F I L E D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

APR 17 2001

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

In re: JAY H. PETERSON,

Debtor.
JAY H. PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
SANDRA LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION;
MIKE MARTIN; DEBORAH
MARTIN,

No. 99-4243
(D.C. No. 98-CV-709)
(D. Utah)

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

Before KELLY , BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Debtor-plaintiff Jay Peterson appeals from a district court order dismissing
these consolidated adversary proceedings.

We affirm, primarily for the reasons

stated by the district court, with minor differences in rationale noted below.
In May 1993, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commenced an action
against Mr. Peterson and several corporations alleging deceptive trade practices.
The FTC secured appointment of an equity receiver to manage corporate assets
and, in August 1995, a settlement agreement was executed encompassing the
FTCs claims and those of various other parties.
Shortly after the FTC action commenced, Mr. Peterson personally filed for
bankruptcy. On November 29, 1995, the bankruptcy court confirmed his Second
Amended Plan of Reorganization. While the plan accommodated the settlement

The notice of appeal was signed by Mr. Peterson (pro se), but not by Sandra
Lopez. We therefore refer only to [Mr. Peterson,] although our decision would
be the same even if [Ms. Lopez] had appealed.
Duncan v. Gunter , 15 F.3d 989,
990 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994); see 10th Cir. R. 3.1.

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agreement in the FTC case in various ways, it was a distinct structuring of assets
and debts specific to Mr. Peterson. And, though certain potential claims available
against Mr. Peterson were deemed satisfied by virtue of the FTC settlement, the
receivership estate and bankruptcy estate were nevertheless distinct entities.
In August 1998 and January 1999, Mr. Peterson filed two adversary
complaints (the second adding one claim to the first) in his bankruptcy case.
These asserted claims against an ex-employee and her husband (the Martins) for
embezzlement and other wrongdoing allegedly prompting financial problems
leading to the FTC enforcement action and Mr. Petersons bankruptcy. They
alleged FTC employees aided the Martins and, more generally, engaged in
submarine receivership tactics, prompting an assortment of claims against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Federal Debt Collection Act,
Tucker Act, Privacy Act, Internal Revenue Code, and Utah law. Eventually,
the proceedings were consolidated and withdrawn from the bankruptcy court.
In October 1999, the district court granted defendants motion to dismiss.
The district court disposed of the case on alternative grounds. First, it
concluded that the claims were not related to the Peterson bankruptcy and,
therefore, failed to implicate bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1334(b).
Second, it held that the claims as pled were deficient in various legal respects and

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thus subject to dismissal in any event. We review both of these conclusions

de novo. See Dry v. United States , 235 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2000).
The district court appropriately applied a strict test for 1334(b) related
to jurisdiction, looking to the proceedings practical effect on implementation of
the confirmed reorganization plan, rather than to its conceivable effect on the
bankruptcy estate.

See Zahn Assoc., Inc. v. Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc. (In re Leeds

Bldg. Prods., Inc.) , 160 B.R. 689, 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
Norman Kinel and Melissa Neier,

See generally

Post-Confirmation Jurisdiction in the

Bankruptcy Courts: Does It Ever End?

, 55 Bus. Law. 81 (1999). Any impact on

the implementation of Mr. Petersons plan is simply too remote a contingency to

support bankruptcy jurisdiction under 1334(b).
That is not the end of the matter, as the district court could rely on other,
non-bankruptcy bases for federal jurisdiction, at least where they were explicitly
invoked in the pleadings.

See, e.g. , Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum,

Inc.) , 910 F.2d 784, 789 (11th Cir. 1990);

In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R.

Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1187-89 (7th Cir. 1986);

Cf. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v.

C.J. Van Houten E Zoon, Inc. (In re Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc.)

, 66 B.R. 614, 617

(E.D. Mich. 1986). Mr. Peterson invoked several grounds for extra-bankruptcy
jurisdiction in his pleadings. As noted above, the district courts order includes
an alternative disposition of the claims involved.
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The district court held that, with one exception not pertinent here,

the

FTCA claim was time-barred under the Acts two-year limitations provision.
We agree that the provision applied to bar Mr. Petersons FTCA claims, and
hold that his attempt to invoke equitable tolling falls far short of the necessary
grounds, see Perez v. United States , 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999) (following
Irwin v. Dept of Veterans Affairs

, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).

The district court similarly held the Privacy Act claim barred under the
two-year statute of limitations in 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(5). We agree and note that,
to the extent Mr. Petersons general discussion of equitable tolling is intended to
apply, it avails him no more here than under the FTCA. The same is true of his
claim under the Internal Revenue Codes non-disclosure provision, 26 U.S.C.
7431, which also has a two-year statute of limitations, 7431(d).
The district court held it lacked jurisdiction over any Tucker Act claim in
light of the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the United States Federal Court of
Claims in 28 U.S.C. 1491. Again, we agree.

See, e.g. , Amerada Hess Corp. v.

Dept of Interior , 170 F.3d 1032, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Peterson now
asks for transfer of this claim, but our acquiescence in this belated request would
not be in the interest of justice, 28 U.S.C. 1631. After taking a peek at the
The exception concerns allegations regarding ex parte contact with a
magistrate judge, which the court held were not actionable in light of judicial
immunity. Mr. Peterson has not challenged that particular ruling on appeal.

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merits, we conclude that, in light of both the timing of the request and the
substance of the underlying claims, a transfer at this point would entail wasting
judicial resources.

Haugh v. Booker , 210 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted).
Mr. Petersons Administrative Procedures Act claim fails for various
reasons. The most obvious is that his pleadings seek damages, which are not
available under the APA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 702. His attempt to circumvent
the statute through a perfunctory reference to restitution is unavailing.
See California v. United States , 104 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 1997).
Finally, the district court dismissed Mr. Petersons state law claims for
lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Peterson has failed to challenge that ruling on appeal.
See generally Franklin Sav. Corp. , 180 F.3d at 1128-29 (potential grounds
supporting jurisdiction may be waived like any other contention).
In sum, Mr. Peterson has failed to show any reversible error in the district
courts disposition of the proceedings. To the extent any particular arguments
he raises on appeal are not addressed explicitly, they have been considered by
the panel but found to be lacking sufficient merit to warrant express comment.

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Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Utah is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge

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