Paras vs.

COMELEC (What
determines construction?); PBCom
vs. CA (Adhesion of Contracts);
People vs. Amigo (Intent of the
Law);
VAHN VILLENAWEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2016

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent. 264 SCRA 49, 04 November 1996
Facts: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to
Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the
first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
Issue: Whether or not the SK election is a local election.
Held: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient
to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par.
(a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines
its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election
to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will
never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting
a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an

effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a

statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.
________________________________________________________________
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent. 264 SCRA 49, 04 November 1996
Facts: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to
Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the
first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. Issue: W/N the
SK election is a local election. Held: No. Every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered
together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent
of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the
letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the
phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly
circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election
rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court
assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An
interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and AMPARO CASAFRANCA,
respondents. G.R. No. 118552, 05 February 1996 Facts: PBComm filed
a petition questioning the lower courts failure to include in its

computation the penalty stipulated in two promissory notes of the loan

obtained by Carlos Po (now succeeded by Spouses Casafranca). The
two promissory notes in question, signed by Carlos Po,15 are similarly
worded and their pertinent provisions read: For value received, I/we
jointly and severally, promise to pay the Philippine Bank of
Communications, at its office in the City of Cebu, Philippines the sum of
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), Philippine
Currency, together with interest thereon at the rate of TWELVE % per
annum until paid, which interest rate the Bank may at any time without
notice, raise within the limits allowed by law, and I/we also agree to
pay, jointly and solidarily 12% per annum penalty charge, by way of
liquidated damages should this note be unpaid or is not renewed on
due date. x x x Should it become necessary to collect this note through
an attorney-at-law. I/we hereby expressly agree to pay, jointly and
severally, ten per cent (10%) of the total amount due on this note as
attorneys fees which in no case shall be less than P100.00 exclusive of
all costs and fees allowed by law stipulated in the contract of real
estate mortgage if any there be. However, the petitioner insists that it
can collect the penalty of the defaulted loan, because the penalties
were covered under the provisions stated in the mortgage contract
signed by Spouses Casafrana, in which this provision states, to wit:
This mortgage is given as security for the payment to the MORTGAGEE
on demand or at maturity, as the case may be, of all promissory notes,
letters of credit, trust receipts, bills of exchange, drafts, overdrafts and
all other obligations of every kind already incurred or which hereafter
may be incurred.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is authorized to collect the penalty
for defaulted loan.
Held: After interpreting the mortgage contract strictly against the
petitioner, considering the intention of the parties as evidenced by

their various pleadings and assertions, the inescapable conclusion is

that the mortgage contract did not authorize the petitioner to include
in the secured amount the penalty stipulated in the promissory notes.
The mortgage contract did not contain a trace of the said penalty and,
proceeding by the rule that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be
limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage, such penalty
cannot be recovered on the foreclosure of the mortgage. A mortgage
which is in the nature of a contract of adhesion is to be strictly
construed against the party which prepared it.- The mortgage contract
is also one of adhesion as it was prepared solely by the petitioner and
the only participation of the other party was the affixing of his
signature or adhesion thereto. Being a contract of adhesion, the
mortgage is to be strictly construed against the petitioner, the party
which prepared the agreement.
_______________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGO
alias BEBOT, accused-appellant.
Facts: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of
murder by the regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too
cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy.
Held: The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of
sympathy or pity for the accused. The court, in all of its cases, is
adeheres with the principle of "Dura lex sed lex".
________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO ATOP @
ALI, accused-appellant.

Facts: The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, holding that his
common-law relationship with the victims grandmother aggravated
the penalty. Sec. 11 of RA 7659, which amended Art. 335 of the RPC,
provides that the death penalty for rape may be imposed if the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim
Issue: Whether the common-law husband of the girls grandmother
included
Held: No. Courts must not bring cases within the provisions of the law
which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be
brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused