Property Set 3

G.R. Nos.
L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY,
ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD,
TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA
UBINA, respondents.
Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the
west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of
Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo
Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919
the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao
Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was
issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by
defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually
eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting
of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the
Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by
the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents,
namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots
3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883,
7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot
3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began
his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was
planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were
overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's
Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was
approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession
was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. FBinayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No.
343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of Maria
Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of
Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the
Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was
defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. EMelad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land
possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River
changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the
process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo
Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina
whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or
Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they
had to cross the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their
tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the
eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of
Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove
away the private respondents from the premises.
recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent
Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No.
344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby made:
In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding
Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto
Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody
acting as their representative[s] or agents
to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre
together with its accretion consisting of
portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of
Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these
defendants to restore ownership in favor
of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who
are the only interested heirs of Macario
Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding
defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor,
Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor
Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo
Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias
Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo
Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin,
Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan
Langoay, or any of their agents or
representatives to vacate the Lots 3349,
7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881,
7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892,
together with its accretion and to restore
possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and
Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement
as to damages which were not properly
proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order
dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25,
Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil
Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T, only
defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero
Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan
Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private
respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending
appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against
Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their
appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at
the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court
rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the
trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners
allege that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question
had become part of private respondents'
estate as a result of accretion;
On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and

Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to
PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)
2. in declaring that the accretion to

323667694.docrespondents' estate which
used to pertain to petitioners' estate
cannot preclude the private respondents
from being the owners thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of
private respondents over the accretion is
not affected by the sudden and abrupt
change in the course of the Cagayan River
when it reverted to its old bed
The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been
accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not
lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were
separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of
course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on
this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters. (366)
area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was

issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in
1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been
added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent
issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original
area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through
alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east.
These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose
lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The
reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on
streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they
are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may
prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be
compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567).itc-asl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their
lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of
the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred
said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the
river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to
this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river,
creek or torrent segregates from an estate
on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of
the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it,
provided that he removes the same within
two years.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following

requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs.
CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for,
as the trial court found:
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year
from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49
years. Within this period, the alluvium
(sic) deposited on the other side has
become greater in area than the original
lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still
the addition in every year is imperceptible
in nature, one could not discern it but can
be measured after the lapse of a certain
time. The testimonial evidence in these
cases that said Cagayan River moved
eastward year by year is overwhelming as
against the denial of defendant Eulogio
Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time
mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo
Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so.
Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic
Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he
testified that when Solana Cadastre was
executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of
Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919.
This could not have happened if that part
of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded
by the overflow of the Cagayan River.
These testimonies cannot be destroyed by
the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo
Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p.
27, Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the
western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from
1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual
and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river

divides itself into branches, leaving a
piece of land or part thereof isolated, the
owner of the land retains his ownership.
He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current.
(Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of
the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon
in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private
respondents to be "separated from the estate by
the current." The private respondents have
retained the ownership of the portion that was
transferred by avulsion to the other side of the
river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31163
November 6, 1929
URBANO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE C. BERNABE, ET AL., defendants.
PABLO TIONGSON and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
BULACAN, appellants.
Arcadio Ejercito and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for
appellants.
Eusebio Orense And Nicolas Belmonte for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the defendants Pablo Tiongson
and the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan from the judgment of
the Court of First of said province, wherein said defendant
Pablo Tiongson was ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano
Santos the value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay, at the
rate of P3 per cavan, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the
following alleged errors committed by the lower court in its
judgment, to wit:
1. The court erred in holding that it has been
proved that in the cavans of palay attached by the
herein defendant Pablo Tiongson from the
defendant Jose C. Bernabe were included those
claimed by the plaintiff in this cause.
2. The court erred in ordering the defendant Pablo
Tiongson to pay the plaintiff the value of 778
cavans and 38 kilos of palay, the refund of which is
claimed by said plaintiff.
3. The court erred in denying the defendants'
motion for a new trial.1awphil.net
The following facts were conclusively proved at the trial:
On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in Jose C.
Bernabe's warehouse by the plaintiff Urbano Santos 778
cavans and 38 kilos of palay and by Pablo Tiongson 1,026
cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain.
On said date, March 20, 1928, Pablo Tiongson filed with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Jose
C. Bernabe, to recover from the latter the 1,026 cavans and
9 kilos of palay deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At
the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ
of attachment was granted, and the attachable property of
Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of
palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached,
sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to
said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in
said case.
The herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the
attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing
the proper bond, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment,
giving rise to the present complaint.
It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos
and those of Pablo Tiongson, deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse, bore any marks or signs, nor were they
separated one from the other.
The plaintiff-appellee Urbano Santos contends that Pablo
Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans and 31 kilos of
palay attached by the defendant sheriff as part of those
deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, because,
in asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly
acknowledged that the same belonged to Jose C. Bernabe
and not to him.
In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C.

Bernabe, civil case No. 3665 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, it is alleged that said plaintiff deposited in the
defendant's warehouse 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay,
the return of which, or the value thereof, at the rate of P3
per cavan was claimed therein. Upon filing said complaint,
the plaintiff applied for a preliminary writ of attachment of
the defendant's property, which was accordingly issued, and
the defendant's property, including the 924 cavans and 31
kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were
attached.
It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson
against Jose C. Bernabe is that provided in section 262 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for the delivery of personal
property. Although it is true that the plaintiff and his
attorney did not follow strictly the procedure provided in
said section for claiming the delivery of said personal
property nevertheless, the procedure followed by him may
be construed as equivalent thereto, considering the
provisions of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the
effect that "the provisions of this Code, and the proceedings
under it, shall be liberally construed, in order to promote its
object and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of
section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the writ of
attachment applied for by Pablo Tiongson against the
property of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as a claim for
the delivery of the sacks of palay deposited by the former
with the latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay belonging to the
plaintiff Urbano Santos, having been mixed with the 1,026
cavans and 9 kilos of palay belonging to the defendant
Pablo Tiongson in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse; the sheriff
having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay in
said warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof; and
there being no means of separating form said 924 cavans
and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and those
belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed in
article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is
applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things
of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the
things cannot be separated without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him,
according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined,
we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay
which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano
Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and
Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the
value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified,
and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at the
rate of P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-20851
September 3, 1966
JESUS AGUIRRE, petitioner,

vs.
VICTOR S. PHENG, in his capacity as General Manager

of the LEONORA & COMPANY, and NATIONAL
SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, respondents.
Sisenando Villaluz for petitioner.
M. C. Virata for respondent National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation.
BARRERA, J.:
Antecedents.On June 28, 1954, Vicente Aldaba and Teresa
V. Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel tank
with a capacity of 5,000 gallons, for the sum of P900.00, for
which the latter delivered to the sellers duly endorsed,
Security Bank & Trust Company check No. 281912, in the
amount of P900.00. Aguirre, however, failed to, take
physical possession of the tank, having been prevented
from doing so by the municipal authorities of Los Baos,
Laguna (where the tank was located), in view of the claim of
ownership being made by the Bureau of Public Highways. It
appears, however, that Vicente and Teresa Aldaba again
sold the same tank on December 2, 1954 to Zosimo Gabriel,
for P900.000. Gabriel, in turn, sold it to the Leonora &
Company on December 5, 1954, for P2,500.00. After some
alterations and improvements made on the tank, Leonora &
Company was able to sell the tank to National Shipyards &
Steel Corporation (Nassco), for P14,500.00. 1
Aguirre immediately filed with Nassco a formal notice of his
claim of ownership of the tank, as a consequence of which,
payment of the purchase price to Leonora & Company was
suspended. Then, Aguirre instituted Civil Case No. 24914 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, against Leonora &
Company and the Aldabas, for delivery to him of the tank,
with damages. On the other hand, because of the
suspension of payment of the purchase price, Leonora &
Company filed Civil Case No. 27988, against the Nassco,
praying for the delivery of the purchase price of P14,500.00,
or the reimbursement of the sum of P2,299.00 allegedly
representing the actual investment and expenses made and
incurred to put the tank in usable condition. Jesus Aguirre
intervened in this proceeding. These two cases were jointly
heard by the trial court.
Thereafter, decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 24914,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
declares Jesus Aguirre the absolute owner of the
property described in his complaint. The
subsequent sale made by defendants Aldaba to
Zosimo Gabriel, the sale made by Zosimo Gabriel
to defendant Leonora and Co.; and the sale made
by defendant Leonora and Co. to the National
Shipyards and Steel Corporation, are hereby
declared null and void and of no effect. Defendants
Aldaba and Leonora and Co. and the National
Shipyards and Steel Corporation, are hereby
ordered to deliver to plaintiff Jesus Aguirre the tank
in question. Failure to make such delivery,
defendant National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation, in whose possession the tank is at
present, shall pay to the said Jesus Aguirre the
original purchase price of the tank in the amount of
P900.00.
No appeal having been perfected on time, this decision
became final.
In Civil Case No. 27988, the court rendered decision based

on a stipulation of facts by the parties, wherein the
existence of Civil Case No. 24914 was admitted, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
Intervenor Jesus Aguirre, as we have already
declared in Civil Case No. 24914, is hereby
adjudged owner of the oil tank in question.
Defendant National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation is hereby ordered to deliver to the said
Jesus Aguirre such tank, but in the event that
delivery is not possible, to pay to Aguirre the
purchase price of P900.00, and to Leonora and Co.
the amount of P11,299.00 which represents the
costs of the improvements made by the said
Leonora & Co.
In the event that the National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation shall deliver the oil tank to Jesus
Aguirre as it is, the latter shall pay to Leonora and
Co. the amount of P11,299.00 which, as already
stated, was spent by Leonora and Co. for the
improvement of the tank.
From this decision, Aguirre perfected an appeal to the Court
of Appeals.
The present case.On January 9, 1963, the Court of
Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment of the
lower court in Civil Case No. 27988, to return to intervenor
Aguirre the sum of P900.00 in case delivery of the tank to
him will not be possible
because this was all the amount that Aguirre had
parted with when he purchased said tank. It was
Leonora & Co. who had 5 spent the sum of
P11,299.00 for the rehabilitation of said tank and
against this amount Aguirre has no rightful claim
whatsoever. Of course, in the event of delivery of
the tank to Aguirre as improved, it would be just for
him to reimburse Leonora & Co. the sum of
P11,299.00. The trial court, therefore, acted
properly in denying Aguirre's claim to be paid the
fair and reasonable value of the tank as improved
in case the same could no longer be delivered to
him.
Aguirre filed the present petition for review, alleging that
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, ordering the return to
him of the sum of P900.00 (when the value of the property
is at least P14,500.00), nullifies the declaration of his
ownership of the tank. He contends that under Article 440
of the Civil Code, his ownership of the property entitles him
to everything that is produced thereby, or is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. Thus, he
reiterates the claim to the fair and reasonable value of the
tank at the time of its delivery to Nassco which is
P14,500.00.
It is clear that we have here a case of accession by
specification: Leonora and Company, as purchaser acting in
good faith, spending P11,299.00 for the reconditioning of
the tank which is later adjudged to belong to petitioner
Aguirre. There is no showing that without the works made
by Leonora & Company, the tank in its original condition
when Aguirre paid P900.00 therefor, would command the
price of P14,500 which Nassco was willing to pay. Although
ordinarily, therefore, Aguirre, as owner of the tank, would be

entitled to any accession thereto, the rule is different where
the works or improvements or the accession was made on
the property by one who acted in good faith. 2 And, it is not
contended that the making of the improvements and
incurring of expenses amounting to P11,299.00 by Leonora
& Company was done in bad faith. Furthermore, to uphold
petitioner's contention that he is entitled to the sum of
P14,500.00 the price of the tank in its present condition,
would be to allow him to enrich himself at the expense of
another. The lower courts, therefore, acted correctly in
ordering the reimbursement to Leonora & Company of the
expenses it made on the tank.1awphl.nt
It must also be remembered that the judgment in Civil Case
No. 24914 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein
Nassco was directed to pay to Aguirre the of P900.00, in
case delivery of the same tank is no longer possible, has
already become final. This ruling cannot be disregarded in
the present proceeding which involves the same parties and
practically the same issue, arising from the same set of
facts.
Nassco cannot also be compelled to pay more than
P14,500.00 for the tank, the bid offered by Leonora &
Company and accepted by this buyer, and which must be
the actual market value of the property at the time of its
delivery to the latter. It has nothing to do at all with the
various transactions or sales and the deprivation of
Aguirre's right to possession of the tank, which culminated
in this legal suit.
Wherefore finding no error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals under review, the present petition is hereby
dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 104813 October 21, 1993
HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA,
VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O.
ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR,
SERILINA G. JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G.
MANALO, MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR, GAUDENCIO
GLOR and CORNELIO GLOR, respondents.
Natalio T. Paril, Jr. for petitioners.
Leovigildo L. Cerilla for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30542, affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon
ordering the defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga (petitioners
herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs,
heirs of Cornelia Glor (now private respondents),and to pay
attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C-883) filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor
and her children against the heirs of Jose Olviga for
reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring 54,406 square
meters (5.44 has), more or less, known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of
the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision.
The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the

private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and considering the
foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the PLAINTIFFS and against the
defendants as heirs of Jose Olviga to
reconvey the land in dispute to the
plaintiffs as heirs of Cornelio Glor Sr.;
condemning the defendants jointly and
severally to pay the plaintiffs attorneys
fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the
suit. The counterclaim interposed by
defendants is dismissed. ( p. 12, Rollo.)
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the
defendants who raised several factual issues regarding
possession and fraud, as well as legal issues involving
prescription and purchaser in good faith, but the appellate
court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.
It was established by the evidence on record that the land in
question was, in 1950, still forest land when Eutiquio
Pureza, then only twelve years old, and his father cleared
and cultivated it. In 1954, they introduced improvements
such as, coconut trees, jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and
bananas. When the area was released for disposition, the
Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in 1956 in the name of
Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land has been known as Lot
13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision.
Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the
latter, protested the survey but without respect to a onehalf-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng AmihananSilanganan." This protest or "tutol" (Exh. B) of Godofredo
Olviga, brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga
Olila, is of public record in the Bureau of Lands (Exh. B). In
said document, Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that
the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare
portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included in
the survey of Pureza's Lot 13.
In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over
Lot 13. Without his application having been acted upon, he
transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelia Glor in 1961.
Neither the homestead application of Eutiquio nor the
proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was acted
upon by the Director of Lands for reasons that the records of
the Bureau of Lands do not disclose.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in
a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and
his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family who were the
real and actual occupants of the land.
What must have happened as found by the Court of
Appeals, is that since Cornelio Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his
wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor, was unschooled, they
failed to follow up Pureza's homestead application over Lot
13 in the cadastral proceedings in the Municipal Court of
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-84, Case 1
(Philcusa-Foa). In fact, they were not aware of the
proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that no notice was ever
posted on Lot 13 about the proceedings nor did the
barangay captain, tell her about them. Neither did she
receive any notice from the court sheriff or any court
employee. This non-posting of the hearing of the cadastral
hearing on the land, or in the barangay hall, was confirmed
by petitioner Virgilio Olviga himself who testified that he did
not notice any papers posted on the property in question
(tsn, October 18, 1990, pp. 83-84). On the other hand,
petitioner's father Jose Olviga, claimed both Lots 12 and 13,

which are adjoining lots, in the same cadastral proceedings.
He falsely omitted in his answer mention of the fact that
other persons were in possession of, and claiming adverse
interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for
Eutiquio Pureza, the former occupant who sold his interests
to private respondents' parent. Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor
was Olviga's neighbor. As a result, both Lots 12 and 13 were
declared as uncontested in the name of Jose Olviga (Exh. 7),
and were registered in his name in 1967 in Original
Certificate of Title, No. 0-12713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga
requested that OCT No. 0-12713 be split into two (2) TCT's,
one each for the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T103824 were issued for lots 12 and 13, respectively. Jose
Olviga later transferred Lot 13 to his son-in-law, Jaime Olila
and daughter, Lolita Olviga resulting in the cancellation of
TCT. No. 241314 in the names of the spouses (Exh. 3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and
Lolita Olviga Olila, were not innocent purchasers for value of
the land from their father, and have never been in the
possession. The Glors and their predecessor-in-interest
(Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio Pureza) were the ones found
to be in possession of the property.
From said finding, and conclusions, the appellate court in its
decision dated January 13, 1992, resolved the issues
presented, thus:
. . ., whether or not plaintiffs' action is
really one for quieting of title that does
not prescribe; or assuming that their
demand for reconveyance of the lot in
question prescribes in ten years, being
based on an implied trust, whether their
cause of action should be counted from
the date of the issuance of the late Jose
Olviga's title over said lot in 1967 and has,
therefore, already prescribed, or whether
the prescriptive period should be counted
from the date plaintiffs acquired
knowledge of said title sometime in 1988.
The first question should be answered in
the affirmative. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
But even assuming that plaintiffs' action
for reconveyance, being based on an
implied or constructive trust, prescribes in
ten years, the lower court again correctly
ruled that their cause of action should be
considered to have accrued not from the
date of registration of the title of Jose
Olviga, defendants' predecessor-ininterest, over the lot in question in 1967,
but only from the time the plaintiffs
learned of such title in 1988. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not
err in holding that plaintiffs' action against
defendants-appellants for the
reconveyance of the lot in question filed
on April 10, 1989, or in less than a year
after they learned of the issuance of a title
over said lot to Jose Olviga, predecessor-
in-interest of defendants, has not yet

prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
herein is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against defendants-appellants. (pp. 48-51,
Rollo.)
Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They
allege that the present action has already prescribed; (2)
the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the private
respondents' cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in
1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to
consider that private respondents as mere homestead
transferees cannot maintain an action for reconveyance; (4)
that the Faja and Caragay-Layno cases have no bearing and
direct application to the case at bar; and (5) that private
respondents have not proven by preponderance of evidence
their ownership and possession of the disputed land.
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled
a number of times before an action for reconveyance of a
parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal
vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.
In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 686-687, appellants'
predecessors sold to appellees in 1931 a parcel of land. The
sale was approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao but
was never registered. Possession of the land was, however,
transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in possession
thereof from 1931 up to the present. The widow and
children of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover the land.
This Court in affirming the validity of the sale in favor of
appellee (Fabiana) held:
No enforcement of the contract is in fact
needed, since the delivery of possession
of the land sold had consummated, the
sale and transferred title to the purchaser,
registration of the contract not being
indispensable as between the parties.
Actually the action for conveyance was
one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud
cast upon appellee's ownership by the
refusal of the appellants to recognize the
sale made by their predecessors. This
action accrued only when appellants
initiated their suit to recover the land in
1954. Furthermore, it is an established
rule of American jurisprudence (made
applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480
of the New Civil Code) that actions to
quiet title to property in the possession of
the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am.
Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930;
Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County,
138 Wash. 439 245 Pac. 14).
In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court
likewise reiterated the ruling that:
. . . There is settled jurisprudence that one
who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be owner thereof may

wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the
aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his own
title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession. No better
situation can be conceived at the moment
for Us to apply this rule on equity than
that of herein petitioners whose mother,
Felipa Faja, was in possession of the
litigated property for no less than 30
years and was suddenly confronted with a
claim that the land she had been
occupying and cultivating all these years,
was titled in the name of a third person.
We hold that in such situation the right to
quiet title to the property, to seek its
reconveyance and annul any certificate of
title covering it, accrued only from the
time in possession was made aware of a
claim adverse to his own, and it is only
then that the statutory period of
prescription commences to run against
possessor.
In the case at bar, private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the
property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave
them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of
petitioners, who in 198 disturbed their possession.
The other issues raised in the petition are factual.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based
their findings of tact on the testimonies of the parties and
their witnessess. It can be said therefore that those
conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No cogent
reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of
decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its
own findings of facts different from those of the trial court
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Vda. de Cailles vs.
Mayuga 170 SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of TML
Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In petitions for
review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction
of this Court is confined to a review of questions of law,
except when the findings of fact are not supported by the
records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a
serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 158
SCRA 307; Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC,
144 SCRA 705). The case at bar does not fall under the
exceptions.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED, with
costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167848
April 27, 2007
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. PRUDENCIO SAN PABLO, JR., and NATIVIDAD O.
SAN PABLO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
Bank of Commerce seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10 September 2004,
and its Resolution2 dated 10 March 2005. The Court of
Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution reversed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,
Branch 56 dated 25 June 2002, which affirmed the
Decision,4 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mandaue
City, Branch 2, dismissing for lack of merit the complaint
against Melencio Santos (Santos) and the Bank of
Commerce filed by the respondent Spouses Prudencio
(Prudencio) and Natividad (Natividad) San Pablo for the
declaration of nullity of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
and cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage. The dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for review is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, Mandaue City, Cebu, in Civil Case 4135-A must
be as they are hereby, SET ASIDE. We therefore declare the
so-called Special Power of Attorney, the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage and the Foreclosure proceedings to be NULL and
VOID ab initio. And, in the meantime, if the subject Lot No.
1882-C-1-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(26469)-7561 has been sold and a new transfer certificate
of title had been issued, let the Registry of deeds of
Mandaue City cancel the new title and issue a new one in
favor of Natividad O. San Pablo, unless the new title holder
is a purchaser in good faith and for value. In the latter case,
respondent Bank of Commerce and respondent Melencio G.
Santos are hereby held jointly and severally liable to
petitioners for the fair market value of the property as of the
date of finality of this decision. Moreover, private
respondents are likewise held jointly and severally liable to
petitioners P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P25,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per count
appearance as attorneys fees and P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses. No costs.
The antecedent factual and procedural facts of this case are
as follows:
On 20 December 1994, Santos obtained a loan from Direct
Funders Management and Consultancy Inc., (Direct Funders)
in the amount of P1,064,000.40.5
As a security for the loan obligation, Natividad executed a
SPA6 in favor of Santos, authorizing the latter to mortgage to
Direct Funders a paraphernal real property registered under
her name and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. (26469)-75617 (subject property).
In the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage8 executed in favor of
Direct Funders, Natividad and her husband, Prudencio,
signed as the co-mortgagors of Santos. It was, however,
clear between the parties that the loan obligation was for
the sole benefit of Santos and the spouses San Pablo merely
signed the deed in order to accommodate the former.
The aforesaid accommodation transaction was made
possible because Prudencio and Santos were close friends
and business associates. Indeed, Prudencio was an
incorporator and a member of the Board of Directors of
Intergems Fashion Jewelries Corporation (Intergems), a
domestic corporation in which Santos acted as the

President.
Sometime in June 1995, the spouses San Pablo received a
letter from Direct Funders informing them that Santos failed
to pay his loan obligation with the latter. When confronted
with the matter, Santos promised to promptly settle his
obligation with Direct Funders, which he actually did the
following month.
Upon learning that Santos debt with Direct Funders had
been fully settled, the spouses San Pablo then demanded
from Santos to turn over to them the TCT of the subject
property but the latter failed to do so despite repeated
demands. Such refusal prompted the spouses San Pablo to
inquire as to the status of the TCT of the subject property
with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and to their
surprise, they discovered that the property was again used
by Santos as collateral for another loan obligation he
secured from the Bank of Commerce.
As shown in the annotation stamped at the back of the title,
the spouses San Pablo purportedly authorized Santos to
mortgage the subject property to the Bank of Commerce, as
evidenced by the SPA allegedly signed by Natividad on 29
March 1995. It was further shown from the annotation at the
back of the title that the spouses San Pablo signed a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in favor
of Bank of Commerce, which they never did.9
In order to free the subject property from unauthorized
encumbrances, the spouses San Pablo, on 22 December
1995, filed a Complaint seeking for the Quieting of Title and
Nullification of the SPA and the deed of real estate
mortgage with the prayer for damages against Santos and
the Bank of Commerce before the MTC of Mandaue City,
Branch 2.
In their complaint, the spouses San Pablo claimed that their
signatures on the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
allegedly executed to secure a loan with the Bank of
Commerce were forged. They claimed that while the loan
with the Direct Funders was obtained with their consent and
direct participation, they never authorized the subsequent
loan obligation with the Bank of Commerce.
During the pendency of the case, the Bank of Commerce,
for non-payment of the loan, initiated the foreclosure
proceedings on the strength of the contested Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage. During the auction sale, the Bank of
Commerce emerged as the highest bidder and thus a
Certificate of Sale was issued under its name. Accordingly,
the spouses San Pablo amended their complaint to include
the prayer for annulment of the foreclosure sale. 10
In his Answer,11 Santos countered that the loan with the
Bank of Commerce was deliberately resorted to with the
consent, knowledge and direct participation of the spouses
San Pablo in order to pay off the obligation with Direct
Funders. In fact, it was Prudencio who caused the
preparation of the SPA and together with Santos, they went
to the Bank of Commerce, Cebu City Branch to apply for the
loan. In addition, Santos averred that the spouses San Pablo
were receiving consideration from Intergems for extending
accommodation transactions in favor of the latter.
For its part, Bank of Commerce filed an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim,12 alleging that the spouses San
Pablo, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Santos,
together with Intergems, obtained a loan in the amount of
P1,218,000.00. It denied the allegation advanced by the

spouses San Pablo that the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were spurious. Since the loan already became due
and demandable, the Bank of Commerce sought the
foreclosure of the subject property.
After the Pre-Trial Conference, trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, Anastacio Barbarona, Jr., the Manager of the
Bank of Commerce, Cebu City Branch, testified that the
spouses San Pablo personally signed the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in his presence.13 The testimony of a
document examiner and a handwriting expert, however,
belied this claim. The expert witness, after carefully
examining the loan documents with the Bank of Commerce,
attested that the signatures of the spouses San Pablo on the
SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were forged. 14
On 10 July 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision, 15 dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit. The MTC declared that while
it was proven that the signatures of the spouses San Pablo
on the loan documents were forged, the Bank of Commerce
was nevertheless in good faith. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant complaint is
hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit. The dismissal
of this case is without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate criminal action against those responsible for the
falsification of the questioned special power of attorney and
deed of real estate mortgage.
Aggrieved, the spouses San Pablo appealed the adverse
decision to the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, which, in
turn, affirmed the unfavorable ruling of the MTC in its
Decision16 promulgated on 25 June 2002. The decretal part
of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
resolves to affirm the assailed Decision.
Similarly ill-fated was the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the spouses San Pablo which was denied by the RTC for
lack of merit.17
Unyielding, the spouses San Pablo elevated the matter
before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court,18 assailing the
adverse decisions of the MTC and RTC.
In a Decision19 dated 10 September 2004, the appellate
court granted the petition filed by the spouses San Pablo
and reversed the decisions of the MTC and RTC. In setting
aside the rulings of the lower courts, the Court of Appeals
ruled that since it was duly proven that the signatures of the
spouses San Pablo on the loan documents were forged, then
such spurious documents could never become a valid
source of title. The mortgage contract executed by Santos
over the subject property in favor of Bank of Commerce,
without the authority of the spouses San Pablo, was
therefore unenforceable, unless ratified.
The Bank of Commerce is now before this Court assailing
the adverse decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.20 For
the resolution of this Court are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR

THE CASE FILED BY THE SPOUSES SAN PABLO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FORGED SPA AND SPECIAL POWER
OF ATTORNEY COULD BECOME A VALID SOURCE OF A RIGHT
TO FORECLOSE A PROPERTY.
III.
the property as he deems best (citation omitted). Such

remedy may be availed of under the circumstances
enumerated in the Civil Code:
"ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title,
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARDS OF DAMAGES, ATTRONEYS

FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES ARE PROPER IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from

being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein."
In questioning the adverse ruling of the appellate court, the

Bank of Commerce, for the first time in more than 10 years
of pendency of the instant case, raises the issue of
jurisdiction. It asseverates that since the subject matter of
the case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the complaint
for quieting of title and annulment of the SPA, the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings should
have been originally filed with the RTC and not with the
MTC. The decision rendered by the MTC, which did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, is
therefore void from the very beginning. Necessarily, the
Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition
when the tribunal originally trying the case had no authority
to try the issue.
The mortgage of the subject property to the Bank of

Commerce, annotated on the Spouses San Pablos TCT,
constitutes a cloud on their title to the subject property,
which may, at first, appear valid and effective, but is
allegedly invalid or voidable for having been made without
their knowledge and authority as registered owners. We
thus have established that the case filed by the spouses
San Pablo before the MTC is actually an action for quieting
of title, a real action, the jurisdiction over which is
determined by the assessed value of the property. 22 The
assessed value of the subject property located in Mandaue
City, as alleged in the complaint, is P4,900.00, which aptly
falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
We do not agree.
Upon cursory reading of the records, we gathered that the
case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC was an
action for quieting of title, and nullification of the SPA, Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings. While
the body of the complaint consists mainly of allegations of
forgery, however, the primary object of the spouses San
Pablo in filing the same was to effectively free the title from
any unauthorized lien imposed upon it.
Clearly, the crux of the controversy before the MTC chiefly
hinges on the question of who has the better title over the
subject property. Is it the spouses San Pablo who claim that
their signatures on the loan document were forged? Or is it
the Bank of Commerce which maintains that the SPA and
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were duly executed and,
therefore, a valid source of its right to foreclose the subject
property for non-payment of loan?
An action for quieting of title is a common law remedy for
the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property. As clarified by this Court in
Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals21 :
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to
secure " an adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is
invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under
him may be forever afterward free from any danger or
hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the complainant and other claimants, " not only
to place things in their proper place, to make the one who
has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the
other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has
the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce
the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse
According to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as

amended, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.0) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (As amended, R.A.
No. 7691.)
Even granting for the sake of argument that the MTC did not
have jurisdiction over the case, the Bank of Commerce is
nevertheless estopped from repudiating the authority of the
court to try and decide the case after having actively
participated in the proceedings before it and invoking its
jurisdiction by seeking an affirmative relief therefrom.
As we have explained quite frequently, a party may be
barred from raising questions of jurisdiction when estoppel
by laches has set in. Estoppel by laches is failure or neglect
for unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
what, by exercising due diligence, ought to have been done
earlier, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it has either abandoned it or has acquiesced to the
correctness or fairness of its resolution. This doctrine is
based on grounds of public policy which, for the peace of
the society, requires the discouragement of stale claims,

and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally an issue of inequity or unfairness in
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or espoused. 23
In Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., we thus ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time,
"this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In
the instant case, respondent actively participated in all
stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked
its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly,
respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts
jurisdiction, especially when the adverse judgment is
rendered.24
Participation in all stages before the trial court, that
included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, effectively bars the party by estoppel from
challenging the courts jurisdiction.25 The Court frowns upon
the undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.26
We now proceed to resolve the issue of whether a forged
SPA or Deed of Real Estate Mortgage could be a source of a
valid title. Settled is the fact, as found by the MTC and as
affirmed by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals, that the
SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage had been forged.
Such fact is no longer disputed by the parties. Thus, the
only issue remaining to be threshed out in the instant
petition is whether the Bank of Commerce is a mortgagee in
good faith. The MTC and the RTC held that the Bank of
Commerce acted in good faith in entering into the loan
transaction with Santos, while the Court of Appeals, on the
other hand, ruled otherwise.
The Bank of Commerce posits that it is a mortgagee in good
faith and therefore entitled to protection under the law. It
strenuously asserts that it is an innocent party who had no
knowledge that the right of Santos to mortgage the subject
property was merely simulated.
In Cavite Development Bank v. Spouses Lim, 27 the Court
explained the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, thus:
There is, however, a situation where, despite the fact that
the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property,
his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising there from are given effect by
reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of "the
mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by the Torrens Certificates of
Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. The public
interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of
title, as evidence of lawful ownership of the land or of any
encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who,
in good faith, relied upon what appears on the face of the
certificate of title.
Indeed, a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the
certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as
security, and in the absence of any sign that might arouse
suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake
further investigation. This doctrine pre-supposes, however,
that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the
property, has already succeeded in obtaining Torrens title
over the property in his name and that, after obtaining the
said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to

another who relies on what appears on the title. This is not
the situation in the case at bar since Santos was not the
registered owner for he merely represented himself to be
the attorney-in-fact of the spouses San Pablo.
In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with
the registered owner of real property, the law requires that
a higher degree of prudence be exercised by the
mortgagee. As we have enunciated in the case of Abad v.
Guimba:28
x x x While one who buys from the registered owner does
not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys
from one who is not a registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all the factual
circumstances necessary for [one] to determine if there are
any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the] capacity to
transfer the land. Although the instant case does not involve
a sale but only a mortgage, the same rule applies inasmuch
as the law itself includes a mortgagee in the term
"purchaser."
This principle is applied more strenuously when the
mortgagee is a bank or a banking institution. In the case of
Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, We ruled:
Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a
mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is
expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its
dealings, including those involving registered lands. A
banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence
before entering into a mortgage contract. The
ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations.29
We never fail to stress the remarkable significance of a
banking institution to commercial transactions, in particular,
and to the countrys economy in general. The banking
system is an indispensable institution in the modern world
and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized
nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the
safekeeping and saving of money or as active instruments
of business and commerce, banks have become an
ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to
regard them with respect and even gratitude and, most of
all, confidence.30 Consequently, the highest degree of
diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and
performance are even required, of it. 31
The Bank of Commerce clearly failed to observe the
required degree of caution in ascertaining the genuineness
and extent of the authority of Santos to mortgage the
subject property. It should not have simply relied on the face
of the documents submitted by Santos, as its undertaking to
lend a considerable amount of money required of it a
greater degree of diligence. That the person applying for
the loan is other than the registered owner of the real
property being mortgaged should have already raised a red
flag and which should have induced the Bank of Commerce
to make inquiries into and confirm Santos authority to
mortgage the Spouses San Pablos property. A person who
deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create
suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an
innocent purchaser for value.32
Having laid that the bank of Commerce is not in good faith
necessitates us to award moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs of litigation in favor of
the spouses San Pablo. Moral damages are not awarded to
10
penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for

the injuries he may have suffered.33 Willful injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due.34 In the instant case, we find that
the award of moral damages is proper. The Bank of
Commerce, in allowing Santos to secure a loan out of the
property belonging to the spouses San Pablo, without taking
the necessary precaution demanded by the circumstances
owing to the public policy imbued in the banking business,
caused injury to the latter which calls for the imposition of
moral damages. As for the award of exemplary damages,
we deem that the same is proper for the Bank of Commerce
was remiss in its obligation to inquire into the veracity of
Santos authority to mortgage the subject property, causing
damage to the spouses San Pablo.35 Finally, we rule that the
award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is valid
since the spouses San Pablo were compelled to litigate and
thus incur expenses in order to protect its rights over the
subject property.36
Prescinding from the above, we thus rule that the forged
SPA and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void ab initio.
Consequently, the foreclosure proceedings conducted on
the strength of the said SPA and Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, is likewise void ab initio. Since the Bank of
Commerce is not a mortgagee in good faith or an innocent
purchaser for value on the auction sale, it is not entitled to
the protection of its rights to the subject property.
Considering further that it was not shown that the Bank of
Commerce has already transferred the subject property to a
third person who is an innocent purchaser for value (since
no intervention or third-party claim was interposed during
the pendency of this case), it is but proper that the subject
property should be retained by the Spouses San Pablo.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated 10 September 2004
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76562,
is hereby AFFIRMED. The SPA, the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, and the Foreclosure Proceedings conducted in
pursuant to said deed, are hereby declared VOID AB
INITIO. The Register of Deeds of Mandaue City is hereby
DIRECTED to cancel Entry Nos. 9089-V.9-D.B and 9084-V.9D.B annotated on TCT No.-(26469)-7561 in the name of
Natividad Opolontesima San Pablo. The Bank of Commerce
is hereby ORDERED to pay the spouses San Pablo
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P20,000.00 as
litigation expenses. Cost against the petitioner.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the June 20,

2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 54684, which reversed the March 13, 1996 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch
49, in Civil Case No. G-2107, as well as the May 18, 2003
Resolution3 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are:
Two parcels of land were originally owned by siblings Juan
Romero and Epifania Romero, the common ancestors of the
parties in this instant petition. Both properties are located at
Sta. Ines, Betis, Guagua, Pampanga covering an area of
1,713 square meters and 788 sq. m., respectively. The first
property was denominated as Cad. Lot No. 3661, Cad. No.
376-D; the second land was denominated as Cad. Lot Nos.
3448 and 3449.4 Juan Romero later married Maria Pecson,
while Epifania Romero married Jose Caoleng.
Juan Romero and Maria Pecson bore Jacoba Romero. Agustin
Caoleng was the only child of Epifania Romero and Jose
Caoleng.
Eventually, Jacoba Romero married Antonio Salonga and
they begot Marcela Salonga, the immediate predecessor-ininterest of petitioners. Marcela was married to German
Bituin and they were blessed with ten children. On July 24,
1986, Marcela died intestate.5
Meanwhile, Agustin Caoleng married Maria David and they
had seven children, respondents in this case. The children
are: Silverio (deceased), Gonzalo, Rita (deceased), Juana,
Teofilo, Angela, and Lourdes (deceased).
On October 9, 1989, petitioners, represented by their
attorney-in-fact German Bituin, filed a Complaint for
"Quieting of Title, Reconveyance, Ownership, Recovery of
Possession, Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction"
before the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 49, against
respondents.
Petitioners alleged in the Complaint that due to stealth and
high-handed machination, Teofilo Caoleng succeeded in
securing a title for Cad. Lot No. 3661 of Guagua Cadastre by
fraudulently stating that the same was owned only by his
late father, Agustin Caoleng. The Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 3399 under Free Patent No. (III-1) 0024906 was
issued on February 11, 1976 by the Bureau of Lands
through the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157567
August 10, 2007
HEIRS OF MARCELA SALONGA BITUIN, Petitioners,

vs.
TEOFILO CAOLENG, SR., GONZALO CAOLENG, JUANA
CAOLENG, ANGELA CAOLENG, JOSE GOZUM, ROSITA
GOZUM, EUFROCINA GOZUM, LOURDES GOZUM,
EPIFANIA GOZUM, CRESENCIA GOZUM, INES GOZUM,
NICOLAS GOZUM, CARMEN GOZUM, GORGONIO
GOZUM, BERNARDO SALONGA, ARCELI SALONGA,
JULIANA SALONGA, ERLINDA SALONGA, VICENTE
SALONGA, LYDIA SALONGA, FERNANDA SALONGA,
and AGUIDO SALONGA, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners averred that they are entitled to the one-half

pro-indiviso share of Cad. Lot Nos. 3661, 3448, and 3449 as
the only surviving heirs of Juan Romero. They admit that the
other half belongs to the surviving heirs of Epifania Romero,
respondents herein. Petitioners likewise assert that
respondents Gonzalo Caoleng, Arceli Manalac (the daughter
of Lourdes Caoleng), Teofilo Caoleng together with daughter
Victoria, Jose Caoleng, and Melanio Caoleng are occupying
most of Cad. Lot Nos. 3448 and 3449. However, petitioners
claim that they have been in the actual, physical, material,
and continuous possession of a great part of Cad. Lot No.
3661; while the smaller portion thereof is being occupied by
the respondent Gozums, the heirs of Rita Caoleng.
Petitioners further state that on November 24, 1983, an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with
Sale7 was executed wherein the subject of the instrument
was a real property covered by OCT No. 3399 Free Patent
No. (III-1) 002490 [Lot No. 3661], containing an area of
1,479 sq. m. In the said deed, Lot A, with an area of 162 sq.
11
m., was adjudicated in favor of Teofilo Caoleng; Lot C,

having an area of 148 sq. m., was given to Angela Caoleng;
and Lot D, with an area of 148 sq. m., was adjudicated to
the heirs of Rita Caoleng, the Gozums. In the same
document, the shares of Gonzalo, Lourdes, and Juana, all
surnamed Caoleng, were sold to Marcela Salonga and this
portion was denominated as Lot B, having an area of 1,021
sq. m.
Furthermore, petitioners recounted that when Marcela
Salonga Bituin died on July 24, 1986, the properties she left
behind were consolidated and it was only at that time that
they discovered OCT No. 3399, the document referring to
the extra-judicial settlement, and the corresponding
subdivision plan8 which was issued after the execution of
the extra-judicial settlement.
Pursuant to the subdivision plan, petitioners fenced the
portion allotted to the late Marcela Salonga Bituin.
Petitioners alleged that they have been in possession of the
property since time immemorial. They claim that they were
only able to fence the three sides of the property, excepting
the side adjoining the portion being occupied by the
Gozums, because of a misunderstanding as to the
boundaries of the property.
On October 16, 1989, a Temporary Restraining Order 9 was
issued by the court ordering respondents to desist
temporarily from selling, disposing, conveying, or creating
any encumbrance against Cad. Lot No. 3661 covered by
OCT No. 3399 until the issue of ownership shall have been
finally determined or unless otherwise ordered by the court.
In their Answer, respondents, except for Gonzalo Caoleng,
declare that the complaint stated no cause of action
because OCT No. 3399 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga cannot be attacked, cancelled, and annulled
through the remedy availed by the petitioners. According to
them, a collateral attack of the title is not allowed by law.
Moreover, respondents claim that petitioners are guilty of
estoppel and laches since OCT No. 3399 was issued as early
as February 11, 1978. They likewise allege that the deed of
extra-judicial settlement was a forged document and,
therefore, cannot give rise to any right on the part of
petitioners.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Complaint.10 In their Amended Complaint,11
petitioners included in their claim Lot No. 3449, which they
allegedly discovered to have been fraudulently titled by
Teofilo Caoleng in the name of the heirs of Agustin Caoleng
alone under OCT No. 3398 Free Patent No. (III-1) 002489 12
issued last February 11, 1976 by the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. Petitioners, therefore, pray that judgment be
rendered in their favor and against respondents, as follows:
a) ordering the cancellation and annulment of
Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 3399 and 3398 of
the Register of Deeds of Pampanga;
b) declaring the Plaintiffs owners of Cad. Lots Nos.
3661, 3448, and 3449 of Guagua Cadastre to the
extent of one half () pro-indiviso;
c) ordering the Defendants to reconvey to Plaintiffs
one half () pro-indiviso share of Cad. Lots Nos.
3661 and 3449 and covered by O.C.T.s Nos. 3399
and 3398 respectively;
d) ordering the Defendants to vacate Cad. Lots No.

3448 and 3449 to the extent of one half () proindiviso share;
e) ordering Defendants Teofilo Caoleng, Sr. and
Gozums, to pay jointly and severally the Plaintiffs
the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees
and incidental expenses, aside from other litigation
expenses and costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs pray further for such and other reliefs as may be
just and equitable in the premises.13
During the trial, petitioners presented two witnesses,
namely, Gonzalo Caoleng and German Bituin.
Gonzalo Caoleng is 81 years old and one of respondents
herein. He testified, among other things, that Lot No. 3661
is located near the sugar land and is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 07026-300.14 Aside from Marcela Salonga
Bituin, the other dwellers of this lot are Rita Caoleng and
her family, Juana Caoleng, and Angela Caoleng. Gonzalo
also affirmed that Marcela occupied a bigger portion of this
land.15 The witness stated that Lot Nos. 3448 and 3449 are
covered by Tax Declaration No. 07026-21516 and are
situated near a creek and now occupied by Loudes Caoleng,
Teofilo Caoleng, and Silverio Caoleng.17 Gonzalo further
testified that the disputed properties are titled though he
had no idea how Teofilo Caoleng had them registered in the
name of Agustin Caoleng. He elaborated that when the
titles were released, Marcela summoned her relatives for a
meeting and they agreed that the property being occupied
by Marcela would be given to her. Thereafter, the parties
prepared an agreement which they called Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Sale. 18 When
shown a copy of the document, Gonzalo confirmed that the
signature appearing on top of his typewritten name was his
signature.19 When asked to identify the signatures of Teofilo
and Angela Caoleng, he did so and readily told the court
that both Teolfilo and Angela signed the document at his
residence.20 After the execution of the deed, Gonzalo related
that Lot No. 3661 was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands and
a subdivision plan was prepared pursuant thereto. Lastly,
the witness averred that the extra-judicial settlement was
executed so that the share of Marcela would be given to
her.21
The second witness, German Bituin, testified that he is the
widower of Marcela Salonga Bituin. Salient points of his
testimony show that petitioners are claiming more than
1,000 sq. m. of the disputed properties which are already in
their possession. Some of the improvements made on the
property were a fence and a bodega that unfortunately
burned during the pendency of the case. He added that his
family is occupying a bigger portion of Lot No. 3661
because his deceased wife was the sole heir of Jacoba
Romero; and while Marcela was still alive, she exchanged
her share with that of her cousin.22 The witness explained
that the contested lots are titled; but his family did not
secure a separate title for themselves inasmuch as the
relatives of his wife refused to acknowledge their right over
the property after Marcela died. The relatives did not even
recognize the extra-judicial settlement after the death of
Marcela.23
The lone witness for respondents, Rosita Gabriana, testified
that the signature appearing above her name in the extrajudicial settlement was not her signature. After discovering
the forgery in the document, Rosita filed a complaint. She
further avowed that the subdivision plan, presented as
evidence for the petitioners, is likewise fake because it was
12
based on a forged document.24 On cross-examination, Rosita

admitted that she came to know the properties subject of
this case only when she saw the documents indicating that
Agustin Caoleng was the owner of the lots. The witness
admitted that she never learned how Agustin got the
properties although she knows that Agustin is the owner of
the lots.
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No.

G-2107.
On March 13, 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of

petitioners. The fallo of the decision reads:
The lone issue raised by petitioners is whether or not the CA

committed grave error in applying the law on prescription.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered:
Petitioners posit that there are two fundamental legal

grounds why prescription should not have been applied by
the appellate court against them to defeat their rights over
the property at issue:
1. Declaring plaintiffs as owner to the extent of 941

square meters of Lot 3661 now covered by Original
Certificate No. 3399, Free Patent No. 002490 of the
Registrar of Land Titles and Deeds of Pampanga.
The remaining area shall belong to defendants.
2. Ordering defendants to cause the segregation of
the aforementioned portion and to reconvey the
same to plaintiffs. Segregations shall be
accomplished by means of an approved subdivision
plan and an agreement of subdivision/partition.
The expense for the subdivision plan shall be born
[sic] by plaintiffs and defendants pro-rata.
3. After the segregation and the subdivision plan
have been accomplished defendants are ordered to
surrender the owners duplicate copy of OCT 3399,
Free Patent No. 002490 to the Registrar of Land
Titles and Deeds of Pampanga who inturn [sic] is
directed to cancell [sic] said title and to issue two
separate titles, one in the name of plaintiffs for 941
square meters and another in the name of
defendants for 538 square meters on the basis of
the approved subdivision plan to be submitted by
the parties to the said office; the herein parties
shall bear their own expense for their own title.
4. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs
P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and expense
of litigation.
SO ORDERED.26
Petitioners now seek relief from this Court.
1. Prescription was not raised by Respondents as a

defense -- in a Motion to Dismiss, in their Answer,
or even in their Appeal Brief; and
2. Petitioners were, have been, and still are in
possession of the portion allotted to their
predecessor-in-interest, Marcela Salonga-Bituin.27
In their Comment, respondents assert that reconveyance is
not a proper remedy because the lands were previously
public in character and only the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources has the capacity to determine who
are qualified to be awarded. They add that the lots are
covered by OCT Nos. 3398 and 3399, and, therefore, cannot
be impugned collaterally. Lastly, respondents aver that they
raised the defense of prescription in connection with
estoppel and laches.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Well entrenched is the rule that an action for reconveyance
prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the
date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded
as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of
the property or its title, which has been erroneously or
wrongfully registered in another persons name to its
rightful or legal owner, or to one who has a better right. 28
SO ORDERED.25
Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, respondents
interposed an appeal.
Stating that respondents ownership over Lot No. 3661 is
based on OCT No. 3399 issued under Free Patent No. (III-1)
002490, the appellate court ruled that respondents are the
registered owners of the lands in dispute. The CA reasoned
that a free patent issued by the proper authority is granted
only to qualified applicants and indicates that the land was
previously public in character. Thus, OCT No. 3399
registered in the name of the respondents gives an
indefeasible title in their favor.
As to the issue of reconveyance of property, the CA held
that the action had prescribed. The CA further declared that
the allegation of fraud on the part of respondents was not
proven by petitioners as OCT No. 3399 was issued by the
Government through a free patent. The dispositive portion
of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
dated March 13, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET
However, in a number of cases in the past, the Court

declared that if the person claiming to be the owner of the
property is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe.29 The reason for this is that
one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being that his
undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
the one who is in possession.30
In his testimony, Gonzalo Caoleng, who is one of
respondents, admitted that Marcela Salonga Bituin occupies
a portion of Lot No. 3661. His telling testimony follows:
Q - Will you please tell us Mr. Witness who is now in
possession of that land near the "sugar" land which
is denominated as cadastral lot 3661?
13
WITNESS:
A - Yes, Sir.
A - Rita Caoleng and her family, Sir.
Q - And how were you able to discover that these

two parcels of land [were] caused to be titled by
Teofilo Caoleng in the name of Agustin Caoleng?
ATTY. DIMALANTA:
Q - Who else?
A - Juana and Angela, Sir.
Q - Who else aside from these persons you
mentioned?
Atty. PUNZALAN:
That is putting the answer to the mouth of the
witness, objection, Your Honor.
ATTY. DIMALANTA:
Q - Are they the onely [sic] persons occupying that
land?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - What about on the portion of the land near the
creek, who is in possession of the said land?
A - I and Lourdes, Teofilo and Silverio, Sir.
Q - What about this Marcela Salonga, what
portion of the land was she occupying?
A - She is occupying the land near the
sugarland, Sir.
Q - The one being occupied by Rita Caoleng?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - Who is occupying a bigger portion of that
land near the sugarland which [is]
denominated as cadastral lot 3661?
A - Marcela Salonga, Sir.
Q - Are these properties covered by titles?
A - Yes, Sir.
A - When the titles were released, Marcela Salonga

called a sort of a meeting among us, Sir.
Q - What did you talk in that meeting?
A - We agreed that the portion being occupied by
Marcela Salonga would be given to her, Sir.
Q - When you said that portion, do you refer to the
portion you mentioned covered by cadastral lot
3661?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That would be leading, Your Honor.
ATTY. DIMALANTA;
That is only a clarification.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
A - Yes, Sir.31
More revealing is the confession of the
respondents sole witness, Rosita Gabriana, when
she testified in this manner:
Q - Mrs. Witness, will you please tell us if this case
is covered by two properties, am I correct?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - One is located near the Betis river, and the
other is a former riceland or "mulahan"?
A - Yes, Sir.
ATTY. DIMALANTA:
Q - And how were they titled?
Q - And the one located near the Betis river is

occupied by Gonzalo Caoleng?
A - I dont know how Teofilo Caoleng had them

registered in the name of Agustin Caoleng, Sir.
WITNESS:
ATTY. DIMALANTA:
Q - Are you referring to these two lots?
WITNESS:
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - And also by Teofilo Caoleng?
A - Yes, Sir.
14
Q - And also the daughter of Lourdes Caoleng by

the name of Araceli Manalang, is it not?
Salonga was in possession of the bigger portion of

Lot 3661 this testimony cannot be ignored. 33
A - Yes, Sir.
However, the appellate court decided otherwise and

emphasized the fact that respondents are grantees of a free
patent and eventually became holders of a title.
Q - And the daughter of Teofilo Caoleng by the

name of Victoria Caoleng?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - And also the two sons of Teofilo Caoleng by the
name of Jose and Melanio?
A - I dont know, Sir.
Q - But you know Jose Caoleng?
A - There is, Sir.
Q - While this former agricultural land is now
enclosed by a hallow [sic] block fence on
three sides?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - And at the edge of the open side is the
house of your sister and also the children of
Rita Caoleng, is it not?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - And it was the plaintiff, particularly
German Bituin
who caused the fencing of the three sides of
the portion
of the former agricultural land?
A - Yes, Sir.32
Surprisingly, respondents did not controvert petitioners
allegations that they are in possession of a large portion of
Lot No. 3661 in the cross-examination or any of the
pleadings. If respondents were truly the owners of Lot No.
3661, why did they allow petitioners to stay there for such a
long period of time? All this time that petitioners introduced
improvements on the land in controversy, respondents did
not oppose or complain about the improvements. Even the
trial court was correct in observing that petitioners
possession of Lot No. 3661 is an advantage for them, thus:
Gonzalo Caoleng, a man of 81 years of age and one of the
defendants in this case testified for and in behalf of the
plaintiffs. He supported the claim of the plaintiffs. His
testimony is a declaration against his own interest because
by saying that plaintiffs have an interest over the land in
dispute he practically waived his right and interest, which is
substantial over the property which is already titled in the
name of the Heirs Agustin Caoleng and he happens to be
one of the heirs of Agustin Caoleng being one of his
children. His testimony which is credible deserves full faith
and credit. A very old man, he undoubtedly has sufficient
knowledge of the history of the disputed land especially of
its possessor, so that when he said plaintiff Marcela
Elementary is the rule that simple possession of a certificate

of title is not necessarily conclusive to a holders genuine
ownership of property. If a person obtains title that includes
land to which he has no legal right, that person does not, by
virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the
land illegally or erroneously included.34 This Court has held
time and again that the rule on indefeasibility of title cannot
be used for the perpetration of fraud against the legal
owner.35 Hence, registration proceedings could not be used
as a shield for fraud. To hold otherwise would be to put a
premium on land-grabbing and transgress the broader
principle in human relations that no person shall unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.36
In Vital v. Anore, et al.,37 this Court ruled that:
x x x if the registered owner, be he a patentee or his
successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was
transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land
described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to
another and who together with his predecessors-in-interest
has been in possession thereof, and if the patentee and his
successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, then
the statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued
upon a free patent does not apply, and the true owner may
bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land
judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that
he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free
patent and described in the Torrens title and that the
defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in
possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the
Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the
defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of
land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true
owner thereof.38
In the present case, it cannot be contradicted that
petitioners have been in actual possession of Lot No. 3661.
The reconveyance is just and proper in order to bring to a
halt the intolerable anomaly that the patentees resort to in
obtaining a Torrens title for the land which they and their
predecessors never possessed and which has been
possessed by another in the concept of an owner. 39
After a careful scrutiny of the pleadings of the case, it was
unearthed that petitioners were asking for the
reconveyance of the one-half portion of Lot Nos. 3661,
3448, and 3449. Sadly, this cannot be done as the records
lack sufficient evidence to support this contention.
Petitioners were only able to prove their right to ownership
of the 1,021 sq. m. of Lot No. 3661 because they showed
adequate proof of their lengthy possession of that area of
land which was concurred in by the witness for the
defendants. This Court cannot grant petitioners ownership
of half of Lot Nos. 3448 and 3449 as they have not shown
any credible and trustworthy evidence that they are entitled
to that share in accordance with law or any existing
jurisprudence.
15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 20, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54684 is MODIFIED.
The Court hereby AFFIRMS the ownership of petitioners of
Lot No. 3661 to the extent of 1,021 square meters and
respondents are ORDERED to RECONVEY title to the same
to petitioners. The Register of Deeds is ORDERED to
CANCEL OCT No. 3399 and ISSUE another certificate of title
over the property in favor of petitioners, to the extent of
1,021 square meters, as co-owners thereof, and another
certificate of title in the name of respondents for the
remainder of the lot as pro-indiviso co-owners. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152716
October 23, 2003
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner,

vs.
BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
DECISION
case had been decided. The Order pertained to the

properties held by the parties, thus:
xxxxxxxxx
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties
submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following
properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties,
namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that
the same is owned by petitioners parents,
Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx
and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735,
considering that the same was purchased on
installment basis by respondent with his exclusive
funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx
Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and
respondent shall be distributed in the following manner:
PUNO, J.:
TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations under Article
36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr
against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati in March 1997.1
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of property.2 The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated January 30, 1998 states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the marriage
between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on March 14,
1985 is hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent to
perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing
between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a
regime of complete separation of property between the said
spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the
rights previously acquired by creditors.1vvphi1.nt
Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO
MERCADO FEHR and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is hereby
awarded to petitioner, she being the innocent spouse.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper
civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of
the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.3
On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order
resolving the various motions4 filed by respondent after the
a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of

671.84 sq. m., covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 14734; and
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)
TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:
a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an
area of 180.81 sq. m. and covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and
b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994
model)
Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of
113.54 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly,
petitioner is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite
204 in the name of respondent, covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 14735, being respondents exclusive
property, acquired prior to his marriage.1awphi1.nt
Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order
of the subject properties, namely the Ground Floor Front
(Fridays Club), Ground Floor Rear Apartment and Upper
Basement at LGC Condominium, all leased by Bar 4
Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in
common, in proportion to one-half each or share and share
alike, after deducting all expenses for Income Taxes,
Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal License fees,
clearances, etc. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to
deliver to respondent the following: a) the balance of his
share of the monthly rentals from February 1998 to May
1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the monthly rentals
of the aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this date.
Thereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their respective
share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties
adjudicated to them as stated above.
16
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly

support their minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for
their education, uniforms, food and medical expenses. 5
We shall first address the procedural issue, whether the

Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the special civil action
for certiorari filed by petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order

with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG
Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner
alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis
at the time when petitioner and respondent were living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should
apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the best
interests of the children if she would be made to demand
periodically from respondent his share in the support of the
children. She instead proposed that the Upper Basement
and the Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium be
adjudicated to her so that she could use the income from
the lease of said premises for the support of the children. 6
Petitioner argues that the filing of a petition for certiorari

with the Court of Appeals was proper because the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its
Order dated October 5, 2000, and there were no other
speedy and adequate remedies available. She asserts that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
held that Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium was the
exclusive property of respondent, although it was
established that they lived together as husband and wife
beginning March 1983, before the execution of the Contract
to Sell on July 26, 1983. Furthermore, the trial courts ruling
dividing their properties into three, instead of two as
provided under Article 147 of the Family Code, or four, as
allegedly agreed by the parties during a conference with the
trial court judge on May 3, 2000, also constituted grave
abuse of discretion.15
Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated

October 5, 2000 that since the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on coownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of
the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147
of the Family Code. The court, however, noted that the
parties have already agreed in principle to divide the
properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them and their children as follows:
1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the
children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couples
cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
respondent.71vvphi1.nt
On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
questioning the October 5, 2000 Order of the trial court.8
Respondent filed an Opposition to the Notice of Appeal. 9 On
January 12, 2001, petitioner withdrew the notice of appeal 10
and instead filed on the following day a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
questioning the findings of the trial court in its Order dated
October 5, 2000.11
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26,
2001, dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
The appellate court stated that petitioner has not shown
any reason to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as
the errors she raised were mere errors of judgment which
were the proper subject of an ordinary appeal, not a petition
for certiorari.12
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision,
which was also denied by the appellate court.13
Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following
arguments:
1) Petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 149 in the Court of Appeals in view
of the fact that the questioned orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of or lack of jurisdiction.
2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
questioned orders were errors of judgment and not
of jurisdiction.14
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioner

may no longer avail of any remedy, whether an appeal or a
petition for certiorari, as she had lost all the right to appeal
from the time the Decision of January 30, 1998 became final
and executory. He argues that the Order of the trial court
dated October 5, 2000 is no longer assailable because it
was merely issued to execute the final and executory
Decision of January 30, 1998. He also submits that the
division of the properties into three and the distribution of
1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent, and their
children was proper, in accordance with Articles 50, 51, 147
and 148 of the Family Code mandating the delivery of the
presumptive legitime of the common children upon
dissolution of the property regime. Respondent further
claims Suite 204 of LCG Condominium to be his exclusive
property as it was acquired on July 26, 1983, prior to their
marriage on March 14, 1985.16
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy,
and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is
defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As a
general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal
is the proper remedy such as when an error of judgment or
procedure is involved. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the
exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a
special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain
exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules
may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified,
for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and
injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be
danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary
appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from
the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.17
The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject
respondents submission that all the appellate remedies of
petitioner have been foreclosed when the Decision dated
January 30, 1998 became final and executory. What is being
questioned in this petition is not the January 30, 1998
Decision of the trial court declaring the marriage between
17
petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of

psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trial court
dated October 5, 2000 dividing the common properties of
petitioner and respondent into three1/3 to petitioner, 1/3
to respondent and 1/3 to their children, and affirming its
previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the
exclusive property of respondent. The issue on the validity
of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has long been
settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the
subject of review. There were, however, incidental matters
that had to be addressed regarding the dissolution of the
property relations of the parties as a result of the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned
Order pertained to the division and distribution of the
common properties of petitioner and respondent, pursuant
to the courts directive in its main decision to dissolve the
conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally
disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the
common properties of petitioner and respondent, and as
such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the
Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However, considering
the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind
adherence to the general rule will result in miscarriage of
justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in
their common property, and thus, deprive her of a
significant source of income to support their children whom
the court had entrusted to her care. We have held that
where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be
a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court
which are technical rules may be relaxed.18
We now go to the substantive issues. The crux of the
petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium
and how the properties acquired by petitioner and
respondent should be partitioned.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in
March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship,
petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in
the latters residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore
fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on
December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14,
1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a
condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983
executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos
Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed
the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado
Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the
condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. 19
In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioners
submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties
cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family
Code, said property should be governed by the rules on coownership. The Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the formers

efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
and owned in common, without the consent of the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, 20 as in
the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with
respect to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102,
Quezon City:21
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and
a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party
to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
partys "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household."
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case
at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent
suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife when
petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and
were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was
found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code
because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply
with essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was
purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time
when petitioner and respondent were already living
together. Hence, it should be considered as common
property of petitioner and respondent.
As regards the settlement of the common properties of
petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in
the records that support the pronouncement of the trial
18
court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties

into three1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent
and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition
before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way
division of the properties1/4 share each to the petitioner
and the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two
children. Moreover, respondents argument that the threeway partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate
only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted
by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void.22
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to

reconstitute and revive Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 16007 in the names of Jose, Crisostomo and
Severo, Jr.
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite

204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of
petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the
parties should be divided in accordance with the law on coownership.
6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and

severally ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellants the
sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses and costs of suit.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or

redeem the share corresponding to the share of
Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30) days from
notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada.
5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and
severally ordered to pay the plaintiffs-appellants
the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED."3
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of petitioner and
respondent in accordance with this Courts ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122047
October 12, 2000
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI,

petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and
REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by
heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente
Armada) respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the
Decision1 dated March 25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and
its Resolutions2 dated March 24, 1995 and September 6,
1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 113, and nullified the sale of the subject lot by
the spouses Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to
spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion of the
respondent court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new one is
rendered:
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the
registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V. Alejo
in favor of Anita Bonode Si.
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to
annul and cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24751, issued in the name of Anita Bonode Si,
married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married
to Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada
Jr., single.
The factual background of the case is as follows:

The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District,
Pasay City, the property in dispute, originally belonged to
Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr. This was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460. During
the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to
their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued
TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows :
"DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V.
Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to
Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR.
SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos." 4
Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said
title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751),
dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO,
as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying
113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of
ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of
P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5,
Book No. 253 of Notary Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian
Florentino)."5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and
Remedios Almanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of
Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages,
against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado
Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the
sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's
share by making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-infact of her husband, is a Filipino citizen, residing with Isada
at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had migrated and
were already citizens of the United States of America. It also
stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute
sale they inserted the phrase "... and that the co-owners are
not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to
them.", and that petitioners knew of the misrepresentations
of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the other
owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the
sale; and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si,
private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of title with damages, claiming they had
a right of redemption.
19
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2,

1954, Escolastica, with the consent of her husband
executed three separate deeds of sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3) 6
conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo,
and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The
three deeds of sale particularly described the portion
conveyed to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners
contend that since the property was already three distinct
parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among
the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of
redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses
Si. Petitioners point out that it was only because the Armada
brothers failed to submit the necessary subdivision plan to
the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City that
separate titles were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was
issued and registered in the names of Jose, Crisostomo, and
Severo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs." 7
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
March 25, 1994, the appellate court issued the decision now
assailed by petitioners. In reversing the decision of the trial
court and ruling for private respondents, the Court of
Appeals found that:
"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows
that the portion sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1,
2, & 3) to the Armada brothers do not appear in the said
title, neither does it indicate the particular area sold.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the
Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the
basis of the said deeds of Sale. In fact, TCT No. 16007 (Exh.
'A') shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose, Crisostomo and
Severo, Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33
sq. m. respectively.
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in
favor of defendants Si, stated that the portion sold was the
'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square
meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of
the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what
was sold to defendants are still undetermined and
unidentifiable, as the area sold remains a portion of the
whole.
Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on
March 27, 1979, Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-infact and co-defendant, Cresenciana Alejo, sold his undivided
113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), and presented for registration
with the Register of Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying
plaintiffs of the sale (TSN, pp. 6-8, December 20, 1988).
Instead, it appears that the phrase 'and that the co-owners
are not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to
them', was inserted in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'B').
xxx
Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in
the undivided property is not invalid, but shall not be
recorded in the Registry Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the Vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners."8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty.

Roberto B. Yam received a copy of the CA decision. On
October 14, 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November 21,
1994, for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new
trial under Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court.9
Petitioners presented new evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460,
registered in the name of Escolastica de la Rosa, married to
Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that
the cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor
of Escolastica's sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court
denied the motion, reasoning that when the motion was
filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the decision
had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ruling that a co-ownership still
existed.
reversible error in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision of 25 March 1994
on purely technical grounds.
reversible error in denying the Motion for New Trial.
reversible error in ordering petitioners to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
the costs of the suit."10
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether
respondent court erred in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and/or the Motion for New Trial; (2) whether
private respondents are co-owners who are legally entitled
to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code;11 and
(3) whether the award of moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs of suit is correct.
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim
the right of redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code.
The trial court found that the disputed land was not part of
an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of absolute
sale12 technically described the portion sold to each son.
The portions belonging to the three sons were separately
declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of
Pasay City on September 21, 1970.13 Jose's testimony that
the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when
she said they had been receiving rent from the property
specifically allotted to Jose.14 More significantly, on January
9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT
24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT
13459415 in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 13459516
under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si;
and (3) TCT 13459617 owned by Jose Armada, married to
Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record.
However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the
trial court's findings.18
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or
when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the
20
facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to

review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual
conclusion.19 This we have done in this case. It is our
considered view now, that the trial court is correct when it
found that:
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question
had already been partitioned when their parents executed
three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and
Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which
documents purports to have been registered with the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970,
and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued.
Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the
three sons was definitely described and segregated and
with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short,
this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every
portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for
taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City
on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts
that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants
Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was
concretely determined and identifiable. The fact that the
three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does
not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over
each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.
Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners exists." 20
(citation omitted)
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they
did not have knowledge about the impending sale of this
portion. The truth of the matter is that they were properly
notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification they
wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22,
1979, a portion of said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the
king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of
Levereza."21 (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the
community ownership terminated, and the right of
preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer
available.22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if
not yet technically described.24 This situation makes
inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a
co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of
adjoining owners."
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was
well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in
the land. In a letter dated February 22, 1979, Jose told his
brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves,
and you can sell your share of Leveriza." 25 Co-owners with
actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A
written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the
co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to

exercise their right of redemption within the limited period
of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of
the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written
notice of a fact already known to them, would be
superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
unnecessary.26
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that herein private respondent could redeem the lot
bought by petitioners, the issue of whether the appellate
court erred in denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and new trial need not be delved
into.1wphi1 The same is true with respect to the
questioned award of damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as
repeatedly held, we cannot put a premium on the right to
litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions
dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated
on August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150707
April 14, 2004
APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO

O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA
OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX OCAMPO
JR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA
OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA OCAMPO,
MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO, ELISA
OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO,
JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA
OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS OCAMPO JR. and
ERNESTO O. FORTUNO, petitioners,
vs.
FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN
OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO, NEMESIO LL.
OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a
civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of evidence. In an action involving property, petitioners
should rely on the strength of their own title and not on the
alleged weakness of respondents claim.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the October 31, 2001 Decision 2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56941. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the
awards for damages and attorneys fees are hereby
deleted, the judgment appealed from is, in all other
respects, AFFIRMED. Without costs."3
21
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,4

rendered on October 30, 1996, which decreed thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds, holds and declares that defendant Belen
Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito, are the
true and lawful exclusive owners of the following
properties, namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land
situated in the poblacion of Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by
Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on
the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by
a street, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo
and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area
of 1,119 square meters, more or less,
presently covered by TCT No. 13654 in the
name of Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to
Vicente Barrito and previously covered by
TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of
Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No.
18856 and assessed at P17,240.00.
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at
San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded
on the North and East by a barrio road, on
the South by a creek, and on the West by
Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square
meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with
an assessed value of P6,240.00.
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto.
Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded
on the North by Lot 10323, on the East by
Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325, and
on the West by Lot 10322, with an area of
about 4884 square meters, declared
under TD No. 35122 and assessed at
P6780.00
as described and referred to in paragraph
9, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the
original complaint and it is hereby ordered
that:
1. The complaint and
supplemental complaint are
dismissed for failure of the
plaintiffs to prove their
cause/causes of action by
preponderance of evidence and
on the added ground of
prescription;
2. The plaintiffs are ordered to
pay as their joint and several
obligation, to defendants Fidela
Ll. Ocampo, Belen OcampoBarrito and Vicente Barrito, the
total sum of P15,000.00 for
attorneys fees and other
expenses of litigation and
P50,000.00 for moral damages;
3. The plaintiffs jointly and
severally pay the cost of this suit.
4. Upon the finality of this
decision, the notice of lis
pendens annotated at plaintiffs

behest in the Certificates of Title
covering the properties in
question, of defendants be
cancelled; and the plaintiffs, their
agents and representatives as
well as successors-in-interest are
ordered to respect the right of
ownership of said defendants
thereto, and to vacate and
restore the lawful possession of
all portions of said properties to
herein defendants, their agents,
representatives and successorsin-interest." 5
The Facts
The CA adopted the RTCs summation of facts as follows:
"Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar
and syntax, the following summation of the
relevant and material antecedents of the case by
the court a quo, is substantially correct -This is a civil suit for partition and
damages filed by plaintiffs against the
defendants.
The complaint alleges that during the
lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and
Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten
(10) children, namely: Fidela, Felix,
Andres, Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia,
Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and Luis. Of the
aforementioned children, the following are
already dead, namely: Felix, who is
survived by his widow, Melita F. Ocampo
and children Felix, Jr., Ramon and Miguel;
Andres, who is survived by Juana Ocampo
and children Jose, Andres, Imelda, Violeta
and Mercedita; Jose, who is survived by
his children Antonia, Elias and Juan
(Johnny); Rosario, who is survived by
Ernesto O. Fortuno; Luis, who is survived
by his children Rose, Ricardo, Jonas, Maria
Dolores, Rebecca, Fidela and Luis, Jr.; and
Luisa, who is survived by Carlos Llorin and
children Mecita, Manuel, Carlos, Jr.,
Carmelita and Marilou L. Arellano.
The complaint further alleges that during
the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo
and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired
several parcels of land and, upon their
death, left the following properties,
namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/
commercial land situated in the
poblacion of Nabua, Camarines
Sur, bounded on the NE by
Carmen Ocampo and Alberto
Espiritu, on the SE by the Burgos
Street, on the SW by a Street,
and on the NW by Julian Ocampo
and Carmen Ocampo, containing
an area of 1,119 square meters,
more or less, presently covered
by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the
name of Fidela Ocampo, declared
22
under TD No. 18856 and

assessed at P17,240.00;
(b) A parcel of residential land
situated at San Luis, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the
North and East by a barrio road,
on the South by a creek, and on
the West by Lot 237, with an area
of about 300 square meters,
declared under TD No. 19639
with an assessed value of
P6,240.00; and
(c) A parcel of land situated at
Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, bounded on the North by Lot
10323, on the East by Lot 9543,
on the South by Lot 10325, and
on the West by Lot 10322, with
an area of about 4,884 square
meters, declared under TD No.
35122 and assessed at
P6,780.00.
that all the above named parcels of land
are actually owned in common by the
children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo
and Juana Llander Ocampo although the
land denominated as parcel (a) of the
complaint is ostensibly registered in the
name of Fidela Ocampo alone but
acknowledged by her as a property owned
in common by all of them, brothers and
sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition
said properties but defendants Fidela
Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and
unreasonably refuse to do so and moved
by a common purpose, both of them
mortgaged to the PNB the land
denominated as parcel (a) of the
complaint to secure the payment of a
P110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which
were x x x exclusively to the benefit of
said defendants only; that the same
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
Ocampo have been receiving the fruits of
the properties to the exclusion of their coheirs amounting to not less than
P2,000.00 a year; and, that because of
their relationship, they undertook earnest
efforts to amicably settle this controversy
but because of defendants Fidela Ocampo
and Felicidad Ocampo[s] utterly
unreasonable and unjustified actuations,
the same failed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that

judgment be rendered ordering the
partition of the properties described in
paragraph 9 of the complaint; ordering
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
Ocampo, to release or otherwise cancel
any and all encumbrances on TCT No. RT4389(983) which they had caused to be
annotated thereon, particularly, the
mortgage in favor of the PNB; requiring
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to
refrain from further encumbering said
properties or otherwise subjecting the
same to any lien and for that purpose, a

writ of preliminary injunction to be issued
against them to enjoin the commission of
such acts; ordering defendants Fidela
Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to submit
an accounting of the fruits and other
produce they had received from said
properties; further ordering Fidela
Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to
indemnify plaintiffs the sum of not less
than P15,000.00 by way of attorneys fees
and related expenses of litigation, plus the
costs of the suit; and, further granting
plaintiffs such other remedies as may be
just and equitable in the premises.
xxx
xxx
xxx
On 17 December 1987, counsel for

plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit
Supplemental Complaint dated 2
December 1987 which was granted by the
Court as there was no opposition to it.
The Supplemental Complaint alleges that
defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and
Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30
September 1987, TCT No. RT-4389(983) in
the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and
covering the lot described as parcel (a) in
paragraph 9 of the original complaint was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
1364 was issued to defendant Belen
Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant
Vicente Barrito, on the strength of an
allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela
Ll. Ocampo in their favor on 13 January
1984; that at the time the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos was presented for
registration and when TCT No. 1364,
Registry of Camarines Sur, was issued to
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the
donor and donees were notoriously aware
that said parcel of land was among the
lots subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867
of which the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo and
the mother of the donees, Felicidad Ll.
Ocampo, are defendants, that said
properties were owned by the Ocampo
brothers and sisters, and that the donor
Fidela Ll. Ocampo was not the exclusive
owner thereof; that the transfer of
defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and Belen
Ocampo-Barrito of the ownership over
said property now subject of this partition
is tainted with fraud, actual and
deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their
legitimate share therein, knowing as they
do that the same are a co-ownership of
the original parties plaintiffs and
defendants herein; that defendants Fidela
Ll. Ocampo and the spouses Belen
Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito have
not acted in good faith, deliberately
causing damage and injury to the
plaintiffs by their avaricious desire to
obtain sole ownership of said properties
through dubious and illegal means that
the defendant spouses Belen OcampoBarrito and Vicente Barrito, through
dubious means and undue influence over
Fidela Ll. Ocampo, a very old spinster
23
whom they have lately taken into their

custody, succeeded in having the latter
execute this supposed deed of donation
inter vivos; that defendants have not
acted with justice, honesty and good faith,
causing injury to plaintiffs rights in a
manner inconsistent with morals and good
customs, hence, are liable for moral
damages of not less than P50,000.00; and
that to set an example for the public good
and to deter others similarly minded from
doing so, defendants should be assessed
exemplary damages of not less than
P50,000.00.
Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered
(a) declaring the Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos allegedly executed by Fidela Ll.
Ocampo in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito
and Vicente Barrito be declare[d] null and
void, (b) ordering defendants Belen
Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito to
reconvey so much of the property subject
thereof as pertain to the plaintiffs, (c)
directing defendants, jointly and severally,
to indemnify plaintiffs such amounts as
this Honorable Court may consider fair
and reasonable by way of actual, moral
and exemplary damages, inclusive of
attorneys fees and related expenses of
litigation, and (d) granting plaintiffs such
other remedies as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
xxx
xxx
xxx
As Special Defenses, defendant Belen

Ocampo-Barrito allege that the original
defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her
predecessor-in-interest, since 1949 has
been the absolute owner in fee simple of
the property by virtue of the issuance of
the certificate of title in her name; that
her predecessor-in-interest held the same
certificate of title to the same parcel of
land (TCT No. RT-4389(983) free of all
encumbrances and adverse claims and
was in notorious, public, and actual
possession of the property in concept of
absolute owner from 1949 until 13 January
1984, when said predecessor-in-interest
validly conveyed the property by donation
inter vivos which she accepted in the
same public instrument; that TCT No.
1364 was issued to defendant Belen
Ocampo-Barrito on the strength of the
donation inter vivos executed in her favor
by her predecessor-in-interest and has
since 30 September 1987, been the
absolute owner thereof; that since 1949
none of the plaintiffs ever questioned the
absolute ownership and title of defendant
Belen Ocampo-Barritos predecessor-ininterest over the property making the
decree of registration incontrovertible;
that it is fatal for plaintiffs cause of action
to allege that defendants exerted undue
influence over Fidela Ll. Ocampo for the
latter to execute the deed of donation
while clearly admitting in both the original
and supplemental complaints that
defendants are residents of Mindoro
Occidental a far away place from Nabua,
Camarines Sur, the place where the same

predecessor-in-interest admittedly
resides; and, that Belen Ocampo-Barritos
title cannot be collaterally attacked in
these supposed partition proceedings.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Defendants pray that the case be

dismissed for utter lack of merit and
plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants
the sum of P200,000.00 for moral
damages, P50,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P100,000.00 as compensatory
damages, to pay attorneys fees in the
amount of P15,000.00, and for other just
and equitable remedies.
xxx
xxx
xxx
As the Special and/or Affirmative

Defenses, defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo
alleges that she is the true and absolute
owner of the real properties described in
paragraph 9 of the original complaint
having acquired the same by lucrative
title and has, since becoming owner
thereof, been in actual possession thereof
excepting the portion of the lot described
in paragraph 9 (a) of the complaint and
covered by Torrens title which was and is
still being unlawfully occupied by plaintiffs
Quiens; that the properties have been
declared for assessment in defendants
name as exclusive owner thereof and
since her acquisition of said properties,
has paid the taxes thereon; that
defendant had exercised continuously all
the legal incidents of ownership on said
lands to the exclusion of and adversely to
the public, plaintiffs herein included; that
the [D]eed of Donation Inter Vivos and the
subsequent transfer of the property
mentioned in paragraph 9 of the
complaint to other defendants Belen
Ocamp[o]-Barrito is valid conveyance
which binds the said property; and, that
assuming that plaintiffs have a cause of
action, the same is barred by laches.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo prays that

judgment be rendered dismissing the
complaint and ordering plaintiffs to
indemnify such sum as will be proved as
well as [s]uch amount as this Court may
assess by way of moral and exemplary
damages and costs, including necessary
expenses for litigation, and for just and
equitable reliefs."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
According to the appellate court, other than the
Acknowledgment of Co-ownership7 executed by Respondent
Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered to
establish petitioners claim of co-ownership. The CA held
that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail
over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence
24
that had been adduced by respondents to prove their

defenses. Communal ownership of the property in question
was supposedly not proven, either, by the ancient
photograph showing Spouses Chino Jose and Juana Llander
Ocampo with their ten children in front of the disputed
property; or by another picture showing the name "Oniang
Ocampo -- 1-15-61" engraved on the said house or building.
The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Ownership of the Subject Property
The court a quo rejected the argument of petitioners that

the title to the subject property had been placed in the
name of Fidela, because their parents followed the Chinese
custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest son
or daughter who was single. Petitioners explained that upon
the death of the eldest sibling, the properties would revert
to the younger brothers and sisters. According to the CA,
however, not a shred of evidence was adduced to prove
that such a Chinese custom existed or was observed in that
place.
The CA also dismissed petitioners contention that common
ownership was indicated by the fact that some of the
children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and lived on the subject
property. It ruled that fraternal affection could have been
the motive that impelled respondents to allow their relatives
to use it.
In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said that
respondents were able to give clear proof of their ownership
of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and the
corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and
later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.
Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for damages
and attorneys fees, because the trial court had failed to cite
the factual, the legal and the equitable bases therefor.
Hence, this Petition. 8
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. Where the evidence presented, oral and
documentary, on the question of co-ownership, is
overwhelming as it is unopposed, unrebutted and
unimpeached, has co-ownership been proved?
"2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long,
public possession by co-owners, did the courts
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that
there is no co-ownership?
"3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak,
puerile and inconsistent, did the courts commit a
grave misapprehension of facts when they gave
credence to it?
"4. Where a deed of donation intervivos entered in
bad faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary
shares, is said deed valid?
"5. Where a declaration against interest has not
been opposed, assailed, rebutted or impeached,
did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding there is no such declaration?"9
At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who
owns the disputed property?
At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3)

properties originally involved in the litigation brought before
the RTC, petitioners appeal dealt only with the first one,
referred to in the Statement of Facts above -- a parcel of
residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In their CA appeal, petitioners
declared that "the focus of this case is on the first [property]
which is located at downtown Poblacion of Nabua and
therefore a valuable piece of property, 1,119 square meters
in all."10 Because petitioners had not questioned the RTC
Decision with regard to the other properties, then the
adjudication of these matters became final. Thus, only one
property is left for resolution in the present proceedings. 11
Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this
Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of a coownership.12 The settlement of the issue of ownership is the
first stage in an action for partition.13 This action will not lie
if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject
property. Parties filing the action are in fact required by the
Rules of Court14 to set forth in their complaint the nature
and the extent of their title to the property. It would be
premature to effect a partition thereof until and unless the
question of ownership is first definitely resolved. 15
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a
civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of evidence.16 Petitioners chief evidence of co-ownership of
the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of
Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier,
both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in
finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not
prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary
evidence that were adduced by respondents, as will be
expounded below.
Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of
ownership of the questioned property that eventually led to
them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their parents -Spouses Ocampo -- whose deaths passed it on to the
children. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no
proof of ownership of their predecessors-in-interest. In
insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, the
former rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership
executed by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her
alleged sole ownership of the property and presented
preponderant proof of her claim.
First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential
Land,17 referring to the subject property, executed between
Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The
document dated July 6, 1948, was signed in the presence of
two witnesses and acknowledged before Juan B. Ballecer, a
notary public.
The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by this
document, which they never contested. According to them,
the land in question was the conjugal property of their
25
parents; and that upon the latters deaths, the former

inherited it in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal
property of Spouses Ocampo, then petitioners should have
presented evidence to prove such ownership by their
alleged predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to
do so, how then can they prove the transfer to them of
ownership that has not been established in the first place? It
is axiomatic that no one can transfer to another a right
greater than that which one has;18 thus, the legal truism
that the spring cannot rise higher than its source.19
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo
declared his "exclusive ownership" of the property, "having
been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his]
continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material
possession for more than 50 years together with [his]
predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of
owner without any claim of other persons."20
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10,
1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo
for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered
the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers
of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen
presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4389 (983), 21
which named the former as owner in fee simple; and a
Declaration of Real Property,22 evidencing payment of real
property taxes, also by Fidela as owner.
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the
property, Belen also presented a Real Estate Mortgage 23
executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had
executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of
the original petitioners in this case, who is now represented
by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a
mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the
true owner of the land in question.
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a
contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged.24 Co-ownership cannot be
presumed even if only a portion of the property was
mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose
only of ones interest in the ideal or abstract part of the
undivided thing co-owned with others.25 The effect of a
mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that
may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the
co-ownership.26 In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definite
portion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgement of co-ownership.
Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos 27
executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee
and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of
the formers claim of sole ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an
effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to
the donee.28 Petitioners stubbornly rely on the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by
Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact
that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -assuming that its authenticity and due execution were
proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen.
The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is
clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by
petitioners. We agree with the RTCs ratiocination:
"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll.

Ocampo herself made a written acknowledgement
for her co-ownership over all the properties
disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the same
cannot be considered as a declaration against
Fidelas interest since the alleged
acknowledgement was written and executed on 24
December 1985 when she was no longer the owner
of the property as the year previous, on 13 January
1984, she had already donated all her properties to
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect,
she had no more properties with which she can
have an interest to declare against."29
Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Coownership may be considered as a declaration against
interest. A statement may be admissible as such a
declaration if it complies with the following requisites: 1) the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; 3) at the time of the
declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to
his or her interest; and 4) the declarant had no motive to
falsify and believed the declaration to be true. 30
As correctly found by the trial court, however, the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact
against the interest of the declarant, since her right over
the property had already been extinguished by the prior act
of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela
could not have acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no
more property against which she had an interest to declare.
Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1365431 as proof of her ownership of the property. To be
sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is the
Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation
is required to defeat the face value of respondents TCT,
which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance. 32
It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers
and titling of the subject property -- commencing in 1948
and eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in
198433 -- it was only after 1984 that petitioners started
asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof.
We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of
a certificate of title does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named therein.34 But given the circumstances of this
case, the claim of co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to
stand on. Again, we stress, Belen clearly traced the source
of her sole ownership of the property in question and
thereby foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated
allegation of co-ownership thereof.
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence
the Tax Declaration35 indicating that she, as owner, had
been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the
exclusion of petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax
receipt or document to prove their ownership. Having filed
an action involving property, they should have relied on the
strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness
of respondents claim.36
Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the
property was sufficiently proved by their witnesses -- Luisa
Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We disagree. Their
testimonies cannot prevail over the array of documents
presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based
26
simply on the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those

of interested parties, self-serving as they are.
As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster
their claim of co-ownership, we affirm the CAs disposition
showing the flimsiness of their claim as follows:
"The other piece of documentary evidence
presented by appellants really proved nothing. The
ancient photograph showing the spouses Chino
Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo together with their
ten children, simply proved that there was such a
picture taking of the spouses with their children.
But the photograph does not prove communal
ownership by appellants over the disputed parcels
of land; neither does it prove that the said
properties were indeed owned by the spouses
Chino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and then later on
transferred to and commonly owned by their
children. By the same token, the picture exhibited
by appellant showing the name Oniang Ocampo -1-15-61 (or Apolonia Ocampo, one of the children
of the spouses Chino Jose and Juana) engraved in
the house or building, does not prove communal
ownership of the properties in question. At best, it
is susceptible of various meanings, like: that of
Oniang Ocampo was born on 1-15-61, or that she
got married on that date, or that she was
celebrating a special event on the date mentioned,
or that she even died on the date mentioned. And
even assuming ex gratia argumenti, that the said
engraving proved ownership over the disputed
building, some such fact can only work to the
prejudice of herein appellants. Why? Because it
would mean that only Oniang (or Apolonia) was the
owner of the building and that the building is not,
therefore, a communal property of the children of
the late spouses Chino Jose and Juana. Adverting to
this piece of evidence, the Trial Court postulated -The engravings on the house ONIANG
OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-61 cannot serve as
evidence that the property is of common
ownership. At most, this can only
establish the fact that said building was
constructed for a certain Oniang on 15
January 1961. If, indeed, the property is of
common ownership, there could not have
been any difficulty to engrave thereon
HEIRS OF JOSE OCAMPO and JUANA
LLANDER-OCAMPO -- 1-15-61 instead of
ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-61."37
Neither can we accept petitioners contention that coownership is shown by the fact that some of the children of
Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses
on the property. The appellate court correctly found that
since the litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal
affection could have been a good motive that impelled
either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the
property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership among
the parties cannot be presumed.
Neither are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses
Ocampo placed the subject property in the name of only
one person in accordance with a Chinese custom. As
mentioned earlier, that custom consisted of placing
properties of parents in the name of the eldest unmarried
son or daughter, with the implicit understanding that
ownership thereof would later revert to the siblings.
In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that such

custom existed and was practiced in that place,38 Belen
presented evidence that clearly negated any claim of
ownership by the formers predecessors-in-interest. Having
shown that the property in question was originally owned by
one Adolfo Ocampo -- not by Spouses Ocampo, from whom
petitioners derive their right -- the claim of custom becomes
immaterial.
The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not
necessarily favor petitioners and prove that the property in
question is indeed co-owned. If they felt that her testimony
would prove their cause, then they could have easily called
her as an adverse or a hostile witness.39 But since
respondents were confident in the documents they
presented in court, they did not see any need to call her as
a witness.
Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for donating
her properties, when she is still alive and needs money in
her old age. They clearly overlook the nature of a donation.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of another
who accepts it.40 Once perfected, a donation is final; its
revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any
legal ground therefor.41 A donation may in fact comprehend
the entire property of the donor.42 At any rate, the law
provides that donors should reserve, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and that of
all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the
donation, are by law entitled to be supported by them. 43
In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the subject
property, petitioners are contradicting even themselves. On
the one hand, they assert that she would not have disposed
of her property, since she would need it in her old age; on
the other, they argue that it was not hers alone anyway. It
should be clear that the law protects donors by providing
that, without any reservation of sufficient means for
themselves, the donation shall be reduced upon the petition
of any person affected.44
To be sure, petitioners arguments all pertain to
circumstances extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself.
The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced to
writing, an agreement must be presumed to contain all the
terms agreed upon; and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. 45
Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the
donation. Never was there any intimation that she had
either been coerced or defrauded into entering into it. As all
the essential elements of a donation -- consent, subject
matter and cause46 -- have been satisfied, we see no reason
to entertain any doubt about the Deed pertaining thereto.
The question of why the land was registered several years
after the donation is purely speculative. What is important is
that there was a duly proven Deed of Donation, which
formed the basis of Belens claim and led to the registration
of the property in her name.
Petitioners also question Fidelas filing of an unlawful
detainer suit after the date of the Deed of Donation. Again,
we remind petitioners that because this action involves
property, they should rely on the strength of their own title,
not on the alleged weakness of the claim of respondents. At
27
any rate, the burden of proof of the claim of co-ownership

rests on the former.
in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that

court.
Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the review

of factual findings of the courts below. It is a settled doctrine
that in a civil case, final and conclusive are the factual
findings of the trial court, if supported by clear and
convincing evidence on record. Usually, the Supreme Court
does not review those findings -- especially when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.47 From the records
of the present case, no cogent evidence appears that would
impel us to apply the above doctrine differently. The courts
below have not overlooked essential facts that, if
considered, may produce a different outcome. The trial
court correctly explained thus:
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City

ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale
was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other
1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of
her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery.
"This Court from the outset had the opportunity to

see and hear the tell-tale [signs] of truthfulness or
perjury like the flush of face, or the tone of voice,
or the dart of eyes, or the fearful pause [--] and
finds that credibility is with the defendants [herein
respondents]. Moreover, the preponderance of
evidence is with defendants whose testimonial
evidences are buttressed by their documentary
evidences."48
Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards for
damages and attorneys fees for respondents failure to
show any factual, legal or equitable bases therefor. 49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152766
June 20, 2003
LILIA SANCHEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and
VIRGINIA TERIA, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its
Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was
registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following coowners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez,
widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to
Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.1 On 20 February
1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the
name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on
23 June 19952 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.3
Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the
document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action
for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial

Court of Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120,
which ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply
with this order, nor even inform her of the developments in
her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the
RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July
1998 decision of the MeTC.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private
respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4
November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was
served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused
to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing
petitioners house without any special permit of demolition
from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24
May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the
premises that used to serve as the houses toilet and
laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief
from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not
bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit
petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied
the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.1wphi1 On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court
of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or
agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of
these courts that the specific action for the procurement of
the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be
convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it
gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a)
The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
28
jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are
giving due course to this petition as there are matters that
require immediate resolution on the merits to effect
substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to
promote their object of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. 4
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and
inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal
construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. 5 Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
mere technicalities. 6
Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be
deemed as negligence of petitioner herself in the case at
bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as
notice to his client.7 Under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, it appears from the records that counsel was
negligent in not adequately protecting his clients interest,
which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the
Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v.
Court of Appeals - 8
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular
case from its operation where the appellate court failed to
obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to appellants failure
to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this
Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate
court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed
case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the
period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a
considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to
do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford
every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as
not to override substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which
would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the
other elements that should be considered are the following:
(a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b)
the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the

review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 9
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since
the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantial justice
requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve
the present controversy that was brought about by the
absence of any partition agreement among the parties who
were co-owners of the subject lot in question. Hence, giving
due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the
dispute on the property held in common.
In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco10
we held:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that
normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that
such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case,
however, should be looked into and adopted, according to
the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the courts
desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might
foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the
detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to
sell ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just
forgot every process of the court affecting his clients,
because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one
should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer
is also a notice to his clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil
law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the
MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership 11
was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari
should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of
discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of
common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically
divided.12 Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the
private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised
by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject
to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided
thing or right to which it refers is one and the same." 13
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of
subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is
not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines the rights and obligations of the coowners.14
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the
other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the coowners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a
trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do
any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners. 15
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the
properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
29
ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee

for the others.16
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 17
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of
it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party independently of the
other co-owners.18 But he has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common because his right over the thing is represented by
a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. 19
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the
property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not
been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of
Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other coowners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected.
Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her
definite share and determine the boundaries of her property.
Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights
of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6
portion of the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its
Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot
with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly
licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the
aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49,
Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and
partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining
to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to
Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other
undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120864
October 8, 2003
private respondent Jose B. Abejo ("ABEJO") possession of

the one half () undivided portion of a fishpond and to pay
actual damages and attorneys fees.
The Antecedents
On 12 May 1986, ABEJO4 instituted an action for recovery of
possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint,
ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the undivided
portion of a property used as a fishpond ("FISHPOND")
situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged
ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of
the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO
further averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use
the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent
to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained
that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and
possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to
do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND
had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to
vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as
well as pay damages.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own
behalf. He filed his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the
Court of Appeals resolved several issues concerning the
validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE
GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of
action and has prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND
was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate
with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to him,
ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs
of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire
FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the
undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed
ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND
for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and
reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a
builder in good faith.
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to
file their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief 5 on 05
April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial brief 6 on 31 July 1990.
DE GUIAs pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case
the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA
should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to
Compromise,7 offering to settle ABEJOs claim for P300,000
and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJOs
choice.
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE
B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case

on 4 December 1990. DE GUIAs last witness completed her
testimony on 22 November 1991. The trial court
summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA
as follows:
DECISION
Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two

parcels of land covering a fishpond with a total area of
79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally
owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to
Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one half undivided portion owned
by Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was
later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo
(Exh. B), the only heir of the original owner on November
22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole
fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a "Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" executed by the heirs of
Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo
A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant. The
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the 22
August 1994 Decision2 as well as the 27 June 1995
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court ("trial court") of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, in
Civil Case No. 8796-M. The trial courts Decision ordered
petitioner Manuel T. De Guia ("DE GUIA") to turn over to
30
contract provided that the period of lease shall be until

November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and
defendant failed to surrender the fishpond, written demands
the last of which was on November 27, 1983 were made for
defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in
question (Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver
possession and also to pay the rentals due. In anticipation,
however, that defendant will vacate the fishpond, plaintiff,
on December 21, 1983 entered into a two year "Kasunduan
ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for a
consideration of P50,000.00 (Exh. G). This contract, despite
its execution and even already notarized, had to be
cancelled and the amount of P50,000.00 returned by
plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant did not heed the
demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as
well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks
payment of P450,000.00 and P20,000.00 attorneys fees.
On the other hand, defendants evidence tends to show that
the entire fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased
to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently,
defendant became the absolute owner of one half of the
undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs
ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. As to the
area pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he
introduced improvements worth P500,000 and being in
good faith, he asked that he should be reimbursed by
plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however, defendant raised the
only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff is
entitled to in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the
testimonies of defendants witnesses particularly Ben Ruben
Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea was the amount of
rental of fishponds in the same locality as the fishpond in
question at a given time. However, the documentary
evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of their testimony were
not offered as evidence.8
The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
and hereby orders that:
1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff
one half undivided portion of the 79,200 sq. m.
fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits and fruits in
equal share with the defendant effective
immediately until such time that partition of the
property is effected;
2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of
P262,500.00 by way of actual or compensatory
damages;
3 Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and
for attorneys fees; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting

the trial court erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender
possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND and
to pay actual damages and attorneys fees. The Court of
Appeals found DE GUIAs appeal without merit and affirmed
the trial courts decision. Upon DE GUIAs motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the
compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500.
Hence, the instant petition.

The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and
adopted in toto by the Court of Appeals are restated as
follows:
1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided
parcels of land used as a fishpond situated in
Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally coowned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego
married to Juan Abejo.
2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of
Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego under TCT
No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as
follows:
PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single -
share; and LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal
age, married to Juan Abejo, share, --3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of
approximately 79,220 square meters. ABEJO is
seeking to recover possession of the undivided
portion of the FISHPOND containing 39,611 square
meters.
4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa)
acquired possession of the entire FISHPOND by
virtue of a document captioned Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan ("Lease Contract")
executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30
July 1974 up to 30 November 1979 for a
consideration of P100,000.
5. The Lease Contract was executed with the
knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir
of Lorenza Araniego Abejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired
Lorenza Araniego Abejos undivided share in the
FISHPOND by intestate succession.
6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his
undivided share in the FISHPOND to his son, ABEJO,
on 22 November 1983.
7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire
FISHPOND and to derive income from the property
despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and
several demands to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo
and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last
demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.
8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of
possession with damages against DE GUIA on 12
May 1986.
9. DE GUIAs claim of ownership over the other
undivided portion of the FISHPOND has not been
finally adjudicated for or against him.
DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real
Estate Mortgage and Contract of Lease with Preliminary
Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano as proof of
his ownership of the other undivided half portion of the
FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA filed the complaint
for himself and as attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano ("Lejano Heirs")10 against Spouses Teofilo Morte and
31
Angelina Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros Villarico, et

al. ("Defendants"). The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as
Civil Case. No. 86-27-M. The complaint alleged that DE GUIA
acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND from the
Lejano Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano
Heirs sought to annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and
Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan, executed on 10
November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the
Defendants. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that
Primitiva Lejano signed these documents under duress and
without consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment11 on 28 February 1992
against DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs as follows:
WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs,
particularly Manuel De Guia, their successor-in-interest, not
entitled upon the facts and the law to the relief prayed for in
the amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED
with costs against said plaintiff. Instead, as prayed for by
defendants, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the "Kasulatan ng Sanglaan" (Exhs.
"A" & "1") dated November 10, 1979, and the
"Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan" (Exhs.
"C" &"3") also dated November 10, 1979, as valid
for all legal intents and purposes;
2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to
proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
subject real estate mortgage; and
3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorneys
fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.12
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision
dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court
of Appeals found the claim of force and intimidation in the
execution of the documents as highly improbable since
Primitiva Lejanos son, Renato Davis, witnessed the signing
of the documents and found nothing irregular at the time.
The appellate court also held that assuming Defendants
threatened DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs with immediate
foreclosure, Defendants were merely exercising their
legitimate right of foreclosing the mortgaged property for
non-payment of the loan. In addition, Primitiva Lejanos
lawyer and notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abao, testified
that the parties appeared before him to affirm the contents
of the documents. He also stated that he was present when
Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano Davis and her son Renato.
As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event
the Court of Appeals Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may
lose whatever right he claims over the FISHPOND.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand
that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to
ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. The trial court
explained that DE GUIAs sublease contract expired in 1979
and ABEJO acquired his fathers share in 1983. However, the
trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence
of the judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND.
The identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO
and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession
of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that
pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a

reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJOs share in
the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he
raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he
should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the
reasonable amount but under certain conditions which
ABEJO found unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial
court considered the Lease Contract between ABEJO and a
certain Ruperto C. Villarico which provided for a yearly rent
of P25,000 for undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The
trial court declared that the total amount of rent due is
P212,500, computed from November 1983 when ABEJO
became a co-owner of the FISHPOND up to 199113 or a
period of eight and one half years. The trial court further
ordered DE GUIA to pay an additional P50,000 which
represents the amount ABEJO returned to Ruperto C.
Villarico when they cancelled the Lease Contract between
them due to DE GUIAs refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as
co-owner has the right to possess the FISHPOND and to
receive an equal share in the benefits from the FISHPOND
effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while
there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on coownership shall govern the rights of the parties.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. The
Court of Appeals debunked DE GUIAs claim that partition
and not recovery of possession was the proper remedy
under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out
that DE GUIAs failure to respect ABEJOs right over his
undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for
recovery of possession. The trial courts decision effectively
enforces ABEJOs right over the property which DE GUIA
violated by possession and use without paying
compensation. According to the Court of Appeals, partition
would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just
like accounting when necessary.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIAs claim that
the award of compensatory damages of P242,000,
computed based on the rent stipulated in the Lease
Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly
exorbitant. The Court of Appeals clarified that the amount
the trial court awarded was P262,500 and not P242,000 as
erroneously alleged by DE GUIA. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between
ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico carries more evidentiary
weight than the testimonies of DE GUIAs witnesses, Ben
Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea. The Court of
Appeals also upheld the award of attorneys fees since the
parties could have avoided litigation had DE GUIA heeded
the justifiable demands of ABEJO.
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced
the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500.
The Court of Appeals explained that the trial court correctly
computed the total amount of rent due at P212,500. The
trial court erred, however, in adding the sum of P50,000
representing the rent for 1983 and 1984 which ABEJO
returned to Ruperto C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified
that the sum of P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the
rent of P25,000 by 8 years. The 8 year period already
included the two months rent received from and then
subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.
The Issues
32
DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO TURN OVER
THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE FISHPOND
WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP;
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE
AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES DESPITE
LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME;
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAVOR. 14
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an
action for recovery of possession and turn-over of the
undivided portion of a common property is proper before
partition; and (2) whether there is sufficient basis for the
award of compensatory damages and attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of
Possession
DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite
portion from the property owned in common until there is a
partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an
action for partition instead of recovery of possession since
the court cannot implement any decision in the latter case
without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for
recovery of possession cannot prosper when the property
subject of the action is part of an undivided, co-owned
property. The procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is
recovery of possession, makes enforcement difficult if not
impossible since there is still no partition of the subject
property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons." A co-owner of an undivided
parcel of land is an "owner of the whole, and over the whole
he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract." 15 On the
other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different
portions owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.16
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the coowners may bring an action in ejectment." This article
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession.
Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer

(accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession
only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts
within one year from dispossession. However, accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the
right to possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper
regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks
the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of
the proper regional trial court.171awphi1.nt
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not
only against a third person, but also against another
co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of the property. 18 In the latter
case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek
exclusion of the defendant from the property because as coowner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot
recover any material or determinate part of the property. 19
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso
v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz,20 we
reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a
material or determinate part of a common property prior to
partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property
owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the coowner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to
demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common because until division is effected his right
over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner
against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the coownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a
specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he
has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any
material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the
courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of onehalf () of the building in favor of private respondent.
Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of
the entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA
disputed ABEJOs claim of ownership over the undivided
portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly
recognized ABEJOs undivided share by offering to settle
the case for P300,000 and to vacate the property. During
the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or
manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership
over the entire FISHPOND.1a\^/phi1.net Before this Court,
DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing an
action for recovery of possession and the recovery of
compensatory damages.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of coownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in
the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same
right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated,
ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the
whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they
are at the same time individual owners of a portion,
which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such
portion remains indeterminate or unidentified.21 As coowners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of
dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
33
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective

portions.
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA,
judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An
action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject
to laches.22 Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property unless a co-owner has
repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions.23
Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership
under the conditions set by law.
To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action
for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property.
However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of
the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the
actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial
or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical
division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An
action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting
the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND.
However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition,
ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and
enjoy the entire FISHPOND.
DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts
erred when they ordered the recovery of rent when the
exact identity of the portion in question had not yet been
clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an
order to pay damages in the form of rent is premature
before partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a
similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot
devote common property to his exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership.24 Hence, if the subject is a
residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their
respective families to the extent possible. However, if one
co-owner alone occupies the entire house without
opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease
agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the
payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement
to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent
from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in
the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of
these options, they must bear the consequences. It would
be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the coowners by their silence have allowed him to use the
property.25
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in
common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without
paying the proper rent.26 Moreover, where part of the
property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the
exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become coparticipants in the accessions of the property and should
share in its net profits.27
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the
entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired
in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND
without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the
entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice
ABEJOs right to receive rent, which would have accrued to
his share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others.28
Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the

FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay
ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJOs
portion beginning from that date. The compensatory
damages of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair
rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property,29 considering the
circumstances at that time. DE GUIA shall continue to pay
ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to ABEJOs
undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the
option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the
FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to
fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in
the last 20 years.1a\^/phi1.net
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by
sending the 27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the
rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum from
27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to
Article 220930 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate
is 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full
payment.31
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of
Compensatory Damages
DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is
exorbitant. He assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence
the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico
that served as basis for the yearly rent of P25,000 for
ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND.
DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have
given credence to the testimonies of his witnesses, Ben
Ruben Camargo ("Camargo") and Marta Fernando Pea
("Pea") that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for
much lesser considerations.
This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a
party may raise only questions of law in an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. 32 More so in
the instant case, where the Court of Appeals affirmed the
factual findings of the trial court.33
It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies
of Camargo and Pea because DE GUIA failed to present
documentary evidence to support their testimonies.
Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the
testimonies of Camargo and Pea unconvincing. Judges
cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every
witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are
credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the
evidence before them.34
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate
courts evaluation of the witnesses testimonies. We likewise
find reasonable the P25,000 yearly compensation for
ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being
a question of fact, it is for the trial and appellate courts to
decide and this Court will not disturb their findings unless
clearly baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain
in this case.
Fourth Issue: Attorneys Fees
34
The trial court did not err in imposing attorneys fees of

P20,000. Attorneys fees can be awarded in the cases
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code specifically:
xxx
GASPAR T. BALITE, CRISTETA T. BALITE and AURELIO

T. BALITE JR., All Represented by GASPAR T. BALITE,
petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO N. LIM, respondent.
(2) Where the defendants act or omission has compelled

the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
xxx
DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a coowner could not take exclusive possession of a common
property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle the case out of
court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable
to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary
expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph
(2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and
Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to that
portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo
compensatory damages of P212,500 and attorneys fees of
P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:
1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia
and Jose B. Abejo over the entire FISHPOND
covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of
Deeds is recognized without prejudice to the
outcome of CAG.R. CV No. 38031 pending before
the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the
same property;
2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall
equally enjoy possession and use of the entire
FISHPOND prior to partition;
3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per
annum representing rent from 27 November 1983
until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum
from 27 November 1983 until finality of this
decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until
full payment;
4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a
yearly rent of P25,000 from June 1992 until finality
of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum
during the same period, and thereafter at 12%
interest per annum until full payment;
5. After finality of this decision and for as long as
Manuel T. de Guia exclusively possesses the entire
FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly
rental of P25,000 for the latters undivided share
in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo secures from
the proper court an order fixing a different rental
rate in view of possible changed circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152168
December 10, 2004
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES AURELIO AND

ESPERANZA BALITE; Namely, ANTONIO T. BALITE,
FLOR T. BALITE-ZAMAR, VISITACION T. BALITEDIFUNTORUM, PEDRO T. BALITE, PABLO T. BALITE,
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the
true consideration is nonetheless binding between the
parties and their successors in interest. Furthermore, a deed
of sale in which the parties clearly intended to transfer
ownership of the property cannot be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code.
Finally, an agreement that purports to sell in metes and
bounds a specific portion of an unpartitioned co-owned
property is not void; it shall effectively transfer the sellers
ideal share in the co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the February 11, 2002 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65395. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Decision of the Court a quo subject of the appeal is
hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED and another
Decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exhibit "A") is
valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of
Esperanza Balite over the property covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 10824 is concerned;
2. The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6683 and to
issue another over the entirety of the property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10824,
upon the payment of the capital gains tax due, as
provided for by law, (based on the purchase price
of the property in the amount of P1,000,000.00),
with the following as co-owners, over the property
described therein:
a) Each of the [petitioners] over an
undivided portion of 975 square meters;
b) The [respondent], with an undivided
portion of 9,751 square meters.
3. The [respondent] is hereby ordered to pay to the
[petitioners] the amount of P120,000.00, within a
period of five (5) months from the finality of the
Decision of this Court;
4. In the event that the [respondent] refuses or
fails to remit the said amount to the [petitioner]
within the period therefor, the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by
Republic 6552 (Maceda Law)."3
The Facts
35
The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

"The spouses Aurelio x x x and Esperanza Balite
were the owners of a parcel of land, located [at]
Poblacion (Barangay Molave), Catarman, Northern
Samar, with an area of seventeen thousand five
hundred fifty-one (17,551) square meters, [and]
covered by Original Certificate of Title [OCT] No.
10824. When Aurelio died intestate [in 1985, his
wife], Esperanza Balite, and their children, x x x
[petitioners] Antonio Balite, Flor Balite-Zamar,
Visitacion Balite-Difuntorum, Pedro Balite, Pablo
Balite, Gaspar Balite, Cristeta (Tita) Balite and
Aurelio Balite, Jr., inherited the [subject] property
and became co-owners thereof, with Esperanza x x
x inheriting an undivided [share] of [9,751] square
meters.
"In the meantime, Esperanza x x x [became] ill and
was in dire need of money for her hospital
expenses x x x. She, through her daughter,
Cristeta, offered to sell to Rodrigo Lim, [her]
undivided share x x x for the price of
P1,000,000.00. x x x Esperanza x x x and Rodrigo x
x x agreed that, under the "Deed of Absolute Sale",
to be executed by Esperanza x x x over the
property, it will be made to appear that the
purchase price of the property would be
P150,000.00, although the actual price agreed
upon by them for the property was P1,000,000.00.
"On April 16, 1996, Esperanza x x x executed a
"Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Rodrigo N. Lim
over a portion of the property, covered by [OCT]
No. 10824, with an area of 10,000 square meters,
for the price of P150,000.00 x x x.
[They] also executed, on the same day, a "Joint
Affidavit" under which they declared that the real
price of the property was P1,000,000.00, payable
to Esperanza x x x, by installments, as follows:
1. P30,000.00 upon signing today of the
document of sale.
2. P170,000.00 payable upon completion
of the actual relocation survey of the land
sold by a Geodetic Engineer.
3. P200,000.00 payable on or before
May 15, 1996.
4. P200,000.00 payable on or before July
15, 1996.
September 15, 1996.
December 15, 1996.
"Only Esperanza and two of her children, namely,
Antonio x x x and Cristeta x x x, knew about the
said transaction. x x x Geodetic Engineer Bonifacio
G. Tasic conducted a subdivision survey of the
property and prepared a "Sketch Plan" showing a
portion of the property, identified as Lot 243 with
an area of 10,000 square meters, under the name
Rodrigo N. Lim.
"The "Sketch Plan" was signed by Rodrigo x x x and

Esperanza. Thereafter, Rodrigo x x x took actual
possession of the property and introduced
improvements thereon. He remitted to Esperanza x
x x and Cristeta x x x sums of money in partial
payments of the x x x property for which he signed
"Receipts".
"Gaspar, Visitacion, Flor, Pedro and Aurelio, Jr. x x x
learned of the sale, and on August 21, 1996, they
wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds [RD] of
Northern Samar, [saying] that they [were] not x x x
informed of the sale of a portion of the said
property by their mother x x x nor did they give
their consent thereto, and requested the [RD] to:
"x x x hold in abeyance any processal or
approval of any application for registration
of title of ownership in the name of the
buyer of said lot, which has not yet been
partitioned judicially or extrajudicially,
until the issue of the legality/validity of
the above sale has been cleared."
"On August 24, 1996, Antonio x x x received from
Rodrigo x x x, the amount of P30,000.00 in partial
payment of [the] property and signed a "Receipt"
for the said amount, declaring therein that "the
remaining balance of P350,000.00 shall personally
and directly be released to my mother, Esperanza
Balite, only." However, Rodrigo x x x drew and
issued RCBC Check No. 309171, dated August 26,
1996, [payable] to the order of Antonio Balite in
the amount of P30,000.00 in partial payment of the
property.
"On October 1, 1996, Esperanza x x x executed a
"Special Power of Attorney" appointing her son,
Antonio, to collect and receive, from Rodrigo, the
balance of the purchase price of the x x x property
and to sign the appropriate documents therefor.
"On October 23, 1996, Esperanza signed a letter
addressed to Rodrigo informing the latter that her
children did not agree to the sale of the property to
him and that she was withdrawing all her
commitments until the validity of the sale is finally
resolved:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"On October 31, 1996, Esperanza died intestate

and was survived by her aforenamed children.
"[Meanwhile], Rodrigo caused to be published, in
the Samar Reporter, on November 14, 21 and 28,
1996, the aforesaid "Deed of Absolute Sale".
Earlier, on November 21, 1996, Antonio received
the amount of P10,000.00 from Rodrigo for the
payment of the estate tax due from the estate of
Esperanza.
"Also, the capital gains tax, in the amount of
P14,506.25, based on the purchase price of
P150,000.00 appearing on the "Deed of Absolute
Sale", was paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
which issued a "Certification" of said payments, on
March 5, 1997, authorizing the registration of the
"Deed of Absolute Sale" x x x. However, the [RD]
refused to issue a title over the property to and
36
under the name of Rodrigo unless and until the

owners duplicate of OCT No. 10824 was presented
to [it]. Rodrigo filed a "Petition for Mandamus"
against the RD with the Regional Trial Court of
Northern Samar (Rodrigo Lim versus Fernando
Abella, Special Civil Case No. 48). x x x. On
June 13, 1997, the court issued an Order to the RD
to cancel OCT No. 10824 and to issue a certificate
of title over Lot 243 under the name of Rodrigo.
"On June 27, 1997, [petitioners] filed a complaint
against Rodrigo with the Regional Trial Court of
Northern Samar, entitled and docketed as "Heirs
of the Spouses Aurelio Balite, et al. versus
Rodrigo Lim, Civil Case No. 920, for
"Annulment of Sale, Quieting of Title,
Injunction and Damages x x x, [the origin of the
instant case.]
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The [petitioners] had a "Notice of Lis Pendens",

dated June 23, 1997, annotated, on June 27, 1997,
at the dorsal portion of OCT No. 10824.
"In the meantime, the RD cancelled, on July 10,
1997, OCT No. 10824 and issued Transfer
Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 6683 to and under the
name of Rodrigo over Lot 243. The "Notice of Lis
Pendens" x x x was carried over in TCT No. 6683.
"Subsequently, Rodrigo secured a loan from the
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the
amount of P2,000,000.00 and executed a "Real
Estate Mortgage" over the [subject] property as
security therefor.
"On motion of the [petitioners], they were granted
x x x leave to file an "Amended Complaint"
impleading the bank as [additional] partydefendant. On November 26, 1997, [petitioners]
filed their "Amended Complaint".
The [respondent] opposed the "Amended
Complaint" x x x contending that it was improper
for [petitioners] to join, in their complaint, an
ordinary civil action for the nullification of the "Real
Estate Mortgage" executed by the respondent in
favor of the Bank as the action of the petitioners
before the court was a special civil action.
"On March 30, 1998, the court issued an Order
rejecting the "Amended Complaint" of the
petitioners on the grounds that: (a) the Bank
cannot be impleaded as party-defendant under
Rule 63, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; (b) the "Amended Complaint"
constituted a collateral attack on TCT No. 6683.
The [petitioners] did not file any motion for the
reconsideration of the order of the court." 4
The trial court dismissed the Complaint and ordered the
cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT
No. 6683. It held that, pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil
Code, a co-owner has the right to sell his/her undivided
share. The sale made by a co-owner is not invalidated by
the absence of the consent of the other co-owners. Hence,
the sale by Esperanza of the 10,000-square-meter portion of
the property was valid; the excess from her undivided share
should be taken from the undivided shares of Cristeta and
Antonio, who expressly agreed to and benefited from the

sale.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the sale was valid and binding insofar as
Esperanza Balites undivided share of the property was
concerned. It affirmed the trial courts ruling that the lack of
consent of the co-owners did not nullify the sale. The buyer,
respondent herein, became a co-owner of the property to
the extent of the pro indiviso share of the vendor, subject to
the portion that may be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. The appellate court
disagreed with the averment of petitioners that the
registration of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. 6683
was ineffective and that they became the owners of the
share of Esperanza upon the latters death.
The CA likewise rejected petitioners claim that the sale was
void allegedly because the actual purchase price of the
property was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale. It
found that the true and correct consideration for the sale
was P1,000,000 as declared by Esperanza and respondent
in their Joint Affidavit. Applying Article 13535 of the Civil
Code, it held that the falsity of the price or consideration
stated in the Deed did not render it void. The CA pointed
out, however, that the State retained the right to recover
the capital gains tax based on the true price of P1,000,000.
The appellate court rejected petitioners contention that,
because of the allegedly unconscionably low and
inadequate consideration involved, the transaction covered
by the Deed was an equitable mortgage under Article 1602
of the Civil Code. Observing that the argument had never
been raised in the court a quo, it ruled that petitioners were
proscribed from making this claim, for the first time, on
appeal.
The CA further held that the remaining liability of
respondent was P120,000. It relied on the Receipt dated
August 24, 1996, which stated that his outstanding balance
for the consideration was P350,000. It deducted therefrom
the amounts of P30,000 received by Antonio on August 27,
1996; and P200,000, which was the amount of the check
dated September 15, 1996, issued by respondent payable
to Esperanza.
Finally, the appellate court noted that the mortgage over
the property had been executed after the filing of the
Complaint. What petitioners should have filed was a
supplemental complaint instead of an amended complaint.
Contrary to respondents argument, it also held that the
bank was not an indispensable party to the case; but was
merely a proper party. Thus, there is no necessity to
implead it as party-defendant, although the court a quo had
the option to do so. And even if it were not impleaded, the
appellate court ruled that the bank would still have been
bound by the outcome of the case, as the latter was a
mortgagee pendente lite over real estate that was covered
by a certificate of title with an annotated lis pendens.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners present the following
issues:
"A
37
"Whether or not the [CA] seriously erred in not

deciding that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April
16, 1996 is null and void on the grounds that it is
falsified; it has an unlawful cause; and it is contrary
to law and/or public policy.
"B
"Whether or not the [CA] gravely erred in not
finding that the amount paid by [respondent] is
only three hundred twenty thousand (P320,000.00)
pesos and that respondents claim that he has paid
one million pesos except P44,000.00 as balance, is
fraudulent and false.
The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Validity of the Sale
Petitioners contend that the Deed of Absolute Sale is null
and void, because the undervalued consideration indicated
therein was intended for an unlawful purpose -- to avoid the
payment of higher capital gains taxes on the transaction.
According to them, the appellate courts reliance on Article
1353 of the Civil Code was erroneous. They further contend
that the Joint Affidavit is not proof of a true and lawful
cause, but an integral part of a scheme to evade paying
lawful taxes and registration fees to the government.
"C
deciding that at the time the Deed of Sale was
registered x x x on May 30, 1997, said Deed of Sale
can no longer bind the property covered by OCT
No. 10824 because said land had already become
the property of all the petitioners upon the death of
their mother on October 31, 1996 and therefore
such registration is functus of[f]icio involving a null
and void document.
"D
ruling that petitioners amended complaint dated
November 27, 1997 was proper and admissible and
deemed admitted to conform to evidence
presented.
"E
declaring that TCT No. T-6683 in the name of
Respondent Rodrigo N. Lim is null and void and all
dealings involving the same are likewise null and
void and/or subject to the decision of the case at
bar in view of the notice of lis pendens annotated
therein.
We have before us an example of a simulated contract.

Article 1345 of the Civil Code provides that the simulation of
a contract may either be absolute or relative. In absolute
simulation, there is a colorable contract but without any
substance, because the parties have no intention to be
bound by it. An absolutely simulated contract is void, and
the parties may recover from each other what they may
have given under the "contract." 8 On the other hand, if the
parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their
real agreement, such a contract is relatively simulated.
Here, the parties real agreement binds them. 9
In the present case, the parties intended to be bound by the
Contract, even if it did not reflect the actual purchase price
of the property. That the parties intended the agreement to
produce legal effect is revealed by the letter of Esperanza
Balite to respondent dated October 23, 199610 and
petitioners admission that there was a partial payment of
P320,000 made on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
There was an intention to transfer the ownership of over
10,000 square meters of the property . Clear from the letter
is the fact that the objections of her children prompted
Esperanza to unilaterally withdraw from the transaction.
Since the Deed of Absolute Sale was merely relatively
simulated, it remains valid and enforceable. All the essential
requisites prescribed by law for the validity and perfection
of contracts are present. However, the parties shall be
bound by their real agreement for a consideration of
P1,000,000 as reflected in their Joint Affidavit. 11
"F
"Even assuming but without admitting that the
Deed of Sale is enforceable, the respondent court
seriously erred in not deciding that the
consideration is unconscionably low and
inadequate and therefore the transaction between
the executing parties constitutes an equitable
mortgage.
"G
"The [CA] greatly erred in not rendering judgment
awarding damages and attorneys fee[s] in favor of
petitioners among others."7
In sum, the issues raised by petitioners center on the
following: 1) whether the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid, and
2) whether there is still any sum for which respondent is
liable.
The Courts Ruling
The juridical nature of the Contract remained the same.

What was concealed was merely the actual price. Where the
essential requisites are present and the simulation refers
only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement
is absolutely binding and enforceable12 between the parties
and their successors in interest.
Petitioners cannot be permitted to unmake the Contract
voluntarily entered into by their predecessor, even if the
stated consideration was included therein for an unlawful
purpose. "The binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so." 13
However, as properly held by the appellate court, the
government has the right to collect the proper taxes based
on the correct purchase price.
Being onerous, the Contract had for its cause or
consideration the price of P1,000,000. Both this
consideration as well as the subject matter of the contract -Esperanzas share in the property covered by OCT No.
10824 -- are lawful. The motives of the contracting parties
for lowering the price of the sale -- in the present case, the
reduction of capital gains tax liability -- should not be
38
confused with the consideration.14 Although illegal, the

motives neither determine nor take the place of the
consideration. 15
The appellate court was correct in affirming the validity of

the sale of the property insofar as the pro indiviso share of
Esperanza Balite was concerned.
Deed of Sale not an

Equitable Mortgage
Article 493 of the Civil Code19 gives the owner of an

undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of such interest. The co-owner, however, has no
right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the
thing owned in common, because such right over the thing
is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any
physical division. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the deed
purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se
render the sale void.20 The sale is valid, but only with
respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.
Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the
partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Petitioner further posits that even assuming that the deed

of sale is valid it should only be deemed an equitable
mortgage pursuant to Articles 1602 and 1604 of the Civil
Code, because the price was clearly inadequate. They add
that the presence of only one of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 1602 would be sufficient to
consider the Contract an equitable mortgage. We disagree.
For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must
concur: one, the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale; and, two, their intention
was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.16
Indeed, the existence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 1602, not a concurrence or an
overwhelming number thereof, suffices to give rise to the
presumption that a contract purporting to be an absolute
sale is actually an equitable mortgage.17 In the present
case, however, the Contract does not merely purport to be
an absolute sale. The records and the documentary
evidence introduced by the parties indubitably show that
the Contract is, indeed, one of absolute sale. There is no
clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed upon
a mortgage of the subject property.
Furthermore, the voluntary, written and unconditional
acceptance of contractual commitments negates the theory
of equitable mortgage. There is nothing doubtful about the
terms of, or the circumstances surrounding, the Deed of
Sale that would call for the application of Article 1602. The
Joint Affidavit indisputably confirmed that the transaction
between the parties was a sale.
When the words of a contract are clear and readily
understandable, there is no room for construction. Contracts
are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and
should not be interpreted beyond their obvious
intendment.18 The contract is the law between the parties.
Notably, petitioners never raised as an issue before the trial
court the fact that the document did not express the true
intent and agreement of the contracting parties. They raised
mere suppositions on the inadequacy of the price, in
support of their argument that the Contract should be
considered as an equitable mortgage.
We find no basis to conclude that the purchase price of the
property was grossly inadequate. Petitioners did not present
any witness to testify as to the market values of real estate
in the subjects locale. They made their claim on the basis
alone of the P2,000,000 loan that respondent had been able
to obtain from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation.
This move did not sufficiently show the alleged inadequacy
of the purchase price. A mortgage is a mere security for a
loan. There was no showing that the property was the only
security relied upon by the bank; or that the borrowers had
no credit worthiness, other than the property offered as
collateral.
Co-Ownership
Hence, the transaction between Esperanza Balite and

respondent could be legally recognized only in respect to
the formers pro indiviso share in the co-ownership. As a
matter of fact, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between
the parties expressly referred to the 10,000-square-meter
portion of the land sold to respondent as the share of
Esperanza in the conjugal property. Her clear intention was
to sell merely her ideal or undivided share in it. No valid
objection can be made against that intent. Clearly then, the
sale can be given effect to the extent of 9,751 square
meters, her ideal share in the property as found by both the
trial and the appellate courts.
Transfer of Property
During her lifetime, Esperanza had already sold to
respondent her share in the subject parcel; hence her heirs
could no longer inherit it. The property she had transferred
or conveyed no longer formed part of her estate to which
her heirs may lay claim at the time of her death. The
transfer took effect on April 16, 1996 (the date the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed), and not on May 30, 1997,
when the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered. Thus,
petitioners claim that the property became theirs upon the
death of their mother is untenable.
Second Issue:
Respondents Liability
Petitioners insist that the appellate court erred in holding
that respondents outstanding liability on the Deed of Sale
was P120,000, when the Receipts on record show payments
in the total amount of P320,000 only. They argue that the
August 24, 1996 Receipt, on which the appellate court
based its conclusion, was unreliable.
To begin with, this Court is not a trier of facts. 21 It is not its
function to examine and determine the weight of the
evidence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that only errors of
law,22 and not of facts, are reviewable by this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals23
has held that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. These
findings may be reviewed24 only under exceptional
circumstances such as, among others, when the inference is
manifestly mistaken;25 the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;26 findings of the trial court
contradict those of the CA;27 or the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.28
39
Although the factual findings of the two lower courts were

not identical, we hold that in the present case, the findings
of the CA are in accord with the documents on record. The
trial court admitted in evidence the August 24, 1996 Receipt
signed by Antonio Balite. Interestingly, he was never
presented in the lower court to dispute the veracity of the
contents of that Receipt, particularly the second paragraph
that had categorically stated the outstanding balance of
respondent as of August 24, 1996, to be P350,000.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that subsequent
payments of P30,000 and P200,000 were made by the
latter. Thus, we affirm the CAs Decision holding that the
remaining unpaid balance of the price was P120,000.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA,
VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO
BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION BACUS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA
(deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, namely:
FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN
NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA
DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA,
respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's judgment
which declared as null and void the certificate of title in the
name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered the
partition of the disputed lot among the parties as coowners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the
respondent appellate court and by the trial court are as
follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on
installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in
1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister
namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and
Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the
property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the
name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased,
represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by
respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial
Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744
was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February
4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion
of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation

purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving
heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action
for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the
annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their
uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima
was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his
refusal to join the latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the
declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate
presently covered by transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3009, each sharing a proindiviso share of one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely:
Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and
Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely
Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo
Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely
Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D. Arias,
Helen Niadas and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu
Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima
(one-fourth).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is
declared null and void and the Register of
Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the
same and issue in lieu thereof another
title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso
owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo
Delima since 1958, the heirs of Galileo
Delima are ordered to turn a over to the
other heirs their respective shares of the
fruits of the lot in question computed at
P170.00 per year up to the present time
with legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
decision the parties are ordered to
petition the lot in question and the
defendants are directed to immediately
turn over possession of the shares here
awarded to the respective heirs.
Defendants are condemned to pay the
costs of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
40
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the

Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate
court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the
claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister
of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had
already relinquished and waived their rights to the property
in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid
the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and
the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging
that the Court of Appeals erred:
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir
to demand partition of inheritance is
imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of
prescription and laches have already been
waived.
2) In disregarding the evidence of the
petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or
not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the
statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo
Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares
in the disputed property. Article 494 of the Civil Code
expressly provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Each coowner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the
thing undivided for a certain period of
time, not exceeding ten years, shall be
valid. This term may be extended by a
new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition
for a period which shall not exceed twenty
years.
Neither shall there be any partition when
it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a coowner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to
be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is
understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such
owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with
the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is
under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a
trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura v.
Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368).
Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time
by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In
other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1,

1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims
that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v.
Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil.
811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for
partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of
the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as
exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that
of a trustee. In order that such possession is considered
adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation
of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1)
that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting
to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive
acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que
trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and
conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51
SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October
18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in
question executed a deed of partition and on the strength
thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of
their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he
appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect
denying or repudiating the ownership of the other coowners over their shares, the statute of limitations started
to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter
seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership
and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action
for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of
the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of
adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is
counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August
31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal
heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was
cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo
Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima
obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered
TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance
of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of
the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of
adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4,
1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As
the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his
exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the
other heirs and started as against them the period of
prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for
reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29,
1968, such action was already barred by prescription.
Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly
asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this
time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19,
1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
41
G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ,
CRISANTA DE CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE CASTRO, EFRINA
DE CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO and ARTEMIO DE
CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the
Decision of the Court Appeals dated August 14, 1995, in CAG.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution dated March 15, 1996,
which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1wphi1.nt
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action
for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal.
They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De
Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only
surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their
father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010
located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of
two thousand two hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters
more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their
knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother
Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when
Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property.
It is the contention of private respondents that the sale
made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the
lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners
equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special
defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches.
The trial court, after hearing the motion, dismissed the
complaint in an Order dated August 18, 1984. On motion for
reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated October 4,
1994, reconsidered the dismissal of the complaint and set
aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated January
5, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following
grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take
cognizance of the case as the causes of actions have been
decided with finality by the Supreme Court, and b) the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority in taking
cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court
of Appeals, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the lower court, dismissed the petition in a Decision
dated August 14, 1995. Petitioner filed a timely motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
March 15, 1996. Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the
granting of the writ of certiorari in the present case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP.
PROC. NO. 118-M). THE "CAUSES OF
ACTION" HEREIN HAVE BEEN FINALLY
DECIDED BY THE HON. COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BR. 31) MAKATI,
METRO MANILA, AND SUSTAINED IN A
FINAL DECISION BY THE HON. SUPREME
COURT.
SECOND GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY
WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79)
DATED OCTOBER 4, 1994, AND THE
ORDER DATED JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN
SAID RTC (BR. 79) INSISTED IN TRYING
THIS CASE AGAINST TCMC WHEN IT HAS
RULED ALREADY IN A FINAL ORDER THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT A "REAL PARTY" IN
INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 170,
ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO, ET. AL.
vs. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE,
ET . AL., WHICH CASE INVOLVED THE
SAME RELIEF, SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND
THE SAME PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY
WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY
DISREGARDED THE EXISTENCE OF RES
JUDICATA IN THIS CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether
or not the Regional Trial Court and/or the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether or not the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner
invokes Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as its mode in
obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Before we dwell on the merits of this petition, it is worth
noting, that for a petition for certiorari to be granted, it
must be shown that the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, for certiorari is
not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible
by appeal. 1 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of
discretion is not enough it must be grave. 2
In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondent. As correctly
pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of
the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 3
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. 4 Acquiring jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that
the lower court meant to reverse the decision of the
Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by
the petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
42
the complaint, hence the court's jurisdiction cannot be

made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss. 5 This has to be so, for were the principle
otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by
making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon
the defendant in all cases.
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction
any alleged errors committed in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are
revisable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action
of certiorari. 6 Based on the foregoing, even assuming for
the sake of argument that the appellate court erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court, which earlier denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss, such actuation on the part of
the appellate court cannot be considered as grave abuse of
discretion, hence not correctible by certiorari, because
certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It was petitioner who
elevated the instant controversy to the Court of Appeals via
a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking
affirmative relief therefrom. If a party invokes the
jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that
court's jurisdiction in the same case. 7 To do otherwise
would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation,
which is against the policy of the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a coowner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to the sale. 8 Under Article 493 of the Civil
Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller's
share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what
corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the
property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not
null and void. However, only the rights of the coowner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like
this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the
recovery of possession of the property owned in common
from the third person, but for division or partition of the
entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it. 9 Such
partition should result in segregating the portion belonging
to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.1wphi1.nt
In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of
prescription against an action for partition is a vain
proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."
In Budlong vs. Bondoc, 10 this Court has interpreted said
provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For
Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and
LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate,
how may marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on
certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals 1 Decision
promulgated December 1, 1994 2 and Resolution
promulgated on February 8, 1995 3 in CA-GR CV No. 23275,
which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
petitioner's action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a
complaint 4 for partition and damages against Private
Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad,
before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. 5 On
October 25, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not
substituted as a party. 6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page
decision 7 in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled: 8
Considering therefore that this court is of
the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate
son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is
entitled to inherit the property left by his
deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4
parcels of land subject matter of this case.
Although the plaintiff had testified that he
had been receiving [his] share from said
land before and the same was stopped,
there was no evidence introduced as to
what year he stopped receiving his share
and for how much. This court therefore
cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the
trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally
married to each other and that acquisitive prescription
against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed: 9
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the
appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the [petitioner's] complaint
and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned
Resolution which reads: 10
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants'
motion for reconsideration, dated
43
December 15, 1994, for lack of merit.

There are no new or substantial matters
raised in the motion that merit the
modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition.
11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this
case, as follows: 12
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein
petitioner] filed with the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action
for partition of four (4) parcels of land,
described therein, claiming that he was
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one
of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad,
who was the original owner of the parcels
of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940,
leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his
three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and
Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three
(3) equal shares and to give him the onethird (1/3) individual share of his late
father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07,
1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Defendants contended that Inocentes was
single when he died in 1941 , before
plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied
that plaintiff had lived with them, and
claimed that the parcels of land described
in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father
in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones
were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.
When Patricio died in 1940, survived by
the above named children, he left four (4)
parcels of land, all situated at Barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943,
claimed to be the legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria
Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23).
Sometime after the marriage, Arturio
demanded from the defendants that the
above-mentioned parcels of land be
partitioned into three (3) equal shares and
that he be given the one-third (1/3)
individual shares of his late father, but
defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by
both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent
portions of the trial court's decision: 13
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness,

Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time
she testified in 1981) who is the barangay
captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan,
since 1972. She testified that before being
elected as barrio captain she held the
position of barrio council-woman for 4
years. Also she was [a member of the]
board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers
Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That
she knows the plaintiff because they are
neighbors and she knows him from the
time of his birth. She knows the father of
the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his
mother Felicidad Molato; both were
already dead, Inocentes having died in
1944 and his wife died very much later.
Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943
in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July
21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the
plaintiff, the house of the witness was
about 30 meters away from plaintiff's
parents['] house and she used to go there
2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both
the defendants as they are also
neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio
because Inocentes Trinidad who is the
father of the plaintiff is the brother of the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
She testified she also knows that the
father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all
surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad
who is already dead but left several
parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows
all these [parcels of] land because they
are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or
boundaries of the 4 parcels of land,
witness answered and mentioned the
respective adjoining owners. That she
knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio
Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was
a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said
Patricio died before the [war] and after his
death the land went to his 3 children,
namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes.
Since then the land was never partitioned
or divided among the 3 children of
Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the
witness for identification and she
identified a woman in the picture as the
defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a
hat holding a baby was identified by her
as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other
woman in the picture was pointed by the
witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad
and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad
pointed to by her in the picture are the
same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are
the plaintiff and the defendants in this
case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was
presented to the witness for identification.
She testified the woman in this picture as
Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes
Trinidad was holding a child which witness
44
identified as the child Arturio Trinidad.

When asked by the court when . . . the
picture [was] taken, counsel for the
plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if
Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness
answered yes, as she had gone to the
house of his parents. Witness then
identified the certificate of baptism
marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio
Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and
the name of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato as father and mother
respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2.
The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was
also marked. The signature of Monsignor
Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified
that she [knew] the land in question very
well as she used to pass by it always. It
was located just near her house but she
cannot exactly tell the area as she merely
passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the
photographer who took the pictures
presented as Exhibit A and B, witness
answered she does not know as she was
not present during the picture taking.
However, she can identify everybody in
the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad
[died] without issue and he was survived
by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is
his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL
MEREN who was 72 years old and a
widow. She testified having known
Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio
Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes are brothers and sister and that
their father was Patricio Trinidad who left
them 4 parcels of land. That she knew
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato
who are the parents of Arturio, the
plaintiff, were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name
of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows
Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very
well because as a farmer she also owns a
parcel of land [and] she used to invite
Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during
planting and harvesting season. That she
knows that during the lifetime of
Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes,
Felix and Lourdes possessed and
usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited
from their father, Patricio. That upon the
death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was
in possession of the property without
giving the widow of Inocentes any share
of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her
two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes,
she was the one possessing and
usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the
present. The witness testified that upon
the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took
Arturio and cared for him when he was
still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio
grew up and got married. That while
Arturio was growing up, he had also
enjoyed the produce of the land while he
was being taken care of by Lourdes
Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on

arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get
his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will
not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was
presented as witness. He testified that
defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad,
are his aunt and uncle, they being the
brother and sister of his father. That the
parents of his father and the defendants
were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones. That both his father, Inocentes
Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato,
were already dead having died in Tigayon,
his father having died in 1944 and his
mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed
a certificate of baptism which had been
previously marked as Exhibit C. That his
birth certificate was burned during World
War 2 hut he has a certificate of loss
issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo,
Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants
invited him to live with them being their
nephew as his mother was already dead.
Plaintiff's mother died when he was 13
years old. They treated him well and
provided for all his needs. He lived with
defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19,
he left the house of the defendants and
lived on his own. He got married at 23 to
Candelaria Gaspar and then they were
invited by the defendants to live with
them. So he and his wife and children
lived with the defendants. As proof that he
and his family lived with the defendants
when the latter invited him to live with
them, he presented a picture previously
marked as Exhibit B where there appears
his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff's daughter, his uncle and his wife.
In short, it is a family picture according to
him. Another family picture previously
marked Exhibit A shows his uncle,
defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff's son. According to him, these 2
pictures were taken when he and his wife
and children were living with the
defendants. That a few years after having
lived with them, the defendants made
them vacate the house for he requested
for partition of the land to get his share.
He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to
handle his case. He testified there are 4
parcels of land in controversy of which
parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10
coconut trees and fruit bearing. The
harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months
and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each.
The boundaries are: East-Federico
Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; NorthTeodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio
Briones; located at Tigayon.
45
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500

square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree
and 1 bamboo groove; also located in
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners
are: East-Ambrosio Trinidad; NorthFederico Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad
and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters
and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio
Trinidad, the deceased father of the
defendants and Inocentes, the father of
the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000
square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans
two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners
are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio
Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and
North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral
survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with
an area of 540 square meters is the
subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral
survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No.
703310 with reference to one of the
owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad
married to Anastacia Briones, one-half
share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot
No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo.
The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad
married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609
in the name of Patricio Trinidad while
parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626
in the name of Anastacia Briones and
another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for
Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad
while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No.
16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified
that during the lifetime of his mother they
were getting the share in the produce of
the land like coconuts, palay and corn.
Plaintiff further testified that his father is
Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was
Felicidad Molato. They were married in
New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty.
Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty.
Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New
Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he
does not know because he was not yet
born at that time. That he does not have
the death certificate of his father who died
in 1944 because it was wartime. That
after the death of his father, he lived with
his mother and when his mother died[,] he
lived with his aunt and uncle, the
defendants in this case. That during the
lifetime of his mother, it was his mother
receiving the share of the produce of the

land. That both defendants, namely
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and
they have no other nephews and nieces.
That [petitioner's] highest educational
attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was
PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old,
unemployed and a resident of Nalook,
Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known
the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad. They being his first cousins
because the mother of Lourdes and Felix
by the name of Anastacia Briones and his
father are sister and brother. That he also
knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother
of Felix and Lourdes and he is already
dead. According to the witness, Inocentes
Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of
his death Inocentes Trinidad was not
married. That he knew this fact because
at the time of the death of Inocentes
Trinidad he was then residing with his
aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia
Briones who is mother of the defendants,
Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as
Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the
death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to
this witness he stayed with his aunt,
Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children
before 1940 for only 3 months. When
asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad
cohabited with anybody before his death,
he answered, "That I do not know",
neither does he kn[o]w a person by the
name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore,
when asked if he can recall if during the
lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness
knew of anybody with whom said
Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband
and wife, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered that he could not recall because
he was then in Manila working. That after
the war, he had gone back to the house of
his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as
he always visit[s] her every Sunday,
however, he does not know the plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the
death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew
anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered: "I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified
that although he was born in Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, he stated to reside in
Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property
of their father was located there. When
asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of
land which is the subject matter of this
case before the court, witness answered
that he does not know. What he knew is
that among the 3 children of Patricio
Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that
at the time of the death of Inocentes in
1940, according to the witness when cross
examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around
65 years old. That according to him, his
aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead
46
before the war. When asked on cross

examination if he knew where Inocentes
Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940,
witness answered that he was buried in
their own land because the Japanese
forces were roaming around the place.
When confronted with Exhibit A which is
the alleged family picture of the plaintiff
and the defendants, witness was able to
identify the lady in the picture, which had
been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes
Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on
the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is
Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he
knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said
he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the
defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD.
She stated that she is 75 years old, single
and jobless. She testified that Inocentes
Trinidad was her brother and he is already
dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone
to Manila where he stayed for a long time
and returned to Tigayon in 1941.
According to her, upon arrival from Manila
in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
lived only for 15 days before he died.
While his brother was in Manila, witness
testified she was not aware that he had
married anybody. Likewise, when he
arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did
[not] get married. When asked if she knew
one by the name of Felicidad Molato,
witness answered she knew her because
Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon.
However, according to her[,] she does not
kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
had lived with Felicidad Molato as
husband and wife. When asked if she
knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she
said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio
Trinidad had lived with them. According to
the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live
with the defendants but he stayed with
his grandmother by the name of Maria
Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato,
having died already. When asked by the
court if there had been an instance when
the plaintiff had lived with her even for
days, witness answered, he did not. When
further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to
visit her in her house, witness also said,
"He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the
plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her
parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio
Trinidad, had 3 children, namely:
Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and
herself. But inasmuch as Felix and
Inocentes are already dead, she is the
only remaining daughter of the spouses
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones.
Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that
her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a
wife and children, in the same manner
that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died
without a wife and children. She herself
testified that she does not have any
family of her own for she has [no]
husband or children. According to her[,]

when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941,
they buried him in their private lot in
Tigayon because nobody will carry his
coffin as it was wartime and the
municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the
Japanese forces. When further crossexamined that I[t] could not be true that
Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941
because the war broke out in December
1941 and March 1941 was still peace
time, the witness could not answer the
question. When she was presented with
Exhibit A which is the alleged family
picture wherein she was holding was [sic]
the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; "Yes." and the child that she is
holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio
Trinidad. According to her, she was only
requested to hold this child to be brought
to the church because she will be baptized
and that the baptism took place in the
parish church of Kalibo. When asked if
there was a party, she answered; "Maybe
there was." When confronted with Exhibit
A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying
the child, witness identified herself and
explained that she was requested to bring
the child to the church and that the
picture taken together with her brother
and Arturio Trinidad and the latter's child
was taken during the time when she and
Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in
court yet. She likewise identified the man
with a hat holding a child marked as
Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When
asked if the child being carried by her
brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of
the plaintiff, witness answered she does
not know because her eyes are already
blurred. Furthermore, when asked to
identify the woman in the picture who was
at the right of the child held by her
brother, Felix, and who was previously
identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as
his wife, witness answered that she
cannot identify because she had a poor
eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in
the picture for the same reason. When
asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she
knows that the one who took this picture
was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the
name of Julito Trinidad who was also their
cousin, witness testified that she does not
know.
Third witness for the defendants was
BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified
that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he
was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same
manner that she also knew the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and
Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because
they were her cousins. She testified that a
few months after the war broke out
Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola's
house whose names was Eugenia Rufo
Trinidad. She further testified that
Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his
lifetime in Manila and he went home only
when his father fetched him in Manila
because he was already sick. That
according to her, about 1 1/2 months after
47
his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad

died. She also testified that she knew
Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato
had never been married to Inocentes
Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941
when Inocentes Trinidad died. According
to her she was horn in 1928, therefore,
she was 13 or 14 years old when the war
broke out. When asked if she can
remember that it was only in the early
months of the year 1943 when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she
[was] not sure. She further testified that
Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their
private lot because Kalibo was then
occupied by the Japanese forces and
nobody would carry his body to be buried
in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner]
presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76
years old and a resident of Tigayon.
Rebuttal witness testified that . . . she
knew both the [petitioner] and the
[private respondents] in this case very
well as her house is only around 200
meters from them. When asked if it is true
that according to Lourdes Trinidad,
[Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in
1941 and he lived only for 15 days and
died, witness testified that he did not die
in that year because he died in the year
1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived
with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a
house which is only across the street from
her house. According to the said rebuttal
witness, it is not true that Inocentes
Trinidad died single because he had a wife
by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he
married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this
fact because she was personally present
when couple was married by Lauriano
Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness
testified that when Inocentes Trinidad
arrived from Manila he was in good
physical condition. That she knew both
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to
be Catholics but that according to her,
their marriage was solemnized by a
Protestant minister and she was one of
the sponsors. That during the marriage of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato,
Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were
also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was
presented as rebuttal witness, he was not
able to present a marriage contract of his
parents but instead a certification dated
September 5, 1978 issued by one
Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of New
Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact
that records of births, deaths, and
marriages in the municipality of New
Washington were destroyed during the
Japanese time.
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or

otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court
ruled: 14
We sustain the appeal on the ground that
plaintiff has not adduced sufficient
evidence to prove that he is the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to
claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was
recognized, as a legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or
a final judgment, in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument, or that
he was in continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz
Trinidad Sayon, testified for the
defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never
married. He died single in 1941. One
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal
for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad
married Felicidad Molato in New
Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant
church and that she attended the wedding
ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4).
Hence, there was no preponderant
evidence of the marriage, nor of
Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff as
his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not
prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil.
23). Where one of the interested parties
openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the coownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936,
January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription
may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised
Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the
defendants have been in possession of
the parcels of land involved in the concept
of owners since their father died in 1940.
Even if possession be counted from 1964,
when plaintiff attained the age of
majority, still, defendants possessed the
land for more than ten (10) years, thus
acquiring ownership of the same by
acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
15
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiffappellee) has proven by preponderant

evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiffappellee) has adduced sufficient evidence
to prove that he is the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private
respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad.
Respondent Court's Ruling
48
3. Whether or not the Family Code is

applicable to the case at bar[,] the
decision of the Regional Trial Court having
been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after
the Family Code became effective on
August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a
legitimate child can be attached
collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent
(defendants-appellants) have acquired
ownership of the properties in question by
acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents'
marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to
collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive
prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the
late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant proof
that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's
estate. 16 His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on
whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such
burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus,
the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is
inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will
not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory
conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule
does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over
the records and the evidence adduced in this case. 17
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his
mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was
born during the subsistence of their marriage. This,
according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the
question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises
in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness
to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation
as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth
and the baptismal certificates of children born during such
union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents. 19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from

the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of
births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's
case. Although the marriage contract is considered the
primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place. 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were
presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she
was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on
May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo,
who testified that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year
old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member
of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit
Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as
she lived only thirty meters away. 22 On July 21, 1943,
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave
birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal
party held at the same house. 23 Her testimony constitutes
evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. 24 It
further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 25 Petitioner
also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which
Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father
and mother. 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate
children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles
indicated in the preceding article, the
filiation shall be proved by the continuous
possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of
birth, authentic document, final judgment
or possession of status, legitimate filiation
may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. 27
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that
records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the
last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed
to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he
presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardo's testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit
A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4)
together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying
petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2).
These pictures were taken before the case was instituted.
Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to
Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the
private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem
motam.
49
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive.

While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita
Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she
did so only because she was requested to carry the child
before she was baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she
recognized her late brother but not petitioner, his wife
and the couple's children slyly explaining that she could
not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. 30
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive
proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under
the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as
this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: 31
What both the trial court and the respondent court
did not take into account is that an illegitimate
child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by
"any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or
"by evidence of proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father," according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed.,
p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a
member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or
affinity, 32 her testimony does not constitute family
reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be
used to establish petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive
evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents'
self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents' thesis is
that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941.
Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that
Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the
Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to
the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the
Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible
because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months,
and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal
and evasive: 33
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the
Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or
not?
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long

did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad
and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death,
Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if
he had cohabited with anybody before his
death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad
Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of
anybody with whom he has lived as husband
and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in
Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having
gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia
at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to the house of your
aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do
you know if there was anybody who has
stayed with the defendants who claimed to be
a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes
Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said "them", to whom are you
referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent,

testified, that when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941,
her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon
because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their
grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and
without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his
return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also
a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever
married to Inocentes. 34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until
December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes dies
in March 1941. 35 The Japanese forces occupied Manila only
on January 2, 1942; 36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan
50
was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery
In Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were
roaming around the area. 37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes'
surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents a presumptive proof of his status as
Inocentes' legitimate child. 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the
evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the
adverse party. 39 Compared to the detailed (even if
awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent
Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate
filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where
the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. 40
Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and
convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in
petitioner's favor. It declared:
. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that
plaintiff had lived with defendants
enjoying the status of being their
nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten
married and had a family of his own where
later on he started demanding for the
partition of the share of his father,
Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so
lived with the defendants . . . is shown by
the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B.
These family pictures were taken at a time
when plaintiff had not broached the idea
of getting his father's share. . . . His
demand for the partition of the share of
his father provoked the ire of the
defendants, thus, they disowned him as
their nephew. . . . In this case, the plaintiff
enjoyed the continuous possession of a
status of the child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the defendants
themselves, which status was only broken
when plaintiff demanded for the partition .
. . as he was already having a family of his
own. . . . .
However, the disowning by the defendant
[private respondent herein], Lourdes
Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein]
being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them
the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo,
who is the barrio captain. This witness
was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to
favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA
officer and the court sized her up as a
civic minded person. She has nothing to
gain in this case as compared to the
witness for the defendants who are either
cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who
stands to gain in the case for defendant,
Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years
old, has no husband nor children. 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42

Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present
evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence,
there is no more need to rule on the application of this
doctrine to petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive
prescription sets in when one of the interested parties
openly and adversely occupies the property without
recognizing the co-ownership, and because private
respondents had been in possession in the concept of
owners of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died
in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired
ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all
the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the coownership. 43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a coowner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so
long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the
action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner,
was receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition
of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond
question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation,
if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes
over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were
still in their father's name. Although private respondents
had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the
pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation
of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court held: 44
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run
again private respondents with respect to
the filing of the action for partition so long
as the heirs for whose benefit prescription
is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In the other
words, prescription of an action for
partition does not lie except when the coownership is properly repudiated by the
co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]
citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532
[1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners
(Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs.
IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other
hand, an action for partition may be seen
to be at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of
the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 118 [1988]).
51
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed

reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the
land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170080
April 4, 2007
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, Petitioner,

vs.
CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI,
JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO M. QUINTOS,
JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS and TYRONE M. QUINTOS,
Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Consolacion Q. Austria assails the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 68591 dated June 21,
2005 and its Resolution2 dated October 7, 2005, which
respectively affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 142, dated February 14, 2000
and its order4 dated August 7, 2000, and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo
Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio
Quintos, and defendant-appellant Consolacion Austria are
siblings of full blood. Jose Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and
Tyrone, all surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of
the defendant-appellant.
The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels
of land with an aggregate area of six hundred sixty one
(661) square meters located in Palanan, Makati City. The
aforesaid parcels of land have permanent improvements
thereon which straddle both lots, namely, a residential
bungalow and two (2) units, two-storey apartments, the
titles of which are registered jointly in the names of the
parties as co-owners thereof.
The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the early
part of 1996, they informed defendant-appellant of their
desire to have the subject properties partitioned based on
the percentage of each co-owners respective share.
A realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by
which the subject properties could be physically partitioned
among the co-owners. However, the defendant-appellant
Austria refused to accede to any of the schemes presented
by the realtor for the physical apportionment of the subject
properties between the co-owners thereof.
Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to
partition the property, and the inability of the co-owners to
mutually agree on an arrangement acceptable to all of
them, on July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1485,
against the defendant-appellant Austria and two other

defendants namely Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos
(as unwilling co-plaintiffs) for partition of the subject
property.
Within the period for filing an answer, the defendantappellant Austria filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
In its order dated November 10, 1997, the lower court
denied the omnibus motion to dismiss of the defendantappellant Austria, and directed the defendants to file their
answer within the remaining period provided by the Rules.
Within the prescriptive period, the defendant-appellant
Austria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November
10, 1997 order, which the lower court denied in an order
dated February 2, 1998.
Not satisfied, the defendant-appellant Austria filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which was
docketed as CA-GR SP No. 46907, seeking to annul the
orders of November 10, 1997 and February 2, 1998.
In a Resolution dated July 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals
required the plaintiffs-appellees to comment, and
temporarily restrained the respondent judge, his agents,
representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 97-1485 in order that the
petition may not become moot and academic.
On November 9, 1998, the defendant-appellant Austria
received a copy of the Decision dated October 30, 1998
dismissing her petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
defendant-appellant Austria moved for the reconsideration
thereof.
Subsequently, on July 19, 2001, defendant-appellant Austria
received a copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated July 9, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration
of the decision denying her petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then filed a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court with the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the Supreme Court
denied the said petition for review for non-compliance with
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to pay on time
docket and other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec.
3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56.
Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the defendantappellant Austria filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution dated October 15, 2001 denying her petition for
review.
In its resolution dated January 24, 2002, the Supreme Court
denied with finality the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
During the pendency of the defendant-appellants petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court, the plaintiffsappellees filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142 where the main case is pending, a motion dated
April 6, 1998 praying that a declaration of default be issued
52
against all defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to

present evidence ex-parte.
In an order dated July 13, 1998, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City held in abeyance the
proceedings before it while awaiting the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration pending before the Court of
Appeals.
Notwithstanding the order holding in abeyance the
proceedings in the lower court, plaintiffs-appellees filed a
Manifestation and Motion dated September 14, 1998
praying for the resolution of their Motion dated April 6,
1998. In its order dated September 25, 1998, the lower
court deemed the incident submitted for resolution.
While the motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant
is still pending before the Court of Appeals, the lower court
in its order dated July 6, 1999 declared the defendants in
default, set the reception of ex-parte evidence, and
commissioned the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the exparte evidence and to submit her corresponding report
thereon as soon as the same is concluded.
On On August 4, 1999, the defendant-appellant Austria filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 6, 1999
with an urgent prayer to cancel plaintiffs ex parte
presentation of evidence on August 9, 1999, which was
however denied by the lower court, for lack of merit, in an
order dated January 14, 2000.
The plaintiffs-appellees then presented their evidence exparte on January 28, 2000.
The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the
lower court on February 14, 2000, finding in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellees.
A motion for new trial was thereafter filed by the defendantappellant Austria, which was, in an order dated August 7,
2000, denied for lack of merit.5
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
dismissed her petition and affirmed the trial courts decision
but deleted the order that petitioner pay reasonable rental
for her use of a portion of the disputed properties. The
appellate court denied reconsideration.
In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
avers that her motion for new trial and appeal of the
judgment by default are valid remedies under the Rules of
Court. She insists that the appellate court erred in not
reversing the declaration of default despite the fact that she
questioned the default order in the petition for review which
she seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
also contends that it was error for the trial court to allow the
sale of the entire property in dispute.
Respondents filed a Comment6 dated March 30, 2006,
arguing that petitioner was correctly declared in default
because of her obstinate refusal to file an answer to the
complaint despite being ordered to do so by the trial court.
They also allege that they cannot be compelled to remain in
co-ownership only because of petitioners unjustified refusal
to consent to a partition.
A Reply to Comment7 dated July 25, 2006 was filed by
petitioner who insisted that she was denied the right to fully
ventilate her case.
Only two issues are raised in this petition. The first issue
pertains to petitioners insistence that the judgment by
default rendered by the trial court, which was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is a denial of her day in
court. The second issue concerns the validity of the trial
courts decision alternatively ordering the partition of the
subject property or authorizing its sale.
A defendant declared in default has the following remedies:
(a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Sec.
3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; (b) a motion for new trial
under Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the default was discovered after
judgment but while appeal is still available; (c) a petition for
relief under Rule 38 if judgment has become final and
executory; and (d) an appeal from the judgment under Sec.
1, Rule 41 even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been resorted to. 8
In this case, petitioner did not move to set aside the order
of default rendered by the trial court but filed a motion for
new trial after a decision had already been rendered in the
case. The motion for new trial, however, was denied by the
trial court for lack of merit. She then appealed to the Court
of Appeals, assailing both the denial of her motion for new
trial and the adverse decision of the trial court.
Evidently, petitioner utilized the appropriate remedies
available to her. The fact, however, that she availed of the
proper remedies does not by itself result in a judgment in
her favor or the reversal of the assailed order and decision
of the trial court. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner was declared in default because of her adamant
refusal to file an answer despite being required to do so.
The factual circumstances in the cases of Heirs of Akut v.
Court of Appeals9 and Ampeloquio v. Court of Appeals,10
cited by petitioner in pleading liberality, are markedly
different from this case. In Heirs of Akut, petitioners were
not able to file an answer within the reglementary period
because they failed to obtain the services of counsel on
time and two of the petitioners were then sick. In
Ampeloquio, the trial courts order denying defendants
motion to dismiss was mistakenly served upon one of its
counsels on record and not upon the lawyer in charge of the
case. Consequently, the answer was not filed on time. In
both cases, there was no indication that the failure to
answer was intended to delay the case.
In contrast, the facts of this case suggest an intention on
the part of petitioner to delay the proceedings. The
complaint was first filed in 1997 but is only now being finally
laid to rest because of several procedural stumbling blocks,
including the elevation of the case to this Court on the issue
of the propriety of the trial courts denial of petitioners
motion to dismiss, hurled by petitioner one after the other.
Parenthetically, the appellate court initially issued a
temporary restraining order as an incident to the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner questioning the trial courts
order denying her motion to dismiss but the restraining
order was lifted after its 60-day validity.11 The expiration of
the temporary restraining order resulted in the running of
the prescribed period to file an answer and the continuation
of the proceedings before the trial court. Petitioners
obstinate refusal to file an answer to the complaint despite
these circumstances clearly justifies the declaration of
default by the trial court and its affirmation by the Court of
Appeals.
This case has crept, ever so slowly, up the ladder of judicial
process. While we are not dissuading parties from availing
53
of the judicial remedies outlined in the Rules of Court, they

should be cautioned to be judicious in availing of these
remedies. After all, rules of procedure are intended to be,
not tools of delay, but of prompt and just disposition of
every partys cause. Having fully availed of, even exploited,
these remedies, petitioner cannot feign denial of her day in
court. She has been given every opportunity to fully
ventilate her side.
Now, we turn to the second issue raised by petitioner, i.e.,
the validity of the trial courts decision alternatively
directing the partition of the subject properties or
authorizing their sale to a third party.
There are two stages in every action for partition. The first
phase is the determination of whether a co-ownership in
fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed, and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is
not entitled to have a partition either because a coownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited;
or (b) with a determination that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter
case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon.12
The second phase commences when it appears that the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by
the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. 13
1) Directing the partition (physical division) of the

subject properties and all improvements thereon
among the co-owners in accordance with their
respective shares; or
2) Authorizing the sale, conveyance or transfer of
the above-described properties to a third-party at
such price and under such terms acceptable
to plaintiffs and thereafter, dividing the
proceeds of said sale among them in
accordance with their proportionate
interests.16 [Emphasis supplied.]
It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on appeal
resulting in the appellate courts failure to rule on the
matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simply brush this issue
aside considering that its resolution is necessary in arriving
at a just disposition of the case.17 The rectification of the
trial courts decision is accordingly in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 is REVERSED in
so far as it affirms the portion of the decision dated
February 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142, which authorizes the sale, conveyance or
transfer of the properties subject of this case and the
division of the proceeds of said sale to respondents herein.
The Decision dated June 21, 2005 and Resolution dated
October 7, 2005 are AFFIRMED in all other respects. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The proceedings in this case have only reached the first

phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that even if the
order decreeing partition leaves something more to be done
by the trial court for the complete disposition of the case,
i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for
the determination of just compensation by the appointed
commissioners, the submission of their reports and hearing
thereon, and the approval of the partition, it is considered a
final order and may be appealed by the party aggrieved
thereby.14
There is no question that a co-ownership exists between
petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court
was correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code
provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership.15
However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized
the sale of the subject properties to a third party and the
division of the proceeds thereof. What makes this portion of
the decision all the more objectionable is the fact that the
trial court conditioned the sale upon the price and terms
acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein) only, and
adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to plaintiffs.
The pertinent portion of the trial courts disposition states:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
54

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G.R. Nos.

L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

2. in declaring that the accretion to

area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river

URBANO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,

In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C.

JESUS AGUIRRE, petitioner,

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

VICTOR S. PHENG, in his capacity as General Manager

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

In Civil Case No. 27988, the court rendered decision based

ordinarily, therefore, Aguirre, as owner of the tank, would be

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the

petitioner's father Jose Olviga, claimed both Lots 12 and 13,

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

in-interest of defendants, has not yet

land claiming to be owner thereof may

April 27, 2007

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

domestic corporation in which Santos acted as the

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

P1,218,000.00. It denied the allegation advanced by the

WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR

the property as he deems best (citation omitted). Such

WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARDS OF DAMAGES, ATTRONEYS

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from

In questioning the adverse ruling of the appellate court, the

The mortgage of the subject property to the Bank of

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

According to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as

the society, requires the discouragement of stale claims,

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to

penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for

This petition for review on certiorari assails the June 20,

August 10, 2007

HEIRS OF MARCELA SALONGA BITUIN, Petitioners,

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

Petitioners averred that they are entitled to the one-half

m., was adjudicated in favor of Teofilo Caoleng; Lot C,

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

d) ordering the Defendants to vacate Cad. Lots No.

based on a forged document.24 On cross-examination, Rosita

ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No.

On March 13, 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of

The lone issue raised by petitioners is whether or not the CA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

Petitioners posit that there are two fundamental legal

1. Declaring plaintiffs as owner to the extent of 941

1. Prescription was not raised by Respondents as a

PROPERTY SET 3 | KRISTEL (ART. 457-494)

However, in a number of cases in the past, the Court

A - Rita Caoleng and her family, Sir.

Q - And how were you able to discover that these

A - When the titles were released, Marcela Salonga

Q - And how were they titled?

Q - And the one located near the Betis river is