Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Game-Theoretic Business
Strategy: DROM B8122
Prof. Gus Stuart
Spring 2016
Class 1: Introduction
Contents
2
Course Logistics
Course Introduction
Introduction to Value Creation and Profitability
Examples (loosely motivated by Harnischfeger case)
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24%
16%
20%
40%
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Common courtesy:
No late arrivals or early departures
No laptops; cell phones off
Participate!
Listen to your classmates. Understand why they
are saying what they are saying.
Test your reasoning. Allow yourself to be wrong.
(Better to be wrong now than when the
consequences of your decisions are for real.)
If you are not prepared, please let me know
before class.
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Corporate Strategy
Class 9: Quiz, Synergy ?
Class 10: Leverage ?
Class 11: Winner-take-all?
Class 12: Does bundling deter entry?
Class 13: Global entry; Review
Administrative Information
8
My contact information:
office hours:
e-mail:
web:
By appointment
hws7@gsb.columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~hws7
Canvas
course syllabus
exercises
class slides
other course documents
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Course Introduction
Course Objectives
10
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What is Strategy?
11
Investments
Materials, Services, etc.
Capital
People
Your Firm
Revenues
(Economic)
Costs
Products,
Services
Investments
Materials, Services, etc.
Capital
People
Your Firm
Revenues
(Economic)
Costs
Products,
Services
Interactive
Dynamic
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Interactive
Good news: our current business context can be modeled
by a game.
Bad news: typically, the game is hopelessly complex.
Dynamic
The game might change due to external factors.
The existing players might find ways to change the
game.
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Our Approach
19
10
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21
11
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Buyer
Profit
price
The Pie
Seller
Profit
cost
Monetary
Flow
Resources or Inputs
Supplier
12
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Value Creation
25
($)
Willingnesses-to-pay
Buyers Shares (Profits)
Price
Firms Share (Profits)
Value Created
Cost
Profits
26
($)
Willingnesses-to-pay
Buyers Shares (Profits)
Price
Firms Share (Profits)
Value Created
Cost
13
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Profits (cont.)
27
28
An Experiment
Play A Basic Game
14
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29
Unrestricted Competition
15
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The DEFINITION:
For each player i, the CONTRIBUTED VALUE of player i
=
Total pie
with
player i in
the game
The PRINCIPLE:
Simultaneously,
for each player i,
Total pie
without
player i in
the game
player is contributed
value
Slice
to
player i
Suppose instead,
for some player i,
Slice
> player is
Slice
to
to player i contributed value
player i
That is:
Slice
to
Slice
player
i
to
player i
>
Total pie
with
player i in
the game
Total pie
without
player i in
the game
16
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Rewriting:
Slice
to
player i
>
Sum of slices
to Slice
other
to
players
player
+
Slice
to
player i
Rearranging:
Sum of slices
Total pie
to other
without
players
player i in
the game
>
Total pie
without
player i in
the game
Sum of slices
to other
players
17
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Unrestricted Competition
35
36
<
Examples
(Loosely motivated by Harnischfeger case)
18
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Our Approach
37
Relevant Players
38
19
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Example 1
39
WTP
Cost
$2.5M
Harnischfeger
$9M
$2.5M
WTP
Cost
Kranco
Example 1 (cont.)
40
$9M
WTP
Cost
$2.5M
Harnischfeger
$9M
$2.5M
WTP
Cost
Kranco
20
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$9M
WTP
Cost
$2.5M
Harnischfeger
WTP
$9M
$2.5M
Cost
Kranco
21
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$9M
WTP
Cost
$2.5M
Harnischfeger
$9M
$2.5M
WTP
Cost
Kranco
Example 2
44
WTP
$9M
$2.5M
$2.0M
Cost
WTP
Cost
Kranco
Harnischfeger
22
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Example 3
45
$10M
WTP
$9M
Cost
$2.5M
Harnischfeger
Cost
$2.5M
Kranco
Example 4
46
WTP
Cost
$2.5M
Harnischfeger
$9M
$2.5M
WTP
Cost
Kranco
23
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Conclusions
47
References
48
24