200 SCRA 271 Political Law Control Power Local Government

reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on

public service so requires.

grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon

against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the

is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted
that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to

supervisory power.

CASE 2013-0009: LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, -VERSUS- DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND HON. ANGELO T. REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF DENR (G.R. NO. 175368, 11 APRIL 2013, PERALTA J. SUBJECT/S:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SMALL SCALE MINING ACT (BRIEF
TITLE: LEAGUE OF PROVINCES VS. DENR).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can

DISPOSITIVE:

suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitutionsupports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere

suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. NO COSTS.

supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because

SO ORDERED.

legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:

control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority

WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE?

of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set

AT ISSUE IS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17 (B )(3)(III) OF THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND SECTION 24 OF R.A. NO.7076.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be

IF THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE IS BEING QUESTIONED, WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION?

THAT IT IS VALID.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS PRESUMPTION?

THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS WHICH ENJOINS THE COURT TO OBSERVE

COURTESY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by
three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or
the Peoples Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE DENR SECRETARY DECLARED THE APPLICATION FOR EXPLORATION PERMIT OF AMTC
VALID AND CANCELLED THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS GRANTED BY THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR. WAS THE DECISION OF THE DENR SECRETARY VALID?

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
YES. HIS DECISION EMANATED FROM THE POWER OF REVIEW GRANTED TO THE DENR
SECRETARY UNDER R.A. NO. 7076 (PEOPLES SMALL SCALE MINING ACT).
WHEN THEREFORE WILL A COURT DECLARE A STATUTE INVALID?

WHEN PETITIONER HAS SHOWN A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE

CONSTITUTION, LEAVING NO DOUBT OR HESITATION IN THE MIND OF THE COURT.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of
the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored
principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each others acts.21 This Court, however, may declare
a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the
Court.23

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration
Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review
granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF THE DENR TO DECIDE ON THE ISSUE CONCERNING
THE VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS?

IT IS A QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT THE LAW
IS, AND WHAT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES ARE, WITH RESPECT TO
THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF AND THE FACTS OBTAINING,
THE ADJUDICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS.

HAS DENR CONTROL OVER SMALL-SCALE MINING IN THE PROVINCES?

YES.

IT IS GRANTED UNDER THREE STATUTES: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, THE PEOPLES
SMALL SCALE MINING ACT AND THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT.

The DENR Secretarys power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as
recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of
what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of
their respective rights.53

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THEN, IS THE ACT OF THE DENR SECRETARY A SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE

PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OR CONTROL OVER HIM?

NO. IT IS JUST THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF AMTC.

In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section
24 of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of law.

Abbas vs comelec

Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following:

The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or
litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can
neither be equated with substitution of judgment of the Provincial Governor in issuing
Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is
a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that [t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in

WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CRITERION IN DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF A STATUTE?

accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor
of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even
if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created

THAT ALL REASONABLE DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE.

composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be

In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by )Jeltran v.
The Secretary of Health, which held:

clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish
the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55

Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein
such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be
that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and
(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if
the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the
totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology
as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double
majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the
vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been
understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Ordillo vs. COMELEC case brief summary

Facts:
The province of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City
cast their vote in a plebiscite held in pursuant to R.A. 6766 creating the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The result of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was
only approved by Ifugao. In consideration of the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces
and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
Ruling:
No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of the 1987 Constitution it includes
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas, that a region is to be made up of
two or more constituent unit.
Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely constitute a region.
- See more at: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2014/06/ordillo-vs-comelec-case-briefsummary.html#sthash.sMYgnRh9.dpuf

Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS-

Ja nua ry 30 , 199 0, pur suan t to Repub lic Act No. 67 66 entitled A n Act
Providing fo r an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the
provinces of Benguet,Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votesin a plebiscite.- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of
5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 inthe rest provinces and city. The province of
Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number
of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act forthe Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of votes cast only in the provinceo f I fugao. Secretar y o f Jus tice
a ls o issu ed a m emor andu m for th e Pres id en t reiteratin gCOMELEC resolution,
stating that Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally
and validly constitutes CAR.- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861
setting elections in CAR of Ifugaoon first Monday of March
1991.- E v e n b e f o r e C O M E L E C r e s o l u t i o n , E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y i
s s u e d F e b r u a r y 5 , 1 9 9 0 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the
affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board andCordillera Regional Assembly created under
Executive Order No. 220.- March 30 , 1 99 0, Pres id en t issu ed Ad min is tr ative Order
N o. 1 60 declar ing among oth er s that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly and all offices underExecutive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification
of Organic Act.- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as theConstitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of morethan one constituent unit.- Petitioners therefore pray that
the court:a . d e c l a r e n u l l a n d v o i d C O M E L E C r e s o l u t i o n N o .
2259, the
m e m o r a n d u m o f t h e Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order N
o . 1 6 0 , a n d R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 6 8 6 1 a n d prohibit and restrain the respondents
from implementing the same and spending publicfunds for the purposeb . d e c l a r e
E xecu t ive Ord er No. 220 con s titu tin g th e Cord il lera E xecu tiv e Board
a n d t h e Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until
anothero rg an ic law fo r the Auton omous Reg io n shall have b een enacted by
C ongres s and th e same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON th e p ro vince o f I fug ao , b eing the on ly p rovince which vo ted favo rably fo r
thecreation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute
suchregion.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.a . T h e k e y w o r d i n s A r t i c l e X , S e c t i o n 1 5 o f t h e 1 9 8 7
C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i n c e s , c i t i e s , municipalities and geographical areas
connote that region is to be made up of moreth an on e cons tituent un it. The term
region us ed in its ordinary s ense mean s two or more provinces.- rule in statutory
construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution,as much as possible
should be understood in the sense it has in common use and thatthe wo rds used
in c ons titu tio na l provis io ns are to b e g iven their o rd in ar y mean ing except where
technical terms are employed.
b .T h e en tiret y o f Rep ub lic Ac t N o. 67 6 6 c rea tin g th e C o rd ill er a
A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n i s infused with pro vis io ns which rule agains t th e so le
p ro vinc e o f I fug ao cons titutin g the Region.- It can be gleaned that Congress never
intended that a single province may constitutethe autonomous region.- If th is were s o,
we wo uld b e faced with the abs urd s ituation of having two s ets o f officials: a set

of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising theirexec utive a nd
legislative powers over exac tly the sa me sma ll a rea . (Ifuga o is on e o f the
smallest provin ces in the Ph ilipp ines, po pulation -wis e) (Ar t III sec 1 an d 2; Ar t
V,sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- A llotment o f Ten Million Pesos to Region al
Go vernmen t fo r its in itia l o rg aniza tio na l requirements can not be construed as
funding only a lone and small province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- C er ta in pro vis io ns o f the
Act call for offi cials c om ing from diff erent provin ces a nd c i t i e s i n t h e
Reg io n , a s well a s tr ib a l c o u r ts a n d th e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o m m o n regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art
XV RA 6766)- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only
violate theletter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be
impractical andillogical.

However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of
votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to
one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the

Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC

Posted on September 10, 2012

Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

G.R. No. 177597

Issues:
July 16, 2008

1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.

Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district ofMaguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on
October 29, 2006.

2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5
ofArt.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao.

to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU

Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable

must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any

membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion

provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.Congress

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to

exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted

create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative

by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded

bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict

as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it)

arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative

[Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].

bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the

An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior

criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the

legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in

Constitution is complied.

its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national

However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of

law.

Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.

The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by

According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:

Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional

Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1

Assembly recognizes this.

representative in the House of Representatives.

The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the

Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,

Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter

But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested

increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at

solely in Congress.

least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of

Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office

provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a

because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of

power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of

regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20,

the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative

2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the

districts for Congress.)

Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the

Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections.

At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental

Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff

importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the

Kabunsuan, is void.

requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial

FACTS:

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD

duty.x x x x
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest

be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

ISSUES:

28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in
the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But
even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization,
and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not
only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does
not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

CONCLUSION:

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

NORTH COTABATO VS GRP

FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about
by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The
agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD
and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are
unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the
mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority
of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

Article III (Bill of Rights)

ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to
official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.

Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No
project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and
approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and
upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is
limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL
Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation
of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional
elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the
election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA
93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of
the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-incharge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of
the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same
officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May
2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to
recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are
more apparent than real.

Issue/s:
1.
WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should
not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.
2.
WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to
appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013
elections.
Held:
1.
No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local
governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and the
regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since
autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
2.
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is
no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of
RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power
of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the
OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to
remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will
be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the
people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision
states:

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO F

O U N D A T I O N I N C . , C E N T E R F O R ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION
INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY HER MOTHER
MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER
MOTHERMRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED
BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIEG. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO
ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS "BAYAY," EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G.
YARANON,D I A N E M O N D O C , p e t i t i o n e r s , v s . V I C T O R L I M , P R E S I D E
N T , B A S E S C O N V E R S I O N D E V E L O P M E N T AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO
POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)CO. LTD.,
ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURALRESOURCES, respondents.Facts:
The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos
declaring a portionof Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax
exemption within the John HaySpecial Economic Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full powerto
exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad
as itspower to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition
that a lawgranting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover,
theclaimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable
from thelanguage of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by Proclamation
No. 420 of taxexemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the
Constitution. However, theentire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other
parts thereof not being repugnant tothe law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area
covered by Camp John Hay as aSEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation. Where part of a statute isvoid as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, as inthe case at bar, may stand and be enforced.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition
Ruling:
YES

Rationale:
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs outof all the base
areas in the country. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence onthe
bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the
realinterests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, ispersonal and
substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government actbeing challenged. Theirs
is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely aninterest in the
question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement of ProclamationNo. 420 is
the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. ... Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T.Claravall and Lilia
G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governanceof Baguio
City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether toconcur with the declaration of
a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitionersClaravall and Yar anon, as city
officia ls wh o voted aga inst the sanggunian Resolu tion No.
255 (Ser ies of 1994)supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal
standing to bring the presentpetition.

On April 12, 1999, Clark Liberty Warehouse, Inc. (Clark Liberty), herein private respondent, a duly
licensed duty-free shop operating in the Clark Special Economic Zone, imported 800 cases or a total of
9,420 bottles of Fundador brandy.
Since the importation by respondent Clark Liberty was not covered by the BFAD Certificate of
Product Registration, the Bureau of Customs seized and impounded the shipment pursuant to Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 228-98, in relation to Sections 101 (K) and 2530 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. The imported brandy then became the subject of seizure proceedings before the District Collector
of Customs of the Port of Manila, docketed as S.I. No. 99-140.
Petitioner then filed a motion to intervene in S.I. No. 99-140 alleging, among others, that it
sustained damages caused by respondent Clark Libertys illegal importation. However, the Bureau of
Customs District Collector failed to resolve the motion.
On September 15, 1999, petitioner sent respondent Clark Liberty a letter demanding that the latter
cease and desist from importing, distributing, selling, or marketing Fundador brandy in
the Philippines. Petitioner also demanded that Clark Liberty refrain from claiming the seized shipment and
participating in the seizure proceedings. Clark Liberty, however, refused to heed petitioners demands.
On October 8, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction. The complaint was raffled to Branch 23 of the Manila RTC, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 99-95337.

ALLIED DOMECQ PHIL., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 23; CLARK LIBERTY WAREHOUSE, INC., BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS and/or DISTRICT COLLECTORS OF CUSTOMS, PORT OF MANILA and CLARK
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, and BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (BFAD) and/or
DIRECTOR OF BFAD, respondents.
DECISION

On August 15, 2000, after hearing petitioners application for TRO and injunctive relief, the RTC
issued an Order denying the same. The trial court held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
Clark Liberty engaged in unfair competition as there is no showing that it employed deceit or otherwise
committed acts constituting bad faith;[3] that the bottles of Fundador brandy imported by respondent are
the ones imported by plaintiff[4] and that these bottles are not genuine, defective, or of poor quality.[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in its Order dated
December 28, 2000.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

On March 16, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63802.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
May 27, 2002 and Resolution[2] dated November 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 which dismissed the
special civil action for certiorari filed by Allied Domecq, Philippines Inc. (ADPI), herein petitioner,for want
of jurisdiction.

On May 27, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack
of jurisdiction. Its ratiocination is quoted as follows:

The factual background of this case is as follows:

On May 8, 1996, petitioner ADPI entered into an exclusive distributorship agreement with Pedro
Domecq, S.A., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Spain, engaged in the manufacture
of wine and brandy. Under the said agreement, Pedro Domecq, S.A. granted petitioner the sole and
exclusive right to import and distribute in the Philippines various Pedro Domecq, S.A. products including
Fundador brandy until May 17, 2000. Upon its expiration, the agreement is deemed automatically
extended for an indefinite period of time.
Petitioner then applied for a Certificate of Registration with the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD),
pursuant to Department of Health Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1979, requiring all imported food
products to be registered with the BFAD prior to their distribution in the local markets.
On June 2, 1998, BFAD wrote then Director Quintin L. Kintanar of the Bureau of Customs,
requesting that entry of imported shipments of Fundador brandy should not be allowed in the Philippines,
unless the importer presents a valid Certificate of Registration issued by the BFAD. The Bureau of
Customs granted petitioners request and on July 13, 1998, issued Customs Memorandum Circular No.
228-098.

[I]tisanadmittedfactrespondentClarkLibertyisoneofthedulylicensedandauthorizeddutyfreeshopsatthe
ClarkSpecialEconomicZonesince1998whichsellsimportedgroceryitemsincludingliquors,appliances,
householdwares,etc.andisexclusivelyregulatedbytheClarkDevelopmentCorporation,createdbyRepublicAct
No.7227,knownastheBasesConversionandDevelopmentActof1992.Itisthereforeajuridicalcreationof
RepublicActNo.7227inrelationtoExecutiveOrderNo.62andPresidentialProclamationNo.163,creatingthe
ClarkSpecialEconomicZone,undertheexclusivejurisdiction,authorityandregulationoftheClarkDevelopment
Corporation.Assuchjuridicalcreation,thisCourthasnojurisdictiontodeterminewhetherornotpetitioneris
entitledtotheissuanceofaninjunctivereliefsincesuchauthorityandjurisdictionbelongtheHonorableSupreme
CourtinaccordancewithSection21ofRepublicActNo.7227.[6]
Hence, the instant petition for review anchored on the following grounds:
I
THEFORMERTHIRTEENTHDIVISIONOFTHECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDSERIOUSAND
REVERSIBLEERRORSINLAWINDISMISSINGTHEPETITIONFORCERTIORARIINCAG.R.SPNO.
63802UNDERRULE65OFTHE1997RULESONCIVILPROCEDUREFORLACKOFJURISDICTION.

II
THEFORMERTHIRTEENTHDIVISIONOFTHECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOF
DISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACKORINEXCESSOFJURISDICTIONBYNOTLOOKINGINTOTHE
MERITSOFTHECASEANDINNOTRESOLVINGWHETHERORNOTPETITIONISENTITLEDTOTHE
INJUNCTIONRELIEFPRAYEDFORINITSPETITION.

ItislikewisethedeclaredpolicyoftheGovernmenttoenhancethebenefitstobederivedfromsaidpropertiesin
ordertopromotetheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofCentralLuzoninparticularandthecountryingeneral.
Republic Act No. 7227 goes on further to provide that:
SEC.4.PurposesoftheConversionAuthority.TheConversionauthorityshallhavethefollowingpurposes:

III
INDISMISSINGTHEPETITIONINCAG.R.SPNO.63802,THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSHAS
DECIDEDAQUESTIONOFSUBSTANCENOTTHEREFOREDETERMINEDBYTHESUPREMECOURT
ORHASDECIDEDITINAWAYPROBABLYNOTINACCORDWITHLAWORWITHAPPLICABLE
DECISIONSOFTHISHONORABLESUPREMECOURT.[7]
Petitioner submits that the Appellate Court gravely abused its discretion in holding that under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7227, only the Supreme Court can issue a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner contends that its cause of action has nothing to do with the implementation of
the projects for the conversion of the military reservation into alternative productive uses
governed by the said law. Since jurisdiction is conferred by law, the Court of Appeals cannot diminish its
own jurisdiction under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Solicitor General and respondent Clark Liberty counter that the Court of Appeals was correct in
dismissing the petition before it for lack of jurisdiction. They point out that in the proceedings before the
trial court, petitioner admitted that Clark Liberty is a registered enterprise of the Clark Special Economic
Zone, thus subject to the operation of R.A. 7227. Under Section 21 of this law, only the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to enjoin the implementation of the projects for the conversion into
alternative productive uses of the military reservation.
The pivotal issue, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding
that it has no jurisdiction over CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act 7227.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause. [8] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.
[9]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any
or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. [10] Basic is the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the cause or causes of action as alleged in the complaint. [11] But
where the actual issues are evident from the records of the case, then jurisdiction over the subject matter
need not depend upon the literal averments in the complaint, but on the law as applied to established
facts.[12]
Here, in order to determine whether the court a quo has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint for
injunction, we have to interpret the law as applied to the established facts. There is no question that
respondent Clark Liberty is a registered enterprise of the Clark Special Economic Zone and is
primarily regulated by R.A. No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992.
The underlying purpose of the Legislature in enacting R.A. No. 7227 is provided by Section 2, thus:
SEC.2.DeclarationofPolicies.ItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheGovernmenttoacceleratethesoundand
balancedconversionintoalternativeproductiveusesoftheClarkandSubicmilitaryreservationsandtheir
extensions(JohnHayStation,WallaceAirStation,ODonnellTransmitterStation,SanMiguelNaval
CommunicationsStationandCapasRelaystation),toraisefundsbythesaleofportionsofMetroManilamilitary
campsandtoapplysaidfundsforthedevelopmentandconversiontoproductivecivilianuseofthelandscovered
underthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreementbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,asamended.

xxx
(c)ToencouragetheactiveparticipationoftheprivatesectorintransformingtheClarkandSubicmilitary
reservationsandtheirextensionsintootherproductiveuses;
The establishment, registration, and operation of respondent Clark Liberty and the other enterprises
within the Clark Special Economic Zone are projects (involving the private sector) which convert Clark Air
Base, a military reservation, into productive uses. In this connection, Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227
provides:
SEC.21.InjunctionandRestrainingOrder.Theimplementationoftheprojectsfortheconversionintoalternative
productiveusesofthemilitaryreservationsareurgentandnecessaryandshallnotberestrainedorenjoinedexcept
byanorderissuedbytheSupremeCourtofthePhilippines.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 for want of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27,
2002 and its Resolution dated November 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 79956
January 29, 1990
Cordillera Broad Coalition
vs.
Commission on Audit
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera
people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement
states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body
that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake
consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the
R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into
law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the
Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the
said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras.

evidenced by Tax Declarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels of land were purchased from Dr. Erotida
Valera. Twenty-two (22) years later, he was able to redeem the parcels of land through payment of 10,000
to the vendor's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. Quema was prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua.
Prompted by such turn of events, David Quema filed a case in the Baranggay Council but failed to have
the dispute settled. A judge advised Quema to file his case in the provincial courts. However, Quema did
not, and filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. Due to several warnings from the tribe, spouses
Badua filed a petition for special relief, with the following to be settled: a. That the respondents be
enjoined from enforcing the decision of the tribal court in the pending case. b. The respondents be

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in
the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to
provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime
that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this
time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet
convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of
government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not
supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the
existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic
groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.

prohibited from usurping judicial power. c. That the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration be clarified. The Baduas also allege that they were denied due process (or hearing) and
that the tribal court has NO jurisdiction over the case, since neither they nor the respondent are members
of the Maeng tribe. The respondents contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case since the tribal
court is NOT a part of the judicial system.

Issue: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They
do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the

In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region
signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which
completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the
parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement,
compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local

Badua vs cordillera

city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or
arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the

Facts: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own farm land from which they were forcibly ejected

decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced

through the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, with the case entitled David Quema v.

or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.

Leonor Badua. The background of this case reveals that David Quema owns the parcels of land

HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exerciseof these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and
155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an

investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric
Cooperative, Inc.) PaterioTorres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and
they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged
inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor
the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The
SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the
power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for
contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to
be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the
grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The
Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise
these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue
the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra
vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.