CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
POLITICAL LAW - POLITICAL
LAW (Or Political Activity Law) is an
established legal practice area encompassing the
intersection of politics and law. Political law
comprises election law, voting rights law, campaign
finance law, laws governing lobbying and
lobbyists, open government laws, legislative and
executive branch ethics codes, legislative
procedure, administrative procedure, constitutional
law, and legislative and regulatory drafting.

MACARIOLA VS.ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion
rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only
by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner
Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his
order
dated
October
23,
1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184,

which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot
1184 A E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on
July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of
Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the
lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing
Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and
Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with
"Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code,
Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3
par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
Background of the Study
Basis of the Study
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II. The Philippine Constitution

Classifications, Qualities and
Interpretations

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY - 194 SCRA 371
Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Governmentowned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive
Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and
other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold 2 positions in the government and government
corporations and to receive additional compensation.
They find it unconstitutional against the provision

provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the

President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold
any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation
or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as
affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive
Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article
IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law which is
construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on
Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice
President who is constitutionally allowed to become a
cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an
exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since
the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is
to prevent government officials from holding
multiple positions
in
the
government for
self
enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7,
Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the
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President, the Vice- President, Members of the

Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the
phrase unless otherwise provided by the Constitution
in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is
contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional
provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly
applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP
to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of
Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null
and void.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of

this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with
the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June
2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied
by
a
"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one3

third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of

Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question
has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the
first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.

Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this

Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2. From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section
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1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review

questions which are not truly political in nature.
Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy
National Patrimony Qualified Filipinos

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. FEBRUARY 3, 1997
Pursuant to the privatization program of the
government Corporation. Two bidders participated,
MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid
was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at
P44.00/share. RB was the highest, GSIS decided to
sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel bidder hence it was
logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to
be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches
RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined
under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987
Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn
MPH filed a TRO to avoid the
perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH
arguing among others that:

1.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution

needs an implementing law because it is merely a
statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2.
Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila
Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the
highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit
buyer of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant
to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the
Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self

executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony
in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
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should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and

other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8
decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness
to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of
the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos
which not only pertains to individuals but to
corporations
as
well
and
other
juridical
entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos
simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference
would be counter productive and inimical to the
common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between
a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the
latter shall be chosen over the former.

**Section
10.
The
Congress
shall,
upon
recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and
in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
FREEDOM CONSTITUION
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES
AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
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Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution

of this Court MAY 22, 1986
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.;
G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of
the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R.
No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C.
Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of
President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her
government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already
voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be
stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as
counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and
73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they
would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods.
The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with
merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not

merely a de facto government but is in fact and law

a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby
dismissed.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES
vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
FACTS: 1.On February 25, 1986, President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were
taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation
No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating
that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
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Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a

justiciable matter but belongs to the realmof politics
where only the people are the judge.The Court further
held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government
which is in effective control of the entirecountry;

Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held

under Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor

Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and

law a de jure government
The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government.

respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of

the same barangay and the other respondents as
members of the barangay Council of the same
barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that

DE LEON VS.ESGUERRA - G.R. No. 78059

Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides

153 SCRA 602 August 31, 1987

that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which

Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al.

Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his
capacity as OIC Governor in the province of Rizal, et
al.
FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain

shall continue until their successors shall have elected

and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that
respondent OIC Governor no longer had the authority
to replace them as well as designate successors.

together with other petitioners as Barangay

Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of
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Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared

null and void and that respondents be prohibited from
taking over their positions.

AMENDMENT AND REVISION,

distinguished
- STEPS IN AMENDATORY PROCESS
(Article 17 Sections 1-4)

ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to

replace petitioners was valid.

Imbong v Comelec (35 SCRA 28) September 11,

1970 RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional
Convention

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared

that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC
Governor designating respondents as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no
legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on

February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the
provisional constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also
immediately upon its ratification.

Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor
(Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional
Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each
representative district who shall be elected in
November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2:
Constitutional Convention shall be composed of
320delegates a proportioned among existing
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representative districts according to the population.

Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2
delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919,
implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as
resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running
for any public office in the election or from assuming
any appointive office/position until the final
adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized
groups from giving support/representing a delegate to
the convention.
FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment.
These are 2 separate but related petitions of running
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales:
Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law
Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:Whether the Congress has a right to call for
Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters
set by such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING:The Congress has the authority to call for a

Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the
petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art
12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full
authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes
were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of
Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for
such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by
Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives to provinces with less population and
vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the
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number of delegates I other provinces with more

population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters
to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore,
this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety
mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling
elections and to allow them to devote more time to the
Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral
process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on
their individual merits, and not the support of political
parties. This provision does not create discrimination
towards any particular party/group, it applies to all
organizations.

Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.
Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution, are
suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of
these petitions is the assertion that the 1973

Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana

ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: What is the power of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be
exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the
extent of the changes that may be introduced, the
number of votes necessary for the validity of a
proposal, and the standard required for a proper
submission?
Held: The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendmnts
is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same
powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof. One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance
with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos,
met as a constituent body its authority to do so is
clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the
amendments embodied in the resolutions now being
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assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far

as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the
authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to
propose amendments is not new. Considering that the
proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of
the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration
of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively
discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well
as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be
said that our people are unaware of the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue: Were the amendments proposed are so
extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim
National Assembly? Was there revision rather than
amendment?
Held: Whether the Constitutional Convention will only
propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely
overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign
to the democratic system, is of no moment; because
the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The

fact that the present Constitution may be revised and

replaced with a new one is no argument against the
validity of the law because amendment includes the
revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At
any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended
in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people.
Issue: What is the vote necessary to propose
amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission?
Held: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies
as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is
not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention
is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in
this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises
its constituent power to propose amendments.
Moreover, even on the assumption that the
requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed
that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of
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land for residential purposes was approved by the vote

of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and
the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to
the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of
148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged
infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not only from
the standpoint of the period that must elapse before
the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to
the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly
be maintained that they were properly informed as to
the proposed changes. As to the period, the
Constitution indicates the way the matter should be
resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable
provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision. The three resolutions were
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as
a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In
the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the
90-day period provided by the Constitution.
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS.COMELEC

GR NO. 127325, MARCH 19, 1997

FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peo
ples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials,
through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on
Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and of the
notice of hearing and thereafter set the case
for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator
Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the
ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court against COMELEC and the Delf in petition
rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1)
The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision,
13

therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative.

The Supreme Court granted the Motions for
Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether
or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether
the lifting of term limits of elective officials would
constitute a revision or an amendment of the
Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory
, thus, without implementinglegislation the same
cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated (po
testas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of
the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right to peoples
initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be
that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of
the Constitution such as the synchronization of

elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access

to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in
the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the
petition is a revision or amendment has become
academic.

PRIMA VS COMELEC (GR NO 129745)

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was
supported by around five (5) million signatures
in compliance with R.A.6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC,
among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition
in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation; (2) order all election
officers to verify the signatures collected in support of
the petition and submit these to the Commission; and
(3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following
proposition would be submitted to the people
for ratification: Do you approve amendments to the
1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to
be reelected for another term, similarly with the VicePresident, so that both the highest officials of the
14

land can serve for two consecutive terms of six

years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other
elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters
the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose,
Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI
and Section 8 of Article X, respectively? The
COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of
the permanent restraining order issued by the Court
in Santiago v. COMELEC.PIRMA filed with this Court a
Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to
set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its
petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Courts
decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the
COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said
ruling was not definitive based on the
deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration,
and because there was no identity of parties and
subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also
urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC. The Court dismissed the petition
for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated
September 23, 1997. It explained: The Court ruled,
first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent
COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.

127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its

Resolution of June10, 1997.The Court next considered
the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the
Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On
this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6)other members
of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero,
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there
wasno need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there
was no need for re-examination of said second issue
since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that
purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely,
Melo, Puno,
Francisco,Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined t
hat there was a need for such a re
examination x x x9In their Separate Opinions, Justice
(later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo
stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the
ground of res judicata.

SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(78 SCRA 333)
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
15

Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other

things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. 20
days after, the President issued another related
decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct
16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia,
Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976,
Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses
that the peoples continued opposition to the convening
of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.

effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose

amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031,
insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no
grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the ReferendumPlebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that
petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the
SC; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.

On Sep 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with

Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and

HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political

question but rather a justifiable one. This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to
initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

16

legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions

are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the
contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable
or non-political. What is confronting the SC is not
the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President
in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but
his constitutional authority to perform such act or
to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should
the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the
judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was
able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time.
III. The Philippine and the State

Government
Constituent and Ministrant Function

G.R. No. 104226 August 12, 1993

CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the Civil Service
Commission.
Domingo A. Santiago, Jr. for Philippine National Bank.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing Resolution No. 92-201
of the respondent Civil Service Commission, which
upheld the petitioner's separation from the Philippine
National Bank(PNB) as a result of the abolition of the
Fund Transfer Department pursuant to a
reorganization under Executive Order No. 80, dated 3
December 1986.
Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working
with the Philippine National Bank on 20 September
17

1972 as special assistant with the rank of Second

Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB
President. After several promotions, she was
appointed in 1983 Senior Vice President assigned to
the Fund Transfer Department.
Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner
filed several applications for leave of absence (due to
medical reasons) which were duly approved. While she
was on leave, Executive Order No. 80 (Revised
Charter of the PNB) was approved on 3 December
1986. Said executive order authorized the
restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB.
Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer
Department was abolished and its functions
transferred to the International Department.
Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation
from the service in a letter dated 30 January 1987,
thus:
Pursuant to the Transitory Provision of the 1986
Revised Charter of the Bank, please be informed that
Management has approved your separation from the
service effective February 16, 1986. You shall be
entitled to the regular benefits allowed under existing
law. (emphasis supplied)

Please be informed further that under Sec. 37 of the

Bank's 1986 Revised Charter, any officer or employee
who feels aggrieved by any matter treated above may
submit his case to the Civil Service Commission
In her motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service
Commission, dated 5 March 1990, questioning
Chairman Barlongay's ruling, petitioner claimed:
1. The opinion/ruling was not fully supported by the
evidence on record;
2. Errors of law prejudicial to the interest of the movant
have been committed. She argued that her separation
from the service was illegal and was done in bad faith
considering that her termination on February 16,
1986 was made effective prior to the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986, which
law authorized the reorganization of the PNB, and
even before February 25, 1986, when President
Corazon C. Aquino came into power. She further
claims that although the notice of termination was
dated January 30, 1987 it was only served upon her on
February 16, 1987 when the new Constitution which
guarantees security of tenure to public employees was
already in effect.

18

Overruling her imputation of bad faith, i.e. her

separation was illegal because it took effect on 16
February 1986 or even before the promulgation of EO
No. 80 on 3 December 1986, the CSC noted that the
year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from
the service was a typographical error. PNB submitted
documents (p. 6 of Resolution No. 92-201) supporting
its stand that the separation actually took effect on 16
February 1987.
In the present petition before the Court, the following
issues are raised:
1. Existence of bad faith in the reorganization of the
Philippine National Bank resulting in the separation
from the service of petitioner.
2. Erroneous application of the Dario
v. Mison doctrine vis-a-vis PNB's reorganization.
3. Erroneous application of the one (1) year
prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in
petitioner's case.
Restoring petitioner to her previous position with
backwages would be unjust enrichment to her,
considering that she had abandoned or showed lack of
interest in reclaiming the same position when the bank
was not yet fully rehabilitated and she only insisted on

reinstatement in August 1989 or two (2) years after her

alleged unjustified separation.
To those who feel that their unjustified separation from
the service is for a cause beyond their control, the
aforecited Magno case teaches: while We fully
recognize the special protection which the Constitution,
labor laws, and social legislation accord the
workingman, We cannot, however, alter or amend the
law on prescription to relieve him of the consequences
of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt (Laws come to the assistance of the
vigilant, not of the sleeping). His explanation that he
could not have filed the complaint earlier because "he
was prevented to do so beyond his control for the
simple reason that private respondent have (sic) tried
to circumvent the law by merely floating" him is very
flimsy and does not even evoke sympathetic
consideration, if at all it is proper and necessary. We
note that petitioner herein is not an unlettered man; he
seems to be educated and assertive of his rights and
appears to be familiar with judicial procedures. He filed
a motion for extension of time to file the petition and
the petition itself without the assistance of counsel. We
cannot believe that if indeed he had a valid grievance
against PNCC he would not have taken immediate
positive steps for its redress.
19

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed

CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The petition is
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the
questioned resolution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

FONTANILIA VS. MALIAMAN

(194 SCRA 486) February 27, 1991
Facts: The National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily
proprietary functions but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo
Garcia, who was not its special agent.
Issue: Whether NIA is performing governmental
functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its
special agent
Held: No, The functions of government have been
classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the
exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory;
the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional. The

functions of providing water supply and sewerage

service are regarded as mere optional functions of
government even though the service rendered caters
to the community as a whole and the goal is for the
general interest of society.
The NIA was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was
essentially a service agency of the government aimed
at promoting public interest and public welfare, such
fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
government-function corporation. NIA was created for
the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating,
and administering all national irrigation systems in the
Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation
projects. Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services the agency
renders, but these functions are only incidental to the
principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands.
The NIA is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government.
It is not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not
its special agent.
20

PVTA VS. CIR (65 SCRA 416)

July 25, 1975
Facts: Private respondents filed a petition wherein they
alleged their employment relationship, the overtime
services in excess of the regular eight hours a day
rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime
compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between
the amount actually paid to them and the amount
allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration would predicate its plea for the
reversal of the order complained of on the basic
proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: whether PVTA discharges governmental and not
proprietary functions
Held: No. A reference to the enactments creating
Petitioner Corporation suffices to demonstrate the
merit of petitioners plea that it performs governmental
and not proprietary functions. As originally established
by Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives

were set forth thus: (a) To promote the effective

merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and
foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry
will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To
establish and maintain balanced production and
consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured
products, and such marketing conditions as will insure
and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the
cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the
local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create,
establish, maintain, and operate processing,
warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable
centers and supervise the selling and buying of
Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy
reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their
investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations
governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of
Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and
economic conditions of the people engaged in the
tobacco industry. The amendatory statute, Republic
Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as
a governmental agency. Its first section on the
declaration of policy reads: It is declared to be the
national policy, with respect to the local Virginia
tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local
Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in
quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign
21

markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and

economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to
local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by
the consuming public, blending imported and native
Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes. The objectives are set forth
thus: To attain this national policy the following
objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2.
Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural
Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable
prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated
Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a
sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported
and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with
corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of
imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco,
purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration.
Functions relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of
justice and the determination of political duties of
citizens, and those relating to national defense and
foreign relations may not be strictly considered
constituent. Under the traditional constituent-ministrant

classification, such constituent functions are exercised

by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not
merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity
of the people these latter functions being ministrant,
the exercise of which is optional on the part of the
government. Nonetheless, the growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals, continue to lose their
well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere
else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.
DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE GUARDIAN OF
THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
22

CABANAS VS PILAPIL
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appelleevs.FRANCISCO
PILAPIL, defendant-appellant
(58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)
Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having
his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiaryand authorized his
brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his
daughters minority. Thelower court decided to give the
mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as
trusteeciting the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and
the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant
appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount
in question by
invokingthe terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful tr
ustee of the insurance policy.
Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as
a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an
insurance policy from the deceased.
Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil
Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the
defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that
the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And
Article 321 state sthat "The property which the child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the father or mother
under whom he is under parental authority and whose comp
any he lives.With the added condition that the child stays

with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack
of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the
strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by
another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its
adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of
the State acting as parens patriae, is calledupon whenever a
pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his bestinterest This prerogative of parens patriae
is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether
that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this
concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as
a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a
stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to
aconstitutional mandate would have led the lower court to de
cide as it did.The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the
above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null andvoid. In
order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian
Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the
guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court
to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

Parens Patriae
A doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority
of the stateto protect persons who are legally
unable to act on their own behalf.

23

DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

75 Phil 113
Facts: The respondent judge of the lower court refused
to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of
civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated
under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation of the Philippines. He argued that the
proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had
the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the courts of the said
governments. He also argued that the said
governments during the Japanese occupation were
noted facto governments.
Issue: Whether or not the governments established in
the Philippines under the names of Philippines
Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation or regime was
de facto governments.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the Philippine
Executive Commission which was organized border
No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces,
was a civil government established by the military
forces of occupation and therefore a de facto

government of the second kind. The source of its

authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a
government imposed by the laws of war. The same is
true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently
established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino
people, was, in truth and reality, a government
established by the Japanese forces of occupation.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
NADECO VS. TOBIAS (7 SCRA 692)

G.R. No. L-17467, National Development

Company and PNB v. Tobias
April 23, 1963 G.R. No. L-17467
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
represented by its Agents, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE
YULO TOBIAS, defendant-appellee.
Ramon de los Reyes for plaintiff-appellant.
Vicente Hilado for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
24

Appeal taken by plaintiff, National Development

issued and plaintiff's action accrued. Hence, the

Company, represented by its agent, The

aforementioned order of dismissal, which

Philippine National Bank, from an order of the

plaintiff assails as erroneous upon the theory

Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

that the statute of limitations does not run

dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon the ground

against the plaintiff because the same is an

of prescription of action, without special

instrumentality of the Government. In support

pronouncement as to costs.

of this view plaintiff cites the case of

In said complaint, filed on March 22, 1960,

plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant, Jose

the Government of the Philippine Islands vs.

Monte de Piedad (35 Phil. 738).

YULO TOBIAS, the sum of P6,905.81, plus

Plaintiffs pretense is clearly devoid of merit. The

interest and attorney's fees, under a promissory

case cited is not in point, it having been

note of said defendant, dated and issued on

instituted by the Government of the Philippine

May 13, 1946, for the sum of P7,000.00,

Islands. Plaintiff herein is neither the

payable "on demand after date" to the order of

Government of the Republic nor a branch or

said plaintiff. Upon being summoned, the

subdivision thereof. It is true that plaintiff is an

defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the

instrumentality of such Government, but as this

ground that "the action upon which the

Court has held in the case of Association

complaint is based has prescribed long ago,"

Cooperative de Credito Agricola de Miagao vs.

more than ten (10) years having elapsed since

Monteclaro (74 Phil. 281), "even the Agricultural

May 13, 1946, when said promissory note was

and Industrial Bank, which is a government

25

owned and controlled corporation and which has

That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign

been created to promote agriculture and

powers and, hence, can not invoke the

industry on a larger scale than agriculture credit

exemptions thereof but is an agency for the

cooperative associations, cannot be said to

performance of purely corporate, proprietary or

exercise a sovereign function. It is, like all other

business functions, is apparent from its Organic

corporation capitalized by the Government,

Act (Commonwealth Act 182, as amended by

a business corporation," and, as such, its causes

Commonwealth Act 311) pursuant to section 3

of action are subject to the statute of

of which it "shall be subject to the provisions of

limitations. To the same effect are the cases

the Corporation Law in so far as they are not

of Monteadora vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co.

inconsistent" with the provisions of said

(54 O.G. 4289), Price Stabilization Corp. vs.

Commonwealth Act "and shall have the general

CIR (54 O.G. 4472), GSIS vs. Castillo(52 O.G.

powers mentioned in said" Corporation Law,

4269), and Manila Hotel Employees Association

and, hence, "may engage in commercial,

vs. Manila Hotel Co. (73 Phil. 374).

industrial, mining, agricultural, and other

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the

foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.

enterprises which may be necessary or

contributory to the economic development of
the country, or important in the public interest,"
as well as "acquire, hold, mortgage, and
alienate personal and real property in the
Philippines or elsewhere . . .; make contracts of
26

any kind and description" and "perform any and

fact that "no costs shall be allowed against the

all acts which a corporation or natural person is

Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise

authorized to perform under the laws now

provided by Law," pursuant to Rule 131, Section

existing or which may be enacted hereafter."

1, of the Rules of Court.

In fact, plaintiff was sentenced to pay costs

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby

in Batongbacal v. National Development Co. (49

affirmed, with the costs of this instance against

O.G. 229), and National Development Co. vs.

plaintiff-appellant.

CIR, L-13209 (September 30, 1959), despite the

27