CONSTITUTION 1 FIRST DISCUSSION 06/25/2016

JUDGE.KAREN SANCHEZ CANULLAS-ARMADA

Political law, definition
Is that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs
of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.
Branches/Scope/Divisions of Political law
1) Constitutional law the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as
represented by the three inherent powers of the state and liberty as guaranteed by the bill of
rights.
Coverage of the study - Constitutional law 1 a study of structure and powers of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Political law as the nature of the state, the
supremacy of the constitution, the separation powers and the rule of majority.
2) Administrative law that branch of public law which fixes the organization, determines the
competence of administrative authorities who executes the law, and indicates to the individual
remedies for the violation of his right.
3) Law on Municipal Corporation
4) Law of public officers
5) Election laws
CASE: Macariola v. Asunsion,114 SCRA
What provision of law refers to political and non-political laws?
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack
of an appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as
Lot 1184 A E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his
wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of

Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.
Issue:Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from
Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no
longer the subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14
of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been
abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign
are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.
Laws mentioned in this case:
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even
at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5)
Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the AntiGraft & Corrupt Practice Act. The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by
proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in

commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which
they discharge their duties:
1.
Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution
in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of
judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx

xxx

xxx

5.
Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his
judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
For extra info
in the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service
Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members
of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court,
which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now
Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section
defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ...
violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the
interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in
rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding
six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action
against civil service officers and employees.

Possible Answer to case question macario vs. asunsion :

Effect of Change in Sovereignty

Political laws

Non-political laws

Judicial decisions

Suspended subject

Not affected-

They are valid

to revival under the

a) Non political laws

during the occupa-

principle of jus

are laws intended

tion & even beyond

postlimini upon the

to govern the

it, except those of

End of occupation

relations of indivi-

political complexion,

duals as among

which is automati-

themselves

cally annulled upon

This applies only to

civilians & not to

b) Political laws are

the restoration of

members of the

laws intended to

the legitimate

armed forces,

govern the rela-

authority.

except laws on

tions between

treason, because

the inhabitants

treason is a breach

& the state

of allegiance to the
sovereign.
Necessity in the study of the constitution
Every citizen, regardless of calling, should understand the mechanics and motivations of his government.
This must be so because sovereignty resides in the people and all government authorithy emanates from
them it is upon the active involvement in public affairs pf every Filipino that the success of the republic
of the Philippines will depend.
ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.
The fundamental law provides that all institutions shall include the study of constitution as part of the
curricula.

ARTICLE XIV EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
EDUCATION
Section 3.
1. All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the
curricula.
Classification of a Constitution:
1. Written or unwritten Written - one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents
Unwritten consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but
are scattered in various sources
Examples: a. statutes of fundamental character; b. judicial decisions; c. commentaries of
publicists; d. customs and traditions; e. certain common law principles
2. Enacted (conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative)
Enacted (conventional) -formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious
or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler
Evolved (Cumulative)-the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time
but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method
3. Rigid or Flexible
Rigid -one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process
Flexible -one that can be changed by ordinary legislation
The Philippine Constitution is written, conventional and rigid. It is embodied in one document and can be
amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.
Essential parts of a good written Constitution:
a. Constitution of Liberty sets forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and
imposes limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those
rights. e.g. Bill of Rights
b. Constitution of Government outlines the organization of the government, enumerates its powers,
lays down certain rules relative to its administration and defines the electorate. e.g. Legislative, Executive
and Judicial Departments, Constitutional Commissions
c. Constitution of Sovereignty the provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with
which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. e.g. Art. XVII-Amendments or
Revisions
Essential Qualities of the Written Constitution:

1. Broad;
2. Brief; and
3. Definite.
The Supremacy of the Constitution
The constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land , must defer, no act shall be valid, however noble its
intentions, if it conflicts with the constitution. The constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow
to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase
its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the
sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of law by the pretenders to
illegitimate power.
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (36 SCRA 228) Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
He alleged that respondent Commission on Elections gave his certificate of candidacy due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound system and loud speakers.
According to him, this violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Petitioner filed a case
against Commission on elections seeking a writ of prohibition and at the same time praying for a
preliminary injunction. The respondent argued that this authority was granted by the Constitutional
Convention Act.
Issues: Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the
petitioner?
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose
such ban in the light of the doctine of ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest
fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The Constitution
prohibits abridgement of free speech or a free press. According to the Supreme Court, this preferred
freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the respondent

Commission did was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is
directed.
The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles.
Laws mentioned in case mutuc vs com:
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6132
AN ACT IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES NUMBERED TWO AS
AMENDED BY RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES NUMBERED FOUR OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE PHILIPPINES CALLING FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROVIDING
FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION THEREIN AND OTHER DETAILS RELATING
TO THE ELECTION OF DELEGATES TO AND THE HOLDING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT FOUR THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FOURTEEN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as "The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act. Section
12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. The following provisions shall govern
election spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act: (E) All other forms of
propaganda are prohibited. Accordingly, outside of Comelec billboards, it shall be unlawful to
erect, attach, float or display any billboard, streamer, tinplate poster, balloon and the like, of
whatever size, shape, form or kind, advertising the name of any candidate; and it shall likewise be
unlawful to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or material,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarette, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin. Any prohibited election propaganda, propaganda gadgets or advertising may be confiscated
or torn down by the Comelec Supervisor upon authority of the Commission on Elections. In no
case, however, shall election supervisors or registrars be assigned to a district or districts where
they are related to any candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Similarly, apart from Comelec time, it shall be unlawful for any radio broadcasting or television
station, moviehouse or theater to show, to display or to give any advertising or propaganda to any

candidate; nor may any candidate appear on any interview or program, unless all other candidates
in the district are also invited to appear.

Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA

Facts: On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine
marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied
by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose
firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was
not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of
rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded
informer, and executing them outright (although the last part is not included in the
modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion
with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to
warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be
expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers
returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male
occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and
photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated
nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition
found in the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their
purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being
used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against selfincrimination. 4
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought
to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. 8
There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of
Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9
Issue: was the operation justified unerr the circumstances?
Held: no, in acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is
at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil

courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable
cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid
without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the
petitioner's guilt.
t he respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact
not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to
get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons
inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no
reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's
premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the
petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional
short-cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Ex parte Milligan: 10
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question
certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to
justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives
from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's
slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they
were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives
from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's
slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they
were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.
Laws mentioned in case alih vs castro:
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in
question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-

Sec. 4(2)

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Basis of the Study of the Constitution
The principle basis of the study of Constitutional Law 1 is the present Constitution of the Philippines as
adopted on February 2,1987. In addition, the student should consider pertinent statutes, executive orders,
and decrees and judicial decisions, as well as current political events in which purposes of the law are
applied (or misapplied)
Particularly with regard to those of their provisions that have heen retained in toto or with modifications
in the new Constitution , the Constitution of 1935 and 1973, which serves as its working drafts, are
intergral part of this study.
So too is the constitution of the united states, aong with relevant rulings of its supreme court, in the
connection with the parts of that document, like the bill of rights, that have been incorporated in the
present constitution of the Philippines, the reason is that imported provisions of law are, as a general rule,
interpreted in the light of their understanding in the country of origin
Basis:
1. 1987 Constitution
2. 1973 and 1935 Constitutions
3. Organic laws made to apply to the Philippines a. Philippine Bill of 1902 b. Jones Law of 1916 c.
Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934
4. Statutes, executive orders and decrees, and judicial decisions
5. US Constitution
The different Constitutions of the Republic of the Philippines
With Effectivity dates
The present Constitution of the Philippines:
Approved by the 1986 Constitutional Commission on October 12, 1986, the 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino on October 15, 1986. It was
ratified on February 2, 1987 by a plebiscite. It was proclaimed in force on February 11, 1987.
Full text of the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution divided per section.

Former constitutions of the Philippines:
The 1986 Freedom Constitution: promulgated by Presidential Proclamation, March 25, 1986.
The 1973 Constitution: as Amended in October 16-17, 1976, on January 30, 1980, and April 7, 1981.
The 1973 Constitution: draft presented to President Marcos by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on
December 1, 1972; deemed ratified by Citizens Assemblies held from January 10 to 15, 1973, proclaimed
in force by Proclamation by President Marcos, January 17, 1973.
The 1943 Constitution: as approved by the Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence,
September 4, 1943 and ratified by the KALIBAPI Convention, September 7, 1943.
The 1935 Constitution: as amended on June 18, 1940, and on March 11, 1947.
The 1935 Constitution: as approved by the 1934 Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935, certified
by the President of the United States on March 25, 1935, and ratified by plebiscite on May 14, 1935.
The Jones Law of 1916: enacted into law by the United States Congress on August 29, 1916.
The Philippine Organic Act of 1902: enacted into law by the United States Congress on July 1, 1902
The 1899 Malolos Constitution: approved by the Malolos Congress on November 29, 1898, draft returned
by President Aguinaldo on December 1, 1898 for amendments, which the Congress refused; approved by
President Aguinaldo on December 23, 1898; formally adopted by the Malolos Congress on January 20,
1899, promulgated by President Emilio Aguinaldo on January 21, 1899.

Conception/history
The 1897 Constitution of Biak-na-Bato[edit]
Provisional Constitution of the Philippines (1897)
The Katipunan's revolution led to the Tejeros Convention where, at San Francisco de Malabn, Cavite, on
March 22, 1897, the first presidential and vice presidential elections in Philippine history were held
although only Katipuneros (viz., members of the Katipunan) were able to take part, and not the general
populace. A later meeting of the revolutionary government established there, held on November 1, 1897
at Biak-na-Bato in the town of San Miguel de Mayumo in Bulacn, established the Republic of Biak-naBato. The republic had a constitution drafted by Isabelo Artacho and Flix Ferrer and based on the first
Cuban Constitution.[citation needed] It is known as the "Constitucin Provisional de la Repblica de
Filipinas", and was originally written in and promulgated in the Spanish and Tagalog languages.[8]

The 1899 Malolos Constitution[edit]

Constitution of the Philippines (1899)
The Malolos Constitution was the first republican constitution in Asia.[9] It declared that sovereignty
resides exclusively in the people, stated basic civil rights, separated the church and state, and called for
the creation of an Assembly of Representatives to act as the legislative body. It also called for a
parliamentary republic as the form of government. The president was elected for a term of four years by a
majority of the Assembly.[10] It was titled "Constitucin poltica", and was written in Spanish following
the declaration of independence from Spain,[11] proclaimed on January 20, 1899, and was enacted and
ratified by the Malolos Congress, a Congress held in Malolos, Bulacan.
Acts of the United States Congress[edit]
The Philippines was a United States Territory from December 10, 1898 to March 24, 1934[14] and
therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of the United States. Two acts of the United
States Congress passed during this period can be considered Philippine constitutions in that those acts
defined the fundamental political principles and established the structure, procedures, powers and duties
of the Philippine government.
Philippine Organic Act of 1902[edit]
The Philippine Organic Act of 1902, sometimes known as the "Philippine Bill of 1902", was the first
organic law for the Philippine Islands enacted by the United States Congress. It provided for the creation
of a popularly elected Philippine Assembly, and specified that legislative power would be vested in a
bicameral legislature composed of the Philippine Commission (upper house) and the Philippine Assembly
(lower house). Its key provisions included a bill of rights for the Filipinos and the appointment of two
non-voting Filipino Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to represent the Philippines in the United
States House of Representatives.
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916[edit]
The Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, sometimes known as "Jones Law", modified the structure of the
Philippine government by removing the Philippine Commission as the legislative upper house and
replacing it with a Senate elected by Filipino voters, creating the Philippines' first fully elected national
legislature. This act also explicitly stated that it was and had always been the purpose of the people of the

United States to end their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognise Philippine
independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein.
TydingsMcDuffie Act (1934)[edit]
Though not a constitution itself, the TydingsMcDuffie Act of 1934 provided authority and defined
mechanisms for the establishment of a formal constitution via a constitutional convention.
The 1935 Constitution[edit]
Constitution of the Philippines (1935)
The 1935 Constitution was written in 1934, approved and adopted by the Commonwealth of the
Philippines (19351946) and later used by the Third Republic (19461972). It was written with an eye to
meeting the approval of the United States Government as well, so as to ensure that the U.S. would live up
to its promise to grant the Philippines independence and not have a premise to hold onto its possession on
the grounds that it was too politically immature and hence unready for full, real independence.[citation
needed]
It was amended in 1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of a Senate and House of
Representatives, as well the creation of an independent electoral commission. The Constitution now
granted the President a four-year term with a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.

A Constitutional Convention was held in 1971 to rewrite the 1935 Constitution. The convention was
stained with manifest bribery and corruption. Possibly the most controversial issue was removing the
presidential term limit so that Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek election for a third term, which many felt
was the true reason for which the convention was called. In any case, the 1935 Constitution was
suspended in 1972 with Marcos' proclamation of martial law, the rampant corruption of the constitutional
process providing him with one of his major premises for doing so.
The 1943 Constitution[edit]
Constitution of the Philippines (1943)
Jos P. Laurel, President of the Second Philippine Republic, addresses the National Assembly at what is
now the Old Legislative Building to approve the 1943 Constitution.
The 1943 Constitution was drafted by a committee appointed by the Philippine Executive Commission,
the body established by the Japanese to administer the Philippines in lieu of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines which had established a government-in-exile. In mid-1942 Japanese Premier Hideki Tj had
promised the Filipinos "the honor of independence" which meant that the commission would be
supplanted by a formal republic.
The 1943 Constitution remained in force in Japanese-controlled areas of the Philippines, but was never
recognized as legitimate or binding by the governments of the United States or of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and guerrilla organizations loyal to them. In late 1944, President Laurel declared a state of
war existed with the United States and the British Empire and proclaimed martial law, essentially ruling
by decree. His government in turn went into exile in December 1944, first to Taiwan and then Japan.
After the announcement of Japan's surrender, Laurel formally dissolved the Second Republic.
The 1973 Constitution[edit]
The 1973 Constitution, promulgated after Marcos' declaration of martial law, was supposed to introduce a
parliamentary-style government. Legislative power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly whose
members were elected for six-year terms. The President was ideally elected as the symbolic and purely
ceremonial head of state chosen from amongst the Members of the National Assembly for a six-year term
and could be re-elected to an unlimited number of terms. Upon election, the President ceased to be a
Member of the National Assembly. During his term, the President was not allowed to be a member of a
political party or hold any other office.
From 1617 October 1976, a majority of barangay voters (also called "Citizen Assemblies") approved
that martial law should be continued and ratified the amendments to the Constitution proposed by
President Marcos.[17]

The 1973 Constitution was further amended in 1980 and 1981. In the 1980 amendment, the retirement
age of the members of the judiciary was extended to 70 years. In the 1981 amendments, the false
parliamentary system was formally modified into a French-style semi-presidential system:
executive power was restored to the President;
direct election of the President was restored;
While the 1973 Constitution ideally provided for a true parliamentary system, in practise, Marcos had
made use of subterfuge and manipulation in order to keep executive powers for himself, rather than
devolving these to the Assembly and the cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. The end result was that
the final form of the 1973 Constitution after all amendments and subtle manipulations was merely the

abolition of the Senate and a series of cosmetic rewordings. The old American-derived terminology was
replaced by names more associated with parliamentary government: for example, the House of
Representatives became known as the "Batasang Pambans" (National

The 1986 Freedom Constitution[edit]

Proclamation 3: Provisional Constitution of the Philippines (1986)
Immediately following the 1986 People Power Revolution that ousted Marcos, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation 3 as a provisional constitution. It adopted certain provisions from the
1973 Constitution while abolishing others. It granted the President broad powers to reorganise
government and remove officials, as well as mandating the president to appoint a commission to draft a
new, more formal Constitution. This document, described above, supplanted the "Freedom Constitution"
upon its ratification in 1987.

Challenges on the legality of the Constitution

?
Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality: 2 Views:
a. ORTHODOX VIEW i. an unconstitutional act is not a law; ii. it confers no rights;
iii. it imposes no duties; iv. it affords no protection; v. it creates no office; vi. it is
inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all.
b. MODERN VIEWCourts simply refuse to recognize the law and determine the
rights of the parties as if the statute had no existence. Certain legal effects of the
statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Thus, a
public officer who implemented an unconstitutional law prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality cannot be held liable (Ynot vs. IAC).
Partial Unconstitutionality Requisites: a. The legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE; and b. The valid portion can stand independently as
lawINDEPENDENCE OF THE PROVISIONS
Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution
Interpretation:
1. Verba Legiswhenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

2. When there is Ambiguityratio legis et anima--A doubtful provision shall be

examined in the light of the history of the times and the conditions and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. (Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317)
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereatthe Constitution has to be interpreted as a
whole. (Francisco vs. HR, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
availableconstrue the Constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper
interpretation, therefore, depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof.
In case of doubt, the provision should be considered as self-executing; mandatory
rather than directory; and prospective rather than retroactive.
Self-executing provisionone which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected.

PREAMBLE
WE, THE SOVEREIGN FILIPINO PEOPLE, IMPLORING THE AID OF ALMIGHTY GOD, IN
ORDER TO BUILD A JUST AND HUMANE SOCIETY AND ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT
THAT SHALL EMBODY OUR IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS, PROMOTE THE COMMON
GOOD, CONSERVE AND DEVELOP OUR PATRIMONY, AND SECURE TO OURSELVES
AND OUR POSTERITY THE BLESSINGS OF INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRACY UNDER
THE RULE OF LAW AND A REGIME OF TRUTH, JUSTICE, FREEDOM, LOVE, EQUALITY,
AND PEACE, DO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE THIS CONSTITUTION.
The Preamble is not a source of power or right for any department of government. It
sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. It bears witness to the
fact that the Constitution is the manifestation of the sovereign will of the Filipino
people.
The identification of the Filipino people as the author of the constitution calls
attention to an important principle: that the document is not just the work of
representatives of the people but of the people themselves who put their mark
approval by ratifying it in a plebiscite.
1. It does not confer rights nor impose duties.
2. Indicates authorship of the Constitution; enumerates the primary aims and
aspirations of the framers; and serves as an aid in the construction of the
Constitution.

FRANCISCO VS. HOR 2003 NOVEMBER

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August
2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law
or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue
was presented before it.
Held: The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide is concerned. The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction
or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here
is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly
and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the
other two great branches of the government.

Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner:

The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches:
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice courts
of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law
doctrine.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political

question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,

then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits.

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of
the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would
require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
HELD:
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus,
in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought
to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the
rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And
so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38
in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through
Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that
all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
GONZALES VS. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS 21 SCRA 774
Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. This
case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1
and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of
the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces
as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution,

the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives
to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on
June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, instituted the case as a class suit, for
and in behald of all citizen, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated, Gonzales
sought to restraint the Comelec from enforcing R.A. 4913 as the same was
unconstitutional and void. On the other hand, PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224 is a
civic, non-profit and nonpartisan organization the objective of which is to uphold
the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against crosions or
onslaughts form whatever source. Both cases raised identical issues and were thus
submitted for a joint decision
ISSUES: 1. Does congresss ( through ordinary legislative process) have the power to
amend or purpose amendment to the constitution?
2. May the proposed constitutional amendments be submitted to a
plebiscite schedule on the same day as the regular elections?
Held: 1. No the power to amed the constitution or to propose, amendments thereto
is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to congress (sec 1
art vi 1935 consti) it is part of the inherent power of the people as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican state , such as outs (sec.1 art 11
1935 constitution) - to make and hence, to amend their own fundamental
law.
Congress may propose amendments to the constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power (sec 1 art xv 1935 consti) hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that senators and members of the house of
representatives act., nots as members of the congress, but as component
elements of constituent assembly.
When acting as a constituent assembly, the members of the congress derive their
authority from the constitution,unlike the PEOPLE when performing the same
function, for their people authority does not emanate from the constitution as
they are the source of all powers of government including the constitution
itself

3. Yes the term election in art xv of the 1935 constitution does not indicate that
the election therein referrec to is a special not a general election. The
circumstances then obtaining it does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Petition is dismissed denied.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC 41 SCRA

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS: the constitutional convention concon of 1971 convened for the purpose of
proposing amendments to the 1935 constitution pursuant to resolutions 2 and 4 of
the joint session held on march 16,1967 and june 17,1969, respectively and by
virtue of the implementing legislation republic act 6132
Concon then approved organic resolution no 1 proposing the amendment of sec 1 of
art v of the constitution to lower the voting age of 21 to 18 the said resolution
scheduled the approval of the amendmend in a plebiscite to concide with the local
elections in nov 1971 with out prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed
in the future by the 1971 concon on other portions of the amended section or on
other portions of the entire consti
Petitioners now comes before the court to prohibit and restrain the respondent
comelec from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on nov 8 1971 at whih the proposed
constitutional amendment reducing the voting age to eighteen years shall be
submitted;; for ratification by the people because the aforesaid consti resolutions
are null and void for being violative of the consti of the phil
Issues: 1) does the court have jurisdiction to resolve whether or not a resolution of
congress acting a constituent assembly violates the constitution?
2) may concon validly call for a nadvance plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in organix resolution no. 1 before the rest of the draft of the consti then
under revision had been approved.
Held: 1) yes the issue is essentially justiciable not political and hence subject to
judicial review and to the extent that this view ay be inconsistent with the stant
taken in mabanag v lopez vito , the latter should be deemed modified accordingly
the members of congress when proposing as a constituent assembly, amendments
to the consti derive their authotity from the fundamental law, that it necessarily
follows that they do not have the final say on whether or not their arts are within or
beyong consti limits otherwise, they could brush aside and st the mae at naught
contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men and to the
rigid nature of consti.
The court does uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes
without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention

or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because
both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of
law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within
the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to
resolve the issues in which petitioner,
2) no the language of section 1 of art xv of the 1935 consti such amendment shall
be valid as parts of this consi when approved by the majority of the votes east at an
election at which the amendment submitted to the people with rafitication. In
equivocally says an election which means only one thus, leaving no room for
dought as to how many elections or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendments proposed by the same constituent of congress or convention
In providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finised, separely from the
whole draft of the consti it has been called to formulate. The convention organic
resolution 1 and all the subsequent acts convention implementingthe same violate
the condition in sec1 art xv that there should only be one election of plebescite for
the ratification of all the amendments the convention may purpose consequently
the proposed amendment should be submitted to them not separately from but
together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present convention.

Planas vs. Commission on Elections

[GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs.
Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National
Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs.
Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec
[GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979]
Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs
as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions

Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which

was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said
Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said
Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was
in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing
the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention
approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,
30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or

rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7

December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the
grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law
because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of
the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are,
by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical
actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued
an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose
of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the
President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until
7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite
scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said
General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17
December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the
events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled
to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to
Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority
to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably
could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative
to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal
Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided
"as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in
said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of
Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted
on certain public questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the
Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms
instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new
Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of
the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4]
The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the
existing Constitution despite Martial Law."

Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential
Decree 73.

Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a
legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one,
on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon
the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less
than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which
expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving
said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the
People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.

Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for
the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said
Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be
held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the
circumstances may justify.

Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the
people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.

Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not
been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases
having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners
in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to
the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental
Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately
argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve
such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible
under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering
the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and
academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which
to move in the premises.

Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the
result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the
legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of
the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic,
whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said
Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the
proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the
petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine
that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4)
Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the
proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold
the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law
affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar
as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion
that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the
1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the
petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra
are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the
factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of
the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly
raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b]
Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the
"purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum
among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the
requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances,
the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as
legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice
Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any
judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a
question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be
dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions.
Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case
No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable
period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest
the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of

said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he
believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits
everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are
dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30

Ponente:

Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion

The Facts:

The Plebiscite Case

A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines was

approved on August 24, 1970 and began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
On September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the
entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 73, submitting to the Filipino people for ratification
or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor, as well as setting the
plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January
15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on

Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any
manner, until further orders of the Court, upon the grounds, inter alia, that said
Presidential Decree has no force and effect as law because the calling of such
plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of
the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress and there is no proper submission to the people of said
Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech,
press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the
contents thereof.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for
the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the
proposed Constitution.

The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said
plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially.

In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed
an urgent motion, praying that said case be decided as soon as possible,
preferably not later than January 15, 1973.

The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to
comment on said urgent motion and manifestation, not later than Tuesday
noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion for hearing on January 17, 1973, at 9:30
a.m.

While the case was being heard, the President issued Proclamation No. 1102.

ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION

PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards

in chartered cities. The said Citizens Assemblies were established to broaden the
base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample
opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142, as a Filipino
citizen, and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself, and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated against the Executive Secretary
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said
respondents and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the
provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution

referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the President ordered the
immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the
latter are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed Constitution. He construed that the President is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the proposed Constitution; proclaim the
ratification; and that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a
free election, hence null and void.

The Issue:

Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and
therefore non-justiciable, question?
Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified
validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions?
Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people? (acquiesced permission given by silence or
passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making
objections.)
Are petitioners entitled to relief?
Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

Decision and Ratio:

The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the petition but when the
crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the
court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to
dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973
Constitution.

The Court held that the issue is political and beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.
Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly

registered voters. However, it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some

American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be
accorded recognition by the Court.

On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal
and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that The effectivity of the said
Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these
cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the
competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable.

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,

Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes
of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that As to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in
the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the
referendum in the Citizens Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein
were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.

However, the fact that there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for
considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, the people may be deemed to have
cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what
counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.

with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution
is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,

Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes
of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls
for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of
President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the
constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling
of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did
not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution
which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice
President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter
states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President
effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President,
their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and
prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an

injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in

as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the
actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue
more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the
people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO 1986

FACTS:
a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer,
quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of
Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the
Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII
of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of
action.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
he 1935 Constitution, the 1913 Constitution as amended, and the 1986 Draft
Constitution uniformly provide 'that boards of canvassers in each province and city
shall certified who were elected President and Vice President in their respective
areas. The certified returns are transmitted to the legislature which proclaims,
through the designated Presiding Head, who were duty elected.

Copies of the certified returns from the provincial and city boards of canvassers
have not been furnished this Court nor is there any need to do so. In the absence of
a legislature, we cannot assume the function of stating, and neither do we have any
factual or legal capacity to officially declare, who were elected President and Vice
President in the February 7, 1986 elections.

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986
Draft Constitution, we agree that there is no doubt the 1986 Constitutional
Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice President Salvador H.
Laurel.

Finally, we agree with the Resolution of the Court in G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and
73990.

For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS the instant petition.

The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602

Facts:
In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners as
Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B.
Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the
same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with
the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the
respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov.
Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall
serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen
of barangay dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo
antedated december 1, 1986 signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8,
1987, designating
Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and
similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid. Was the designation of the new Barangay
Officials valid?

Held:
The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987.
By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as
provided in Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
Wherefore, the designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from
ouster/take-over of petitioners position subject of this petition.

No, memoranda has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So,
February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was
no longer in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its
transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were
suspended.

4. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in

effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for
barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent
with constitution.
Permanency of a Constitution
The constitution is blue print governance. It is the duty of government to follow this blue print.
The constitution shows direction to the government. The government is likely to reach its goal if
it proceeds in that direction. The constitution advises the government to avoid disputes, and also
to disputes. Constitution is indispensable f administration of state. Administration would not be
smooth, fair and efficient in the absence of a constitution. The constitution is a record of the state
providing for rule of law.
Amendment - piecemeal or isolated change in the Constitution. It is the generic
term used to denote change in the Constitutio s
vs. Revision - revamp or rewriting of the entire Constitution. It means overhauling
of the government.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplate a re-examination of the entire document-or of provisions of the
document (which have overall implications for the entire document or for the
fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document)
-to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its
effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the
quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative
alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that

the use of the plural form of "amendments" means that a revision can be
achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity of amendments!
But the further question really is: Why only amendments? The answer, which one
can easily glean from the rather long deliberations on initiative and referendum
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to
formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated?
ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
Section 4.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

2 Stages of Amendment:
1. Proposal (Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII)-the adoption of the suggested change in the
Constitution. A proposed amendment may come from(3 ways of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the

Constitution under Article XVII):

(a) Congress i. (Sec. 1, Art. XVII) Acting as Constitutional Assembly and not as
a legislative body. -One of the non-legislative powers; ii. By a vote of 3/4 of all its
members. (3/4 of the Senate, 3/4 of the House of Representatives
(b) Constitutional Convention- which may be called into existence either: i. By
directly calling a Constitutional Convention by a 2/3 vote of all the Members of
Congress, or; ii. By submitting the issue to the people in a plebiscite [if the twothirds (2/3) vote is not obtained] by a majority vote of all the members of
Congress with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be
resolved by the people in a plebiscite. (Sec.3, Art. XVII) superior- people;
Theory of Conventional Sovereignty inferior- it is a mere creation of Congress;
co-equal to and independent of the 3 branches Occena vs. COMELEC 104
SCRA 1, the choice of method of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by
Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of
the legislature. (c) People, through the Power of Initiative (Sec.2, Art. XVII)- A
petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein --This is not a self-executing provision, it will require an enactment of law.
Occea V. COMELECG.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Facts:1. The petitioners, namely, Samuel Occea and Ramon Gonzales, members
of the Philippine BAR and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention are
suing as taxpayers.2. In the prohibition proceedings, they challenged the validity
of three(3) Batasang Pambansa Resolution, which consists of the following: (a)
Proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own alimited area of land for residential
purposes; (b) dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet,
and the National Assembly; (c) amendment to the article on the Commission on
Elections.
Issues:1. Whether or not the 1973 constitution is a fundamental law.2. Does the
Interim Batasang Pambansa have the power to propose amendments?3. What is
the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as a standard for proper
submission?
Held:1. Citing the case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary where they
dismissed the petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification with a vote of six(6) to four(4), the Supreme Court said: This being
the vote of majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new constitution
being considered in force and effect(in force and effect on January 17, 1973).
With such the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, and with the recognition of
the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to
respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts are resolved. The 1973 constitution isa
fundamental law.2. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang

Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision of the 1976 amendment is

quite explicit, which reads: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the
same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities,
rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."14 One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of
its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 3. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensibleproposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative bodyapplies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far
as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,
as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power
to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the
requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was
obtained. Resolution 1 was approved by a vote of 122 to 5; Resolution 2
RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Law
INITIATIVE-the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
*3 kinds of initiative: 1. initiative on the Constitution- refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution
2. initiative on statutes- refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation
3. initiative on local legislation- refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, municipal, city, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
[Sec.2(a),RA6735] Section 2 (b), RA 6735 provides for:
INDIRECT INITIATIVE- exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition
sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action; and
DIRECT INITIATIVE- the people themselves filed the petition with the COMELEC
and not with Congress

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for
Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to
amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,

which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power todirectly
propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and
thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator
Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several
arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onpeoples
initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is
limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the
term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples
initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the
conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3)
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision
or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementinglegislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non
delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the
latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise
of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that
of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A
revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision
in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or
amendment has become academic.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have the power under
RA 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2 (1), Article IX-C is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under Section 3 of Article IX-C or a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and
the sufficient standard tests. (Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106)

Article V S U F F R A G E
Section 1 Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen (18) years
of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Section 2 The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballots as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure
for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws
and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Right of Suffrage Right to vote in election of officers chosen by people and in the
determination of questions submitted to people.
ELECTIONis the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It is the means by which the people choose their officials for a
definite and fixed period and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise
of the powers of government.
Kinds: 1. REGULAR ELECTIONrefers to an election participated in by those who
possess the right of suffrage and not disqualified by law and who are registered
voters. It is the election of officers either nationwide or in certain subdivisions
thereof, after expiration of full term of the former members.
a. National Election i. for President and VPevery 6 years ii. for Senatorsevery
3 years
Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996, the SK Election is not a
regular election because the latter is participated in by youth with ages ranging
from 15-18, as per RA 9164, some of whom are not qualified voters to elect local or
national elective officials.
b. Local Elections i. For Members of HOR ii. Party-List Representatives iii.
Provincial Officials Every 3 years from the 2nd iv. City Officials Monday of
May 1992 v. Municipal Officials c. Barangay Elections every 3 years after July

2002 to be held on the last Monday of October, synchronized with the SK elections
d. ARRM Elections i. For Regional Governor ii. Regional Vice Governor
Every 3 years from March 1993 iii. Regional Assemblymen e. Sanggguniang
Kabataan (SK) Elections -- every 3 years after July 2002 to be held on the last
Monday of October, synchronized with the Barangay elections
2. SPECIAL ELECTIONwhen there is a failure of election on the scheduled date
of regular election in a particular place or which is conducted to fill up certain
vacancies, as provided by law. This is being held to fill any vacancy in an office
before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected.
a. Plebiscite electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people. P-eople power thru plebiscite and initiative(Sec. 32, ART VI; Sec. 10, Art. X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; RA 6735) Under the 1987
Constitution, there are specific provisions where the people have reserved to
themselves the function of legislation.
ALMARIO VS. ALBA
In January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to allow the voters to either approve
or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa.
The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be
answered by simple YES or NO answers.

Alex Almario and some other concerned groups seek to enjoin the submission in
the said plebiscite of Questions No. 3 (grant as an additional mode of
acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the
government of a land reform program and a social reform program) to the
people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and
proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC.

However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs COMELEC, Almario et al do not seek

to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people
to study the meaning and implications of the said questions/proposals until the
nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the
electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a

later date.

HELD: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of
the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate.
Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban land reform are
unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are

unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are
presented for their determination.

Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land
reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the
millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes.

Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter does
not know the meaning of grant of public land or of urban land reform.

b. Initiative power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution

or to propose and enact legislations through election called for the purpose i.
Initiative on the Constitution ii. Initiative on Statutes iii. Initiative on Local
Legislation c. Referendum power of the electorate to approve or reject a piece
of legislation through an election called for the purpose. i. Referendum on
Statutes ii. Referendum on Local Laws d. Recall mode of removal of an
elective public officer by the people before the end of his term of office
Components:
Choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote
Conduct of the polls
Listing of voters
Holding of electoral campaign
Act of casting and receiving the ballots from the voters
Counting he ballots
Making election returns
Proclaiming the winning candidates
COMMISSION ON ELECTION (COMELEC) The COMELEC is an independent
constitutional body charged with the exclusive power to administer and enforce
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections and other political
exercises, such as plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls.
The periodic political exercises give meaning to the declaration in the
Constitution that, sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.

Powers and Functions:

1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, referendum, initiative and recall.
2. Exercise a. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective provincial and city officials; b.
Appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving i. Elective municipal officials
decided by the trial courts of general jurisdiction ii. Elective barangay officials
decided by the trial courts of limited jurisdiction
Decisions, final orders, or ruling of the COMELEC on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final and executory, and not
appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the government, including the AFP for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Registration of political parties, organization, or coalition/accreditation of
citizens arms of the COMELEC.
6. File, upon verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for the
inclusion or exclusion of voters, investigate and where appropriate, prosecute
cases for violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
7. Recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and
to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to it. 9. Submit to the President and Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscites, initiative,
referendum, or recall.
POLITICAL PARTY A political party is any organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidate in public office. To acquire juridical personality and to entitle it to
rights and privileges granted to political arties, it must be registered with
COMELEC.

Party-List System Act (RA 7941) (See Discussions under the Legislative
Department)
VOTERS Qualifications:
1. Filipino citizen
2. At least 18 years of age on the day of the election
3. Resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately before the
election
4. Resident of the city/municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election
5. Not otherwise disqualified by law
Requisites of Acquisition of Domicile by Choice
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
2. An intention to remain there; an
d 3. An intention to abandon the old residence.
Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, the meaning and purpose of residency
requirementthe place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.

2. Ratification- (Sec. 4, Art. XVII) The proposed amendment shall become part of
the Constitution when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held
not earlier than 60 nor later than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by
Congress or the Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the
COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition for initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.
REFERENDUM- the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation
through an election called for that purpose.
Two (2) Classes: 1. Referendum on Statutes - refers to a petition to approve or
reject a law, or part thereof, passed by Congress
2. Referendum on Local Law - refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies Doctrine of Proper Submission (proper frame of reference) Because the
Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which the plebiscite is to be

held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time given to the people
to determine the merits and demerits of the proposed amendments is adequate.
The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections.
Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is now regarded as subject to
judicial review because invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the
constitutional provisions had been followed. (Sanidad vs. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333;
Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 50)
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19

of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989,
Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR
THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said
law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the
Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification
of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was,
however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226
dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A.
6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner
Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW"
for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of
Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During

the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because

it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news
correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a

columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his
opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes.
Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their
views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact
help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as
well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is

unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what
was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use
and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to
the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision
is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage
to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is
also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who
is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from
his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot
be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be
more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required
to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of
R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the
right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of
their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right
to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would
be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including

the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not
be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression
may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum
for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is

declared null and void and unconstitutional.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force
and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that
the president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as
such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1.

Is the case at bar justiciable?

2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the

Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the
time frame allowed sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the
constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question. The
president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers
are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for
deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short

especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have been
living with them since the proclamation of martial law.

Prohibited Measures: The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or

referendum 1. No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted
to the electorate; and 2. Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment
of which is specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject
of referendum until ninety (90) days after the effectivity. (Sec. 10, RA 6735)
Local Initiative: not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous
regions, 1,000 in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and
50 in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. (Sec. 13, RA 6735)
Limitations on Local Initiative:
a. The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year;
b. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact; and
c. If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt
in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, thos
against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative. Limitation on Local
Legislative Body vis--vis Local Initiative
Sec. 125, RA 7160any proposition or ordinance approved through an initiative
and referendum shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the Sangggunian
within 6 months from the date of approval thereof, and may be amended,
modified or repealed within 3 years thereafter by a vote of of all its members.
In case of barangays, the period shall be 18 months after approval.
Revision In the case of Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October
25, 2006, the SC held that a peoples initiative to change the Constitution
applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
Certainly, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul
two articlesArticle VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliam
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Sec. 1, Article II The
Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the

people and all government authority emanates from them. (Relate this to Article
XI)
1. Essential features: Representation and Renovation.
2. Manifestations: Ours is a government of law and not of men (Villavicencio
vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778). Rule of the majority. (Plurality in elections)
Accountability of public officials Bill of rights Legislature cannot pass
irrepealable laws. Separation of powers.
STATEa community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying
a definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a
government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (CIR
vs. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23)
State -is a legal or juristic concept nation-is an ethnic or racial concept
Elements of State:
1. People the inhabitants of the State; the # of which is capable for
selfsufficiency and self-defense; of both sexes for perpetuity. a. Inhabitants; b.
Citizens; c. Electors.
2. Territory a fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people
of the State.
3. Governmentthe agency or instrumentality through which the will of the
State is formulated, expressed and realized.
Government of the Philippinesrefers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various
arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
De Jure Has a rightful title but no power or control, either because the same
has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually entered into the
exercise thereof.
Defacto Actually exercises the power or control but without legal title.
a. De facto propergovernment that gets possession and control of, or usurps,
by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter;
b. b. Government of Paramount
Forcesestablished and maintained by the military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; c. Independent
Government established by the inhabitants of the country who rise in
insurrection against the parent State.
Functions of the government:

a. Constituent compulsory because constitutive of the society;

b. Ministrant undertaken to advance the general interest of the society;
merely optional.
Doctrine of Parens Patriaethe government as guardian of the rights of the
people may initiate legal actions for and in behalf of particular individual.
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738;
Cabaas vs. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94)
4. Sovereigntythe supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State
by which that State is governed.
It is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other
State.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as
a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws.
Government of Laws and Not of Men.sovereignty of the people also
includes the concept that government officials have only the authority given
them by law and defined by law, and such authority continues only with the
consent of the people.
Kinds of Sovereignty:
a. Legalthe power to issue final commands;
b. Politicalthe sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law;
c. Internalthe supreme power over everything within its territory;
d. Externalalso known as independencefreedom from external control.
Characteristics:
a. Permanence
b. Exclusiveness
c. Comprehensiveness
d. Absoluteness
e. Indivisibility
f. Inalienability
g. Imprescriptibility
Sovereignty, often referred to as Imperiumis the States authority to govern; it
includes passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it,
and defending it against foreign invasion. It is the government authority possessed
by the State expressed in the concept of sovereignty.
of treason, are suspended; municipal laws remain in force unless changed by the
belligerent occupant.

Principle of Jus Postliminiumat the end of the occupation, when the occupant is
ousted from the territory, the political laws which have been suspended shall
automatically become effective again. (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, No. L049,
November 12, 1945)
Effect of Change of Sovereigntypolitical laws of the former sovereign are
abrogated unless they are expressly reenacted by the affirmative act of the new
sovereign. Municipal laws remain in force. (Macariola vs. Asuncion, Adm. Case No.
133-J, May 31, 1982)
Effect of Revolutionary Governmentit is bound by no constitution. However, it did
not repudiate the Covenant or Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations
under international law. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers did not exceed
the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives or
orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003)
Jurisdictionis the manifestation of sovereignty.
a. Territorial power of the State over persons and things within its territory
subject to its control and protection
b. Personal power of the State over its nationals, which may be exercised by the
state even if the individual is outside the territory of the State.
c. Extraterritorial power of the State over persons, things or acts beyond its
territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory