
to happen. Its psychological effect was huge and changed peoples perception of the risk of nuclear energy all over the world. Indeed,
it is constantly cited as an example of the unparalleled threat to health from nuclear disasters. Tragically, it led to 31 deaths, mainly
among rescue workers who were exposed to very high doses of radiation. Yet in

the areas around Chernobyl the extra

radiation to which people were exposed in the nine years following the accident was slight - an
increase of about 0.8- 1.4 mSv. In May 2001, in the Ukrainian town of Pripyat, which is now a ghost town after its complete
evacuation, the average amount of persistent radiation found was 0.9 mSv a year, five times lower than the level in New Yorks Grand
Central Station. In parts of southwest France the levels of natural radiation are as high as 870 mSv a year. There

is strong
evidence that people exposed to low doses of radiation amounts 100 times more than the
recommended range actually benefit. The incidence of thyroid cancers among children under 15
exposed to fallout from Chernobyl was far lower than the normal incidence of thyroid cancer
among Finnish children. The death rate from leukemia of nuclear industry workers in Canada is
68 per cent lower than average. Workers in nuclear shipyards and other nuclear establishments in
the US and many other countries have substantially lower death rates from all cancers and are
much less likely to die from leukemia. This might be explained by the fact that their health is regularly checked and that
only healthy workers are employed. But it corresponds with a mass of other evidence that people who live in areas of unusually high
natural radiation, in Japan, China, India and the US, are less likely to die from cancer than a control group. These facts destroy what
are perhaps the strongest objections to nuclear power. They show that the regulations seeking to enforce present, let alone
proposed, minimum standards of safety not only cost billions of pounds and have

undermined the prospects of our

development of nuclear power, but do more harm than good. It is time that we looked more closely at the phenomenon of
hormesis and at the successful Japanese experience of using low-dose radiation to treat cancer. When the evidence is so clear, we
should not allow it to be brushed aside by conventional wisdom and ignorance. (Adapted from an article by Dick Taverne in the
August 2004 issue of Prospect magazine).

Millions of people die from cancer each year only nuclear meltdown
resolves that
American Cancer Society 6 [American Cancer Society, Cancer Action Network, 7/12/6,
http://action.acscan.org/site/DocServer/ACS_CAN_pushes_for_FCTC_ratification_7.12.06_FIN
AL.pdf?docID=223]
Cancer will kill more people in the world this year than HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria combined. By

2020, the number

of new cancer cases worldwide will grow to 15 million and the number of deaths will double to
as many as 12 million. An estimated 70 percent of these deaths will occur in developing
countries, which are least prepared to address their growing cancer burdens. The only consumer product proven to kill more than
half of its regular users, tobacco will be responsible for 4.9 million deaths worldwide this year alone. If left unchecked, tobacco use
will kill more than one billion people in this century, the worst case of avoidable loss of life in world history.

Weak immune systems mean pandemics coming now

AIDS INFO 95 [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, , 2/21/95, The World as a
Hot Zone: New and Re-Emerging Diseases, http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/aprs/release.aspx?
an=A00170&section=SearchAgency]
Diseases such as AIDS and therapies for organ or bone marrow transplantation and some cancers
impair the immune system's ability fight disease. This suppression allows normally harmless
microbes to cause life-threatening illnesses, such as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia in AIDS
patients. Additionally, the extensive and inappropriate use of antibiotics, including broadspectrum drugs designed to kill many kinds of bacteria at once, has led to the appearance of
resistant bacteria. These "super bugs" require physicians to use more expensive drugs and higher
doses of older drugs in treatments that are not always effective. ARE THESE BUGS COMING TO YOU?
Many microbes, including viruses, bacteria, protozoa and fungi, threaten world health. Moreover, many diseases associated with the
tropics increasingly cause concern in the United States. Some of the more important emerging, re-emerging and enduring diseases are
listed below:

Disease kills millions each year greatest threat to human survival

Zimmerman and Zimmerman 96 [Barry and David Zimmerman, 1996, Killer Germs,
pg. 132, both have M.S. degrees from Long Island University]
Then came AIDSand Ebola and Lassa fever and Marburg and dengue fever. They came, for the most part, from the steamy jungles
of the world. Lush tropical rain forests are ablaze with deadly viruses. And changing lifestyles as well as changing environmental
conditions are flushing them out. Air

travel, deforestation, global warming are forcing never-beforeencountered viruses to suddenly cross the path of humanity. The resultemerging viruses. Today some five
thousand vials of exotic viruses sit, freeze-dried, at Yale Universityimports from the rain forests. They await the outbreak of
diseases that can be ascribed to them. Many

are carried by insects and are termed arboviruses (arthropod borne). Others,
of even greater concern, are airborne and can simply be breathed in. Some, no doubt, could threaten humanitys
very existence. Joshua Lederberg, 1958 winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and
foremost authority on emerging viruses, warned in a December 1990 article in Discover magazine: It is still
not comprehended widely that AIDS is a natural, almost predictable phenomenon. It is not going
to be a unique event. Pandemics are not acts of God, but are built into the ecological relations between
viruses, animal species and human speciesThere will be more surprises , because our fertile imagination
does not begin to match all the tricks that nature can play According to Lederberg, The survival of humanity is not

preordainedThe single biggest threat to mans continued dominance on the planet is the virus
(A Dancing Matrix, by Robin Marantz Hening.

Radiation solves cancer and other stuff 10 examples

Kauffman 3 [Joel Kauffman, 2003, Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 17, No. 3, Professor
of Chemistry Emeritus, Department of Chemistry & Biochemistry, University of the Sciences in
Philadelphia, http://www.scientificexploration.org/jse/articles/pdf/17.3_kauffman.pdf]
Recent reviews on radiation hormesis in humans cite examples of: (1)

Decreased cancer mortality in government

nuclear facility workers in Canada, the UK, and the US (Luckey, 1991, pp. 111121). Whether exposed in
uranium mines or processing plants, laboratories, or nuclear power plantsand whether the exposure was to uranium, plutonium,
thorium or radium, so long as the dose was , 50 times background (chronic) or , 50 rad (acute, and QF 5 1)workers

were
healthier than those in the general population, mainly due to lower cancer incidence. Any possible healthy
worker effect was eliminated in studies in which nuclear workers in a single large energy
company had lower mortality than thermal-only workers or non-energy workers within the same
company. All groups of workers had the same physical examinations and health care. (2)
Decreased cancer mortality, decreased leukemia rate, decreased infant mortality rate and
increased lifespan in atomic bomb survivors from both Hiroshima and Nagasaki who received , 1.2 rad
(Luckey, 1991, pp. 148158), and further discussed in detail below. (3) A 20% lower cancer death rate in Idaho,
Colorado and New Mexico, which have background radiation of 0.72 rad/yr compared with Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama with 0.22 rad/yr (Luckey, 1999). However, a supposed inverse correlation of all-cause death with the level of
background radiation in the southeastern states compared with the Rocky Mountain states (Luckey, 1991, pp. 181182) failed to
exclude magnesium in drinking water as a confounder (Kauffman, 2000). But high background radiation in parts of China and in
Kerala, India, confers longer lifespan, supporting the first USA data above (Luckey, 1991, p. 181). (4)

Slightly lower cancer

mortality after a 1957 explosion that dispersed nuclear weapon wastes in the eastern Urals village
of Chelyabinsk. About 1,000 people were exposed to about 0.5 Sv of 90Sr over 1.5 years (Luckey, 1991, p. 26, 141). (5)
Lower incidence of breast cancer in patients who received a cumulative 1029 rad of X-rays during
repeated fluoroscopy in Canada (discussed in detail below). (6) Decreased cancer mortality and decreased total
mortality from the US Nuclear Shipyard Worker Study (Pollycove & Feinendegen, 2001). (7) British male
radiologists practicing after 1954, exposed to 0.055 rad annually of X-rays, have a lower cancer and allcause death rate than the most relevant peer group, other male medical practitioners (Sherwood,
2001). (8) For half of all US counties, representing 90% of the US population, lung cancer rates decrease by about 35% as the mean
radon level in homes (by county) increases from 0.5 to 3 pCi/L, and the cancer rate is still 25% below the ZEV at 36 pCi/L (Cohen,
1997a). Similar smaller studies in England and France confirm these findings (Cohen, 1995). This effect was less pronounced in the
results from a questionnaire study relating the ratio of lung cancer deaths to all cancer deaths vs. individually measured radon levels,
but the findings did not follow the LNT relationship at all (Cohen, 1997b). (9) The Holm Study in Sweden on about 35,000 normal
subjects who received 50 rad of 131I (primarily a gamma emitter) to the thyroid for diagnostic purposes, and who were followed for
20 years; the relative risk (RR) for thyroid cancer was 0.62 compared with that of controls (Yalow, 1995); in other words, this means
that there were 62 cases of cancer in the treatment group for every 100 cases in the control group. (10) An examination of older
literature disclosed a 12-year study on the effect of six 50-rad doses of X-rays in 364 patients with gas gangrene, a treatment which
brought the death rate from 50% down to 512% without surgery or antibiotic (Cuttler, 2002).

3,000 studies prove

Mortazavi 7 [S.M. Javad, An Introduction to Radiation Hormesis, Biology Division at
Kyoto University of Education,http://www.angelfire.com/mo/radioadaptive/inthorm.html Date
Last Modified December 17]
During the 1950`s, Luckey, a pioneer researcher in radiation hormesis, indicated that low dose dietary antibiotics caused a growth
surge in livestock. Later he found that hormesis could be induced effectively by low doses of ionizing radiation. In 1980 the first
complete report on radiation hormesis was published (Luckey TD 1980). In this report he reviewed numerous articles regarding
radiation hormesis. Since the first reports, 3000

papers have been published on the benefits of low doses of

ionizing radiation (for a review see Luckey 1980, Luckey 1982, Luckey 1991). The concept of radiation hormesis is usually
applied to physiological benefits from low LET radiation in the range of 1-50 cGy total absorbed dose (Macklis 1991). It is widely
believed that radiation biology in the future will be focused on biomolecular and genetic
implications, problems of damage and repair and connected problems such as radiation hormesis
and radioadaptive response.