PRODUCTION OF WILL

RULE 75
PRODUCTION OF
WILL. ALLOWANCE
OF WILL NECESSARY

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PRODUCTION OF WILL
ANG-OY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
L-27421; September 12, 1986
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

FACTS: On September 4, 1937, Tumpao executed a last will and testament. He appointed his son
Bando Tumpao to carry or fulfill his Testament. The contents of the document were read to the
beneficiaries named therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively
allotted to them. The beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, affirmed and
recognized the terms of such will. Two days later Old Tumpao died.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extra judicial partition in which they divided
the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other
persons mentioned in the above quoted documents. By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao's
title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents.
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance. They
had been sustained by the trial court which was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is immediately operative?
HELD: No. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the
Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or
allowed in court.
The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated, however, when
the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to
abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate. And furthermore, carried out its terms
after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them.
Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the
testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the
lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.

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FERNANDEZ vs. DIMAGIBA
L-23938; October 12, 1967
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L, J.
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

FACTS: It appears from record that on January 19, 1955, Ismael Dimagiba, now respondent,
submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes, executed October 22, 1930.

The will instituted the petitioner Fernandez as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The
petition was set for hearing and Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, and Mariano,
Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes all claiming to be heirs intestate of the
decedent.
After trial the CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on
the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of the adjudication of the properties is
opportunately presented.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the allowance of the will to probate had become final?

HELD: Yes. It is so recognized by express provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 109, that specifically
prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will." Appellants argue that
they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition
before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher
Courts. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed
on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer
revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest.

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PASTOR JR. vs. COURT OT APPEALS
L-56340; June 24, 1983
Ponente: Plana, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

FACTS: Pastor Sr., a Spanish subject died in Cebu City, was survived by his Spanish wife Sofia
Bossio, their 2 legitimate children Pastor Jr. and Sofia Midgely, and an illegitimate child Lewellyn
Barlito Quemada. Pastor Jr is a naturalized Philippine Citizen,Sofia is a Spanish subject and
Quemada is a Filipino by his mother's blood.
Quemada file a petition for the probate and allowance of the holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the
CFI of Cebu. The will contained only one testamentary disposition, a legacy in favor of Quemada,
which consists of 30% of Pastor Sr.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation (ATLAS).
Quemada, after an ex parte hearing, was appointed by the probate court as special administrator
of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by a holographic will.
On December 7, 1970, Quemada as special administrator instituted against pastor jr and his wife
an action for reconveyance of the alleged properties of the estate which included the properties
subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor Jr, and his wife Maria
who claimed to be the owners of the property in their own right and not by inheritance. December
5, 1972, probate court issued an order allowing the will to be probated. Spouses Pastor Jr.
opposed allowance on the ground that the action for reconveyance is still pending in another court.
The probate court still decided on the ownership of the properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can resolve the question of ownership
HELD: No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule
76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

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PRODUCTION OF WILL
NUGUID vs. NUGUID
L-23445; June 23, 1966
Ponente: Sanchez, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

FACTS: On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon city died on December 30, 1962, single without
descendants. She was survived by her legitimate parents and 6 brothers and sisters. During the
proceedings for the probate of the will, petitioner prayed that the said will be admitted to probate
and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. On June 25, 1963, the
legitimate parents of rosario, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefore,
inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heirs of the
deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were
illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the oppositors were preterited?
HELD: The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear
case of preterition. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir
nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we
say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

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PRODUCTION OF WILL
REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 12099. 30 October 1997
Ponente: Makasiar, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

Facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament in the presence
of his witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio
A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S.
Vivares. Reyes died on May 12, 1992. On May 21, 1992, Julio filed a petition for probate of the will
before the RTC of Mambajao, Camiguin. On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of
Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and
the deceased's natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an
opposition and alleged that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in
accordance with the formalities of law; and that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and
improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further
averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he
claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was
still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir
for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.

The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never
married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. On appeal
the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the probate court.

Issue: Whether or not probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity of the will.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that as a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely
inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and
the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge
the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are,
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PRODUCTION OF WILL
however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the
defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because
"practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary
provisions are of doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first
determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible
and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.

The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not
have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning
Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and
which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial
evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the
testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the
whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion. The Court opined
that the Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a
copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the
said certificate before the probate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an
existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be
entertained on appeal, much less in this petition for review. This Court would not try the case anew
or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have
been passed upon by the lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate
court will not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which
petitioners have not shown in this case.

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PRODUCTION OF WILL
MANINANG v. CA
114 SCRA 478
Ponente:
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

FACTS: Clemencia Aseneta executed a holographic will. Clemencia died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital at age 81 and had no heirs according to the will. Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a
petition for probate of the will of the decedent. Respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted
son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings
with the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig. Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as
the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. The lower Court
ordered the dismissal of the case. On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration
and appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia
Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang
is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the
duties of the trust.

Petitioners Maninang filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case. CA denied
the same and ruled that the lower court's dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the
Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the testate case

HELD: Yes. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Normally, the
probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in the case
of Nuguid v. Nuguid was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so
demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the
intrinsic validity of the Will. Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is
insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.

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Moreover in the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of
the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter,
whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law. The
effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different. Pretention under Article 854 of the
New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of
the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited.

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ESTATE OF HILARIIO CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
252 SCRA 542
Ponente: Puno, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

FACTS: On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only
son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline,
all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and
real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will.
For unknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will.
Four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of
Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz, Surprisingly,
Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and
payments totaling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In
compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing
the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the
estate.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion
for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch
Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for
Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate
Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

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ISSUE: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate's debts and obligations, has the authority to order the distribution of the estate properties

HELD: In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or
any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and
the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of
first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not
payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes
on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that
the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in
proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued
the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic
validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate
court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for
reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of
his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide
that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.

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IN RE KAW SINGCO
74 Phil. 484
Ponente: Moran, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.
FACTS: Kaw Singco died intestate. Sy Oa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila intestate
proceedings wherein she prayed that she be appointed administratix of the intestate estate. In her
petition, Sy Oa alleged that Kaw Singco was a resident of the City of Manila at the time of his death
which took place in China on January 20, 1921. On February 23, 1940, the respondent judge
granted Sy Oa's petition and accordingly appointed her administratix of the estate of the deceased
Kaw Singco. On March 13, 1940, Sy Oa filed a petition for the examination of the herein petitioner,
Co Ho, regarding the properties belonging to the deceased Kaw Singco which were then in the
possession and under administration of the said Co Ho. The respondent judge, by order of March
20, 1940, granted Sy Oa's petition and accordingly directed the herein petitioner to appear before
the court on April 12, 1940, for the examination prayed for, the acting deputy clerk of the court
having been commissioned for the purpose.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that the respondent judge declare himself incompetent and without
jurisdiction to entertain the intestate proceedings of Kaw Singco, on the ground that the latter was a
resident of Bato, Camarines Sur, and not of Manila, at the time of his death. After hearing, the
respondent judge, on June 4, 1940, disallowed Co Ho's motion and reiterated his order requiring
the latter to appear for examination, for the reasons that the deceased Kaw Singco was a resident
of Manila and that Co Ho was a stranger in the intestate proceedings. On June 13, 1940, Co Ho
excepted to this order and announced his intention to appear therefrom. The next day, or on June
14, 1940, the herein petitioner filed his record on appeal and on July 11, 1940, he deposited an
appeal bond in the amount of sixty pesos (P60). The respondent judge, on July 22, 1940,
disapproved said record on appeal on the grounds that the order sought to be appealed is
interlocutory and that the petitioner, Co Ho, has no interest in the intestate proceedings. Hence, the
petition for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was properly filed with respect to venue?
HELD: In probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we declined to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to a Court of First
Instance of a province whether the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein
completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on
appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of
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the trial court for lack of the residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the
effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which
have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew
before another court of the same rank in another province.
Furthermore, section 600 of Act. No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled in the province whether he had last resided could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained
in law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter is another. The law of jurisdiction
Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many
courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the
deceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules
of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called
"venue." (Rule 75, section 1.)

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REYES v. DIAZ
G.R. No. L-48754. 26 November 1941
Ponente: Moran, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.

Facts: Emilio Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy but its due filing is being questioned. The
authority of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant,
which have not been challenged by Apolonio Diaz, is being questioned.
Issue: What is the jurisdiction of the trial court?
Held: Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court and defines its powers.
In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree
that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no
jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to
what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between
them is one of fact - whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And
not until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined.
Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above
quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is
merely a question of relevancy of evidence. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case,
it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the
court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and
decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should
be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the
former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may
be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly
pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties.
This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over
the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that
requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such
importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

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BERNABE vs. VERGARA
73 Phil 676
Ponente: Moran, J
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.
FACTS: The plaintiff in the action for partition were the heirs of Benito and Apolonia Zafra and the
defendants were Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she sad sold her share in the common
property; namely, Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho. Dominga Zafra, in
her answer, pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts contracted by
Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. These debts
constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by said deceased Apolonia Zafra.
At the trial, evidence was presented as to such debts, and the trial court in its decision awarded the
plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara one-third of the common property and, at the same time,
ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia Zafra, in the amount of P350.
Appeal was interposed by them from this judgment, and in this Court no question was raised as to
the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment in the said amount of P350. This Court
accordingly assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment for the sum of money
HELD: There can be absolutely no doubt that the trial had such jurisdiction not only because there
was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the
proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by
the deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was
the case.
The question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of question that
confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter but
at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines the court
and defines its powers.
The question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only unsubstantial but is also not the
kind of question that may deprive the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case.
CASTRO et al vs. MARTINEZ
10 Phil 307
Ponente: Arellano, C.J.
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.
FACTS: Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on Calle Cadiz,
city of Cebu, valued at 200 pesos, not including the ground wherein the same is erected, which
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although belonging to her, was, according to the title of ownership held by her and recorded in the
registry of property was only worth 100 pesos. On the 17th of October, 1896, before a notary and
the proper number of witnesses she executed a nuncupative will under which she died and wherein
she disposed of the house in which she lived and of some furniture and credits of small
importance.
The plaintiffs named asked in their amended complaint that judgment be entered in their favor
"declaring them to be the owners of the property of the late Marcelina Cuico y Rodis; for the
possession of said property, or in case that the same could not be found, for the sum of P4,000
pesos as indemnity, and for the sum of 1,500 pesos for the loss and damage suffered and the
products not received, for costs in the proceedings, and any other remedy which may be
considered just.
The court having considered as a matter of fact, that the will was not only null and illegal but also
fraudulent, it naturally results that all the transfers made by Antonio Martinez Gallegos were and
are null and illegal, and that the title to, and right of possession of No. 19 Calle Cadiz has always
remained with the heirs of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis, and that they are entitled to the possession
and to the proceeds of the sale of same, if there were any, now retained by the said defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court below erred in declaring null, fraudulent, and illegal the will of
Marcelina Cuico
HELD: It has been proven by the testimony of the surviving witnesses to the will, Francisco Reyes
and Brigido Famador, that the testatrix dictated her will to the notary, that she was in the full
enjoyment of her mental faculties, that she was in the free use of her speech, and that she had
asked the witness Casals to sign for her. And in the heading of the will the notary attests that the
testatrix was in the free use of her intellectual faculties, and that in his judgment and in that of the
witnesses, she had the necessary legal capacity to make her will and that she was in the free use
of her speech; all of the foregoing antecedents are confirmed by the detailed testimony of the priest
who administered the sacraments to the sick woman and by Evaristo Rodis, a relative of the
testatrix, who was appointed one of the executors and declares that he conversed with her after
the execution of the will.
It is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions in that of the 13th of February, 1889, "that is
not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when
the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the
time of executing the will, was of sound mind."

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Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis
have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law. In the event that the will in question
was really null, the proper thing to do would be open the intestate succession of Marcelina Cuico
by means of the procedure established by law; in which action the declaration of heirs of Marcelina
Cuico could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts or contracts by virtue of
which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to third persons.

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