STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION
DIGESTS

CASE

CHAPTER 1 & 2

Morales vs. Subido

GR No. 1-29658
27 February 1969
FACTS:
In the Senate, the Committee on Government
Reorganization, to which House Bill No. 6951
was referred, reported a substitute measure. It
is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the
Act owes its present form and substance. The
provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of the city
police agency unless he holds a bachelors
degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation or police department of any
city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city for at least 8 years
with the rank of captain or higher.
The petitioner asserted that there were various
changes made in House Bill 6951 and
according to the Petitioner the House bill
division deleted an entire provision and
substituted what is now section 10 of the Police
Act of 1966, which section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief
of Police Agency. No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served as chief
of police with exemplary record or has served
in the police department of any city with the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate
who has served as officer in the Armed Forces
for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/higher.
Petitioner even submitted documents that
would appear that the omission of the phrase
who served the police department of a city
was made not at any stage of the legislative
proceedings but only in the course of
engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreading stage and that the change was
not made by Congress but only by an
employee.
It is for this reason that the Petitioner would
have the court look searchingly into the matter.
ISSUE: Whether the Judiciary can assail the
validity of an enrolled bill by investigating the
legislative process.

RULING: Negative, the Judiciary cannot be a

sleuth trying to determine what actually
happen in the process of lawmaking without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers
and
undermining
one
of
the
cornerstone of our democratic system. The
investigation which the Petitioner would like
the Court to make can be better done in
Congress.
The enrolled bill prevails in any discrepancy.
Tanada vs Tuvera
146 scra 446
Publication Presidential Proclamations etc
What unless otherwise provided means in
Article 2 of the Civil Code
FACTS:
With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered
Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette
the unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and
effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration
and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be
made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as
long as the people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon
the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it
finds the same as impractical. That is not its
function for such is the function of the
legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is
merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance
with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court
declared that all laws shall immediately upon
their approval or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days
from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause unless
otherwise provided pertains to the date of
publication and not the requirement of
publication.
PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY
94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954
(Constitutional Law Publication
Circulars and Regulations)

of

Bank

FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of

foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S.
checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the
same to the Central Bank through its agents
within one day following the receipt of such
foreign exchange as required by Central Bank
Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim

that the said circular had no force or effect

because the same was not published in the
official Gazette prior to the act or omission
imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General
counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and
2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force
and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and
regulations should be published in order to
have force and effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially
like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. Before
the public is bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.

PNB v. CA
Case No. 238G.R. No. 98382 (May 17,
1993)
FACTS: To secure payments of his loans,
Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner
bank. For
failure
to pay
the obligation, Petitioner bank extra judicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won
the highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a
final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan
Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner
bank and later sold the said lots to a third
party. The notices of sale of Appellants
foreclosed properties were published on March
28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper Daily Record. The date March 28,
1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11
and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires
that the notice of auction sale shall be
published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requ
irements of weeklypublication of notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
HELD: It must be conceded that that Article
13 is completely silent as to the definition
of what is week. In Concepcion v. Andueta,
the term week was interpreted to mean as a
period of time consisting of seven consecutive
days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to

comply with
publication

the

legal

requirement

of

National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson

G.R. No. L-29131. August 27, 1969
FACTS: On November 14, 1955, the Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in
Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson
and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," The
National Marketing Corporation, as successor
to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses
in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation
filed a complaint against the same defendants,
for the revival of the judgment rendered in said
Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel Tecson
seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription.
Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court
became final on December 21, 1955. This case
was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 but
more than ten years have passed a year is a
period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff
forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so
that when this present case was filed it was
filed two days too late.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for
the revival of a judgment is barred by the
statute of limitations.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil
Code, an action upon a judgment "must be
brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues," which, in the language
of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences
from the time the judgment sought to be
revived has become final." Plaintiff-appellant
insists that the same "is erroneous, because a
year
means
a calendar
year (Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by
Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being
computed here is the number of years, a
calendar year should be used as the basis of
computation. There is no question that when it
is not a leap year, December 21 to December
21 of the following year is one year. Certainly,
the extra day in a leap year must belong to the
year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366
days constitute one year."
Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code
of Spain, the Supreme Court held that when
the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural"
month or "solar" month, in the absence of
express provision to the contrary. Hence, the
same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant
to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are
referred to in the law, it shall be understood
that the months are of 30 days," not the

"natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months,

unless they are "designated by name," in which
case "they shall be computed by the actual
number of days they have. This concept was
later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13
of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to
which, "month shall be understood to refer to a
calendar
month." However,
the
court
has reverted to the provisions of the Spanish
Civil Code in accordance with which a month is
to be considered as the regular 30-day
month ... and not the solar or civil month," with
the particularity that, whereas the Spanish
Code merely mentioned "months, days or
nights,"
ours
has
added
thereto
the
term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall
be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days."

FACTS: In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her

candidacy to the position of Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was
opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the
ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years
old, 9 months at the time of the filing).
Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she
be admitted as a candidate and the SK
elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume,
filed a petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Garvida. When the elections
results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78,
while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually
proclaimed as winner but had to face the
petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section
424 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
provides that candidates for the SK must be at
least 15 years of age and a maximum age of
21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not
specify that the maximum age requirement is
exactly 21 years hence said provision must be
construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year
but still less than 22 years so long as she
does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because
she is still, technically, 21 years of age
(although she exceeds it by 9 months).

provides that candidates for SK must be:

Filipino citizen; an actual resident of the
barangay for at least six months; 15 but not
more than 21 years of age; and duly registered
in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in
the official barangay list. The provision is clear.
Must not be more than 21 years of age. The
said phrase is not equivalent to less than 22
years old. The law does not state that the
candidate be less than 22 years on election
day. If such was the intention of Congress in
framing the LGC, then they should have
expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second
highest number of vote, hence he should be
declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid
contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a
defeated candidate, though obtaining the
second highest number of vote, is not deemed
to have been elected by reason of the winners
eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot
be declared as successor simply because he
did not get the majority or the plurality of votes
the electorate did not choose him. It would
have been different if Sales was able to prove
that the voters still voted for Garvida despite
knowing her ineligibility, this would have
rendered her votes stray.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK
Chairman should be succeeded by the SK
member who obtained the highest number of
votes, should the SK member obtaining such
vote succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales situation
Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not
SK membership.)
The above argument cant be considered in
this case because Section 435 only applies
when the SK Chairman refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony,
voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently
incapacitated, is removed from office, or has
been absent without leave for more than three
(3) consecutive months. Garvidas case is not
what Section 435 contemplates. Her removal
from office by reason of her age is a question
of eligibility. Being eligible means being
legally qualified; capable of being legally
chosen. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution or the statutes for holding
public office. Ineligibility is not one of the
grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age

requirement.

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL

(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)

HELD: No. Section

Government Code

FACTS: This is a petition to review a decision

of Auditor General denying petitioners claim

Garvida vs Sales
271 SCRA 767
Law on Public Officers Ineligibility SK
Chairman Labo Doctrine Applied

424

of

the

Local

for quarters allowance as manager of the

National Abaca and other Fibers Corp.
(NAFCO). Petitioner was general manager in
1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of
P15,000.00 NAFCO Board of Directors granted
P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner
amounting to P1,650 for 1949. This allowance
was disapproved by the Central Committee of
the government enterprise council under
Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation
by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the
Auditor general on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting
managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

Palomar however denied the mailing of such

contest rules according to him violates the said
provision. He contends that the contest can be
subject to fraud order if pursued because it
falls under any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any
real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind which is not allowed by
the Postal Law. Caltex referred the case to the
trial court and the trial court ruled in favor of
Caltex. Palomar appealed arguing that Caltex
has no sufficient cause of action to seek
declaratory relief (and decisions can only be
advisory in nature) and that the proposed
contest does violate the Postal Law.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Executive Order

No. 93 exercising control over Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC)
implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null
and void.
(2) Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing
presidential
control
over
GOCCs
is
Constitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contest violates the

Postal Law (Chap 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code).

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is

not illegal delegation of legislative power to the
executive as argued by petitioner but a
mandate for the President to streamline
GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93 is valid
because it was promulgated within the 1 year
period given. Petition for review DISMISSED
with costs

Caltex vs Palomar
Corpus Juris Secundum
FACTS: In 1960, Caltex announced its Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest. The aim thereof is to
let participants estimate the actual number of
liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station dispense during a specified period. In
order to join, no fee or consideration is required
to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be
made available upon request at each Caltex
station where a sealed can will be provided for
the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not
only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of
communications
relative
thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the
postal authorities for the contest to be cleared
in advance for mailing and to make sure that
the contest does not violate the anti-lottery
provision of the Revised Administrative Code.

HELD: The issue at bar cannot be passed

upon. Judgment has to be made otherwise
Caltex will have no definite recourse. Hence,
Caltex has sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief.
The term lottery extends to all schemes for
the distribution of prizes by chance, such as
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts,
raffles at fairs,-etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize;
and third, chance. The elements of prize and
chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme
to be the subject of contention. In respect to
the last element of consideration, the law does
not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is
derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but does condemn as
criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement
that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any service be rendered, or any value
whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. The scheme does not only appear
to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution
of property by chance. And that the purchase
of any Caltex product is not a pre-requisite in
joining the said contest. Further, the required
element of consideration does not consist of
the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for
the chance, and not whether those conducting
the enterprise receive something of value in
return for the distribution of the prize.
Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint
of the contestant is all that matters, not that of
the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus

Juris Secundum, should set the matter at

rest: The fact that the holder of the drawing
expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage
or otherwise, as a result of the drawing, does
not supply the element of consideration.
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or
chance does not constitute lottery, if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
consideration is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the party receiving the chance, gambling
spirit not being cultivated or stimulated
thereby. Lottery and gift enterprise must be
construed as the same
Tanada v Cuenco
FACTS: After the 1955 elections, members of
the Senate were chosen. The Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista
Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo.
Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting
it before the SET. But prior to a decision the
SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9
members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority
party. But since there is only one minority
senator the other two SET members supposed
to come from the minority were filled in by the
NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did
Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET
would be dominated by NP senators then he,
as a member of the Liberalista will not have
any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the issue because it
is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue
before judicial courts but rather to leave it
before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political
question.
HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and
ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The
term Political Question connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Republic Flour Mills vs Commissioner of C
ustoms

39 SCRA 269
FACTS: The personalities involved: (1) Republic
Flour
Mills
(petitioner)
is
a
domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacture of
wheat flour and in the process of milling said
product, produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa); (2)
Respondents are the Commisioner of Customs and the
Court
of Tax
Appeals.
The complaint: Petitioner questions respondent
s decision to charge thecorporation P7,948 in
wharfage dues on exported pollard and/or bran
.Petitioner paid this amount in protest.
Petitioner sent the case to Court of
Tax Appeals who decided in favour of responde
nt (sustained the actions of theCommissioner
of Customs). Petitioner elevated the mat
ter to the SC andrequested that the decision of
the Court
of
Tax
Appeals
be
reviewed.P e t i t i o n e r c l a i m s : S e c t i o n 2 8 0
2 o f t h e Ta r i ff C u s t o m C o d e ( w h i c h
w a s respondents basis for the collection of wharfage
dues) is not applicable in the case at bar because
the bran and pollard are actually not
"products of the Philippines" because they
came from wheat grain which were imported
from abroad.
ISSUES: Is respondent liable for wharfage dues on its
exportation of bran and pollard as they are not "products
of the Philippines?
HELD: The SC denied the petition; It re-affirmed the
Court of Tax Appeals decision. Rationale: The
petitioner erred in its construction of the Act.
As per section2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,
"There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on
products of the Philippines exported from the
Philippines, a charge of two pesos per
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage. The meaning
and intent of the Act is precisely to collect tariffs on
anything imported and exported to and from the
Philippines.
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
Case No 295G.R. No. 17122 (February
27, 1922)
FACTS:
Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53
(which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may
be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater
than that fixed by law. E.O. 53 follows Act
No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and
hoarding of product under extraordinary
circumstances. Respondent contends tha
t the Legislature has not defi ned any
basis for the order but has left it to the
discretion
of
the
Governor General.
Without leaving the discretion to say which

extraordinary circumstances to the Governor

General are, Defendant will not be charged.
ISSUE:
W/N
Act No.
2868
is unconstitutional for undue delegation
of legislative power.
HELD: The act is unconstitutional. The
Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. As known, no nation living
under republican form of government
can enact a law delegating the power to fix
the price at which rice should be sold. That
power can never be delegated under a
republican form of government. This power is
exclusive to the legislative. In fi xing the
price, the law is dealing with private
property and private rights, which are sacred
under the Constitution
Alejandra
Torres
et.
al.
plaintiffappelleesvs.Francisco
Limjap,
Special
Administrator
of
deceased
Jose
B.
Henson, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 34385
FACTS: The plaintiff s alleged that the
defendant, in his lifetime, executed in
their favor a chattel mortgage (Exhibit
A) on his drug store at Nos. 101-103
Calle
Rosario,
known
as
Farmacia
Henson, to secure a loan of P7,000,
although it was made to appear in the
instrument
that
the loan
was
for
P20,000. The defendant denied generally
and specifically the plaintiffs' allegations and
set up the defense that the chattel mortgages
(Exhibit A, in G.R. No. 34385 and Exhibit A, in
G.R. No. 34286) are null and void for lack of
sufficient particularity in the d e s c r i p t i o n o f
the
property
mortgaged.
A
judgment was rendered in favor of
the
p l a i n t i ff
and
against
the
defendant, confi rming the attachment of
said drug store by the sheriff of the City
of Manila and the delivery thereof to the
plaintiff. The defendant appealed from the
judgment and made the assignments of
error, among others, that the lower court
erred in failing to make a fi nding on the
question of the suffi ciency of the
description of the chattels mortgaged
and in failing to hold that the chattel
mortgages were null and void for lack of
particularity in the description of the
chattels mortgaged and in refusing to
allow
the
defendant
to
introduce
evidence tending to show that the stock of
merchandise found in the two drug stores was
in existence or owned by the mortgagor at the
time of execution of the mortgages in

question. Defendant then insists that a

stipulation authorizing the disposal and
substitution of chattels mortgage does not
operate to extend the mortgage to afteracquired party, and that such stipulation is in
contravention of the express provision of the
last paragraph of section 7 Act No.1508,
which provides that
A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to
cover
only
the
property
described
therein and not like or substituted property
thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and
placed in the same depository as the property
originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage
to the contrary notwithstanding.
I SS U E :
Whether
or
not
the
provision in the chattel mortgage
l a w t h a t e x t e n d s c o v e r a g e t o a f t e ra c q u i r e d property is valid and binding.
HELD: We are of the opinion that (a.)
the provision of the last paragraph of
section 7 of Act No. 1508 is not applicable
to drug stores, bazaars and all other stores in
the nature of a revolving and floating business;
(b) that the stipulation in the chattel
mortgages in question, extending their effect
to after-acquired property, is valid and binding;
and (c) that the lower court committed no error
in not permitting the defendant-appellant to
introduce evidence tending to show that the
goods seized by the sheriff were in the nature
of after-acquired property. In order to give a
correct construction to the above-quoted
provision of our Chattel Mortgage Law
(Act No. 1508), the spirit and intent of the law
must first be ascertained. When said Act was
placed on our statute books by the United
States Philippine Commission on July 2,
1906, the primary aim of that lawmaking body was undoubtedly to promote
business and trade in these Islands and to give
impetus to the economic development of the
country. Bearing this in mind, it could
not have been the intention of the
Philippine Commission to apply the
provision of section 7 above quoted to
stores open to the public for retail
business, where the goods are constantly
sold and substituted with new stock, such as
drug stores, grocery stores, dry-goods stores,
etc. If said provision were intended to
apply to this class of business, it would
be practically impossible to constitute a
mortgage on such stores without closing them,
contrary to the very spirit about a handicap
to trade and business, would restrain the
circulation of capital, and would defeat the
purpose for which the law was enacted, to wit,
the promotion
of
business
and
the

economic development of the country. The

judgment appealed from is in accordance with
the facts and the law, and the same should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Manila Jockey Club v. Games
Amusements Board
G.R. No. L-12727. February 29, 1960

and

FACTS: As stated, Republic Act No. 1502

increased the sweepstakes draw and races of
the PCSO to twelve, but without specifying the
days on which they are to be run. To
accommodate these additional races, the GAB
resolved to reduce the number of Sundays
assigned to private individuals and entities by
six. Appellants protested, contending that the
said increased should be taken from the 12
Saturdays reserved to the President, for
charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should
be assigned to any other day of the week
besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday.
They also hold that respondent PCSO does not
have the right or power to appropriate or use
the race tracks and equipment of petitioner
without its consent, nor can respondents
compel petitioner to so allow such use of its
race tracks and equipment under pain of
having its license revoked.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was a proper
placement of the six additional racing days
given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502.
(2) Whether or not legislative debates and
explanatory statements by members of the
legislature may be resorted to in the
interpretation of statutes.
HELD:
(1) Yes. It is clear from Section 4 Republic Act
No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983,
that appellants have no vested right to the
unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24
Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays),
because their holding of races on these days is
merely permissive, subject to the licensing and
determination by the GAB. When, therefore,
Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing
by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but
without specifying the days for holding them,
the GAB had no alternative except to make
room for the additional races, as it did, from
among the only available racing days
unreserved by any law the Sundays on
which the private individuals and entities have
been permitted to hold their races, subject to
licensing and determination by the GAB.

The law does not authorize the holding of horse

races with betting on week days. Secondly,
sweepstakes races have always been held on
Sundays. It is not possible to hold them on
Saturday afternoons as, it is claimed, a whole
day is necessary for the mixing of the
sweepstakes balls, the drawing of winning
sweepstakes numbers, and the running of the
sweepstakes races. The language of Republic
Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase,
clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws
and races. The conclusion seems inevitable
that the additional sweepstakes draws and
races were intended to be held on a whole day,
separate and apart from the club races.
(2) No. Legislative debates are expressive of
the views and motives of individual members
and are not safe guides and, hence, may not
be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and
purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible
to determine with certainty what construction
was put upon an act by the members of the
legislative body that passed the bill, by
resorting to the speeches of the members
thereof. Those who did not speak, may not
have agreed with those who did; and those
who spoke, might differ from each other.The
legal act, so to speak, is made up of two
elements an internal and an external one; it
originates in intention and is perfected by
expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the
former.
Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act
No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to
reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed
area was to form part of the Luneta extension.
The act provided that the reclaimed area shall
be the property of the City of Manila, and the
city is authorized to set aside a tract of the
reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or
to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila
conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to
Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land,
together with all the improvements, to
the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE: W/N the subject property
patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

was

HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of

merit. The court found it necessary to analyze
all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended,
in order to unravel the legislative intent. The
grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed

land to the City of Manila is a grant of

a public nature. Such grants have always
been strictly construed against the grantee
because it is a gratuitous donation of public
money or resources, which resulted in an unfair
advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar,
the area reclaimed would be filled at the
expense of the Insular Government and without
cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of
the statute should be narrowed to exclude
matters which, if included, would defeat the
policy of legislation.
Civil
Liberties
Union
vs.
Executive
Secretary
Case No. 64G.R. No. 83896 (February
22, 1991)
FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order
which, in effect, allows members
of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant
s e c r e t a r i e s t o h o l d o t h e r government
offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions. This runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of
the Constitution which provides that the
President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of
the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2.
HELD:
No. A foolproof yardstick in constitu
tional construction is the intentionu
nderlying the provision. The practice
of holding multiple
offi ces or positions in the government
would lead to abuses by unscrupulous
public offi cials who took the scheme
for purposes of self-enrichment,
particularly during the Marcos era. The
qualifying phrase unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution of Sec. 13,
Art. 7c a n n o t p o s s i b l y r e f e r t o t h e
broad exc epti ons of Sec. 7, A rt. 9 -B
o f t h e 1 9 8 7 Constitution. The former is
meant to lay down the general rule of
holding multiple offi ces applicable to all
elective public offi cials and employees
while the latter is meant for the exception
of the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. To

construe otherwise would be to render

nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent
and purpose of the framers of the Constitution.
E.O.284 is therefore declared null and void.

Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS

267 SCRA 402
3 February 1997 En Banc
FACTS: The Respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the
privatization
program
of
the
Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated
8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued. In a
close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as
the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC,
petitioner matched the formers bid prize also
with Php 44.00 per share followed by a
managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid
Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both
the bid match and the managers check.
The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution Filipino first
policy and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since
51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it
the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a
part of the national economy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of

Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
1987 Constitution is self executing or non self
executing
If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to
Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional
provision of Filipino First policy (Section 10,
second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution) and is therefore null and void.
HELD: As the Filipino first policy was deemed
self executing, the court ruled that the
qualified Filipino entity must be given
preference by granting it the option to match
the winning bid because the provision. The
Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS
and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the
Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to
accept the matching bid of the petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel.
The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of
doubt, the constitution should be considered
self executing rather than non self executing.
Such is the case with Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution
which states that in grant of rights and
privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the state
shall give preference to qualified Filipino.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the
case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph,
Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory provision, a positive command
which is complete in itself and needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it.
The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as
mandated by the provision in question.
Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary
meaning the term patrimony pertains to
heritage . the constitution speaks of national
patrimony , it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the constitution
could have very well used the term natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of

the Filipinos and therefore an example the

Manila hotel which has become a landmark a
living testimonial of Philippine heritage
The Court also reiterated how much of national
pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage
will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this is
not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is
inherent in the concept of the Philippines being
a democratic and republican state. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the
provision in question should be interpreted as
pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not antialien in itself because it does not prohibit the
State from granting rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners in the absence of
qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the
petitioner is estopped from assailing the
winning bid of Renong Berhad because the
former knew the rules of the bidding and that
the foreigners are qualified, too.
Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts: On February 8, 1965, Primicia was
driving his car within the jurisdiction of
Urdaneta when he was found violating
Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for
overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance
decided that from the action initiated by
Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and
void and had been repealed by Republic Act
4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of
Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not
definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is
an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per
general rule, the later law prevails over an
earlier law and any conflict between a
municipal order and a national law must be
ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was
ambiguous and not definite. Vehicular Traffic
is not defined and no distinctions were made
between cars, trucks, buses, etc.