Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141181

April 27, 2007

SAMSON CHING, Petitioner,

vs.
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching of the
Decision1 dated November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
23055. The assailed decision acquitted respondent Clarita Nicdao of eleven (11) counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22, otherwise known as "The Bouncing
Checks Law." The instant petition pertains and is limited to the civil aspect of the case
as it submits that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal, she should be held
liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in the aggregate
sum of P20,950,000.00.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal
complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent Nicdao.
Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan, which, except as to the
amounts and check numbers, uniformly read as follows:
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22, committed as follows:
That on or about October 06, 1997, at Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully and
unlawfully make or draw and issue Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc. Check No.
[002524] dated October 06, 1997 in the amount of [P20,000,000.00] in payment of her
obligation with complainant Samson T.Y. Ching, the said accused knowing fully well that
at the time she issued the said check she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment in full of the said check upon presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient
funds and notwithstanding receipt of notice of such dishonor the said accused failed and

refused and still fails and refuses to pay the value of the said check in the amount of
[P20,000,000.00] or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for the payment in full
of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving the said notice, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Samson T.Y. Ching in the aforementioned amount of
[P20,000,000.00], Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Dinalupihan, Bataan, October 21, 1997.
(Sgd.) SAMSON T.Y. CHING
Complainant
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9433 up to 9443 involving the
following details:
Check No. Amount
Date Private Complainant
Reason for the Dishonor
0025242
P 20,000,000Oct. 6, 1997 Samson T.Y. Ching DAIF*
0088563
150,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
0121424
100,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
0045315
50,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
0022546
100,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
0088757
100,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
0089368
50,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
0022739
50,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
00894810
150,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
00893511
100,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
01037712
100,000
Oct. 6, 1997 "
"
At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for violation of BP
22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law
spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14) checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00,
were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient
funds. The Informations were filed with the same MCTC and docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471.
At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to all the
charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 94589471.
For the prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner Ching and Imelda
Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were presented to
prove the charges against respondent Nicdao. On direct-examination,13 petitioner
Ching preliminarily identified each of the eleven (11) Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank
(HSLB) checks that were allegedly issued to him by respondent Nicdao amounting to
P20,950,000.00. He identified the signatures appearing on the checks as those of

respondent Nicdao. He recognized her signatures because respondent Nicdao allegedly

signed the checks in his presence. When petitioner Ching presented these checks for
payment, they were dishonored by the bank, HSLB, for being "DAIF" or "drawn against
insufficient funds."
Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by respondent Nicdao as
security for the loans that she obtained from him. Their transaction began sometime in
October 1995 when respondent Nicdao, proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore,
together with her husband, approached him to borrow money in order for them to settle
their financial obligations. They agreed that respondent Nicdao would leave the checks
undated and that she would pay the loans within one year. However, when petitioner
Ching went to see her after the lapse of one year to ask for payment, respondent
Nicdao allegedly said that she had no cash.
Petitioner Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao several times more
but every time, she would tell him that she had no money. Then in September 1997,
respondent Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for being insistent and challenged him
about seeing each other in court. Because of respondent Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay
her obligations, on October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching deposited the checks that she
issued to him. As he earlier stated, the checks were dishonored by the bank for being
"DAIF." Shortly thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma Nuguid, wrote a
demand letter to respondent Nicdao which, however, went unheeded. Accordingly, they
separately filed the criminal complaints against the latter.
On cross-examination,14 petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a salesman of the
La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing for almost ten (10) years already. As such,
he delivered the goods and had a warehouse. He received salary and commissions. He
could not, however, state his exact gross income. According to him, it increased every
year because of his business. He asserted that aside from being a salesman, he was
also in the business of extending loans to other people at an interest, which varied
depending on the person he was dealing with.
Petitioner Ching confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations contained in the eleven
(11) Informations that he filed against respondent Nicdao. He reiterated that, upon their
agreement, the checks were all signed by respondent Nicdao but she left them undated.
Petitioner Ching admitted that he was the one who wrote the date, October 6, 1997, on
those checks when respondent Nicdao refused to pay him.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check (Check No. 002524), petitioner Ching
explained that he wrote the date and amount thereon when, upon his estimation, the
money that he regularly lent to respondent Nicdao beginning October 1995 reached the
said sum. He likewise intimated that prior to 1995, they had another transaction
amounting to P1,200,000.00 and, as security therefor, respondent Nicdao similarly
issued in his favor checks in varying amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00. When
the said amount was fully paid, petitioner Ching returned the checks to respondent
Nicdao.

Petitioner Ching maintained that the eleven (11) checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos.
9433-9443 pertained to respondent Nicdaos loan transactions with him beginning
October 1995. He also mentioned an instance when respondent Nicdaos husband and
daughter approached him at a casino to borrow money from him. He lent them
P300,000.00. According to petitioner Ching, since this amount was also unpaid, he
included it in the other amounts that respondent Nicdao owed to him which totaled
P20,000,000.00 and wrote the said amount on one of respondent Nicdaos blank
checks that she delivered to him.
Petitioner Ching explained that from October 1995 up to 1997, he regularly delivered
money to respondent Nicdao, in the amount of P1,000,000.00 until the total amount
reached P20,000,000.00. He did not ask respondent Nicdao to acknowledge receiving
these amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed that he was confident that he would be paid by
respondent Nicdao because he had in his possession her blank checks. On the other
hand, the latter allegedly had no cause to fear that he would fill up the checks with just
any amount because they had trust and confidence in each other. When asked to
produce the piece of paper on which he allegedly wrote the amounts that he lent to
respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not present it; he reasoned that it was not
with him at that time.
It was also averred by petitioner Ching that respondent Nicdao confided to him that she
told her daughter Janette, who was married to a foreigner, that her debt to him was only
between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00. Petitioner Ching claimed that he offered to
accompany respondent Nicdao to her daughter in order that they could apprise her of
the amount that she owed him. Respondent Nicdao refused for fear that it would cause
disharmony in the family. She assured petitioner Ching, however, that he would be paid
by her daughter.
Petitioner Ching reiterated that after the lapse of one (1) year from the time respondent
Nicdao issued the checks to him, he went to her several times to collect payment. In all
these instances, she said that she had no cash. Finally, in September 1997, respondent
Nicdao allegedly went to his house and told him that Janette was only willing to pay him
between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00 because, as far as her daughter was
concerned, that was the only amount borrowed from petitioner Ching. On hearing this,
petitioner Ching angrily told respondent Nicdao that she should not have allowed her
debt to reach P20,000,000.00 knowing that she would not be able to pay the full
amount.
Petitioner Ching identified the demand letter that he and Nuguid sent to respondent
Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her about depositing her checks on his
account because she already made that statement about seeing him in court. Again, he
admitted writing the date, October 6, 1997, on all these checks.
Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an employee of
HSLB. On direct-examination,15 she testified that she worked as a checking account

bookkeeper/teller of the bank. As such, she received the checks that were drawn
against the bank and verified if they were funded. On October 6, 1997, she received
several checks issued by respondent Nicdao. She knew respondent Nicdao because
the latter maintained a savings and checking account with them. Yandoc identified the
checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and affirmed that stamped at the
back of each was the annotation "DAIF". Further, per the banks records, as of October
8, 1997, only a balance of P300.00 was left in respondent Nicdaos checking account
and P645.83 in her savings account. On even date, her account with the bank was
considered inactive.
On cross-examination,16 Yandoc stated anew that respondent Nicdaos checks
bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and her account was closed the following
day, on October 8, 1997. She informed the trial court that there were actually twenty-five
(25) checks of respondent Nicdao that were dishonored at about the same time. The
eleven (11) checks were purportedly issued in favor of petitioner Ching while the other
fourteen (14) were purportedly issued in favor of Nuguid. Yandoc explained that
respondent Nicdao or her employee would usually call the bank to inquire if there was
an incoming check to be funded.
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of respondent Nicdao, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct-examination,17 respondent Nicdao stated that
she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she had
borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total amount of
P22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted, however, that she had obtained a loan
from Nuguid but only for P2,100,000.00 and the same was already fully paid. As proof of
such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated August 13, 1996 in
the amount of P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the said demand draft
showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of petitioner Ching.
In addition, respondent Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette
wrappers18 at the back of which appeared computations. She explained that Nuguid
went to the grocery store everyday to collect interest payments. The principal loan was
P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the payments for the
daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to respondent Nicdao.
The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered by Nuguid to
respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00 and P150,000.00. Respondent
Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Ching that prior to 1995, they had another
transaction.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the
signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to petitioner Ching.
Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon were
hers while the amounts and payee thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or
Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and authorized by her to
do so.

Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten
(10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different occasions. Nuguid came to the grocery
store everyday to collect the interest payments. Respondent Nicdao said that she
purposely left the checks undated because she would still have to notify Nuguid if she
already had the money to fund the checks.
Respondent Nicdao denied ever confiding to petitioner Ching that she was afraid that
her daughter would get mad if she found out about the amount that she owed him. What
allegedly transpired was that when she already had the money to pay them (presumably
referring to petitioner Ching and Nuguid), she went to them to retrieve her checks.
However, petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to return the checks claiming that she
(respondent Nicdao) still owed them money. She demanded that they show her the
checks in order that she would know the exact amount of her debt, but they refused. It
was at this point that she got angry and dared them to go to court.
After the said incident, respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified by HSLB that her
check in the amount of P20,000,000.00 was just presented to the bank for payment.
She claimed that it was only then that she remembered that sometime in 1995, she was
informed by her employee that one of her checks was missing. At that time, she did not
let it bother her thinking that it would eventually surface when presented to the bank.
Respondent Nicdao could not explain how the said check came into petitioner Chings
possession. She explained that she kept her checks in an ordinary cash box together
with a stapler and the cigarette wrappers that contained Nuguids computations. Her
saleslady had access to this box. Respondent Nicdao averred that it was Nuguid who
offered to give her a loan as she would allegedly need money to manage Vignette
Superstore. Nuguid used to run the said store before respondent Nicdaos daughter
bought it from Nuguids family, its previous owner. According to respondent Nicdao, it
was Nuguid who regularly delivered the cash to respondent Nicdao or, if she was not at
the grocery store, to her saleslady. Respondent Nicdao denied any knowledge that the
money loaned to her by Nuguid belonged to petitioner Ching.
At the continuation of her direct-examination,19 respondent Nicdao said that she never
dealt with petitioner Ching because it was Nuguid who went to the grocery store
everyday to collect the interest payments. When shown the P20,000,000.00 check,
respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but she denied issuing
it as a blank check to petitioner Ching. On the other hand, with respect to the other ten
(10) checks, she also admitted that the signatures thereon were hers and that the
amounts thereon were written by either Josie Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, her
employees whom she authorized to do so. With respect to the payee, it was purposely
left blank allegedly upon instruction of Nuguid who said that she would use the checks
to pay someone else.
On cross-examination,20 respondent Nicdao explained that Josie Nicdao and Melanie
Tolentino were caretakers of the grocery store and that they manned it when she was

not there. She likewise confirmed that she authorized them to write the amounts on the
checks after she had affixed her signature thereon. She stressed, however, that the
P20,000,000.00 check was the one that was reported to her as lost or missing by her
saleslady sometime in 1995. She never reported the matter to the bank because she
was confident that it would just surface when it would be presented for payment.
Again, respondent Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers which indicated the daily
payments she had made to Nuguid. The latter allegedly went to the grocery store
everyday to collect the interest payments. Further, the figures at the back of the
cigarette wrappers were written by Nuguid. Respondent Nicdao asserted that she
recognized her handwriting because Nuguid sometimes wrote them in her presence.
Respondent Nicdao maintained that she had already paid Nuguid the amount of
P1,200,000.00 as evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft which she gave to the
latter and which was subsequently negotiated and deposited in petitioner Chings
account. In connection thereto, respondent Nicdao refuted the prosecutions allegation
that the demand draft was payment for a previous transaction that she had with
petitioner Ching. She clarified that the payments that Nuguid collected from her
everyday were only for the interests due. She did not ask Nuguid to make written
acknowledgements of her payments.
Melanie Tolentino was presented to corroborate the testimony of respondent Nicdao. On
direct-examination,21 Tolentino stated that she worked at the Vignette Superstore and
she knew Nuguid because her employer, respondent Nicdao, used to borrow money
from her. She knew petitioner Ching only by name and that he was the "husband" of
Nuguid.
As an employee of the grocery store, Tolentino stated that she acted as its caretaker
and was entrusted with the custody of respondent Nicdaos personal checks. Tolentino
identified her own handwriting on some of the checks especially with respect to the
amounts and figures written thereon. She said that Nuguid instructed her to leave the
space for the payee blank as she would use the checks to pay someone else. Tolentino
added that she could not recall respondent Nicdao issuing a check to petitioner Ching in
the amount of P20,000,000.00. She confirmed that they lost a check sometime in 1995.
When informed about it, respondent Nicdao told her that the check could have been
issued to someone else, and that it would just surface when presented to the bank.
Tolentino recounted that Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect the
interest payments of the loan. In some instances, upon respondent Nicdaos instruction,
Tolentino handed to Nuguid checks that were already signed by respondent Nicdao.
Sometimes, Tolentino would be the one to write the amount on the checks. Nuguid, in
turn, wrote the amounts on pieces of paper which were kept by respondent Nicdao.
On cross-examination,22 Tolentino confirmed that she was authorized by respondent
Nicdao to fill up the checks and hand them to Nuguid. The latter came to the grocery
store everyday to collect the interest payments. Tolentino claimed that in 1995, in the
course of chronologically arranging respondent Nicdaos check booklets, she noticed

that a check was missing. Respondent Nicdao told her that perhaps she issued it to
someone and that it would just turn up in the bank. Tolentino was certain that the
missing check was the same one that petitioner Ching presented to the bank for
payment in the amount of P20,000,000.00.
Tolentino stated that she left the employ of respondent Nicdao sometime in 1996. After
the checks were dishonored in October 1997, Tolentino got a call from respondent
Nicdao. After she was shown a fax copy thereof, Tolentino confirmed that the
P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she reported as missing in 1995.
Jocelyn Nicdao also took the witness stand to corroborate the testimony of the other
defense witnesses. On direct-examination,23 she averred that she was a saleslady at
the Vignette Superstore from August 1994 up to April 1998. She knew Nuguid as well as
petitioner Ching.
Jocelyn Nicdao further testified that respondent Nicdao was indebted to Nuguid. Jocelyn
Nicdao used to fill up the checks of respondent Nicdao that had already been signed by
her and give them to Nuguid. The latter came to the grocery store everyday to pick up
the interest payments. Jocelyn Nicdao identified the checks on which she wrote the
amounts and, in some instances, the name of Nuguid as payee. However, most of the
time, Nuguid allegedly instructed her to leave as blank the space for the payee.
Jocelyn Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers as the documents on which Nuguid
acknowledged receipt of the interest payments. She explained that she was the one
who wrote the minus entries and they represented the daily interest payments received
by Nuguid.
On cross-examination,24 Jocelyn Nicdao stated that she was a distant cousin of
respondent Nicdao. She stopped working for her in 1998 because she wanted to take a
rest. Jocelyn Nicdao reiterated that she handed the checks to Nuguid at the grocery
store.
After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal Cases
Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of BP
22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Chings testimony that respondent Nicdao
borrowed money from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00. Petitioner Ching
delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to 1997 until
the sum reached P20,000,000.00. The MCTC also found that subsequent thereto,
respondent Nicdao still borrowed money from petitioner Ching. As security for these
loans, respondent Nicdao issued checks to petitioner Ching. When the latter deposited
the checks (eleven in all) on October 6, 1997, they were dishonored by the bank for
being "DAIF."
The MCTC explained that the crime of violation of BP 22 has the following elements: (a)
the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have

sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and (c) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.25
According to the MCTC, all the foregoing elements are present in the case of
respondent Nicdaos issuance of the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443.
On the first element, respondent Nicdao was found by the MCTC to have made, drawn
and issued the checks. The fact that she did not personally write the payee and date on
the checks was not material considering that under Section 14 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, "where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person
in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks
therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature
in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a
prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount x x x." Respondent Nicdao
admitted that she authorized her employees to provide the details on the checks after
she had signed them.
The MCTC disbelieved respondent Nicdaos claim that the P20,000,000.00 check was
the same one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary prudence would dictate
that a lost check would at least be immediately reported to the bank to prevent its
unauthorized endorsement or negotiation. Respondent Nicdao made no such report to
the bank. Even if the said check was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted respondent Nicdao
for being negligent in keeping the checks that she had already signed in an unsecured
box.
The MCTC further ruled that there was no evidence to show that petitioner Ching was
not a holder in due course as to cause it (the MCTC) to believe that the said check was
not issued to him. Respondent Nicdaos admission of indebtedness was sufficient to
prove that there was consideration for the issuance of the checks.
The second element was also found by the MCTC to be present as it held that
respondent Nicdao, as maker, drawer or issuer, had knowledge that at the time of issue
she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full
of the checks upon their presentment.
As to the third element, the MCTC established that the checks were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for being "DAIF" or drawn against insufficient funds.
Stamped at the back of each check was the annotation "DAIF." The bank representative
likewise testified to the fact of dishonor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction of
respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a worthless
check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of
deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and
conviction of BP 22.26 The decretal portion of the MCTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant
the amount of P20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the
complaint until the total amount had been paid. The prayer for moral damages is denied
for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment
equivalent to 1 year for every check issued and which penalty shall be served
successively.
SO ORDERED.27
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in Criminal
Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the fourteen (14) counts of
violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in
separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of the
MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen (14) counts of violation
of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471, respectively.
Respondent Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for review of the two
decisions of the RTC. The petition involving the eleven (11) checks purportedly issued
to petitioner Ching was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 (assigned to the 13th
Division). On the other hand, the petition involving the fourteen (14) checks purportedly
issued to Nuguid was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 (originally assigned to the
7th Division but transferred to the 6th Division). The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its respective comments on the said petitions. Subsequently, the OSG filed
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 a motion for its consolidation with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054.
The OSG prayed that CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 pending before the 13th Division be
transferred and consolidated with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in accordance with the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 issued a
Resolution dated October 19, 1999 advising the OSG to file the motion in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23054 as it bore the lowest number. Respondent Nicdao opposed the consolidation
of the two cases. She likewise filed her reply to the comment of the OSG in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23055.
On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed Decision in CAG.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11) counts of violation
of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching. The decretal portion of the assailed CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision dated May 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial
Region, Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the decision dated December 8, 1998, of the First

Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, convicting petitioner

Clarita S. Nicdao in Criminal Cases No. 9433 to 9443 of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment rendered ACQUITTING her in all
these cases, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.28
On even date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above decision
has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of Judgments.
In acquitting respondent Nicdao in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, the CA made the following
factual findings:
Petitioner [respondent herein] Clarita S. Nicdao, a middle-aged mother and
housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd, who is
married to a wealthy expatriate.
Complainant [petitioner herein] Samson Ching is a Chinese national, who claimed he is
a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
Emma Nuguid, complainants live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly connected with
Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery store now known as the
Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store, which was about to be foreclosed, to
petitioners daughter, Janette Boyd. Since then, petitioner began managing said store.
However, since petitioner could not always be at the Vignette Superstore to keep shop,
she entrusted to her salesladies, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao, pre-signed
checks, which were left blank as to amount and the payee, to cover for any delivery of
merchandise sold at the store. The blank and personal checks were placed in a cash
box at Vignette Superstore and were filled up by said salesladies upon instruction of
petitioner as to amount, payee and date.
Soon thereafter, Emma Nuguid befriended petitioner and offered to lend money to the
latter which could be used in running her newly acquired store. Nuguid represented to
petitioner that as former manager of the Vignette Superstore, she knew that petitioner
would be in need of credit to meet the daily expenses of running the business,
particularly in the daily purchases of merchandise to be sold at the store. After Emma
Nuguid succeeded in befriending petitioner, Nuguid was able to gain access to the
Vignette Superstore where petitioners blank and pre-signed checks were kept.29
In addition, the CA also made the finding that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from
Nuguid in the total amount of P2,100,000.00 secured by twenty-four (24) checks drawn
against respondent Nicdaos account with HSLB. Upon Nuguids instruction, the checks
given by respondent Nicdao as security for the loans were left blank as to the payee
and the date. The loans consisted of (a) P950,000.00 covered by ten (10) checks
subject of the criminal complaints filed by petitioner Ching (CA-G.R. CR No. 23055);
and (b) P1,150,000.00 covered by fourteen (14) checks subject of the criminal

complaints filed by Nuguid (CA-G.R. CR No. 23054). The loans totaled P2,100,000.00
and they were transacted between respondent Nicdao and Nuguid only. Respondent
Nicdao never dealt with petitioner Ching.
Against the foregoing factual findings, the CA declared that, based on the evidence,
respondent Nicdao had already fully paid the loans. In particular, the CA referred to the
Planters Bank demand draft in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which, by his own
admission, petitioner Ching had received. The appellate court debunked petitioner
Chings allegation that the said demand draft was payment for a previous transaction.
According to the CA, petitioner Ching failed to adduce evidence to prove the existence
of a previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao.
Apart from the demand draft, the CA also stated that respondent Nicdao made interest
payments on a daily basis to Nuguid as evidenced by the computations written at the
back of the cigarette wrappers. Based on these computations, as of July 21, 1997,
respondent Nicdao had made a total of P5,780,000.00 payments to Nuguid for the
interests alone. Adding up this amount and that of the Planters Bank demand draft, the
CA placed the payments made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid as already amounting
to P6,980,000.00 for the principal loan amount of only P2,100,000.00.
The CA negated petitioner Chings contention that the payments as reflected at the back
of the cigarette wrappers could be applied only to the interests due. Since the
transactions were not evidenced by any document or writing, the CA ratiocinated that no
interests could be collected because, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, "no interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
The CA gave credence to the testimony of respondent Nicdao that when she had fully
paid her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her checks. Nuguid, however, refused to
return the checks to respondent Nicdao. Instead, Nuguid and petitioner Ching filled up
the said checks to make it appear that: (a) petitioner Ching was the payee in five
checks; (b) the six checks were payable to cash; (c) Nuguid was the payee in fourteen
(14) checks. Petitioner Ching and Nuguid then put the date October 6, 1997 on all these
checks and deposited them the following day. On October 8, 1997, through a joint
demand letter, they informed respondent Nicdao that her checks were dishonored by
HSLB and gave her three days to settle her indebtedness or else face prosecution for
violation of BP 22.
With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations to Nuguid,
the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for violation of BP 22. It was
explained that to be held liable under BP 22, it must be established, inter alia, that the
check was made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value. According to the
CA, the word "account" refers to a pre-existing obligation, while "for value" means an
obligation incurred simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In the case of
respondent Nicdaos checks, the pre-existing obligations secured by them were already
extinguished after full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid.
Obligations are extinguished by, among others, payment.30 The CA believed that when

petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to return respondent Nicdaos checks despite her
total payment of P6,980,000.00 for the loans secured by the checks, petitioner Ching
and Nuguid were using BP 22 to coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt which she no
longer owed them.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by petitioner
Chings claim that he delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to respondent Nicdao until
the amount reached P20,000,000.00 and, when she refused to pay the same, he filled
up the check, which she earlier delivered to him as security for the loans, by writing
thereon the said amount. In disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA pointed out that,
contrary to his assertion, he was never employed by the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette
Manufacturing per the letter of Susan Resurreccion, Vice-President and Legal Counsel
of the said company. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner Ching, he did not own the
house where he and Nuguid lived.
Moreover, the CA characterized as incredible and contrary to human experience that
petitioner Ching would, as he claimed, deliver a total sum of P20,000,000.00 to
respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof thereof, e.g., written
acknowledgment that she received the same. On the other hand, it found plausible
respondent Nicdaos version of the story that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same
one that was missing way back in 1995. The CA opined that this missing check surfaced
in the hands of petitioner Ching who, in cahoots with Nuguid, wrote the amount
P20,000,000.00 thereon and deposited it in his account. To the mind of the CA, the
inference that the check was stolen was anchored on competent circumstantial
evidence. Specifically, Nuguid, as previous manager/owner of the grocery store, had
access thereto. Likewise applicable, according to the CA, was the presumption that the
person in possession of the stolen article was presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen
article.31
The CA emphasized that the P20,000,000.00 check was never delivered by respondent
Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, the said check without the details as to the date,
amount and payee, was an incomplete and undelivered instrument when it was stolen
and ended up in petitioner Chings hands. On this point, the CA applied Sections 15 and
16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:
SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. Where an incomplete instrument has
not been delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid
contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed
thereon before delivery.
SEC. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable
instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose
of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party
other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made
either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as
the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been

conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid
delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is
conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a
party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is
presumed until the contrary is proved.
The CA held that the P20,000,000.00 check was filled up by petitioner Ching without
respondent Nicdaos authority. Further, it was incomplete and undelivered. Hence,
petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest therein and could not assert any
cause of action founded on the
stolen checks.32 Under these circumstances, the CA concluded that respondent could
not be held liable for violation of BP 22.
The Petitioners Case
As mentioned earlier, the instant petition pertains and is limited solely to the civil aspect
of the case as petitioner Ching argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos
acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22, she should be held liable to pay
petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in the aggregate sum of
P20,950,000.00.
He urges the Court to review the findings of facts made by the CA as they are allegedly
based on a misapprehension of facts and manifestly erroneous and contradicted by the
evidence. Further, the CAs factual findings are in conflict with those of the RTC and
MCTC.
Petitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal
by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on
her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which,
prior to its amendment, provided, in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-9733 dated September 16, 1997 is also cited as it
provides in part:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized. x x x
Petitioner Ching theorizes that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the civil action for the recovery of damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 arising
from the same act or omission of the accused is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. Moreover, under the above-quoted Circular, the criminal action for violation of BP
22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the
amount of the dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the
payee.
In seeking to enforce the alleged civil liability of respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching
maintains that she had loan obligations to him totaling P20,950,000.00. The existence
of the same is allegedly established by his testimony before the MCTC. Also, he asks
the Court to take judicial notice that for a monetary loan secured by a check, the check
itself is the evidence of indebtedness.
He insists that, contrary to her protestation, respondent Nicdao also transacted with
him, not only with Nuguid. Petitioner Ching pointed out that during respondent Nicdaos
testimony, she referred to her creditors in plural form, e.g. "[I] told them, most checks
that I issued I will inform them if I have money." Even respondent Nicdaos employees
allegedly knew him; they testified that Nuguid instructed them at times to leave as blank
the payee on the checks as they would be paid to someone else, who turned out to be
petitioner Ching.
It was allegedly erroneous for the CA to hold that he had no capacity to lend
P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao. Petitioner Ching clarified that what he meant
when he testified before the MCTC was that he was engaged in dealership with La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing, and not merely its sales agent. He stresses
that he owns a warehouse and is also in the business of lending money. Further, the
CAs reasoning that he could not possibly have lent P20,950,000.00 to respondent
Nicdao since petitioner Ching and Nuguid did not own the house where they live, is
allegedly non sequitur.
Petitioner Ching maintains that, contrary to the CAs finding, the Planters Bank demand
draft for P1,200,000.00 was in payment for respondent Nicdaos previous loan
transaction with him. Apart from the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10) checks
(totaling P950,000.00) were allegedly issued by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching
as security for the loans that she obtained from him from 1995 to 1997. The existence of
another loan obligation prior to the said period was allegedly established by the
testimony of respondent Nicdaos own witness, Jocelyn Nicdao, who testified that when
she started working in Vignette Superstore in 1994, she noticed that respondent Nicdao
was already indebted to Nuguid.

Petitioner Ching also takes exception to the CAs ruling that the payments made by
respondent Nicdao as reflected on the computations at the back of the cigarette
wrappers were for both the principal loan and interests. He insists that they were for the
interests alone. Even respondent Nicdaos testimony allegedly showed that they were
daily interest payments. Petitioner Ching further avers that the interest payments
totaling P5,780,000.00 can only mean that, contrary to respondent Nicdaos claim, her
loan obligations amounted to much more than P2,100,000.00. Further, she is allegedly
estopped from questioning the interests because she willingly paid the same.
Petitioner Ching also harps on respondent Nicdaos silence when she received his and
Nuguids demand letter to her. Through the said letter, they notified her that the twentyfive (25) checks valued at P22,100,000.00 were dishonored by the HSLB, and that she
had three days to settle her ndebtedness with them, otherwise, face prosecution.
Respondent Nicdaos silence, i.e., her failure to deny or protest the same by way of
reply, vis--vis the demand letter, allegedly constitutes an admission of the statements
contained therein.
On the other hand, the MCTCs decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is allegedly based on
the evidence on record; it has been established that the checks were respondent
Nicdaos personal checks, that the signatures thereon were hers and that she had
issued them to petitioner Ching. With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, petitioner
Ching assails the CAs ruling that it was stolen and was never delivered or issued by
respondent Nicdao to him. The issue of the said check being stolen was allegedly not
raised during trial. Further, her failure to report the alleged theft to the bank to stop
payment of the said lost or missing check is allegedly contrary to human experience.
Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdaos defense of stolen or lost check as
incredible and, therefore, false.
Aside from the foregoing substantive issues that he raised, petitioner Ching also faults
the CA for not acting and ordering the consolidation of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 with CAG.R. CR No. 23054. He informs the Court that latter case is still pending with the CA.
In fine, it is petitioner Chings view that the CA gravely erred in disregarding the findings
of the MCTC, as affirmed by the RTC, and submits that there is more than sufficient
preponderant evidence to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to him in the amount of
P20,950,000.00. He thus prays that the Court direct respondent Nicdao to pay him the
said amount plus 12% interest per annum computed from the date of written demand
until the total amount is fully paid.
The Respondents Counter-Arguments
Respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition. She posits preliminarily that it
is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in
Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which
has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action.
xxxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
According to respondent Nicdao, the assailed CA decision has already made a finding
to the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability might arise did not exist. She refers
to the ruling of the CA that the P20,000,000.00 check was stolen; hence, petitioner
Ching did not acquire any right or interest over the said check and could not assert any
cause of action founded on the said check. Consequently, the CA held that respondent
Nicdao had no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot be held liable for
violation of BP 22. She also refers to the CAs pronouncement relative to the ten (10)
other checks that they were not issued to apply on account or for value, considering that
the loan obligations secured by these checks had already been extinguished by her full
payment thereof.
To respondent Nicdaos mind, these pronouncements are equivalent to a finding that the
facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The instant petition, which
seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly
already barred by the final and executory decision acquitting her.
In any case, respondent Nicdao contends that the CA did not commit serious
misapprehension of facts when it found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen
check and that she never made any transaction with petitioner Ching. Moreover, the
other ten (10) checks were not issued to apply on account or for value. These findings
are allegedly supported by the evidence on record which consisted of the respective
testimonies of the defense witnesses to the effect that: respondent Nicdao had the
practice of leaving pre-signed checks placed inside an unsecured cash box in the
Vignette Superstore; the salesladies were given the authority to fill up the said checks
as to the amount, payee and date; Nuguid beguiled respondent Nicdao to obtain loans
from her; as security for the loans, respondent Nicdao issued checks to Nuguid; when
the salesladies gave the checks to Nuguid, she instructed them to leave blank the
payee and date; Nuguid had access to the grocery store; in 1995, one of the salesladies
reported that a check was missing; in 1997, when she had fully paid her loans to
Nuguid, respondent Nicdao tried to retrieve her checks but Nuguid and petitioner Ching
falsely told her that she still owed them money; they then maliciously filled up the
checks making it appear that petitioner Ching was the payee in the five checks and the
six others were payable to "cash"; and knowing fully well that these checks were not
funded because respondent Nicdao already fully paid her loans, petitioner Ching and
Nuguid deposited the checks and caused them to be dishonored by HSLB.

It is pointed out by respondent Nicdao that her testimony (that the P20,000,000.00
check was the same one that she lost sometime in 1995) was corroborated by the
respective testimonies of her employees. Another indication that it was stolen was the
fact that among all the checks which ended up in the hands of petitioner Ching and
Nuguid, only the P20,000,000.00 check was fully typewritten; the rest were invariably
handwritten as to the amounts, payee and date.
Respondent Nicdao defends the CAs conclusion that the P20,000,000.00 check was
stolen on the ground that an appeal in a criminal case throws open the whole case to
the appellate courts scrutiny. In any event, she maintains that she had been consistent
in her theory of defense and merely relied on the disputable presumption that the
person in possession of a stolen article is presumed to be the author of the theft.
Considering that it was stolen, respondent Nicdao argues, the P20,000,000.00 check
was an incomplete and undelivered instrument in the hands of petitioner Ching and he
did not acquire any right or interest therein. Further, he cannot assert any cause of
action founded on the said stolen check. Accordingly, petitioner Chings attempt to
collect payment on the said check through the instant petition must fail.
Respondent Nicdao describes as downright incredible petitioner Chings testimony that
she owed him a total sum of P20,950,000.00 without any documentary proof of the loan
transactions. She submits that it is contrary to human experience for loan transactions
involving such huge amounts of money to be devoid of any documentary proof. In
relation thereto, respondent Nicdao underscores that petitioner Ching lied about being
employed as a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing. It is
underscored that he has not adequately shown that he possessed the financial capacity
to lend such a huge amount to respondent Nicdao as he so claimed.
Neither could she be held liable for the ten (10) other checks (in the total amount of
P950,000,000.00) because as respondent Nicdao asseverates, she merely issued them
to Nuguid as security for her loans obtained from the latter beginning October 1995 up
to 1997. As evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft in the amount of
P1,200,000.00, she already made payment in 1996. The said demand draft was
negotiated to petitioner Chings account and he admitted receipt thereof. Respondent
Nicdao belies his claim that the demand draft was payment for a prior existing
obligation. She asserts that petitioner Ching was unable to present evidence of such a
previous transaction.
In addition to the Planters Bank demand draft, respondent Nicdao insists that petitioner
Ching received, through Nuguid, cash payments as evidenced by the computations
written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Nuguid went to the Vignette Superstore
everyday to collect these payments. The other defense witnesses corroborated this fact.
Petitioner Ching allegedly never disputed the accuracy of the accounts appearing on
these cigarette wrappers; nor did he dispute their authenticity and accuracy.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the CA allegedly correctly held that, computing the
amount of the Planters Bank demand draft (P1,200,000.00) and those reflected at the
back of the cigarette wrappers (P5,780,000.00), respondent Nicdao had already paid
petitioner Ching and Nuguid a total sum of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligations
totaling only P950,000.00, as secured by the ten (10) HSLB checks excluding the stolen
P20,000,000.00 check.
Respondent Nicdao rebuts petitioner Chings argument (that the daily payments were
applied to the interests), and claims that this is illegal. Petitioner Ching cannot insist that
the daily payments she made applied only to the interests on the loan obligations,
considering that there is admittedly no document evidencing these loans, hence, no
written stipulation for the payment of interests thereon. On this point, she invokes Article
1956 of the Civil Code, which proscribes the collection of interest payments unless
expressly stipulated in writing.
Respondent Nicdao emphasizes that the ten (10) other checks that she issued to
Nuguid as security for her loans had already been discharged upon her full payment
thereof. It is her belief that these checks can no longer be used to coerce her to pay a
debt that she does not owe.
On the CAs failure to consolidate CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054,
respondent Nicdao proffers the explanation that under the RIRCA, consolidation of the
cases is not mandatory. In fine, respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition
as it failed to discharge the burden of proving her civil liability with the required
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is
premised on the finding that, apart from the stolen check, the ten (10) other checks
were not made to apply to a valid, due and demandable obligation. This, in effect, is a
categorical ruling that the fact from which the civil liability of respondent Nicdao may
arise does not exist.
The Courts Rulings
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the
civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."34
Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action is generally
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of petitioner Chings filing of the
Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section 1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,

unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxxx
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the
extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b)36 of the same Rule, also
quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state "whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist."37
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b)
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the
criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from
the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People39 the consequences of an acquittal
on the civil aspect in this wise:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not

based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. Moreover, the civil action
based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the
civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party,
may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal
by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did
not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the accused
should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of
the decision," the period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that
granted to the accused.40 With petitioner Chings timely filing of the instant petition for
review of the civil aspect of the CAs decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and
authority to determine the civil liability of respondent Nicdao notwithstanding her
acquittal.
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the judgment of the
CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of the three categories enumerated in
Salazar and Sapiera, to wit:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted.
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there
is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the
act or omission imputed to him.
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that respondent Nicdao
cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her civil liability

A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdaos
acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability.
There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt.
Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22.
In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was
never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such,
according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over Check
No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said check,"41 and that
respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot,
therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured by
these checks had already been extinguished after full payment had been made by
respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22,
i.e., "that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value," is
not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable
to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her
obligations. The CA computed the payments made by respondent Nicdao vis--vis her
loan obligations in this manner:
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma
Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and the P1,200,000.00 demand
draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner [respondent herein] had
already made payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of
only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23054).43
On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen
check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well.
Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdaos liability did not
arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex
delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however, petitioner Ching
miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of these unpaid loan
obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its
decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the act or omission from which her civil
liability may arise did not exist. On the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as follows:
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the
possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his paramour Emma Nuguid,
filled up the blank check with his name as payee and in the fantastic amount of

P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented it to the bank on October 7,

1997, along with the other checks, for payment. Therefore, the inference that the check
was stolen is anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. The fact already
established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store, had access to said
store. Moreover, the possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason, as
in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen
article is presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA
664).
As previously shown, at the time check no. 002524 was stolen, the said check was
blank in its material aspect (as to the name of payee, the amount of the check, and the
date of the check), but was already pre-signed by petitioner. In fact, complainant Ching
himself admitted that check no. 002524 in his possession was a blank check (TSN, Jan.
7, 1998, pp. 24-27, Annex J, Petition).
Moreover, since it has been established that check no. 002524 had been missing since
1995 (TSN, Sept. 9, 1998, pp. 14-15, Annex DD, Petition; TSN, Sept. 10, 1998, pp. 4346, Annex EE, Petition), it is abundantly clear that said check was never delivered to
complainant Ching. Check no. 002524 was an incomplete and undelivered instrument
when it was stolen and ended up in the hands of complainant Ching. Sections 15 and
16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provide:
xxxx
In the case of check no. 002524, it is admitted by complainant Ching that said check in
his possession was a blank check and was subsequently completed by him alone
without authority from petitioner. Inasmuch as check no. 002524 was incomplete and
undelivered in the hands of complainant Ching, he did not acquire any right or interest
therein and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action founded on said stolen check
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Sima We, 219 SCRA 736, 740).
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire any right or interest
over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said check,
petitioner has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.44
Anent the other ten (10) checks, the CA made the following findings:
Evidence sufficiently shows that the loans secured by the ten (10) checks involved in
the cases subject of this petition had already been paid. It is not controverted that
petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a demand draft valued at P1,200,000 to pay for the loans
guaranteed by said checks and other checks issued to her. Samson Ching admitted
having received the demand draft which he deposited in his bank account. However,
complainant Samson Ching claimed that the said demand draft represents payment for
a previous obligation incurred by petitioner. However, complainant Ching failed to

adduce any evidence to prove the existence of the alleged obligation of the petitioner
prior to those secured by the subject checks.
Apart from the payment to Emma Nuguid through said demand draft, it is also not
disputed that petitioner made cash payments to Emma Nuguid who collected the
payments almost daily at the Vignette Superstore. As of July 21, 1997, Emma Nuguid
collected cash payments amounting to approximately P5,780,000.00. All of these cash
payments were recorded at the back of cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own
handwriting, the authenticity and accuracy of which were never denied by either
complainant Ching or Emma Nuguid.
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma
Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and the P1,200,000.00 demand
draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner had already made
payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan in the total amount of
P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at
bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).45
Generally checks may constitute evidence of indebtedness.46 However, in view of the
CAs findings relating to the eleven (11) checks - that the P20,000,000.00 was a stolen
check and the obligations secured by the other ten (10) checks had already been fully
paid by respondent Nicdao they can no longer be given credence to establish
respondent Nicdaos civil liability to petitioner Ching. Such civil liability, therefore, must
be established by preponderant evidence other than the discredited checks.
After a careful examination of the records of the case,47 the Court holds that the
existence of respondent Nicdaos civil liability to petitioner Ching in the amount of
P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid obligations to the latter has not been
sufficiently established by preponderant evidence. Petitioner Ching mainly relies on his
testimony before the MCTC to establish the existence of these unpaid obligations. In
gist, he testified that from October 1995 up to 1997, respondent Nicdao obtained loans
from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00. As security for her obligations, she
issued eleven (11) checks which were invariably blank as to the date, amounts and
payee. When respondent Nicdao allegedly refused to pay her obligations despite his
due demand, petitioner filled up the checks in his possession with the corresponding
amounts and date and deposited them in his account. They were subsequently
dishonored by the HSLB for being "DAIF" and petitioner Ching accordingly filed the
criminal complaints against respondent Nicdao for violation of BP 22.
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the
allegations Et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam
factum negantis probatio nulla sit (The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him
who denies; since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any
proof).48 In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be

synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.49 Section 1, Rule 133 of
the Revised Rules of Court offers the guidelines in determining preponderance of
evidence:
SEC. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance
is not necessarily with the greater number.
Unfortunately, petitioner Chings testimony alone does not constitute preponderant
evidence to establish respondent Nicdaos civil liability to him amounting to
P20,950,000.00. Apart from the discredited checks, he failed to adduce any other
documentary evidence to prove that respondent Nicdao still has unpaid obligations to
him in the said amount. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under our Rules.50
In contrast, respondent Nicdaos defense consisted in, among others, her allegation that
she had already paid her obligations to petitioner Ching through Nuguid. In support
thereof, she presented the Planters Bank demand draft for P1,200,000.00. The said
demand draft was negotiated to petitioner Chings account and he admitted receipt of
the value thereof. Petitioner Ching tried to controvert this by claiming that it was
payment for a previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao. However,
other than his self-serving claim, petitioner Ching did not proffer any documentary
evidence to prove the existence of the said previous transaction. Considering that the
Planters Bank demand draft was dated August 13, 1996, it is logical to conclude that,
absent any evidence to the contrary, it formed part of respondent Nicdaos payment to
petitioner Ching on account of the loan obligations that she obtained from him since
October 1995.
Additionally, respondent Nicdao submitted as evidence the cigarette wrappers at the
back of which were written the computations of the daily payments that she had made
to Nuguid. The fact of the daily payments was corroborated by the other witnesses for
the defense, namely, Jocelyn Nicdao and Tolentino. As found by the CA, based on these
computations, respondent Nicdao had made a total payment of P5,780,000.00 to
Nuguid as of July 21, 1997.51 Again, the payments made, as reflected at the back of
these cigarette wrappers, were not disputed by petitioner Ching. Hence, these
payments as well as the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft establish that

respondent Nicdao already paid the total amount of P6,980,000.00 to Nuguid and
petitioner Ching.
The Court agrees with the CA that the daily payments made by respondent Nicdao
amounting to P5,780,000.00 cannot be considered as interest payments only. Even
respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments that she made to Nuguid were for
the interests due. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, no interests could be properly
collected in the loan transactions between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao
because there was no stipulation therefor in writing. To reiterate, under Article 1956 of
the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing."
Neither could respondent Nicdao be considered to be estopped from denying the
validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law
or one that is against public policy.52 Clearly, the collection of interests without any
stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. Consequently, the daily payments
made by respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 were properly considered by
the CA as applying to the principal amount of her loan obligations.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the defense of respondent Nicdao that it was
stolen and that she never issued or delivered the same to petitioner Ching was
corroborated by the other defense witnesses, namely, Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao.
All told, as between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao, the requisite quantum of
evidence - preponderance of evidence - indubitably lies with respondent Nicdao. As
earlier intimated, she cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching for her acquittal;
under the circumstances which have just been discussed lengthily, such acquittal
carried with it the extinction of her civil liability as well.
The CA committed no reversible error in not consolidating CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and
CA-G.R. CR No. 23054
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in the CA,
the pertinent provision of the RIRCA on consolidation of cases provided:
SEC. 7. Consolidation of Cases. Whenever two or more allied cases are assigned to
different Justices, they may be consolidated for study and report to a single Justice.
(a) At the instance of any party or Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and
report, and with the conformity of all the Justices concerned, the consolidation may be
allowed when the cases to be consolidated involve the same parties and/or related
questions of fact and/or law.53
The use of the word "may" denotes the permissive, not mandatory, nature of the above
provision, Thus, no grave error could be imputed to the CA when it proceeded to render

its decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, without consolidating it with CA-G.R. CR No.
23054.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167546

July 17, 2009

SONNY ROMERO Y DOMINGUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ISABEL PADUA, REGINA BREIS, MINERVA
MONTES and OFELIA BELANDO BREIS,1 Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 1, 19992 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner3 driven by petitioner Sonny
Romero and the Apego Taxi4 driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision
along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines
Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction
of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr.,5 Arnaldo
Breis,6 Gerardo Breis, Jr.,7 Rene Montes,8 Erwin Breis9 and Jimmy Padua.10 Luckily,
Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious
injuries.
As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to
property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a
decision11 dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was
ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual
damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of
earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, claiming
that the MTC erred in holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal. On July 17, 2001,
the RTC affirmed the MTC judgment in toto.12

Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed13 to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 3,
2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision14 affirming the RTC.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argues15 that his acquittal should have freed
him from payment of civil liability. He also claims that he should be totally exonerated
from any liability because it was Gerardo Breis, Sr., not the regular driver, Jimmy Padua,
who was actually driving the taxi at the time of the accident, which was clearly in
violation of insurance and transportation laws.
We disagree.
The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.16 Criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury
to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.17 Every crime gives rise to (1)
a criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.18
However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions of
Section 2, Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.xxx
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.xxx
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.19 Courts can acquit an
accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same
case.20 It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.21
In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton
and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the
highway where the accident occurred and the short distance between the bus and the
taxi before the collision. However, it categorically stated that while petitioner may be
acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable.
221avvphi1

The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which
petitioners civil liability may arise did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct in
holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision for the tragedy,
mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus expenses they incurred during the wake
and interment.23
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with the conclusion
of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime
charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction
the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the
accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries
and damages arising from the collision is another matter.
While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was
established by preponderance of evidence.24 In other words, the failure of the evidence
to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with)
a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient
to hold him civilly liable.
Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on
petitioner despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have
been held civilly liable if his act from which the civil liability had arisen did not in fact
exist.
Anent the second issue, it would be well to remind petitioner of the time-honored
doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts.25 The rule finds greater relevance in this
case because the MTC,26 the RTC27 and the CA28 uniformly held that it was Jimmy
Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the accident.
There are of course instances29 when this Court can embark on a re-examination of the
evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Sad to say, none of those instances is
present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173807

April 16, 2009

JAIME U. GOSIACO, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by juridical
persons such as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules. Our rules of
procedure governing the litigation of criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) have given the appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and
we take the opportunity herein to assert the necessary clarifications.
Before us is a Rule 45 petition1 which seeks the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR No. 29488. The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the decision3
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68 in Criminal Case No. 120482. The RTC's
decision reversed the decision4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58
in Criminal Case No. 70445 which involved a charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against
respondents Leticia Ching (Ching) and Edwin Casta (Casta).
On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with
ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of
48 days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB
through its Business Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS
checks no. 0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00
respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati
Head Office branch. ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000, acknowledged that it
owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.5
Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to
deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored
and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of
funds. Petitioner informed respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000,6
about the dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of
the money placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan against the
private respondents.

Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability and
claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have
knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks. Such responsibility, she
claimed belonged to another department.
On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved7 that ASB and its president, Luke Roxas, be
impleaded as party defendants. Petitioner, then, paid the corresponding docket fees.
However, the MTC denied the motion as the case had already been submitted for final
decision.8
On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve
her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was
civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks.9
Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the
RTC on the ground that the MTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or severally
liable with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a reconsideration which was
subsequently denied. Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she
should not be held civilly liable for the bouncing checks because they were contractual
obligations of ASB.
On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC
affirmed the MTCs ruling which denied the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons. The RTC also exonerated Ching from civil liability and
ruled that the subject obligation fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held
civilly liable.10
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the
RTC erred in absolving Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal of the MTC to
implead ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate veil of ASB and hold
Roxas liable.
On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that
the amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to ASB and not to Ching.
Roxas testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks issued by Ching were for and
in behalf of ASB. The Court of Appeals ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P.
Blg. 22 case since it is not a natural person and in the case of Roxas, he was not the
subject of a preliminary investigation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was
no need to pierce the corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites were present.11
Hence this petition.
Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) is a corporate officer who signed a bouncing
check civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22; (2) can a corporation be impleaded in a B.P. Blg.
22 case; and (3) is there a basis to pierce the corporate veil of ASB?

B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons,
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as
payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely
affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice
because it was deemed injurious to public interests12 and was found to be pernicious
and inimical to public welfare.13 B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the act of making and issuing
bouncing checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks which is considered malum
prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and not an offense against
property.14 It penalizes the issuance of a check without regard to its purpose. It covers
all types of checks.15 Even checks that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee
were held to be within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.161avvphi1.zw+
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be
held personally liable for violating a penal statute.17 The statute imposes criminal
penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or
issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank
to meet the check on presentment.18 Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate
officer is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his
own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal act.19 As we
held in Llamado v. Court of Appeals:20
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the
check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the
same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third
paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act."
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can
only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the recent case of Bautista v. Auto
Plus Traders Inc.,21 the Court ruled decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer
in a B.P. Blg. 22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined
through this case to revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes
us to discharge Ching of any civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case against her,
on account of her acquittal in the criminal charge.

We recognize though the bind entwining the petitioner. The records clearly show that it
is ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. In the various stages of this case, petitioner has
been proceeding from the
premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB itself for the
recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premise, petitioner
sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case, even if such case is
criminal in nature.22
What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to pursue a separate civil
action against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly the
provisions involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases, which state that:
Rule 111, Section 1Institution of criminal and civil action.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered
as the actual damages claimed. Where the complainant or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended
party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.23
We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg.
22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the joint trial
of both the criminal and civil liability. A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the
interpretation of penal laws is strictly construed against the State and liberally construed
against the accused. Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may
be impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law,
even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.
Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable
obligations against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of
procedure. Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a

separate civil action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued.
What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil
action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such
corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.
In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check
in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself,
such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability
of the signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability
of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from
the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the
amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was permissible to
pursue the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself
for the civil liability.
However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability
attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue
the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil obligationthe corporation
itselfis no longer that clear. In theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the
criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22 should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the
same check, since such implied institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory,
and not of the corporation.
Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the
signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the
amount represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises
from the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the
account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation
covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are
mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of
each.
If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
civil action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of
the signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of
action against the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond
dispute. It follows that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged
according to their respective standards and merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the
trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had signed the check with
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil
case the trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation itself
is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed
independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the
other.

It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were made liable for the
amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case, such signatory would have the
option of recovering the same amount from the corporation. Yet that prospect does not
ultimately satisfy the ends of justice. If the signatory does not have sufficient assets to
answer for the amount of the checka distinct possibility considering the occasional
large-scale transactions engaged in by corporations the corporation would not be
subsidiarily liable to the complainant, even if it in truth the controversy, of which the
criminal case is just a part, is traceable to the original obligation of the corporation.
While the Revised Penal Code imposes subsidiary civil liability to corporations for
criminal acts engaged in by their employees in the discharge of their duties, said
subsidiary liability applies only to felonies,24 and not to crimes penalized by special
laws such as B.P. Blg. 22. And nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability
to the corporation in whose name the check is actually issued. Clearly then, should the
check signatory be unable to pay the obligation incurred by the corporation, the
complainant would be bereft of remedy unless the right of action to collect on the liability
of the corporation is recognized and given flesh.
There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be
pursued even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First, the
possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that
should not be permitted. Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the
amount of the check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend with that
possibility through this case. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best we refer
the matter to the Committee on Rules for the formulation of proper guidelines to prevent
that possibility.
The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and
the civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress if
the plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based on the amount of the check in both the
B.P. Blg. 22 case and the civil action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate
option to file two separate cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check
against the corporation could evidently be pursued through the civil action alone.
Nonetheless, in petitioners particular case, considering the previous legal confusion on
whether he is authorized to file the civil case against ASB, he should, as a matter of
equity, be exempted from paying the filing fees based on the amount of the checks
should he pursue the civil action against ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason,
we likewise find that petitioner should not be barred by prescription should he file the
civil action as the period should not run from the date the checks were issued but from
the date this decision attains finality. The courts should not be bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Jaime
U. Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the
amount of the subject checks, in accordance with the terms of this decision. No
pronouncements as to costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the Committee on Revision of the Rules
for the formulation of the formal rules of procedure to govern the civil action for the
recovery of the amount covered by the check against the juridical person which issued
it.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141986

July 11, 2002

NEPLUM, INC., petitioner,

vs.
EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Within what period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment
acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted
from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is
served on the offended party? Our short answer is: from the time the offended party had
actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation
or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the February 17, 2000 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City (Branch 133) in Criminal Case No. 96-246. The Order reads in full as
follows:

"Opposition to Notice of Appeal being well-taken, as prayed for, the Notice of Appeal
and the Amended Notice of Appeal are denied due course."3
The foregoing Order effectively prevented petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of
the criminal proceedings in which the accused was acquitted based on reasonable
doubt.
The Facts
The factual antecedents, as narrated by petitioner in its Memorandum,4 are as follows:
"2.01 On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment (the Judgment) in
Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were
present during such promulgation.
2.01.1 The private prosecutor represented the interests of the petitioner who was the
private offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-246.
"2.02 On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its
copy of the Judgment.
"2.03 On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment.
2.03.1 Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion
for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a Monday.
"2.04 On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000
Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
"2.05 On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of
Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28
January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
"2.06 On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner
received through the private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to
petitioners Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal x x x."5
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC refused to give due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal6 and Amended
Notice of Appeal.7 It accepted respondents arguments that the Judgment from which
the appeal was being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the

Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day
period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be
reviewed.
Hence, this Petition.8
The Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:
"Whether the period within which a private offended party may appeal from, or move for
a reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal
action should be reckoned from the date of promulgation or from the date of such
partys actual receipt of a copy of such judgment considering that any party appealing or
challenging such judgment would necessarily need a copy thereof, which is in writing
and which clearly express the factual and legal bases thereof to be able to file an
intelligent appeal or other challenge."9
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Preliminary Matter:
Mode of Review
Petitioner brought this case to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Petition seeks to set aside the February 17,
2000 Order of the RTC which, in effect, disallowed petitioners appeal of its Judgment.
An ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) is "taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party."10 Consequently, the disallowance of
the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.
A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or
final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order is not a
"decision or final order" from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court states
explicitly:
"No appeal may be taken from:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;"11

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable remedy that petitioner should
have used, in view of the last paragraph of the same provision which states:
"In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."12
In turn, Rule 65, Section 1, provides:
"SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require."13 (Italics supplied)
By availing itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the Petition merits an
outright dismissal.14 Supreme Court Circular No. 2-9015 (hereinafter "Circular") is
unequivocal in directing the dismissal of an inappropriate mode of appeal thus:
"4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed."16
The same Circular provides that petitioners counsel has the duty of using the proper
mode of review.
"e) Duty of counsel It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek
review of a judgment or order promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature
of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of law; then upon such
basis to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow
scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or
imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his clients cause." 17
This Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to
follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any
error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the clients cause.18
On this score alone, the Petition could have been given short shrift and outrightly
dismissed. Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the issue presented and its far-reaching
effects, the Court will deal with the arguments raised by petitioner and lay down the rule
on this matter. As an exception to Circular 2-90, it will treat the present proceedings as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Main Issue:

Timeliness of Appeal
Petitioner contends that an appeal by the private offended party under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure must be made within 15 days from the time the appealing party
receives a copy of the relevant judgment. It cites Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
"SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his counsel." (Italics supplied)
The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive "or" in providing for the
reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted from the
promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
It is petitioners assertion that "the parties would always need a written reference or a
copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and consider the judgment from
which an appeal will be taken."19 Thus, it concludes that the 15-day period for filing a
notice of appeal must be counted from the time the losing party actually receives a copy
of the decision or order. Petitioner ratiocinates that it "could not be expected to capture
or memorize all the material details of the judgment during the promulgation thereof."20
It likewise poses the question: "why require all proceedings in court to be recorded in
writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit of utilizing these written
[documents]?"21
We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily ruled that the
reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the judgment.
In People v. Tamani,22 the Court was confronted with the question of when to count the
period within which the accused must appeal the criminal conviction. Answered the
Court:
"The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963,
when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellants counsel by registered
mail is not well-taken. The word promulgation in section 6 should be construed as
referring to judgment, while the word notice should be construed as referring to
order."23
The interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was to be counted
from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers24 are in agreement with this
interpretation.
In an earlier case,25 this Court explained the same interpretation in this wise:

"It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal case must file a
notice to that effect within fifteen days from the date the decision is announced or
promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done by the court either by announcing
the judgment in open court as was done in this case, or by promulgating the judgment in
the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court."26
Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at
bar, because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here we are
confronted with the offended partys appeal of the civil aspect only. Thus, the question
arises whether the accused-appellants period for appeal, as construed in the cited
cases, is the same as that for the private offended party. We answer in the negative.
No Need to Reserve
Independent Civil Action
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed
separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,27 33,28
3429 and 217630 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of
such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved
in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the
crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the
same act or omission.
Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to
protect such remaining civil interest therein.31 By the same token, the offended party
may appeal a judgment in a criminal case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt,
but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.
And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability
arising from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.
Period for Perfecting an Appeal

Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure declares:

"Section 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been
served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins
to run."
This provision is similar, though not identical, to Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules
invoked by petitioner. The difference is that the former makes clear that promulgation
refers to "judgment," and notice refers to "final order appealed from."
Taken on its face, the provision seems to suggest that the period for any appeal,
whether by the accused or by the private offended party, must be counted from and
understood in conjunction with the provision on the promulgation of the judgment. This
provision mentions the presence of the accused, the judge or the clerk of court in
certain instances, and/or the counsel or representative of the accused. Petitioner is
correct in observing that the private offended party is not required to be present during
the promulgation; in fact, the said party is not even mentioned in the provision.
For clarity, the 2000 Rule on the promulgation of judgment is quoted in full hereunder:
"Section 6. Promulgation of judgment The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However,
if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
"If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the
appellate court.
"The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped
from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
"In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

"If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice."32
Appeal of the Accused Different from That of the Offended Party
Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the
private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the proceedings.
Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be
inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but logical
to begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the
offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused. It is only through notice to
the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it is only from that date that the
complainant will have knowledge of the need to elevate the case. Till then, the remedy
of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.
We clarify also that the situations covered by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are limited
to appeals of judgments rendered by regional trial and inferior courts. In higher courts,
there is no promulgation in the concept of Section 6 Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a decision is
promulgated when the signed copy thereof is filed with the clerk of court, who then
causes copies to be served upon the parties or their counsels.33 Hence, the presence
of either party during promulgation is not required.
The period to appeal, embodied in Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, cannot be applied equally to both accused-appellant and private offended
party. Further bolstering this argument is the second sentence of this provision which
mandates as follows:
"x x x. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions
has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the
period begins to run."34 (Italics supplied)
The above-quoted portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming the
reglementary period of appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding sentence.
However, it is clear that the procedure operates only in relation to the accused. This
conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the period to
appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel of the accused is given
notice of the order overruling the motion for reconsideration or for new trial. Verily, the

assumption behind this provision is that the appeal was taken by the accused, not by
the private offended party.
Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the
same as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not
completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter. As correctly pointed out
by petitioner, "[t]he appeal from the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for
all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal
cannot affect the criminal aspect thereof."35 Being akin to a civil action, the present
appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.
In People v. Santiago,36 the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which
the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect
may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor
general. As a rule, only the solicitor general may represent the People of the Philippines
on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
However, the offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused. As such, the present appeal undertaken by the private
offended party relating to the civil aspect of the criminal judgment can no longer be
considered a criminal action per se, wherein the State prosecutes a person for an act or
omission punishable by law. Instead, it becomes a suit analogous to a civil action.
Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings
brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latters
original jurisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal.37 An
appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from.38 For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses
the counting of the period to appeal from the "promulgation" of the judgment to the
accused.
In sum, we hold that an offended partys appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a
judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or the
final order appealed from. To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby directed to
cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended
parties or their duly appointed counsels -- the private prosecutors. This step will enable
them to appeal the civil aspects under the appropriate circumstances.
General Rule Not Applicable to the Present Case
Having laid down the general rule on the appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now
determine its application to the present controversy. In short, was petitioners appeal
timely filed?

If we were to follow the reasoning of petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on January 31,
2000 was on time, considering that (1) the Judgment had been received by its counsel
only on November 12, 1999; and (2) the Motion for Reconsideration filed on November
29, 2000 interrupted the running of the reglementary period.
However, a peculiar circumstance in this case militates against this conclusion. Here,
the private prosecutor himself was present during the promulgation of the Judgment.
This fact is undeniable, as petitioner itself admits his presence in its Memorandum as
follows:
"2.01 On 29 October 1999, the Trial Court promulgated its judgment (the Judgment) in
Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were
present during such promulgation."39 (Italics supplied)
Further, private prosecutor40 even signed a copy of the Judgment dated October 29,
1999, a signature which in unequivocal terms signifies notification of the party he
represents -- herein petitioner.
Having been present during the promulgation and having been furnished a copy of the
judgment at the time, private offended party was in effect actually notified of the
Judgment, and from that time already had knowledge of the need to appeal it. Thus, the
very raison d'tre of this Decision is already satisfied: the filing of an appeal by the said
party, only after being notified of the Judgment. As argued by respondent, "did not the
public and private prosecutors acquire notice of Judgment at its promulgation because
of their presence? Notice of the judgment may not be defined in any other way x x x."41
Petitioner stresses the need for service of the Judgment on the offended party. It harps
on the fact that -- based on constitutional, statutory and even jurisprudential edicts -judgments must be in writing and with the factual and legal bases thereof clearly
expressed.
Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the
Judgment, for "the parties would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof
which] they can review or refer to from time to time."42 To rule otherwise would
supposedly deny them due process.
We clarify. If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then the
period for appeal would never have run. True, no law requires the offended party to
attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date. But
fiction must yield to reality. By mere presence, the offended party was already actually
notified of the Decision of acquittal and should have taken the necessary steps to
ensure that a timely appeal be filed.

Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief
statement of its intention to elevate the trial courts Decision to the CA. There was no
reason why it could not have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse
Judgment during the promulgation.43 Parties and their counsels are presumed to be
vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay
and without resort to technicalities.
Appeal Not Part of Due Process
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.1avvphi1 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its
exercise.44 Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with.45 The failure of
petitioner to file a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus rendering the
Judgment final and executory, is not a denial of due process. It might have lost its right
to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as
merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.46 Indeed, deviations
from the rules cannot be tolerated.47 "The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult
to appreciate. These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed
cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be
followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims
and caprices of appellants."48
Neither has petitioner justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Anyone
seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal
has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances
warranting such deviation.49
A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly
observed, for they are indispensable interdictions against needless delay and for an
orderly discharge of judicial business.50 After judgment has become final, vested rights
are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, so does the winning party also have the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.51 This principle becomes even more
essential in view of the fact that the criminal aspect has already been adjudicated.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 159017-18

March 9, 2011

PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C.
BOMBASI, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 159059
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO
T. COMENDADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench are appeals by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T. Comendador3 (Mayor Comendador) and
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.4 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against accused Alberto S. Angeles;5
(3) ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T.
Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now respondents Visitacion C.
Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi damages; and (4) dismissing the cases
against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza6 and Benita and Isagani Coronado.7
The factual antecedents of the case are:
On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De
Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented
by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract
whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot
and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondents mother for a period of twenty (20) years
beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.8

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her
rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification
of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984.9 From then on
up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.10
Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions
request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe
(Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways,11 Regional
Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This
finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from Mayor Comendador directing
her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were
copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 15613 dated 30 August 1993 and a
Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna.
The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio
T. Comendador to enforce and order the Coronados to demolish the building
constructed on the space previously rented to them in order to give way for the
construction of a new municipal market building.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of
Nagcarlan to file an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses incurred
due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronados continuously resists
the order.
On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor Comendador saying that:
(1) the lease contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she was willing to vacate
the store as long as same place and area would be given to her in the new public
market; and (3) in case her proposals are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the
latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against her pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 156. Pertinent portions of the letter read:
x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal Council and the opinion
rendered by the Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered view, however,
arrived at after consultation with my legal counsel, that our existing lease contract is still
legally binding and in full force and effect. Lest I appear to be defiant, let me reiterate to
you and the council that we are willing to vacate the said building provided that a new
contract is executed granting to us the same space or lot and the same area. I believe
that our proposal is most reasonable and fair under the circumstance. If you are not

amenable to the said proposal, I concur with the position taken by the Council for you to
file the appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to enable our court to finally
thresh out our differences.141avvphi1
On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to
Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying
within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.
On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution
No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by
Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the Resolution reads:
Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang
pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang
istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang
bayan.15
On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a
letter16 to Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her store the next day.
Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no
legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions
did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful
detainer case against her. She further replied that if the demolition will take place,
appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor
Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the demolition.
On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo
and Angeles supervising the work.
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated the
cost of the demolished property as amounting to P437,900.0018
On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses
Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case19
for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles. The
complaint was soon after amended to include the Spouses Benita and Isagani
Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as formal defendants because they
were then the occupants of the contested area.
The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant Municipality and defendant Municipal
Mayor from leasing the premises subject of lease Annex "A" hereof, part of which is now

occupied by PNP Outpost and by the Municipal Collectors Office, and the equivalent
adjacent area thereof, and to cause the removal of said stalls;
2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the equivalent corner area of the leased
areas being now assigned to other persons by defendants Municipality and/or by
defendant Municipal Mayor, and to allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon;
3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;
4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following
(a) P437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items therein;
(b) P200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P30,.00 for attorneys fees and P700.00 for every attendance of counsel in court.
5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice and equity may warrant in the
premises.20
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint21 against Mayor Comendador,
Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known
as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. On
22 February 1996, an Information22 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles
was filed, which reads:
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers,
accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S.
Asilo, Jr. being then the Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles being
then the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause
the demolition of a public market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of
one Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus,
causing undue injury to the latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (P437,900.00).
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not Guilty."
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the
consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)23 with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending

before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which
pertinently reads:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts,
the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the
case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.24
During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16 November 1997.
Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On 22
September 1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan issued an Order25 DISMISSING
the case against Angeles. The germane portion of the Order reads:
In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant Alberto S.
Angeles, and there being no objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor, cases
against deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby DISMISSED.
The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a result, the
counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before the
Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of Mayor Comendadors death.
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused Demetrio T. Comendador and
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic
Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months imprisonment as minimum
to 10 years and 1 day as maximum.
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases against the
accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby reiterated.
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T.
Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay

plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as
moral damages; P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The
prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the court found no aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime.
In view of this courts finding that the defendant spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza are
lawful occupants of the subject market stalls from which they cannot be validly ejected
without just cause, the complaint against them is dismissed. The complaint against
defendant spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it appearing that
they are similarly situated as the spouses Coroza. Meanwhile, plaintiff Visitacion
Bombasi is given the option to accept market space being given to her by the
municipality, subject to her payment of the appropriate rental and permit fees.
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having become moot and academic.
The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is likewise denied for lack of
merit.26
Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration27 of
the Decision alleging that there was only an error of judgment when he complied with
and implemented the order of his superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that
there is no liability when a public officer commits in good faith an error of judgment. The
Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution28 dated 21 July 2003 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that good faith cannot be argued to support his cause in
the face of the courts finding that bad faith attended the commission of the offense
charged. The Court further explained that the invocation of compliance with an order of
a superior is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be described as having the
semblance of legality inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and therefore the
same was patently illegal."29
The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration30 on 12 May
2003 alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal
and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan on its Resolution31 granted the Motion insofar as
the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil
liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.32
Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public officer must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence. He also contended
that he and his co-accused acted in good faith in the demolition of the market and,
thereby, no liability was incurred.
On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor Comendador prior
to the promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor Comendadors

criminal liability but also his civil liability. She also asserted good faith on the part of the
accused public officials when they performed the demolition of the market stall. Lastly,
she contended that assuming arguendo that there was indeed liability on the part of the
accused public officials, the actual amount of damages being claimed by the Spouses
Bombasi has no basis and was not duly substantiated.
Liability of the accused public officials
under Republic Act No. 3019
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public
positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.33
We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against
petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador as here represented by his widow
Victoria Bueta.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first two requisites of
the criminal offense were present at the time of the commission of the complained acts
and that, as to the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of evidence to
establish that there was an undue injury suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi
and that the public officials concerned acted with evident bad faith when they performed
the demolition of the market stall.
Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean actual
injury or damage which must be established by evidence.34

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual." Undue has been

defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or
damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the]
invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of
these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.35
It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo
and Mayor Comendador as accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage
caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the finding that:
xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out without a court order, and
notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition
was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two
(2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs store.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive or ill will.36 [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes.37
It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith
in performing the demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents structure is a public
nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is
nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any
circumstance, regardless of location and surroundings.39 In this case, the market stall
cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the
buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by
Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer
Office.40 To quote:
An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited above
and found out the following:
1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.
2. It is located within the market site.
3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to fire.41

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike
its predecessor law,42 the present Local Government Code43 does not expressly
provide for the abatement of nuisance.44 And even assuming that the power to abate
nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused public officials were under
the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the
contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an
unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the
building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case
was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible
provision.
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then Mayor
Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits45 in favor
of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
representation made by the municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right to
continuously operate its store binds the municipality. It is utterly unjust for the
Municipality to receive the benefits of the store operation and later on claim the illegality
of the business.
The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal offense of
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith serves as the
source of the civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.
It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November 1997, a motion to drop him as
an accused was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part of the prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and issued an Order dismissing all
the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when Mayor Comendador died and
an adverse decision was rendered against him which resulted in the filing of a motion
for reconsideration by Mayor Comendadors counsel, the prosecution opposed the
Motion specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence,
survived the death of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the
prosecution which disposition was not appealed.
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the
pendency of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor Comendador
survived his death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been for
the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil
liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality.
We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:46

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)
Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for recovery therefore
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action47 and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.48
The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations, were cited by the
prosecution to substantiate its argument that the civil action based therein is an
independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the accused during the pendency
of the case.

On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249, in support of its argument that the civil action was
dependent upon the criminal action, thus, was extinguished upon the death of the
accused. The law provides that:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right
to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized. (Emphasis ours)
We agree with the prosecution.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished
the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this
case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law on human
relations.49 The pertinent articles follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
As held in Aberca v. Ver:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of the New Civil
Code] is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in

the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights
with impunity. x x x.50
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on
human relations. First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the
information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for damages specifically invoked
defendant Mayor Comendadors violation of plaintiffs right to due process. Thus:
xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual natural
defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which
belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith
and constitute an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of
law.
xxxx
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private
property of the Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials should have accorded
the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code.
The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already
shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This Court in a number of
decisions51 held that even if there is already a writ of execution, there must still be a
need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court before the
officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested
property.52 The pertinent provisions are the following:
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order,
hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property
subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after
due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable
time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary,
there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the
issuance of a special order of demolition.53
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been
litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case
was even filed by the municipality.

The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice

and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an
otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.54
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations
was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the
deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria
who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above
captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned
in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it
maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their
consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."
We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded to the Spouses Bombasi.
To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable.55 In this case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to
prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost items56
prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to
estimate the costs.
As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v. People of the
Philippines,57
x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that
the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only
evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private
respondent were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal,
Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel
Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works,
masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify
on his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as
actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such
award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that
the "sum of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her
damaged apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at
the amount of P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the appellate court merely
declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent
necessity to completely demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of

the damages sustained as a result of the accident. Consequently, appellants continue,

the award of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her
damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.
Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the amount claimed by the respondentclaimants witness as to the actual amount of damages "should be admitted with
extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be
supported by independent evidence." The Court further said that whatever claim the
respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his particular
self-interest.59 There must still be a need for the examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual
amount of damages.
The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit60 partakes of
the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued them was not
presented as a witness.61 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that
the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.62 Further, exhibits
do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages claimed, this Court
grants temperate damages for P200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by the Spouses
Bombasi. Temperate damages are awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New
Civil Code when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. The amount of
temperate or moderated damages is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the
same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that the temperate damages should be
more than nominal but less than compensatory.63 Without a doubt, the Spouses
Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the impairment of their store. Based
on the record of the case,64 the demolished store was housed on a two-story building
located at the markets commercial area and its concrete walls remained strong and not
affected by the fire. However, due to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the
exact amount of damage in accordance with the Rules of Evidence,65 this court finds
that P200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T.
Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the
finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as
the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending
trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta

Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for
temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00.
Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.