CASE

ILUSORIO V.
BILDNER
Article 68

FACTS
- Erlinda Kalaw is the wife of Potenciano Ilusorio (possessed
extensive property valued at millions of pesos Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country Club)
- they lived together for 30 years but they separated lived
separately since 1971
- Potenicano, after arriving in PH from US, stayed with Erlinda for 5
months
- E gave P the wrong dose of an antidepressant drug P was taking
causing the deterioration of his health
- E filed before the RTC a petition for guardianship over the person
and property of P as he is ill = impaired judgment
- P, after a meeting in Baguio City, did not return to the home of E and
instead lived at the Cleveland Condominium in Makati
- E filed a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of P since
the RESPS were allegedly refusing her demands to see her husband
+ they in turn prohibited P from returning to her home
- CA allowed E to have visitation rights over her husband + petition
for habeas corpus was dismissed

ARCABA VS.
TABANCURA

Article 87

MUNOZ, JR.
V. CARLOS

Francisco Comille and wife Zosima owned a lot/no children

On Zs death, her mother waived her share of the property in
favor of F
F had a helper who took care of him BUT people claimed
that the helper, Cirilia Arcaba, was in fact his lover/mistress
F executed a deed entitled Donation Inter Vivos before his
death where he ceded a portion of his lot to the
helper/mistress/petitioner for the services she rendered to F
RESPS (Fs nephews, nieces, and heirs by intestate
succession) filed a suit against PET for the declaration of
nullity of the deed of donation and invoked Article 87 of the
FC
RTC declared the donation void CA affirmed

RESP spouses mortgaged the paraphernal property of the

wife to the GSIS to secure a housing loan (they constructed

ISSUE
1. WON the CA erred in
dismissing the petition
for habeas corpus

RULING
1. SC: the CA did not err.
Habeas corpus- extends to illegal confinement or detention where the rightful custody of
a person is withheld from the person who actually has the right of custody available
when a person is unlawfully and unnecessarily denied his freedom devised for a
speedy and effectual remedy for the unlawful restraint

2. was the order

granting visitation rights
proper?
-

WON the donation was

void

there was no detention or deprivation of Ps liberty that would justify the issuance of
the writ of HC: he made it clear that he was not prevented from leaving the house or
from seeing people
The fact that he is under medication + is 86 years old does not mean he is
incapacitated in terms of making a sound decision + he was od sound and alert
mind: HE HAS THE CHOICE CONCERNING HIS RESIDENCE AND THE PEOPLE
HE SEES/LIVES WITH

2. IT WAS NOT PROPER- CA exceeded its authority in granting the rights especially
since E didnt even pray for the said visitation rights
- when the CA granted the rights, it emphasized that the same shall be enforced under
the penalty of contempt on case of violation or refusal to comply
- the case is not a case concerning the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a WIFE to visit a HUSBAND:
in case a husband refuses to see his wife, he is at liberty to do so without the
threat of penalty + no court is empowered to compel a husband to live with his wife as
this is a matter beyond judicial authority and should be left to the w & hs free choice
Article 87: donations between spouses during marriage are void except for moderate
gifts + shall apply to persons living as husband and wife without valid marriage
SC: the relationship between F and PET was considered as husband and wife albeit
without a valid marriage
- cohabitation is more than sexual intercourse: it is the public assumption by a man and
a woman of the marital relation + it is also the dwelling together as man and wife
EVIDENCE THAT SHES HIS WIFE:
application for business permit to operate a business was signed by PET with
Fs last name
sanitary permit ^ same thing
the death certificate of F was also signed by PET using his last name
she was not paid regularly and SC finds it hard to believe that she stayed with F
out of pure beneficence as a caregiver-employee
they lived together for a really long time

1.

Is the property
paraphernal
or

1. The property is paraphernal.

general rule: property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal property

Article 105

a residential house on the said lot)

PET granted the spouses a 600k loan to cancel the GSIS
mortgage (200k for the cancelation)
They agreed that the balance of the loan (400k) will be given
in exchange of the surrender of the title of the property + an
affidavit of a waiver of rights over the property to be
executed by the husband no affidavit was signed by the
husband
Munoz refused to give the 400k to the spouses and since the
spouses couldnt return the 200k, PET kept the title over the
property and eventually caused the issuance of a new one
with his own name
The spouses failed to repurchase the property within the 1
year period given to them despite a notice they were
ejected from the property
Spouses filed a case for annulment for the sale of the
property RTC ruled that since the lot was the paraphernal
property of the wife and not part of the conjugal property
thus the sale is valid even without the husbands consent
CA reversed the rule and said that the property became
conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a
housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds sale is
void

conjugal?
2.

Was
the
transaction a sale
or
equitable
mortgage?

AYALA
INVESTMEN
T VS. CA
Article 121

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3 million

loan from Ayala Investment and Development (AIDC)
Alfredo Chin (PBMs VP) executed security agreements
making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs
indebtedness to AIDC
PBM failed to pay the loan Ching spouses were issued and
served a notice of sale regarding their 3 conjugal properties
They filed a case of injunction alleging that judgment cant
be enforced against conjugal partnership since the loan in
question did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership

1.

2.

what
debts
&
obligations
contracted by the
husband alone are
considered for the
benefit
of
the
conjugal
partnership
thus
chargeable to it?
Is
a
surety
agreement or an
accommodation
contract entered
into
by
the
husband in favor
of his employer
w/in
the

UNLESS the contrary is proved (Article 92, par 1 & Article 109, par 2)
in this case, there is clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father
thus it is her exclusive paraphernal property
it was wrong of the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC since the FC and its
provisions on the CPG is retroactively applied to marriages with conjugal
property regimes: FC governs the marriage
^ Article 120: when the cost of the improvement of a property exceeds the value
of the property at the time of its improvement, the property shall belong to the
conjugual partnership. IF NOT, the original owner shall retain the property and
reimburse the cost of the improvement
the husband only paid 60k for the improvement thus the value of the property at
the time of the improvement is still higher than cost of the improvement
property is exclusive praphernal property & the written consent of the husband
is not necessary as it is not a conjugal property
2.

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE

the spouses retained possession of the property, PET retained a portion of the
purchase price, it was the spouses who paid the real property taxes of of the
property, it was the wife who secured the payment of the principal debt of the
property: PARTIES CLEARLY INTENDED AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE AND
NOT A CONTRACT OF SALE

PET IS OBLOGATED TO RECONVEY THE PROPERTY TO RESPS UPON PAYMENT

OF THE 200K + 12% INTEREST
1. Article 121 of the FC states that the payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership EXCEPT to the extent that they redounded to the
benefit of the family
the benefits must be one directly resulting from the lone and CANT BE A MERE
BYPRODUCT OR A SPINOFF OF THE LOAN ITSELF
2.

While the husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from PBM, they are not
considered to be the benefits referred to in the article. What is contemplated is
the benefit derived directly from the use of the loan
in the case at bar, the loan is a CORPORATE LOAN and USED BY PBM
ITSELF, not by the husband or his family
a surety agreement is certainly not to be considered as an act of administration
for the benefit of the family
AIDC failed to prove that the debt contracted by the husband was for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains: IT WAS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PBM AND NOT FOR THE SPOUSES CONGUGAL PARTNERSHIP THUS THE
CP OF THE SPOUSES IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS
OF THE HUSBAND

CHING VS.
CA

Article 121
-

FRANCSICO
VS.
GONZALES

Article 121
-

PANA VS.

PBM obtained a 9 million peso loan from Allied Banking

Corporation (ABC)
Alfredo Ching and 2 others executed a continuing guaranty
with ABC thus binding themselvess to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PMB debts
PBM defaulted in the payment of its loans which amounted
to more that 12 million pesos
Sheriff issued a preliminary writ of attachment then levied
(refers to when an item or items of property are seized to
satisfy a legal judgment) the 100,000 common shares of
CityCorp stocks registered to Alfredo Ching
Mrs. Ching moved to set aside that levy claiming that the
shares were acquired by the couple during the marriage
using conjugal funds thus cant be levied + the debt did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Cleodia Francisco and Ceamantha Francisco are the minor
children of Cleodualdo Francisco and Michele Francisco
there were married prior to the effectivity of the FC thus their
property relations were governed by the CC but yeah the FC
is still applicable in terms of its provisions for the CPG
In the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage their
Compromise Agreement was approved:
dissolution of
conjugal partnership gains house and lot (located in Taal
St., Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City) transferred to
the children by way of a deed of donation
Spouses Gonzales (Jeorge and Purification) filed a case for
unlawful detainer with preliminary attachment against Matrai
and Michele orederd to vacate the house leased to them
(located in Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
City) + to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bills, and
attorneys fees
A notice of sale by execution was issued by the sheriff
covering the REAL PROPERTY under the name od
Cleodualdo Francisco
PETS grandmother filed with the RTC an affidavit of third
party claim and a very urgent motion to stop sale by
execution denied

contemplation of
debts that redound
for the benefit of
the family?
WON the argument of
Mrs. Ching is tenable

It is not enough that the shares were registered in the name of the husband and thus not
part of the conjugal property and could be levied
- it was up to the ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of
the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone BUT THEY FAILED
For the conjugal partnership to be liable, there must be a showing that some benefits
redounded to the family since a presumption that the husband, by entering into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, ensured that the conjugal
partnership was also benefited is not enough

WON
the
conjugal
partnership should be
held liable

Although it could be said that Alfredo benefited in terms of the rehabilitation of the PBM
through the loan and that his career would be enhanced if PBM would survive BUT
these are not the benefits referred to in Article 121 of the FC as the benefits meant in
this article are the benefits that would the direct result of the loans and not merely the
byproduct or a spinoff of the loan itself.
There was failure to establish that the conjugal property should be held liable
due to the actions of the wife: (Art. 121, par 3)

since in this case, the liability of Michele came from a judgment rendered in
an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai thus It cant
be said that the debt or obligation was incurred to benefit the family
The Franciscos, in the dissolution of their CP, waived away their rights to
the property

RESPS allege that the lease of the property in Lanka Drive redounded to the
benefit of the family BUT since the debt was incurred by Michele and Matrai, it
is obvious that the family in this case did not benefit in anyway whatsoever from
the lease of the property

CONJUGAL PROPERTY IS NOT HELD LIABLE THUS IT IS INCORRECT TO HAVE

THE PROPERTY LEVIED AND SOLD AT EXECUTION SALE
- CA committed an error in affirming RTCs decision

WON the CA erred in

holding
that
the

To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability
is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to

HEIRS OF
JUANITE
Article 122

- The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (was acquitted), his

wife Melecia (found guilty and ordered to pay the heirs of the victims
for civil indemnity, moral damages, temperate damages, and
exemplary damages), and others of murder before the RTC of
Surigao City.
-

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the

RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, 5 resulting in the levy
of real properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a notice of
sale on execution8 were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia - the RTC denied
the motion
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA which they dismissed along with
Efrens motion for reconsideration hence the present
petition for review on certiorari

conjugal properties of
spouses Efren and
Melecia can be levied
and executed upon for
the
satisfaction
of
Melecias civil liability in
the murder case

identify the spouses property relations - Efren claims that his marriage with
Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they
were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not
execute any prenuptial agreement.
-

CA and RTC claimed that their marriage settlement changed when the FC took
effect this is wrong according to the SC and would impair vested rights with
regards to the properties: marriage settlements cant be modified during the
marriage (ONLY BEFORE!!)

What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was
still the operative law on marriages - Of course, the Family Code contains terms
governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the
conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code

the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not
the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil
liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case

Article 122: the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient
- Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property
of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case
imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered

CASES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE

CASE
BA FINANCE V.
CA

FACTS
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from PET
Signed a promissory note in behalf of A & L Industries
(registered under the name of his wife) a special power
of attorney was allegedly executed by his wife thus
authorizing A to procure the loan & sign the promissory
note
A had left L and their 2 months prior + abandoned their
conjugal home
A failed to pay the loan
PET filed a complain against the spouses on the basis of
the promissory note + prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment last one was granted by the RTC
PET attached the properties of A & L Industries
L filed a counterclaim: 1) A had already abandoned her
and their children 5 months prior to filing of the complaint
2) they were already separated when the promissory note
was executed 3) her signature in the special power of
attorney was forged 4) she did not benefit from the loan
5) because of the illegal attachment of her properties, she
had to close the business already taken over by a new
owner

ISSUE
WON the exclusive
property of the RESP
forms part of the
conjugal partnership
gains and thus can be
made answerable to
the obligation

RULING
While it is true that A & L Industries is a single proprietorship and the registered
owner thereof is private respondent Lily Yulo, the said proprietorship was established
during the marriage and its assets were also acquired during the same. Therefore, it
is presumed that this property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Augusto and Lily Yulo and thus, could be held liable for the obligations contracted by
Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
-

However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by
the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which
the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed
by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto
Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he
had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse,
he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L
Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L
Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the
express provision of the Civil Code.

SC: the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against
his conjugal properties with respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the writ of
attachment cannot issue against the said properties.
- Both the trial and appellate courts found that there was bad faith on the part of the
petitioner in securing the writ of attachment. We do not think so. "An attachment may
be said to be wrongful when, for instance, the plaintiff has no cause of action, or that
there is no true ground therefore, or that the plaintiff has a sufficient security other
than the property attached, which is tantamout to saying that the plaintiff is not
entitled to attachment because the requirements of entitling him to the writ are
wanting.

HEIRS OF
AYUSTE V. CA

Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste they had a

machine shop in Lucena which was managed by R
They bought a parcel of land in order to serve as a
temporary residence for R the Register of Deeds issued
a Transfer of certificate of Title in the name of R

WON the petitioners

are entitled to the
annulment
of
the
contract
of
sale
entered into by R w/o

PET: since the law expressly prohibits the husband from alienating real property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without his wifes consent, the contract of sale
in question is a nullity pursuant to article 1409 of the Civil Code + action is not barred
because the action to declare the nullity of a contract does not prescribe + Christina
Ayuste cannot be faulted for having brought the action only after the death of her

HEIRS OF
REYES V.
MIJARES

HARSHHHHH

R executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of PRIVATE

RESP who then sold the parcel of land R
acknowledged that he received the payment in the deed
In the deed there was the signature of C
R died and C discovered that the house & lot was sold by
R C filed a complaint with the RTC for the annulment of
the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name of
PRIVATE RESP and payment for damages: C claimed
that her signature was forged and that the property was
sold w/o her consent
RTC: declared the sale null and void
CA: reversed the RTCs decision Cs right to action is
barred by laches because of her failure to file it during the
existence of the marriage in accordance with article 173
of the Civil Code + PRIVATE RESP is entitled to the
protection of a buyer in good faith: wife (sic) instituted on
March 2, 1990 her action for annulment of the sale
executed by her husband on February 27, 1987 long after
said vendor-husband died in 1989. It is thus clear that the
action for annulment of the sale was not instituted during
the marriage as required by Article 173, the very provision
of law which grants the wife the privilege/right to have the
sale executed by her husband annulled, in derogation of
the suppose (sic) vested right of the buyer. The two
periods provided for in said Article 173 during the
marriage and within 10 years should concur.
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been
separated de facto since 1974
I learned that V sold a parcel of land to the Mijares + V
filed a petition for administration & appointment of
guardian with the MTC: he claimed that I was dead that
the court granted his petition
I demanded the return of her share in the lot -> failing
this, she filed a complain for annulment of sale against
RESP + V
MTC: declared the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void
with respect to of the said property
I filed a motion for modification, praying that the sale be
declared void in its entirety MTC granted the motion
CA: notwithstanding the fact that the sale was done w/o
Is consent, the sale is still valid in favor if the Mijares

the consent of c

husband, despite the periods stated in article 173 of the Civil Code, since she had no
knowledge of the sale during his lifetime as he concealed the same from her. +
Article 166 of CC is relevant here

SC: the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on
October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed
her complaint with the lower court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the
action was filed within ten years from the questioned transaction, it was not brought
during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael
Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred
for having been filed out of time. - The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the
sale after the death of her husband is not material.

- CAs decision was affirmed

WON the sale is void,

valid, voidable

Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, [29] the governing laws at the time the assailed
sale was contracted, provide:
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or
is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her
to grant the same
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated

by the husband.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or
encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the
wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases[30] the Court had
ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view,
however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void. [31] This is
consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during
the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its
annulment.
-there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been
purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their
marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses
without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the
March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly
within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we
reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the
respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias
action would still be within the prescribed period.
- MTC correctly annulled the voidable sale of the parcel of land
- the Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. A
purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for
the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief
that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey
title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. [38]
In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed
respondent spouses on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died
on March 22, 1982.The same death certificate, however, reveals that (1) it was
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982;
(2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar
on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982.
[39]
These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to
investigate further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on
cross examination that she asked for the death certificate of Ignacia because she

was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.

- the deed of absolute sale was annulled
PELAYO V.
PEREZ
Article
166:
Unless the wife
has
been
declared a non
compos mentis
or a spendthrift,
or is under civil
interdiction or is
confined in a
leprosarium,
the
husband
cannot alienate
or
encumber
any
real
property of the
conjugal
partnership
without
the
wifes consent .
..

David Pelayo executed a Deed of Sale on 2 lands located

in Panabo Davao to Melki Perez
Loreza , wfe of David, signed only the 3 rd page of the
deed thus Perezs registration of the deed was denied
Perez asked L to sign the other pages but she refused
he filed a complaint for specific performance against the
spouses
The spouses claimed that the complaint should be
dismissed since contracts are only valid when registered
w/in 3 months with the Register of Deeds which Perez
failed to do
RTC dismissed the complaint
Spouses claimed that they just made it appear in the
deed that the lots were sold to him in order to frighten the
illegal occupants + intentional omission of Ls signature
so deed couldnt be registered
D claimed that since the deed was without Ls consent,
then it is null and void in accordance to Article 166 of the
CC
Perez did not pay the taxes on the lots + no marital
consent + no actual consideration of the deed RTC
declared the deed null and void
CA: Ls signing of the execution of the deed meant that
she had knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to
have given her consent + David, being a lawyer, is
presumed to have acted with due care & to have signed
the deed with full knowledge of its contents and import
CA REVERSED RTCS DECISION

WON the deed of sale

is null and void
a. not registering it
w/in 3 months
with the Register
of Deeds
b. for the lack of
marital consent
c. for
being
prohibited under
Article 1491 (2) of
the CC
d. for
lack
of
consideration

SC: NAH BRO.

a.

b.

c.

CA ruled that the failure to register the deed of sale w/in 3 months after the
effectivity of the comprehensive agrarian reform law did not invalidate the
deed of sale this ruling is binding upon PETS
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her
signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is
deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed
only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the
execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully
aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale
they should have proven that she didnt know what the fuck she was
doing. Eh.
Under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code,
which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question
was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of
conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely
voidable. (IN THE CC, THE DSIPOSITION OF A CONJUGAL PROPERTY
IS VOIDABLE WHILE IN ARTICLE 124 OF THE FC, THE DISPOSITION
OF A CONJUGAL PROPERTY IS VOID WITHOUT OTHER SPOUSES
CONSENT) the contract is valid UNTIL the court annuls it BUT only
through an action brought by the wife whose consent was not
obtained. L did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale.
With regard to petitioners asseveration that the deed of sale is invalid under
Article 1491, paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code, we find such argument
unmeritorious: the prohibition against agents purchasing property in their
hands for sale or management is not absolute. It does not apply if the
principal consents to the sale of the property in the hands of the agent or
administrator.
d. Petitioners also argue that the CA erred in ruling that there was
consideration for the sale. We find no error in said appellate courts ruling.
The element of consideration for the sale is indeed present elements: they
allowed RESP to represent them in negotiations with the squatters, they
executed the deed of sale, they also acknowledge that the received 10k
from RESP, they acknowledged that they have entrusted the titles of the lots

to RESP

AGUETE V.
PNB

spouses Jose & Estrella Aguete obtained a loan from

Philippine National Bank (PNB) & as security for the loan,
Jose executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel
of land
the loan was not paid thus PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property
after the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of PNB
the property remained unredeemed for 1 year and thus
was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB
Estrella filed a complaint to annul the proceedings:
claimed that she had no knowledge of the loan obtained
by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property, her signatures affixed
on the documents were forged, the loan did not redound
to the benefit of the family
RTC ruled in favor of the PETS: Aguete did not sign the
loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public
to acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did
not receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not
aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August
1978 that she and her family should vacate the
mortgaged property because of the expiration of the
redemption period
- CC: Ros cant encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without his wifes consent E may
ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her
husband entered into without her consent (w/in 10 years
& during their marriage)
CA: RTC concluded forgery even though there was no
adequate proof (it should not have relied solely on Es
testimony) + E signed the documents knowingly and with
full consent
- assuming that E did not give her consent, the

1. WON the real

estate mortgage is
valid
2. WON the loan
redounded
to
the
benefit of the family
thus
making
the
conjugal partnership
liable

SC: DAMN STRAIGHT IT DID

1. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract
is
voidable.17 Article
173
of
the
Civil
Code
allows Aguete to
questionRos encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does
not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment
will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the
present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that
Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the subject property.
- The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be
disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer - petitioners omission to present
other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners
cause.
2. The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco.23 In her
testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be
unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros,
but did not know where he wasted the money.24 Debts contracted by the husband for
and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
- we rule that Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

DE LEON V.
DE LEON

- similar to
Article 118 of
the FC

HEIRS OF
HERNANDEZ
V. MINGOA

conjugal partnership is still liable as the loan redounded

to the benefit of the family (expansion of the family
business)
Bonifacio De Leon (single)and the Peoples Homisite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Condition
Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot
B married Anita
After the full payment for the lot, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of B but the Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued to B BUT IT SAID THAT HE WAS
SINGLE
B sold the lot to his sister and her husband BUT the Deed
of Sale did not have As written consent and signature
B died
After hearing that the sister and the husband had
registered the deed of sale, A and her children filed a
complaint alleged that fraud attended the Deed of Sale
no consent regarding the disposition of a conjugal
property
RTC: in finding that the lot was the conjugal property of B
& A, rendered judgment in favor of A and her children
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC
Both RTC and CA claimed that the Tarrosas failed to
prove that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal

WON the
subject
property (purchased
before the marriage
but was fully paid after
the
marriage)
is
conjugal and thus not
Bs exclusive property

Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of real 1.

property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the governments
housing program at the time.
Title over the said property was issued in 1966 in the
name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for the
2.
property was received by the PHHC.
The land covered by a Transfer certificate of Title was
issued and registered in the name of D but this was
cancelled and was instead issued in favor of Melanie

SC: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or the wife.
- ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita.
- in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the
buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes
upon delivery of the thing sold.
- The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on
July 20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on
Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in turn, will be effected
upon payment of the full purchase price
- title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the
purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than
two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property
was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the
property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership - the Deed of
Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas
covering the PHHC lot is void.

whether there was

a valid alienation
involving
the
subject property;
and
whether the action
impugning
the
validity of such
alienation
has

- the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is
void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in
the conjugal assets isinchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal
nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.
The rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the subject property were
validly transferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. Since the sale of the conjugal
property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is
voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her
right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period, she is now
barred from questioning the validity thereof. And more so, she is precluded from
assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel Mingoa
and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa. Therefore, title to the subject property cannot
anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches.

HEIRS OF
PROTACIO
GO, SR. V.
SERVACIO

Mingoa
Ds wife and children asked for the annulment and
declaration of nullity of the said certificate, the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney (SPA), and the Deed of Absolute Sale
+ the issuance of the certificate of title to the RESP by the
register of deeds
According to the RESPS: D failed to pay the installments
due on the property hence he was afraid that he would
forfeit his right to purchase the property, he sold his rights
to Dolores Camisura as their attorney with express power
to sign, execute, and acknowledge any contract of
disposition, alienation and conveyance of her right over
the parcel of land
this special power of attorney was executed for the
purpose of securing her right to transfer the property to a
third person considering that there was a prohibition to
dispose of the property by the original purchaser within
one (1) year from full payment. Else wise stated, the
irrevocable power of attorney was necessary in order to
enable the buyer, Dolores Camisura, to sell the lot to
another, Plaridel Mingoa, without the need of requiring
Hernandez, to sign a deed of conveyance.
Dolores Camisura sold her right over the said property to
Plaridel Mingoa
P took possession of the property but then sold it to his
eldest child Melanie Mingoa and the Tansfer Certificate of
Title with Ds name on it was cancelled and another one
was issued but this time with Ms name on it
RTC: decided in favor of PET
CA: reversed RTCs decision
2 parcels of land was sold to Protacio Jr he executed
an AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION AND WAIVER
(where he affirmed that it was his father who purchased
the 2 parcels of land)
Srs wife died, Sr and son Rito sold a portion of the
property to RESP
They eventually demanded the RESP to return the land
but RESP refused
PET: property is conjugal property and the sale is null and
void as the sale was done without prior liquidation of the
community property
RESP: (Rito sided with Servacio lol) the property was
Srs exclusive property as he bought it with his own

prescribed and/or
was
barred
by laches.

1. WON Article 130 is

applicable
2. WON the sale by
Sr, to RESP was void
for
being
made
without
prior
liquidation

SC: BRO, THE APPEAL LACKS MERIT.

1. conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of
the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership
of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family
Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void. - however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code.
- Upon wifes death the conjugal partnership was dissolved, and an implied ordinary
co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect
to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following

money
RTC: property is conjugal according to Art. 160 all
property acquired during the marriage is conjugal unless
there is proof that the property is an exclusive property of
one of the spouses RTC STILL AFFIRMED THE
VALIDITY OF THE SALE SINCE APPARETNLY IT WILL
NOT ENCROACH UPON THE LEGITIMATE OF OTHER
HEIRS

its liquidation (Article 493 of the CC).

- a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
-

the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling coowners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a
co-owner of Martas share.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws. This provision gives another reason not to
declare the sale as entirely void.
[I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would
pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is
valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more
conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it
turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs
to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half
should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the
husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all
these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it
follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is
not void ab initio.

CASES UNDER THE FAMILY CODE

CASES
GUIANG V. CA
- landmark case

FACTS
Gilda and Judie Corpuz were married before the effectivity of the FC
they purchased a lot - they sold 1/2 of its portion to Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang after a few years they built a house there
while Gilda (wife and plaintiff) was in Manila seeking employment, her
husband sold to the petitioners-spouses - the remaining portion of their
conjugal property (house and lot) Gilda objected to the sale in a letter
& Luzviminda knew about it (DAT BITCH)
Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale of the original portion
sold & not for the other half recently bought HAHAHA
G returned home and lived with her children in the sold house they
were charged with trespassing & made to leave the house
RTC: any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal
property w/o wifes consent is void under Article 124 of the FC

1.

2.

ISSUE
WON the contract
of sale was merely
voidable
WON the contract
of sale was ratified
by Gilda Corpuz
when she entered
into an amicable
settlement
with
Guiang

RULING
SC: nONONONONONO
1.

in comparing Article 124 of the FC with Article 166 and Article 173
of the CC, the same idea regarding that fact that the husband
cant alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent arises BUT this is subject to
recourse to the court by the wife availed w/in 5 years (unlike in
CC where it is 10 years)
- THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS VOID RESP was absent and
unable to give consent
- GILDA: barangay authorities made her sign the document
through coercion and misrepresentation irrelevant

SC: to constitute a valid contract, the CC requires that the elements

(cause, object, and consent) be present

2. Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a

previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).

MANALO V.
CAMAISA

PET (Thelma Manalo) came across an advertisement for the sale of a

10 door apartment in Makati and in Taytay, Rizal owned by the
Camaisas (Norma & Edilberto)
They negotiated for the price and eventually came to an agreement on
the price and terms of payment (handwritten by PET and signed by
Edilberto)
PET asked about Es wifes consent and E assured that she consented
to the sale

WON the husband may

validly dispose of a
conjugal
property
without the wifes written
consent

- In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of Rights

(Exh. A) and the amicable settlement (Exh. 3) are null and void.
- Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified
SC: no NO NO NO WAY
(there is no genuine controversy in this case thus it is correct to enter a
summary judgment)
there were negotiations for the sale -> they came to an agreement in terms
of price and terms of payment -> downpayment was paid by PET -> N

HOMEOWNERS
SAVINGS BANK
V. DAILO

Contracts to Sell were prepared and E signed them = PET gave him 2
checks = contracts were given to E so that his wife could sign them
The Camaisas backed out of the sale the next day because apparently
the need spot cash for the full amount of the consideration PET
reminded them that the contracts to sell have already been perfected
and Ns refusal would unduly prejudice PET N still refused to sign the
contracts
PET filed a complaint before the RTC for specific performance and
damages against RESP spouses dismissed by the RTC
The checks issued by PET was returned to her by E and RESP
claimed that her acceptance signifies her assent to the cancellation of
the sale
RTC: dismissed the complain since the court cant authorize the
transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since the said
wife has not been shown to be incapacitated Article 124
CA: affirmed the dismissal of the RTC the properties are conjugal
properties thus consent is necessary + N never signed the contracts
thus the sale was never perfected + the authority of the court to allow
sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of the
other spouse is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal property.
(1967) Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married
They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City
(1993) Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo (thereby authorizing her to obtain a loan
from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
house and lot)
the transactions took place without the consent of the RESP
upon maturity of the loan, PET instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of PET -> w/o the property being redeemed w/in 1 year,
PET executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed
of Absolute Sale
Husband died RESP visited the property and discovered that PET
had already hired someone to clean its premises
RESP filed for the nullity of the real estate mortgage, certificate of sale,
affidavit on consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance
with prayer fro preliminary injunction and damages against her
RTC: documents were rendered null and void
CA: affirmed the RTCs finding that the property was conjugal in nature
(other side gave no evidence to rebut this presumption this) thus the
mortgage was declared void because it was constituted w/o the

refused to sign the contracts to sell = written consent of the spouse must
be present for the disposition of the conjugal property to be valid (Art. 124
of the FC)
- even though N was aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties, this does not mean that she gives her consent
regarding the sale

1.
WON
THE
MORTGAGE
CONSTITUTED
BY
THE
LATE
MARCELINO
DAILO,
JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS COOWNER THEREOF IS
VALID AS TO HIS
UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2.
WON
THE
CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP
IS
LIABLE
FOR
THE
PAYMENT OF THE
LOAN OBTAINED BY
THE
LATE
MARCELINO
DAILO,

1. PET: Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code
requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal
properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the
right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership.
[12]
Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the
mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the
conjugal partnership.
SC: The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations
of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory
manner.
-

Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on

co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,[18] the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
Mortgage is not valid: The basic and established fact is that

consent of the wife

during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property
shall be void.

JR. THE SAME HAVING

REDOUNDED TO THE
BENEFIT
OF
THE
FAMILY.

2.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such.

Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
- a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial,
petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr

RAVINA V. VILLA
ABRILLE
- DAVAO CITY
CASE
WOOOOOOOO!

- Mary Ann and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife
- they acquired a parcel of land in Matina, Davao City (TCT No. T-88674) which
is adjacent to a parcel of land acquired by P before their marriage (TCT No. T26471)
- through their joint efforts and the load they got from the Development Bank of
the Ph, they built a house on the 2 lots
- P got a mistress & began to neglect the family P offered to sell the house
and the two lots to PETS (Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina)
- M objected and notified PETS of her objections but P went ahead and sold the
house and the 2 lots
- M did not sign the Deed of Sale
- P, along with armed members of the CFGU, began transferring all their
belonging from the house to the apartment
- M and daughter Ingrid, after coming home, were stopped from entering it:
They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. M and her children
filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale
- P: *during the trial* declared that the house was built with his own money
(SABA BE)
- RTC: ruled in favor of RESP Mary Ann (the sale of the lot owned by P was
void while the sale of the lot which was conjugal property was valid)
- CA: modified the RTCs decision (the sale of the lot owned by P is valid while

1.

2.

WON the subject

property covered by
TCT No. T-88674 is
an
exclusive
property of Pedro or
conjugal property,
WON its sale by
Pedro was valid
considering
the
absence of Mary
Anns consent

1. PET: the subject lot is Ps exclusive property (WALA MO NA BUANG?

PAG SURE) cine it was acquired by him through barter/exchange
SC (not persuaded): all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it is the exclusive property
of the husband or the wife Article 160 of the CC
-

TCT No. 2641 is the exclusive property of P since he acquired it

BEFORE the marriage BUT TCT No. T-88674 was acquired
during the marriage and is thus conjugal property no evidence
was given to show that the property was acquired through
exchange or barter SO IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR AND
SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE, the subject property then is
presumed to be conjugal in nature

2.a sale concluded after the effectivity of the FC is governed by

Article 124 of the same Code which dictates that a disposition is void if
done without the consent of a spouse OR the authorization of the court (in
cases where the spouse is unable to provide thus) + the wife is given 5
years to annul the alienation of the property:

the sale of the conjugal property was null and void void)

3.

FUENTES V.
ROCA

FC
is
applicable
even
though
the
marriage
occurred
before
its
effectivity
FC did not
provide
a
period of time
allowed for the
wife to file a
case for the
annulment of
the husbands
decision/act
A sale done
after
the
effectivity
of

-> Sabino Tarroza sold a parcel of land to her son Tarciano Roca -> Tarciano
sold the lot PETS Manuel and Leticia Fuentes
-> Atty. Plagata prepared the documents of sale which the parties then signed
(PETS at this time also asked T to secure the consent of his estranged wife)
-> according to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent
-> T executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses they
gave their payment for the lot
-> the Rocas filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses - the sale to the spouses was void since
Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged.
-> Handwriting experts lol
-> RTC: dismissed the case
-> CA: reversed RTCs decision: sale is voidable 10 years to file an
annulment of sale

1. WON Rosarios
signature
on
the
document of consent to
her husband Tarcianos
sale of their conjugal
land to the Fuentes
spouses was forged;
2. WON
the
Rocas
action
for
the
declaration of nullity of
that sale to the spouses
already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only
Rosario, the wife whose
consent was not had,
could bring the action to
annul that sale.

in the case, Mary Ann filed the action for annulment of sale w/in 5
years from the date of sale and execution of the deed HOWEVER
her action only pertains to the lot that is conjugal property
and excludes the lot that exclusively belongs to P (which P
can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent) CAS
DECISION WAS AFFIRMED

buyers were not in good faith petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a
right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain
her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now
invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith. they
should have inquired into the Ps capacity to sell in order to establish
himself as a buyer for value in good faith

4. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from
the family home deserves our condemnation. - any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages
caused.
1. SC: The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature
strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her
specimen signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke
and more fluid. The way the letters R and s were written is also remarkably
different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
- While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken
together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document
as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes
spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios
consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and
Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the
Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. - the Family Code provisions were
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights.
- In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may

the
FC
is
governed
by
the FC
READ
THE
SCRA
PHOTOCOPY

assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void.
- the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold
without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did
not erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the
transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an
action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent
during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently,
the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of
the January 11, 1989 sale. - It did not yet prescribe.
3. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent
was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare
void her husbands sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990,
the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale
declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the
beginning.Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and
Rosario despite that sale.When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.
- the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude
any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
* the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the
land and building improvements on it.
* The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had
violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing
that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no
evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of consent
presented some difficulty.
SC: DEED OF SALE IS DELCARED VOID