Calalas v.

CA
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to
give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco
Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a
complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of
carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against
Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved
Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for
quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable
to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of
contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict
between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on
the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary
diligence required in the contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in
Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of
the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she
was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the
issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case
the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
Consequently,
in
quasi-delict,
the
negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach
of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In
case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the
Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the
Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing

liability to a person where there is no relation between

him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway,
and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver
took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was
seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious
thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries
to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should
not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires
that the following requirements be present: (a) the
cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will;
(b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases
in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in
Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for
awarding moral damages since there was no factual
finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in
bad faith in the performance of the contract of
carriage.

JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
(G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit
above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified
bystander. Respondents personnel lost no time in
bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner
partially lost his left eyes vision and sustained a
permanent
scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of
damages before the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the
Court
of
Appeals
reversed
said
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not common carriers assume risks to
passengers such as the stoning in this case?
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public
to engage in the business of transporting passengers
and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent
to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers
and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain
duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself
liable
for
any
breach
thereof.
x

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence

from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence
against them, it does not, however, make the carrier
an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
x

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for

injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by
a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not
accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier.
The negligence for which a common carrier is held
responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
employees to prevent the tort from being committed
when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them. Further, under the same provision,
it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract
is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant
case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by
the common carrier for the protection of its passenger
is only that of a good father of a family.

Gatchalian v. Delim
Facts:
On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian
boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by
respondents. While the bus was running along the
highway, a snapping sound was heard, and after a
short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot,
turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were
confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by
respondents spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left,
she had the injured passengers sign an already
prepared affidavit waiving their claims against
respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed.
Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a
claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of
employment opportunities, mental suffering and
inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead.
Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the
waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the
validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but
also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was a valid waiver
(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and
moral damages
Held:
(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals
who held that no valid waiver of her cause of action
had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and
effective, must in the first place be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be
attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not
explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was
signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered.
Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the
effects of the vehicular accident when the purported
waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented
to her for signing; that while reading the same, she
experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the
document, she too signed without bothering to read
the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt
whether petitioner understood fully the import of the
Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private
respondent) she signed and whether she actually
intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of
a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers
in respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any
such purported waiver most strictly against the
common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any

right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under

circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would
be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and
hence to render that standard unenforceable. We
believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public
policy.
(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a
statutory presumption arises that the common carrier
was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves
that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must show to
the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence
to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary
diligence
imposed
upon
common
carriers
is
considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry
its passengers safely "as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person, with due regard to all the
circumstances".
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence
showing
that
respondent
had
exercised
the
extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious
continued failure of respondent to look after the
roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the
driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he
had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the
cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted
wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of
respondent and his driver.
(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer
employed in a public school. Her employment as a
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic,
contingent upon the availability of vacancies for
substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in
fact lost any employment after and by reason of the
accident. She may not be awarded damages on the
basis of speculation or conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for
removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or
her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable.
Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly
as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a
legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross

negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown.
Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which
petitioner must have suffered as a result of her
physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00
would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more
modest.