Rule 74

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
RULE 74
SUMMARY
SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATES
ANG~CABRERA~CALDINO~CHUPUNGCO~JOSOL~MARAVILLA~SAGUINSIN~SAN JOSE~SUVA~TOLENTINO~TOLENTINO~UY
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (SBCA, Monday Class) S.Y 2012-2013
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372

McMICKING vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG
G.R. No. L-6871. 15 January 1912
Ponente: Moreland, J.
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.
Facts: In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the
will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao
became his sureties. After the execution of this bond said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession
of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. In 1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of
Manila. CFI made an order directing the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the place of the undertaking upon
which said Mariano Ocampo and Dy Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new sureties
thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca.
In the same year Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and
Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator. Doroteo
Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the
deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said
administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano
Ocampo agreeing to the partition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same
time assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. The CFI, upon the request of
the administrator and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, entered an order in
said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco,
as administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said
decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of the administrator no
property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time forward said administrator
has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has not had any
participation in the management thereof.
At the time the agreement for participation was made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the
property of the estate pursuant thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate
of the said Mariano Ocampo, and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present
their claims against the said estate in the manner prescribed by law. In 1908, Palanca was removed from
office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose and Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead.
Palanca refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose.
Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said propertyand funds, absconded with the same, and never
returned to the Philippine Islands. In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the
court for the appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing
claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it
by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was
allowed by said commission and later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by
Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due
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by the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose. In 1905, Pio de
la Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng. In 1909, upon the
application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio
de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so presented
against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. Upon
these facts the court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. Hence this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has already
consummated?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597
have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the
following requisites: 1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after
such settlement and distribution of estate."2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves
the court for the appointment of an administrator. In the case at bar:
1. No debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the
estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that
Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records
shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed;
and
2. No creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of
commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and was
without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against
the estate and none against the so-called administrator. This section creates a statute of limitations
which deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of
requiring an administration of the estate.
The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is no prescribed method of
ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors,
and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in partition out of
court
It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the
debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot, then, because by the
creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the
debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition cannot legally and va lidly take place
while a debt is outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took
place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he may urge as a
reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration of so much of
the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

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ILUSTRE vs. ALARAS
G.R. No. L-6077; November 16, 1910
Ponente: Johnson, J.
FACTS: Franciso Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903. The plaintiff alleges that he
was appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. Although that fact is
not denied, the record fails to show when he was appointed. At the time of Calzado's death, he was
the owner of certain property, some of which was described in the complaint.
Nearly six years after the death of the said Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the
present action to recover the property described in the complaint. The defendant demurred to the
complaint, alleging that the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring the action; and that at the time
of the death of Calzado, the latter had no relatives, descendants or ascendants, but he had
nephews, who being of lawful age, divided among themselves the property in question and sold the
same to the defendant; Defendant also alleged that the plaintiff is not a creditor of the estate of the
said deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ilustre can intervene in the recovery of the properties of the deceased?
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of
a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at
the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against
the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. When
there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of
an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are
all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with
the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the
absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs.
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ERNANDEZ vs. ANDAL
G.R. No. L-273; March 29, 1947
Ponente: Tuason, J.
FACTS: Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff; and intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez; and
Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are siblings. When their father died, they
acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land known as lot No. 120073 of the
Batangas cadastral survey. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel of land to Andal
and his wife for P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the
larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made among the five
brother and sisters. Cresencia was willing to repurchase the share of her sister for P860.
According to Cresencias counsel, the best evidence to show the partition must be the document of
partition. Counsel for the defendant and intervenors on the other hand averred that parol partition
made among the five brother and sisters is valid as he can produce witnesses to testify. Counsel
for the plaintiff again objected asserting that "under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real
estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the
proof is offered. Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of
Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition
was inadmissible,.The court then decided that the resale of the land by Andal in favor of Maria
and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and attended by bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not oral evidence for proving a contract of partition among the heirs is
admissible?
HELD: Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a

contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the
affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the
operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and
designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. On general principle,
independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when
it has been completely or partly performed. It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is
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entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a public
document and its registration.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening and
instructive. The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the
words "and not otherwise." The Court found these to be expressive of an intention to make the
written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But what is far more to the point
is that by logical process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not
otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural character
which the document enjoyed in the former code
The Court said that requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for
its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others.
If a completed oral partition may be enforced, as the defendant and the intervenors contend and as
we opine, their evidence should be allowed, and if allowed and it establishes their allegation, the
plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.
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VERONA PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No.134329; March 29, 1947
Ponente: De Leon, J.
FACTS: Jacinto Pada died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut
land located in Leyte with an area of more than 1,300 square meters.
During the lifetime of Jacinto, his half-brother, Feliciano, obtained permission from him to build a
house on the northern portion of the lot. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in
the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children,
has been living in that house since 1960.
In May 1951, the heirs of Jacinto entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. They
executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Deeds of Leyte. Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, a son
of Jacinto, as co-owner of the lot. Thereafter, it was the turn of Maria to sell the co-ownership right
of his father, Marciano, one of Jacintos children. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of
Maria, was the buyer. Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the
northern portion of the lost so his family can utilize the said area. In 1995, private respondent filed
a complaint for ejectment against petitioner spouses. Thereafter, the heirs of Amador Pada
executed a Deed of Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares
as co-owners petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of the lot had
already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial
partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special
power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective
children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only
through a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial partition executed in a private document is valid?
HELD: Yes, the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951
is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs
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to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. The partition of inherited property need not
be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over Immovable property, must
appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect
the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the
Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is
not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance; The
1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over the lot to Engr. Paderes and
private respondent, respectively.
The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously
in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate
of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such,
their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the
estate which had not been paid.
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DE BORJA vs. DE BORJA
GR No. L-28040, L-28568, L-292611; August 18, 1972
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator of the estate of his wife:
their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de
Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings where she was appointed special administratrix. The testate
estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to
put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into. The same provides
that it is the mutual desire of all the parties to terminate all the controversies between and among
them. And that they agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties with a segregated
area of approximately 1, 300 hectares.
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja opposed the compromise agreement in both Rizal and Nueva
Ecija courts. Rizal Court approved the agreement but Nueva disapproved it. Tasiana refutes the
validity of the agreement claiming that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without
first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the
validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. It is argued further by
Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement expressed no definite period for its performance, the
same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such
contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms
entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid?
HELD: Yes. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. And as a hereditary share in a
decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal
bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate. It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the
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surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article
995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would
exist even if such will were not probated at all.
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GUEVARA vs. GUEVARA
G.R. No. L-5405; January 31, 1956
Ponente: Ozaeta, J.
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire
FACTS: Victorino Guevara executed a will distributing assorted movables and a residential lot
among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren. Victorino also executed a
deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying to the latter the southern half of the 259hectare lot and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half. Because of
this sale, the entire lot was subsequently issued in the name of Ernesto Guevara. The said will was
not filed for probate. About four years later, Rosario Guevara claimed that she was preterited and
was asking for at least 420,000 square meters of the lot in Ernesto's name.
The Court of Appeals decided in Rosario Guevaras favor; the SC reversed the decision in so far as
it awarded relief to Rosario Guevara and the parties were thereafter ordered to present the will to
the proper court for probate without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan
may take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. Claiming to act
pursuant to the foregoing decision, Rosario Guevara commenced on October 5, 1945 in the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan for the probate of the will of Victorino Guevara.
Ernesto Guevara, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that (a) the
petition itself alleged that the will was revoked; (b) that whatever right to probate the parties may
have has already prescribed; and (c) that the purpose of the probate was solely to have Rosario
declared an acknowledged natural child of the deceased.
The petition was dismissed on the ground that Rosario Guevaras petition did not ask for the
probate of the will, contrary to the order of the Supreme Court; and that her right to petition for the
probate of the testament of Victorino L. Guevara had prescribed; and that her action for judicial
declaration of acknowledgment had likewise prescribed as the testator died on September 27,
1933, and that the petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years later.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for probate is barred by the statute of limitations?
HELD: No. The provision of Article 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the
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presentation of a decedents will to the competent court has always been deemed by our law as
more of a duty than a right.
Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the
heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present
that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not
disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do
away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will
is contrary to law and public policy.
In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below failed to notice
that its doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition and violative of the owners
right to control his property within the legal limits. The appealed order in fact leaves wills at the
mercy and whim of custodians and heirs interested in their suppression. The lower court would in
effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to the Republic from the former sovereigns.
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VDA DE LOPEZ vs. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-23915; September 28, 1970
Ponente: Makalintal, J.
FACTS: On October 13, 1962, Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of
the deceased filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and
her legitimate children with the deceased. The lower court approved the project of partition and
declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes."
Seventeen days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their
mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming
that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital
relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares
in the estate given to them.
The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had
already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the
distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which
should be an independent action against the individual distributees. The trial court denied the move
to reopen. The movants asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereupon appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed out of time?
2. Whether or not the motion to prove the status of the children should have been exhausted in
a separate proceeding
HELD: 1. No. The appellants are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in his
estate. Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial administratrix and
approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby. In a case, the Court held that a judicial
partition in probate proceedings (and the same thing can be said of partition in intestate
proceedings) does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. A judicial partition in probate
proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such definitive character to stop all means
of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the
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prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property
of the deceased may be situated.
The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon
its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders
in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this
case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of
closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.
2. Taking up the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the appellants' motion (to annul the
deed of partition and the order approving it), it must be remembered that in Benedicto vs. Javellana
this Court held that an demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a testate
or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings, and not
in a separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance,
and who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the interested
parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.
In the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., the Court pointed out that there are two alternatives
for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased
parent, to wit: (1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed.
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TOMIAS vs. TOMIAS
G.R. No. L-3004; May 30, 1951
Ponente: Reyes, J.
FACTS: Eustaquio Tomias died intestate in 1920, leaving 7 children named Leon, Benita, Monica,
Bernabela, Toribia (alleged to known also as Enrica), Agustina, and Josefa, all surnamed Tomias.
Two of these, however later died, Leon in 1931 and Josefa in 1944. It is claimed that the latter was
survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who had married twice, was
survived by 4 children Conrado Magdalena, Dolores, and Anicetas the first two, by the first
marriage, and the other two by the second marriage. It is claimed, however, that he has also had
natural son named Filemon Tomias.
On January 19, 1948, Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias (two of the children of the deceased
Leon Tomias), in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the
deceased Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the deceased Josefa Tomias), filed a
complaint(registered as civil case No. 857 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros)
against their aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, alleging that their deceased
grandfather Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of the 15 parcels of land (in Occidental
Negros) of the total assessed value of P8,290 and that since the death of Leon Tomias the
defendants had continued in possession of said land and had been refusing to divide it among the
heirs and to give plaintiffs their share of the products. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and
accounting. For refusing to join as plaintiffs, Dolores Tomias and Anicetas Tomias (the other two
legitimate children of Leon Tomias) were included as defendants. Through their counsel Atty. Jose
M. Millares, the defendants appeared and filed their answer; but as this was merely a general
denial, the plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings.
The Court held that the petitioners and defendants owned the 15 parcels of land in common. Some
5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural son Leon
Tomias, sought to annul it by filing an action for that purpose on the ground (1) that the court did
not have jurisdiction over the case because some of the parcels of land partitioned among the heirs
did not belong to the deceased Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons not made parties to the suit,
and (2) that not all of the heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged
natural child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Filemon Tomias was an indispensable party to the action in the absence of
a judicial decree declaring him to be an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Leon Tomias
HELD: No. The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere allegation that some
of the parcels of land partitioned were the property of persons not made parties to the suit when
none of those persons has come to the court to protest. There is no showing that Toribia Tomias
has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the
court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same person. There is no claim that
Toribia is entitled to more. The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged
natural son of Leon Tomias does not call for the annulment of the decision in the partition case.
That claim should be asserted in separate action against the four legitimate children of Leon
Tomias to whom the latter's share in the inheritance was adjudicated in the partition.
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MARQUEZ vs. MARQUEZ
G.R. No. 125715; December 29, 1998
Ponente: Romero, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez had twelve children. In 1982, Rafael Marque,
Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the propertya
parcel of land wherein they constructed their conjugal home. Thereafter, Rafael Marquez, Sr.
executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land as well as the house constructed
thereon to three of his children to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein.
The excluded children filed a complaint in 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages"
before the trial court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their
father in making him execute the said documents.
Private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of limitations
since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged
fraud. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and held that prescription cannot set in because an
action to set aside a document which is void ab initio does not prescribe. The CA reversed the
RTCs decision and held that the action prescribed four years after the discovery of the fraud. The
petitioners MR having been denied, they now come to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance of the other children had prescribed
HELD:
No. Petitioners asserted that a constructive trust was created and maintained thus that an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years.
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388

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by
the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children
and her spouse. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by
executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased
wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
A constructive trust was created under Article 1456 when Rafael Marquez Sr. misrepresented in his
unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive. In
this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of
this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on
June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.
Page
389

PEDROSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118680; March 5, 2001
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: In 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez legally adopted Maria
Elena Pedrosa. In 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the
estate of Miguel. Thereafter, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner.
In 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private
respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. On March 11, 1983, while said appeal
was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for
the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
Respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were
able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein through the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition,
In 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a
joint Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the
adoption of petitioner who sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties
from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since
they were not their blood relatives.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition had already prescribed?
2. Whether or not said deed is valid?
3. Whether or not the court can decide on ownership of the property?

HELD: 1. No. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with. Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not
participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman,
which held that: The action to annul a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of
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390

fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of
title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial
settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof.
2. No. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial
partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code.
The adopted child was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her
own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests
did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.
3. No. We are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The
properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third
parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity
of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.
Page
391

LEE VS. RTC
G.R. No. 146006; Feb. 23, 2004
Ponente: Corona, J.
FACTS: The Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. was incorporated on July 6,
1956 by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez who owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya
Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo,
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez). Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez. Ma.
Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint special
administrators of their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular
administrator. Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate
of their father.
Decedents wife, Juliana, claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her
conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase of Filipino Loan Assistance
Group (FLAG), represented by Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to repurchase the shares of
stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by FLAG in its name.
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, owned the remaining 1,011. Philinterlife shares of stocks, sold
said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. Jose Ortaez failed to
repurchase the same.
It appears that several years. Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael
and Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares
separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on
Page
392

October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.On July 12, 1995, herein private
respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of special
administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. On November 8, 1995, the intestate court appointed
private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. She filed a
motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate. These
motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.Special Administratrix Enderes filed
an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock. Jose
Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale and (2) the release of Ma.
Divina Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground
that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation of the property by the administrator without court order is
valid?
HELD: No. An act of the administrator of selling the property without court order is void and passes
no title to the purchaser. Further, any subsequent sale thereof to a 3rd party without court approval
is likewise invalid. It is clear that the heirs of the deceased invalidly entered into a memorandum of
agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their
knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the
estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez
and her children as invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
Page
393

ESTATE OF OLAVE vs. REYES
123 SCRA 767
Ponente: Relova, J.
FACTS: Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a Civil Case with the Court of
First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos and Matias, in their capacities as coadministrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness
in the amount of P19,952. and for attorney's fees.vAmadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple
of a parcel of land containing an area of 293,578 square meters, situated in Sitio Tibambam, barrio
Tibambam, Municipality of Sigaboy province of Davao. Southwest Agricultural Marketing
Corporation (SAMCO) filed against Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute in their capacities as coadministrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness
of P19, 952.11. Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, questioned the legality of the claim of
SAMCO. Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order directing the administrators to secure
the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles
of the estate. An amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted to and
approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, nor notice thereof made to the
beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.
SAMCO contended that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, "the
same having been entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal
rank. Article 2032 of the Civil Code applies only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the
administrators of the estate. In the alternative, lack of approval of the probate court of the Amicable
Settlement does not render it null and void, but at most voidable, which must be the subject matter
of a direct proceeding in the proper Court of First Instance."
ISSUE: Whether or not CFI of Davao can approve the amicable settlement?
HELD: No. The CFI of Manila has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No.
4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable
Settlement. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts. The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the
subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Page
394

MANOTOC REALITY INC. VS CA
149 SCRA 174
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: Vicente Legarda was co-administrator of a parcel of land in Dinalupihan, Tondo. He

allegedly sold an area of about 280 square meters of the same at P30.00 per square meter to
Abelardo Lucero who took possession of the lot. Lucero leased the lot to six persons, one of whom
is herein private respondent. Like the other tenants, respondent constructed a house on an area.
The probate court issued another order authorizing the Philippine Trust Company as administrator,
to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time at the best obtainable price. The lessees of
Lucero, including the private respondent, defaulted in their payment of rentals. Separate actions for
ejectment were filed against them However, a compromise agreement was concluded and the
tenants resumed the payment of rentals.
Lucero accordingly awaited the sending by Legarda of the formal contract but as none came, went
to the Philippine Trust Company to make further payments, showing it the receipt evidencing the
down payment but the latter refused either to receive payment or to issue a formal contract
because the Legarda-Tambunting Subdivision was involved in litigation.
The deed of sale was executed by and between petitioner and Philippine Trust Company and the
same was approved by the probate court. Petitioner filed the complaint below for ejectment against
the private respondent Manotoc Reality Corp. On March 11, 1966, summons was served on the
latter. These circumstances, notwithstanding, on May 23, 1966, Lucero executed a deed of
assignment of the lot in question in favor of his lessees, including the private respondent.
ISSUE: whether or not court approval is needed in the case at bar?
HELD: Although the rules of court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of the decedent, in a special proceeding should be made with the approval
of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
Page
395

Vda. DE GIL v. CANCIO
G.R. No. L-21472. 30 July 1965
Ponente: Bautista, Angelo, J
Facts: Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate in Manila on November 28, 1943 instituting as his exclusive heir
his widow Isabel Herreros subject to the condition that should the latter die the estate, if any, would
be inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr., the decedent's adopted son. In due time, the decedent's will was
duly admitted to probate, the widow Isabel having been appointed as the administratrix of the
estate. Isabel and Carlos Jr secured a loan from Cancio a loan, and I payment thereof they agreed
to transfer two lots from the estate. However, Carlos and later Isabel died without transferring the
ownership of the two lots. Hence, Cancio filed a motion to execute the necessary deed of transfer.
But Dolores, Carlos Jr widow and the new co-administrator filed an opposition on the ground that
the late Isabel and Carlos entered into the agreement to sell the property without the authority of
the court.
Issue: Whether an heir can sell is interest to the estate still under administration.
Held: Yes, It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. on the
one hand, and Agustin Cancio, on the other, concerning the transfer of the two lots in question in
payment of the loan of P89,000.00 is conditioned upon the final adjudication of said properties to
both or either of them, and here such adjudication has not been made in view of the early death of
the two heirs; but this circumstance is now of no consequence considering that it is beyond dispute
that the properties left by the late Carlos Gil, Sr. were inherited, first, by Isabel and, later, by the
children of Carlos Gil, Jr. who inherited them through their father charged with the commitment in
favor of Cancio. As a matter of fact, Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the estate, is
now estopped from disputing the sale because she herself in her capacity as co-administratrix filed
the petition in court asking for the approval of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons
that do not appear in the record. And there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest,
of participation he may have in the property under administration, a matter which comes under the
jurisdiction of the probate court.
Page
396

GODOY v. ORELLANO
G.R. No. L-16584. 20 November 1917
Ponente: Villamor, J.
Facts: On January 13, 1919, in consideration of the amount of P1,000 received by the appellant,
Felisa Pagilinan, a document was executed by her giving the appellee, Eusebio A. Godoy, an
option to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is
the common property of the vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and
Paz, all surnamed Orellano. According to their document agreement, Godoy must pay the entire
P10,000 within 20 days. However, the co-owners did not ratify the said sale. Before the lapse of the
20-day period, Godoy is ready to pay the entire amount but Felisa Pangilinan did not deliver the
said dredge. Godoy filed a case against the Orellanos and Pangilinan.
On the other hand, the Orellanos claimed that the dredge was the property of the intestate estate
of Julio Orellano and that Felisa Pangilinan is the administrator of said estate. They also alleged
that Godoy knows this fact. Furthermore, Jose, Alfredo and Guillermo are all minors and Paz is
married and did not obtained the consent of her husband when they executed the power of
attorney to Pangilinan.
Pangilinan, in her defense, claimed that she believed that it was her obligation to comply with the
deed in favor of Godoy and thus she applied to the probate court permission to sell the dredge for
P10,000. While she was asking the court for permission, the Orellanos opposed claiming that there
were higher bidders and thus the court ruled that the dredge be sold in public auction. The court
authorized Pangilinan to sell the said dredge in public auction. Pangilinan also claimed that she
never refused to deliver the dredge to Godoy rather the court would not give her authority to do so.
Issue: Whether or not Felisa Pangilinan has authority to sell the property?.
Held: No. The appellant was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of
Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate
Page
397

without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this
authority, is null and void.
In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to
comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said
sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate
estate may sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real
property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless
compliance is had with the provisions of these sections, the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the
administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one
under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the
administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of
the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract.
Page
398

BONAGA vs. SALER
2 SCRA 755
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Julian Boaga, Administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria
Isaac, appeals directly to this Court.
Juan Garza was authorized by the probate court on August 29, 1944 to sell certain parcels of land
pertaining to the estate. On October 14, 1944, the heirs of the deceased wife, Maria Isaac, sold all
their shares and interests over certain parcels of land in favor of Soler. Sometime during the war,
the Records were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of these records by court order, Julian Bonaga
was issued letters of administration. Bonaga sought to annul the sale in favor of Soler on the
ground that said transactions were fraudulent, made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros.
Soler filed a motion to dismiss, for the first time raising estoppel, prescription of the action, and
non- inclusion of necessary parties, as grounds. Upon an order for plaintiff to include the vendors in
the sales as parties to the case, the court, on August 22, 1955, denied the motion to dismiss, but
apparently without resolving the issues of estoppel and prescription. On February 9, 1959, Soler
sought a resolution of his third motion to dismiss. On April 30, 1959, and over plaintiff's objections,
the court ordered the dismissal of the action, sustaining the contention that as administrator of the
estate succeeding Juan Garza, plaintiff was estopped to file an action to annul the sales, and,
moreover, that the action had prescribed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the action has prescribed?
2. Whether or not the sale is valid?
HELD:
1. We also find untenable the claim of prescription of the action. Actions to declare the inexistence
of contracts do not prescribe (Art. 1410 N.C.C.), a principle applied even before the effectivity of
the new Civil Code. The sale on October 14, 1944 by the heirs of Maria Isaac of whatever interests
or participation they might have in the four parcels of land covered by the deed may be valid, yet it
could not have effected an immediate and absolute transfer of title to appellee Soler over any part
of the parcels of land themselves, much less over their entirety. Necessarily, the sale was subject
to the result of the administration proceedings, a contingency upon which the deed of sale itself
expressly founded the transaction. By its terms, not only was the existence of possible heirs of
Alejandro Ros recognized, but it also provided for the contingency that said heirs could yet be
declared or adjudicated in the administration proceedings as the sole owners of the four parcels
being sold.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that a sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested
parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, must comply with the requisites therein provided, which
are mandatory. Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an
application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority
to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. Rule 90, Section
4, does not distinguish between heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines.
Therefore, its requirements should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to
be notified under said rule. The sale is invalid and any subsequent sale is invalid. Notice to heirs
and hearing of application to sell is essential. Without notice and hearing the sale is null and void
ab initio.
Page
399

Rule 74

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SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

HELD: Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

3. Whether or not the court can decide on ownership of the property?

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

FACTS: Vicente Legarda was co-administrator of a parcel of land in Dinalupihan, Tondo. He

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

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